

RAMPART JOURNAL

OF INDIVIDUALIST THOUGHT

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Autarchy

by Robert LeFevre

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All history reveals the existence of the great human struggle for survival and supremacy. This struggle has two arenas: the arena of nature and the arena of political action.

In the arena of nature, man matches his wits, skills, and strength against his natural environment in an effort to wrest from the forces and materials of nature sufficient for his survival and comfort.

In the arena of political action, man arrays his wits, skills, and strength against others of his kind in an effort to obtain supremacy over them and by this means to control them to his advantage.

In both of these arenas, human energy has always been organized. One of the earliest characteristics of man to be discovered is the characteristic of social organization. Although some theorists have held that men in earliest times lived as isolated and unorganized units, no evidence has yet been unearthed to substantiate this theory. As artifacts are uncovered and as scholars continue to probe, a growing mountain of evidence reveals that individual human beings have coordinated their efforts in some kind of social structure for at least a million years of human and near-human existence. They united behind a skillful hunter or trapper. They united behind a shaman or witch doctor. They united behind a man of power or of property. Finally, they united behind political leadership. When men joined forces in hunting, trapping, fishing, trading, or manufacture, they did so because it was clearly to their advantage to do so. Economic necessity is ever present. Life on this planet does not favor the sloth-

ful and indolent. To live requires certain basic necessities and a host of comforts most men value far beyond their minimal caloric intake.

When they combined their energies in the hunt or in other economic ventures, they did so motivated by a central desire to stay alive and to stay alive with a full stomach, relative security, and a degree of pleasure and satisfaction. They were motivated by a search for gain or profit. Conversely, they were motivated to escape the grim necessities the nature of the world forces upon men. To prevent the loss of life and of items of value, great effort must be expended. From earliest times and continuing to this day, every human being seeks to add to his gains and to diminish or eliminate his losses. That he acts at all can be attributed to economic necessity and to the fact that man has a sense of uneasiness occasioned by that necessity. If there were no uneasiness, no economic necessity, the chances are excellent that man would not act at all. His ease would become apathy; his apathy, stagnation; his stagnation, death. It is economic necessity and the urge to survive that postpone death, minimize stagnation, and overcome apathy.

When men combine their energies into political organizations, a slightly modified motivation on the part of some can be discerned. Economic organization presumes individual self-seeking and personal interest. Political organization presumes a search for the "common good." Man, within a political structure, is not always seeking to benefit himself. He is seeking to benefit all. All political organization is nothing more nor less than enforced altruism at the common expense.

It is true, of course, that the professional politician has precisely the same personal motivation as the early hunter, forager, or marauder. He is personally involved with making gains and preventing losses for himself. But he conducts his affairs within a structure which disregards the common nature of man and creates, instead, a class culture in which some men have authority over other men, hence power over other men. This political structure is invariably based upon the ability of some to exploit others to their own advantage by force or the threat of force.

Economic structures so long as they remain strictly economic, lack the ability to coerce anyone. Nature is the general coercer, demanding effort if death is to be postponed. But in economic structures, all men cooperate in one gigantic, desperate effort to escape nature. Their cooperation is voluntary in the face of the common natural

enemy, economic necessity. No man is forced to cooperate with anyone. He cooperates because it is to his advantage to do so. If it is not to his advantage, as he sees it, he withholds his cooperation. With economic structures, cooperation is sought on a voluntary basis for mutually held interests. If it is not forthcoming in a given case, the project is abandoned or cooperation is sought elsewhere.

Within political structures a mystique is summoned. It is presumed that the total numbers of a given group form a "society." From this it is but a step to assume that there is a kind of social entity having what has been called general will, social responsibility, social consciousness, social conscience, social awareness, socialism. The presumed "good" of the social whole is contrasted against the actual "good" of each individual within the group. In order to provide for the general "good," private "good" and private interests are systematically ravaged. Human sacrifice makes its appearance. Any person who does not agree to the "general good" can be forced by the strong or more numerous to help provide for it anyway. Repeated negligence or repeated resistance summons ever larger employment of coercion. The person who will not submit to the theme of "general good" is victimized. He is victimized up to and including his ultimate demise, if this is deemed in harmony with the "general good." This is the single unvarying characteristic of all political organizations. They require victims. When theocracies flourished, either the shaman and the strong man combined their resources or a single man assumed both mantles. Human sacrifices for the "general good" became the murderous rule. Modern warfare is nothing more than mass sacrifice of opposing nationals for the "general good."

If Sherman was correct when he suggested that "war is hell," then all political action is merely purgatory. It is the arena of purge wherein those having power determine the names, the races, or the nationalities and faiths of the next victims.

The mystique of enforced altruism now engulfs the world. Virtually without numerically significant opposition, the masses of humanity, whether they view themselves as "common men," "aristocrats," "intellectuals," or mere observers, adhere to the "common good" mystical illusion.

But it is important here that a fine line of demarcation be made. There are certain things that men do in common. They share a natural desire to live, and to live in relative ease and security. All

men seek to own property. They are driven by a mutually experienced sense of frustration and uneasiness. Beyond these areas of common interest, it is a matter of common interest that each person must seek his own personal best interests. Further, in the process of seeking and in the process of keeping, it is a common interest to all that each remain unmolested. Molestation of some by others violates both personal interests and any real "common good" that can be discerned.

The question to be posed is a derivative of the situation men experience. How can a system of procedure be found which will make possible the maximum self-seeking and self-keeping of men individually, without impairing the same maximum self-seeking and self-keeping proclivities of all other men? Must men live in an armed camp, forever engaged in holding back some so that others may prosper? Is there such a scarcity of resources and goods that some must be masters and others slaves? Is our ability to procreate so large and our ability to produce so meager that, as Malthus opined, there will always be those who are pressing upon the food supply and only the fortunate and the strong will eat?

It is against this background that the idea and ideal of autarchy emerges. The fundamental premise of autarchy is rooted in stoicism. (See Zeno, Epicurus, Marcus Aurelius.) The Stoics understood that each man does control his own energy and his own person. Because of this observable fact of nature, and because of the added fact that man has a rational ability to foresee the results of his actions, it follows that each man is responsible for his choices and actions. The preaching of the Stoics can be summed up in this phrase: Control yourself.

To this end, the Stoics were among the first who philosophically supported the idea of individual liberty. Nor did they imagine that liberty was a mere lack of control so that any can could do exactly as he pleased. On the contrary, the requirement was rigid self-discipline. Freedom was not to be construed as license. Liberty could only endure when individuals voluntarily refrained from imposing their wills upon others.

In other areas, the stoic philosophy wanders inexcusably. It counsels a completely rigid submission to the gods; almost makes poverty a virtue; and extols the ability to suffer to the point where self-control becomes self-denial.

Having obtained the stoic virtue of self-control, autarchy passes to the Epicureans and owes them a debt of gratitude. For the Epicureans (see Epicurus) recognized that man is a profit-seeking creature and prefers pleasure to pain. Man will always seek to avoid pain (losses of anything he values) and will always seek to experience as much pleasure (profit, gain) as possible. Nor are pleasure, profit, gain, or even delight and ecstasy forbidden. To live is good. To live well is better. To live in abundance, security, and joy is the acme of living.

Both Stoics and Epicureans saw that a "social whole" is a pleasant fiction. The building material out of which any social unit is created is always the individual. You do not create social perfection by molding a rigid Platonic state in which political (coercive) organization dominates and eclipses the individual. Rather, if you can educate men to control themselves, the social whole will take care of itself.

But the doctrine of autarchy was still incomplete. Granted that each man could and must control himself. Granted that men will seek profit and avoid loss. But is this practical? Isn't it true that men will seek profits by imposing their wills on others? Isn't it true that men will seek to compel others to share in their losses while they reserve their profits for themselves? Isn't it true that some men are fundamentally incapable of self-control and hence, to preserve the "social good" or the common good of non-molestation, an agency of molestation must be created which will hold back the malefactor?

Praxeology offered the answer. Austrian economists, enlarging on the works of Menger and Böhm-Bawerk, were able to define the workings of a free economy in scientific terms. If men are free to pursue their individual economic aims, motivated by grim economic necessity, and if they are unmolested by any agency of coercion, the greatest good for the greatest number will emerge. (See Von Mises, *The Anti-Capitalistic Mentality* and other writings.)

The Stoics provide the moral framework; the Epicureans, the motivation; the praxeologists, the methodology. I propose to call this package of ideological systems *autarchy*, because *autarchy* means *self-rule*.

It is true that the word *autarchy* has fallen upon evil times. Usually when the word is employed, it has been given a social complexion. *Autarchy* (customarily in this usage spelled *autarky*) is

employed to designate the economically self-sustaining state. But this is improper and a corruption of the original meaning. *Auto* means *self*. *Archy* means *rule*. *Autarchy* is *self-rule*. It means that each person rules himself, and no other. The autarchist not only rules himself but operates within a voluntary context respecting economic necessity.

Autonomy is a similar word with similar origins. It, too, supposes *self-rule*. This word has customarily escaped the economic implication which is found in *autarky*. It has been employed primarily to denote those communities or nations which practice democracy. An autonomous country is one in which the majority (or a plurality) select the rulers who will impose their wills upon the total population. An *autonomist* can be construed as one who supports the idea that self-rule is nothing more than majority rule. This, too, is a distortion, with the social coloration impinging upon the original meaning.

The word *autocracy* likewise has been subjected to social implications. This word, also, means *self-rule*. But it has been corrupted to mean total rule by one man over others.

The enormous effect of reliance upon political structures and the collective mystique is seen in our vocabulary. Three words, all essentially meaning self-rule and self-control, have been corrupted to imply collective rule of one kind or another. I propose to reclaim *autarchy* to its original meaning. There are plenty of other words so that communication and expression will not be impaired by reserving this usage and spelling for what was originally intended. As I will use the word, *autarchy* will signify *total self-rule*. It will presume a system or social arrangement in which each person assumes full responsibility for himself, proceeds to control himself, exercises authority over himself, supports himself, takes initiative, joins with others or not as he pleases, and does not in any way seek to impose his will by force upon any other person whatever.

The matter of uniting with others must receive first consideration. It is often assumed by persons claiming to be individualists and who therefore feel that they are autarchic minded, that organization is both unnecessary and fundamentally immoral or improper. Frequently, we hear such persons claiming that the individualist is he who can support himself without any help from anyone else. The individualist is totally independent, it is claimed. Any organization invariably takes away something of a man's freedom. The

moment a person joins in any kind of group endeavor, where two or more persons are involved, then choices and actions are curtailed or harnessed, and individuality is impaired to the degree this occurs.

Conversely, those who submit gladly to the concept of the "general will" or the "common good" stand opposed to any trace of individualism. The person who seeks profits is narrow and selfish, it is charged. The great pleasures of life come from serving others. It is more blessed to give than to receive. There are a score or more similar platitudes ending with the conviction that "no man is an island" and that he must invariably harness his individualistic impulses or become a societal problem, a sort of anti-social anachronism, carried over from savage times.

Autarchy is more practical than either extreme view. It holds that men control their own energy individually and, hence, whether it is desirable or not, men *are* individuals. Individuality is one of the great facts of nature. No two persons are alike so far as their respective aptitudes, capacities, energies, or longevities are concerned. Perhaps the closest look man has yet obtained of the universe confirms the fact that individuality is the first rule.

But autarchy does not stop here. Looking at the matter of survival for man, it is at once discernible that no man is strong enough, wise enough, or will live long enough to produce all the products he will need and want for his own existence. The individualist who contends that a strong individual can live without help from others is wrong. The collectivist who denies individuality is wrong.

Autarchy seeks to deal with both realities. To do so, it supports the freedom of each individual to retain his individuality so long as he wishes without threat or force imposed upon him by others. Likewise, autarchy holds that uniting with others in a common objective is not a violation of freedom, but an illustration of it. The only reservation is that all parties to any union must decide individually that they wish to unite. Within the framework of autarchy no individual or group of individuals may properly force any other to do anything against his will.

Autarchy would support the free market because the free market requires no coercion whatever. At any point where either aristocrats or democrats seek to coerce any person or group for any reason whatever, the principles of autarchy vanish and political organization appears.

A person enters the market hoping to sell a product. Some buy the product, but others do not and will not. Autarchy forbids the seller to force a single buyer to his cash register. Likewise, it forbids the buyer to compel the seller to continue selling or to change the price. The seller is free to sell his produce at any price desirable to him. The buyer is free to try to purchase what he wishes at any cost he is willing to assume.

The product or service offered or sought does not alter the rule of procedure. The principle stands. If one person wishes to buy protection, he has only to seek to purchase it. If others agree with him as to the amount and kind of protection each is willing to buy, they have only to pool their energies or resources and thus procure it. If there are some who do not wish it, they have only to make this decision and they remain unmolested. They cannot be forced into any organization or cooperative endeavor for the "common good."

Let us suppose that one person wishes to associate with another. When the association is mutually sought, it occurs. If one person rejects an association that another desires, individuality is sustained. Autarchy preserves the right of the individual to say no. The collectivist point of view forbids a no. But individualism sometimes forbids yes. Autarchy favors total freedom of choice so that each individual, acting in his own best interest as he sees it, can say either yes or no. Therefore, with autarchy no voluntary union of any sort is banned. It can and will exist whenever two or more persons wish it to exist. But it will never come into existence unless at least two persons favor it.

This opens the door to any kind of corporate endeavor, provided only that no coercion is employed at any point. Because it opens the door to economic organization of any kind or size, maximum production and distribution can and will occur. To the degree that autarchy has been practiced in this country or elsewhere, enormous advances have been made and great human satisfactions have been experienced.

Each business, industry, or activity profits as it voluntarily attracts people to its wares or services. If it fails to attract enough people, it will not profit. But nothing will be done to compel support of a given business, or to prevent patronage. Competition, in such instance, would be as near maximum as all other natural factors permit.

The practical aspects of autarchy as well as its desirable features are generally understood by many millions of persons except at one point. This is the point relating to possible molestation. It is obvious that the system of self-rule advocated under the name *autarchy* is both feasible and desirable IF molestation does not occur. The problem of autarchy is to deal with molestation in a manner that is consistent with self-rule and that does not, for the sake of expediency, fall into the same trap that has waylaid virtually every culture of which we have knowledge. Whenever in the past the problem of possible molestation has appeared, it has been customary for men to create political and military organizations to deal with this problem. The difficulty here is this: Political and military organizations in themselves are agencies of molestation. Theoretically, they are to be limited to molestation of those who have molested others. Practically, they have never been so limited. The agency on which mankind has relied in all its various forms and guises has proven to be the major source of all trespass and molestation. The "cure" has created a deeper problem than the disease. To cure the common cold, we have contracted political pneumonia.

It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the various and sundry efforts that have been made through the centuries to create a political organization that would limit itself to preventing predation or to punishing the predator. Obviously, protection of life and property is desirable. Efforts to provide for this protection are meritorious, provided that these efforts are limited to protection and do not, in themselves, become predatory.

But there has grown up, largely since the formation of the United States and our "representative" system, the idea that governments can be and are limited by democratic processes. Further, it is believed that the creation of a constitution which binds the hands of lawmakers successfully restrains the state and makes it malleable and adaptable to the "general will." Yet even a casual glance at the American government will reveal that the central power accumulated here is virtually unlimited. It molests its citizens each year and extracts from them an ever-larger sum of their earnings. It embarks upon enormous economic and military expeditions. It employs millions of personnel, spends billions, intervenes in affairs of other nationals the world around, and truckles and is truculent by turns as it pleases current administrators. Yet the illusion persists

that the American government is one of limited powers. From whence comes this illusion?

The American government is largely made up of British antecedents, at least insofar as legal theory is concerned. It is noteworthy that the Whig faction in Britain, the politically liberal (the left), championed the idea of "representative" government. Earlier kings were presumed to hold divine sanction. In most countries this view was supported for a very long time. In Britain, traceable probably to Anglo-Saxon times, the idea of representative government had emerged as an extrapolation from the "folk moot" or tribal assemblies. As early as 1265 the British had established what is remembered as the Simon de Montfort Parliament. Representation was assured although kings were still viewed as "divinely ordained."

Following Elizabeth and in the reign of James I, opposition to the unchallenged authority of the monarch gained ground. Men like Sir Edward Coke worked ardently to enhance the prestige of parliament and to curtail the unbridled power of a single ruler. This representative opposition solidified into what was called the "Whig" party in 1679 during the time of James, duke of York. This same political group became the organized political "left" and the source of American resistance to the British crown from as early as 1714 after the accession of George I. The Whigs, or the representatives who opposed divine and unchecked monarchial sway, took the position that no subject of the crown should be taxed without the approval of his representative. While this militant Whig opposition originally was identified with the property-owning or burgher class, it later broadened its base and after 1824 in America was one of the two recognized political parties.

Americans became pre-eminent in the world in supporting the idea that democratically formed representative bodies provided a "limited" government. But this was not the case. From the standpoint of the king, accustomed to total power, parliament definitely tied his hands. And kings opposed this move, but lost the battle. A government with power residing both in an executive and a legislature, was definitely a government of DIVIDED power. In America we provided for a third division, and introduced the judicial branch as a separate and distinct repository of coercive force. To the men in government, this division of power always ties down and limits their respective functions. The executive can be checked by the

legislature, the legislature by the executive, and either of these by the Supreme Court. This is, in theory, a "limited" government.

But to the men outside of government, a division of power is not a limitation. It makes little difference to the taxpayer whether he is regimented by an executive decree, steam-rolled by a legislative enactment, or sent to jail by a judicial writ. All the political power that exists is in the political organization. That power is not limited; it is merely channeled into one or another branch. And while it can be contended that this introduction of competition between competing branches serves to check each branch, the rules of competition are such that it will almost invariably stimulate growth. Each branch grows, and all branches combine to consolidate one vast unlimited power that is wholly unchecked. When men compete with each other to provide better mouse traps, the growth of the best firms can be predicted. Such competition stimulates self-discipline, creates superior products, and tends toward price reductions. But when men compete within political organizations, such competition relates to the amassment of power and becomes, in fact, rivalry in taxing and coercive ability. Whichever agency of power gains, the people themselves lose.

But we have been conditioned for so many centuries to suppose that political and military organizations are necessary to deal with molestation that any suggestion to the contrary is apt to fall on deaf ears. By relying on various political organizations to prevent trespass, or, if not to prevent, at least to punish the careless marauder, we have actually created the very condition most feared. Men united in legalized armed bands roam the earth for purposes of imposing molestation upon any who oppose them. In order to pay for the costs of these armed bands, harmless and innocent taxpayers the world around are trespassed constantly, the degree of trespass varying in precise ratio as they are able to bear the burden. The human situation, so far as the true human picture is concerned, is one of chaos and wild disorder. But the nature of this disorder having been legalized, nearly everyone mistakes legal confusion with orderly and peaceful procedures.

It is the height of non-reason to suppose that molestation will be enlarged and enhanced by two systems which are opposite to each other, i.e., autarchy and the political state. If molestation can be put down by political and legal organization, then reliance upon political and legal organization is justified. In that case, a growth

of political and legal organization will reduce or eliminate molestation.

For better than six thousand years we have relied upon political and legal organization to put down molestation. The facts are plainly in evidence. Political and legal structures enlarge constantly and as they enlarge, the area of molestation increases. We fancy that we are made secure by law and by police power. But the more the laws multiply and the larger the police power becomes, the less security, the more uncertainty, the larger the invitation to trespass. The crutch upon which we have been taught to lean for our security turns out to be the very device by which we are undone.

We cannot have it both ways, and the evidence is plain. It is scarcely news that governments can and do inflict tyranny. It is hardly a revelation when we discover that big governments lead to big wars, and combinations of governmental structures in one or another form of empire commit more predation and cause more damage among helpless and innocent humans than all the private trespassers combined have ever committed or done. Indeed, it would be safe to say that the trespasses, legal murders, extortions, tortures, and acts of theft and vandalism committed by all private persons in six thousand years could hardly total the like acts of criminality performed during any single generation within the same period by legal and aggressive governments.

But so caught up are we in the mystique of government that somehow we avoid looking at the evidence. We adore the agency that molests us. So fearful are we of the possibility of occasional trespass that we approve trespass organized on a grand scale, performed legally by men who say they "represent" us and who loot us and kill us for the "good" of the social whole.

If molestation on a grand scale is demonstrably the result of reliance upon predatory political organizations, it follows that if such reliance were to be removed, all other factors remaining constant, the worst to be anticipated would be molestation on a small scale. This is not to say that autarchy supports petit molestation. But it is to suggest that if we must choose between grand theft and petit theft, the latter is preferable.

At this point, so pervasive is reliance upon political forms, the greatest fiction of all emerges. It is presumed, by those who support the status quo, that in order to put down legal molestation, all that is necessary is that agencies of molestation be put in the hands of

"good" men. Then, only "bad" men will be molested and most of us, being "good," can live in peace and security.

We have so abused our minds with great doses of fiction that we are ready for almost any fiction provided that it comes to us with the seal of government attached. By this process we have been led to believe that the world is divided between the "good" men (us) and the "bad" men (others). If people live within the geographic confines lorded over by our own political satrapies, they are presumed to be "good" in the main. The "bad" men live elsewhere. *Our* intentions are peaceful and productive; *their* intentions are rapacious and warlike. Only Americans are pure. Therefore, we must have an agency of predation to keep the rest of the world at bay.

Examine the system we have established for our security. First, an agency is created capable of general spoliation. This is followed at once, not by any protective procedure but by a general act of trespass wherein all men, the innocent and guilty alike, are looted systematically for the wherewithal by means of which this agency can be sustained. This general act of molestation is justified on the grounds that by legal molestation, illegal molestation will cease. But nothing ceases. Molestation occurs.

The victim, already victimized by the political organization, is now injured in one way or another by a private and unorganized trespasser.

It is at this point that our mighty political organization springs into action; not to prevent the damage, for it has already occurred, but to take vengeance against the private perpetrator of damage. In some cases, but by no means in every case, the malefactor is identified, arrested, arraigned, held, examined, tried, convicted, and punished.

To pay for the enormous costs involved, the agency of public protection now trespasses all of the taxpayers again.

It has been said that crime does not pay. Surely, it does not pay the criminal. But the system we have established does pay for a host of persons and the maintenance and enlargement of enormous and impressive establishments whereby the petit criminal can be dealt with summarily at the hands of a grand professional class of criminal chasers. The cost of crime now relates largely to the professional anti-criminals. The actual damage performed by the criminal himself is minute in comparison.

This is the system, and it is invoked both locally and nationally. Indeed, it is invoked internationally. In the name of protecting some, everyone is molested. Can a worse system be devised?

If we did not have these politically organized deterrents to petit crime, would not the situation worsen immeasurably? I do not know. I only know that for some six thousand years and more, we have tried organized political force as a means of creating and maintaining security. That force has operated under the management of men who were as kindly and as cruel in turn as those against whom the force was arrayed. Through the years, greater and greater reliance has been placed upon this agency of force. I note that during this period, aggression, violence, murder, and coercion of every description have continued, and in periods when governments expand, coercion expands.

If, as it appears, there is an interaction between criminal actions and political restraint, both enlarging or subsiding side by side, then it follows that if we no longer place our reliance upon political organization but seek for our security in other directions, the incidence of crime OUGHT to diminish. Will it? No one can be certain. But in the interests of truth, in the interests of survival we ought to make certain. We know where reliance upon political organization has always taken us in the past and is in process of taking us now. If we do not KNOW that reliance upon autarchy and self-rule will bring amelioration, at least in theory it does. What little evidence exists where political structures as such have NOT been relied upon provides a great reservoir of hope. (Read existing evidence concerning the ancient Etruscans and Hebrews. The early Islamic peoples did not rely upon political organizations. Neither did the early American colonies, except in very meager doses.)

With several major powers in the world now equipped with devices by means of which the awesome power of the atom can be released for purposes of destruction, I question whether or not reliance upon such potentially dangerous and costly instruments as political organizations can longer be afforded without at least examining alternative procedures.

There is no reason to debate the question as to whether or not mankind made an error when political structures were first devised. The innovation apparently occurred sometime in early barbarism and may be satisfactory for barbaric or savage peoples. But civilization brings its refinements, both in manners and in murders. And

a civilized people which clings to instruments of barbarism is doomed to abandon whatever constructive role the future may hold. Civilization may lie before us. But it cannot be based upon barbarous practices. Nor can it be based upon one last holocaust by means of which barbaric tools are employed to win the world from barbarism.

Certainly, most will confess that the system we have is far from ideal, and many will concede that the present direction being taken by virtually all the world as it girds up its zones for war offers a terrifying spectacle. But it will be said that autarchy is too visionary, too ideal, depending entirely upon a virtual alteration of human nature before it could work. Further, it will be repeated that if one human being chose to disregard the principles of non-molestation, the entire concept would come to grief.

But this is the great practical appeal that autarchy has. Because it combines the stoic virtues with the practical aspects found in economic science, not only is no alteration of human nature required, reliance may be placed upon man and the nature he has always exhibited. Autarchy is predicated upon the assumption that men will not always recognize truth; that they will often be narrow in their views; that they will be stubborn, intractable, yet self-seeking to a total degree. The system of autarchy is based upon the human characteristic of profit seeking. It includes the idea that pleasure is more desirable than pain, that each person will always seek to minimize his costs, not only in money and energy, but also in psychic costs. It includes the idea that each of us will always seek to gain more than we have now, or, failing this, each will try to minimize or totally prevent losses. We need not remake the human race in this regard. This is the way men have been; it is the way they are; it is predictable that they will remain this way in the future.

It is essential to point out that autarchy does not require acceptance by every human being. Were this true, prospects for improving the human situation would indeed be bleak. But the story of mankind, if it tells us anything, reveals that human beings are not alike; that they do not march forward out of a grim and savage past shoulder to shoulder. Rather, the evidence shows that men stagger forward behind a few innovators who blaze new trails. In the same world where, at the moment, aborigines use the boomerang and have flies crawling over the naked eyeball, there are great

and enlightened minds fighting disease, learning more and more about physical reality, trying desperately, not always with success, to make human life better, more enriching, more desirable. How can both these conditions exist now on the same planet? They do. They always have. Concurrence in a given belief or practice has never occurred in the past so far as I can learn. It is entirely unlikely that it will occur in the future. Autarchy does not depend upon any such concord. Rather, autarchy means one thing only. It means that the reality of government is placed in the hands of each human being, not to impose upon others but to impose upon himself. It means that we can reverse our present direction and move toward a more desirable future when those who are the true intellectuals stop trying to impose their wills upon others and, instead, impose strict self-rule upon themselves.

History teaches us that men who will not control themselves will invariably serve to justify others who will impose controls upon them. And when our intellectuals champion ideas relating to controlling others, it is inevitable that moves will be made wherein such controls will appear.

Open rebellion against entrenched political authority serves to justify a strengthening of that authority. Force begets force; violence, violence. Government of a political character by strong men creates the pressure to impose another government of a political character by still stronger men.

Governments must not be abolished! They must be abandoned. They will be abandoned when YOU demonstrate that you can manage your affairs without the supervision of a *pater familias*. In short, when YOU abandon your political adolescence and come of age, you will stop seeking to impose your will upon others, and at the same time demonstrate that your will is strong enough to control your own actions within a framework of non-molestation.

Do this in your own case with your own life in your own affairs and no political agent or agency can justify its existence on grounds that you require its help.

Of course autarchy is an ideal. Is there any reason to devote one's self to something that is less than ideal? But is it so ideal as to be impractical? Not at all. Autarchy is being born right now under the noses of political authorities. Already, here and there, far-seeing men, sensing the practical aspects of self-rule as contrasted either to no-rule (anarchy) or political rule of any sort, are making per-

sonal, high-spirited resolutions. They are resolving to adjust their affairs in such manner that they no longer require an overseer. They are resolving to do no harm to any man. They are resolving to solve all their problems without political assistance.

No political agent or agency can possibly object to such a procedure. Yet, just such a procedure will reduce political structures to a shadow of their present breadth and scope. Autarchy produces a social solution by the process of individual self-control. It is an individualistic revolution, bloodless and without violence, which simply shifts reliance from group consciousness to individual conscience. Group solutions need not be sought. When the intellectual elite begin, as Zeno suggested, to try to encourage men who will control themselves regardless of provocation or problem, the groups will take care of themselves.

Will men be perfect then? Certainly not. But men will seek their own personal gain within the most practical framework open to them. It will be enormously profitable for rich and poor alike to abandon reliance upon political organizations. Economic science shows that the greatest good for the greatest number will be served in a free market. All that has to be added is the recognition that protection is neither more nor less than a free-market service. Nor is it retributive. It will protect prior to the commission of a crime.

But what if it does not? Would any free-market protective device or practice positively guarantee non-molestation? Of course not. Nor does our present system. The free market can never guarantee any panacea. Do you have a motor car that is guaranteed against possible mechanical failure? No. But do you seek, because an automobile might break down or get a flat tire, to abandon automobiles? Is there a razor blade that will not dull? Is there a battery that will not run down? Is there a medicine that will eliminate all sickness? Is there a house that will never need repair?

Because imperfect man makes imperfect devices does not cause us to abandon the devices. Rather, it encourages us to try again and to seek ever to improve what we have. And with autarchy we need not be confined to systems that continually demonstrate their impracticability. If a particular device proves to be faulty, improve it. If a particular custom does not bring the results sought, invent or devise a new practice.

Autarchy is but human liberty elevated to the status of principle. But autarchy does not suggest a lack of social organization, a lack

of cooperative effort. On the contrary, autarchy presumes that men outside of political organizations have at least as much self-interest and mental acumen as men inside such organizations. Autarchy sees nothing mystical nor magical about political structures. Rather, it strips away all pretense and shows them for what they are: monsters of human contrivance capable of predation against all.

The autarchist will control himself in his own best interests. He will cooperate with others, individually or in groups, when he wishes to do so for his own gains. If he does not believe that cooperation in a given case will benefit him, he will refrain from such cooperation. He will not be coerced, and he will refrain from coercing others, even for their own good.

He will replace the apparent necessity for general coercion by clear evidence that he requires no coercion. He will no longer concern himself with what others ought to do because he will be too busy doing what he ought to do.

The autarchist is an intellectual activist. He is a builder, not a destroyer.

The Return of the “War Crimes”-- “War Criminals” Issue

by James J. Martin

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“The Second World War was prosecuted by the United Nations against Germany long after an equivocal patched-up armistice was possible. Impatience for the end of the war was not allowed to prevent the Allies from continuing until they had won a real and lasting victory.” Trygve Lie (first secretary general of the United Nations, 1946-1953), “A World of Patience,” *New Republic*, October 28, 1946, pp. 539-540.

“The Nürnberg court is a political court with a political job to perform.” Editorial, *Nation*, October 27, 1945, p. 418.

“Where there is a free press and academic freedom to teach history honestly, politically tainted trials tend to enshrine not the State’s evidence, however interesting, but rather the prisoner, however unpopular at first.” Editorial, “The Nürnberg Confusion,” *Fortune*, December, 1946, p. 120.

In recent months, particularly between the summer of 1965 and the spring of 1966, America’s press, radio, and television have been deluged with loud and angry complaints over the “war criminal” designation of captured United States military personnel by North Vietnamese, and the threat of their “trial” and execution. A few murders of this kind have actually been carried out. All such pro-

ceedings have been denounced as "farces" and "war crimes" in turn, and in truth they do not approach legal proceedings by the wildest stretch of the imagination. But an entire generation of Americans has reached voting and fighting age with only the muddiest notion of what the whole affair is all about. Anyone even faintly acquainted with the process of Anglo-Saxon legal action indignantly repudiates such summary preliminaries to murder, but he gets little or no help from his own sources of information as to what a "war criminal" correctly is, and how such persons are to be recognized in the first place. The only obvious criterion seems to be that it is always someone among the enemy; one's own martial colleagues never commit a "war crime."

Before examining the problem within the limits imposed by the rules and verbiage of Mars, it is appropriate to observe that it was an unfortunate moment when the warriors and their civilian "statesmen" superiors began to indulge themselves in language inviting moral comparisons. For a long time there was no attempt to exploit any particular phase of the lengthy catalog of death and destruction, and the means whereby they were brought about, in warfare. While combatants could prosecute the mutual struggle with any and all devices and implements at their disposal, and press advantages with the same detachment exhibited by a housewife pouring a teakettle of boiling water on an ant-hill, there at least was the consolation of not encouraging the analysis of social, moral, and ethical critics. (It should be pointed out, however, that during the time of the feudal wars, churchmen sought to establish the immunity of even combatants who sought the refuge of a church, as well as sanctioning fighting only on certain days of the week, an idea which seems to have been revived, at least in principle, in the current war in Viet Nam, what with occasional cease-fires and postponements to facilitate the celebration of various holidays.) However, the fatal flaw in the effort to capitalize by way of propaganda maneuver was the invocation of the terminology of law, and the fabrication of the synthetic "war crime." Once this gate opened, warfare lost forever the possibility of being exempt from examination in the same way individual behavior has been scrutinized since the so-called "dawn of conscience."

For, of all the criminal institutions and procedures invented by the human race over the millennia since the Neolithic Age, by far

the one of first magnitude is war. As the Crime of Crimes, it has enjoyed a degree of relative immunity from moral and ethical condemnation unshared by any of its relatives.¹ Over the years it has served as the cloak for the perpetration of acts under the auspices of the collective herd which have been condemned and made serious crimes by nearly all peoples when committed by individuals. The anonymous herdist quality of war has served as a disguise for the violation of the last six of the Ten Commandments on a scale so towering as might cause even the mechanism of the most advanced computer to waver trying to compile them. Though killing, robbing, and raping are ferociously denounced and punished within the specific community, it has long been considered quite proper to engage in all these activities as long as they are inflicted on the persons of strangers, preferably a long distance from home and unknown to the perpetrators.

The only thing more repulsive than these crimes is the mountain of print and the billions of spoken words employed to justify them over the centuries, a nauseating literary and oral tradition most frequently engaged in by the very same people who wring their hands over crime in their own vicinity and profess to be prostrated by its existence. And thanks to the evolution of the mass national State and communications technology, these grand adventures in crime are generally masked by all involved, in turn, as expeditions in the advancement of moral and ethical purity of blinding whiteness and ineffable scope. The lust and greed for the land and possessions of the other, the anticipation of the power resulting from such acquisitions, and the slaking of hatred by means of the murder of the antagonists themselves? If such subjects ever are brought out into the open, they are exclusively ascribed only to the opposition. And over all is cast the cloak of anonymity through mob action, probably the most comforting concomitant of all. The escape from the indictment of individual responsibility is of first-rank importance, otherwise the residues of the received moral and religious values and taboos would limit the prosecution of these country-wide criminal essays by exercising restraining inhibitions on the behavior of the individual participants. Once these barriers have been breached,

¹The literature attacking war as a criminal enterprise is neither sparse nor of just recent vintage. But it has grown substantially in the last century; one might compile a stunning bibliography beginning with the noted Argentine writer Juan Bautista Alberdi's *El Crimen de la Guerra* (*The Crime of War*), published in Buenos Aires in 1870.

indeed, it becomes a situation where "the sky is the limit."

It is impossible to make a full analysis of the pressures and forces which make war attractive and exciting even to the vast number of those who gain little if anything from its conduct, and who most often are the ones who lose their lives during its transpiration. One will find excuses ranging from the desire to escape the prosaic and "boring" realities of "peace," to possession by a powerful urge to satisfy irrational appetites. With the wondrous growth of mass communication there is a new element in the form of induced synthetic hatred manufactured by specialists and distributed among the populace in generous quantities. In addition, ferocity toward those in distant lands may serve as a substitute for that which might be incubated toward those near at hand.

Though the invention of conscription has brought on to the battlefield a multitude who have no heart for martial enterprise at all (professional soldiers have concluded on a number of occasions that one out of every two conscripts on the line of fire refuses to aim or is incapable of aiming his weapon at an enemy's person), the criminal content of war has steadily risen in the era of the forced-military-service democratic national State. And the devices of national patriotism in all lands encourage the veneration by the citizenry of those who have been unstinting in sacrificing the lives of their ancestors in warfare.² It has been remarked that the masses everywhere most dearly love those who have been the most proficient in getting them killed.³ This is made all the more dramatic in view of the invention of totalitarian strategic warfare and its prosecution far behind the battle lines against the women, children, the old, sick, and non-combatants of all descriptions.

It is puzzling, therefore, that as warmakers in this century have effectively obliterated the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, have made war become more herdlike and impersonal

²One is reminded of the grim observation of William L. White: "Very few of those who maintain that it is sweet to die for one's country have ever done it." White, "The Dying and the Buying," *Saturday Evening Post* (October 18, 1941), p. 9. White, the son of the famous Kansas editor William Allen White, and then a roving editor for the *Reader's Digest*, later became famous as a writer of wartime best sellers, *They Were Expendable*, *Journey for Margaret*, *Queens Die Proudly*, and *These Are the Russians*.

³"So runs the love of nations

As old men specify

The fitful love of nations,

For which the young men die."—"EBW," "Love Among the Foreign Offices," *New Yorker* (February 1, 1947), p. 24.

than ever before, and have fought it on an ever-rising curve of ferocity and destructiveness, they should make a sickening invocation of the principle of personal responsibility in seeking to fasten upon their defeated counterparts the full blame for the hostilities and some of the things that went on during them, once the gunfire has terminated in "victory." (The immense destructiveness of and loss of life in modern industrial war also suggest a frightening expansion of the irrational component now present in such conflicts. The economic historian Fred Shannon concluded that since it cost the United States more to fight World War Two than the total value at the beginning of hostilities of all the real and personal property of its defeated enemies combined, it would have been cheaper to buy out these lands rather than fight with them. This indicates the degree to which the economic aspect involved in war has been altered. Instead of the goal of the occupation and use of his productive land and the immediate enjoyment of the enemy's personal property [now mainly confined to the looting or "liberation" of personal items as souvenirs by the soldiers], the long-range aim appears to be control over productive properties, working forces, markets, and other capital, as well as giving the economy of the victor's State, more and more collectivized and centrally-controlled as a result of the pressures of war, an excuse for subsequent dynamism in providing for war damage repair and additional enlargement of "defense," which also extends and enhances power tenure.)

In returning to the theme of "war criminals," the term which has been used for over a quarter of a century to designate specific persons as more criminal than others in the welter of murder, theft, rape, and destruction which encompasses everyone in war,⁴ we are faced with a complex subject. "War crimes" seem to consist of two classes of offenses. The first is obviously political, and relates to the

⁴The subject of atrocities in the Second World War is almost entirely a one-sided story to this day. A brief, preliminary commentary on American atrocities by Edgar L. Jones early in 1946 ("One War Is Enough," *Atlantic Monthly* [February, 1946], pp. 48-53) drew an angry, outraged reaction from the readers. This prompted Jones to comment, "I cannot blame the home front for being shocked, because censorship regulations during the war banned any mention of our own acts of bestiality, but anyone who knows war will assure the ivory-towered unbelievers that there is little room for Christian integrity in battle. The issue is not what Americans or any other troops did, but what the war did to them." Jones, rejoinder in "Atlantic Repartee," *Atlantic Monthly* (April, 1946), p. 31. Two other contemporary items of some interest are Jan Valtin, *Children of Yesterday* (New York: Reader's Press, 1946) and Austin J. App, *History's Most Terrifying Peace* (San Antonio, Texas, 1946).

alleged responsibility of certain persons for "starting" a given war, usually designated as "aggression." There is an absolute absence of agreement on the meaning of "aggression" when used in the verbiage of statecraft, and no efforts to define it to the satisfaction of any significant part of the world have ever come even close to success. But this has not inhibited its subjective application by an almost numberless multitude of politicians and propagandists to acts of others with whom they have a conflict of interest. Effectiveness in making the charge stick, however, depends on unlimited success in battle; only when one has his hands on the defeated can he possibly go through the motions of instituting court proceedings to "try" these predesignated "war criminals." It has never been known throughout history for a victorious war power to admit to any responsibility for the precipitation of hostilities. Therefore, the outcome of any "trial" for "war crimes" of this type is predictable on the part of almost anyone above the level of an imbecile; it is a more sophisticated and hypocritical way of annihilating the losers for the crime of having lost.

The class of "war crimes" which has drawn the attention of the people in the last nine months is of the second rank: presumably insufferable acts perpetrated by actual combat forces after the war has gotten under way. It takes a particular kind of mind to be able to distinguish, within this immense Crime, that there is a range of variable criminality among these offenses. Thus, for instance, shooting or stabbing to death a woman or child in the immediate combat zone may be designated as a "war crime" by one side but not the other, while the burning to death of a woman or child with a jellied gasoline bomb 1,000 miles from the combat zone may similarly be viewed by each of the contesting forces, in turn, as a "war crime" or a successful sortie of strategic warfare. Therefore, "war crimes" proceedings for this class of offense, unless there has been a knockout victory, rapidly descend to the level of crude mutual reprisals upon each side's helpless personnel, a particularly savage type of crime itself.

Again, only if one side is completely at the mercy of the other can a genuine "war criminal" proceedings be carried out, and with the usual foreseeable denouement. But the result will hardly be of a moral order superior to that following any tribal clash of Stone Age people, after which the living vanquished are all massacred. These people deserve the nod, actually, in that they make no recourse to

the hypocritical balderdash of pretending to be putting their powerless enemy through a legal process prior to putting them to death. The effort to add dignity to these preposterous proceedings by presuming that there are "rules of civilized warfare" which contestants are bound to be governed by, violation of which being the grounds for indictment as a "war criminal," is mainly an essay in unintentional black humor. As if there were any more reprehensibility involved in killing a soldier with poison gas, flame throwers, or exploding bullets than there is in killing his wife and children by imposing a food blockade on his homeland or incinerating them by incendiary bombs dropped on their home, a thousand miles from the scene of combat. (Is there really any distinction between being done in with a pocket-knife and being converted into ashes by an atom bomb? By what kind of obtuseness must one be possessed to engage in long, tedious, hair-splitting discourses on the alleged vast, galactic differences between such fates?)

Even more engrossing than the incredible arguments over the degrees of criminality involved in the methods employed for killing people of various official and unofficial states and dress are the tortured, uneasy discourses of theologians on the abyss which separates the act of murdering a neighbor, relative, or intimate as compared to the slaughter of a total stranger in a distant land against whom one has no personal grievance whatever.

No introductory discussion of the subject of "war crimes" would be satisfactory without attention to that one known as "genocide," the neologism of the jurist Raphael Lemkin in 1943, now entered in our dictionaries (*American College Dictionary*: "Extermination of a national or racial group as a planned move"). This introduces a peculiar distinction in the area of mass murder, in addition to imposing the difficulty of proving such action as a product of conscious planning, namely, the apparent sanction of such exterminations as long as they are unplanned. As such, "genocide" has been with us for a long time, and again, we have no record of a victorious force or State undergoing prosecution for this "war crime." On the other hand, devious juristic legerdemain could be employed at the conclusion of all wars by the winners to lay this charge upon the defeated, and a specious though attractive case could easily be presented for approval by the populace representing the land of the victors. After all, if the leaders of a war believe that winning is impossible without planning to kill all the enemy, then they are obvi-

ously promoting "genocide." There is every likelihood that there will be as ugly a backfire some day on the issue of "genocide" as there has already been and will continue to be on the matter of other "war crimes" and "war criminals."

In essence, however, "war crimes" trials are political spectacles, and are basically continuations of the war after formal hostilities have ceased. Though draped with the toggeries of legality, the most repulsive aspect of them all, they are intended to perform in not much different manner from the guns which did the speaking until shortly before these "trials" began. The sating of vengeance against the persons of prominent antagonists who survived the war is an obvious objective. Cowing the survivors of these "trials," that they will be amenable to the most crushing impositions of the victors shortly, is another; these tribunals represent, if nothing else at all, *total power*, subject to no review or appeal whatever. The supreme mockery perhaps is the immunity of the prosecutors and judges from the "law" they are enforcing upon the preconvicted "war criminals." (In a stage trial of this sort, the court is seeking to find out not if the accused are guilty or not, but *how* guilty, for the purposes of being able shortly thereafter to make political capital out of the event, emphasizing in tones of fake horror how unspeakable the condemned are, which in turn is presumed to release the conquerors from all restraint and permit any savagery to be visited upon the persons of the condemned as proper punishment.⁵

There is still another objective of such "trials," in the classic sense, which the English observer F.J.P. Veale has referred to as "political biology." In this case, action proceeds almost devoid of emotion, and takes place with the same aplomb and objectivity which prevails when one is culling over vegetables for a stew. The situation is simply this: the new political dispensation that is to rise on the rubble of the just-concluded war is one which must make use of some of the defeated, preferably the thoroughly terrified, the venal, and those who change "principles" and ideologies in the

⁵The writer John Dos Passos, in an article written for *Life* early in 1946 on his impressions of defeated and occupied Germany, quoted a U.S. Army lieutenant "of Jewish faith" who understood explicitly the operational consequences of the mandate of total power: "I've been interrogating German officers for the War Crimes Commission and when I find them half-starved to death right in our own PW [prisoner of war] cages and being treated like you wouldn't treat a dog, I ask myself some questions. All these directives about don't coddle the Germans have thrown open the gate for every criminal tendency we've got in us." Dos Passos, "Report on the Occupation," *Life* (March 11, 1946), p. 118.

same manner and with the same regularity that they change shirts. There will be an irreducible remnant of the late adversary, however, which cannot, for a variety of reasons, be considered as proper recruits for the New Order. They may have been too vigorous in their resistance, they may be stubbornly unwilling to change their views, they may refuse to work under the new "leadership." For these and possibly several other reasons, such persons are utterly out of consideration. And, being resourceful, intelligent, and possibly implacable, allowing them to remain in the "body politic" is akin to permitting dangerous disease carriers to remain at large in the community. Therefore, they must be excised, not necessarily because their executioners hold high personal animus toward them, but simply because *they* cannot by any stretch of their imagination be envisioned as subordinate partners in the next regime. And at the same time, the disposing of such individuals is an act of political decapitation, depriving the remnant of the vanquished of any possible leadership cadre of top rank and previous prestige.

It is obvious that simple summary execution upon capture is the easiest method of handling this problem. But there is believed to be an additional political advantage to be gained by keeping them alive, stripping them of their official dress, forcing them to don shabby clothes and subsist on poor food, incarcerating them under conditions forced upon only the most brutal and degraded law violators, and then shaming them before the world in a big propaganda extravaganza, preferably billed as creatures almost of a sub-human order, before finding "legal" grounds justifying their ceremonial murder. Nothing better pin-pointing such "trials" as political floor shows is the nature of the indictment. Those on trial are rarely if ever charged with *individually doing* anything, the very essence of legal process. Invariably, the issue involved is their responsibility in a generalized way growing out of their previous high positions. Of course, there are subsequent "trials" for those of lesser rank, down virtually to those employed as servants, maids, and kitchen help. There may be a greater degree of insistence in the case of the less highly-placed on their personal guilt, and in no case are such accused allowed to enter a plea of having followed orders from higher authority. Two sets of standards prevail during these "trials," and it is rarely illustrated better than when such matters are on the agenda. Though the victors sitting in judgment punish defiance of orders from superiors swiftly and drastically, the con-

viction they seek to impress upon those they are trying as "war criminals" is that they should have listened to the Higher Law instead of that of *their* superiors, presumably their personal conscience, and refused to carry out the order which supposedly resulted in the "crime" for which they are being tried. Neglecting for a moment the prodigious hypocrisy of the judges, this is a dangerous doctrine for all concerned, judges and judged alike. Sustained insistence upon the principle of individual responsibility and the subordination of authority to the Higher Law of individual conscience, as a universal constant, might easily undermine and make unworkable all statecraft built upon conscripted and otherwise impressed and dragooned military force. There would be the strong threat that such elements might disregard the hyperbole and the hyperthyroid gasconade of the propaganda departments and "vote with their feet" (as Lenin described the behavior of Russian armies in 1917) against further participation, and such mass desertion would be absolutely impossible to cope with. Even the ferocious Clemenceau, who had one out of every ten Frenchmen shot at random in units of their army infected with mutiny, disaffection, and desertion in the First World War, would have been in a grave predicament in a putative situation comparable to that described above. One may conclude, however, that insistence on individual moral culpability will invariably be confined for export to one's enemies, as well as for keeping in reserve for invocation at possible "war crimes" trials.

Absolutely essential to a really effective "war crimes" trial is a psychical atmosphere brought to as near incandescence as possible by a hate campaign. This is quite out of the question if the contest among warriors is not fairly long-drawn-out, even though remarkable achievements of this kind are possible even in short encounters. The hate propaganda against the Germans in the U.S.A. in the short year and a half of participation in World War I reached a breathtaking peak, and its main themes have never disappeared. They were enlisted all over again for World War II, and combined with many new ingredients to make a product which shows little sign of abatement, even now, over twenty years since that war ended and since the Germans were enrolled in the American camp. The aura of hate built up by every means available as a prelude to the "war crimes" trials of Nuremberg, Manila, and Tokyo of 1945-46 is in a class all by itself in modern times, and made possible a public

temper of permissiveness and a remarkable lack of disagreement in which everything previously cited above went through with effortless efficiency. In the midst of the sweet twittering of public communications media on the subject at that time, one was able to detect few if any harsh bellows of disapproval, and the effect of such as were heard was quickly and effectively choked by neglect. In the course of this synthetic legal circus of vengeance and political biology were launched all the bothersome ideas which refused to be buried with the executed "war criminals" who were disposed of at its conclusion.⁶ They are returned again and again and again, to use the words of Franklin D. Roosevelt, are being tossed around today, and are likely to be present at every other war that will ever be fought.

A hasty murder of various numbers of the defeated enemy in 1945-47 for the commission of acts which in reality are universal to all parties to a war would have been in harmony with what has been going on for several thousand years, and probably would have been quickly forgotten thereafter. There were quite a few voices raised in favor of this procedure in those days.⁷ The ineradicable

⁶The "war crimes" trials were conducted on their part by the American prosecutors with the smug self-righteousness which has become the hallmark of American conduct of foreign affairs as hypocrisy has long been that of the British. Undoubtedly, the spirit of this adventure is more fully reflected in the companion to the trials, the abortive "denazification" policy of 1945-1948, about the most spectacular failure in the field of synthetic social revolution ever undertaken by one regime in the land of another. "Nothing but the spirit of hatred and revenge can explain our exaggerated, self-defeating zeal," declared Max Rheinstein, the Max Pam professor of corporate law at the University of Chicago, early in 1947. Prof. Rheinstein took part in this operation as part of American Military Government from the fall of 1945 to the spring of 1947. Rheinstein, "The Ghost of the Morgenthau Plan," *Christian Century* (April 2, 1947), pp. 428-430.

⁷There were scores of suggestions for mass executions of Germans, in particular, upon the successful conclusion of hostilities, between 1940 and 1945. The ardent Stalinophile Alexander Werth, in his book *Moscow War Diary* (1942), cited S. A. Lozovsky, Soviet vice-commissar for foreign affairs, as favoring killing 300,000 opponents upon capture, and there were several other prominent Soviet proposals of this sort, down to Stalin's recommendation that the top 50,000 officers of the German army be so dispatched. But the proposals were not confined to Soviet functionaries. All manner of persons of far milder cast and persuasion had ferocious solutions. Even the relatively detached Friedrich A. Hayek in 1945 called for mass killings. "Neither legal scruples nor a false humanitarianism should prevent the meting out of full justice to the guilty individuals of Germany," Hayek called out. "There are thousands, probably tens of thousands, who fully deserve death. All the Allies need to do is to decide how many they are prepared to put to death." Hayek, "A Plan for the Future of Germany," *Saturday Review of Literature* (June 23, 1945), pp. 39-40.

mistake was the adorning of this ceremonial blood-letting with the trappings of law, attempting to convince the world that a new era of high moral and ethical standards would henceforth prevail as a consequence of the benignant consequences which would surely flow from it, and become the cornerstone of new "law." One needs to know but a precious little bit of what has happened in the last twenty years to realize how staggeringly wrong such yearnings and predictions turned out to be. Were they alive in our time, Gilbert and Sullivan might easily have composed a shattering theatrical spoof of the whole sorry episode, but perhaps would have desisted from the effort because of the macabre nature of it all. The nearest thing one can find comparable to what they might have done is suggested by Charles Duff's sardonic commentary on Nuremberg in his trenchant *A Handbook on Hanging*.

Even if the pleas of the protagonists of the "war crimes" trials, that they wished to make new law applicable to subsequent wars, were to be taken seriously, there is no escaping that their making these laws retroactive to cover the war just fought was naked *ex post facto*, and all the sly word games and juridical nit-picking and the superbly skilled evasiveness of the international law barristers from that time to this have not succeeded in dismissing or obscuring this fact.

(One need not comment on the spectacle of this *ad hoc* "court" purporting to be a lawmaking body at the same time it was engaged in trying persons for having violated the very "laws" it was still fabricating. For all the vaunted belief in the "democracies" in the "separation of powers" dictum, the growing accommodation to judge-made law is a reality, but there surely must be a remarkable stretching of the imagination in order to get this offensive combination of tribal vengeance, Soviet legal and juridical practice, and retroactive decree in under the tent of international "law." Rather than succeeding in "charting bold new directions" and making new "law," and getting the succeeding circumstances and adaptation to this "law" described as "custom," the "war crimes" court mainly succeeded in constructing a terrifying blind alley, and the difficulty of backing out of it should become more evident as time goes by.)

Under the inept direction of Justice Robert H. Jackson, the Nuremberg process inscribed as criminal acts certain deeds which were not criminal acts at the time they took place, and the pious effort to gather them under the tent of such declarations of inten-

tion as the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 in order to validate them and make them binding was about the most unconvincing caper of the whole affair. (This pact, which found various leaders of political regimes in the world offering to desist from making recourse to war as an instrument of national policy, except if attacked, has been rightly described as an agreement not to raise umbrellas unless it rained.) The painful attempt of Justice Jackson to make a case against the arraigned German military and political personalities was about as distressing an exhibition as the entire gathering witnessed, and even his ardent supporters in the journalistic contingent in attendance had to admit that he was eminently unimpressive, in addition to being incredibly outclassed and deflated by one of the defendants, Hermann Goering.⁸ The trials in the Pacific were a veritable burlesque compared to their relatively dignified German counterparts.⁹

⁸Janet Flanner, who covered the trial for the *New Yorker* under the pseudonym "Genêt," cabled home on March 22, 1946, "... in that extremely important Göring-Jackson duel, it was, unhappily, Prosecutor Jackson who lost. . . . There had been no 'battle of ideas,' because Jackson seemed not to be able to think of any." "Letter from Nuremberg," *New Yorker* (March 30, 1946), p. 76. *Fortune* (December, 1946, p. 121) commented that Goering "handled Mr. Jackson during cross-examination like a fiend playing with a well-intentioned lad." No organ of the U.S. press was more chagrined at Goering's suicide than *Time*, which lamented that his act of evading hanging at Nuremberg managed "virtually to destroy the positive psychological effect of the Nuremberg trial," and successfully "wiped away ten months of painstaking work." *Time* (October 28, 1946), p. 35. But *Time* had acknowledged months before Goering's suicide that the work of the trial had been unsuccessful; in a comment on Jackson's closing statement at Nuremberg, in which he pointedly avoided restating "the trial's moral and legal basis," it admitted, "The world public would be content to see the Nürnberg criminals die, but it had not got around to distinguishing between criminal and legal war," and that until "a considerable part of it did that," the convictions "would be a function of victory rather than of law." This was a roundabout way of admitting that though the war actions of the defendants had not been successfully established as crimes, nevertheless it was meet that they die because the world propaganda campaign which had preconvicted them prior to trial had become too ponderous to defy at this stage. "Trial by Victory," *Time* (August 5, 1946), p. 31.

⁹There was usually a private and little-publicized mortification of prominent World War Two "war criminals" prior to the public spectacle. The least known perhaps was that of the Japanese premier, General Hideki Tojo, partially due to its peculiarly scandalous nature. It is best described by Captain P. J. Searles, USN (ret.), in his review of Clark Lee's *One Last Look Around* (New York: Duell, Sloane and Pearce, 1946) in the *New York Herald Tribune Weekly Book Review*, June 8, 1947, p. 9: "One of the most shockingly brutal episodes in journalism is revealed in Clark Lee's new book without any indication that the author or his colleagues felt the slightest bit of shame as participants. A few days after the occupation of Japan, Mr. Lee, with a fellow correspondent, Harry Brundidge, located General Tojo in Tokyo and had what was probably

It undoubtedly is extremely unnerving and disheartening for the parents of young Americans taken prisoner by the Communists in Viet Nam to hear them described as "war criminals" and threatened with trial and summary execution. Scores of angry newspaper editorialists have fulminated at such ominous proceedings as "farces," and indeed they are. Nevertheless, they are in close harmony with Communist concepts of group and ceremonial guilt, without any necessity to provide for individual protections nor encumbered by the principle of presumption of innocence unless and until proven otherwise. In this sense, the "war crimes" trials following the end of the Second World War also were the sophisticated offspring of the celebrated Moscow purge show trials of 1936-1938, though a thorough discussion of this aspect would be long and involved. But the silence of the country's major newspapers on the ancestry of these "war crimes" and the twisted verbiage and reasoning they have left us as a heritage has been as deafening as the barking and yelling over the most recent turn of events. Of the major papers, only the *Chicago Tribune*, which attacked the whole "war crimes" business twenty years ago and has never changed its position since, has been dealing with the current situation in a historical fashion, and acquainting readers who have come of age since those times with something of what prevailed when the whole episode had its inception.¹⁰

If the "war crimes" trials of 1945-47 and after were intended as object lessons to the world and designed to serve as a curb on warlike propensities by demonstrating the fate of "war criminals,"

the first American postwar interview with Japan's No. 1 criminal [sic], a relaxed, rather genial chat. The following day the pair, plus half a dozen other newspapermen, tipped off that our Army authorities were going to arrest Tojo, hustled off to the general's home to cover the story. American troops arrived an hour or so later, demanded entrance and were met by the shot which was Tojo's attempt to suicide.

"Then came the disgraceful affair. Reporters and photographers crowded into the room where Tojo lay wounded, laughing, smoking, cheered by a sensational story. They jeered at the general, called him almost unprintable names, screamed at him for statements and pictures, stole his belongings, intimated he was a homosexual, complained that he took too long to die, and, as the author discreetly hints, even attempted to assist him out of the world for the sake of a more exciting news dispatch. This is not a reviewer's nightmare but a plain statement of what is set down in black and white to the dishonor of those who were present." Though Captain Searles was as inclined to preconception of "war criminals" as the next person, his fundamental decency and honorableness certainly stand out prominently in this instance.

¹⁰One of the best of the more recent editorial summarizations of the subject by the *Tribune* was the September 30, 1965 "War of No Quarter."

then they are a miscalculation of dizzying dimensions. The world has known nothing but wars, civil and otherwise, ever since. But none of them has been fought to a unilateral conclusion, nor have any of them been allowed to spread beyond local regions. The lesson is still bright and fresh before all military leaders and "statesmen." Nuremberg, Tokyo, and Manila did not outlaw war or establish new international law; they made *losing* a war a crime and stipulated the new look in neckwear for the losing military leaders and "statesmen": a tidy piece of sturdy hemp rope. For that reason, it is likely that it will be in the interests of such people in the future to keep their wars small, localized, and inconclusive, and in particular avoiding such counsels of insanity as "unconditional surrender" policies. The alternative to this is a war fought with unprecedented savagery and lacking in the employment of no weapon, no matter how destructive, if thereby defeat may be avoided, since the lives of all the prominent losers are forfeit anyway under the doctrine of "war crimes."

In the light of this, the behavior of the Viet Cong is pointless, and simply an incitation to reprisals against their own prisoners in the hands of their enemy. Each side lacks possession of prominent figures from the opposition, as was also the case during the Korean War (1950-1953), when both sides there also went through the motions of assembling lists of "war criminals." Regardless how far these mutual murders of each other's captives go on, they will be simply sordid and vulgar killing bees and a retreat morally to a point in time at least before that of Ashurbanipal, if not to that before Bronze Age man.

There is much evidence that a goodly number in this country in particular would like to forget all about "war crimes" and "war criminals." But it does not appear that the Communists, who seem to have introduced both these political epithets, intend to let them do it, since there is still a considerable amount of political mileage remaining in them.

After all, joint supervision of World War II German "war criminals" is about the only political enterprise in which this country participates today in full cooperation with the Soviets: the management of the huge Spandau prison in Berlin, where three Germans convicted but not hanged in 1946 constitute the entire incarcerated community, run at an annual cost in recent years of at least a quarter of a million dollars. But far more important than that, the world

political structure, West and East, for twenty years, has rested on the "war crimes" trials of Nuremberg, Manila, and Tokyo. It is not possible to raise one's voice too high over the basic fundamentals of the "war criminal" idea without creating a stupendous political problem. Russian and Asian communism, the principal victors in the Second World War, are likely to be the major gainers from any bedrock re-examination of the War Criminal Follies of 1945-1947.

Observations of a Free Market Operator

by Wm. J. Grede

When, a few years ago, industrialist Wm. J. Grede proposed a free market solution for a labor problem to CIO-AFL chiefs Walter Reuther and George Meany, Reuther said to Meany, "I didn't know there were people like that alive any more."

Wm. J. Grede, chairman of the board, Grede Foundries, Inc., and a director of numerous corporations, followed the Horatio Alger pattern in his business career. Beginning from scratch, utterly independent, unhampered by contemporary dogma imposing unrealistic altruism, Bill Grede has been too busy producing, building, expanding, and succeeding to become enmeshed in the collective ideology which has sapped the business acumen and accomplishment of many of today's businessmen.

Yet his willingness to serve, his personal involvement in "causes," is well demonstrated by positions to which he has been elevated. He is a past president of the National Council of the YMCAs, and of the National Association of Manufacturers, and is a member of the boards of trustees for Carroll College in Wisconsin and Rampart College in Colorado. He holds three honorary degrees bestowed by separate colleges, and has become known internationally for his speeches on behalf of liberty and the American idea of private property and private enterprise.

The following excerpts are from a speech by Mr. Grede in Colorado Springs, Colorado, in May, 1961, at the Garden of the Gods Club, at a dinner in his honor given by a fellow trustee of Rampart College, Harry H. Hoiles.

As I have traveled across the country, speaking for the NAM and the YMCA, I discovered that America does not divide into sharply defined groups—the "haves" and the "have nots," the big and the little, or the rich and the poor. I find that usually anybody

whose business is bigger than yours is "big business." It's the same as this "rich" and "poor" business. Anybody who has more money than you have is rich. Regardless of where you may classify yourself, you can just make up your mind that to somebody you're rich. America is not groups. America is people, important, significant, individual people. It is difficult to get Americans themselves to appreciate and understand the importance and the significance of people as individuals. We've developed a great collectivist fancy around the world and in this country, and we're trying to do everything in groups.

In the last analysis, no corporation ever made a tractor or a pound of steel. No corporation ever made a dime of profit. People do that, important, individual, significant people, and if we are going to save liberty, not only for ourselves but for the rest of the world, we must establish the importance and the significance of this in the hearts and in the minds and the understanding of the people with whom we are dealing. We talk about the "heartless corporation." Of course it's heartless. It is also brainless—so is a government. Corporations and governments do not have personality. They can't have any particular freedom. Freedom is for people, and the unit of our freedom is the individual person.

Our forefathers said no majority, not even the government itself, can interfere with the unalienable, God-given rights of people, important, significant, individual people. And this is the foundation of our freedom.

There's nothing as autocratic as a majority. It seems to me the whole union program is a very sharp example of the autocracy of the majority. If the majority wants to belong to the union, then everybody must belong to the union. Of course, the unions assume that they are beneficial, and so they say if one guy "gets the benefit of the union," everybody has to belong. But this whole concept of the "closed shop" I think violates our American concepts of individual choice and decision.

Of course, even in NAM circles we find employers who may quarrel with the way unions are run under present circumstances, but who like to stand before audiences and chastise themselves and blame all the development of unions on the exploitation of labor by employers. I'm one employer who doesn't buy that. Sure, I recognize that in our business experience we have employers who don't use good judgment, either in the use of the people who work

for them or in the use of their materials, but it's largely a matter of judgment.

People sometimes talk about the terrible times of the Industrial Revolution, when ten and twelve-year-old children were working in the factories and what a dreadful thing that was, but of course that was a hundred or so years ago and they're comparing that period with modern conditions. What we really ought to do is compare the development of the Industrial Revolution with what conditions were the day *before* the Industrial Revolution. Now, I realize this didn't happen in twenty-four hours, but if you'll think back, or read back in your history, to the time when there were no factories and when there was no mass-production and people were spinning their own cloths and churning their own butter and raising their own food, you will recall that almost before a youngster could walk, he had to learn to milk the cows—provided his family had cows. The burden on people before the Industrial Revolution seems to have been forgotten. And so, today, when we think of putting children in factories even at twelve years old, it seems terrible. We forget that the development has been largely technological. As we developed electric power and steam power and all the new gadgets and the new technologies, we have lightened the work of the world and we lift these burdens from the backs of people. It was the Industrial Revolution that made this possible.

So, when people credit unions with having bettered conditions, I'm reminded of my early days as a youngster on my uncle's farm. I used to go in the cow barn, and it was a kind of messy place. It was full of flies and it was dirty and the barnyard was muddy, and I don't think it was very comfortable for the cows. And then, of course, on cold winter mornings my uncle used to go out and milk those cows with his cold hands. I'm sure it wasn't very comfortable for those cows. But have you visited a modern dairy farm in recent years? They now have tile barns and automatic barn-cleaners and screen doors and insecticides. There are no flies. The barnyards are concreted, if they ever let the cows out in the barnyards. The barn is much cleaner. And when it comes to milking time, they use preheated rubber caps. Must be very comfortable. There's even Muzak. And, you know, the cows never had a union!

Back in those early days when I bought the Liberty Foundry, the foundry was working nine and a half hours a day. Terrible, you say under present circumstances. Well, I don't want to say that I

was completely devoid of any humanitarian interest, but I was just a young fellow getting started and I owed more money than I thought there was in the world. I had only one thing in mind when I started that foundry, and that was to make some money.

One day I said to our supervisors, "How much production would we lose if we worked the foundry only nine hours?"

Most of our workers were piece-work, but we had a few day-workers around whom we paid by the hour. And the supervisors said, "Well, let's try it," so we worked the foundry nine hours. We didn't lose one pound of production. The piece-workers made just as much money in nine hours as they made in nine and a half hours.

"Well," I said, "why don't we try eight and a half hours?"

So we tried eight and a half hours. And we didn't lose—not a pound of production. And, of course, while the piece-workers were earning just as much money in eight and a half hours as they did in nine and a half, we were saving an hour's pay on every day-worker.

And then we said, "Well, let's go to eight hours," and at eight hours we lost a little production—and believe it or not, 'way back there in the twenties, we operated our foundry for several weeks eight hours and twenty minutes a day because we thought that was the most efficient point to operate.

Now, we didn't do it out of consideration for the men or for humanitarian reasons. We did it because it was the most efficient way to operate. At that time I hadn't even heard of the union. This had nothing to do with unions. This was the development of scientific management.

Some of my competitors were still working nine and a half hours. I don't think it was because they were harsh or cruel. They just didn't have good judgment, that's all, and the result was that they didn't make as much money as we did, but this is all a part of the whole development.

Some of you may be familiar with the program we called B.I.E. Day—Business, Industry, Education Day. This was up in Iron Mountain. We invited the school teachers to visit all the plants. Each plant took a certain number of school teachers. We took a few to the foundry and we told them all about our processes.

When I was telling these teachers all about our business and where our materials came from and where our product went to, one of the teachers said to me, "Mr. Grede, what do you do on the human side of business?" Then she started to talk about insurance

and safety and the kinds of things that concern people, and I said, "Well, I'm glad you asked that question because today we're operating our four hundred and ninety-second consecutive day without a lost-time accident. We spend an awful lot of money to prevent accidents; we provide guards on the machinery, certain kinds of clothing; we have contests and banquets and prizes." And I said, "About group insurance, my little company, in 1924, provided group life insurance, and that group insurance program was expanded to include accident, and health, and hospitalization coverage for dependents, as well as employees—the whole ball of wax.

"In 1926," I said, "our company put in paid vacations for the shop employees.

"You see that halo over my head for my humanitarian approach to these human problems? Watch it grow brighter when I tell you that a few years ago we established a pension plan which works on the same formula basis for me as it does for the sweeper.

"Now that my halo is burning very brightly, watch it disappear when I ask myself and answer the question, 'Why?' Why did we do all these things? Well, because accidents are expensive. They cost a lot of money. Not only the cost of paying the doctor bills and paying for the time off—that's the least part of the cost. The only way we can make any money is to get production. If we have machinery that isn't safe and these men are afraid of the machinery, we don't get the production from which we can make money. We are concerned about accidents because it pays to be concerned about them."

I said, "Back in those early days, in '24, we had about sixty employees. When one of the fellows died, they took a collection in the foundry, getting about \$12.30, which I was asked to deliver to the widow. Well, I didn't have nerve enough to give her only twelve dollars, so I pitched in a couple of hundred dollars of my own. Two hundred dollars at that time was a lot of money for me. It became expensive. I found I could buy group insurance cheaper, and so in 1924 we bought group life insurance, long before the CIO was born."

And then I got to paid vacations. I told her, "I was a young fellow and I'd read some of these modern books on management and efficiency and how to retain employees. There was another foundry in Milwaukee and every pay day they'd be hiring our best molders. We'd get them all nicely trained and built up, and then these fel-

lows would hire them. We used to do it to them, too, but I decided we had to do something to make these fellows stay with us, so I thought we'd put in this paid vacation idea—and it went over with a bang. The vacations weren't large ones. I think we started the first one, the first year, with three days' vacation, one day for each year of service up to three years. It was very much appreciated in those days. I don't think it's so much appreciated now. But it was very much appreciated and was very effective.

"Then we extended the benefits of the group insurance to include dependents. We now take care of little Johnny's tonsils, because if big Johnny comes to work and he's worried because he hasn't got money enough to take out little Johnny's tonsils, we don't get the molds on the floor; and so we say, 'Get little Johnny's tonsils removed, quit worrying about it, get to work—we'll pay the bill.' And that's what happened. Pensions were put in for the same reason we gave vacations—to induce people to stay with us."

And I said to the school teachers, "And by now the halo has disappeared and you see me for the selfish, nickel-pinching capitalist that you thought I was. But, you see, it's this whole process of selfishness, if you please. Because I'm so selfish, we don't have fellows running around our plants with a patch on their eye, or their arm in a sling. We don't have as many accidents, because I'm so selfish. And now, the widow, instead of getting \$212.30, gets \$2,000. Little Johnny gets his tonsils out before they get a chance to stunt his growth and retard his development, because I'm so selfish. That's the story of America, this whole process of self-preservation and self-improvement.

"How do you make money in a free economy? Well, you make money by making a better product at a lower cost, so you can sell it cheaper and sell more products and make more money. Just as simple as that. But what happens to the rest of the country? Everybody is better off—more employment—better products—lower cost. You have a higher standard of living. This is the selfish process of America."

At this point the inquiring school teacher said, "Well, Mr. Grede, I'm beginning to understand. But," she said, "I don't like the word—selfish is a harsh word."

I asked, "What do you teach?" and she said, "I'm the librarian at the high school."

"Well," I said, "we're going to adjourn for lunch, and when we

do, I wish you would go to your library and come back and tell me what word I should use."

She returned after lunch and I said, "Did you look in your dictionary?"

She said, "Yes—but I still don't like it."

Then I explained to her that we have a misconception about "selfish." I think self-interest is rather a wholesome thing. In fact, once when I was negotiating with one of the union committees, they said to me, "Well, Mr. Grede, you take pretty good care of yourself, don't you?" And I said, "Yes, I do, and if everyone took as good care of themselves as I do, we wouldn't need a community fund. As we improve our own lot, we improve the lot of nearly everyone around us."

I think we misunderstand the selfish process that I've been describing. This is the process of making your piece of pie bigger by making the whole pie bigger. But do not confuse this with the covetousness of certain groups in America who would make their piece of pie bigger by taking some of yours. And I'd like to suggest that they aren't even selfish. If they were truly selfish, they would realize that by their process they will destroy the whole pie, including their own piece.

I went to a Council of Churches meeting when I was president of the NAM and the topic was to see how our economic decisions conflicted with our Christian convictions. I was in the management group. We started the conference by asking, "What are we in business for?" and then I listened for a day to these men recite all the noble purposes for which they were in business: make jobs, raise the standard of living, serve the community—all these noble purposes. When it came my turn, I said, "You know, I'm going to drop a bomb into this discussion, because when I think back to 1920, when I started in business, I had only one thing in mind and that was to make some money."

They said, "But, Mr. Grede, you have to serve the community."

"Oh," I said, "sure, the fact of that matter is, the better I serve the community, the more money I make."

Somebody else said, "You have to treat your employees well."

I said, "The better I treat my employees, the better employees I get, the more production I get, the more money I make. It's just as simple as that."

We spent the next few hours discovering that every one of these

noble purposes was profitable. That's the process by which we make money.

When we got to the end of the second day, one of these fellows said, "Well, Mr. Grede, we thought you were kind of nuts when you started, but we're beginning to understand what you're talking about."

"Well," I said, "if you really do understand, let's talk about some of these decisions that might conflict with our Christian convictions."

I said, "What do you do when fifty-one per cent of the people in your plant vote for a union and then demand that everybody in the plant belong to that union? If you really have a Christian concept of the significance of the individual person, does this decision conflict with it?"

That precipitated quite a lot of discussion. We got all the usual free-rider arguments and, finally, the vice president of a utilities company said, "I'll make a confession. We faced that decision: either make our city dark, or give these fellows a closed shop. We compromised our Christian conviction and we signed a closed shop contract." He was ready to admit that it was a compromise.

All this shallow thinking about the noble purposes really wasn't getting us anywhere, but when we came to grips with a specific instance, we could appreciate how significant is our American concept of *individual* freedom and how important it is that we preserve it.

In 1960 I was asked to serve on the Labor-Management Committee. Mr. Eisenhower wanted three employer members and Mr. Meany, Mr. Reuther, and Mr. Harrison from the unions to discuss whether there should be a labor-management conference, who should attend, and what the agenda should be.

As soon as I was appointed, Mr. Reuther made a blast in the newspapers that the union representatives had thought they'd get men of stature on this committee. Of course, what he meant was the president of U.S. Steel or General Motors or General Electric, or somebody like that, instead of such a little pipsqueak from Wisconsin. "Furthermore," he said, "he's now got a strike at the Case Company" (where I was president at that time). Someone faster than I responded by saying, "Well, Mr. Grede has a strike at the Case Company, but doesn't Mr. Reuther have a strike at the Case Company, too?"

At the first meeting (we called them Summit Meetings, they were

supposed to be so sort of secret), Mr. Reuther told the three of us face to face that he expected to see men of bigger stature. Anyway, we began discussing some of the questions that ought to be on the agenda, and Mr. Meany pulled out a chart showing the growth of job seekers and the growth of jobs, and the curves were spreading. He pointed out there was going to be more and more unemployment.

Said Mr. Meany, "This is the kind of a problem we ought to discuss in this labor-management conference." And some of the fellows started to talk about it.

One of the management fellows said, "Well, Mr. Meany, if you're going to keep on raising wages faster than you raise productivity, this curve is going to widen."

Mr. Meany's solution was to have the government spend more money and get more money in circulation, and by that process he thought we would cure this.

I finally said, "Mr. Meany, what would you think if we tried a free market on this problem?"

"What do you mean, a free market?" he said. "We have a free market."

I said, "I mean a free labor market."

"Well, don't we have a free labor market?"

"Well," I said, "Mr. Meany, we have a strike at one of our plants and you won't even let your competitors in." I said, "We've got a lot of people who want to work at the wages we will pay, but you won't even let your competitors in. I don't call that a free market."

Mr. Meany looked at Mr. Reuther and Mr. Reuther looked at Mr. Meany, and Reuther said to Meany, "I didn't know there were people like that alive any more."

Mr. Reuther, in a lull in the discussion one day, said to me, "You know, Mr. Grede, about this strike at Racine—we've got ten thousand contracts that have just the things we are asking you for in that Case strike." He said, "If you'll just take the time, you and I could sit down and in an hour we could settle that strike."

"Well," I said, "Mr. Reuther, you're busy and I'm busy, and I think the fellows in Racine are doing pretty well. Furthermore, somebody said once that fifty million Frenchmen can't be wrong but, you know, they were wrong. You ought to look at those ten thousand contracts and see what you can do to bring them up to the standards of the Case Company."

I have been asked many times, "If this group gets the benefit of the union, why shouldn't everyone pay the dues? Why shouldn't everyone belong?"

My answer is, "If the union is beneficial, why wouldn't they all *want to belong?*"

On one occasion Secretary of Labor Mitchell answered my question with another. He asked me, "Did you ever hear of where a union didn't get some benefits?"

I said, "Yes, Mr. Secretary, I have. In 1942 we took over a steel foundry and this steel foundry had a union contract. We just bought the physical assets, didn't recognize the contract, and we had a little to-do about that, but we still are without any labor contracts at the foundry. It was during the Wage Stabilization days and we had two steel foundries within a mile of each other. We wanted to move the people back and forth, and we had to have the same wage structure. We couldn't pay a man one wage when he worked in one plant, and a different wage when he worked in the other. So we made an application to the Wage Stabilization Board to have the same rate of pay in the two plants, but our application wasn't processed. So I went to the Wage Stabilization Board and asked why.

"The fellow there said, 'Well, you know, Mr. Grede, we have a policy. We will not permit a non-union shop to raise their wages up to the level of a union shop.'

"Well,' I said, 'I'm not sure I agree with you, but I'm not going to argue with that. Do you have a policy that will enable us to raise the wages in the union shop up to the level of the wages in the non-union shop? Because that's what my application is trying to do.'"

They didn't know what to do with that one. They had no policy on that. We finally got it approved, but this gives you some idea of the general misconception of the role of the union.

I don't object to people joining any club or church or union they want to belong to, but there should be no law on the books that makes me do business with them.

If you look at the fundamental objective and purpose of the union, it is banding together for the purpose of wresting more from the market than the free market will pay.

It violates our whole concept of freedom, and we ought to have a free market. Individualism is the thing that our forefathers were

concerned about and they were really frightened at the autocracy of the old world. That's what they fled from. When they established our government, they tried to protect the freedom of the individual.

Our forefathers used the majority process for certain actions and to send representatives to government, but they never envisioned that majority rule would become majority reign, as it did in Germany, for instance. Hitler was elected by a majority. And by majority rule, if you please, they literally wiped out the minority. Nothing is as autocratic as a majority, and our forefathers were so concerned that they said, "No majority, not even the government, can interfere with our own unalienable, God-given rights."

So many times America has been described as the "last bulwark of democracy." First of all, it is not a democracy, but neither is it a last bulwark. It is a frontier, not the New Frontier. Individual people are important and significant—America is still a frontier of freedom. For America, for the freedom of yourselves and your children and your grandchildren, I dare you to play your role on that frontier.

America's Sacred White Cow

by Larry F. Glaser

Larry F. Glaser received an A.B. degree in philosophy from the University of Kansas in 1963 and is presently a senior medical student at the University of Kansas School of Medicine. He has in the past helped to edit a journal of libertarian thought, *The Standard*. Now twenty-five years old, Glaser is a graduate of a Comprehensive Course at Freedom School (1962).

We as a nation of individuals have finally done it. We have arrived and we don't even know it. We're wailing for peace while we cheer on the bombing of ignorant peasants. We're scrambling for public trials of "the new war traitors" while we ourselves have already committed the most dastardly treasons. We scream for the blood of the enemy while we ourselves thank the gods for our being such great humanitarians. We thrive on the police brutality of enforcing "free education" on a minority religious group while we spew forth criticisms of our enemy's lack of freedom of religion. We praise the killer agents of our "security forces" while we bitterly denounce the old Nazi death camps.

Yes, we have finally arrived. We think lies to be truth. We think war to be peace. We think hate to be love.

We are slaves.

And, we love it!

Why?

Because we've deluded ourselves into thinking sacrifice for the common good is somehow an *acceptable* and *necessary* slavery.

A slave is owned by a master. A slave's productive energy is used to the ends chosen by that master. The master must keep the slave alive though, or he is of no use. The master knows best. Ask the slave. He believes the master knows best.

The slave's very life has been conscripted.

How can the slave object when he, himself, thinks conscription is the path to liberty? The slave is sentenced by his own morality. It condemns him to a life of slavery, and yet he must praise this misery as virtuous. He must praise his slavery because conscription is the path to liberty—and who is against liberty? No one—not even the master, for *he too knows* conscription is the path to liberty.

Why?

Because lies are truth; war is peace; hate is love; and conscription is liberty.

We as individuals in a land that was once so rebellious as to throw off a king as master are perfectly happy to adopt a new, more efficient, more sophisticated, more tyrannical, and more ambitious master—CONSCRIPTION. Conscription not as an idle stopcheck; but as an institution to be enlarged upon; as a morality to be defended; as individuals to be prosecuted if they object; as a machine to be fed with human bodies; as a now *acceptable* form of slavery.

To oppose conscription per se is a thing of the past. It is a thing you might find men like Thomas Paine, Daniel Webster, and yes, even Karl Marx, condemning, but it is not the acceptable thing to be doing today. Today, the institution is sacred. Conscription as the white cow of the United States has really only achieved its own in the last twenty-five years. Before that time, a few daring persons were willing to write, speak, and fight against any and all conscription procedures. But today is a new world. And those old fighters have been silenced by either prison, fines, or the grave. Their words are not to be found in any elementary or high school texts, let alone in any of the required college paperbacks. Not even the once-revered American Civil Liberties Union has the guts to “go against the trend.” The Students for a Democratic Society of recent infamy has even turned cowardly in its tracks at its most recent national conference. All the priests, rabbis, and clergymen in the country can stand before their pulpits and yell about the cruelty of war, but not one is willing to yell, much less do anything, about opposing conscription per se.

Many supposed rebels agitate and are heard, but they say nothing of the basic institution involved. The pious little noncombatant conscientious objectors stand and tell you that they don't believe it moral for *them personally* to kill, but they *are* willing to keep the lines open that feed the front lines that do kill. Of course, nothing is said about conscription per se. Then there are the even more

pious "total conscientious objectors" who declare with such righteousness that they are in total opposition to war. Therefore, they are only willing to carry bedpans during their period of conscription.

There are of course the "new left" objectors who see themselves as the only really moral ones. They believe the United States to be the aggressor and dictator in Viet Nam. Naturally, they are therefore opposed to conscription because that is what feeds the war monster. Where were these tiny little radicals fifteen years ago when we were not at war in Viet Nam? These "new left" are fakers; they are not liberal at all. They are the most arch-reactionary and deceptive of all those individuals supposedly objecting to oppression and exploitation. If the war in Viet Nam ends tomorrow, so too will end their objection to conscription. They are the sunshine patriots.

Everyone has his out. You've heard them all. "Conscription is necessary." "Conscription is our duty." "Conscription is for the sake of preserving our freedoms." "Conscription will save us from communism."

Conscription is the new sacred white cow. One does not touch such institutions, much less begin to discuss whether or not the institution is sacred. Heresy is unforgivable, and in the political arena it is treason and is dealt with as such. Heretics begin by discussing the sacredness of the institution, while traitors work actively to abolish it. Neither is an "acceptable" occupation nowadays.

More than one heretic has been born from oppression and many a traitor has emerged a hero from the dens of tyranny. This is the trap into which the state has fallen in attempting to suppress the birth of heresy and of traitors.

Let us begin this cultivation of heresy by reviewing our own nation's history of conscription.

The king's militia "pressed into service" some young men in our colonial days in order to preserve "law and order," but conscription was not a widespread, entrenched institution with a bureaucracy. Massachusetts and Virginia temporarily employed compulsory service in 1777 to fight the redcoats but, immediately following the revolution, this tactic was abandoned. There was also much opposition to the very idea of conscription. This is seen in a letter to John Adams from Thomas Jefferson in 1777: "In Virginia a draft was ever the most unpopular and impracticable thing that could

ever be attempted. Our people . . . had learned to consider it as the last of all oppressions."

This opposition was evidenced again in Daniel Webster's famous anti-conscription speech in the House of Representatives in 1814. He closed his plea for defeat of a bill of conscription with these words: "If the administration has found that it cannot form an army without conscription it will find, if it ventures on these experiments, that it cannot enforce conscription without an army."

The next serious attempt at institutionalizing conscription came with the Civil War. One American who was much concerned about tyranny and oppression was warning the nation's individuals about the origin of these evils. In his Lyceum Address on January 27, 1837, he warned: "At what point shall we expect the approach of danger? By what means shall we fortify against it? Shall we expect some transatlantic military giant to step the ocean and crush us at a blow? Never! All the armies of Europe, Asia, and Africa combined, with all the treasure of the earth (our own excepted) in their military chest, with a Bonaparte for a commander, could not by force take a drink from the Ohio or make a track on the Blue Ridge in a trial of a thousand years. At what point, then, is the approach of danger to be expected? I answer, if it ever reach us it must spring up amongst us; it cannot come from abroad. If destruction be our lot we must ourselves be its author and finisher. As a nation of free men we must live through all time, or die by suicide."

The speaker: Abraham Lincoln. This same man, who denounced the Mexican War while in Congress from 1847-49, helped pass and finally make law the enrollment bill of March 3, 1863. This was applied to areas which had not produced their quota of volunteers. If volunteers could not be found to "preserve the Union," then conscription was the "only practical solution." Because this bill allowed for an exemption system whereby exemption could be bought for \$300, and because it was a shock to many individuals' ideals, there was trouble from the beginning. The now famous New York draft riots stemmed from this bill. During the first four months of its application, ninety-eight federal registrars were killed, victims of popular wrath. This only increased the Leader's determination, and he withdrew troops from the front lines to "preserve law and order." We have come full circle as warned by Daniel Webster: ". . . it cannot enforce conscription without an army."

Also, there were rumors of a "conspiracy" to account for the New

York draft riots. The Confederacy had already imposed universal conscription in April, 1862, and this too had not been accepted without struggle. Presumably, the theory of little old ladies in wide-brimmed hats went something like this: All that rabble which is rioting in New York and Boston is actually being led by Confederacy spies and agents. If the Confederacy can upset our efforts to carry on the war, then it will win and evil will triumph. We cannot allow this to happen. It would be the end of the Union. Therefore, we must deal harshly with these traitors in our midst because they will disrupt the war effort.

Despite the passing on of the word of conspiracy by such vigilant patriots, the Draft Act remained unpopular. In fact, it was so unpopular that it gathered less than 50,000 conscripts, or less than three per cent of the total forces in *four* draft calls.

Such was the first really large organized attempt at institutionalizing conscription in the United States. Some historians have implied that General Meade's failure to pursue Lee after Gettysburg in 1863 was because regiments had been sent to New York to suppress the anti-conscription riots. This ultimately prolonged the war.¹

We had been warned: "If destruction be our lot, we must ourselves be its author and finisher. As a nation of free men we must live through all time, or die by suicide."

The next serious cry to institutionalize "our duty" came with World War I. This time it was not to "save the Union," but "to make the world safe for democracy." In the name of idealism and humanitarianism, Woodrow Wilson proposed that Congress pass a bill of conscription. This met with prolonged opposition and debate both inside and outside Congress. At the same time, some Englishmen were fighting the same issues. One of the more famous was Bertrand Russell. In 1916 he was fined 100 pounds because he *wrote a pamphlet* criticizing a two-year sentence imposed upon a conscientious objector. Russell's library was sold to pay the fine because he refused to be a party in the crime. Luckily, his friends were able to purchase his library.

Back in the States, tempers were flaring; Congressmen were calling names; citizens were taking sides; and "traitors" were being created by rumor and press alike. In the end, all went well "to make the world safe for democracy," though. We were able to send an

¹Richard B. Morris, *Encyclopedia of American History* (revised ed.; New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 239.

army abroad to fight in a war. A few "traitors" went to jail, but it didn't upset our attempts at establishing a tradition of conscription.

Next, the Second World War loomed large and menacing. Again there was a vigorous debate. Finally, the Senate voted 47 to 25 and the House, 232 to 124, to once again turn to conscription to build our army. This time, it was to save the world from Hitler. Conscription had become "necessary." Furthermore, it was our "duty" to save the world from Nazi tyranny. Finally, it was accepted. Because of "the emergency," we had come to accept conscription as an institution. It was "the practical solution." This was all evidenced by the extension of conscription a year later when it passed the House by only one vote, 203 to 202.

In 1963, twenty-two years after conscription's victory by one vote, extension once again passed the Senate with ten minutes of "discussion" and a voice vote. Now, indeed, it was institutionalized. Besides, what would we do with all the Selective Service offices and their personnel?

In the most recent presidential election, both candidates promised a re-evaluation of the draft law. No one is quite sure when that re-evaluation took place, but obviously the decision has been made to continue the conscription process. The reason this time: to save the world from communism; to save the world from Red China; to save the Vietnamese from "invasion." The new white cow has come of age in America.

As is evident from this history, more often than not individuals were opposing conscription because it was the means to perpetuate a war. When this occurs, the question then becomes one of "just and unjust wars"—wars of which one approves or disapproves. However, a few of those individuals opposing conscription were doing so in opposition to conscription per se. That is, they objected to being conscripted, or to the conscription of other individuals, for any reason whatsoever. To oppose conscription because one is opposed to a specific war is a matter of tactic. To oppose conscription because one is opposed to slavery is a matter of principle.

Let us concern ourselves with conscription per se. For many, to attempt this means they must quiet their emotions about the stormy question of Viet Nam. It is not enough to concern ourselves with "the dirty American imperialists" or those "bearded peacenik cowards." We must go beyond our whims of the moment no matter which side we are taking in the current issue. We must not limit

ourselves to tactics but must attempt to consider principles. The principle at issue is one of slavery, of sacrifice, of coercion, of conscription.

With the intellectual gymnastics of which most of our population are capable—especially those “college graduates”—let’s not tie ourselves down to all the routine arguments of Natural Law, The Common Good, The Common Defense, Our Duty, and The Judeo-Christian Ethic. Everyone has some preconceived notion about these little philosophical gems, and each immediately draws forth his “standard arguments” complete with affects—and often a little drama. Let us talk and think about those things we have observed in our own century. Let us talk about and think about the real implications of conscription as an institution and a principle.

What does it mean to be conscripted? It means one must direct his energy toward those goals chosen by another person, and, if one refuses, that second party, whether in person or by functioning within an organization of individuals, will punish him as he sees fit. Without punishment, conscription would be impossible. This might be more vividly defined by observing what happens if one opposes being conscripted. If nothing happened to persons who refused to be conscripted, then those who did comply would nearly be “volunteers.” By joining the armed forces after being asked via a conscription notice but without threat of punishment, the individual would merely have received information to the effect that his assistance was needed to carry on such-and-such an activity; this obviously depends upon the war situation at the time of notification. Some would no doubt believe it their obligation or moral duty to comply with the “request” even though they did not like it. The difference between these men and the man who balks under threat of punishment is *a gun*. The man who complies because of his moral commitment is motivating himself, but the man who balks at being conscripted when punishment is threatened is partially motivated by a gun. That gun is held by the functionary who has already accepted it as his “duty” to enforce the law—regardless of whether or not the law is a just one. The legality of the use of the gun does not change the fact that one individual is threatening another with violence.

We could review, *ad infinitum*, cases of individuals who objected to being conscripted and discuss in minute detail their punishment. We could talk of the man who objected because he didn’t believe

in war; of the man who didn't support a specific war; and of those few who objected just to the idea of being conscripted. The punishments have varied from their being shot as traitors—a common procedure during the Civil War—to imprisonment with or without fines. Everyone knows that these individuals are being punished every day for refusing to cooperate with “the system.” We prefer to ignore it. These individuals are not actively attempting to “overthrow” our government by refusing to cooperate. They are refusing to act. Theirs is a worse crime—the crime of omission.

The failure to fulfill one's “duty” is the crime of omission. These individuals are criminals because they refuse to direct their energy toward the ends of another's choosing even at the point of a gun.

The most common refutation to this observation about using the gun to get others to use the gun is “the practical solution” idea. This takes the form of agreeing that it is too bad that those fellows must go to jail but, “How else would we meet ‘the need’?”

This curious little piece of logic could well be applied to an historical event of our own century. During the 1930's, Hitler rode high on the tide of popular support. It was during this time that anti-semitic feelings were beginning to be an *acceptable* public position. “The problem” was being discussed in public places as well as in high governmental circles. Finally, “the practical solution” was agreed upon by a few. The wheels turned, the camps were built, and the solution took form—the form of dead bodies and furnaces. More important, though, was the fact that the many accepted this solution without a whimper.

Many will cry that this is an unfair analogy to our conscription problem, so elaboration may be necessary. “The problem” in Germany's case was The Jew. The problem in our case is An Army. At this particular moment, it is An Army To Fight The Communists, but the logic can be applied to all times. Many persons in Germany may have secretly despised the furnace solution to their problem, but evidently there were not many who had the guts to protest publicly because the practice grew in size. Germans watched their neighbors being dragged away, and they said, “It's too bad. Ruben wasn't a bad fellow, but how else are we going to deal with the problem?” People watch individuals dragged to prison because they refuse to be conscripted, and we hear, “It's too bad. James wasn't a bad fellow, but conscription is the practical solution.”

Some may protest that being in the armed forces is not like being

in a German gas camp. At times it may not be, but it sure is if you are the one who dies at the hands of the enemy by a gun, a flame thrower, or grenade.

The most interesting parallel between The German Problem and Conscription is the acceptance of it by the victims themselves. Many German Jews walked to their deaths voluntarily because they believed their fate inevitable. Few protested. Many "holed up" in tiny hiding places and literally *waited* for that knock that would eventually spell death. The most famous account of this behavior is Anne Frank's diary. So, too, this is the case in the United States with respect to conscription. The victims who are about to be victimized sit and wait. Why? Because it is inevitable. Because it is "the practical solution." Because it is their "duty." Because "this is just the way we do things." This process of "waiting for the inevitable" is now quite acceptable behavior in our society. Those who protest here are likened to "stupid Jews" who tried to escape their fate in Germany by fleeing the country. "Cowards and traitors" is their greeting from their American neighbors.

If we are to deal with this problem of conscription in principle rather than tactic, then that principle must be stated. It is this: no violence may be employed against a nonaggressor.

Those who protest against being conscripted are not being aggressive toward anyone. They are unwilling to cooperate. They need not be pacifists to refuse to cooperate. They believe they have a right to their own life, their own energies, and they do not want to sacrifice those precious items to anyone else. They are selfish. They do not wish to be slaves.

The most embarrassing position a government can find itself in is as the aggressor. The government will take all efforts possible to avoid being seen publicly as the aggressor. A government cares about its image. A bad image over an extended period of time spells doom.

One way this government tries to avoid being placed in the position of the aggressor is by perpetuating several ideas about conscription. One of the most popular today is that of duty. "It is our duty to defend our nation." "Heroes are those who defend their country." There are many more but these two suffice to demonstrate the point. You will notice there is no mention of conscription, prison, or the gun. It is hoped that if you believe these little slogans, then you will not protest when conscripted, or, better still, you may even

volunteer. If you do not believe this tripe, then you may protest and the government must show its hand of aggression against a nonaggressor. The gun comes forth, the prison looms large, and the judge finally "just obeys the law." And all is well in Utopia. The letter of the law has been fulfilled. The government's duty to imprison heretics as an example has been fulfilled.

The principle has been elaborated, examples given, and the facts about what happens to protestors have been noted. Why and on which side different individuals will align themselves remains to be seen in the years to come. As the image of our government grows dimmer, hopefully the light of liberty will increase. Those who choose to be aggressors against nonaggressors may some day find those victims protesting. They will protest because they have nothing to lose but slavery and everything to gain for their liberty. The victims will only protest *after* they believe that there is no virtue in being victimized, no duty in allowing one's self to be told to die for another's interests, no profit in sacrificing one's liberty for "the inevitable." No, those who will really protest conscription per se are not those who deal with it as a matter of tactic, but those who see it as a matter of principle, as a moral question. A principle of aggressor and nonaggressor, of victimizer and victim, of hunter and hunted. Let this be a warning to those who choose the role of aggressor, victimizer, and hunter: dedication to moral absolutes has laid naked, made vulnerable, and subverted the workings of many a tyrant and his lackeys.

Leonard Read's Dilemma-- and Mine

by Howard E. Kessler

A native of Canada, Howard E. Kessler was graduated from the University of Oregon School of Journalism, and has been a reporter for newspapers in California and Oregon. For the past twenty years he has been manager of trade associations and educational institutes. He recently returned to Canada, where he and his wife live near Victoria, Vancouver Island. Mr. Kessler operates his own "Poor Richard's" bookshop, stocked with the several thousand books he has collected over the years. He was awarded the Rose Wilder Lane scholarship to attend the Freedom School in 1964.

Reading the latest in a lengthy series of little books by Leonard E. Read, I have realized once more the tremendous debt which students of liberty owe to this courageous man, who has spent most of his adult life teaching that "the destiny of man is to emerge toward an advancing potential and that individual liberty is essential to such progress." Thus Leonard Read restates his thesis at the beginning of *The Free Market and Its Enemy*, published by the Foundation for Economic Education, of which he is president and founder.

I have studied with enthusiasm nearly all of Read's works (including *The Romance of Reality*, which appeared in 1937, when the author was manager of the western division of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States) and I have become, in most respects, an ardent apostle of his teachings. I applaud the skill with which Read demonstrates the superiority of the ways of freedom over the ways of coercion, through his use of acutely apt analogies and examples.

In recent years, however, I have felt puzzled and discomfited by

Leonard Read's premises regarding limited government, and his insistence upon its unalloyed goodness. It is with respect to this phase of Read's philosophy, then, that I shall write, and I beseech the reader to understand that, with this exception, I continue to count myself a proud and stalwart supporter of Read.

In his new book, Leonard Read loses no time making clear his position favoring limited government. "Market freedom is declining partly because . . . we incorrectly identify the free market's enemy . . . as government," he writes. "This formal agency of society, when organized to keep the peace, to invoke a common justice under law, and to inhibit and penalize fraud, violence, misrepresentation, and predation, is a necessary and soundly principled ally of the free market. When we mistakenly identify an institutional ally as a foe and cast our barbs at it, we act against ourselves, and downgrade our philosophy. By so doing, we become our own enemy."

Read goes on to pinpoint the real enemy of the free market as "ignorance of being ignorant." He warns: "Keep the eye peeled for know-it-alls, because they are authoritarian in spirit." Yet we are to permit some "know-it-all" in government to decide what is fraud and misrepresentation, etc., and who shall be inhibited by force from practicing it.

There is no doubt Read recognizes this danger, for he says, of those know-it-alls: "They seek and often obtain positions in society's agency of organized force: government." Still, in the next paragraph, he shrugs off this observation: "Government, per se, is not the enemy. Rather, it is the psychotics who have taken roost in government." It seems to me, however, that this overlooks an inevitable characteristic of *all* artificial, coercive government . . . that, by its nature, and not by the nature of the men employed by it, it is an agency of force and violence.

Read's emphasis upon "emerging man," and his frequent references to the fact that never has there been a government that achieved the ideal "limited" scope for which he pleads, would lead one to assume that its realization must await that day when man's nature has been changed so that he can become capable of practicing limited government. If this be so, how account for his advice to libertarians to work for "the *restoration* of the free market and a government *restored* to its principled role of keeping the peace"? Was this a slip of the pen?

In a footnote, Read has this to say about government: "Inhibiting and penalizing destructive actions such as fraud, violence, misrepresentation, predation, invoking a common justice, keeping the peace, call for a compulsive agency of society: government. The management of destructive activities cannot properly be left to the free market, the nature of which is voluntary and the scope of which is the productive and creative."

This is a distinction frequently made by Leonard Read, but the reasons for dismissing protective functions as being outside the realm of the free market are never made clear. His ruling out protection from all that is productive and creative seems to me to be unrealistic and unimaginative. Furthermore, by praising free-market activities outside government, and relegating protection to compulsive agencies only, he would seem to be creating a natural haven in government for the dull clods and psychotic know-it-alls. He advises libertarians to shun government, then paints an ideal government . . . staffed by whom? It should certainly not be surprising if such a limited government were ever achieved, to find it rapidly degenerating into despotism.

In his concluding chapter of this new book, "Incomprehensible Order," Leonard Read makes a splendid case. But why, may we ask, since "the complex of creativities flowing through the minds of men . . . if not aborted . . . result in order," should we not extend this incomprehensible order to the protective functions?

This is about all Read has to say on the subject of government in *The Free Market and Its Enemy*. The remainder of this essay will serve as a summary of Leonard Read's views on government as they are recited in his essays and books written during the past thirty years.

In *The Romance of Reality*, Read was much more explicit as to the duties of a "good" government than he has been subsequently. Following a query, "What is a good government?" he fills thirteen pages with exposition, leading to the conclusion: "A really good government is the 'mainspring' to progress." This reference, coincidentally, occurred years before FEE's big seller, *The Mainspring of Human Progress*, and its author, Henry Grady Weaver, certainly was not referring to government in his title.

Most of these pages in *The Romance of Reality* which Read devotes to the ideal government are "thou shalt nots," but here is a condensation of his positive duties of government:

"A good government is a servant of all the people . . . whose administrators must think of themselves only as representatives of the people. . . . A good government recognizes that the best interests of the people are served when government keeps itself to the very minimum compatible with actual necessities . . . will assume the role of umpire . . . will maintain order, suppress crime and racketeering, assure justice, conduct international relationships, do a minimum of necessary duties beyond the powers of private enterprise to perform, regulate certain monopolies in the public interest, and maintain a national defense compatible with national safety . . . will set the example in economy, in controllable indebtedness and in the virtue of assets over liabilities . . . will serve as a model in the high regard for sanctity of contracts. . . .

"Its taxing system will be fair and equitable. . . . The taxing power will be used for securing revenues only. . . . It will issue a currency and coin the money . . . will close the gate to the political means as an avenue for man to satisfy his wants . . . will be a government of laws and not of men. . . . No good government would usurp any powers or prerogatives not specifically delegated to it by its citizens. . . . Is a good government as here defined a mere dream? Very likely."

I submit that the generalized authorizations listed above are very similar to those embodied in the U. S. Constitution, and that their implementation could only be expected to result in the same kind of unlimited government we have today in this country.

The highwater mark of Read's thinking on government, in my opinion, was registered in 1950, four years after he organized the Foundation for Economic Education. In an essay, "Students of Liberty," he confessed:

"Even the American theory of government, which has always appealed to me, raises two questions to which, thus far, I have been unable to find answers: 1. Can violence be instituted, regardless of how official or how limited in intention, without begetting violence outside officialdom and beyond the prescribed limitation? 2. Is not limitation of government, except for relatively short periods, impossible? Will not the predatory instincts of some men, which government is designed to suppress, eventually appear in the agents selected to do the suppressing? These instincts, perhaps, are inseparable companions of power. . . . Neither theory nor experience have, so far, supplied me with reassuring answers."

Here, in truth, Leonard Read seems on the very verge of taking that last, logical step away from coercive government. But it was not to be, and I, for one, would be interested in knowing why this astute student of liberty went back to his advocacy of limited government. For by 1954, when FEE published *Government—an Ideal Concept*, Read had moved backward, to this apologia for government:

“Government is said to be a necessary evil. The saying appears to be without merit. For can anything be at once necessary and evil? True, all governments have had a history of evil-doing. However, it does not follow that their good is indistinguishable from their evil. . . . Their evil begins when they step out of bounds . . . ,” as though the vague boundaries outlined in *The Romance of Reality* could ever be respected or even comprehended by those hirelings of government whose job it is to make decisions for other people.

By 1954, however, Leonard Read had taken up his position in defense of limited government, and he was opening a tentative attack upon those who insisted upon freedom as a total concept: “Numerous students of liberty falsely reason right past properly limited government to the abolition of all formal government, as though limited government were nothing more than a convenient compromise for ideological weak-hearts who have no stomach for the whole truth.”

Attempting to form a *raison d'être* for limited government, Read wrote: “Man is incapable of protecting his life as a personal, individual project. . . . He is committed to cooperating with his fellow men in the protective project of ‘one for all and all for one.’” (This was an unfortunate choice of quotations, for in *The Three Musketeers*, the phrase “one for all and all for one” certainly had no reference to government, and was, indeed, a demonstrable application of the efficacy of voluntary protective devices.) But to continue:

“Force is of two types. There is aggressive force. It is always evil. There are no exceptions . . . (but) any person has the natural and moral right to use repellent force against any other person who would aggress against him.” So far so good. But Read then attempts to bring government under his morally rightful “defensive force,” and he does it in this way:

“We inherit an obligation. . . . One cannot deny his societal obligation. . . . To support or not to support a limited organization of society, based on right principle, is logically exterior to the area of

free choice. For one not to support that which he has inherited as an obligation is to put the burden on others. Others have a moral right to protect themselves against anyone who would burden their energy. . . . Thus, the agency of society must, in justice, collect from him." But how, may we ask, does this differ from the union leader's argument against the right-to-work, i.e., "We don't want no free riders!"? Thus, in Read's view, collecting taxes at the point of a gun from an individual who does not wish to avail himself of services offered by government is morally defensible. Yet, surely, the energies of these individuals will be burdened by their having to pay the taxes!

By 1958, in "Why Not Try Freedom?" Leonard Read had further refined his case for limited government: "The moral sanction for establishing government springs from the right of the individual to inhibit or prohibit or restrain the destructive actions of others. . . . An ideal theory of government is to be derived from the necessity for the free, uninhibited flow of all creative human energy. . . . Little else but the removal of inhibitory influences is required." In this line of reasoning, one inhibitory influence would be expected to remove another inhibitory influence.

Nevertheless, Read continues to insist that the free market cannot possibly deal with "fraud, violence, misrepresentation and predatory practices," despite clear evidence on every hand that this is just what the free market is doing in thousands of instances, when government gives it the chance. "These inhibitory actions cannot be dealt with personally. . . . No individual could possibly police the numberless instances of aggressive force. . . . If every person were to be a law unto himself, we would have no less than 170,000,000 governments in the United States." Exactly. Isn't this precisely what Read has pointed out in the workings of the free market, that "incomprehensible order" is the resultant of 170,000,000 individuals coming together in the market place? Don't we really live today pretty much in peace and harmony, with very few evidences of predation, except when government or the ideas popularized by it intervene?

While he denies, however, that under a free market system the dire predictions of socialists would come to pass, that "bloated plutocrats" would monopolize the economy, Read sees the identical thing happening if there were no coercive government. "The offenders in society would soon be in command. They would be the govern-

ment. . . . The responsibility for society-wide protection cannot, in sound organizational practice, be vested in anything less than society. . . . Cooperation ought to be as nearly unanimous as possible. . . . Ideally, the only dissenters would be those who want to live by predation." But, as Read has pointed out elsewhere, this would account for nearly everyone in the population today, for how many Americans are not out for all the government goodies they can obtain?

In another 1958 essay, "Two Kinds of Influence," Leonard Read has another crack at those who favor self-government: "To avoid the authoritarianism of each citizen being a complete law unto himself—each person his own gun-toter—we should, in good theory, delegate the defensive function to a formal agency called government."

It is this persistent assertion, that the government has a delegated right to defend a person's life, liberty and property, regardless of whether that person granted such delegation or not, which appears to be at the root of Leonard Read's confusion. Thus, in "Let Anyone Deliver the Mail": "Any person has a moral right to inhibit the destructive action of another, aimed at himself. . . . Government, in good theory, and on moral grounds, has a right to inhibit the destructive actions of anyone menacing our society. Government has no grounds for forcibly directing or controlling the creative actions of anyone." But, it seems to me, when an individual is forced to work a portion of each day to pay taxes extracted at the point of a gun, his creative actions are certainly being controlled.

Here is another example of Leonard Read's argument for limited government, from "Violence as a Way of Life," published in 1962: "Any individual has a moral right to defend his life, the fruits of his labor, and his liberty—by demeanor, by persuasion, or with a club, if necessary. Defensive force is morally warranted. Moral rights are exclusively the attributes of individuals. They inhere in no collective, governmental or otherwise. As the individual has the moral right to defend his life and property—a right common to all individuals—he is within his rights to delegate this right of defense to an organization." This much is granted, but it is just here, it seems, that Read is continually taking away with his right hand what his left hand has given us, by defining "organization" willy-nilly as "government," and giving it enforcement powers over *all*

persons within its boundaries, whether they have delegated their individually-held rights to government or not!

Right down to *Anything That's Peaceful*, his 1964 book, Read reiterates his by now well-rehearsed defense of limited government: "My theme is that any one of us has a moral right to inhibit the destructive actions of another, and by the same token we have a right to organize (government) to accomplish this universal right to life, livelihood, liberty."

Then Leonard Read adds a statement which inspired the title of this essay:

"I confess to a practical dilemma. Regardless of the attempts throughout history to limit police force to its role of keeping the peace, it has always gotten out of hand. Sooner or later, in every instance, the role has been shifted from guard to boss of the citizenry, that is, from people service to people control; protector turned predator. So sad is the record of limitation that some persons throw up their hands in despair, incorrectly concluding that if limitation has never been maintained, it, therefore, is forever impossible. They begin to disbelieve even in government as peace keeper, insisting on no government at all; they become what might be called philosophical anarchists. . . . The dilemma is this: the understanding of police-force-as-guard will, obviously, never be advanced but only retarded when the police-force-as-boss is put in the educational driver's seat. . . . The myth of governmental education, in our country today, is an article of general faith. . . . But heart can be taken in the fact that the art of becoming is composed of the acts of overcoming."

What is remarkable in this statement, as in so many others made by Leonard Read, is not his penchant for government, which is shared by the vast majority of the world's population today. It is his shunning of government solutions to almost any specific problem mentioned, yet at the same time insisting upon the effectiveness and moral rightness of coercive government as such.

Read is opposed to government education. He has no faith in the inherent rightness of 50 per cent plus one of the voting populace. He abjures elections, and criticizes those who vote for "the lesser of two evils." He believes delivery of the mail should be a free-market enterprise. He opposes conscription, the government "moon shot," the union shop. In fact, in every specific problem with

which he deals, he comes out on the libertarian side, the side of letting individuals handle the matter in the free market . . . with the single exception of limited government as a theoretical ideal.

Nobody challenges Leonard Read's life-long devotion to freedom, or his courageous leadership of the libertarian cause when few dared to speak of it. That he does not believe in half-measures is clearly set forth in his own pledge: "What the Foundation for Economic Education attempts is to learn of freedom in its consistent, undiluted, ideal form."

Which brings me to my own dilemma: inasmuch as we recognize that a world of perfect liberty is an ideal whose realization must realistically be placed far into the future; and inasmuch as Leonard Read's compromised ideal of a free market with limited government can only be slightly less distant in prospect, if at all less remote; why should I, or anyone else who seeks a consistent, undiluted, ideal form of freedom stop short of such an ideal by advocating a measure of unfree, coercive government of some men over others? Insofar as I have been able to see the ideal, it involves the completely autarchic self-government of the individual, the inner-directed being who wears no man's yoke.

Myths of the Cold War

by Murray N. Rothbard

An observer for the past decade and more of the embattled "left and right," and of official actions touted as mighty blows in the struggle to "defeat communism," Dr. Murray N. Rothbard originally wrote the following article before overt military involvement of the United States in Viet Nam. Thus, it offers a vantage point of unheated analysis of the War-Hawk mentality which has led to political violence and war-induced emotions.

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I. The Arguments of the War Hawks Refuted

The Cold and Hot Warriors use a stock of arguments to support their position: some plausible, most of them hypocritical, all specious. Here is a refutation of the main points in their bellicose sophistry.

1. *Peace or war? The Communists declared war upon us fifty years ago. Therefore, we are at war already; therefore, let us . . . drop the bomb, etc.*

This argument centers upon a deceptive and disastrous equivocation on the word "war." It uses the term "war" to mean *ideological* conflict, and then cunningly switches the meaning to try to justify U.S. *military* action. The libertarian should, more than anyone else, be able to grasp the vital distinction. For the whole political philosophy of the libertarian rests upon it: upon the particular evil of physical violence used for aggression against others. The libertarian believes in ideological persuasion and is opposed to physical violence; he, above all, should stop using "war" as a loose and deceptive coverall.

But the Communists might stoop to violent revolution in America? Perhaps. But does anyone in his right mind believe that Amer-

ica faces the clear and present danger of overt, violent destruction by our tiny handful of domestic Communists?

But the Communists have behind them a military base in the Soviet Union? Right, and that is why we should be happy that the Soviet Communists realize the futility of nuclear war, and call for peace. Khrushchev and his successors have, frankly and honestly, been making their position unmistakably clear: they hope for internal adoption of communism in the U.S. and other countries, but they renounce any international, inter-state, *war*. This is what they mean by "peace," and this is what "peace" has always meant: absence of inter-state conflict. Why, then, must we simply assume that the men in the Kremlin are lying and that they don't want peace? Any rational person should prefer peace in the nuclear age. Let the ideological "war" with communism proceed, but let us also conclude military peace. Why, then, should we fear and hate the concept of "peaceful coexistence"? There is no basis on which to oppose it unless we think that freedom and free enterprise are ideologically *inferior* and could not survive an ideological debate with communism.

Let us, then, abandon this and all other similar equivocations, such as the concept of "indirect aggression." *There is no such thing*. If, for example, the Cairo Radio beams broadcasts to Jordan calling upon the Jordanese to revolt, this is *not* aggression in any sense; it is an attempt at ideological persuasion. Anyone who doesn't like it should broadcast his own messages to the Jordanese, and not try to suppress Cairo messages by force. Ditto for any other messages or propaganda that any group or ideology may make. There is another, better term for "indirect aggression," and that is "exercise of freedom of speech." There is no point to a "freedom of speech" that only permits people to say what you or I would like them to say. The only freedom of speech worth talking about is one that permits the speech of groups and ideologies that we hate.

There is *one* at least respectable argument by those who would lock up, or kill, domestic Communists: namely, that, in advocating communism, they are advocating crime (against persons, property, etc.), and therefore it is legitimate to take preventive action against them. The trouble with this argument is that it proves far, far too much. For, if one takes this position, what do we do with the *other* groups that are engaging in similar crimes: Socialists, New Dealers, Modern Republicans, Conservatives, etc., all of whom advocate

crimes similar to those of Communists? And what do we do with our sturdy Rightists who advocate the crime of enslavement known as "conscription"? I am afraid that we could not stop at locking up only Communists: we would have to place in jail about 95-99 per cent of the American population—to say nothing about the rest of the world!—a program which, at the very least, would be rather impractical.

Furthermore, I think that we would *all* have to agree that actually *committing* a crime is far worse than simply advocating one; and if we are to lock up Communists for advocating crime at some vaguely distant date in the future, what in the world are we going to do with all those government officials who have actually been *committing* these crimes? What are we going to do with all the old New Deal rulers, and Presidents Eisenhower and Johnson, and all the Congressmen voting for "criminal" legislation? And what in the world are we going to do about General Hershey? And Harry S. Truman, the mass Butcher of Hiroshima? In short, if we are to incarcerate for a decade or more a handful of agitators for a crime at some vague date in the future, we must do something far worse, and much more immediately, to those who have already committed similar political crimes. As long as we let our Trumans and our George Marshalls remain scot free, and indeed lionize them as heroes, it is indeed grotesque to incarcerate our Eugene Dennises.

Returning to the problem of the Communist "war," it is odd, indeed, that our War Hawks are willing to place the credence of Revelation (albeit a diabolic one) on any inflammatory statements made by Soviet Communists in 1917 or 1919 or 1921, yet place no credence whatever on any pro-peace statements made by the Communists *now*. Surely, here is a grave contradiction: to place absolute reliance on an old pronouncement of the Communists, and none whatever on a pronouncement made amidst the realities of our nuclear age. If, in short, the Communists have "already declared war on us," *what evidence* will the War Hawks accept to prove that the Communists are ready to call this war off? *Any* evidence, short of immolating themselves on a Kremlin funeral pyre?

In fact, taking "war" in the ideological sense, "they" have been "at war with us," *not* since 1917, but since 1848 as Marxism. But our War Hawks never mention this, for to do this would mean an embarrassing opening of the dyke: it would mean that we would have to include all Marxists as our "enemy," and then all Socialists,

New Dealers, etc. And then we would realize that, to uncover enemies of freedom and free enterprise, we need not traipse off thousands of miles to launch a Holy Crusade against Moscow or Peking. We have plenty of such enemies here at home—enough to keep us busy for many years to come. Instead of hailing, for example, Senator Paul Douglas as a champion of the “Committee for the Freedom of All Peoples,” we had better devote more attention to Senator Paul Douglas as a destroyer of *American* freedom.

2. *Peace would mean betrayal of the lovers of freedom in the “captive nations,” such as Hungary (or even Russia?), who long for us to liberate them.* There follows a half-hour of weeping over our “cowardly” failure to come to the aid of the Hungarian Revolution.

First, as to the hypocritical weeping over Hungary.* When the Hungarians revolted, and for a few glorious days had overthrown the Communist regime, the great desideratum was to keep Russian troops out of Hungary. How was this to be accomplished? By American planes bombing the Kremlin and precipitating a nuclear World War III? By ultimatums to Russia that would have provoked World War III? Would this have benefited the Hungarians? Or us? By H-bombing Budapest, perhaps, as the Russian troops were entering? No, the Hungarians, along with the rest of the bleeding European continent, have already suffered two great American “liberations”; they could not possibly have survived a third.

There was one possible way, and one alone, to keep Hungary free of Russian troops in that tempestuous week: and that was to make an immediate deal with the Russians, that we would pull all our troops out of Europe if they would keep theirs out of Hungary. Would the Russians have accepted? At least we should have made the offer, and by the hysteria of the War Hawks at the very thought, one suspects that the Russians would have agreed. And, from this hysteria, we can gauge how sincere the militant mourners for Hungary really are.

There is, of course, the argument that pulling troops out would leave a “power vacuum” in Europe which someone, presumably the Russians, would have to rush to fill. This is an example of the mischief caused by using natural-science metaphors in the affairs of

*Let us not forget the role of the British–French–Israeli aggression at Suez, which the *National Review* supported, in making the suppression of Hungary seem respectable.

human action, and then taking them too seriously. There *is no* "power vacuum," requiring something to fill it.

There is, indeed, something exceedingly odd about the argument that Americans should be cremated in a nuclear holocaust, because this is necessary to "preserve their Honor" by trying to liberate the slaves of communism. There are, let us say, 800 million people living behind the Iron Curtain. The very fact that all these people are still alive testifies to the fact that they, every one, prefer life under communism to death, with or without Honor. But if all the 800 millions prefer life under communism to death, prefer "slavery" to death, who are *we* to have the unmitigated gall to advocate murdering millions of Americans and Russians in order to free these slaves? If the Russian *muzhik* prefers his slavery to death, this is a choice which he has the right to make, and an anti-Communist who sends missiles to murder him to make sure that he dies Honorably is, simply . . . committing murder. And this—murder—mass murder—is what all the fancy and high moral slogans about Death With Honor boil down to.

Many Americans may each, individually, prefer death to life under communism. And that is their privilege. But they have *no* right, and as professed libertarians they have certainly no right, to murder countless millions of people because of this choice. In short, they have no right to cremate other people: Americans, Russians, or what have you, who would make the *opposite* choice, who would opt for survival. The War Hawks like to talk of *their* noble disregard for human life, on behalf of the spiritual ideals of honor, etc., and of their opponents' miserable atheistic regard for life as a supreme value. But what is there noble, what is there spiritual, what in fact is there Christian, about mass murder of those innocents who do not share these values? Surely, it would be both more libertarian, more courageous, and more Christian for such conservatives quietly to commit suicide and insure their martyrdom that way, rather than drag millions upon millions of innocents to their death along with them.

If, then, the new crusaders are itching to liberate the slaves who look askance at liberation, their only truly honorable course would be to outfit themselves individually and corporately, without involving the rest of us Americans, or Americans officially as a nation, and go winging their way to fight the Russians on their own. With *this*

kind of war, Americans can only be the gainer, whoever wins: if by some quirk the crusaders win, then those Russians left alive will be free (if they don't die of radiation poisoning before they can enjoy their freedom), and if the crusaders lose, then they will have had their coveted Death With Honor, and the rest of us will be left alone to conclude peaceful agreements with the Russians.

By their failure to commit suicide, we know that the 800 millions are not nearly as anti-Communist as their would-be saviors. And by their utter failure to revolt against Communist rule, which has now lasted for fifty years, we can well wonder just how anti-Communist the Russian slaves—and now the Chinese slaves—really may be. Mr. Eugene Lyons, for two decades now, has been trumpeting imminent revolution in Russia; I think it is about time that Mr. Lyons be asked to put up or shut up.

3. *Don't Shake the Hands of the Bloody Butcher.*

This introduces into international diplomacy all the irrelevant High Seriousness of the *code duello*, or "Whom Should We Snub at Mrs. Astorbilt's Tea Party?" Yes, yes, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev is a Bloody Butcher. On the Day of Judgment he will answer for his crimes, and roast a thousand years in hellfire. But there are a lot of Bloody Butchers around; the world reeks with them, is universally run by them, has been run by them, more or less, for many centuries. Lord Acton, the great British libertarian historian, once said that the Muse of the historian is not Clio, but Rhadamanthus, the avenger of innocent blood. I agree. But, in the meanwhile before the millenium arrives, what do we do with these Bloody Butchers? Khrushchev *is* a Bloody Butcher, but so is Churchill, and DeGaulle, and Franco, and Chiang, and Ky, and countless other "bastions of the free world." Why did these hypocritical moralists, who not only do not blanch at these people but rush to Shake Their Hand, suddenly balk at Nikita? Certainly, Winston Churchill slaughtered far more men in his lifetime than had Nikita. So did F.D.R. Harry S. Truman, Butcher of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is not far behind. Our task should be: to reduce the annual quantity of butchery as much as possible. How do we do this, we anti-Butchers? By reviling Khrushchev or Kosygin as much as possible, and thereby making a peaceful *detente* impossible, and nuclear extermination ever closer? Or by seeing to it that peace prevails, and that therefore there is no mass international butchery to worry about? The chief instrument of butchery by state rulers over innocent civilians

is *war*; refrain from war, work for peace, and we shall have done our part in reducing butchery in the world. But, on the other hand, if we send H-bombs and missiles to Moscow as pique for past Muscovite butchery, we thereby *add* immeasurably to the total amount of butchery in the world.

It is, indeed, surprising that the very same people who blanch so quickly at a few selected Foreign Butchers, never protest against the continued good repute of various Domestic Butchers, who are much more under our jurisdiction. Why hurl anathema at the Butcher of the Ukraine, while continuing to hail as Elder Statesmen the Butcher of Hiroshima and countless others?

The Buckleysque horror at the Butcher of the Ukraine, coupled with the warm praise showered on the Butchers of China, Korea, Dresden, etc., leads one to believe that the whole argument reeks with hypocrisy. Trujillo was a Good Butcher, because he was Our Butcher, i.e., a good "anti-Communist." Castro is a Bad Butcher, because he gives every indication of being one of Theirs. Despite the high moral tone of the War Hawks, it turns out that the high crime of Butchery is strictly relative, depending on who's doing it.

In fact, the whole argument is pure hypocrisy, designed to fool the "mass base" of the Right, and whip them into war hysteria. To demonstrate this, let us take Brezhnev and Kosygin, younger men who have not been implicated in any of the major butcheries of Stalin or Khrushchev. And let us suppose that they come over here for a visit. Does anyone believe for a single instant that they would not be equally denounced, that their visit would not be just as staunchly opposed as Khrushchev's was by the rightist War-Hawk organs? Let us face it: the Butchery argument is a pure red herring, a demagogic device to whip up opposition to peace.

4. *We should not negotiate with the Russians, or Chinese, until they show by deeds, not words, that they favor peace.*

This is a typical State Department-type argument, rather than a War Hawk one. It doesn't make any more sense, nevertheless. What deeds are the Russians supposed to undertake, to "prove" their peaceful intentions? A deed like disarmament? Who is for complete and general disarmament, the Russians or us? A deed like ending foreign bases? Who has bases, encircling the other side, the Russians or us? A deed like finally liquidating World War II, concluding a peace treaty with one or two Germanies, and getting foreign troops out of Germany? Who advocates this, the Russians

or us? A deed like expanding trade and cultural interchange between the nations? Who advocates this, the Russians or us? Who has called for abandonment of underground nuclear tests, for outlawry of nuclear war, etc.? Aren't these suggestions "deeds"?

What else can the Russians do—except voluntarily abandon communism? Is this the *only* deed that we will consider as satisfactory before agreeing on peace? Is such a demand on our part *peaceful*, or is it an ultimatum? The fact is that it has consistently, for many years now, been the *Russians* who have taken the lead in moves for peace: in calling for disarmament, for withdrawing troops, for concluding peace treaties with our former enemies, for Summit talks to reduce tensions and make agreements, etc. And in every case it has been the Americans who have held back and shown the utmost reluctance. What would *we* be saying now, I wonder, if the positions were reversed, if the Russians adamantly refused to negotiate unless we voluntarily gave up free enterprise? (Of course, we seem to be doing this anyhow, but that's another story.) If the Russians are willing to negotiate fully with us without asking for "deeds," why shouldn't we be?

As for the Chinese, we can have nothing to say about them. How can we, when officially they do not exist? In old-style international relations, the only sensible kind, "recognition" means simply that: the recognition of reality, of the existence of a government. Just because Woodrow Wilson and Henry Stimson launched the absurd policy of using recognition—or non-recognition—as a moral weapon, is no reason for us to pursue it.

5. *The Russians have fixed a timetable for our destruction. Nothing we can do can alter that timetable; therefore, we should be tough with the Russians, not worry about provoking them, etc.*

This is the great myth of the Russian "timetable," used to the hilt some years ago by Willi Schlamm in his *Germany, East or West*. All we need to do to puncture this nonsense is to consider what would happen if we delivered an ultimatum to Kosygin to resign and dissolve the government within twenty-four hours, else we drop H-bombs upon Russia. Does anyone believe that the Russians would not regard this as a war ultimatum and act accordingly? But if we have to admit that the Russians would be provoked into fighting after such an action, then the whole myth of a fixed timetable comes tumbling down. For then we would have to admit that *some* acts

of ours would be so provocative as to induce the Russians to make war, which means that there is no fixed timetable, and that we had better watch where we warmonger.

It is understandable how youngish men who perhaps cannot remember the nonsense of F.D.R.'s fantasy about Hitler's timetable to invade Iowa by way of Dakar, Brazil, Panama, Guatemala, and Mexico, can swallow this timetable myth, but it is hard to understand how elderly conservatives, many members of America First and heated critics of the Roosevelt mendacity, can now credit and support an even more incredible and dangerous "timetable" swindle.

The whole idea that the Communists have some Master Timetable where all future history is writ, is sheer irrationality and diabolism. It is based on the view that the Communists are omniscient supermen, infallible, all-seeing, who *know* that on July 1, 1973, they will take over the earth. No shred of evidence has ever been brought forward to prove the existence of such a timetable, our warmongers having to fall back on flagrant, and apparently deliberate, misinterpretations of such phrases as "we will bury you." But, of course, something as mundane and earthbound as evidence has very little to do with the rhetoric of our War Hawks, whose attitude can best be explained as a *literal* belief that Communists are agents of the Devil.

In this connection, it is interesting that Willi Schlamm, after assuring us that, because of the Master Timetable, nothing warlike that we could do can provoke the Russians to premature attack, ends by saying that if the Russians should perchance attack, it would not be a refutation of his theory. For it would simply mean that the Russians had, absolutely independently, decided to change their timetable! This, of course, is a very convenient way of having your theory without having to submit it to any test of evidence whatever. It is also the kind of reasoning engaged in by primitive savages to justify their superstitions.

It is curious, by the way, how the pro-war Right, on this as on many other occasions, who never tire of preening themselves as the lonely carriers of Western Civilization, are ready to revert to the most uncivilized modes of thought and action. It is also curious that the very people who devote much of their energies to attacking modern technology as being somehow demeaning to their aristocratic tastes, should enthusiastically embrace every advanced tech-

nological weapon of mass destruction. The air-conditioner or television set is crass materialism; the H-bomb and the guided missile are the arms of spiritual Righteousness.

Such, I believe, are the main War-Hawk arguments. We come now to Part II, where we consider the interesting question: Why be anti-Communist? What are the reasons that the American officialdom, press, etc., are so vehemently anti-Communist? Let us go down the list of these common reasons, one by one.

II. Why Be Anti-Communist?

1. *Communism permits no free elections* (the favorite Social-Democrat argument).

True and deplorable. But: what of Chiang, and Franco, and Ky, and Trujillo, and Rhee (who permitted elections only after jailing opponents)? When did they ever permit free elections? Why, then, are they our "heroic allies" while Soviet Russia and China must be fought to the death? Obviously, *this* is no reason to be for war against communism, any more than it would be to declare war on Chiang. And, by the way, the one place in Southeast Asia where there *were* partial free elections was in Laos, where the Communists won, and where our puppets stepped in to dissolve the legislature and jail the Communist leaders in breach of national and international agreements. This was done at American urging—this sabotaging of free elections, which apparently are only good when Our Side wins.

2. *Communism permits no freedom of speech.*

True, and still more deplorable. But: what of Chiang, and Franco, and Ky, and Castillo Branco, and Rhee? Since when did these Bastions of the Free World ever permit freedom of speech? There are surely countless other examples. But we don't whoop it up for war crusades against these nations; why against Russia and China? Again, a better reason will have to be found.

3. *Communism is a conspiracy.*

Social Democrats, the argument runs, are nice guys who are open and above-board; Communists, on the other hand, lurk in dark corners, as conspirators. It is about time that this nonsense be speared. How does one define the word "conspiracy"? A *conspiracy is an agreement—any agreement—between two or more people made in private*. If Jones and Smith and Robinson meet in Jones' home to decide to support Robinson at the next meeting for president of the

local lodge, and they do not publicize their agreement, this is "conspiracy." And so all of us, in one way or another, are "conspirators" about something. So what? The whole conspiracy bogy was introduced into the common law by kings who feared opposition to their rule, and wanted to crush all dissent. It's about time we abandon this bogy concept, or else logically widen it until its use against only Communists becomes nonsensical.

4. *Communists believe in lying for their cause.*

Again highly deplorable. But which government officials don't do the same? What government doesn't employ propaganda bureaus in highly organized lying for what they think is the dumb public's benefit? What government official doesn't lie in his teeth for the supposed national welfare, and pride himself upon his deeds? Did not Professor Thomas A. Bailey, a leading partisan of F.D.R., admit that Clare Boothe Luce was correct in holding that F.D.R. lied the United States into war? And did not Bailey praise F.D.R. as a great democratic statesman for his political mendacity? Does any sane and informed person believe that General Marshall told the truth when he said he could not remember where he was on the night before Pearl Harbor?

5. *Communists do things like preventing Pasternak from accepting a Nobel Prize.*

Again deplorable. And what of the United States, bastion of the free world? We prevent an American Leftist from getting the Lenin Peace Prize, and prevent a Russian from travelling here to give it to him. We prevent Paul Robeson from getting a passport to visit abroad. We revile the editor of the *National Guardian*, and jail those whose crime is only to advocate communism. This is to say nothing of the similar actions of Chiang, Franco, and. . . . So why go to war with Russia?

6. *Communists want to impose socialism on the economy.*

Correct, and here is the main reason why I am anti-Communist. But, here again: who doesn't? Doesn't Chiang, or Franco, or Ky, or Trujillo, or Rhee? America's foremost advocate of Chiang—an ardent free enterpriser—once admitted to me that Chiang and his associates are thoroughly socialist, and don't even have the slightest conception of free enterprise. So, what do we do? Fight Chiang as well? And, again, what about our home-grown Socialists, who don't belong to the Communist sect of socialists? They are far more popular and influential in the U.S. than are the Communist sect. What

do we do to the Walter Reuthers and Mrs. Roosevelts, Norman Thomases, David Dubinskys, and editors of the *New Leader*? Do we slaughter them? And if not, why travel thousands of miles to slaughter Russians?

7. *Communism is Godless.*

Ah, here we come to what I suspect is the main reason why the "mass base" of the Right is anti-Communist. Yes, Communists are atheists. (The only adjective that the man-on-the-street seems to be able to apply to communism is "atheistic.") May I be so bold as to say: so what? Are we then *really* back in the early Seventeenth Century, and must we really slaughter every heretic we can find? (A pro-Right War Hawk has used a phrase that is quite revealing. He called pacifism a "Christian heresy." Torquemada rides again!) Bertrand Russell is an atheist; must we drop an H-bomb on London in order to rid ourselves of his presence? There are lots of atheists, furthermore, who are thoroughly anti-Communist. Some of my best ardently libertarian friends are atheists. It should not be forgotten that the most glamorous and conservative Republican leader of his generation, Robert G. Ingersoll, was an agnostic, which would be regarded by many of the pious Cold Warriors as even worse than atheism.

If this whole affair is to be turned into a mighty theological (instead of a political-economic) struggle, how do the War Hawks account for the plethora of Protestant bishops and ministers who are "fellow travelers" of the Communists, or who are even so wicked as to be for peace? How do they account for the Red Dean of Canterbury? Or, even further, what do they do about Metropolitan Alexei, head of the flourishing, pro-Communist Holy Orthodox Church of Russia?

I suspect that some Cold Warriors may have at least an answer to the latter questions: i.e., by suggesting that Protestants and the Russian Orthodox Catholics are not *really* Christian.

In its early years, the Soviets tried to exterminate religion in Russia. They soon gave it up as a bad job—as they gave up egalitarianism—and turned, instead, to sponsoring religion. Khrushchev himself admitted the popularity of the churches in Russia today. Is the Orthodox Church of Russia then bad because it is a state church, run by state rulers? Of course, but let us not forget that the Russian Church has *always* been a state church under the czars.

And, we might note, in passing, the state church of that mighty bastion of the Free World, Great Britain.

And so we have it. The purpose of this paper has not been to advocate dictatorship, suppression of free speech, conspiracy, mendacity, socialism, or atheism. The purpose has been to show that, in every one of the common indictments of communism, there is nothing uniquely applicable to Soviet Russia or China, or to communism. All of these bad qualities adhere to a great many other social systems, including those of our most Heroic of Allies, and including the United States itself. There is, therefore, no reason for singling out communism or Russia upon which to launch a Holy War.

Let's Call It Anarchy

by Robert E. Gaskins, Jr.
Leanna J. Koehn
Richard H. Gaskins

Three California college students, majoring in English, in foreign languages, and in economics, philosophy, and political science (respectively), believe that "anarchy" is the best term to describe a non-politically governed society.

Twenty-two-year-old sophomore Robert E. Gaskins, Jr., is editor of the Los Angeles City College literary magazine. He plans a career in advertising and publications. Gaskins participated in the 1963-1964 Phrontistery held at Rampart College.

Miss Leanna J. Koehn, twenty-two, and also a sophomore at Los Angeles City College, plans to teach at secondary level. She was a Phrontistery participant.

Richard H. Gaskins, nineteen, is a senior at the University of Southern California who plans to teach at university level.

All three are graduates of a Comprehensive Course at Freedom School.

We see by the Winter, 1965, number of the *Rampart Journal* that Robert LeFevre has decided to call himself an "autarchist." He offers two reasons for this decision: 1. he cannot possibly be an anarchist since he is not a socialist, and 2. he feels that the label "autarchy" best describes his free-market position. While these ideas are thought-provoking, we think that Mr. LeFevre is mistaken on both points.

The crucial element in Mr. LeFevre's first line of defense is his insistence upon some "inextricable link" between anarchism and socialism. He never tells us if socialism is an unshakable part of the logic of the anarchist point of view; instead, he provides a "careful check" of anarchist writings which shows that nearly all anarchists of the past have also been socialists. Mr. LeFevre evidently realizes that his historical approach fails to establish any *logical* connection

between the two doctrines, and so he adds an extremely important *interpretive* judgment: "The anarchist is correctly included in the socialist movement because of his *central purpose* of intervening in the economy" (emphasis added).

This judgment is essential to Mr. LeFevre's argument, but it is questionable indeed. From our reading, we have reached a different point of view: it seems to us that the *central purpose* of the anarchist is and has been to deny the necessity or utility of the state, "the social apparatus of compulsion and coercion" (Mises), and not to apply force to the market place. Anarchy is thus a *political* term, not an economic one; it refers to the location of the decision-making power, not to the character of the decisions made. Since the anarchist's fundamental goal is the abolition of political authority, his economic ideas are merely incidental predictions of which economic system is most likely to prosper in an atmosphere of freedom. Any specific economic doctrine is, in Tucker's phrase, "not a decree, but a prophecy."

The fact that most anarchists have also been socialists can be better interpreted as the result of an historical accident. The accident is this: the anarchists were forced to select their economic ideas long before the marginalists successfully explained the self-regulating characteristics of the free market.

In the first half of the nineteenth-century the anarchists had decided that the state should be abolished, and were then called upon to say what economic organization would prevail in the absence of political authority. They required some economic theory which would avoid the gloomy predictions of the Ricardians and still not encourage the power of the nation-state. Capitalism was not for them a real choice, because the key to the dynamic, self-regulating nature of capitalism was the breakthrough of marginal utility analysis—an event which took place in the second half of the century, *after* the anarchists had committed themselves. Without this key, it is understandable that the anarchists failed to recognize that the institutions of capitalism provide a natural organization of the unhampered market.

Consider the dates. Although the 1870's are selected as the decade of the discovery of marginal analysis, the implications of this discovery remained unknown outside the classrooms of three or four universities. The European anarchist movement was already attached to certain economic ideas by this time; the American move-

ment was in its great period of growth (the publication of Tucker's *Liberty* may be taken as a gauge of the strength of anarchist influence in America, and its dates are 1881-1907). In other words, by 1880 anarchism had become a social movement and its doctrines were no longer subject to refinement. But the work of Jevons and Marshall did not reach this country until the 1890's, the first translations of Böhm-Bawerk were available only after 1900, and not even small sections of Menger's writings were translated until just a few years ago. (This information can be verified by consulting the catalogues of the British Museum and the Library of Congress.) More important, it is unlikely that the writings of Jevons, Marshall, Walras, or any of the others would have been able to influence anarchism even before its growth as a social movement began. These works were written for the arm-chair specialist who was well-versed in the differential calculus; chances are these books would have had little effect if they had appeared in time.

The major weakness in Mr. LeFevre's analysis is his failure to distinguish between the logic of the anarchist position and the usually inconsistent ideas which anarchists have held in the past. His assertion that anarchism and socialism are somehow "inextricably linked" is only a rather shaky inference from the historical situation which we outlined above; it tells us nothing about the logical implications of the anti-statist political viewpoint.

This confusion seems all the more strange since Mr. LeFevre himself has been one of the major contributors to a consistent reformulation of the anti-statist point of view: his usual message is that political freedom and economic liberalism are logically inseparable—that socialism is *incompatible* with anti-statism. If, as we feel, opposition to the state has been the fundamental guiding purpose of nearly all those we call anarchists, then Mr. LeFevre's writings clearly show that he not only shares in the central purpose of anarchism, but that he is one of the most consistent and sophisticated anarchists on record. The fact that he is not a socialist is what makes him so consistent, just as the fact that he opposes the existence of the state is what makes him an anarchist.

We now take up the question as to whether "anarchy" should give way to "autarchy" as a name for the anti-statist, free-market position. Our aim in choosing one word or the other is to communicate, accurately, with as many people as possible; and to do so we

must select the word that is generally accepted as conveying the meaning we wish to express. This is not a question on which every man is entitled to his own opinion. In matters of language, the tyranny of the majority is absolute.

The way in which we determine the will of the majority in matters of usage is to consult the records of how each word has been used. The most extensive compilation of this kind (and by far the most reliable guide) is the great Oxford English Dictionary, the OED. It gives the following information under the entry *Autarchy*: 1. Absolute sovereignty, despotism. 2. Self-government. This second meaning is Mr. LeFevre's intended usage, but unfortunately the OED records no use of the word in this sense after 1691 A.D. The plain fact is that the word has been dead as "self-government" for 275 years. The Merriam-Webster Third International defines autarchy as despotism or economic nationalism only, the meaning also used consistently by Mises in his works. (This last point is important because, after Mises has accepted the word's current meaning, we could only introduce ambiguity if we tried to re-define the word.)

Mr. LeFevre says in his article that he realizes that dictionaries do not support his usage, but that the "despotism" they refer to must be *self*-despotism because of the derivation of "autarchy." He says that *auto* means "self" and that *-archy* means "rule," so therefore the compound must mean "self-rule." This is precisely equivalent to believing that a "redcoat" is a jacket of crimson color, which can be defended by the same process of reasoning. Words acquire meanings by usage, not by etymology; today a redcoat is a British soldier and autarchy is despotism, whatever the two words may have meant in the past.

Let us see, then, if "anarchy" suits our purpose of communication any better. Under *Anarchy* the OED records: 1. Absence of government; a state of lawlessness due to the absence or inefficiency of the supreme power; political disorder. (This usage is illustrated with quotations from 1539 to 1878.) At first glance the reference to "political disorder" would seem to disqualify "anarchy" since disorder is no part of the peaceful, voluntary cooperation we envision. This, however, is not the latest information.

The volume of the OED containing "anarchy" was prepared for publication in January, 1884. Other sections were published over the next 45 years, the final one appearing in 1928. At that time the

editors realized that many words had undergone changes in usage during the period of publication, and they prepared a supplement to bring the earlier portions of the work up to date.

In the supplement, Volume 13, published in 1933, we find that "autarchy" has not been resurrected; it is not even mentioned in the supplement. "Anarchy," though, has undergone a significant change in meaning; the OED records it as follows: *Anarchy*. Add: 1b. A theoretical social state in which there is no governing person or body of persons, but each individual has absolute liberty (without implication of disorder). It is in that last phrase that the OED records the sense shift; "anarchy" has since 1891 achieved currency as a term that does not imply disorder. And, now that we have the word in the sense we want, there is an urgent reason to use it: it (like "autarchy") will die if we neglect it, and the partisans of the free market may once again be in the situation of 1691-1891 with no word to describe themselves.

From these references, the following should be clear: If we choose to call our position "autarchy," we are merely obscuring communication with medieval terminology. But if we choose "anarchy," we have a live word with a sense that describes our position perfectly; we can communicate with the world, and not withdraw from it into a language of our own making.

It may be difficult for individualists to bow to the will of the majority, but in this instance we gain a very real advantage by doing so: we are enabled to enter into a dialogue with the rest of the scholarly community, rather than withdrawing into "*Autism*. Morbid admiration of oneself" (OED).

On the Other Hand

The Return of the "War Crimes"—"War Criminals" Issue

There is a great deal to be said concerning war, and certainly many a timely observation should be made of the current claim that American servicemen are "war criminals." With devastating verbiage and with equal emphasis in both directions, Dr. James J. Martin has a few things to say in this area.

Commenting on trials such as those of Nuremberg, he observes: "Sustained insistence upon the principle of individuality and the subordination of authority to the Higher Law of individual conscience, as a universal constant, might easily undermine and make unworkable all statecraft built upon conscripted and otherwise impressed and dragooned military force."

If we are to accept the edict of the ex post facto proceedings at its face value, then each man should weigh the consequences and moral implications of any order he receives. If the order goes against his conscience, it would follow that he should disobey. It's an interesting proposition with fascinating convolutions in the area of predictability.

Observations of a Free Market Operator

This is a two-fisted, hard-hitting presentation in fresh contrast to the usual learned style and form of an article in a scholarly journal. Actually, the argument is scholarly in a most practical sense for it is offered, not as a result of intellectual theorizing, but as a result of experience in a real world. The purpose of scholarship has always been to come to grips with reality, and William Grede's grasp of industrial reality is profound. In recent years, there has been a widening gap in communications between business leaders and the intellectual leadership of our institutions of higher learning. The breakdown has been extensive, to the point where today many industrialists simply do not comprehend what professors are saying, and the professors do not comprehend what the industrialists are saying.

It is in hopes that this breakdown can be at least partially bridged that Mr. Grede's thoughts are offered here.

America's Sacred White Cow

Larry Glaser has penetrated to the roots of the problem of conscription. He sees our conversion from a nation of people who opposed conscription to one of people who favor it, as the result of a process of governmental conditioning. There can be no avoidance of the inescapable conclusions drawn here. Governments have customarily been their own worst enemies. When the image of government as a supporter of peace and freedom is shattered and its real character is seen through the tattered veil of broken lives and imposed violence, then changes can and will occur. Mr. Glaser's warning is timely, indeed.

Leonard Read's Dilemma—and Mine

Howard E. Kessler has developed his analytical powers to a remarkable degree as recent articles from his pen have indicated. His current analysis on the position taken by Leonard E. Read respecting government is a case in point. Mr. Read has already become a legendary figure in his own lifetime and the philosophic position he supports has been the source of both inspiration and frustration along the libertarian front.

While the article may be taken by some as an attempt to criticize unduly, no such motivation exists. It is one of the purposes of this *Journal* to discuss ideas and ideological systems without personal rancor. Mr. Kessler has succeeded in illustrating the dilemma and in avoiding the all too prevalent tendency to descend to bitterness and calumny. It is hoped that other articles of this same genre will be forthcoming.

Myths of the Cold War

Dr. Murray N. Rothbard is opposed to communism because communism advocates the confiscation of private property and the operation of the tools of production and distribution by the state. In his well-reasoned article in this issue of the *Journal*, Dr. Rothbard catalogues many of the arguments marshalled by anti-Communists and finds most if not all of them specious.

Dr. Rothbard is also opposed to war, in which position he favors peace and freedom, both of which are customarily reduced or de-

stroyed by war. Many will find Dr. Rothbard's article inflammatory and we can anticipate that some will even suppose it to be pro-communistic.

The merit of the "Myths of the Cold War" lies in its intellectual stance in respect to principles. Dr. Rothbard, unlike many who will recoil at his logic, applies precisely the same reasoning to both sides of each issue. If peace and freedom are constructive, and war and slavery destructive, then moves toward peace and freedom are laudatory, and moves toward war and slavery are to be deplored. It matters not one iota who favors war and slavery; such advocacy, while it must be permitted as an adjunct to free speech, cannot be logically supported by those who profess to believe in peace and freedom. If identical tests relating to motive and evidence are applied to both Communist and anti-Communist arguments, then truth may be discerned.

Let's Call It Anarchy

Miss Koehn and Messrs. Gaskins have collaborated in this effort to show that the word *autarchy* should not be used in relation to a system containing no political government. They prefer the word *anarchy*. This is in response to an article which appeared in the winter edition of the RAMPART JOURNAL (1965).

They argue that the author was in error when he contended that he cannot be an anarchist because he is not a socialist and that the word *autarchy* (self-rule) can be used to describe a free-market economy.

It appears that the authors are not trying to establish that autarchist LeFevre is a socialist. Rather, they wish to establish that anarchy is not necessarily socialistic, and that there is no necessary connection between the concept of self-rule as embodied in the word *autarchy* and an actual free-market condition.

While autarchist LeFevre is criticized for interpreting anarchist writings as invariably including economic intervention and hence being part and parcel of the socialist movement, Miss Koehn and Messrs. Gaskins employ precisely the same method, interpretation of anarchist writings, to reach an opposite conclusion. The difficulty here lies in the fact that any interpretation is neither more nor less than a value judgment. Therefore, criticism of LeFevre for employing literary interpretation is only valid if his critics abstain from like behavior. Since their first line of attack is to offer their

own interpretation of anarchistic writings, the criticism as to the use of interpretation will not stand.

Nor will the assertions that economic revisions were offered by Tucker as a "prophecy," or that the admitted fact that anarchists were historically included as socialists as a result of "an historical accident," impress many thoughtful readers. The fact is that anarchists were socialists. The fact remains that economic intervention is their central goal.

Since Tucker has already been referred to, it is instructive to note this analysis of Mr. Tucker's writings in *Men Against the State* by Dr. James J. Martin. The reference is on page 205 under the subhead, "2. Theoretical Anarchism Matured." "The crystallization of anarchist thought which took place during the period of Tucker's prominence as the literary focal point of the native American demonstration can be found illustrated in both political and economic senses throughout *Liberty*. Tucker himself, however, left no doubt as to which aspect of the struggle against the state he considered the most important. Production, distribution, and exchange were all subjects of long study on his part, and he came to the conclusion that the political and social structures of American culture could better be dealt with *after economic problems had been settled* (emphasis added). 'Liberty, to be effective, must find its first application in the realm of economics,' he declared, and on this matter of the economic basis of life he drummed continually."

The claim that economic science had not advanced to the place where capitalism was viewed as self-regulating, and hence the anarchists advocated economic reform, is of course valid. But this is all the more reason why the term *anarchy* cannot be applied equally to those scholars and theorists today who wish to rely upon private capitalism and who detect the role of government as private capitalism's destroyer.

If there are two groups of theorists wishing to avoid state rule and state control, one because the state makes private ownership of property possible, and the other because the state impairs private ownership of property, it is clear that a single term will not encompass the task. Since anarchists are historically admitted to have been practicing socialists (accidental or not), then it follows that those who reject socialism totally cannot be called anarchists. And it is far more logical and far more useful to devise a new term to

indicate the new departure away from socialism than to attempt to rewrite history.

The next objection, and we suspect the real objection, of the three critics relates to the admitted fact that the word *autarchy* has not been used to mean "self-government" for 275 years. Therefore, when it is used today, it is apt to convey some of the meaning that is intended to relate to the economically self-sufficient state (autarky). The difficulty here is admitted. Nonetheless, the word *autarchy* implicitly means self-rule or self-government. *Anarchy*, on the contrary, means no rule and no government.

The argument proceeds to show that when common usage corrupts a word, the word can only be used in its corrupted sense; therefore, "redcoats" may mean an external garment of crimson hue but it will also certainly signify the British soldier of the American revolutionary period. While this criticism has merit, it serves to sustain LeFevre's rejection of anarchy as a useful word. Webster gives this meaning to the word *anarchy*: "1. The state of society where there is no law or supreme power; a state of political disorder. 2. A state of confusion or disorder. Syn. *Anarchy*, chaos, lawlessness mean a breakdown in law or order. Anarchy implies total absence or suspension of government; chaos, the utter negation of law or order; lawlessness, a prevalent or habitual disregard of law or order."

Under the term *anarchism*, the same dictionary includes as a second meaning: "Advocacy or practice of anarchistic principles; esp., anarchistic revolution, nihilism; terrorism."

Under the term *anarchist*, Webster advises: "One who advocates anarchy or believes in anarchism; a terrorist; a nihilist."

The *American College Dictionary* adds this to the definition of *anarchist*: "One who seeks to overturn by violence all constituted forms and institutions of society and government, with no purpose of establishing any other system of order in the place of that destroyed."

While it could readily be shown that such blanket indictments of anarchy do not apply to historical anarchists as a whole, but rightfully adhere only to Bakuninists, Marxists, Nihilists, and so on, if reliance is placed upon the argument offered, that corruption permanently impairs a word, it would follow that *anarchy* has been far more grossly impaired than *autarchy*.

The position taken in "Autarchy Versus Anarchy" is not a position leading to chaos, social disruption, violence, and a complete lack of social order. On the contrary, the position of the autarchist is one that supports self-rule rather than a lack of rule. It calls for social order of a high caliber and totally eschews violence for any reason whatever. The autarchist does not seek to overthrow government even by peaceful means, certainly not by violent means. The autarchist has no political objective whatever. He will abandon reliance on the state in favor of self-reliance. The autarchist seeks to build a useful and constructive order by reliance upon economic law and the manifest self-interest each of us unquestionably has. If the word *autarchy* has its limitations, then it would be valid to offer a better and more useful term. *Anarchy*, even by the arguments of its supporters, is hopelessly corrupted and out of date. Until a better word can be found, the autarchists will use *autarchy*.