

RAMPART JOURNAL

OF INDIVIDUALIST THOUGHT

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RAMPART JOURNAL of Individualist Thought

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Prelude to Hell

by Robert LeFevre and Seymour Leon

Rampart College instructors LeFevre and Leon report some shattering statistics on the lethal weaponry presently available to warring states, and suggest that thinking individuals reconsider the validity of mass reliance upon violence as a deterrent to war.

Work on this paper was originally performed by Seymour Leon, and adapted by Robert LeFevre in a speech before the Downtown Kiwanis Club of Wichita November 1, 1967.

Anthropologists agree that from the very beginning, man's ability to survive in the environment in which he found himself, surrounded by other living creatures stronger, larger, and faster than he, can be attributed to this prime factor: man's capacity for conceptualization, which enabled him to create and use tools.

Scientists and scholars are beginning to find the origins of why we behave as we do. Man is known as the tool maker, distinguishing himself from other animals because of his remarkable rational facilities by means of which he can think and visualize what does not presently exist. This ability to reason has led man to invent and devise tools that multiply his effectiveness.

Nor is it altogether surprising to learn that the first tool men contrived was a weapon. In the terrifying conditions of a primordial world, our forebears apparently learned to pick up heavy branches or to make use of the bones of mastodons and antelope and elk, by means of which to gain some kind of physical superiority over the game they stalked and over the large carnivores which stalked them. Such a tool would have served as an effective weapon for hunting food and for bashing in the skulls of those who might be of a different philosophic point of view.

So it appears that among the first uses to which men put their minds was the creation of tools which would assist in providing food and in settling arguments. And there is some evidence that the settling of the latter quite often satisfied the former. This is entirely

understandable. Why else does a man create a tool except to help him solve problems?

It is at once obvious that a given tool, employed to enlarge food supplies, will be used to set up a chain of consequences leading to the emergence of a market, advanced productivity, marketing and selling, financial investment. With the contrivance of a multitude of new products and services, the well-being of many can be and has been enormously advanced.

It is equally obvious that this same tool, or other tools employed to settle arguments, will be used to set up a chain of consequences leading to the formation of governments and states, periodically plummeting men first into courts of law and penal institutions, and finally plunging them into war, by means of which political superiority will be vouchsafed depending on the advancement of the military hardware employed.

It would appear that when tools are used to enhance human well-being, free enterprise and market-place procedures proliferate and we have the advantage of greater assurances of survival, as well as survival with a growing degree of comfort and pleasure in living life.

It would also appear that when tools are used to punish and to take vengeance upon those who disagree, a disfunctional result is obtained leading to the oppression and regimentation of man, who becomes in time merely a tool for his overlord to exploit and employ as the overlord sees fit.

We might, from the vantage point of our present culture, look back on those acts of tool-making leading into a more complex and dynamic market and nod in understandable pride. Through this tool-making ability we have remade the world. It is shrinking rapidly, thanks to our communication media and our transportation media and our recognition that the world is in reality just one great big market place in which we should all be able to exchange our goods and services in favor of the goods and services produced elsewhere. Science and technology have now advanced with such rapidity that, in our own time, there is virtually no market-place problem we cannot solve if we are patient and persevering and willing to let the voluntary choices of men provide the necessary incentives.

But science and technology have been made available outside the market place, too. And man has come a long way in his ability to improve his weaponry. By relying on government and its taxing and military ability, we have created a subculture to the market place

which has raised the punishment of those who disagree to a fine art. This is an area in which most of us, who are preoccupied with the market, express both incompetence and disinterest. It is up to the military, we contend, to develop, contain, maintain, and employ the weapon-tools of today. Yet, we are being called upon to pay for them. And perhaps we can no longer ignore and shrug off the enormous potential consequences of having surrendered so much of our know-how to those who will employ it disfunctionally insofar as the human species is concerned.

The employment of weapon-tools against men for any reason is a disfunctional procedure insofar as man is concerned. It creates frictions in what otherwise could be a smooth working market-place system. These frictions have now grown to alarming proportions which are shaking the world.

Few of us have any solid conception of the magnitude of the development of military hardware which has occurred in recent years and is still occurring. In World War II, one of the most devastating weapons employed was called the "blockbuster." A bomber could carry just one such bomb. It contained TNT and weighed just a trifle more than twenty tons. Its destructive effect in a major city was colossal. By the end of World War II, the United States introduced a new weapon called the atom bomb. Two of these were dropped on Japan at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The explosive force of these bombs was one thousand times greater than each blockbuster.

Within the first decade following World War II, the atom bomb had been replaced with a thermonuclear weapon which multiplied the destructive effect of the atom bomb by another factor of one thousand. Today, a modern bomber can carry what we call an "H-bomb." The H-bomb has the destructive potential of twenty million tons of TNT.

Let's imagine a scale with the blockbuster of World War II measured at twelve inches. On this scale, the atom bomb at Hiroshima had a destructive effect of the height of the Empire State Building. A twenty-megaton bomb would have the destructive effect of the height of the orbit of Sputnik I. A single thermonuclear weapon would release more destructive potential than all of the allied bombs rained upon Germany and Japan during all four years of World War II.

Now that men have contrived the thermonuclear war-head, man has at his fingertips the release of destructive energies which rival

those found in nature in earthquakes and typhoons. Not only do we have gargantuan destructive weapons in our arsenal, we have the ability to deliver them far more rapidly than ever before.

During World War II we could carry a blockbuster at a speed a little in excess of 300 miles per hour. Modern, long-range jet bombers can travel 650 miles per hour and more; better than twice as fast. However, even that increase was too slow for us. We developed the ballistic missile, that is capable of delivering a thermonuclear war-head at speeds in excess of 10,000 miles per hour. In a mere twenty years we have speeded up potential destruction. Heretofore, it could have taken a Russian plane sixteen hours to fly from Moscow to Washington, D.C. Today, a much improved war-head can be delivered in less than thirty minutes.

When the fall-out had subsided from the bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, the belief began to grow that war had become obsolete. The results of atomic bombing were so horrible that many persons began to suspect that no nation would dare to go to war again. However, little in the history of man's ability to improve his weaponry sustained this view. Human ability to rationalize and to justify the destruction of his fellows appears to be limitless.

Following World War I and the Geneva convention and the accord labored for by the Red Cross, we had devised an idea called the "open city." That idea lasted from 1918 until the beginning of World War II. The relentless blitzkriegs of the Third Reich and the equally relentless allied retaliatory blows in the 1940's virtually spelled its obsolescence. There were exceptions. The holy city of Rome was spared by both the Nazis and the allies. But these were political decisions having little to do with any humanitarian ideals or ethical considerations. It would have been political folly for either side to have united the Catholics of the world against themselves. Elsewhere, art treasures and artifacts of priceless value were committed to caldrons of destruction along with millions of innocent human beings when political decisions ran the other way.

The wave of disgust and revulsion which followed the indiscriminate destruction of Rotterdam and the senseless searing of Coventry gave rise to ruthless application of massive aerial assaults embroidered by what the victims had learned in the process. As an example, in 1943 the British were able to totally demolish Hamburg after intensive preparation. Over a ten-day period, that city became the graveyard of 70,000 men, women, and children, when it was pounded

to rubble and consumed by high explosives and fire. Up to that time, the destruction of Hamburg was the most relentless and catastrophic man-caused event in history.

Later, attempts to accomplish the same demolition of Dresden and London were only somewhat less successful, but not through any lack of resolution on the part of the attackers in each case. The ensuing fire-bomb raids on Tokyo and finally the atomic bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima were accepted as military necessities—even though the evidence reveals that Japan had already begun to sue for peace. They had become militarily and politically desirable expedients based on the logic of retaliatory war learned in Europe.

Many competent and knowledgeable persons became convinced that a major war fought with atomic weapons could spell the finish of civilization as we know it. But following the cessation of hostilities, it wasn't very long before political and military leaders became convinced that atomic war needed only a minor intellectual adjustment to be accepted as a practical way of waging future wars. Far from being unthinkable, the conviction grew that atomic war could be successfully waged . . . and won. The U.S. Navy conducted atomic tests at Bikini. Soon the Air Force came to believe that it held the ultimate weapons in its hands, which it could use to impose a kind of Pax Americana upon the world. Then work was begun on developing small atomic weapons which could be used by the Army for tactical purposes.

Next in development came the thermonuclear weaponry. Once more, the belief was widely held that a full-scale use of such weapons was unthinkable. Certainly, it was argued, thermonuclear war was really too horrible ever to be fought. An all-out war using such weapons, it was said, not only could bring the end of civilization as we knew it, but the death of mankind itself. The politicians and the military combined to attack this concept. It was argued that although *all-out* thermonuclear war was unthinkable, still there could be small or limited use of thermonuclear devices. So we must do all in our power to prevent a large-scale involvement requiring thermonuclear weaponry. The military decision as an instrument of national policy was not to be abandoned. So it was reasoned that we must prepare ourselves for an endless succession of "limited" wars and develop, for this purpose, a variety of tactical atomic weapons.

At the same time, the lessons of World War II respecting massive retaliation were brought out and dusted off. No nation, it was

claimed, would dare launch a large-scale attack were its leaders convinced that their own cities could be destroyed by large-scale nuclear devices.

Currently, we are being asked to accept the proposition that even all-out thermonuclear war is by no means unthinkable—provided it is not TOO all-out. Proponents of this position now argue that quite a few individuals could be saved even from such an ultimate confrontation. It is being said that even if such a confrontation is horrible to contemplate, there would be a sufficiently high number of survivors and a sufficiently large quantity of undamaged consumer merchandise to permit a nation to rebuild its economy in a reasonable period of time—say, about ten years. If this opinion is correct—that it is possible for a nation to survive an all-out nuclear war, and what is even more important, if a significant number of persons can be convinced that such survival is possible—then it follows that the threat of all-out nuclear war will continue to be a decisive factor governing international relations.

Thus, the weighing of international decisions will contain these two factors: the risks of all-out war as contrasted to the risks of not being willing to conduct an all-out war.

Following the cessation of shooting in World War II, we moved into an era of cold war, characterized by the emerging of a vast arms race between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.

At first, the U.S. was the sole possessor of the atomic bomb. The Soviets were quick to see what military scholars refer to as an “imbalance” of power. In the succeeding twenty years, both nations pursued the new technology. We went from atomic, to nuclear, to thermonuclear devices and then, in 1956, we began to concentrate upon delivery systems and the development of tactical weaponry in the same categories.

The United States developed the B-47 bomber. It was soon made obsolete by the B-52 strategic bomber. Then missiles entered the program along with air-to-air nuclear rockets and radar and sonar warning systems. The development of the Russian ICBM's led to the American development of the high-flying U-2. Today, we have the Dew Line and the Pine Tree Line and NORAD, and a ballistic missile early warning system. And as the arms race roars along, both sides are paying dearly for the skills by means of which a few minutes or even a few seconds can be pared away from the time necessary in launching a retaliatory attack.

The cost in dollars and energy and skills and time has become abusive to both sides. In 1960, if we use the grossly inaccurate Gross National Product figure provided by the government, some 10 per cent of our total production was earmarked for military expenditure. In Russia the same year, and by use of the same misleading figure, some 25 per cent of their production went the same route.

It is now estimated that if we combine the explosive capacity of both nations, we have the equivalent of about thirty billion tons of TNT, or roughly about ten tons of TNT for every man, woman, or child now living on this earth.

And this has introduced us to the novel situation of over-tax; over-work; over-burden; over-tense, and over-kill.

We talk in terms of millions and billions of tons of explosive power. We hear such words as *nuclear* and *thermonuclear* and *megaton*. What does all this mean when translated into understandable English?

If a ten-ton megaton war-head is detonated, approximately one third of that explosion is in the form of heat and light. The bomb itself and the surrounding air are heated to incredibly high temperatures on the instant. The resulting fireball swells to a diameter of about three and a half miles. The heat flash lasts for about twenty seconds and on a clear day it can produce third-degree burns for a distance of twenty miles and second-degree burns for about twenty-five miles from the explosion. If the ten-ton megaton burst occurred thirty miles above the earth, it would set fire to combustibles over an area of 5,000 miles on a clear day.

If this same bomb were exploded at the surface of the earth, it would produce a crater some 250 feet deep and about half a mile across. The area of complete demolition would extend for about three miles. Severe blast damage would extend to about nine miles from the center of the explosion, and moderate to major damage would occur as far as twelve miles from the explosion point. This would destroy and damage an area containing a total of 450 square miles.

It can be anticipated that a fire storm would result from a thermonuclear explosion over a large city. A fire storm is just that. A huge fire occurs to which cooler air is drawn from the surrounding atmosphere. This cooler air is quickly heated, the oxygen is consumed, and the fire is perpetuated. Winds reach hurricane velocity in moments. With available oxygen being consumed, persons in the fire-storm area who are not burned to death will suffocate or die of carbon monoxide poisoning.

The explosion results in instantaneous production of nuclear radiation in amounts that can be lethal at distances up to two miles. Adding to the danger is the production of radioactive materials which are manufactured by the blast and then scattered over the countryside as fallout.

The explosion of a nuclear weapon produces more than 200 species of radioactive materials. These attach themselves to the inert debris which is swept into the air by the explosion and produces the well-known configuration of the mushroom cloud. The heavier particles will fall back to earth within an hour or so. The lighter particles drift downward and follow the wind. They will be deposited over an area fifteen to thirty miles wide and 100 to 500 miles long. If the explosion occurs at low altitude, about 80 per cent of the fallout is local. The balance is propelled into the stratosphere and is distributed globally. It will take most of a year for about half of that material to come down to earth.

The local fallout from a ten-megaton explosion could, if spread equally, produce lethal levels of radiation over an area of 5,000 square miles. In the absence of protection, many deaths could occur far from the scene of the explosion. In the event of a large-scale nuclear engagement, many more deaths can be predicted on the periphery of the explosion than within the explosion area.

In an attempt to visualize the order of magnitude of this type of warfare, let us imagine that a ten-megaton warhead is exploded over downtown Wichita. I will assume that the bomb hits during the working hours of a week-day and that the attack occurs sometime in the fall. This last supposition is based on the assumption that the attacker will anticipate retaliation and has already harvested and safely stored his crops.

The blast will immediately exterminate virtually all but the most deeply sheltered living things within a radius of five miles. Assuming that the bomb drops over the First National Bank Building, total devastation would occur to the north clear to Forty-fifth Street. The central blast area would go beyond the city limits to the northeast and northwest. To the east, the extent of total destruction would extend to Rock Road, completely wiping out the district of Eastborough. To the south, it would fall just short of Forty-seventh and would take out the northwest section of McConnell Air Force Base. To the west, it would go beyond Ridge Road and would remove the

eastern portion of the Wichita Municipal Airport. In short, Wichita would cease to exist.

The major phenomenon which would complete the destruction would be the fire. This entire area would be one great ball of fire, which would continue to burn until there was nothing left to consume. Automobiles, trucks, and buses within the explosion area would be lifted and tossed about like bizarre molotov cocktails. They would spew flaming gasoline and oil, and mechanical and glass shrapnel, onto everything in their paths.

On the instant, underground gasoline storage tanks would rupture and explode, each in its own particular manner. Pumps and pipes would be sheared off and, finally, higher and higher temperatures would soar which would soon expand, rupture, and explode anything that remained.

Beyond the blast radius, the remainder of the greater Wichita area is occupied by farms and small communities. The entire area, viewed through the eyes of thermonuclear warfare, is just a great heap of tinder and flammable material.

There are relatively few facts about truly large fires. Several fire-storms were produced by the incendiary bombing of German cities during World War II. One such fire-storm occurred after a fire-bomb raid over Tokyo. An atomic bomb brought on a fire-storm at Hiroshima but not at Nagasaki.

It is predicted that in Wichita, should a bomb burst occur, the surrounding terrain for a distance of at least twenty-five miles would be engulfed in a sea of fire within minutes after the explosion. This means that whatever in the immediate Wichita area was not destroyed in the explosion would go up in flames, including the balance of McConnell Air Force Base and the Municipal Airport. Newton would go up in a ball of fire and smoke. Park City would be annihilated. Augusta on the east would be a raging inferno in minutes. To the south, Derby, Oaklawn, and even Wellington would be swept by columns of advancing flame. Haysville to the southwest and Valley Center to the northwest would be lost in the flaming caldron of central Kansas that could even lick its way to Kingman and to the Oklahoma state line.

Certainly, in the event of such an explosion there would be virtually no survivors of the blast and thermal effects, with the possible exception of a few persons who had made elaborate preparations for surviving. Their shelters would have to be very deep and pro-

vided with built-in oxygen supply and cooling devices. They would have to be able to live in those shelters for many weeks before venturing out if they intended to continue existence. Once they did venture out, a new problem would confront them. They would have to wade through ash varying in depth from ankle depth to knee high. It would serve to conceal many hidden pitfalls. They would have to climb over smoking piles of burned-out rubble, all of which would be radioactive. They would trip and stagger over twisted steel girders, wiring, and interlaced timbers, and by the time they reached the edge of the devastated area, in all likelihood they would have acquired fatal radium burns—although the Wichita situation is admittedly not as extreme as the conditions which might occur in other cities of much larger populations. If fire-storms are the rule, and this is not certain, then we could anticipate that survivors from such storms would be few, indeed.

Present civil defense programs in our major metropolitan areas appear, in the light of the evidence, to be an exercise in something near futility. If serious effort is to be made, what is indicated is the provision for deep, extensive, and sealed underground quarters that could house many thousands of persons at one time.

An alternative concept would relate to the mass exodus of huge populations beyond the threatened area. But the time for such evacuation would be short, especially since there is no way of knowing just how accurate the marksmanship of a possible attacker would be. In fact, the technical problems involved are so great that massive underground preparation seems a far more practical alternative.

A number of well-informed persons are looking forward to the establishment of enormous systems of underground shelters.

When neither belligerent can look forward to the destruction of the other's retaliatory capacity in an all-out first strike, it is believed there will be no first strike. If that can be achieved, it is fondly hoped that the international situation will be a "stable" one. That would be distinctly different from the present one.

Since we appear to be moving rapidly toward the position in which technology and taxation combine to produce a relatively invulnerable retaliatory system, it would be important that an examination be made as to whether or not such a development would in fact be stable. Can the pyramiding of destructive potential create stability? Or is this procedure fundamentally unstable? If armaments on a

giant scale are basically unstable and we follow the path we are presently pursuing, then it is likely that we shall perish.

In considering deterrent systems we usually think of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. However, nuclear technology, in particular, nuclear military know-how, is not confined to these two powers. England conducted nuclear tests a few years ago. More recently, France and China tested their first atomic devices. It is predictable that nuclear military capacity will radiate out to a number of additional powers in the next ten to twenty years.

If we look at the capabilities of various nations to engage in nuclear mass-death devices, we can readily see that there are no fewer than fifteen to twenty nations which presently have the latent capacity. Within twenty more years we could have as many as thirty nations involved in the nuclear-bomb business. Certainly, military alliances of the kind so popular with us in our international dealings will spread. Although this nation exerts nominal control over all its own nuclear weapons, it has, in effect, placed them in the hands of its NATO allies.

It is well within the bounds of credulity that nuclear devices will soon enter the marts in international trade. This will certainly be the case if market-place development of nuclear power for earth moving and for other purposes becomes practical, as it surely will.

Nuclear production is rapidly becoming less costly and less complicated. Nuclear power is by all odds the best source of power we have come up with yet. It is certainly the least costly and the most effective source of power for all purposes both commercial and military. What should have been done is now too late. Nuclear power sources should have been developed in the market and been confined to commercial usage. But now that this source of power is a government monopoly many small nations will certainly get into the act for it is the most practical and least expensive way of equalizing the potential of a small nation with a large nation, militarily speaking. Nuclear bombs can provide for the smaller nations an opportunity of waging all-out war against their giant neighbors. With nuclear weapons, Cuba could effectively threaten the United States; Turkey could demand a showdown with the Soviet Union.

To be sure, a challenge from a small nation might not contain the potential of total annihilation, but it could be enough to cause serious difficulties. It is possible to visualize a number of ways in which a nuclear war might be triggered accidentally. Radar evidence might

be misinterpreted. Under the misconception that an attack has already been launched by one country, retaliation could be launched before the attack actually materialized. Nor is a hot-line communication between two major powers reliable. If, for instance, the radar reported unknown objects speeding from Russia to the United States, would a telephonic denial from Moscow be creditable? Would we rely on the Soviets telling the truth about such a thing? Wouldn't it be certain that the aggressor would deny his aggression in order to forestall retaliation?

Reconnaissance planes flying near the borders of one nation might be taken as evidence of an impending attack. Or an American pilot might, after great tension, inadvertently bomb a target in a Chinese or Soviet city. The reverse situation is also conceivable. And were New York and Los Angeles suddenly made targets in fact, could anyone question the likelihood of retaliatory measures being taken on the instant?

When we are fully committed to an age of "stable" missile warfare, we must constantly keep in mind the possibility of accident, particularly when the time for decision making would be so slender.

We are not far away from the ability and the intention of using satellites for large-scale reconnaissance purposes—both for communication and for war. Satellites with weapons systems are being considered. The mere launching of such a satellite could be construed as an act of war. And if such a satellite were to sustain an enemy attack, wouldn't THAT be viewed as an act of war? Such satellites could be used to jam national communications. Might that be construed into an act of war? And under such tensions as we now have, it would take only a moment before a retaliatory strike could be launched.

Submarine activity, even of a harmless nature, could be construed into an act of war. Misinterpretation of the identity or the intentions of an underwater carrier could lead to unwarranted retaliation. Failure of a submarine to maintain communications with home base might, through a mere technical malfunction, produce the decision for that submarine commander to launch his atomic war-heads.

Nor can this situation, unstable as it surely is, become anything but increasingly unstable as long as we rely on violence or the threat of violence. We appear to be committed to the ancient diplomatic chalk-line syndrome. So far, but no farther!

On the basis of this reasoning, the entire world is in great danger, and the danger will increase so long as the arms race continues. The retaliatory systems do not create stability. It would appear that we are proceeding, about as rapidly as technology makes possible, in precisely the wrong direction.

There are many knowledgeable persons who contend that under no circumstances should research and development of new weapons be postponed or halted. There is always the fear that the potential enemy might develop a greatly superior weaponry which would provide him an instant advantage. The only way known to these persons by which this danger could be minimized is to maintain at all costs a diversity of research and development covering all aspects of military technology. It is, therefore, predictable that no nation will feel that it need not continue this process. Rather, something in the nature of an international scramble for superior means of committing mass murder will lead to the development of ever more terrible means of destruction with its concomitant, the ever more dreadful system of retaliation. As research and development grows apace, it is predictable that there will be new breakthroughs which will render even our present systems obsolete.

Today, the proponents of a rising crescendo of arms research and production can point to much more than the thermonuclear bomb to justify their position. No matter what is possible . . . it must be pursued. Can gigaton bombs be built? We must do the work and see. Can climate over the Soviet Union be altered? We must find out. Can the earth be burned, broken, kept from rotating? Can it be split open like a melon? Can we make the oceans boil? Can all life be eliminated in a huge geographic area? All of these questions must be considered. If we don't think about them, the enemy may be thinking about them. And if they can get the jump on us, they would have an enormous advantage.

In addition, we must confront the ever-increasing dollar cost of an on-going, upward-thrusting military expenditure. Based on the defense budget of 1960, roughly \$40 billion, and the formula for maintaining it at 10 to 12 per cent of the Gross National Product, and allowing for an annual expected increase of from 3 to 5 per cent, some economists predicted that by 1965 about 50 per cent of the annual GNP would be used directly or indirectly for military expenditures. Unfortunately, this prediction seems about right in terms of the military budget for 1965 which was right at \$70 billion.

At what point will this kind of economic procedure become so crucial that the direction of relying upon military production cannot be altered with grave consequences? It may be that such a time is already upon us.

If the arms race continues, as it probably will in the face of our present policies, there will be increasing talk of constructing mass shelters under major urban areas. Our ability to marshal mass killing on a global scale will also increase the likelihood that major programs will begin, aimed at massive evacuation of large cities. But with each new shelter or evacuation program will come, through weapon research and development, increased offensive potential which will then occupy center stage to make previous shelter and evacuation programs obsolete.

Larger and larger explosive power will be crowded into smaller and smaller packages to be successfully rocketed by ICBM's. Very large bombs can be built (about 10,000 megatons) which, when detonated about 300 miles above the surface of the earth, could sear all the land in six western states. Massive evacuation, on these terms, will become totally ineffective. Instead, the new developments will cause people to burrow ever more deeply underground. We already have NORAD, built underground at Colorado Springs. This will be followed by having new factories buried in caves far below the surface. Then will come apartment houses and stores. Eventually, most human life will go underground, confronted by arsenals capable of destroying all surface life on all the land areas of the world.

If people dig deep enough, they will be relatively safe. At least until such time as we learn how to develop explosives which could pulverize earth and rock to great depths.

Once the shelters have been built deeply enough, there will be a significant retreat from the idea that war is to be made obsolete. In underground safety, there would be no need to discuss abandonment of global conflict. As soon as the people are convinced that they could survive the then-existent art and method of killing, a broad and significant new habit of thought will be introduced and accepted without much in the way of opposition. It will be a bizarre alteration from the general idea we have held as men for thousands of years. It will simply be that men are intended to live in holes rather than in the sunlight. From that time onward, it will be simple to adjust ourselves to living in deeper holes as the occasion seems to warrant.

Tens of thousands of years ago, our Cro-Magnon and Neanderthal ancestors lived in caves. The vast knowledge we have accumulated in the intervening millennia will have brought us full circle. Man's journey into the light will terminate where it began.

Mark Twain once made some very meaningful comments about man's tendency to wage wars. He said:

"Man is the only patriot. He sets himself apart in his own country, under his own flag, and sneers at other nations. He tries to grab slices of other people's countries and keep them from grabbing slices of his; with the result that there's not an acre of ground on the globe that's in possession of its rightful owner. And in the intervals between campaigns he washes the blood from his hands and works for the brotherhood of man—with his mouth.

"Man is the only animal that deals in the atrocity of war. He's the only one that, for sordid wages, goes forth in cold blood to exterminate his own kind. He has a motto for this: 'Our country—right or wrong.' Any man who fails to shout it is a traitor! Only the others are patriots. Say, who is the country? Is it the government? In a republic the government is merely a servant—a temporary one—its function is to obey orders; not originate them.

"And if that phrase needs help, he gets another one: 'Even though the war be wrong—we are in it. We must fight it out! We cannot retire without dishonor!' Why, not even a burglar could have said that better."

"Man is the only animal that blushes—or needs to."

Man can be justly proud of his technological progress and the knowledge he has acquired concerning the workings of nature. However, in respect to knowledge concerning himself, and his ability to live in freedom and in peace with his own kind, he has learned virtually nothing. Here he must surely blush.

For since the first man picked up the first weapon, we have moved forward hardly a step in two million years. From utilizing the thighbone of an antelope we have advanced to worshipping the jawbone of an ass.

It is possible, although far from probable, that war could be made obsolete. If it can be made obsolete before we unleash total devastation upon ourselves, then it will be because men will have become willing to banish it from their culture. And that will mean that we have learned one of the great lessons that we have before us to learn: that governments are the perpetrators of war, and that peace and

freedom are products of the market and cannot be wrought by the state.

In the meantime, war is not obsolete. And it is not obsolete partly because people still believe that they can survive an all-out war. In other words, people still seem to accept as a kind of blind faith that the consequences of war are less dangerous than the consequences of not being able and willing to wage it.

Whether a war is potentially too dangerous to fight will depend, of course, on individual outlook. How many deaths can be tolerated? And who will do the tolerating? The political leaders? The people? What are the chances of recovery from a global thermonuclear holocaust? Will anyone *want* to recover?

As we are presently committed, it seems likely that the reliance upon government and its war-making potential will result in the violent deaths of tens of millions to possibly hundreds of millions of people, coupled with the serious risk that economic recovery might not be possible at all. As long as people are unwilling to shoulder their own responsibilities and are willing to rely upon governments to resolve their problems for them, then war and retaliation will continue to serve as the indispensable vehicle for the resolution of foreign and even domestic dilemmas.

If war is truly to be abandoned, the code of ethics by which we presently live must undergo revision. If men can be educated and trained to understand that they will live better and maximize their own well-being by turning their backs on the tools and the application of violence, they will do so. The only way to alter our value systems and to introduce higher and superior values is through the educational process.

Slow? Yes, it is slow. Agonizingly slow. And one reason it drags along at such a snail's pace is that too many people are investing their minds and their monies and their energies in support of violence. Too many persons assume that education is the route of doing nothing. Only violence appears to be action. Anything less than violence is construed as a kind of placid surrender. Wars are not ended by wars. Violence cannot be ended by relying on violence. To overcome a fearsome foe by violent means indicates that a stronger and more fearsome force has been created. Then it, in turn, will succumb to a still greater and more powerful application of violence. This process can lead only to total destruction or to living entombment as a kind of slave to global killing machines.

Only ideas increase material well-being. They cannot be shot from a gun nor stopped by a bullet. Idea formulation is the truly active action. It is where the brains are in use that the action IS.

The ability to think, to conceptualize, to create new concepts and ideas, is an ability unique to man. And after two million years we are daily wasting at least 50 per cent of our energies in trying to figure new ways to exterminate our species.

Only two known methods exist by means of which we might maximize our well-being and minimize violence. One of these is through government; the other, through the planning and implementation of ideas by means of a free market.

We have only to examine history from the first primitive government to the formulation of the United Nations to recognize that governmental reliance does not stop war; it creates it and spreads it. Reliance on government has produced all the war, all the taxes, and most of the murders and mass violence written in blood on the pages of every history.

The market place has provided man with all the things he regards as beneficial to life: food, shelter, comforts, entertainment, and the various art forms. Yet there continues to exist a mystical reliance on the tool of violence to achieve a lasting peace. Doesn't it seem strange that at a time when the U.S. possesses the most devastating and potentially destructive defensive force in history, its people are commonly concerned about the safety and security of their lives and property?

Man's two million-year experiment with the light of day is reaching a culmination point. It is up to us to interpret and evaluate the results of this experiment. It is not too late to change direction if we have the courage to consider the possibility that we are presently going in the wrong direction. Mankind is not predestined to self-destruction.

An examination and a reconstruction of our system of ethics is in order. A challenge to contemporary values and a development of a superior system of values is in order. The methodology is education; the tool is the mind of man. Let's put that tool and that method to work.

Figures on the effect of nuclear bombing and attendant details were extracted from "Community of Fear" by Harrison Brown and James Real (published by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions). In an introductory note Brown and Real say: "In this paper we present many problems but no solutions." LeFevre and Leon have endeavored to examine the problems in the light of the only possible solution consonant with human liberty.

The Bombing and Negotiated Peace Questions—in 1944

by James J. Martin

Dr. James J. Martin, chairman of the history department of Rampart College, comments cryptically on data which he has meticulously exhumed from its World War II sepulcher and thus provides a historical propaganda perspective to the current anti-bombing campaign and the drive for a negotiated peace in Vietnam.

Dr. Martin has achieved international recognition for his scholarship in the field of revisionist history. He will offer a month-long course in "The State, the Military, and the Economy: The American Experience Since 1607," at Rampart College this summer.

Late in 1967 there appeared a "Negotiations Now" movement in the United States attempting to influence government policy to the end of seeking a negotiated peace in the war in Vietnam. Related to this was the existence during the whole year of several spirited protests from many sources against the American strategic bombing of its North Vietnamese enemy. One would never know from exposure to the country's mass communications of all kinds that there were interesting ancestors of both these gestures during the closing years of World War II, the electrifying "Peace Now Movement" of 1943-1944, under the leadership of George W. Hartmann, and the even more aggravating effort during the same time to halt strategic or "area" bombing of Germany by the Royal and American Air Forces. This latter was under the direction in England of Vera Brittain and the Bombing Restriction Committee, and fronted in the United States by a variety of notables in literary and clerical circles. Though both these campaigns excited a large contemporary literature, they have disappeared almost without a trace from works dealing with those times, and it is a rare moment when either of them is recalled. This to some extent is due to ignorance on the part of contemporaries, who imagine they are the first people in

history to become involved in efforts of this kind, victims of what Pitirim Sorokin calls the "Columbus complex." But there undoubtedly is an element of studied fastidious oversight on the part of many of the elders taking part in today's activities, who prefer to have the past effectively forgotten, especially insofar as it involves situations of this kind.

The separate campaigns carried on by Vera Brittain and George Hartmann stand out as about the only humanitarian protests against an all-out war against civilians fought by armies that had lost their horror of horror, and led by politicians who had done so as well. The negotiated peace and anti-strategic bombing efforts caused more than a ripple in England and the United States, though they were doomed from the start. The communist tactic of enrolling the civilian community in the war in Russia, China, and the various western countries occupied by the German armies by way of their underground "resistance" fronts, had long before destroyed the distinction between combatants and non-combatants. Saturation bombing of the civilian sectors of cities hundreds of miles from the scene of active fighting was so thoroughly a part of the new barbarism by late 1943 that it now seems to have been undue caution to conceal until recent years that the deliberate annihilation of congested urban districts had been a plan from early in the war. Charles P. Snow's revelation, nearly twenty years later, somehow lost much of its striking power. The ability on the part of many to react had been destroyed long before by a steady barrage of words and photographs which had so cheapened human life that even by the end of the war in 1945 nothing could shock the blood-soaked populaces out of their semi-coma other than the fear of atomic disintegration, and even this was a modified reaction.

The liberal Catholic weekly *Commonweal*, hardly a pacifist organ, early in 1944 denounced the policy of strategic bombing as "the murder of innocent people and the suicide of our civilization."¹ It was one of the few expressions of concern over what the dulling of sensitivity was doing to the future of the world. But the biggest loud-speakers of the printed and spoken word were quite unmoved, and did their best to show that most others were similarly indisposed to react to such appeals favorably. The *New York Times* reported comfortably that the Hartmann and Brittain campaigns were opposed by reader response at a ratio of fifty to one. There were hundreds of

¹"Area Bombing," *Commonweal* (March 17, 1944), p. 532.

attacks in the magazines, newspapers, and on the radio for each defense; those in such journals as the *American Mercury*, the *New Republic*, *Life*, and the *New York Herald-Tribune* were particularly noteworthy in their ferocity. In the latter, William L. Shirer, emerging in five years from journalistic obscurity to a front-page celebrity status, and whose opinions by then even drew attention as news events, volunteered that the anti-strategic bombing protests of the Bombing Restriction Committee and the Fellowship of Reconciliation were evidence that they had become mere dupes of the German national socialist propaganda chief, Dr. Joseph Goebbels.²

Efforts to stop the war at this moment were premature; a great number of the propaganda commandos had not yet drawn their sufficient measure of gore prior to joining in the great wailing over the threats to our "Judeo-Graeco-Christian civilization" in the years subsequent to 1945. In one instance, there was an ironic parallel incident to the denunciation of the anti-war and anti-bombing propagandists; *Life*, at the height of its vituperation against the Hartmann and Brittain enterprises, ran one of its most adversely commented-on specials, a photographic account of a fox hunt in Ohio in which 600 people eventually cornered one small tired animal, which was then beaten to death by a child with a club. That there were many people who saw nothing praiseworthy in such a caper and wrote at length in horrified tones marking it as an act of barbarity, was grounds for hope of a sort, but the massacre of non-combatant human civilians of enemy states in distant locations aroused no such general response.

The objections to halting the war or interfering with the bombing of non-combatant targets were many, ranging from the ingenious to the devious. Typical of the "practical" kind were those of the *Christian Century*,³ America's outstanding voice of liberal Protestantism and the *New Yorker*,⁴ the weekly journalistic paragon of American sophistication. In their view it was too late to make "ground rules." The idea was to prosecute the war in full savagery until victory was achieved, after which it would then be proper to dream up restraints on future behavior in war, while nobody was doing anything.

Peace Now had few defenders, but Miss Brittain enrolled a goodly brigade. One of the most formidable was the Rev. James M. Gillis, editor of the monthly *Catholic World*, held in substantial respect by

²New York *Herald Tribune*, March 12, 1944.

³March 22, 1944.

⁴March 19, 1944.

members of this faith despite his persistent and unwavering opposition to the war ("Father Gillis is by all odds the ablest Catholic editor of our time," wrote the fiercely pro-war Catholic professor Theodore Maynard late in 1941⁵). In the late spring of 1944, Rev. Gillis wrote the most devastating indictment of Miss Brittain's attackers in the press and pulpit, the most thorough exposure of the utter moral bankruptcy of her antagonists.⁶ The largest and fairest coverage of both the Hartmann and Brittain movements took place in the weekly *Christian Century*, however. They were the only widely read journal in the country to give Peace Now a chance to make an extended statement of their contentions, objectives, and recommendations, possibly because the editors were more inclined to be influenced by the Brittain appeal, since her first widely circulated publication, *Massacre by Bombing*, contained a preface signed by twenty-eight Americans, many of them Protestant clergymen of national and even international repute.

Trygve Lie, the Norwegian socialist politician who became the first secretary general of the United Nations from 1946 to 1953, declared, shortly after World War II ended, that an armistice could have been negotiated a number of times between the "allies" and the "axis," but that nothing was allowed to interfere with the winning of a lasting victory.⁷ That this "lasting" triumph lasted less than six months is perhaps peripheral to this account, but it suggests that terminating the war on a basis short of the obliteration of the enemy could hardly have become the prelude to a worse "peace" than has prevailed since 1945.

Talk of possible negotiations between one or another party of both sides involved in the war was part of political gossip at various times during hostilities. Perhaps both the Germans and Japanese would have been willing to call fighting to a halt were some kind of tolerable conditions made available, even as early as the spring of 1943. The very largest part of the loss of life and property in the war would have been prevented had the war ended then. But the unconditional surrender dictum of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, acceded to by Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, made such an end impossible, and guaranteed the long, grinding struggle which left much of Western Europe and Eastern Asia a vast rubble strewn

⁵Maynard, "Catholics and the Nazis," *American Mercury* (October, 1941), p. 399.

⁶*Catholic World* (May, 1944), pp. 97-104.

⁷Lie, "A World of Patience," *New Republic* (October 28, 1946), pp. 539-540.

with the corpses of millions, a mutual achievement of the various belligerents.

A hint as to the likely acceptability of terms occurred at about the time Mr. Churchill was about to leave London to meet with Mr. Roosevelt at a conference at Quebec late in the summer of 1943. A reporter for *Time* wrote, "Everybody laughed over a gag credited to Churchill before he left England. Interviewer: 'Will you offer peace terms to Germany?' Churchill: 'Heavens, No! They would accept immediately.'"⁸ This was considered a humorous political incident, but there probably were a number of discussions going on of ways to bring about the end of the war short of "total victory." Rumors of this kind flew around the world on various occasions, and the most alarming and disturbing was that of late January, 1944, launched by the Soviet news organ *Pravda*. Two stories actually were loosed in America, both involving the British and Germans. In one, the communist publication charged that two British representatives had met with Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German foreign minister, to discuss a separate peace in Spain, while the other alleged that the British and German foreign ministers had conferred in Cairo on the same subject. The Soviet never apologized about it, the British never admitted it, and the Germans remained non-committal. But for a moment, a fluttering occurred in Anglo-American circles such as had not been seen for a long time.⁹ Even if utterly false, the story did much damage to the glowing picture which had emerged from the famous Anglo-Russo-American gathering at Teheran November 29-December 1, 1943, at which time the celebrated participants, apparently pledging eternal love and mutual cooperation, had fashioned the framework for a vast eon of internationalist political bliss which was to follow as soon as the enemy was drowned in blood and hot metal. The American periodical press worked overtime on the populace for weeks with what was sometimes humorously described as the "oh-gawd-let's-avoid-the-creation-of-suspensions" line, and to keep up the belief in the indivisibility of peace and the great dividends sure to follow from collective security pacts with the Stalinists, even

⁸Account in *Time* (August 30, 1943), p. 18.

⁹Some idea of the stir can be grasped from the following accounts and interpretations: *Life* (January 31, 1944), p. 24; *Nation* (January 22, 1944), p. 87; (January 29, 1944), p. 113; "Behind the Pravda Incident," *Christian Century* (February 2, 1944), pp. 134-136; *U.S. News* (February 18, 1944), p. 33 (one of the best); "The Great Pravda Mystery," *New Republic* (January 31, 1944), pp. 135-136; "Allied Ideals Present a Puzzle When Put to the Test of Reality," *Newsweek* (January 31, 1944), pp. 27-28.

though the faintest admirers of collective security were more and more convinced that nothing had been agreed upon at Teheran except military commitments.

The fact that the uneasy "allied" partners ultimately did not adhere to unconditional surrender as a practical policy—the Russians in dealing with the regimes of Eastern Europe which they overran, the Anglo-Americans in dealing with conquered Italy—indicates that it might also have been dispensed with in the cases of Germany and Japan, both of which were clearly beaten in mid-1943 at least, thus saving the blood and lives and treasure frittered and dissipated away in the following eighteen months. Whether such turnabouts might have been politically possible or feasible in view of the hate propaganda which had been so generously employed to whip up popular support for war against the Germans and Japanese is another matter.

No good study of domestic war propaganda in the United States during World War II has ever been published, as against the output which stands on World War I. It is unlikely that one will be for generations to come, and one that is critical may never appear, since it seems likely that World War II, barring a catastrophic realignment in world politics, may become as formalized a story and as unsusceptible to revision, alteration, or reassessment as the ancient account of the struggle between the Hebrews and the Philistines. For a vast multitude it is the One Good War, rejoiced in and defended vociferously by even a large majority which now finds the current war in Asia so heart-rending and indefensible. Contemporary accounts might induce visitors from another planet to think that it was the only war ever fought between humans and some variety of lesser creatures on the evolutionary scale, so vicious and inflammatory was the portrayal of the enemy, in which enterprise the prize must go to the scribes and mouthpieces of the ultimate victors, as it surely did to the same forces during the struggle of 1914-1918.

Said a *Life* editorial in the fall of 1942, "Despite the diplomats and the secret talks and the intrigue, opinions held by the run of the citizenry are largely responsible for what is done in the field of foreign affairs."¹⁰ These opinions are also responsible for what is *not* done, and they had much to do with the abuse, denunciation, and repudiation of Peace Now and the Britain campaign against strategic bombing of non-combatants.

¹⁰*Life* (November 30, 1942), p. 38.

It is possible to argue that, after all, the massacres of civilians in Germany and Japan did not approach by a wide margin what civilian propagandists had called for as a proper fate for these lands. Bernadotte E. Schmitt, professor of modern history at the University of Chicago, in a speech before the twenty-first annual meeting of the National Council for the Social Studies in Indianapolis on December 1, 1941, before the United States was even an official belligerent, advocated, among other things, for Germany, a reduction of its population by *thirty* million, method of disposal unspecified but starvation indicated, since he also recommended the country's reduction and confinement to a strictly agricultural economy. "Since there are only 45 million Britons, 45 million Italians, 40 million Frenchmen, and 30 million Poles, as opposed to 80 million Germans, the equilibrium of Europe would be more stable if there were only 50 million Germans,"¹¹ Schmitt concluded. However, he did not disclose how many Russian communists were too many Russian communists for Europe's welfare and stability.

Few Germanophobes subsequently approached Schmitt's standard, though a few months before, it was exceeded by one Theodore Newman Kaufman, who published a book, *Germany Must Perish!*¹², a plea for sterilizing the entire adult German population, a project which he calculated might be achieved in about three years. Though privately published, this book received an amazing amount of attention in the spring of 1941, including a major uncritical review in so widely dispersed a journal as *Time*.¹³ Strangely enough, two years earlier Kaufman, as chairman of the American Federation of Peace, had suggested sterilization for all adult Americans should Congress permit the United States to become involved in another European war.

Once American participation in the war which began in 1939 became a reality, hate literature directed against the enemy became a major industry, and a large contingent became specialists in it. The full story will surely be a multi-volume effort, and can only be mentioned in passing, though it was the major obstacle which stood in the way of acceptance of appeals for negotiated peace and a halt to "area" bombing. In wars between modern national states,

¹¹See long story in *Time* (December 1, 1941), pp. 57-58, headed "History Lesson." Also useful to the subject is Schmitt's *What Shall We Do With Germany?* (Public Policy Pamphlets, No. 38, University of Chicago Press, 1943).

¹²Newark, New Jersey: Argyle Press, 1941.

¹³*Time* (March 24, 1941), pp. 95-96.

there are experts in hate found in all groups, classes, and interests, though some may be more accomplished than others. In the United States, the sector of liberalism's spokesmen who advocated war-breeding policies for many years before they bloomed into reality led the field in zeal for the big bloodletting of 1942-1945. Their bellicose admonitions flamed from the pages of even the multi-million circulation family magazines, and their voices were heard on the radio by tens of millions. Lack of devotion to spreading interest in the arts of killing is a charge which can never be placed on their doorstep. It is worth noting, however, their amazing conversion to peace, co-existence, the beauties of negotiation and compromise, even pacifism, in the period from 1945 to the present, in the case of those who are still active merchants of the printed and spoken word. Their pious early postwar books such as *Lead Kindly Light* and biographies of such peace figures as Mahatma Gandhi and Albert Schweitzer, their whole literature of mercy and compassion, while figuratively still knee-deep in German blood and Japanese radioactive ashes, stand out as still another of history's great contradictions. One cannot accuse them of inflexibility.

Charles E. Montague, in his little post-World War I book, *Disenchantment*, made a classic comment on the home-front literary and microphone warriors whose martial chores consist of verbal weaponry: "Hell hath no fury like a non-combatant."¹⁴ In the United States a large number of persons would be competitors for the civilian who most closely fitted Montague's general observation. Norman Cousins, editor of the *Saturday Review of Literature*, might have been a strong contender early in the war, but the ferocity of several other journalists soon relegated him to the rank of moderates in this venture. His outstanding achievement was his famous defense of the necessity of deep, burning hatred of the enemy in order to fight effectively, in "The Time for Hate Is Now," published July 4, 1942.¹⁵ But others came along who were somewhat more effective and frightening than Cousins, particularly Rex Stout and Clifton Fadiman of the War Writers Board, an adjunct of the Office of War Information, the wartime government's principal propaganda agency. Stout, a famous writer of detective fiction, and Fadiman, a prominent New York

¹⁴Montague, *Disenchantment* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1922), p. 220.

¹⁵Cousins, "The Time for Hate Is Now," *Saturday Review of Literature* (July 4, 1942), pp. 13-14. Eleanor Roosevelt defended the negative. All concerned were sure such a hate campaign could be turned off promptly at the conclusion of hostilities.

literary figure and among other things a book reviewer for the *New Yorker*, were two of eighteen members of the WWB, described at one time as "the semi-governmental agency that serves as a clearing-house for writers willing to work for the war and government agencies needing specific writing jobs done."¹⁶

Fadiman was regarded by some as the most towering Germanophile throughout the war, while others had as their outstanding figure in this field of action such as Lord Vansittart of England, and such Americans as Shirer, Kaufman, Quentin Reynolds, Walter Winchell, Ben Hecht, Stout, Louis Nizer, and Henry Morgenthau, though a full roll-call would number in the hundreds. The most explosive incident involving exhortations for mass hate occurred at the meeting of the famous literary organization, the P.E.N. Club, at the Ambassador Hotel in New York City on October 28, 1942. On this occasion Stout and Fadiman made spirited calls for indiscriminate hate of *all* Germans (for some reason the Italians and Japanese were slighted by neglect) in such incendiary tones that they were reproached by literary friends who really did not lack interest in a tooth-and-claw struggle. Stout's insistence on "the need for a propaganda of hate" and Fadiman's "sweeping indictment of the German people" ("The only way to make a German understand is to kill him, and even then he doesn't get the point"),¹⁷ drew reproaches from such eminents as Henry Seidel Canby and Arthur Garfield Hays, and ultimately an editorial scolding from Cousins, who was clearly outclassed as a hate-monger in this encounter.¹⁸ But Cousins in turn was chastised by a correspondent who said in conclusion, "What we need in this country are more good haters like Mr. Fadiman." The P.E.N. meeting got completely out of the control of its president, Robert Nathan, and ended in an angry, noisy hubbub. But Mr. Fadiman was unruffled by the experience and repeated his dictum verbatim on the need for killing all Germans as a means for expanding their understanding, in a review of John Steinbeck's *The Moon Is Down* in the *New Yorker* a few weeks later.¹⁹

¹⁶Austin Stevens, "Notes on Books and Authors," *New York Times Book Review* (November 15, 1942), p. 10, for this and story on P.E.N. meeting below.

¹⁷Quoted in another report of the meeting in *Saturday Review of Literature* (November 7, 1942), p. 9.

¹⁸Cousins, "Open Letter to Clifton Fadiman," *Saturday Review of Literature* (November 7, 1942), p. 10.

¹⁹*Time* considered Fadiman's review as news and quoted his recommendation (December 21, 1942), p. 108.

Bernadotte Schmitt also came to Fadiman's defense, attacking Cousins for deploring Fadiman's hate-Germans propaganda. And Fadiman went on for years developing his thesis of the ageless criminality of the entire German ethnic stock. We even find during this same time a revival of the recommendation of mass sterilization of Germans, this time by no less than Ernest Hemingway in the preface to the collection of short stories titled *Men at War*. "Germany should be so effectively destroyed that we should not have to fight her again for a hundred years, or forever," said Hemingway, though his suggestion was specific compared to Kaufman's, confined just to the membership in Hitler's party organizations,²⁰ most of whom were civilians even then. Apparently Hemingway did not think the German Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe, navy, and general staff of much consequence as fighters, only Hitler's home-front storm troopers and secret police. Nor was Stout quiet or disengaged in subsequent months. His famous article, "We Shall Hate or We Shall Fail," was given prodigious exploitation in the *New York Times* in 1943, and through the spring of 1944 he was pushing a vigorous hate program in the pages of the *Times* through his organization. His main opposition by this latter date was largely furnished by clergymen, particularly those connected with the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace of the Federal Council of Churches.

By this time the hate campaign had formidable aid from England in the form of the contributions of Lord Vansittart, whose books *Black Record* and *Lessons of My Life* contained the most highly refined and sophisticated Germanophobic literary poison yet seen originating in the English tongue. Actually, Vansittart's participation in the fashioning of hate literature aimed exclusively at the Germans preceded the war's outbreak, but the period of hostilities was a time of exceedingly favorable circumstances for maximizing production, and he wasted no time, as the printed record testifies. For an American market he prepared a famous twelve-point program for dealing with the Germans *in toto* which must have warmed the hearts of such *simpaticos* as Stout, Fadiman, and Schmitt, to mention just a few of the major participants. It was given top billing in an issue of the *New York Times* magazine in January, 1944, and subsequently

²⁰Quoted in review in *Time* (December 21, 1942), p. 108.

given further publicity in abbreviated form by *Time*.²¹ By this time there were many contributors to the plans for what-to-do-with-Germany; Vansittart's fell somewhere between that of Schmitt at the beginning of the war and that attributed to Henry Morgenthau toward the end, which latter appears to have been the working model which functioned in large part as the program of the "liberators," at least in the non-Soviet-occupied portions of German territory, between 1945 and 1948. Vansittart's message encountered a small amount of reservation in the United States, though about the only specific rejoinders at that moment were those by Francis Neilson in his *Hate the Enemy of Peace: A Reply to Lord Vansittart*,²² and by George Bernard Shaw.

Shaw, on being asked for his views on a postwar plan for the permanent disablement of Germany at this same time, exploded in anger, denouncing it as "cowardly rubbish," "impudent and pretentious and so deliberately wicked that if it were not fortunately quite impossible to put it into practice it would justify a holy alliance against any power giving the slightest countenance to it." Shaw was a little too optimistic, in view of the subsequent enforcement of the Morgenthau Plan in postwar West Germany, abandoned after it threatened not only to make the area a howling wilderness but to make possible its dropping into the lap of Stalin as the early Cold War took shape.

The concurrent propaganda of Japanophobia was of a different order, featured by a variety of racist venom which still is in a class by itself in the history of such matters. Here the success of the hate builders was an unqualified success compared with the program directed at the other enemy peoples. For all practical purposes the Japanese were reduced below the human level, and there undoubtedly existed the notion in most circles of lowest intellectual attainment in this country that American armed forces were actually engaged in a struggle against a lower species. No special literature was needed to achieve this end, and the task seemed to be handled most adequately by the radio, moving pictures, and oral folk-lore.

²¹*Time* (January 24, 1944), p. 21. By far the largest part of the American left approved of Vansittart's hate views on Germans, one of the rare exceptions being Reinhold Niebuhr. His reservations on Vansittartism were parried by several of the Vansittart persuasion, one of the most ferocious being Erika Mann, the daughter of the novelist Thomas Mann, and a Stalinist admirer of ardent intensity. See her three-column letter to the *Nation* (March 11, 1944), p. 318, in ringing defense of Vansittart.

²²n.p., 1944. Shaw quoted in *Time* (January 17, 1944), p. 37.

The segregation of the resident mainland Japanese population in special concentration camps, mainly in the West, was the most striking evidence of an attitude in this country based on the theory of special, and lower, creation in their case. Though news from the Pacific war fronts was expertly and severely filtered for the home audience, and though evidence seemed to suggest that Americans were at grips with a tough, intelligent, resourceful enemy possessing a technical facility of a high order, it was still possible to broadcast a propaganda suggesting that they were barely above the level of insects. An indication of the nature of the fighting was suggested in the news early in 1944 that after over two years of combat, American forces had taken less than 300 Japanese as prisoners of war.²³

Though all this is but an inkling as to the real dimensions and proportions of the state of mind prevailing at the midway point of the war, it is necessary to be aware of this when examining the incipience of the negotiated peace and anti-strategic bombing movements of that time.

The Peace Now Movement was launched in Philadelphia on July 11, 1943, at a time when the war had taken a decisive turn in favor of the Anglo-Russo-American "allies," what with the turning back of the German armies in Russia, after the German disaster at Stalingrad, the defeat of the Germans and Italians in North Africa, and the overwhelming of the Japanese navy in the Pacific. The invasion of Sicily by American and British forces was a day old when Peace Now began its official existence. Quakers and other peace figures were the principal elements involved at the beginning, though adherents and supporters were gradually attracted from many persuasions, which had much to do eventually with the violent attack directed their way from the preponderant supporters of a war fought to "unconditional surrender" of the enemy.

One of the chief organizers and ultimately the principal spokesman for the PNM was George W. Hartmann, professor of educational psychology at Columbia Teachers College at the time the war broke out, and serving in the same capacity at Harvard when this venture was initiated. Hartmann, associated with the Socialist Party of Norman Thomas for some time, and its candidate for mayor of New York City, had been in the news on two other occasions prior to emerging as a prime worker in fashioning Peace Now. His part in opposing the infiltration of the Teachers Union in New York by the

²³*Nation* (February 5, 1944), p. 147.

Communist Party had earned him much publicity, little support, but the profound hostility of the CPUSA, and CP publications and their satellite journalists in the left-liberal sector of the newspaper and periodical press, who had a big part to play in the smearing of Hartmann and Peace Now; undoubtedly they had this score to settle with him still on the agenda when he surfaced on the national scene in this new capacity. Hartmann, along with Clyde R. Miller, also on the Columbia Teachers College faculty and director of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, had further excited publicity because of their anti-war stands and their subsequent departure from there after challenging Columbia president Nicholas Murray Butler, a major Francophile and proponent of interventionism in the war in the period shortly prior to American involvement.

Hartmann, a handsome man with the physique of a professional football player, was an attractive chairman and chief speaker. He was also responsible on at least one occasion for putting the objectives of Peace Now in the fewest words. "The advocates of Peace Now," he said, "want the United States to proclaim fair and reasonable peace terms at once as a basis of an immediate armistice and simultaneously invite representatives of all nations without discrimination to a world conference for achieving these conditions."²⁴ This statement was made in May, 1944, after the PNM had been under a specially hostile publicity barrage from the entire American political spectrum for six months because it called for the declaration of political war aims to supplement the military course of action, and embarrassed many war supporters, since there really never had been any such pronouncements, at least from the American and English leaders, other than an intention to fight to "victory." The more idealist supporters of the war had suffered much heartburn over this from the very beginnings of the war. While the political objectives of Stalinist Russia were overt and obvious, it was becoming increasingly plain that Stalin's partners had none of any significance. Fritz Sternberg, a Marxist economist whose views were regularly proclaimed in the weekly *Nation* in the war years, put it very bluntly at about this time, when he commented, "The Anglo-Saxon powers have no positive program in Europe; the destruction of the Nazi state is their only clear aim."²⁵

²⁴*Christian Century* (May 24, 1944), pp. 646-647.

²⁵Sternberg, "Germany, Economic Heart of Europe," *Nation* (February 12, 1944), pp. 187-189.

The late winter and early spring of 1944, when Peace Now began to make its only serious impact, was a time when numerous pathetic and querulous calls were leaking into the American and English press, seeking to learn what it was all about. The London Sunday *Observer* sponsored one late in February, 1944, which condensed the whole literature on the subject, titled "What Are We Fighting For?" The editors, tiring of five years of what they called "'win-the-war-first-and-find-out-afterwards' propaganda," wanted some tangible political proposals:

War is politics. We fight for principles or war is madness. If we deny this, we deny all that the war has cost us and our Allies; we ought never to have begun. . . .²⁶

In one way this was simply a symptom of the restlessness and malaise which had invested a large contingent of this country's major opinion fashioners as well; Dorothy Thompson and Arthur Krock were already loosing their fears that the Atlantic Charter had been "buried" by Churchill, and that Soviet Russia was sure to "dominate the post-war structure," while Anne O'Hare McCormick, James B. Reston, Hanson Baldwin, William Philip Simms, and even Samuel Crafton were all lowing in protest over American no-policy, and the jovian Walter Lippmann had just come forth with a book titled *U.S. War Aims*, which in impeccable prose informed the readers that there were virtually none. *Time* concluded that Lippmann's message was, that since no one knew what was going on, it was best that "no one should say anything in particular."²⁷

But by this time, a national exposure to the war aims of Peace Now had occurred, and they had stirred up a mighty storm. It was not until a meeting sponsored by PNM which took place in New York City's Carnegie Hall the evening of December 30, 1943, that more than local attention to the organization and its aims was gained, and the very largest part was fiercely hostile. First to hit PNM was the communist weekly *New Masses*, in a two-page editorial five days

²⁶Reprinted in *Time* (February 28, 1944), p. 34. In a whistling-in-the-dark conclusion, the *Observer* reassured itself at least on all points by declaiming tremulously, "We *are* fighting to make the world safe for democracy. We *are* fighting for homes fit for heroes [one of the most hooted-at objectives announced during the war of 1914-1918]. We *are* fighting for 'freedom and progress.'"

²⁷For summary of above, see lead story, "Cause for Alarm," in *Time* (March 20, 1944), pp. 17-18.

later, titled "Hitler's Doves."²⁸ The communists, thanks to wartime partnership with Stalin, "wrapped so tightly in the American Flag," as one ironic observer had noted, "that the hammer and sickle were barely visible," sounded precisely like a post-war anti-communist right-wing organ, used the same language, and recommended the same action. PNM's program was described as an "incitement to sedition and treason," and the communists urged the Department of Justice to investigate it. Hartmann was blasted as a "red baiter" leader in the Teachers' Union,²⁹ demonstrating that they had not forgotten his part in that pre-war imbroglio. A series of later editorials in this journal dwelled on the same theme, that of a month later selecting the Peace Now Movement as best typifying a spreading "intellectual 'left' defeatism," "steeped in hatred of Russia and the Teheran program."³⁰ The *New Masses* recommended Hartmann's dismissal from Harvard and his indictment for sedition.

This latter recommendation had apparently already been done, by *Life* magazine. In its story on the Carnegie Hall meeting, accompanied by the most unflattering pictures of the proceedings they were able to select, the editors delayed publication for three weeks after the event, and ran it back-to-back with a similar lurid spread on the people just indicted for sedition by the Justice Department for conspiracy to violate the Smith Act.³¹ A banner one-fourth of an inch over Hartmann's picture read "U.S. Indicts Fascists." Hartmann wrote a short but heated letter to *Life* over their smear, and pointed

²⁸*New Masses* (January 4, 1944), pp. 7-8. Hartmann's first widely circulated call for a negotiated peace was issued the week before Christmas, 1943, and given prominent notice in the *New York Times* (December 19, 1943), p. 3.

²⁹"Pravda's Warning," *New Masses* (February 1, 1944), p. 21.

³⁰"Smoking Out Treason," *New Masses* (February 8, 1944), p. 17. Along with Hartmann and the Peace Now Movement, the editors included Norman Thomas, John Haynes Holmes, the *Progressive*, the *Call*, *Common Sense*, Sidney Hertzberg, Alfred Bingham, Milton Mayer, and Granville Hicks for special attack because of their anti-war and peace talk. Bruce Bliven's "The Hang-Back Boys" in the *New Republic* (March 5, 1944), pp. 305-307, charged resisters of this sort with being "spiritual saboteurs" who were "sitting out" the war; "Their hearts are not in it," The *New Republic's* former editor-in-chief complained. There was a similar but more generalized attack by Norman Cousins, in which he characterized such behavior as "intellectual treason," and he mourned that in such circles, "mention of the coming peace is greeted with the enthusiasm of a lost soul waiting for the fog to close in." There really was every reason for the resisters to feel this way. See Cousins, "Never Call Retreat," *Saturday Review of Literature* (January 1, 1944), p. 14.

³¹*Life* (January 17, 1944), pp. 18-19. The New York daily press reported the meeting promptly, of course; a full account was carried by the *New York Times* the next day (December 31, 1943), p. 3.

out that "such old-established societies like the National Council for the Prevention of War, the War Resisters League, and the Fellowship of Reconciliation are also vigorously pushing a Wage Peace Now campaign," but that *Life* had pointedly omitted paying any attention to them. *Life* apologized lamely for the juxtaposition of the lurid headline and Hartmann's picture, offering the preposterous excuse that it was all a "typographical error," but concluded, "*Life* believes that, at this critical time when united effort is necessary to gain a worthwhile victory and a worthwhile peace, 'Peace Now' is not only dangerous but subversive to that end."³² *Life* did not meet Hartmann's challenge to discuss the other peace groups and their demands for a negotiated peace, but did show that as far as Peace Now was concerned, they agreed with the *New Masses* on what subversion was. They also admitted indirectly that of all these campaigns, they considered that of PNM most formidable.

However, they had plenty of company in this venture. The *New York Post* was one of the leaders in imputing that the leaders of Peace Now were little more than subversive and the *Saturday Evening Post* published a vigorous editorial some two months after the Carnegie Hall meeting, repudiating the PNM.³³ The liberal weeklies, both running high fevers over the war and entertaining fervent pro-Stalinist sympathies, both launched ugly attacks on Hartmann and Peace Now, that in the *New Republic* being especially offensive. Being "a tool of axis diplomacy," a vicious guilt-by-association, content-analysis charge, was the kindest accusation leveled against it. The editors hoped Peace Now was being investigated by the FBI, and that it would be destroyed regardless of what the investigation revealed.³⁴ So spoke one of the traditional voices in defense of minority views and a grand champion of free speech and the diversity of opinion in a democracy.

On the subject of government investigation of PNM, the liberal weeklies were divergent. The *Nation*, famous for its many bellows of pain about the Dies Committee and this House of Representatives agency's periodic investigation of communists and other favored leftists, thought that this committee's announced intention of investigation of Hartmann and Peace Now was quite fine, and accorded

³²*Life* (February 17, 1944), p. 11.

³³*Saturday Evening Post* (February 26, 1944), p. 100.

³⁴"Peace Now," *New Republic* (February 7, 1944), pp. 164-165. For the *New Republic* one of the two principal reasons it opposed negotiated peace was that it would deprive the "allies" of the satisfaction of exacting vengeance.

its approval.³⁵ But the *New Republic* sniffed editorially, "Peace Now has already been 'investigated' and completely discredited."³⁶ Apparently the editors spoke too soon, since the movement gained attention rather than lost it, and they soon followed with a ferocious special dispatch of some length by their Washington correspondent, Helen Fuller,³⁷ which quoted at length from an attempt at literary assassination of Peace Now by M. M. Marberry of the New York afternoon tabloid, *PM*, referred to by wags as "the uptown edition of the *Daily Worker*." Ever since the *Life* pictorial adventure and a long and fairly restrained commentary in *Newsweek*,³⁸ Peace Now's national press coverage had spread widely and rapidly, although the stir in the New York City daily press was probably the wildest, and a new tack was being taken in the war of innuendo on the organization. The Fuller vignette was in the main a personal attack on the founders, Hartmann, and the executive secretary of PNM, Bessie Simon, who had connections in both the organized pacifist and pre-Pearl Harbor anti-war organizations, principally the America First Committee. But the emphasis now was swinging away from the reprehensibility of Peace Now's negotiated peace objective to an *ad hominem* denigration of specific people known for or suspected of having become affiliated, but only those of conservative reputations, the casting of suspicions as to the sources of their funds, and allegations of guilt by association with such organizations as the Christian Front and America First, even though the latter no longer existed.

There was little doubt by the spring of 1944 that, even if the Peace Now Movement had not yet made any appreciable impact on policy makers, they surely had made their mark upon the opinion-makers. A torrent of incensed and infuriated print had flowed from coast to coast, and though PNM claimed to have members in nearly every state at the beginning of their national notoriety, which may have been doubtful, there were few areas which could claim to know

³⁵*Nation* (February 5, 1944), pp. 146-147.

³⁶"The Dies Committee," *New Republic* (February 7, 1944), p. 166. The Dies Committee eventually branded the action of Peace Now as "treasonable and seditious"; *New York Times*, February 17, 1944.

³⁷"Peace Now," *New Republic* (February 14, 1944), pp. 203-204. Miss Fuller disclosed that PNM was working out of a small office on East 40th Street in New York City.

³⁸"Behind Peace Now," *Newsweek* (February 7, 1944), p. 80. This summary, which contained less malice than most, emphasized the part played by Quakers in its origin.

nothing about it by the end of the spring of 1944. Those most firmly devoted to the unconditional surrender doctrine as the ultimate in war aims were by far the most hostile, and to them Hartmann and his associates, whether from the Friends, the *Catholic Worker*, the Socialist Party, surreptitious supporters from other peace organizations, or the lately-defunct America First Committee, were as bad if not worse than the alleged seditionists, whose Washington trial was going on simultaneously. The conservative *Saturday Evening Post*, the American Century press of Henry Luce, Eugene Lyons' fiercely anti-Soviet *American Mercury*, the pro-Stalin but anti-CPUSA *Nation* and *New Republic*, and the Stalinist American organs, the *Daily Worker* and *New Masses*, all had something in common in the period ending with the Anglo-American invasion of France: a generously-proportioned and nearly identical antipathy toward George Hartmann and the Peace Now Movement.

Of singular significance was the effect upon, and the response from, the organized peace forces in the United States. Of the mass of periodical publications in the country the only one of national repute which gave Peace Now serious and dignified attention and permitted its spokesman to explain their position at length was the *Christian Century*, and its editorial position was not friendly toward pacifism. The editors gave Peace Now publicity but did not support it, and argued against all pacifist and peace organizations, PNM and the older ones alike. They spent most of the spring of 1944 in making ironic sallies at the expense of the established peace groups, which without exception shied away from Hartmann and his associates as if they were leprous. Their particular target was A. J. Muste, a repeated attacker of Peace Now, whose main objection was that the organization was not selective about who were permitted to join it, and accepted anyone who was against the war and wished it brought to an end through a negotiated peace. In this tack Muste was following a rather generalized and ceremonial anti-war leftist response. Granted that the communists and the vast majority of liberal-left forces in America were in firm support of the war, and probably would have favored its prosecution far beyond the time it did take to bring it to a halt, a significant part of the peace societies and pacifist organizations also consisted of those of left-wing persuasions. Since it was part of their dogma that it was almost impossible for a non-leftist to be for peace, it followed that the membership of peace groups, whether actionist or not, had to be screened with great thor-

oughness in order to maintain ideological purity, and that anyone without impeccable leftist credentials seeking to join a peace organization was obviously a likely *agent-provocateur* or trying to attain sinister and ignoble goals of a selfish and personal order. It was impossible to be a conservative or other non-leftist and be sincerely interested in peace.

Muste was firmly captured by this form of conspiratorial suspicion, and responded in the expected conditioned reflex when allegations began to be made (mostly in circles just as hostile to Muste on account of his general anti-war stand) that Hartmann and his associates were attempting to find financial support in unorthodox places and from people who lacked the patina of established pacifist respectability. Muste began to repeat these charges, accompanied by warnings to his own Fellowship of Reconciliation, and to other older organizations, that they stay away from Peace Now and all its works and pomps. Far better was it to let the war go on than to cooperate in bringing about its cessation through the media of such auspices as these.

In mid-March, 1944, the *Christian Century*, in a major editorial, "Pacifists Want Peace—But When?" took Muste and other critics of Hartmann and Peace Now to task in rather stringent fashion. "Nothing illustrates the political naïveté of American pacifists better than their current embarrassment over what is called the 'Peace Now Movement,'" it led off, and flayed Muste for his attacks on PNM and his denunciation on the grounds it "was receiving the support of 'reactionaries' and possibly other rather dubious characters." The implication to the editors was that "pacifists should decline to associate with such people when they advocate peace, even though pacifists are supposed to stand for peace, first, last and all the time." The editors also included a solid rebuke to the Socialist Party for its hasty scurrying from association with Hartmann, once a candidate for office by their nomination. They reminded the SP that their memories were deficient. "The Socialists seem to have forgotten that their party, which was then stronger than it is today [1944], held to the position in the First World War which Dr. Hartmann takes now." It was a mark of political ineptness of a high order to the editors for all the veteran peace organizations to shun Peace Now, in the hope that the same thing might be done by themselves somehow, while at the same time maintaining their innocence. "The pacifist in time of war lives in a dream world," they concluded. "Their present effort to put

as much distance as possible between themselves and 'Peace Now' " "provides another proof of their own political incompetence and irrelevance."³⁹

The *Christian Century* was not registering pique over pacifist rejection of Hartmann and the PNM, but merely demonstrating that to achieve peace was, in wartime, a political affair. The older groups, by shunning PNM (which was obviously trying to influence policy), because it had mobilized people the established peace elements considered impure in their motives, were voluntarily approving of the war continuing because it could not be ended in their way with their kind of political solution, proving that they really were not for peace under all circumstances. When Dorothy Detzer, national secretary of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, one of the most respected of the older peace organizations, admitted in a comment on the editorial that "all the old established peace organizations have withheld cooperation from the Peace Now Movement as an organization," while sturdily maintaining that there was still "political relevance" to pacifism, the editors responded,⁴⁰

The *Christian Century* has not challenged the political relevance of pacifism in peacetime—as an effort to *prevent* war. It challenges its relevancy only in the midst of an actual war. Every pacifist and every pacifist organization, including Peace Now and "all the old established peace organizations," are working for either victory or defeat in this war—there is nothing else they can do.

The *Christian Century's* editors argued that once a state became involved in a war, its citizens could only work for its victory or its defeat, and even war opponents contributed to the "war effort" by working on their jobs from day to day, even when engaged in the more or less forced labor of the conscientious objector. Hartmann argued that there was an alternative, stalemate, which might be construed to be more in the "national interest" supporters of the war talked about than victory, in which sense he sounded to some as though he had been influenced by Milton's declaration, "Who overcomes by force hath overcome but half his foe."

³⁹"Pacifists Want Peace—But When?" *Christian Century* (March 15, 1944), pp. 324-325. It is instructive to note that a few months before, the editors of the *Christian Century* (October 27, 1943, p. 1236) also expressed their support for a negotiated peace "at any time," based on a statement of post-war aims by the allies at once, so that the enemy might know what they were and thus could evaluate them as against the costs of continuing the struggle.

⁴⁰Letter to editors, *Christian Century* (April 5, 1944), p. 437, the editorial response, same page.

Muste promptly returned to the dispute with another elaboration on the reason why he was against a negotiated peace, maintaining that such a settlement would stabilize the "existing power relationships" between the two combatant combinations of states then fighting, which "would contain within itself the seeds of World War III."⁴¹ The editors promptly took after him again, and demonstrated to their satisfaction that Muste was no pacifist in this war, that he was for "active participation" in it; "Mr. Muste wants to see his country victorious and makes a strategic suggestion to that end." They were referring to Muste's hope for civil war breaking out in Germany and Japan, with the rebellious element bringing about the end of fighting after overpowering the regimes prosecuting the war, a finale strongly suggesting Lenin, the Bolsheviks, and the Russia of late 1917, though the *Christian Century* made no point of it. Muste "plainly prefers the continuance of the war to any attempt in the name of peace to 'stabilize the existing power relationships' between the belligerents," the editors remarked in closing.⁴² He was for a different kind of political situation, and preferred struggling and hoping for this even if the war had to go on indefinitely.

Muste was back with a two-column letter in rejoinder the next month, trying to elucidate further on the veteran pacifist organizations and why they took the position they did on Peace Now, but it added up to about the same as before; PN contained people Muste and the others of traditional pacifism disdained to work with. All the while he insisted that the latter were for "peace now" and had been "constantly working for that," even though rejecting the possibility of working to that end "with a specific organization named Peace Now."⁴³

The editors then gave Hartmann space to comment on what had been said on the subject over the previous ten weeks. He scolded those who had backed off from working for Peace Now "merely because some wholly respectable conservative non-pacifists also endorse it for good rational, humanitarian, patriotic or even 'selfish' motives." He also reproached those pacifists who preferred "armed revolution or civil war among the enemy peoples" to negotiated peace. "A pacifism that does not mean peaceful social change comes dangerously near to meaning nothing."

⁴¹Letter to editors, *Christian Century* (April 19, 1944), p. 501. Muste wrote in his capacity as secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation.

⁴²"Pacifism Disintegrating," *Christian Century* (April 26, 1944), pp. 519-521.

⁴³Letter to editors, *Christian Century* (May 17, 1944), pp. 622-623.

Hartmann then addressed himself to the assertion, made directly in a number of quarters, and by inference in the *Christian Century*, that Peace Now was essentially in favor of the "Allies" suffering military defeat. Said Hartmann,⁴⁴

The charge that the Peace Now Movement is "defeatist" is faulty. All we assert is that there is no *decent* national objective that could not equally well be reached by group negotiation in place of combat to the death. It is wholly unscientific to say it can't be done until we try—and we haven't tried. Since when is it more democratic or Christian to seek certain worthy goals—incidentally, what are they?—by clubbing another into submission because one is stronger? Factually, our administration's demand for the unconditional surrender of the foe also includes the unconditional surrender of the American citizen, who is asked to sign an international blank check, pledging his blood and treasure in behalf of commitments he knows nothing about, and might not approve of if he did.

And in a parting observation on the opponents of negotiated peace, Hartmann remarked, "Presumably all who are opposed to Peace Now are in favor of peace-the-day-after-tomorrow. Until then, millions more must be slaughtered. Why?"⁴⁵ Apparently the *Christian Century*, though officially opposed to Peace Now and all other related efforts, thought there was something about the former worthy of more extended attention. Three weeks after publishing Hartmann's rejoinder to Muste and themselves, they published the only sober and extended exposition of PNM's full position that appeared in a nationally-circulated periodical, written by Dorothy Hewitt Hutchinson, a prominent member of the Society of Friends⁴⁶ and one of the founders and associate chairman, along with Hartmann, of the organization. "The Peace Now Movement urges that the United States, recognizing the requirements of permanent peace, as set forth

⁴⁴Letter to editors, *Christian Century* (May 24, 1944), pp. 646-647. Hartmann wrote from his Harvard address and not from the PNM headquarters in New York City.

⁴⁵Wrote one informed activist to the editors, "I was delighted with your 'Pacifists Want Peace—But When?' in the March 15 issue. Only you don't know half the pacifists in the country want 'Peace Now' and are with it. The opposition of the old so-called peace organizations is economic—the simple old source of evil. There is just so much money for peace in the country and the Peace Now Movement is diverting some of it." Letter, Yoné U. Stafford to the editors, *Christian Century* (April 26, 1944), p. 532.

⁴⁶Mrs. Hutchinson, born in 1905, was a graduate of Mount Holyoke College and held the Ph.D. degree from Yale (1932); she was active in the field of various biological studies and was involved in a number of humanitarian enterprises as well. She authored two pamphlets in the peace campaign, *A Call to Peace Now* and *Must the Killing Go on?*

in the Atlantic Charter, promptly formulate fair and reasonable peace terms and invite her allies and her enemies to negotiate for peace on this basis at once," she declared. "It is the contention of the Peace Now Movement that such an immediate peace proposal is a practicable and honorable alternative to the indefinite prolongation of the war," and one "which could be made only by a nation which is sure of victory but whose consciousness of superior strength is tempered by a realization of the material and spiritual cost of a complete military triumph and by a sense of responsibility, before God, for the welfare of mankind."⁴⁷

"Like a mouse transfixed by the paralyzing gaze of a snake, the American Christian watches the relentless approach of D-Day," the Hutchinson statement went on. "In dumb horror he sees at least half a million of America's sons groomed for sure death in the bloodiest invasion of history because he sees no honorable alternative to the continuation of the war." "It is to such agonized souls that the Peace Now Movement offers its alternative to the anguish of war and the disillusionment of victory," this long manifesto's concluding appeal, was already by-passed by the course of the war, for D-Day was already a week in history when the document appeared in print. It was possible to object that Dr. Hutchinson had anticipated a somewhat larger loss of life than actually took place, in the invasion of western Europe in June, 1944, but there was little to quarrel with other than that, and least of all her prediction of "disillusionment" with the "victory," for no war in history has produced such a mountain of print and length of talk complaining of the vast hiatus between expectation and realization, though no war in history has also known so many who found every moment of it high adventure, who relished it with savor and glee, and who regretted profoundly its termination. For all who contemplated the saturation of Europe with war in June, 1944, with "dumb horror" there probably was an equal number which waited for it in high anticipation.

But the vast spread of the war and the preponderant part in this spread played by Americans wiped out the discussion and writing on the merits of negotiated peace as a substitute for one following "victory." Of the world's notables only Pius XII called for what Peace Now campaigned. In a speech delivered to the College of Cardinals on June 2, 1944, just as the Anglo-American armies were about to enter Rome, the Pope called for "a speedy opening of peace

⁴⁷Hutchinson, "Peace Now," *Christian Century* (June 14, 1944), pp. 723-725.

negotiations,” predicting the enormous increase of death and destruction in a war prolonged “endlessly and senselessly,” “a war whose economic, social and spiritual consequences threaten to become the scourge of the age to come.”⁴⁸

The Peace Now Movement quietly disappeared from view, most of the calamities they predicted came true, and a large part of the citizenry which looked upon them and pronounced them good for a few months, has been wailing about their evil consequences ever since. Before sagging out of sight under the weight of the massive spreading of the war in June, 1944, it was subject to a savage attack in the *American Mercury* by two vigorous pro-war propagandists, who summarized what had been said in denigration of PNM in all circles for the previous six months, and succeeded in sounding like the Stalinist press at its worst in an organ devoted to anti-Stalinism.⁴⁹ Unfortunately, the article was loaded with factual errors, but if its object was the portrayal of the personalities of the movement as psychotics and lightheaded traitors, it was possible to consider it a success. (The authors were especially delighted in the infiltration of the PNM headquarters by an employee of the pro-war leftist New York *Post*, and its subsequent publication of correspondence which was filmed on the sly. In a time of national sanity Peace Now might have sued the *Post* successfully for heavy damages for perpetrating this stunt.)

Hartmann responded with a long letter to the *Mercury* the following month deploring this marathon performance of “name-calling distortions.” “For sheer cruelty to harmless individuals and for crude misrepresentation of a humane outlook, your May article on ‘Peace Now’ takes the prize,” said Hartmann in reproach. “It is a repugnant model of totalitarian intolerance toward minorities which should cause authentic liberals some severe conscience pangs.”⁵⁰ But not

⁴⁸The editors of the *Christian Century* in a full-page editorial called attention to the similarity in content between the Pope’s appeal, and the “authoritative statement” on the objectives of the Peace Now Movement. “So far as we can see, the Pope is a Peace-Now-er in full standing,” they concluded, and cautioned, “No such warning as Pius XII has given as to the consequences if the war is greatly prolonged can be dismissed lightly.” “The Pope Is For Peace Now,” *Christian Century* (June 14, 1944), pp. 715-716.

⁴⁹Russell Whelan and Thomas M. Johnson, “‘Peace Now’ Rests in Peace,” *American Mercury* (May, 1944), pp. 589-595. Whelan was a publicist for United China Relief, while Johnson was a military writer for the Newspaper Enterprise Association. What qualified these journalists as experts on the subject of Peace Now is a mystery.

⁵⁰Hartmann, letter to editors, *American Mercury* (June, 1944), pp. 766-767.

right away. The war was the great totalitarian liberal triumph, and no incidentals were to stand in their way in enjoying it to the full, while they showed the enemy how "total war" was really supposed to be fought. The grieving and anguish over being the victims of the treatment accorded Peace Now was to come their way in the first decade of the Cold War, when it became totalitarian liberalism's turn to plead for the consideration of the value of negotiated peace.

The most vicious of all the smears of Peace Now came, strangely enough, over a year after the war had ended, in the anonymously-written book *The Plotters*,⁵¹ an account which glowed with simulated indignation and bogus patriotism, and gave indication of having been written while the war was still in progress, in what might be described as Teheran-era *Daily Worker* "unity" style. As far as its relevance for that moment, the fall of 1946, was concerned, the publishers might just as well have included as many pages concerning the menace of the Seljuk Turks.

The tens of thousands of lives expended and the hundreds of billions of dollars spent in the last score of years trying to repair the consequences of the "victory" which seemed so much better than a termination of the war short of such a conclusion is another story. Raymond Aron, in his *The Century of Total War*, in 1954, came up with a fitting epitaph to it all when he pointed out, "The goal that Western strategy has set itself in Japan as well as in Germany is not very different from the situation that would have arisen of its own accord if peace had been concluded before the entry of Soviet troops into the Reich and Manchuria, and before complete destruction of both armies and countries. We are trying to efface the consequences of a too complete victory, and get back to a victory compatible with the resurrection of the vanquished." What Aron is lamenting is that the war was not brought to an end by a negotiated peace, though it would seem that the easy part has been the achievement of the objective he described; the undoing of the profound dislocations which

⁵¹New York: E. P. Dutton, 1946, pp. 179-182. The author, Avedis Derounian, used the pseudonym "John Roy Carlson." His previous book of this kind, *Under Cover* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1943), was the subject of a famous Chicago lawsuit just a few weeks before *The Plotters* was published, at which time United States District Court Judge John P. Barnes said of Derounian-Carlson, "I wouldn't believe him on oath, now or any time hereafter." Westbrook Pegler, interested in other aspects of the book than its caricature of Peace Now, included the court transcript of Judge Barnes' remarks of September 25, 1946, in his King Features Syndicate column published in the Albany, N. Y. *Times-Union* and elsewhere on November 13, 1946.

remain as unaltered today as they did more than twenty years ago is an achievement no one alive will live to see. "The war is the peace," enthusiastically proclaimed the *New Republic's* editor Michael Straight, in his book *Make This the Last War*, published late in 1943. World War II will undoubtedly be the last war of its kind; we have reverted to guerrilla war and civil war, the most primitive and brutal kinds of war, respectively, as General J. F. C. Fuller maintains.⁵² But the significance of Straight's dictum, anticipating the famous commandment of 1984 society in George Orwell's novel, is what is most compelling. His calling attention to the simultaneous construction, step by step, of the world to come while the war destroying the previous one was in progress, long ago deserved attention from the numerous clan who believe war is a means of preserving a status quo, when it is unmatched as machinery for effecting change, profound, sweeping, irrevocable, and invariably degenerative.⁵³

Walter B. Pitkin, in his *A Short Introduction to the History of Human Stupidity*, suggested that "not all the discoveries and inventions of mankind since the close of the Pleistocene age have benefited the race as extensively or as intensively as the war morons and war maniacs have harmed the race."⁵⁴ It was obvious he was not referring just to professional soldiers, few of whom have ever expressed any great zeal over the beauties of war, particularly if they had ever done any fighting. The civilian politicians, zealots, vengeance-seekers, propagandists, and the army of the ignorant taxpayers and supporters with their single-hypothesis theory of the origins of war, had their way. The Peace Now adherents were able to take comfort, if they wished, in the many rueful indirect testimonials to the correctness of their assertions when it was all over. On the last day of 1945, *Time's* commentary on a goalless war began, "World War II had ended badly." "Except on the military side, where allied might and allied generalship were crushing and supreme, it had never been fought well. The why of the fighting had

⁵²Fuller, *The Decisive Battles of the Western World* (3 vols., London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1956), Vol. III, p. 634.

⁵³One of the few discussions of this aspect of Straight's book, published by Harcourt Brace, is to be found in the *Times Literary Supplement* (February 12, 1944), p. 74.

⁵⁴New York: Simon and Schuster, 1932, p. 476.

never been adequately spelled out.”⁵⁵ This latter remark was at the core of Hartmann’s position throughout the brief day of Peace Now; no one seemed to know what the war was being fought to achieve. A year later, the *U.S. News* published an even bleaker summary of the existing anti-millennium the political and ideological warriors in mufti had never contemplated as the sum total of all their efforts:⁵⁶

The world’s worst war is being followed by the world’s worst peace. The present peace the elementary details of which have not been framed a year after the cessation of fighting in Europe, is not a peace at all. It is a dismal orgy of violence, looting, oppression, of slave labor and starvation, of mutilation of historic ethnographic frontiers and of defiance of natural economic law.

So ended the second great crusade against political sin, in which the “utter destruction” of the enemy was set down as the principal prerequisite to the creation of “a decent world,” and, as General Fuller encapsuled the situation, “the second American crusade ended even more disastrously than the first.”⁵⁷

Unlike Peace Now, the campaign against obliteration bombing of the enemy’s cities began in England, a logical development, since England was the place where obliteration bombing was first shaped into a practical policy. From there it filtered to the United States, and created a stir of about the same duration as Peace Now and at the same time. To some extent the people involved also came from the same general sector of the community, with the exception that there were more personalities from the clerical world involved in the protest against the bombing of the enemy cities.

Like Peace Now, the protest against aerial massacre of enemy civilian urban populations had to struggle against a hostile public opinion of many years’ standing, and a mixture of ignorance of what was going on and an obtuseness toward brutality which were objectives of propagandists seeking to firm up home-front support for about anything which may have been decided was a “military necessity.” (The senseless, pointless and fruitless destruction of the

⁵⁵*Time* (December 31, 1945), p. 16. Hartmann proved to be no better at predicting the future than anyone else; in a speech before the War Resisters League on February 27, 1945, he thought the world was on the verge of a long era of peace, if only war between Russia and England could be prevented. “Permanent Peace Via the Triple Alliance,” *Vital Speeches* (March 15, 1945), pp. 341-343.

⁵⁶Franklin P. Hammel to *U. S. News* (December 20, 1945), p. 66.

⁵⁷Fuller, *Decisive Battles*, Vol. III, p. 629.

Benedictine Abbey of Monte Cassino in Italy by American and British bombing planes and artillery in January-February, 1944, is a case in point, as General Fuller put it, "not so much a piece of vandalism as an act of sheer tactical stupidity."⁵⁸

Aneurin Bevan, wartime Labor Party member of parliament and subsequently minister of health and housing in the British government in 1945, once declared, "Remember that when you put a man in uniform, you reduce his intelligence by fifty per cent."⁵⁹ But in view of the political decisions made during the war, there were grounds for suspicion among strictly military men about the amount of intelligence existing among the decision makers, even assuming they were not subject to any subsequent reduction at all after election to office. And one of the decisions made was the "military necessity" of area bombing.

No account of the reasons for the grudging bit of headway made by the campaign to halt this program in 1944 is understandable without some knowledge of the success of popular, but not official, Anglo-American propaganda in convincing the vast majority that, even if the results of strategic bombing, particularly of Germany, were dubious, at least it was justified because the Germans had commenced it all, and therefore this was justifiable retaliation, a primitive level of rationalization where most of the talk and print on the subject stayed. A well-exploited saga of the early war years was the German bombings of Warsaw, Rotterdam, London, Coventry, and Stalingrad, even though the first, second, and last of these cities were under assault and also were defended, and the activities of the German air force were tactical operations in conjunction with ground fighting in a war zone. London and Coventry were strategically bombed by the Germans in 1940-1941, and the issue as understood by almost all at the time plainly depended on a propaganda insisting that in all cases unprovoked attacks had been made on these communities, and that therefore what was to happen to some seventy German cities of 100,000 population or higher was at worst only retribution.

Rotterdam, attacked in the second week of May, 1940, as German armies were beginning their sweep of the Low Countries, was the first to be exploited. A certain amount of attention to the German attack on Warsaw had preceded the whole affair, in September,

⁵⁸Fuller, *The Second World War, 1939-1945* (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1949), p. 272.

⁵⁹Quoted by Quentin Reynolds in his profile of Bevan, "Rebel in the House," *Collier's* (December 29, 1945), p. 36.

1939. British apologists for their subsequent demolition of Germany frequently cited this as the precedent for their action, rather than what the Germans inflicted upon English towns in the spring of 1940 and thereafter, again daintily avoiding the distinction between the bombing of cities under direct attack and the bombing of cities hundreds of miles behind the fighting lines, the concentration of fire upon military objectives as against the annihilation of whole communities as policy, with hardly any pretense of special attention to targets of military importance.

But Rotterdam received the first major publicity, and the numbers game properly begins here. Over two months after the attack, the Royal Netherlands Legation in Washington with casual aplomb announced to the world via the *New York Times* that German air attackers had killed 30,000 people in seven and one-half minutes. Americans in particular were horrified by this story, and it became part of the folklore in Anglo-American circles, and has actually been little jarred by the research of a quarter of a century, though David Irving, while writing his *The Destruction of Dresden*, obtained figures from Rotterdam authorities in 1962 that the verifiable loss of life was 980, not 30,000 and that most of these persons were killed in fires which were set by the bombing, which was to prove to be the case in German cities also in subsequent years. As Irving says, "Dramatic exaggerations die hard—not least those that are generated in the dire necessity of war-time morale-boosting."⁶⁰

In the summer of 1940 came the German attacks on England, particularly the blows struck to London and Coventry. In the case of the latter city, from the popular press stories and radio broadcasts which blanketed America, one might have gathered that the Germans had bombed this place only to destroy its cathedral and its civilian population. Again the account suggested immense loss of life, while it turned out that a total of 380 persons were killed. Almost always unmentioned was that Coventry was a major center of vital war production industries, many of which were destroyed or damaged, including twelve which were engaged in military aircraft manufacturing.

In the case of London the volume of reportage was astounding, and Americans in particular were able to start off each day listening to the sepulchral voice of Edward R. Murrow, describing new de-

⁶⁰Irving, *The Destruction of Dresden* (London: William Kimber, 1963), pp. 24-25; on Coventry, see p. 30.

struction day by day, with the impression being gained by most listeners that hardly anything of the town existed by the end of 1940. One would never have known that at the same time the Germans were making nightly visits to bomb London, similar excursions by the Royal Air Force to Italian but principally German cities were taking place, but the last thing available to the yet-uninvolved Americans was a correct picture of the total situation. Nor would one have guessed that the exaggeration of the damage was on a scale just short of breath-taking.

Especially interesting in connection with this was a report made in the *Saturday Review of Literature* late in 1943 by one of its house book reviewers, Henry C. Wolfe, just back from a visit in London. "If you go to London," revealed Mr. Wolfe, "you will not find a city in ruins. You can walk from Picadilly to Oxford Circus without seeing a building that shows marks of the blitz. Or from Trafalgar Square to the House of Parliament and hardly come across a reminder that the Luftwaffe has been over London."⁶¹ This was rather strange news for a recent eye-witness to be relating, while still trying to tell an American reading public that England was under "concentrated devastation."

As for the total damage achieved in England by the Germans, as compared to that achieved in Germany, the summary by Allen A. Michie, a one-time *Time-Life* reporter, in the *Reader's Digest* in the summer of 1945, is particularly dramatic and succinct: "The combined damaged areas of London, Bristol, and Coventry and all the blitzed cities of Britain could be dumped in the ruins of just one medium-sized German city and hardly be noticed."⁶² Coventry was many times cited in the popular propaganda as the excuse for obliteration strategy applied later on in Germany. Michie estimated that by comparison Berlin suffered 363 Coventrys; Cologne, 269; Hamburg, 200; and Bremen, 137. Few believed that this was an excessively weighted retaliation, or that such prodigious damage was not absolutely necessary.

⁶¹Wolfe, "A London Report," *Saturday Review of Literature* (December 11, 1943), pp. 14-15, in part a review of J. M. Richards, *The Bombed Buildings of Britain* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1943).

⁶²Michie, "Germany Was Bombed to Defeat," *Reader's Digest* (August, 1945), pp. 77-78, the first popularized summarization of the overall report of *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey* which, though an accurate account of the damage done by bombing, came to specious conclusions which no longer are supported.

In the case of Stalingrad, here we have a prime instance of the diligence and assiduousness of Soviet and pro-Soviet word merchants. In a city fought for block-by-block and even house-by-house, the damage is bound to be utterly appalling, but most Americans went through the war believing the destruction was a malicious product of German air attack, and inclined to forget that the Red Army had anything to do with a goodly share of the wreckage. In such circumstances it is conventional to blame it all on the enemy. The exploitation of it for propaganda purposes was almost fulsome, and tended to be brought up every time there took place a discussion of the part played by the Soviet in the war against Hitler Germany. And the objective was well reached before deflation of the legend took place. William L. White, one of America's most prestigious reporters in World War II, is principally responsible for the deflation. As a traveling companion to Eric Johnston, the president of the American Chamber of Commerce, on the latter's celebrated tour of Stalinist Russia in the second half of 1944, White was permitted to see a number of things barred to other American correspondents, who themselves read about the war in Soviet newspapers, and wrote the stories they filed to America and England from their hotels in Moscow, not from the front, where most readers thought they were. One of White's treats was an air tour of Stalingrad, a long, narrow community winding mostly along one bank of the Volga. The purpose was obvious, to impress White with this destroyed place, and thus get more wordage placed before American readers. White, who had been in London during the German bombing of 1940-1941, and thought that was considerable, soured on Stalingrad as a site of vast destruction. Said he with a sniff in his subsequent book *Report on the Russians*, on what he was shown, "If you coiled [the ruins of] Stalingrad up and set it down in the ruins of London there would still be plenty of room for Stalingrad to rattle around."⁶³

So we have some interesting wartime eyewitness stories on the relative damage of air attacks: Stalingrad a bagatelle compared to London; London and the entire damaged areas of all Britain combined virtually *nothing* compared to any one of seventy German cities *alone*, and one interesting traveller who hardly was able to find any

⁶³White, *Report on the Russians* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1945), p. 19. When the *Reader's Digest* issued an abridged version of the book, this account of Stalingrad was for some reason omitted.

damage in parts of London he visited at the very height of the war. The Anglo-American propaganda picture of this interesting business was just about the reverse.

But who had started it? This was an important question, because at the core of what might be called vulgar propaganda, whichever side "started" any particular maneuver (be it explosive bullets, gas warfare, tanks, submarine attacks, and the like, as has been seen prior to this time) was sure to be blamed by the later side on the scene, not only for its prior actions but those of its antagonists in similar enterprise later on. Another standard staple, particularly of the *ex post facto* vulgar propaganda, was the self-righteous claim that the area bombings were retaliation for German concentration camp excesses, as though the people killed in these massacres from the air were the same people in charge of the concentration camps.⁶⁴ One of the repetitious charges used to counter Vera Brittain, particularly in England, her home, when she headed up the critique of allied area bombing, was that those whom she sought to be spared had undertaken this policy first. Public opinion was prepared for years to support such action, and nothing ever came up which diverted the English and American policy makers from it. But it was a false charge.

There is no doubt of the English origin of both strategic bombing, directed ostensibly at military objectives, and area bombing, a variant of this, in which the goal was to destroy as much of the enemy's civilian housing and as many inhabitants as possible, both these kinds of targets being far behind the fighting lines, if any. Many printed sources by important participants and functionaries who figured in the decisions exist, in which the authors boast of their deeds. General Fuller has pointed out that a form of area bombing against the villages of rebellious natives of Waziristan in Northwest India was carried out by the Royal Air Force as far back as 1925,⁶⁵ even though a ruling established at the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments of 1922 had stipulated, "Aerial bombardment for the purpose of terrorizing the civilian population, of destroying or damaging private property not of a military character, or of injuring

⁶⁴See for example Martin Caidin, *The Night Hamburg Died* (New York: Balantine Books, 1960), for impressions of this sort. Compare this with Prime Minister Churchill's July, 1943, Guildhall speech, in which he declared, "We entered the war of our free will, without ourselves being directly assaulted." Quoted in *Time* (July 12, 1943), p. 35.

⁶⁵Fuller, *Second World War*, p. 221.

non-combatants, is prohibited." (The English did not adhere to this ruling, nor did the French, who repeatedly bombed the Syrian city of Damascus in 1925 and 1926.)

A book which appeared early in 1944, by J. M. Spaight, principal assistant secretary of the Air Ministry, *Bombing Vindicated*, was the first inkling for many that such a policy was of English origin. Mr. Spaight, who launched the incredible slogan, "The bomber is the savior of civilization," dated the decision to engage in such warfare from May, 1940, and bluntly declared, "We began to bomb objectives on the German mainland before the Germans began to bomb objectives on the British mainland." This is a historical fact which has been publicly admitted. Spaight went on to explain why it had been suppressed from general news so long: ". . . because we were doubtful about the psychological effect of propagandist distortion of the truth that it was we who started the strategic offensive, we have shrunk from giving our great decision [of May, 1940] the publicity which it deserved. That surely was a mistake. It was a splendid decision."⁶⁶

But Spaight was far from alone, nor was he first. As far back as September 13, 1941, in the London *New Leader*, the celebrated military analyst B. H. Liddell Hart had the following to say:⁶⁷

On May 10, 1940, the German offensive in the West was launched and the Royal Air Force in natural reply, launched attacks on the communications of the invading enemy, first in the invading territory, and then extending into Western Germany.

On the night of May 17, the policy of confining air operations to what might be roughly described as the battle zone was abandoned, and air attacks were made against targets at Hamburg and Bremen; on the following nights targets at Hannover were attacked. This new policy of attacking military objectives in the interior of Germany was continued in the weeks that followed.

On May 24, the Germans dropped their first bombs on English soil, although only a few of them, at scattered places on the East Coast. This was not repeated, however, until British night raiding had been in process for a further three weeks.

On the night of June 17, the first considerable German air raid on England took place—and then continued nightly, although on a moderate scale, and with evident care to confine the aim to military objectives. In August the massed German daylight air offensive was launched and defeated.

⁶⁶Spaight, *Bombing Vindicated* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1944), pp. 68, 74.

⁶⁷Quoted by James McCawley, "The Bombing of Civilians," *Catholic World* (October, 1945), pp. 11-19, (15).

Just how careful either the German or English air forces were in their discrimination is not just a matter of opinion, for hitting specific targets from great altitudes at night was exceedingly difficult throughout the war, and rarely more precise in daytime, and under some situations the aim was made even worse by the increasing speed of the aircraft. The mutual bombings of London and Berlin were so unsuccessful in this respect that one English observer suggested ironically that it would have been simpler to have the opposing air forces stay home and bomb military objectives in their own cities; in that way there would be a much higher degree of accuracy and far less punishment meted out to men, women, and children non-combatants, on both sides.⁶⁸

One need not belabor this matter; there is a substantial literature which is no longer squeamish about the issue, and it is freely discussed. Spaight's book; *Bomber Command* by Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris; Liddell Hart's *The Revolution in Warfare*; F. J. P. Veale's *Advance to Barbarism*; General Fuller's history of World War II; Irving's book on the bombings of Dresden, and many other books by

⁶⁸The Butt Report to the Royal Air Force in August, 1941 (prepared by David Bensusan Butt, secretary to Professor F. A. Lindenmann) revealed that only one-third of the aircraft striking German targets came within five miles of striking it, and in the case of well-defended ones, the bombs of only one tenth of the attackers came as close as five miles. (Irving, *Destruction of Dresden*, p. 32.) But the degree of error continued very high even after scientific sighting became universally employed. In the summer of 1944 in the fighting in France, eye witnesses reported heavy bomb loads aimed at the Germans landing six or more miles inside the Anglo-American lines, and one American air group attacking a German position missed it by eight miles and scored a direct hit on a Canadian divisional headquarters instead. (Fuller, *Second World War*, pp. 303-304.) The record on churches seemed to be better; McCawley (see note 67 above) concluded that bombing destroyed 10,000 of the 12,000 Catholic churches in Germany, while Walter W. Van Kirk, a member of a deputation representing the Federal Council of Churches, the first civilian commission to visit Japan after the war, reported to the *Christian Century* (December 19, 1945), p. 1409: "It is impossible to describe in words the catastrophic damage to the churches resulting from air raids." Van Kirk calculated that 300 of the 600 Christian kindergartens in Japan had been demolished too. Yet the strategic bombers in Japan missed "ninety-seven per cent of Japan's stocks of guns, shells, explosives and other military supplies," either as a result of wide dispersal or underground storage, where they were "not vulnerable to air attack." Fuller, *Second World War*, p. 388, quoting from *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific War)*. On the other side, it now appears that the bombing of the German town of Freiburg by three planes on May 10, 1940, killing fifty-seven, of which thirty-five were women and children, was done by German bombers as a result of a navigational error. (Irving, *Destruction of Dresden*, pp. 19-20; Hans Rumpf, *The Bombing of Germany* [New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963], p. 24.)

English writers go into various phases of this early English strategic or "precision" bombing and the nature of the German retaliation. The wonder is that there is so little general admission of it even in the most advanced intellectual centers in the United States; it is to be assumed that the mass of the citizenry will continue to incubate the same old fables, mainly as a consequence of having them drummed home weekly via repeated showing of twenty-five-year-old propaganda moving pictures on television.

Mr. Spaight told the world about the "splendid decision" of May, 1940, in England to engage in strategic "precision" bombing, in 1944. It took somewhat longer for other Englishmen to reveal when the decision was made to move on to the far more comprehensive "area" bombing. There was little doubt the "precision" stage of bombing was "a grotesque failure," in the words of General Fuller, if the object was the ruination of German war industry. The index of combat munitions output (including aircraft, ammunition, weapons, tanks, and naval construction) by German industry shows a steadily rising curve reaching a high point in mid-1944, and maintaining a very high level into the last four months of the war; at the moment of defeat it was still well above anything in 1941 and equal to most of 1942.⁶⁹ Hence, the move to area bombing, to destroy the homes and if possible the persons and families of industrial workers in Germany, was fully as much a failure if set against persisting production of the means whereby to fight. But one must credit the program with awesome success if the standard is the demolition of the built up centers of major cities and the massacre of civilians; General Fuller described them as "appalling slaughterings, which would have disgraced Attila." It is interesting to note how the top radio, newspaper, and magazine propagandists in the United States, who took such delight in reporting all this destruction and carnage and gloried in it as evidence of American "might," shuddered so violently at the end of 1945 over the possibility of a new war resulting in the "destruction of civilization." Apparently they looked on the tens of millions killed and mutilated, and the hundreds of billions of dollars in property damage of 1939-1945, as not having resulted in the slightest in the "destruction" of civilization, but in its saving (*vide*

⁶⁹See Fuller, *Second World War*, p. 227, for the *Strategic Bombing Survey* chart on 1942-1945 German combat munitions output. General Fuller was a persistent contemporary critic of strategic bombing in his wartime columns in *Newsweek*.

Spaight and the role of bombing planes). By such standards, a third World War could only "save civilization" that much more.

"Area" bombing also had another goal, the undermining of German morale, in the hope that subsequent disaffection would encourage various forms of breakdown leading to collapse and surrender.⁷⁰ Various staff papers and directives on the subject were filed in 1941, and a number of separate investigations into possibilities of maximizing personnel injury by bombing were conducted, the best known being those of Professors Solly Zuckerman, P.M.S. Blackett, and F. A. Lindemann. Zuckerman and Blackett were both pessimistic about the possibilities of causing any formidable degree of harm to the German populace via area bombing. But Prime Minister Churchill turned for advice to Professor Lindemann, who, according to Irving, "was asked to propound a bombing policy by which Britain could effectively assist her ally in the East," Stalin. It is instructive to note that the Earl of Birkenhead's special plea in defense of Lindemann, *The Professor and the Prime Minister*,⁷¹ makes no reference to this. However, Churchill had taken the initiative in pushing through as policy a twenty-year treaty of amity and alliance with Stalin, and was under some pressure to create a second front in Europe against Hitler, pressure which grew to immense proportions later in 1942.

The Lindemann report, filed on March 30, 1942, as Irving puts it, "suggested that there was little doubt that an area bombing offensive could break the spirit of the enemy provided it was aimed at the working-class areas of the fifty-eight German towns with a population of more than 100,000 inhabitants each."⁷² As things turned out, Lindemann's prediction of the number that area bombing would kill or leave homeless was remarkably close to what was to transpire.

When this report, and the gruff controversy which it provoked, principally between Lindemann and Sir Henry Tizard, was disclosed by Sir Charles P. Snow in his Godkin Lectures at Harvard in 1960, subsequently published as *Science and Government*,⁷³ it was a revelation which produced widespread shock. Undoubtedly both the Earl of Birkenhead, in his official biography of Lindemann (and

⁷⁰See Irving, *Destruction of Dresden*, pp. 33-36 for discussion of matters below.

⁷¹Subtitled *The Official Life of Professor F. A. Lindemann, Viscount Cherwell* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962).

⁷²Lindemann's "minute" submitted to Churchill is reproduced in Birkenhead, *The Professor and the Prime Minister*, pp. 261-262; Lindemann was mainly concerned with the number who might be rendered "homeless" by bombing.

⁷³Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961.

the *Times Literary Supplement*, also defensive of Lindemann), had a point in taking Snow to task for his account of the fight, in which Lindemann came out a sinister villain and Tizard some kind of hero. "Both men were avid for power, but in the eyes of Snow that was fitting in the case of Tizard, but reprehensible in that of Lindemann." Actually the two men were not supporters of vastly different approaches to the subject; "there was far less difference between the views of Prof (sic) [Lindemann, as he was known to intimates] and Tizard on strategic bombing than Snow would have us believe," asserted Birkenhead. Sir Charles Webster, one of the co-authors of the official British history of strategic bombing, also came forward with the declaration that Tizard "did not disagree fundamentally" with the bombing policy recommended by Lindemann. If anything it was a violent personality conflict and a struggle for power. As Birkenhead admitted, "Both men were intensely ambitious to dictate the scientific policy of the country, and, in their grapple for power, there was room for only one at the summit." Lindemann won.⁷⁴

And this was the policy adopted by Churchill, and with modifications became general "allied" policy after the January, 1943, Casablanca meeting, while official propaganda fed to the British (and of course American) publicity organs of all types insisted in highly moral terminology that only military targets were being attacked, and all others scrupulously avoided, even in 1944 and 1945. And Irving points out that the Churchill government was "able to safeguard its secret from the day that the first area raid had been launched," "right up to the end of the war."

Probably the only serious regret the authors and executioners of the area bombing policy had concerned the failure to involve the Stalin regime in support of our collaboration with it. No attention was ever called to a Soviet strategic bombing attack on a German city during World War II, and there was no indication that one ever took place, other than nuisance raids conducted by one or two planes.⁷⁵ One of the few times the subject ever was mentioned occurred late in the war, in the House of Commons on March 6, 1945, when M. P. Richard Stokes conducted an incensed attack on the Churchill government for the Dresden holocaust, in which he pointed

⁷⁴For the critique of Snow and observations in extenuation of Lindemann, see Birkenhead, *The Professor and the Prime Minister*, pp. 258-261, 265-267.

⁷⁵Rumpf, *Bombing of Germany*, p. 59.

out the Soviet was not conducting such “blanket bombing” destruction of German cities, and would very likely make expert political capital out of it after the war ended, a remarkably astute prediction.⁷⁶

The failure of the so-called “responsible” communications media in the United States to discuss at any time the political consequences of the no-bombing policy of the Russians is indeed impressive. In fact, there can be found numerous complaints in American papers criticizing the Reds not only for abstaining from these big bombing runs, but also for their refusal to cooperate with the RAF and USAAF by not allowing them to use bases in Russia, and later in Poland and other captured areas as the Red Army rolled West. So permitted they might conduct shuttle raids, hitting the German towns on eastward flights, refuelling and reloading in areas under Russian control, striking the same or other targets on the way back, to maximize use of the aircraft, which had to fly back empty on unproductive return flights. A particularly heavy flurry of wistful hopes began to appear in the American press in the fall of 1943 when the Red Army moved westward to within 450 miles of the big industrial cities of both Germany and Italy. Again it was felt that the Soviets would allow American and British bombing attacks from these closer Russian bases, and apparently the idea had travelled about in Anglo-American circles that the Reds were in full harmony with mass bombing policies. Some RAF-AAF bombing flights to East Prussia and western Poland had already taken place, and the returning fliers expressed wonder that no Russian fighter escorts had risen to defend the bomber fleets.⁷⁷

⁷⁶Irving, *Destruction of Dresden*, pp. 225-227.

⁷⁷“Russia as Allied Air Base,” *United States News* (October 22, 1943), pp. 20-21. Rumpf, *Bombing of Germany*, p. 141, describes one such shuttle raid in June, 1944, however, involving American bombers landing at Red bases in Poltava and Mitgorod after attacking synthetic oil plants at Kottbus. From the Soviet locations they flew to attack oil fields in Galicia, proceeded to Italy, and then returned to their bases in Britain, attacking railway yards in southern France in transit. Rumpf claims this was the first time this was ever done, but mentions no others.

It was part of the propaganda of May-June, 1945, to proclaim with great force and velocity the delicious sense of comradeship prevailing between American and Soviet troops following their meeting in Germany in the closing days of the European war. Fellow traveler and communist fable-makers extended themselves to the limit in publicizing these capers, but paid no attention whatever to the fact that Red and American soldiers had already enjoyed three and a half years of intimate contacts in their joint activities on the supply routes of the Persian Gulf Service Command in Iran. Sidney W. Morrell, former London

What the English-speaking world in alliance with "Stalin the Great,"⁷⁸ as he was once toasted by Churchill at a banquet, did not know was that not only did the Russians apparently want no part of this program, but they had systematically interned fliers of the "allies" who had inadvertently wandered across Soviet frontiers and landed there, either mistakenly or because of being disabled. Information of this sort was as systematically and effectively suppressed as the policy of area bombing, and only in the budding Cold War days did it also leak out, to join the mass of other disheartening evidences of wartime bad faith. Americans had to escape from Soviet internment camps in about the same manner that they made their getaways from German prisoner of war camps. The American public did not learn anything about this until the publication of General John R. Deane's *The Strange Alliance* (New York: Viking, 1947), subtitled *The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Cooperation with Russia*. General Deane, the chief liaison negotiator in Moscow from October, 1943, to the end of the war, in this book detailed among other things the struggle to get American airmen who made forced landings in Soviet territory released from internment by their "gallant Red allies."

There is no point in trying to set the stage any further at the time the protest made by Vera Brittain stirred up its little storm in England and the United States. The heaviest part of the area bombing damage in Germany had already been achieved by the early months

Daily Express war correspondent, who spent a substantial period of time in the Near East on various special missions, in his *Nation* article "Iranian Checkboard" (December 29, 1945), pp. 733-735, said, "One would like to think that in this zone where the American, British, and Russian armies first met, there was fraternization among the troops." "Unfortunately, however, there was nothing of the kind. . . . Fraternization between Red Army troops and either Americans or British was almost nonexistent." Morrell expanded on this in his book *Spheres of Influence* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), which failed to charm Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. In the latter's review (in the *New York Herald Tribune Weekly Book Review* for August 25, 1946, p. 10) Schlesinger complained of the "distortions" caused by Morrell's "boiling anti-Soviet emotions."

⁷⁸The bacchanalia at the British embassy in Teheran celebrating Churchill's 69th birthday during the November, 1943, conference was described by *Time* as "the most spectacular meal since the Last Supper." There were somewhere between thirty-five and fifty alcoholic toasts during the festivities, and Stalin was reported to have participated in all of them, "amiably ambling around the table to clink glasses with the person being toasted." It was at this occasion that Churchill's toast to the Red leader was addressed, "To Stalin the Great." The party then "roared on in high good humor." *Time* (December 13, 1943), p. 28.

of 1944; the centers of scores of old German cities had been gutted and hundreds of thousands of people already killed or injured, though most important German industry had hardly been hit, war production was still rising to new peaks, and no sign of civilian morale breakdown was surfacing, despite the wishful thinking. There was evidence only that the war was being stretched out, not shortened. But the citizenry at large knew none of these things in either England or the United States; a combination of the propaganda of the enemy and their own had succeeded in masking the very largest part of the real situation, making discriminating judgments virtually impossible. Most people still believed military and industrial targets were the sole striking points of the air arm of the "allies."

The reprinting of the Italian General Giulio Douhet's 1921 classic, *The Command of the Air*, in England late in 1943,⁷⁹ with its enthusiastic message of mass bombing of cities to ruin morale and destroy industries, and Spaight's book a few months later, announcing to Britain's home front that they could rest assured that this was all being done in generous fashion, in addition to the Air Ministry's tireless propaganda, were enough for most, even though they were contradictory. The attempt to tell people that multitudes of German non-combatants, half of them women and children, were dying in fire-storms in bombed cities, where temperatures approached 1500° Fahrenheit, and the scores of other revolting consequences, was bound to encounter open-mouthed stares of disbelief. Furthermore, the demands of wartime partisanship upon the news dispensers resulted in preposterous non-sequiturs being used to divert attention from the main issue. When the official Stalinist photographic agency Sovfoto supplied American papers and magazines with pictures of dead Russian civilians, these were published here and invariably accompanied by charges or imputations that the dead were victims of German "atrocities." But when a German picture arrived here in September, 1943, of a vast collection of bodies of women killed in an allied air raid on Cologne, laid out in rows to facilitate identification by surviving relatives, it was disparaged as an example of the "lengths to which the Nazis have gone in building up the horror

⁷⁹Published in London by Faber and Faber, and lauded in the *Times Literary Supplement* (January 8, 1944), p. 14, as a great masterpiece which was being vindicated by events. It was expectable that the *TLS* would also welcome Spaight's book in similar fashion (March 3, 1944), hailing it as a great contribution to the study of modern warfare.

aspects of the allied bombing offensive against the Reich" (*Newsweek*, September 20, 1943, p. 38). Apparently the experiencing of "horror" by the enemy was possible only as a by-product of propaganda.

The first influential voices raised in England against the area bombing of civilian targets in Europe by the RAF Bomber Command were those of Dr. George Bell, Bishop of Chichester, and Cosmo Gordon Lang, Archbishop of Canterbury, in the House of Lords early in February, 1944.⁸⁰ Dr. Bell had learned of the frightful fate of Hamburg and the full horror of the raids on the other big German cities from neutral sources while in Sweden on a visit. Their denunciation of these achievements of course produced only public scoffing and scorn, for the official releases of Sir Archibald Sinclair's office in the Air Ministry adhered tenaciously to the line that military targets alone were being bombed, and these releases were what was available in the form of "reliable" information.⁸¹

A month after the protests by these famed English churchmen came the alarming arraignment of bombing policy, *Massacre by Bombing*,⁸² by Vera Brittain. First published in the United States in the February, 1944, issue of *Fellowship*, the organ of the pacifist Fellowship of Reconciliation, it actually had first appeared in London under the title *Seed of Chaos: What Mass Bombing Really Means*.⁸³ It was an essay of about 20,000 words, prepared in a non-emotional style but packed with facts and revelations which soon showed, by the fantastic volume of extreme attacks upon it, that it was a formidable and upsetting surprise. The author of this little literary ambush was the wife of a well-known professor and author, George E. G. Catlin, and a writer and lecturing personality in her own right, as well as being a veteran participant in peace society activism. Though her plea for a major protest against area bombing fell mainly on the unheeding and the hostile, it shattered the wall of silence which wartime censorship had been able to prop up against such reports to that moment. Its distribution in a ten-cent reprint began its

⁸⁰"Revolt Against Bombs," *Newsweek* (March 20, 1944), p. 86.

⁸¹Irving, *Destruction of Dresden*, pp. 53, 225, ff.

⁸²It was subtitled *The Facts Behind the British-American Attack on Germany*.

⁸³London: New Vision Publishing Company, 1944, under the auspices of the Bombing Restriction Committee. The specific aspect of the name of the English organization is significant: they were not against all bombing, and had no opposition to the bombing of military and industrial targets in German-held areas.

period of national attention, at about the time its publisher's chairman, A. J. Muste, was mounting his campaign against cooperation with George Hartmann and Peace Now, which helped to complicate the scene somewhat.

Part of the reason for the sober attention *Massacre by Bombing* received in the United States was due to the preface, consisting of a statement graced by the signatures of twenty-eight prominent American writers and clergy, a testimonial to their belief in the Britain message and an affirmation of their conviction that obliteration bombing was a barbarian enterprise and should be abandoned at the earliest opportunity. Among these signers were Allen Knight Chalmers, J. Henry Carpenter, Harry Emerson Fosdick, John Haynes Holmes, Rufus Jones, Kenneth Scott Latourette, Clarence Pickett, Edwin McNeill Poteat, and Oswald Garrison Villard.

As *Newsweek* described it, "The reaction was immediate and one-sided."⁸⁴ Attacks on Miss Brittain occurred from coast to coast by the hundreds in every imaginable medium of communication; the printed condemnations alone would have filled a number of volumes. The *New York Times* reported its mail running fifty to one against it, and notables entered the arena repeatedly. Because so many of the signers of the preface of *Massacre by Bombing* were renowned Protestant clergy, it appeared as though there were a compulsion on the part of those clergy of similar faith supporting the obliteration bombing to come out immediately in rejection of Miss Brittain and her small company of supporters. Famed Episcopal Bishop William T. Manning denounced Miss Brittain in a letter to the *New York Herald Tribune*, and the Rev. Daniel A. Poling, editor of the quarter-of-a-million circulation *Christian Herald*, a major in the Army Chaplain Corps and president of the International Christian Endeavor Society, was especially bitter, charging the entire group involved in the protest against bombing with "giving comfort to the enemy," which turned out to be a common, expectable, and widespread charge. Still another national figure, Bishop Garfield Bromley Oxnam, leader of the Methodist Bishops' Crusade, rose to the counter-attack, incensed at the prominent part played by Methodists in the protest. He was given a choice launching platform, no less than a

⁸⁴*Newsweek* was itself upset; it editorialized in the story on the upheaval caused by *Massacre by Bombing*, "The military necessity of mass bombing must be left to the decision of Allied military leaders."

major radio spot on the "March of Time" program;⁸⁵ (there was little doubt where the sentiments of the Luce empire lay).

One of the gems in the pro-bombing array which came from the clergy was sent in protest to the *Christian Century* by Rev. Paul Koslowski, rector of the Polish National Catholic Church of New Britain, Connecticut, who was especially incensed at the Brittain message. "There is no other way but to attack these beasts in their lairs—that is, in the German cities—where they plan further mass murders of innocent people," thundered Rev. Koslowski. "Christ's saying, 'If one smite thee on one cheek, give him the other,' is a beautiful theory, but not with human beasts, drunk with vengeance and conquest."⁸⁶ A generous sample of other blood-curdling attacks on the Brittain group was assembled by Rev. Gillis, editor of the *Catholic World* and an opponent of strategic bombing; it was one of the most ferocious samples of opinion from the followers of the Prince of Peace since Ray H. Abrams had produced his *Preachers Present Arms*, the saga of clerical belligerency during World War I. Rev. Gillis was appalled by the ethics of nearly all the critics and characterized that and their logic succinctly: missionaries should eat cannibals because cannibals eat missionaries.⁸⁷

⁸⁵L. O. Hartman, "What is Disturbing the Methodists," *Christian Century* (April 12, 1944), pp. 458-460. Bishop Oxnham was the subject of a long and adulatory tribute in *Time* two months later (June 26, 1944), pp. 88, 90, 92, which demonstrated how far he had moved from his anti-militarist days when, as president of DePauw University in Indiana in the early '30s, he had abolished the ROTC campus organization. A three-time visitor to Stalinist Russia, his effusive enthusiasm for the Soviet had "earned" him one and half pages in Elizabeth Dilling's *Red Network* (1934), *Time* insisted on pointing out. It was the culminating irony of the moment that anti-communist Mrs. Dilling was on trial for sedition in Washington while Bishop Oxnham was flying around the country making militaristic patriotic speeches; nothing better illustrated the fact that such words as "sedition" and "treason" have only subjective definitions, formulated by whatever element happens to be in power at the time.

Rev. Poling's *A Preacher Looks At War* (New York: Macmillan, 1943) received an ample and sympathetic review in *Time* (July 5, 1943), pp. 44-45. In this book he denounced pacifism as "immoral and un-Christian" and listed a number of "holy causes" for which war should be fought.

⁸⁶Letter, Rev. Koslowski to editors, *Christian Century* (March 22, 1944), p. 372.

⁸⁷See note 6. Another contemporary critic of obliteration bombing, in addition to his opposition to Vansittartite Germanophobia, was Francis Neilson; especially useful are his wartime diaries, published contemporaneously (*The Tragedy of Europe: A Day by Day Commentary on the Second World War*, 5 vols., Appleton, Wisconsin: C. C. Nelson Publishing Co., 1940-1945).

The *New York Times* and *Herald Tribune* both condemned the Brittain group editorially, and an especially outraged statement was issued by the formidable propaganda front, Freedom House, which numbered among its signatories Bishop Henry Hobson, Wendell Willkie, and Dorothy Thompson, grimly announcing its support of "all available means" to defeat the enemy, an echo of Churchill's famous declaration, "There are no lengths of violence to which we shall not go," and his Minister of Information Brendan Bracken's "bomb, burn, destroy" dictum issued at the 1943 Quebec Conference. A denunciation was even obtained from Eleanor Roosevelt, wife of the President. The attitude of the two most prestigious voices of liberalism in those times, the *New Republic* and the *Nation*, was what might be expected from such concentrations of civilian battlers. On March 13 the latter discounted the whole endeavor, making the usual plea of military necessity and denying that area bombing, as far as its editors were "aware," was taking place, embellished with the propaganda rhetoric of the day, such as "Those who take up arms to end aggression by others against humanity must do what is necessary to win." The *New Republic* concluded, "It is late in the day to appeal to the codes of warfare appropriate to the romantic times when war was a sort of game carried on by professional soldiers and 'noncombatants' had no part in willing the war, in carrying it on, or in willing its end." The editors, snugly secure in their New York offices from any possible retaliation in the form of German bombing attacks, obviously felt that there no longer were any "non-combatants." The *Nation* came up with a remarkably restrained critique of the Brittain statement, but complained that it was "hardly objective or reliably documented" (though in retrospect these were the least vulnerable aspects of the entire publication). Nevertheless, the editors supported Bishop Oxnham's position that obliteration bombing was "a revolting necessity," and concluded, "Deprived of the weapon of mass bombing our armies might easily be so handicapped that the war might be stalemated. That, perhaps, is what the protestors have in view, for what they are really attacking is not a weapon of war but war as a weapon." And if there was one thing the left-wing liberal warriors had in common with their Tory-warrior contemporaries and colleagues, it was their determination to saturate

the planet with unlimited and endless war, in order that "victory" be realized.⁸⁸

On Good Friday, in April, Cyril Foster Garbett, Archbishop of York, in a New York City interview, countered the views of his counterparts in England by supporting the urban bombing of Germany.⁸⁹ There were many expectable retorts to the opponents of obliteration bombing, and some quite ingenious; probably first in this class was that of Royce Brier of the *San Francisco Chronicle*, who doubted that any obliteration bombing had occurred, and implied that the Brittain pamphlet was a hoax.⁹⁰

One of the most lyric defenses of the bombing was by Cousins, editor of the *Saturday Review of Literature*, though his eloquence was largely spent in embellishing the crude schoolboy argument that the enemy "started it" (citing Warsaw, Rotterdam, London, and Coventry as examples of communities devastated by obliteration strategic bombing), and that what was happening in Germany now was merely just retribution. On April 30, 1944, on the prestigious "Town Meeting of the Air" radio program, Cousins and the military analyst Major George Fielding Eliot defended the affirmative against Norman Thomas and C. G. Paulding of the liberal Catholic weekly *Commonweal*, on the question, "Should We Continue Mass Bombings of Enemy Cities?" For material Cousins depended upon his five-column *SRL* editorial critique, "The Non-Obliterators."⁹¹ His main counts against the Brittain group were, "They would like to mark out sanctuary areas which would receive immunity from our fliers," and "We fail to see how anything short of a negotiated peace itself could bring about the type of agreement necessary to enforce such a plan." For Cousins, the Hartmann and Brittain programs

⁸⁸See summary of New York City press and other comments on Brittain in *Christian Century* (March 22, 1944), p. 380; (March 29, 1944), p. 412. Most of the signers of the preface remained silent during the uproar, though there was an occasional exception, one of the most notable being Ralph W. Sockman, minister of Christ Church, who came out with a blast at Miss Brittain's attackers during this time. On the liberal weeklies, see "Massacre by Bombing," *New Republic* (March 13, 1944), p. 332; "A Revolting Necessity," *Nation* (March 18, 1944), pp. 323-324.

⁸⁹Report on the Archbishop of York's interview with the New York City press in the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in *Christian Century* (April 19, 1944), p. 507. Ironically, Dr. Garbett was the subject of a cover portrait and story in the April 17 issue of *Time*, with the cover bearing his dictum, "The Church's great function is to arouse the conscience of the State."

⁹⁰See Rev. Gillis' bantering editorial comment on Brier in *Catholic World* (August, 1944), p. 391.

⁹¹*Saturday Review of Literature* (April 8, 1944), pp. 14, 26.

were complementary. After the atom bombing of Hiroshima, one of the most terror-stricken voices in the English-speaking world was that of Norman Cousins.

One of the things which most offended American enemies of the anti-strategic bombing was Vera Brittain's reproduction of many shocking reports on the destruction of German cities by thousand-plane attacks and the annihilation of women and children which had appeared in the neutral press from their eye-witness reporters; the stories of contemporary bombing damage in North Vietnam are pallid child's play by comparison.⁹² But it was not just the Germans who were suffering from obliteration bombing. Anne O'Hare McCormick of the *New York Times* soon was in competition with her descriptions of the flattening of a long string of Italian communities, as the Anglo-American forces began their move up the peninsula, and protests began to file in from prominent churchmen in Belgium and France. Rev. John L. Bazinet of St. Mary's Seminary in Baltimore acted as the agent for Cardinal Van Roey, Archbishop of the Belgian city of Malines, in presenting to the *New York Times* his protest against Anglo-American mass bombing of Belgian and other European cities, in May, 1944, though the *Times* quietly rejected it for publication.⁹³ On the heels of this came the May 14, 1944, Paris and Vichy radio broadcasts of an appeal to the Cardinals and Archbishops of the Catholic Church in the United States and the British empire to intervene against indiscriminate bombing of French and other European cities. The appeal came from Cardinals Liénart of Lille, Suhard of Paris, Gerlier of Lyon, and Archbishop Chollet of Cambrai. Not long after, Paulding in *Commonweal* engaged in a recital of Belgian and French cities from one-third to one-half destroyed by area bombing.⁹⁴ Of course the appeal of the churchmen

⁹²Among those quoted were a Stockholm *Aftonbladet* reporter who described corpses everywhere after the July, 1943, Hamburg raid, even in tree tops; the Swiss *National-Zeitung* reporter for August 9, 1943: "The largest workers' district of the city was wiped out," news of which should have been disturbing to many American leftists with their long record of boasting about Hamburg's numerous Marxian radicals, but apparently was not; the Swiss *Baseler Nachrichten* for September 9, 1943, also on Hamburg: "the cellar shelters became death chambers" which "must have reached a temperature such as is not reached in the burning chambers of a crematorium" (many of the victims were reduced to tiny heaps of ashes).

⁹³Catholic weekly papers published it, however. Rev. Gillis in *Catholic World* (August, 1944), pp. 391-392.

⁹⁴"Plea of French Bishops," *Commonweal* (June 2, 1944), p. 165; Paulding, "Other Cities," *Commonweal* (June 16, 1944), p. 197.

in question received very little attention here, despite their eminence; after all, they were dignitaries associated with the church in regions controlled by the enemy, and the war was demonstrating that though Maxim Litvinov's bromide, that "peace is indivisible," was possibly so, the divisibility of Christianity definitely was so.

The most careful and unimpulsively-indignant considerations of the Brittain message and its implications were to be found in the voices of liberal Catholicism and Protestantism, *Commonweal* and the *Christian Century*. The former devoted its entire front page on March 17, 1944, to an evaluation; after disavowing pacifism, the editors suggested that although the great majority of the clergy signing the preface were Protestants, "they are thinking, perhaps, more in terms the Pope is thinking in." They went on to deliver an ironic definition of area bombing: "the precision bombing of entire inhabited areas." The military analyst Hoffman Nickerson a decade later was to dub strategic bombing "scientific baby-killing."⁹⁵ In conclusion, *Commonweal's* policy-makers declared, "This policy, which Mr. Churchill announces will not be abandoned by the United Nations, is in our opinion murder and suicide. It is the murder of innocent people and the suicide of our civilization."⁹⁶

The *Christian Century's* five-column editorial five days later was fully as sober and ruminative. "If the war goes on, with obliteration bombing continuing to wipe out whole regions and populations, it is quite possible that in the hour of triumph the victors will find that they have created so much destruction, so much hate, so much misery, so much despair that the very well-springs of Occidental life have been poisoned not only for the vanquished but for the victors also." Their parting suggestion was, "The question which Miss Brittain's pamphlet raises in the mind of every thoughtful reader is as to whether victory won in this fashion is worth having."⁹⁷ But the editors still thought it was too late to do anything about it.

Each weekly numbered one tenacious opponent of the bombing, Paulding in the pages of *Commonweal*, Oswald Garrison Villard, one of the signers of the Brittain preface, appearing in the *Christian Century*. Paulding scolded both the *New Yorker* and the *Christian Century* for suggesting that limitations on bombing constituted the

⁹⁵In Nickerson's review of Veale's *Advance to Barbarism*, in *Faith and Freedom* (May, 1954), p. 23.

⁹⁶"Area Bombing," *Commonweal* (March 17, 1944), pp. 531-532.

⁹⁷"Obliteration Bombing," *Christian Century* (March 22, 1944), pp. 359-361.

making of "ground rules" and that it was impossible to do things of this sort, since the war was long under way and was running on an impulse and momentum of its own. Paulding called this "escapism" and "surrender to automatism" and retorted, "We might as well give up thinking about the purpose of the war—stand stupid and silent and with our eyes shut, until someone tells us that we may come out and play again, play at making rules." There was plenty of time to do something about bombing, "for it is when you are doing something that you must watch what you are doing."⁹⁸ Late in May, he noted that the writing, speeches, and debates on obliteration bombing had had one big effect; the newspapers had stopped talking of the effects of bombing on the civilians. And when the famous SHAEF communique in February, 1945, admitted terror bombing as a policy, Paulding had the quiet satisfaction of vindicating himself at the expense of those who had been calling him a liar for a year.⁹⁹

Villard, in a denunciation of all bombing in the summer of 1944, including the new desperation rocket bombing of England by the Germans, established a record of some sorts by reviewing at length Spaight's book boasting of England's priority in beginning strategic bombing of non-combatants, one of its few notices in America. But the defenders in general won the day.¹⁰⁰ The main escape they employed was the plea that surely "military necessity" warranted all these bombings, and that the continuation of the program would surely "hasten the end of the war." (A small library of works exists which agree that area bombing not only did not shorten the war a day but probably stretched it out considerably, in addition to failing to effect any substantial damage to German war industry, break the morale of their civilians, or contribute in any appreciable manner to the "allied victory." Some three-quarters of wartime German in-

⁹⁸Paulding, "Ground Rules," *Commonweal* (March 31, 1944), p. 582.

⁹⁹Paulding, "Words and Bombs," *Commonweal* (May 19, 1944), p. 101, and "Terror Bombing," *Commonweal* (March 2, 1945), p. 485; see note 104.

¹⁰⁰Villard, "Bombs and Bombing," *Christian Century* (July 19, 1944), pp. 849-850. There was an ironic accompaniment to the publication of *Massacre by Bombing*. Though six of the twenty-eight persons signing the statement which preceded it were prominent Methodists, three months later a small, fast-talking and crudely propagandist minority, mainly laymen, succeeded in getting the Methodist General Conference to repudiate its unequivocal stand of 1940 against official endorsement, support, or participation in the war. See the long and interesting report in *Newsweek*, "Methodists at War" (May 15, 1944), pp. 88, 90. The Baptists remained on record against war in general but made support or repudiation of the present one a matter of individual conscience. See summary of the Northern Baptist Convention in *Newsweek*, "Yes or No" (June 5, 1944), p. 82.

dustury was not eliminated by bombing; it was made ineffective by dismantling by the victors *after* the war.)

In the late spring, Miss Brittain's first effort, *Seed of Chaos: What Mass Bombing Really Means*, made its tardy debut in London, and received an almost universal slight in the conventional press. The *Times Literary Supplement* probably spoke for all in scoffing at her "rebellion" against government policy and correctly predicted her campaign would gain little ground in Great Britain. Said the *TLS* in lofty disdain, "Miss Vera Brittain maintains in this book that unrestricted bombing will make peace impossible for a very long time. She disregards the instructions given to bombers to aim only at targets and does not suggest what we should do to win the war if we desisted from destroying these targets."¹⁰¹ It is hard to believe so sophisticated a source as this could have been so naïve, and so unaware or unheeding of what was on the record for them to see, available in the copious reports of the neutral press witnesses alone. The absence of a peace treaty with Germany twenty-four years after her prediction suggests some commentary on her prowess as a seer, though this situation results from complications even beyond her analysis at that time. It has been remarked that self-delusion is the cardinal English weakness, but Vera Brittain demonstrated her immunity.¹⁰²

The most striking aspect of the campaigns against obliteration bombing and for negotiated peace was the marked absence of young people from both. This was not entirely a consequence of the enrollment of America's youth in warring enterprise by the millions all over the world; by the time of the Hartmann-Brittain gestures, well over five million American males alone had been rejected for military service on various grounds, and individuals from this sector might have engaged in such efforts, without fear of the ordinary retaliatory ceremonials of the state. The reasons for abstention are

¹⁰¹*Times Literary Supplement* (June 17, 1944), p. 300.

¹⁰²Miss Brittain's novel *Account Rendered* (New York: Macmillan, 1944) was far more pleasantly received than her anti-bombing brochure; Ben Ray Redman in a full-page *Saturday Review of Literature* analysis (December 16, 1944), p. 9, called attention to the fact that it was "a passionate denunciation of war, all war, any war," and while noting that righteous warriors would not like it, "to others it will seem a brave and good thing that an author should speak out against criminal lunacy at a time when it is most rampant." Miss Brittain's attacks on strategic bombing continued after the war.

many and complex; the capacity of modern totalitarian nationalist wars to accentuate the sheep-like traits of the race is just one of them.

A full-page advertisement by the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad in the *U.S. News* for January 7, 1944, featured this opening sentence: "One thing distinguishes American democracy most sharply from other forms of government—and that is its regard for human life." The copy writers apparently did not realize that their masterpiece was quite equivocal; excluding all considerations involving the national murder rate, the victims of American strategic bombing in the enemy countries in the last two years of World War II might have agreed, adding only that the question was whose lives were being regarded, and how they were being regarded.

The American press carried vast spreads on the exploits of the United States Air Force in Europe from 1943 on; its participation as a partner to the RAF in the massive bombing raids on Hamburg, Berlin, and Dresden¹⁰³ have been documented in profusion. It is for this among other reasons that some observers thought there was something peculiarly anticlimactic when the New York *Herald-Tribune* and other papers published on Sunday, February 18, 1945, less than three months before the end of the war in Europe, a dispatch from the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force in Paris announcing that "the allied air chiefs have made the long-awaited decision to adopt deliberate terror bombing of German population centers as a ruthless expedient to hasten Adolf Hitler's doom."¹⁰⁴ One might have been led to wonder that if "terror bombing" was next, what possibly might be the name for what had already taken place, and whether making sure of the doom of additional hundreds of thousands was necessary in order to make sure of Hitler's.

¹⁰³*World War Two in the Air: Europe*, edited by Major James F. Sunderman, U.S.A.F. (New York: Franklin Watts-Bramhall House, 1962), contains no entry for "Dresden" in the index nor any mention of the raids carried out by the Eighth Air Force in February, 1945. However, this is an episodic unofficial compilation.

¹⁰⁴This communiqué aroused a furious discommotion. It was suppressed in England but filtered into the Associated Press traffic and was published in the United States; as Irving says, "Thus, for one extraordinary moment, what might be termed the 'mask' of the allied bomber commands appeared to have slipped." It was eventually "officially taken back," but the damage was done. Irving, *Destruction of Dresden*, pp. 218-222.

Most Americans, living anywhere from four to eight thousand miles from where the bombs were falling, had no conception of what area bombing was like, and still do not, with the exception of those who have taken part in it or who were able to see the stunning mass of wreckage in Europe at war's end. (Postwar tourists fortunately were spared the death and carnage.) What Vera Brittain was trying to do was as incomprehensible to the vast majority as an attempt to establish the reality of science fiction. This cannot be laid entirely to remoteness from the field of action; the English, already bombed and always in the line for more, were scarcely more moved by the Brittain appeal than were Americans. However, the feeling of relative immunity from any substantial retaliation surely had a part to play in the complacency. The progressive dulling of the public conscience with daily drippings of horror throughout the war such as newsreel episodes of Japanese flushed from caves with flame-throwers, with clothing and hair on fire, was hardly conducive to the development of public conscience against the savagery of distant, impersonal aerial bombing carried out against women and children. The 40,000 killed in Berlin in a single daylight raid, the 60,000 to 100,000 in the July, 1943, week-long raids on Hamburg, the 100,000 to 150,000 killed in Dresden in one raid in February, 1945, were all as hard to conceive as the most incredible of fairy tales, and undoubtedly still are. As Stuart Chase summarized it, while reviewing Donald M. Nelson's *Arsenal of Democracy*, the wars in Europe and Asia were won, "not by superlative generalship, courage, or cunning, but by literally overwhelming our enemies with shot and shell, a rain of steel and lead more dreadful than anything hitherto known. Where they sprinkled it on us, we let loose a continuous cloudburst on them."¹⁰⁵ Indeed, to compare anything achieved in aerial bombing by the Germans with what later befell them is a travesty; English and American bombers dropped 315 tons of bombs on Germany for every one Germans dropped on England.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵*Nation* (November 23, 1946), p. 587. Published by Harcourt Brace, this book, by the Sears Roebuck executive, and head of the wartime War Production Board, was an account of the technical side of American industrial achievements in the production of martial hardware.

¹⁰⁶*An Encyclopedia of World History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), p. 1164. Though there is generous mention in this standard reference work to German bombing of Rotterdam, London, and Coventry, there is no evidence in its treatment of World War II that any of the area saturation bombings of Germany found in the books of Irving, Rumpf, Fuller, Caidin, and others ever took place.

The atomic bombing of Japan in August, 1945, broke through the general reverie for the first time, and modern protests against bombing have their intellectual and literary roots in this event and the vast attention it received. Such works as John Hersey's *Hiroshima*¹⁰⁷ received a wide audience and immense publicity, with the attention always being directed to the horror and loss of life. Yet the stories about the conventional bombing of Hamburg, which terminated in a fire-storm six miles square with flames leaping 15,000 feet into the air, dwarfing that of Hiroshima, drew little more than a yawn. It was also strange that neither Hersey nor any other exploiter of Hiroshima fashioned a dramatic report about the B-29 raid on Tokyo six months earlier (March 9), where fire-bombs and a favorable wind burned to death or injured 185,000 people, and built a circle of fire within the city so high and hot that crews of later waves of bombers reported smelling burning human flesh at altitudes of two miles.¹⁰⁸ It is little wonder that Norman Thomas was moved in April, 1945, to describe the American conduct of the Asian War as "an organized race riot" and "a wholesale slaughter of women and children to a degree which ancient Assyrians could not match."¹⁰⁹

It is hard to figure out whether the universal paralyzed shock over Hiroshima was due to amazement at how many were killed in such a brief moment, or whether it resulted from a realization that a weapon now existed capable of visiting annihilation upon one or all. But it really was a technical problem of magnitude, guaranteeing

¹⁰⁷New York: Knopf, 1946.

¹⁰⁸See review of Hersey's *Hiroshima* by Louis Ridenour in *Saturday Review of Literature* (November 2, 1946), p. 16. What might have happened to Japan had the B-36 been begun in the fall of 1940 instead of that of 1941 can only be imagined. According to Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson in the Truman cabinet, "Every plane used in the [Second World] war, the B-29, the B-17, the P-51, and so on—was in the course of preparation before the war broke out." Quoted by Donald B. Robinson, "The Army Plans the Next War," *American Mercury* (February, 1947), pp. 140-146. The author was chief historian for the U.S. Military Government in Germany, among several other prestigious positions he held in the Army. He reported that designs for the B-29 were started in 1939, and that the B-36 was being worked on two months before the Pearl Harbor attack, but never saw real combat.

¹⁰⁹Thomas, "Our War With Japan," *Commonweal* (April 20, 1945), pp. 8-10. Said Thomas in rhetorical interrogation, "Does the safety of America require annihilation in Japan in order that the USSR may be supreme from Port Arthur, and possibly Tokyo, to the Adriatic Sea, and possibly by its alliances even to Dakar in Africa?" Undoubtedly there even were "conservatives" who considered this premature anti-communism. (Thomas was additionally incensed by a short film sponsored and circulated by the War Department, which was titled, "Have You Killed a Jap?")

to achieve in minutes what it had taken hours to accomplish in Hamburg. Surely the residents of this latter community who died the slow, excruciating, fiery deaths inflicted by phosphorous bombs¹¹⁰ endured as much as if not more than those snuffed out at Hiroshima, or who died the slow, lingering way of radiation burns.

Loss of life alone cannot explain it. The piecemeal, unspectacular death of hundreds of thousands of Americans in accidents of all kinds during the war years of 1941-1945 produced hardly any notice. When the America Fore Insurance and Indemnity Group, an association of insurance companies, in a safety appeal at the end of 1944, announced that 97,900 Americans had been killed and 10,000,000 injured in industrial and other home-front accidents in 1943, and that 50,000,000 work days had been lost in production, it drew barely a glance.¹¹¹ According to a *New York Times* calculation two months after the end of the war, American loss of life in military operations during the entire war totalled 262,000 while accidents in the United States took the lives of 355,000; the logic of this suggested that the American civilian scene, even without bombing, was somewhat more dangerous than the armed services, averaging in all combat losses.

The insensitivity to misery and disaster befalling an enemy in wartime,¹¹² which formed the vast reef of unconcern on which Peace Now and the Brittain appeal to halt strategic bombing ran aground in 1944, is a constant in the wars of barbarian antiquity and the religious and politico-moral crusades of modern times alike. Political efforts among the publics of ostensibly winning sides to end wars short of victory or to modify their conduct are increasingly inhibited and thwarted to the scope and degree of the victory which is impending. Such efforts may run smoother when no clear triumph is discernible, and a stalemate is looming, though concern for humanitarian considerations is as dimly registered then as at other times when mercilessness is considered to be an irreducible factor and an in-

¹¹⁰One of the most grisly pieces of war reportage is Caidin's summary of the suppressed story of the phosphorous bomb victims in the Hamburg raid, which forms the last chapter of his *The Night Hamburg Died*, titled "Not in the Records."

¹¹¹*Newsweek* (December 11, 1944), p. 62; *Fortune* (January, 1945), p. 195.

¹¹²The readers of *Life* rose to a towering rage in the autumn of 1945 over the picture of a beheaded rooster which was still being kept alive and denounced this as the epitome of cruelty, yet at the same moment were writing almost unanimously in savage delight over the pictures of German refugees streaming from areas under communist control, the victims consisting mainly of pathetic old women, children, and raped teen-age girls.

dispensable agent, primarily responsible for the predicament of the enemy.

It is obvious that decisions to stop fighting and end wars are political to the same degree that the decisions to start fighting and persist in prosecuting wars are political, and the employment of more or less terror is of little significance here. History is filled with the accounts of hopelessly beaten sides continuing to fight indefinitely. Even the atom bombing of Japan and its subsequent swift surrender does not constitute an exception; it is simply a case of a new catastrophe hurrying the decision to quit on the part of a regime which had long before decided to do so, and which had been desperately trying to arrange such a conclusion for many months without previous success. But efforts on the part of civilian non-combatants to influence such policy alterations stand much better chances of making headway in struggles fought with considerably less vindictive ferocity and fixed retributational obsessions than was true in the Second World War.

Analysis of Conflict

by Butler D. Shaffer

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A situation of "conflict" exists whenever two or more persons value the same specific and exclusive property as a value higher than other specific values offered as alternatives to it. To be more precise, "conflict" occurs only when two or more persons have desires, the satisfaction of which can, in the view of each, be maximized only through the exclusive control of the same specific property.

The classic case of conflict is, perhaps, seen in the example of two men, A and B, in a dispute over the ownership of a parcel of ground called "Blackacre." Each seeks exclusive control over Blackacre as the best means of satisfying whatever value he attaches to it. As long as each man does so value Blackacre, a conflict will exist.

Most men do not desire conflict. They do desire to satisfy their values with a minimum expenditure of time, energy, and material. Conflict increases the cost of satisfying values, and consequently men have a tendency to seek to eliminate its presence. The most significant effort man has made to eliminate conflict is the "market place."

Let us suppose two men, X and Y. Assume that X is a man desiring to purchase a suit of clothes, and that Y is a retailer of clothing. In the window of Y's store is a suit X finds particularly to his taste. X enters the store, approaches Y and says: "I offer you \$100 for that suit." Y answers: "No, I wouldn't consider selling for that price." At this point a conflict exists. X is saying, in effect, "I would rather have that suit than the alternative of my \$100." Y is saying, "I, too, would rather have the suit than your \$100." Each man now values the same property (the suit) more than he does the alternative (the \$100).

As long as a conflict remains, neither man will profit: X will not obtain a suit, and Y will not be able to obtain money in exchange for

the suit. But since men are motivated to seek profit, there is a natural factor introduced into the situation which results in a resolution of the conflict. In order that each may obtain what he wants, the two men "bargain" about the matter. *Y* says, "I *will* sell the suit to you for \$130." *X* replies, "I will go as high as \$115." *Y* agrees to this offer and the suit is sold.

What has occurred in this "bargaining" situation is no more than this: an alteration of the position of each man has occurred, resulting in a disparity of values. Whereas, before, each man valued the suit more than the \$100 alternative — resulting in conflict — the offer by *X* to pay \$115 has caused *Y* to re-evaluate his position. When he accepted the offer, he said, in effect, "I would now rather have the \$115 than the suit," and since *X* was demonstrating that he would rather have the suit than the \$115, no longer do these two men value the same property (the suit) higher than the alternatives to it.

The market place, it will be seen, operates as an institution of "conflict resolution." Trade *cannot* and *will not* occur as long as conflict is present, and a natural desire — motivated by profit — impels men to willingly shift their positions *away* from the conflict situation, and toward the acceptance of more suitable alternatives.

Because men desire the elimination of conflict, they have constructed institutions to, hopefully, deal with the problem. One such institution has been political government. The government, it is expected, will establish police departments, military forces, courts, and the like, to handle situations in which conflict occurs or threatens to occur. With a government court, for example, *A* and *B* who, earlier, were in a conflict situation regarding the ownership of Blackacre, may go before the court and have the conflict resolved. Or so it is hoped. The problem with this approach, however, is that unless either *A* or *B* agrees to shift his values to an alternative, an imposed decision by a judge (or even by a voluntarily selected arbitrator) will not, in fact, eliminate the value placed on that property by the losing party. If the judge holds in favor of *A*, *B* is upset. If his verdict is in *B*'s favor, *A* is displeased; and if a decision in favor of both men occurs (as by splitting the property in half), neither *A* nor *B* receives satisfaction. A more satisfactory solution to this problem is this: allow *A* and *B* to bargain over their conflict. *A* might say to *B*: "I will now pay you \$500 to give up your claim." If *B* accepts, he has now found a more satisfying alternative to the ownership of Blackacre, and the conflict is resolved.

In addition to the problem arising from an "imposed" decision, there is an objection that must be made to the reliance upon political governments to resolve conflicts. The politicians are well aware of men's desire to eliminate conflict but, being as desirous as any men to expand the operations of their "businesses," the politicians recognize that men will turn to the government in order to get conflicts resolved so long as men believe (1) that conflicts do — or might — exist, and (2) that the government can successfully resolve the conflict. It does not take long for the politician to see the opportunity for the enhancement of his position by stepping into human affairs and *creating* a situation of conflict, in order to increase public demand for the services of government in resolving such conflicts.

The history of political governments has been the history *not* of "conflict *resolution*," but of "conflict *management*." Just as men in the market find it to their interests to resolve conflicts, the politicians have a vested interest in seeing to it that conflicts exist — to "keep the pot boiling," as it were. To this end, the impression has been created in the minds of most men that "the interests of labor and management conflict"; "the interests of Negroes and whites conflict"; the interests of the manufacturer and his customers conflict"; "the interests of the United States and Japan conflict."

On and on go the examples wherein it is to be supposed that two groups of persons have interests diametrically opposed to each other, that such interests are irreconcilable, and that the government must step in and resolve the conflict for the good of all. Nor does the politician lack the support of the intellectual community in this undertaking. For example, he can always find someone who will declare that "in any exchange transaction, one man's profit is another man's loss." The politician thus receives his "justification" for imposing "price controls" to alleviate this "conflict."

Another man will declare: "Every dollar of profit is an unearned wage," leading to wage and hour controls. It is said that "employers always exploit their employees," and, that "landlords exploit their tenants," thus "justifying" compulsory unionism and rent controls. "Wealthy people," it is maintained, "get rich at the expense of the poor," and thus progressive taxation is needed to resolve this problem. (It is at this point that the statist's reliance on the doctrine of "fixed value" can be observed. In order to justify the government forcing an employer to pay an employee more money than the two had freely

bargained for, the statist has to be able to argue that there is an objectively determinable "fair" wage, and if the employee does not receive at least this amount, he has been "cheated" out of what is "rightfully his." The necessary relationship between the concept of "objective value" and statist intervention in the market would, itself, constitute a good subject for a future article.)

In point of fact, in an economy built on the principle of free exchange, no "irreconcilable conflict," of the sort imagined by the politician as a justification for the extension of his powers, can occur. But the politician must, if he is to stay in business, create the impression in the minds of his subjects that man is imbued with "original sin," that the world is a malevolent place, and that men are nothing but "animals" living in a fiercely foreboding "jungle." "Government," he promises his subjects, "will change all that and civilize man."

Rather than *eliminating* conflict, then, governments must *nurture* it, a racket that goes back into the most primitive of times when a tribal witch doctor warned his tribesmen of the "evil spirits" that were always present, but which he could control. The ancient practice whereby the tribal chief justified his military control over his subjects with the warning, "If we do not arm ourselves, the Nine Bows will attack us and take us over," is nothing more than current "foreign policy" expressed in more primitive terms. Governments have always sought to create the impression that "other nations" are motivated to do evil against "us," so that we must turn to the government as our only defense.

Men find themselves in a situation of "conflict" with the government. The nature of the conflict is this: those who sanction political government do so because they sincerely believe what the politicians — and the statist intellectuals — have told them. With the impression of conflict firmly implanted in the minds of men, they do what the politicians hoped they would do: turn to the government to eliminate this conflict.

"But in order to solve this problem," the politician declares, "the government must take control of private property." "Then do it," is the reply, and the politician has obtained what he wanted. When the government does seek to control either the life or the property of any of its subjects, the *real* conflict is born. There now exists a situation where both the property-owner and the government value the same exclusive property as a means of achieving their respective

desires. Both parties cannot prevail and, in the end, the government — armed with coercive powers — wins out.

Many persons assume, unfortunately, that the best way to eliminate this conflict with the government is through the use of force. To object to political government because of its coercive methods and, at the same time, to suggest using coercion against the government in order to eliminate coercion, is not only the grossest of contradictions, but is a way of virtually guaranteeing the enlargement of government. When men oppose the government with force, this permits the politician to come back and say, "See, I told you there were these evil, violent people around, and that you need the government to protect you from them." In such a situation, the government obtains public justification for its enlargement to deal with such a threat.

No, any attempt to lessen conflict with the government must proceed in a non-violent manner which does not have the effect of actually increasing the conflict. To find such a method, one should go right back to basic economic principles of exchange. Inasmuch as political government exists only through the approval which people give to it, the most effective way of eliminating conflict with government is to try to convince men to withdraw their approval.

While the politician is interested in obtaining control over your life and property, most persons who lend their support to government do not value this as an end. Rather, there are other objectives which they value (e.g., elimination of poverty, care for the elderly, education, etc.), and the assumption is made that the only way to achieve such objectives is through the control of your life and property. The control of your life or your property is, then, an alternative that has been valued by some persons as the most satisfactory means of obtaining certain objectives.

To those desirous of lessening the conflict they face with government, it would seem that the most appropriate action to be taken would be to return to basic market-place procedures: in the face of a conflict within the market, said conflict is resolved by seeking a disparity of values through the introduction of a more acceptable alternative than that over which the conflict is based. Just as the man seeking to buy the suit with \$100 finds that the conflict with the retailer can be resolved by raising his offer to \$115, so too a man who finds himself in a conflict situation with government could seek to lessen that conflict by offering a more satisfactory method of obtaining the objectives sought by those supporters of government

action who see in the control of other men the best means to their end.

To be more specific, I am suggesting that individuals could better employ their energies by providing voluntary, market-place alternatives to governmental programs which, in the process, might well cause other men to accept this approach as a more suitable alternative, and to reject governmental control as the best means. In this connection, I am reminded of the many individuals and organizations presently in existence doing just that!¹ In the field of education, privately supported schools — from nursery schools on up through colleges — provide a good portion of the total education facilities throughout the country, in most cases operating more efficiently and with a higher quality of education than most government schools.

There are, in addition, numerous privately supported medical clinics and hospitals providing medical care for those unable to provide for themselves. There are many privately operated fire departments (even one in New York City)^{2, 3} and protection agencies throughout the United States. In many communities, privately supported agencies and companies are engaged in voluntary community redevelopment activities, not the least of which is the outstanding work done by the U.S. Gypsum Company in working with the owners of slum properties to improve their homes.⁴ In the field of housing, there are different organizations that are building low-cost housing for poor persons, one of which rents apartment units for as low as \$22 per month. There are programs such as STEP, which has been working with the chronically unemployed to teach such persons better methods of marketing their services.⁵ In conservation and recreation, the lumber companies of America have been doing a monumental task in providing privately owned and managed recreation areas (in fact, private lumber companies maintain some sixty-seven fish hatcheries) as well as taking the lead in the preservation of our natural resources.⁶ Along the same line, many companies

¹Such alternatives are recommended by Richard C. Cornuelle, *Reclaiming the American Dream* (New York: Random House, 1965).

²A report on the private fire department in Scottsdale, Arizona, appeared in the *Wall Street Journal* (June 19, 1963).

³A report on a private fire department in New York City appeared in *The Freeman* (August, 1958), p. 29.

⁴*Reader's Digest* (August, 1966), p. 107.

⁵STEP was launched under the auspices of the National Association of Manufacturers, 277 Park Avenue, New York, New York.

⁶American Forest Products Industries, Inc., 1816 N Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

have been working to eliminate problems of air and water pollution as well.⁷ We know, too, of the work of such organizations as the Salvation Army, Community Chest, and various church and civic groups in providing voluntary welfare assistance to impoverished persons.

The suggestion that private persons and groups ought to organize themselves to provide alternatives to governmental programs has been echoed by a high official of the current Johnson administration. Undersecretary of Commerce J. Herbert Holloman recently stated:

The greatest single opportunity for business in the 1970's, is for private companies to provide public services such as fire protection, medical centers, urban redevelopment, and junior and community colleges.⁸

One man who has done a great deal to promote voluntary alternatives to government action is Richard Cornuelle. Having, himself, organized the United Student Aid Funds — a voluntary method of financing college education for young persons — Mr. Cornuelle has seen the value of this approach and has recommended its use in his *Reclaiming the American Dream*.⁹ I share the spirit of Mr. Cornuelle's work, for by approaching various social problems within the market, through voluntary action, men could lessen the tendency they have to assume that government control of individuals and their resources is the sole means to the solution of such problems. I am not suggesting that any man has a "moral obligation" to pursue such a course; I am suggesting it only as a very practical method of solving such problems and, at the same time, reducing the demand many people have for government intervention into human affairs.

I must admit to becoming quite disenchanted with those libertarians who seem to be able to muster only resentment and anger at the growth of statism throughout the world. I am reminded of an example Richard Cornuelle provides in his book of a very conservative man he once knew who viewed F.D.R. as the "father" of American state socialism. This man would sit around with a fistful of Roosevelt dimes and a hammer, and whenever the spirit moved him, would place one of the dimes on the floor and hit it with the hammer.

⁷See *Business Week* (May 24, 1958), p. 133; *The American City* (November, 1965), p. 12; *Reader's Digest* (August, 1966), p. 107; and *U.S. News & World Report* (April 3, 1967), p. 42.

⁸Alumni day address at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1967 (reported by A.P.).

⁹*Op. cit.*

This was the extent of his ability to cope with the problems of government.

I see this same tendency on the part of too many libertarians. If their resentment is not expressed by hitting Roosevelt dimes, then it takes the form of buttons and bumper-stickers which proclaim various anti-state slogans. Added to this are the many demonstrations, letters to the editor, and periodic discussions in which each confirms his allegiance to unerring principle. In such behavior is found the frustrated champion of "entrepreneurship" who cannot even direct his mind toward the innovation of solutions to what he describes as his most pressing problem. The futility is appalling!

If one of the conditions in which you find yourself is that some men seek, through government action, to control your life and property, and if you seek to eliminate this element of conflict, then I think it is incumbent upon you to employ your mind to devise better methods of solving those problems. Men will cease to sanction government action when a better method is demonstrated to them. If you are unwilling to move in a direction which can result in the diminution of conflict which you currently encounter with the government, then please excuse me if I fail to be too interested in the expression of your problems.

Pakhtun Tribesmen and Their Free Society

by Aslam Effendi

Aslam Effendi, forty-four, of West Pakistan, describes himself as a writer and thinker who has spent a great part of his life preaching world peace through a one-world market. He reports that his great grandfather conquered Afghanistan at the age of fifteen, and is considered the second greatest hero in Pakhtun history. Aslam Effendi makes the Pakhtun region his home "because this is one of the spots on earth where there are no taxes and where the government is felt least."

Prof. F. A. Hayek writes, "The fact is that if 'to rule' means to make man obey another's will, government has no such power to rule in a free society."

The Pakhtun tribes, including the Mormands, Afridis, Waziris, Masudis, etc., that live on the borders between Pakistan and Afghanistan, are an interesting people, for history has seldom recorded any period in which they were ruled by a formal government as we understand it.

Soldiers and fortune seekers such as Alexander of Macedonia, Mahmud of Ghazni, Babur the Mughal, and others marched through their territory but left these freedom-loving people alone. If ever these tribesmen submitted to any law and order, it was the religious order of Islam.

This essay should be of special interest to such intellectuals as Dean Robert LeFevre, who has greatly influenced my thinking on political theory and maintains that formal government is not necessary for holding human society together. The Pakhtun society may not be a perfect example, but still such a society does work and smashes the theory of those who believe that without formal government there would be chaos and that human civilization would be wiped off the face of the earth.

So in dealing with the Pakhtun society I have tried to keep three important questions in view. First, what is that force which prevents the Pakhtuns from completely destroying one another in a society that recognizes no formal government, or formal police or courts of law; second, what prevents the strong from grabbing the property of the weak in such a society; third, how do the Pakhtuns deal with problems of public interest in a society that recognizes no taxation?

Let's take up these three questions one by one.

Law and Order

First, in the Pakhtun society law and order is based on an unwritten constitution which is respected by the tribes under all circumstances. Some of the features of this constitution are: *melmastiya* (hospitality), *badal* (retribution), *tiga* (armistice), *nanawati*, and *jirga*, among others.

Melmastiya (hospitality) plays a vital role in Pakhtun society and is an expression of the sense of self-respect and personal dignity of an individual tribesman. Each family or clan has a *hujra* (a sort of social club) which caters to the comfort and protection of a guest, whosoever he may be. The *hujra* provides food and shelter to guests; it is a place where marriage and death ceremonies are performed, and also a sort of assembly house where problems of a political and social nature are discussed. A *hujra* that is visited by few guests is sometimes described by the rival *hujra* as *spayrah*, meaning *desolate*. In short, a *hujra* is a tribal institution that contributes in a big way toward cementing brotherhood in the Pakhtun tribal society.

Murders are few and far between among the Pakhtun tribesmen. Similarly, other crimes are very rarely witnessed. But if ever a murder or crime does take place, it probably occurs for very good and strong reasons. And if a Pakhtun murders, he places not only himself but his entire family in a very embarrassing and dangerous situation, for the institution of *badal* (retribution) comes into force. This arrangement itself acts as a marvelous check on crime and, according to my learned friend, Prof. Maulana Abdul Qadir of the Pakhtun Academy, University of Peshawar, there is one murder in Pakhtun society compared with one hundred in areas having formal government and police.

After a murder occurs, a tribal ceremony takes place known as *nanawati*. Let's take an example. Suppose Dilbar Khan murders

Shere Dil Khan. Then the relatives of the former, along with the religious dignitaries of the tribe, will enter the house of the latter's family; this entering is called *nanawati*. After entry an attempt is made to offer apology. Such an approach invariably results in peaceful settlement of as serious an issue as murder. Settlement can take many forms; but in some cases the sister of the murderer is, by mutual consent, given away in marriage to the nearest relative of the murdered man to wash away the enmity. This ceremony is called *sowara*, a Pakhtun word meaning to send the bride to the bridegroom's house on horseback and with all the tribal ceremony.

In case of inter-tribal feuds (and this is very rare), firing may be exchanged on both sides. But this, too, ends with the operation of a tribal ceremony, here called *tiga* (armistice). It is surprising how each individual member of the tribe respects the armistice. Not a shot is fired thereafter.

Property Rights

And now we come to our second question: how safe is property in such a society? A Pakhtun society is a free society and therefore attaches the greatest importance to property, or, as a Pakhtun said to me: "Property is our birthright."

Now, property ownership is based on an interesting tribal institution called *waish* (or distribution). According to *waish*, each individual must have an equal share in whatever form the property of the tribe is — whether it is a mountain, dale, jungle, pasture, arable land, etc. This system is unique in the world, for it makes every individual an equal share holder with others, yet allows nobody the entire ownership of the community's property. Every individual has the right to keep or sell his share of the tribal property, which is quite unlike communism, which preaches ownership by the community as a whole but in fact it is not so. In the Pakhtun tribal society we often find some people with bigger property than others, and you may want to know why this is so, despite the fact that it is stressed that all will have equal shares. Well, those belonging to bigger tribes have lesser shares compared with those of smaller tribes. The biggest share is called *brakha*; the lesser shares are called *nemakai*, *teerao*, *nadirai* or *adayla*, *pow* or *tanga*, and *paisa*.

Prof. Maulana Abdul Qadir said to me: "The *waish* is such a surprisingly original system of property distribution, for there is no danger of anyone becoming a feudal lord. In fact I would welcome

any economist anywhere in the world to communicate with me on this fascinating subject."

The Pakhtuns settle land, property, irrigation, and similar disputes through an institution called *jirga*, which is a meeting place of the elders of the various tribes. The elders as well as both parties in a dispute sit in a circle (and on the bare earth) to indicate complete equality before the law. This is so unlike the formal courts where the judges sit on daises or raised platforms to indicate their superiority over others. The *jirga* does not use compulsion, but only invites the consent of the parties to a dispute and its decision lies up to the extent that the honor, property, and freedom of the individual are not violated. Nobody, however, dares violate the decision of the *jirga*, but if any there be, he is socially boycotted and expelled from the tribe — and who dares face expulsion in such a social order?

Public Works

And finally we come to the question: how do the tribesmen deal with problems of common interest such as building wells, canals, roads, fighting floods, etc.? Now suppose a certain tribe needs a road. Then a tribal *jirga* is held and all the elders of the tribe meet to decide how the problem may be tackled. And if a certain problem like flood concerns all the tribes, then the elders of all the tribes will get together and decide the issue. It is interesting to note that each individual in the tribe takes interest in such matters because such projects affect everybody, for all have a right to benefit from it.

Each Pakhtun is proud to belong to a tribe, but he never loses his individuality. You can easily recognize him wherever he may be, for he walks with his shoulders thrown back, with his head held high, and with a confidence that gives the impression that the whole world is too small a space for him. Here I am tempted to quote a Persian couplet which very much applies to him:

Har mulk mulkay mást
Ke mulay Khudáay mást

Every country is ours,
For what belongs to God is ours.

And I can never forget the words of an aged tribal poet who said to me: "The Pakhtun's love for freedom is so great that if he were ever to be deprived of it and someone told him that he could refind it in the stars, he would surely lose no time to build a ladder and try to recapture it."

The Contradiction In Objectivism

by R. A. Childs, Jr.

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Articles by Mr. Childs are being syndicated by Pine Tree Features along with columns by other freedom-oriented writers.

PREFACE

"Why the devil are you wasting all your time quibbling among yourselves? Why aren't you out selling the masses, or the intellectuals?" This question, which periodically arises to derail any libertarian seeking consistency, is one asked by a great many people today, mostly those who themselves lean towards libertarianism. Why do libertarians "quibble among ourselves?" Just what is the point of finding fault with the theories of one another? The purpose is simply to discover the truth. Liberty isn't something which can be "sold" like so many pounds of fish; like any idea, it can only present itself for acceptance to people who care to think about such matters. All this "quibbling" among individualists is nothing more than a strengthening force; and refinement of ideas, in accordance with the dictates of consistency, is always to the ultimate benefit of any ideology or philosophy. The point is that before ideas can be accepted on a wide scale, they have to be *worthy* of being accepted, which at the very least means that they should be consistent with one another. An inconsistent or contradictory philosophy is a *wrong* philosophy. Contradictory ideas cannot possibly describe correctly, a non-contradictory reality. There are no contradictions in reality, and to maintain a contradiction in one's ideas is to confess errors of reasoning.

This emphasis on consistency is nothing new. Aristotle may be blamed with starting the whole concern with being logical, when he

began talking about the law of contradiction in his *Metaphysics*. And the tradition begun by Aristotle has survived, and lives even today, in this most irrational of periods.

Probably the best known philosopher today in this Aristotelian tradition is novelist-philosopher Ayn Rand, the fountainhead of Objectivism.

Objectivism is a philosophical movement, which begins with the axiom that existence exists: which is just a way of translating into the form of a proposition, a fundamental axiom, one which is assumed by everyone, even when they try to refute it; that is, the existence of reality is an objective fact, regardless of anyone's wishes to the contrary. But the existence of the universe implies two other axioms which, again, must be assumed in any attempt to deny them: that consciousness exists (you are conscious), because consciousness is the faculty which perceives that which exists, and that a thing is itself; A is A. Everything is something, and every something is what it is. A contradiction cannot exist. From these fundamental axioms, Objectivism begins. All of Objectivism is based on the law of contradiction.

Objectivism's philosophy of man begins with the fact that man is a being of volitional consciousness: man is the one animal who has to *choose* to be conscious, to use his mind. Man is a rational animal, and reason is his only guide to *knowledge*, reason being that faculty which identifies and integrates the material provided by man's senses. Man has no *automatic* knowledge, hence he has no automatic means of survival. For man, the question of survival is a *problem*, to be solved. Just as reason and logic—the art of non-contradictory identification—are man's only guide to knowledge, so they are his only guide to action. Specifically, they are his only guide to solve the problem of maintaining and furthering his life.

Man's life, to an Objectivist, is an end in itself. It is the only thing which makes action in the face of alternatives necessary, and the only standard against which such action—such *values*—should be evaluated. Man is an end in himself; he is not a sacrificial animal and he is not a means to the ends of others. The moral purpose of his life is the achievement of his own rational self-interest. Man's self-interest has to be defined rationally, because anything other than that leads to physical and psychological destruction. Nature forbids man the irrational, because the irrational will not work.

The social consequence of this ethic of rational self-interest has its essence contained in a single principle: No man—or group of men—has the right to initiate the use of physical force against others. This is directly based on an acceptance of reason as man's only means of survival, and therefore, persuasion, voluntary agreements, and trade are the only proper basis of human relationships.

Up to this point, I consider myself as being in basic agreement with Objectivism. But now the problem. The Objectivists believe in a political government, bound by Objective laws, whose only proper function is to use physical force in retaliation against those who do in fact initiate the use of physical force in their dealings with others. Here I must part company with the Objectivists.

Ayn Rand and her philosophy of Objectivism will, I believe, be a powerful influence upon the future of this country. I know from personal experience that the Objectivist ethics, which is based on epistemology and psychology, can be an invaluable tool in rebuilding one's own character, in awakening one's mind, and in helping to provide a sound foundation for mental health and, especially, for self-esteem. If Objectivism is properly understood and applied, it can help a "looting mystic" become a rational, free, and productive human being. It can turn a man who despises himself into a man of unquestionable self-esteem. It can give purpose to the parasite, and rationality to the emotional whim-worshipper.

But there is one thing which it *cannot* do, and that is to make the principle that no man or group of men has the right to initiate the use of physical force, compatible with a belief in political government. This, I maintain, is a contradiction in Objectivism. The object of this essay is to show that in no way can a government exist which does not have the power to *initiate* the use of physical force against its citizens.

To Objectivists, the state is an institution holding a monopoly on the use of physical force. They hold that, properly speaking, no man or group of men may initiate the use of physical force against others; that the state may use physical force only in retaliation against those who do in fact initiate the use of physical force in attempt to gain values. Now, the question I should like to offer up for debate, and to answer, is this: considering the very essence of the state, can it be limited to a use of physical force only in retaliation?

To the reality-centered Objectivist, the question should be of the utmost importance. I would like to show that the Objectivist is under

the necessity of either abandoning the consistent application of his principles, or abandoning his belief in political government. To proceed, issue by issue:

1. Taxation

Taxation is by definition legalized robbery. Clearly, it is initiated coercion. As such, no Objectivist can in good conscience support it. So, naturally, most of them don't. Ayn Rand, in her essay in *The Virtue of Selfishness* entitled "Government Financing in a Free Society,"¹ states emphatically that the financing of the state in a free society would be voluntary. But *can* it be? She provides a number of suggestions as to how this might be accomplished, but aside from these, let us consider this proposal.

What would happen if a government were to repeal all taxes, declaring that henceforth all contributions to the state would be voluntary? Well, if everyone were going to get all the "benefits" of this government without paying anything, chances are that they simply wouldn't pay anything. The state would become somewhat of a Red Cross type of outfit, providing its services for all who need it, at the cost of voluntary contributions. If it continued to insist that it was in business to protect everyone at the cost of whoever volunteered to pay, its revenues would probably shrink because there would be no necessary connection between paying for the service and receiving that service. It simply would not be able to provide protection for all at the voluntary cost of some. Thus, it would simply fade away into bankruptcy, or else re-institute taxation.

Another consideration which re-inforces this belief is that there is simply no reason for the wealthy, or anyone else, to pay, voluntarily, for the protection of all, when it would be much cheaper for them to hire private protection agencies to protect them. Then they would be paying *only* for their own protection, and would be getting the same service at a much cheaper cost, since there would not be any subsidizing of the protection costs of others. What would happen if the state which we are concerned with provided its services *only* to those who paid for it? It would, in fact, become a market agency of protection, so long as it did not stop those who do not want to patronize it, from patronizing others. The result would be in fact, not *one* government which provided monopolistic services for all at the cost

¹Ayn Rand, *The Virtue of Selfishness* (New York: New American Library, 1964).

of all or a few, but a number of competing defense agencies, with the government with which we began, just one more competitor.

As an aside here to those Objectivists who are ready, willing, and able to quote Miss Rand on the horror of competing governments, let me point out that I am talking about competing *protection* and *defense* agencies, not competing agencies of *retaliation*, which is what the Objectivists are concerned with. Protection always occurs before a crime has been committed, and prevents that crime from happening. Defense occurs during the crime. Retaliation always occurs afterwards. Modern private enterprise protection agencies provide *protection* and *defense* for their customers. If a crime is successfully committed, then the employer of the defense agency either proceeds to patronize another establishment, or chastises the agency he has employed, whereupon it either shapes up or sinks into oblivion. If a crime has been successfully committed, the agency takes no further action, but rightfully declares itself a failure at protection and defense.

The modern state does no such thing. It is concerned with catching a thief, for example, *after* he has robbed someone. It is concerned with *revenge* and *not protection*. Now when Ayn Rand concludes in her essay on the "Nature of Government"² that what the autarchists*—and others—advocate is competing agencies of *retaliation* which would compete in the forceable restraint of men, leading to chaotic gang warfare, she really misses the point by a mile. If a free-market agency *is* successful in its attempt to protect a customer, then there is no need for revenge. And if it isn't, it sees its customers deserting it by the dozen, to patronize some other agency which *does* have a reputation for success in this field.

Now, this is quite different from what we have today. For the very existence of the state bears witness to the fact that today, there exists neither absolute ownership of property by individuals, nor absolute responsibility on the part of individuals for protecting that property. If a man *is* the absolute owner of his property, then he and he alone is responsible for *protecting* it. Today, we are so concerned with tribal agencies of retaliation that we simply ignore the fact that the logical corollary of sovereign ownership is sovereign responsibility

²*Ibid.*

*Miss Rand does not use the term *autarchists*. She talks about a "recent variant of the anarchistic theory" which, apparently, wants to replace the state with market-place alternatives. (Editor's note: *Anarchistic* is the erroneous label attached to ideas which withdraw sanction of the state while advocating market-place alternatives.)

for protecting that ownership. Remove the tribal agencies of retaliation, and you would have the creativity of profit-seeking businessmen producing new and better—even revolutionary—ways of *protecting* an individual's property from molestation. Keep the tribal agencies of retaliation and you eliminate that incentive to discover ways to *protect* property rights from violation.

If such things were left to the market, retaliation would probably disappear, because it would prove to be too costly. In our present system, the public is often milked thousands of dollars, by taxation, to support men and equipment whose sole function is to capture petty purse thieves and the like. In the market, this would prove to be economically unjustifiable, as would the entire court-trial procedure and the institution of public prisons.

But, in any case, I think that my point, that government without taxation would collapse, has been demonstrated. For government to exist, so must taxation, and therefore the initiation of physical force.

2. Arrests

To the educated Objectivist, who realizes that a government has to have the power of arresting criminals in order to exist, it will seem strange that I list the legal function of "arresting" criminals as an initiation of the use of physical force. But to one who believes that a man is innocent until proven guilty, it must be considered as such. If a man is *in fact* presumed innocent until *proven* guilty by *objective evidence, in a court of law*, then any policeman who does capture a man, claiming to arrest him "in the name of the law," is in fact operating according to the principle that the man is guilty, and not innocent as is ordinarily presumed. This, of course, could be defended if one believed in the validity of the principle of original sin, but most Objectivists would not want to be called advocates of such a doctrine. If a man is presumed innocent, then *no one*, whether in the name of the law or not, has a right to lay a hand on him, let alone the right to drag him off to some public dungeon, called a "prison cell." Now, can any government exist which does not have the right to arrest people? No? Then it's either-or; either the state exists with the power of arrest, or no man or group of men has the right to initiate the use of physical force. It's the principle against the state.

Next to be considered are the power of subpoena and the power to compel truthful testimony. The Objectivists do not explicitly sanction these two powers. However, it is my contention that they

are necessary for the state to function, and, therefore, Objectivists can be accused of implicitly sanctioning these illicit uses of initiated force by explicitly sanctioning the state.

3. Subpoena

The power of subpoena is, in every nation I can think of, accepted without objection. Without it, we are told, no man could ever be convicted of anything. But what is the power of subpoena? It is an order of a court of legislative body *requiring* the attendance of a witness. If it is what is called the subpoena "*duces tecum*," it requires the witness to bring with him certain specified documents or papers. Now, if the man who receives the subpoena is innocent, that is, if he has initiated the use of physical force against no one at all, then the subpoena is a clear and apparent violation of his liberty. By *compelling* the attendance of an innocent man *anywhere at all*, the state is in fact initiating the use of physical force against him. Or, at least, it is threatening to do that if he does *not* attend a trial, etc., in the capacity of a witness.

Now, what right does the state, or anyone else, for that matter, have to require, under penalty of imprisonment or fine, the attendance of an innocent man anywhere at all? None. Then, if the power of subpoena is abandoned, what is left? How is one persuaded to testify? Does one testify out of the goodness of his heart? Possibly this would work in a few cases, but in the vast majority of cases, taking the time and effort to testify would prove to be economically harmful to the man involved. So what happens then? Is a man paid for testifying? By whom? If he is paid by the state, surely he will be partial to its side. And if he is paid by the defendant, he will probably be partial to him. In either case, such payment would surely be little more than a bribe, whereupon objective justice would be a complete farce. And what of the subpoena "*duces tecum*?" It amounts to little more than a state-sponsored confiscation of private property, or robbery, or an initiated use of physical force. In any case, the power of subpoena is a clear and present instance of yet another invasion of individual rights. As such, it should be condemned.

4. Perjury

Perjury is a similar case. What right does the state have, under penalty of fine and imprisonment, to compel the honesty of anyone

whatever? The modern state not only has the power to compel a man to become a witness, but to tell the truth once he is testifying! Certainly, mere lying does not constitute an initiation of the use of physical force. But if a man is punished, by fine or imprisonment, that *does* constitute the initiation of the use of physical force and is, by the standards of Objectivism, immoral and unjustifiable.

5. Constitutionalism

Ask any solid Objectivist how you go about limiting the power of the state, and he will say, like most conservatives today, that what we need is a good, rigid constitution, defining the powers of government, without room for misinterpretation by anyone. This is the logical consequence of his belief that all government properly rests on the consent of the people—of those who are governed—and that the only proper function of government is to protect men's rights against violation by the use of physical force.

There are three aspects of this, all of which must be considered. The first is the question of whether or not a constitution can actually ever limit the power of government, the second is the general acceptance of our present constitution by Objectivists, and the third is the sanctioning of the entire principle of constitutionalism.

Can a constitution ever limit the power of government? I believe that it cannot. In order for a government to be bound by a constitution, which limits its power, there has to be some agency which has the power of sovereign interpretation of that constitution. In other words, there has to be an agency which has the power to evaluate the laws of the government and reject them if they are "unconstitutional." Now, the problem is that such an agency of evaluation has to be a *part* of that very government which is it supposed to check. In other words, the government is given the power of interpretation over that very document which exists to limit its power. The government has the power to limit its own power. And when it doesn't *want* to limit its power, it simply won't. The fact that there are checks and balances *within* the government doesn't mean that the power of the government itself is checked. To someone standing *within* the framework of a government, such checks and balances may *appear* to be limiting its power. But to anyone standing on the outside, there are no limitations on the government's power at all. The only thing limiting the power of the state *is itself*, and that certainly is the same as having no limitations at all.

This is demonstrated conclusively today, in the case of conscription. Contradictions or not, there are some things which our Constitution states quite explicitly. One of them is that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime . . . shall exist within the United States. . . ." This, of course, is the 13th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Now, conscription is obviously a form of slavery, or involuntary servitude, and as such is clearly prohibited by the Constitution. There is no justification or authority for it granted anywhere. Yet it exists. So what? Well, it just demonstrates that the only thing limiting the power of the government *is itself*, and that whenever it doesn't *choose* to have its power restricted, its power *will not* be restricted.

In short, a constitution cannot limit the power of a government at all. And thus, a constitution *cannot* limit the state to the use of physical force in retaliation against those who initiate its use. If a state chooses to initiate the use of physical force, nothing can prevent it from doing so.

Now consider the acceptance in general by the Objectivists of our present Constitution and most "laws" passed under its authority as binding on people today regardless of their wishes in the matter. If the only valid basis of government is the consent of the governed, then how can any Objectivist sanction our present Constitution or *any single law passed under its authority*? The Constitution of the United States was, as Lysander Spooner ably points out in his *No Treason: The Constitution of No Authority*,³ at best consented to by our ancestors nearly two centuries ago. Insofar as it rests on consent, or ever did, it was the consent of those ancestors and has no inherent binding on anyone living today. If any Objectivist claims that it is binding on anyone today who doesn't accept it, then he must also maintain the following: (1) That any two people may make a contract binding not only themselves, but a third party as well, regardless of whether or not it is against his will to be bound by that contract, and (2) that anyone wishing to give his consent to any organization, or to be bound by any "social contract," has not only the right to speak for himself, but for his descendants as well. This, I submit, is nonsense. It would lead to the acceptance of such things as inherited obligations, that is, the "duty" to submit to something which one had no part in creating or establishing. Again, by sanctioning this doc-

³Lysander Spooner, *No Treason: The Constitution of No Authority* (Larkspur, Colorado: Pine Tree Publications, 1966).

trine, the Objectivist is sanctioning the initiation of the use of physical force against others.

If the Objectivists would do the logical thing—not, I must add, altogether foreign to their nature—then they must withdraw any sanction whatever from the present government in the United States, it being a government existing under the presumed “authority” of a document which binds no one who does not want to be bound, and does in fact authorize the initiation of the use of physical force. If any Objectivist doubts this last point, I suggest that he simply read the document, and notice how many times and on how many issues—beginning with taxation—that document “authorizes” the initiation of the use of physical force against the people of the United States. And further: if that document is invalid as any kind of “social contract,” then not only are all laws as such in the United States binding on no one at all who doesn’t want to be bound, *any* form of civil disobedience which is not, in itself, an initiation of the use of physical force against others is justifiable and not, as Miss Rand suggests in her essay on “The Cashing-In: The Student Rebellion,”⁴ something evil to be condemned. Whether it is advisable or not is, of course, another matter altogether.

In any case, I believe that I have refuted any basis for the Objectivists’ claim that the present Constitution is somehow binding on everyone; that any law claiming to bind everyone, which was passed under its non-existent universal authority, is valid; or that there is any basis for condemning civil disobedience to those laws, whether such disobedience is “mass” civil disobedience or not. The claim of Miss Rand that the only circumstances under which such civil disobedience is justified is if such disobedience is aimed at making a “test case” out of the law, is an absurdity unworthy of her. If a law violates your rights—as most do—then what is wrong with violating the law? Now, if all laws in the U.S. don’t bind anyone who doesn’t accept them, since whoever was responsible for passing them had no rightful authority to bind non-consentors in the first place, then civil disobedience turns out to be, not an assault on the concept of individual rights, but an assertion of individual rights against the power of state enforcement of invalid laws. And if all laws claiming to bind non-consentors are invalid, then the defiance of legality as such—that

⁴Ayn Rand, *Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal* (New York: New American Library, 1966).

is, legality in the sense of laws binding everyone—is precisely the sort of thing which should be encouraged by any decent Objectivist.

Again, the question of whether such defiance should be physical or merely intellectual (the withdrawing of one's sanction from the state and its laws) is another matter, and will probably differ according to context. But in any case, the only logical attitude that any Objectivist should take toward the present government and constitution is one of uncompromising hostility. And since one does not sanction evil in *any* capacity, that means that every Objectivist should withdraw his sanction from the political establishment immediately and in every possible way. And in the way of a question to Miss Rand, isn't the placement of one's manuscripts and personal papers in the Library of Congress or any other state archives, and the supporting of political candidates in Presidential elections, an immoral sanctioning of something evil?

Now we come to the issue of constitutionalism in general. How can one support any constitution whatever? First of all, if the only proper basis of government is *consent*, then such a constitution is valid *only* if it has been consented to by *every single human being who is to be bound by it*. If it is not agreed to by any one person, and if that person is coerced into accepting the decision of the majority or whatever is the case, then that is an example of the initiation of the use of physical force and should be condemned as immoral by any consistent Objectivist. The principle of majority rule is perhaps the most recent philosophic addition to a long, long list of attempts to justify the initiation of plain brute force against dissenters, by the state, but it is still invalid. Morality, as Miss Rand once said, is not a matter of numbers. In her essay "Textbook of Americanism,"⁵ Miss Rand says a number of things which would tend to support me. Pressing on the issue of noncontradiction, she merely points out that either a man's individual rights are inalienable or they are not. It's either-or; and if you think that rights can be "semi-inalienable," you can't claim to be either honest or sane, according to her. So, if you find yourself saying that the only consent a constitution needs is the consent of a majority, then I suggest that you check your premises. A constitution, to be binding on everyone, has to be accepted by everyone. If a *single individual* dissents from the consensus of the

⁵Ayn Rand, "A Textbook of Americanism" (New York: Nathaniel Branden Institute, 1946).

mob, and is in any way punished for asserting his rights, then *that* constitutes the initiation of the use of physical force against another—an innocent man.

The basis of the Objectivist's political theory lies in the right of an individual to delegate his right to self-defense to an outside force, presumably, the state. But the corollary of this right to delegate the right to the retaliatory use of physical force to an outside agency is the right *not* to delegate it to any outside agency, that is, the right to keep it for oneself. Now, if one is fined or imprisoned or "eliminated" for refusing to delegate his right of self-defense to the state, then *that* constitutes the initiation of the use of physical force against an innocent man, and is unjustifiable.

Any Objectivist who takes his principles seriously has to realize yet another aspect where he is advocating the initiation of physical force, in attempting to "establish" a political society. If he believes that an individual's right to life, liberty, and property is *in fact absolute and inalienable*, then he should immediately question the right of any state whatever to assert authority over any individual's use, control, or disposal of his own life or property. For if any outside agency claims the right to regulate, in any way, an individual's actions or uses of his property, then, in fact and in principle, that agency is claiming a part ownership over that man's life or property. If that "part ownership" is in conflict with the will of the man involved, then it constitutes a form of intimidation and the initiation of physical force against that man.

Thus, again, we come to the same conclusion: the Objectivist is faced with the alternative of either abandoning his principle, or abandoning his belief in political government. But there is one more point to be covered.

6. War

To an Objectivist, war is justified only when it is in retaliation against an "aggressor" who initiated the violence in the first place. War, like all forms of retaliation, can rightfully be used only against those who start using violence, in order to accomplish some end or another. This, I submit, is impossible. A nation is nothing more than a group of men. When an individual starts the use of physical force, it is at least *theoretically* possible to isolate the use of retaliation so that he, and he alone, is affected by it. In the case of a nation, it is

not even theoretically possible. Why? Because when a nation starts a war to gain an end, one cannot isolate the individuals responsible for the outrage. *One cannot, therefore, use war only in retaliation.* All the people within a single territory—a nation—are certainly *not* responsible for a war. The leaders perhaps are and as such, it is only they who could rightfully be punished.

Consider any attempt to use war in retaliation. What does the “innocent” nation do? Does it, as Miss Rand sanctioned in the case of Nazi Germany and others, “invade” the “aggressor” nation? Fine. And how does it do that? By bombs? By sending in an army? But what assurance can be given that *not one single innocent person*, that is, not one single person who has had no part in the initiation of the war, will be harmed? Is such assurance possible? No. Even if one should accept the principle that a man can rightfully use retaliation against those who initiated physical force, on what grounds does one sanction the violation of the rights of even a single innocent person? Even if it were possible to rightfully use retaliation in any conflict between individuals, it isn’t possible in the case of entire nations. If the people of Nazi Germany were *not*, in fact, responsible for their government, then they weren’t responsible for the actions of that government. And this being so, on what grounds do we claim the right to attack them? Do we attack only the armies of the nations involved? But armies are composed only of people, most of whom probably have had no part in the initiation of the war in the first place. Certainly, from the standpoint of history, a great number of the soldiers composing any army are unwilling draftees. They are innocent. According to Miss Rand, a coerced compliance with a law does not constitute a sanctioning of that law, so the fact that a draftee allows himself to be drafted is certainly no sign that he sanctions the actions of “his” government.

No matter what path we take, we always find ourselves coming to the same conclusion: that *any* war, whether it is rationalized as a “defensive” war or not, is in fact a large-scale initiation of physical force against innocent victims of the state. There is no possible way to separate those who did engage in the initiation of the war—any war—from those who live in the same geographical region but who are totally innocent of any wrongdoing. And any “defensive” war will ultimately violate the individual rights of not only a *single* innocent man—which any Objectivist would condemn—but hundreds of

thousands of innocent men, women, and children. This is totally unjustifiable.

Recently, on the *Tonight Show*, in an interview with Johnny Carson, Ayn Rand sanctioned Israel's actions against Egypt as being "defensive," or in "retaliation." What she ignored, of course, was that among Israel's tactics used in winning the war was the napalming of innocent women and children in Arab villages. Is *this retaliation*? Or is it rather an inconsistency in Miss Rand?

And finally, Ayn Rand has put herself on record a number of times as being completely opposed to unilateral disarmament. Now, since it is logically impossible for nuclear weapons to be used *solely* on those who are "guilty" of initiating physical force, what possible basis has she for this position?

It would seem that Miss Rand is in fact on record as favoring the initiation of physical force—in fact the complete annihilation of large numbers of people—so long as it is in an "emergency," namely *war*. It seems that it's all right to regard man as a sacrificial animal, but only in *certain* circumstances.

I suggest a re-reading of the first part of Section 12 of Miss Rand's "Textbook of Americanism." In it, she explicitly denies the possibility of recognizing inalienable rights all the time except in an emergency, or in special circumstances. Inalienable rights are just that—inalienable. And that means that there are *no* circumstances, not even for a "good cause," under which those rights may be violated. Not ever, at any time, for any reason. But doesn't that, then, preclude the support of *any* war, at *any* time, for *any* reason *whatever*?

I believe that it does. Just as it precludes the support of a political government which cannot, in fact, ever be limited to a use of retaliation against those who initiate the use of physical force.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Putting all I have said in a form familiar to all Objectivists:

Objectivist Premise: The initiation of the use of physical force against others is evil.

Observation: No government can exist which does not initiate the use of physical force against others.

Conclusion: No government can exist which is not evil.

Objectivist Premise: One should never sanction evil in any capacity.

Observation: No government can exist which is not evil.

Conclusion: One should never sanction any government.

Now, if it is true that believing consistently in the principle that no man or group of men may initiate the use of physical force against others, is incompatible with believing in a government, then there are four alternatives open to Objectivists:

(1) They can abandon the consistent application of the principle, thus contradicting their ethical philosophy.

(2) They can abandon their belief in government, and join the autarchists in looking for different methods of protecting individual rights.

(3) They can abandon their belief in the law of contradiction.

(4) They can ignore everything I have said, thus contradicting their principle that the root of all virtue is the choice to think.

Needless to add, the question of which alternative to choose is up to every Objectivist as an individual. An individualist, like Howard Roark of *The Fountainhead*, is a man of sovereign intellect. He makes up his own mind, and doesn't wait to be told what to think by others.

On the Other Hand

The Bombing and Negotiated Peace Questions in 1944

Dr. James Martin has reviewed some of the events of World War II in his article, "The Bombing and Negotiated Peace Questions in 1944." He brings to light certain aspects of the American and British policies, especially those related to strategic and area bombardment, which have generally been kept from the American public.

What is particularly instructive is the manner in which American and communist objectives coalesced in World War II, with American and British policies assuming aspects of barbarism which went beyond those advanced and advocated by Joseph Stalin.

This is a sad and a frightening story of the manner in which a vast, and essentially peace-loving, people can be hoodwinked, cajoled, and brainwashed, in time of war, into accepting doctrines and dogma which they could not possibly accept in a more rational setting.

It has particular impact and importance right at this juncture because America is again at war, with the same arguments pro and con making their appearance as were offered during the 1942-45 holocaust. But with the advantage of perspective in terms of the earlier struggle, it is possible to derive a better view of what is transpiring today.

Analysis of Conflict

Butler Shaffer applies the principles of economics to the area of conflict and finds that ordinary market-place procedures can be relied upon to resolve what otherwise might develop into hostilities.

Mr. Shaffer has no time for individuals who wish to sit around bemoaning the amount of government control they are experiencing. He suggests that if they are simply bewailing their plight, they are valuing their predicament and actually relishing the opportunity of complaining. He recommends that they re-evaluate their situation and begin constructive activity of one sort or another.

There is a flair of originality in this offering that may cause readers to think about some old problems in a new way.

Pakhtun Tribesmen and Their Free Society

Aslam Effendi provides a brief glimpse into one of the few places in the world where there are neither taxes nor parking meters. The system of *waish* (distribution) described by the author is similar to the old Russian *mir* and other earlier customs relating to the management of land. Although the author contends that *waish* is not communistic, it could be argued that prior to distribution all land is presumed to be communally held and thus does parallel communism in this particular. However, it is clear that compulsion and violence are not employed.

It is also implicit in a distribution system of this kind that while there may never be a feudal lord, there will also never be large-scale savings and hence large-scale investments such as are required in a modern capitalistic economy. Thus, while this method of managing land may be satisfactory in an agrarian culture, it would predictably prove to be inadequate following large-scale industrialization.

This observation is not intended to imply that central planning and taxation become mandatory handmaidens to an industrialized economy — a conclusion that is often accepted without challenge. Can the Pakhtuns work out a system which would provide for the accumulation and retention of capital, thus making industrialization feasible, without at the same time reverting to government regulation and control? Perhaps they have already done so and the brevity of Aslam Effendi's article precludes a more complete explanation.

Just what the Persian poet intended when he suggested that "every country is ours" isn't clear. But the picture drawn is charming, if slightly bucolic, and it suggests that a love of freedom is at least as important as a love for the latest modern improvements.

The Contradiction in Objectivism

"Objectivism," the name taken by Ayn Rand to signify her personal philosophy, is one of the minor but growing influences on American campuses today. Roy Childs, in his examination of the doctrine, has put his finger on the central contradiction embodied in it. He has done so in a manner which takes due notice of the plus factors in the Objectivist line of reasoning.

Objectivists may bridle at this criticism of their patron saint, but if they have the willingness to use logic and reason, which is advocated by their protestations, they may well receive a boost toward an ultimate grasp of reality exceeding the borders of the accepted dogma.

Response

from PHILIP E. O'CONNELL (So. Weymouth, Massachusetts)

Robert Newell in an article in the Fall issue of the *Rampart Journal* spoke out strongly and rightly against shamanism, or the use by the state of religion to keep its subjects or citizens in line. Unfortunately, Mr. Newell gave the impression that Christianity, down through the centuries, had become a captive of the state and had accomplished little more than to promote the interests of the state—the Christian state, as it were. My thesis is the opposite. Christianity, without attacking the state directly, has gradually negated the state as the vital force in man's social existence. Any active Christian should be able and could function without benefit of the state or any government. Many have, in effect, done so. The state has constantly tried to involve itself in Christianity, but Christianity does not involve the state or in any way depend on it or depend on any type of compulsion. It only depends on the aspirations of the individual and what he does to fulfill those aspirations.

I might add that shamanism or religious opportunism was also not the goal of the people of the Old Testament. The all-perfect God was their goal and they did stumble on in that general direction along with their leaders.

In the above-mentioned article, by Robert Newell, Moses was singled out as being a pioneer in the practice of shamanism. Moses not being God may have succumbed to this human temptation to some degree (it is difficult to judge the personal motives of an individual at this late date and judge his actions in the context of the circumstances with which he had to deal) but Moses did give us a personal code from God to live by that did more than anything else, outside the teachings of Jesus, to give men a sense of personal responsibility and independence. Shamanists could draw little actual consolation from the Old Testament, although they certainly tried. However, Jesus settled any doubts once and for all when he said that he was not here to establish a worldly kingdom or help anyone else to do so.

I can not prove my thesis any more than any such thesis can be

proved. I can only refer one to the existing record, the whole record, and ask what was the underlying cause that inspired this or that individual to rid himself of some particular enslaving set of chains, whether physical, mental, or spiritual. Possibly it wasn't always Christianity directly. However, I believe it was the prime mover and is still the prime mover in the struggle for individual freedom.

Christianity has tackled every bogey ever raised to scare man into submission including those inevitably but wrongly raised in its own name. Man has yet to invent one that it can not demolish, including the present crop.

It is difficult to imagine what man's history would have been without Christianity, without Christ, or even without Moses. Worship of the state and its gods and complete submission to its rulers may well have prevailed to this day. If we just remove the influence of Christianity from our community, what would fill the void? The state appears to be the only alternative.

Man, however, must have more motivation than just man and his moral codes or laws, scientific or otherwise. Thus far, Christianity has been the only source of such motivation and it would seem that no man can provide us with anything better. This Truth shall help make us free.

from TRISTAN C. HAUER (Falls Church, Virginia)

I have read the article, "Police Protection," in the *Rampart Journal* of Fall, 1967. May I make the following comments and evaluation of the author's stand.

Strengths: Certain key phrases come to mind and are very thought-provoking, namely:

The term *protection* is misunderstood.

Violence begets violence.

Every idea is suspect.

Peace officer—paradox—trained to dispense violence.

The price of violence—triple jeopardy with private property.

The law-abiding are made to support the law-breaking.

The above are abetted by your pointed questions:

Will man realize a situation is peaceful only by virtue of the absence of those who would use violence to achieve some end?

What does it mean to be pure at heart?—and the implied character traits of a policeman.

Which is the greater problem, resisting crime or supporting the police?

The author's arguments supporting and justifying the above fair questions are solid and logical.

Weaknesses: I agree with his platform of non-violence and responsibility, however, I feel more concrete suggestions and plans are in order if these ideas are to be carried out. A great deal of "education" would be necessary for the average citizen to cheerfully assume his individual role. Years of dependence and "security syndromes" have made the proud independent stance an outdated image. Witness the pre-occupation of college graduates with retirement and other benefits before they even start to tackle life. I respect and admire your independent man, but feel he is rare today in our togetherness-oriented society. Most of our alienation and loss of identity problems come from the establishment of its non-thinking conformity. Mr. Hobson's principles are fine, but please, sir, how can we apply them realistically in today's complex world?

Means of Improvement: In general I would rate Mr. Hobson's article excellent. It is applicable to the classroom, and is stimulating to any interested social critic. I congratulate him on his choice of words and general style. As mentioned before, the only serious lack I see is a more pragmatic approach as to how his ideas could be carried out.

I am interested in his writing. Please forward any further efforts my way.

from JEREMY W. SMITH (Shrewsbury, Massachusetts)

Laurence McGann's article on "The Political Spectrum" obviously leaves it up to the reader to apply his own value judgment and speculation to the development of the "Citizen's Criterion Curve."

I would agree with Robert LeFevre that under proper conditions, the point of maximization of the "Safety" curve might well be at 0% regimentation, and the F-S curve would then duplicate the "Freedom" curve. However, another point seems to have been overlooked. The approach, as shown, assumes equal weight for both "Freedom"

and "Safety." Many, if not most people, once aware of all the facts, would give extra weight to the "Freedom" curve. The point of maximization of the combined curve would probably still be at 0% regimentation, even with the debatable bell-shaped "Safety" curve. Several thousand eighteenth-century frontiersmen probably would have agreed.

P.S. Thanks to Dean LeFevre for the wonderful article on "The Structure."

from STANLEY YANKUS (Grange, South Australia)

This is a small note of appreciation for the good job you're doing in putting together the *Rampart Journal*. I never count a day as dull if I can find a stimulating idea. And your publication is peppered with good ideas.

Yesterday it was a warm as summer and as full of sunshine. So I drove out about forty miles to see one of my friends who is a farmer. Our discussion turned to the article, "Police Protection," by Jim Hobson in the Fall, 1967 issue of the *Rampart Journal*. My greatest loss of property was caused by government agents rather than by private crooks. Come to think of it, most people lose more money through legal taxation than through illegal thievery.

One day, my Aussie friend was driving to Adelaide with his family. It's a lovely drive through the hills and gum trees. Most of the homes along the way belong to sheep farmers and dairymen. As my friend and his family got close to Adelaide, they saw an empty house with broken windows. My friend said to his family, "The government police protect all the houses on this road except this one." His ironic remark was meant to teach a self-evident lesson: Vandals are always quick to break windows in an unoccupied home. The protection of each person's property is mostly a private, do-it-yourself task. The owner of damaged property is always more interested in catching the culprit than a hired policeman.