Review Essay

MANUEL CASTELLS AND THE DECLINE OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY SOCIOLOGY

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THE INFORMATION AGE: ECONOMY, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE, VOLUME 1: *THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY*; VOLUME 2: *THE POWER OF IDENTITY*; AND VOLUME 3: *END OF MILLENNIUM*. BY MANUEL CASTELLS. OXFORD, U.K.: BLACKWELL PUBLISHERS, 1998.

A quick consideration of the recent decade reveals the implosion of sociology. Several sociology departments have been merged with those from other disciplines, and as the number of undergraduate sociology majors has declined, some even have been eliminated. The discipline's research openly assumes an ideological tone palatable to only the most liberal of scholars or ignorant of laymen. Clearly, the discipline Auguste Comte once set at the apex of the sciences is in a free-fall and his grandiose vision that it be the queen of the sciences and savior of the world now mocks those hopes in its decline into the periphery of social sciences alone.

Yet, a series of books by the neo-Marxist scholar Manuel Castells has injected some new life into the discipline. It has been hailed in many circles as a rebirth of sociology in its grand classical tradition—that is, positivistic in its epistemology, anti-individualistic in its paradigm, and collectivistic in its ideology. Such giants of sociology and anthropology as Anthony Giddens and Peter Hall have referred to it as the worthy successor of the "grand theory" tradition exemplified by Karl Marx and Max Weber; that is, broad discursive social analyses that explain why society is in such a deplorable state (Fuller 1999). Anthony Orum (1999) of the University of Illinois at Chicago writes with almost religious enthusiasm that the series is "uplifting and mind-expanding, ambitious and lustrous."[1] Castells's fame is even spreading beyond academic

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[1]Response to Castells's trilogy has not been uniformly positive, however. John Boli, in America's oldest academic sociology publication, *The American Journal of Sociology*, argues

circles as the trilogy earns features space in such mass circulation newspapers as the *Christian Science Monitor* (Slambrouck 1998, sec. 1) and the *Wall Street Journal* (Paschal 1998, sec. B)—a feat rare for sociologists of any stripe. Even the business magazine *Management Today* refers to Castells as "possibly the world's most highly regarded commentator of the information age and new economic order" (1999, p. 46).

Is all of this attention merited? Does Castells offer the scholarly as well as lay communities a new lens through which to understand contemporary society? Or, does he simply peddle the same old sociology with a techno-twist that appeals to the new suburban bourgeoisie and to an academia fatigued by the pointlessness of postmodern scholarship?

This article reviews and assesses the trilogy Castells's entitles *The Information Age: Society, Economy, and Culture.* Despite the adulation and attention the books have drawn, their ideas are strikingly similar to those sociology has proffered for the past 150 years, conceptual frameworks that more often resemble ideological interpretations than a scientific praxeology. What passes for scientific sociological theory and analysis actually proves to be little more than an expression of the sociologist's own preferred vision of the world—in Castells's case, a "social democratic" one (Lloyd 1998, pp. 13–14). As Mises points out in *Theory and History* (1985, p. 250), "Collectivism transforms the epistemological doctrine [of conceptual realism] into an ethical claim." If such is the case, then Castells's work is refreshing and stimulating because of a collectivist ethos made enticing by its hip, techno theme, not its pathbreaking sociology. If so, then the *information* age closely resembles a futuristic myth instead of science, yet another confirmation of sociology's demise, not its resurrection.

Indeed, much of *The Information Age* reminds one of what sociology has fallen to in the last half-century: (1) political bias hidden by the so-called objective scientific method, (2) exaggerated claims for the conclusions of its research, and (3) an ongoing social vision that seeks to reconstruct society in a way that emphasizes collective over the individual, social uniformity over liberty.

But, first, some background about Dr. Castells. Born in Barcelona, Spain, in 1942, he fled Franco's regime for Paris during the 1960s. Like many of his contemporaries in sociology, Castells's formative experiences took place during that era. As a professor at the University of Paris, he saw and participated firsthand in the 1968 student uprisings—a fact he often cites in the trilogy. In 1979, the University of California at Berkeley appointed him professor of

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that Castells's interpretations are too "neat and tidy," and lack the "institutional and historical incisiveness so characteristic of Marx and Weber." See also Boli (1999, pp. 1843–44).

sociology, and he later assumed chairmanship of the Center for Western European Studies there. In the ensuing years, Castells's prominence has only increased. In 1995, he was appointed to the European Commission's High Level Expert Group on the Information Society. Recognizing his stature in the field of sociology, the American Sociological Association in 1998 awarded him one of its highest honors, the Robert and Helen Lynd Award for distinguished career contributions to community and urban sociology. Though he labels himself a European "social democrat" worried about losing the political gains made in Europe, he admits that, when it comes to the Marxism he claims to have forsaken, he still employs it as a "tool" (Lloyd 1998, p. 13).

Much of Castells's earlier work was in urban sociology (specifically grassroots urban political movements) and included books such as *The Urban Question* (1979) and *The Informational City* (1989). These volumes lay much of the groundwork for what would follow in *The Information Age.*

Not until the early 1990s did Castells's thinking hit its pace. For years, he had been studying American and European cities. What he discovered, he believed, is a new form of social organization. No longer does the industrial–capitalist configuration of society hold. Instead, information is becoming the new capital, information networks the new means of production and influence organizing contemporary social life. It is this theme that *The Information Age* develops.

THE TECHNO-MARXIST METHOD: THE INFORMATION AGE TRILOGY

From his opening volume, Castells's method reveals his reliance upon Marxist presuppositions and categories. He employs first a dialectical and historical materialism and then the base and superstructure distinction so characteristic of Marxist argument. The analytical categories (class, ideology, etc.) may be different, but the conceptual framework is strikingly similar—historical conditions creating a structural determinism that, in turn spawns the struggle and conflict that evolves a new synthesis of forms. "What truly matters for social processes and forms making the living flesh of societies," Castells writes,

> Is the actual interaction between modes of production and modes of development, enacted and fought for by social actors, in unpredictable ways, within the constraining framework of past history and current conditions of technological and economic development. (vol. 1, p. 18)[2]

[2] Another representative quotation comes from the opening of the trilogy's conclusion.

> A new society emerges when and if a structural transformation can be observed in the relationships of production, in the relationships of power,

The series is divided into three books, and almost dialectically. Volume 1, subtitled "The Rise of the Network Society," presents Castells's findings on the new material conditions of capitalism. Information networks, not industry or capital versus labor, are the heart of a new social morphology. To be included in these information networks is to have access to power and control. It is this network structure, not human action, that increasingly defines the Informational Society.

Networks take many different shapes. They may be combinations of political elites who manage the European Union, international markets, global criminal organizations, even television systems. Common to all is their internal flow of information, which turns information networks into social networks. This gives groups, regardless of their composition, a dynamism that responds to needs and influences from other networks. Often, information and social networks overlap and bring about new configurations of power. In these cases, influence and power then rests in the "switches" that connect people and groups—that is, gatekeepers of information and capital (vol. 1, p. 471).

Behind our new society lies the technological revolution that has turned information into the new vehicle for capital. Technology rejuvenates capitalism by injecting speed and connecting people, parties, and corporations in new ways. New technologies not only overcome political systems but transcend cultural differences among nations. Computers and the Internet transform global diversity into unity and, eventually, homogeneity. "The new economy is organized around global networks of capital, management, and information, whose access to technological know-how is at the roots of productivity and competitiveness," concludes Castells (p. 471). These networks cut across geographic, national, corporate, and even demographic boundaries.

We have, consequently, a new social order tuned to technological educability and a new stratification system calibrated upon varying educational levels. The educational institution is central, in other words, and reorganizes the great cleavages in the Network Society on new terms. Education equips information producers to acquire new knowledge, empowering them to generate new information that then fuels capitalist expansion. Those without education generally cannot absorb and create new information, which leaves them as dregs of the Information Society, to be exploited as expendable labor and, hence, marginalized.

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and in the relationships of experience. These transformations lead to an equally substantial modification of social forms of space and time, and to the emergence of a new culture. (vol. 3, p. 340).

Volume 2 advances Castells's argument beyond social structure and capitalism, and moves into the antitheses they trigger, cultural reactions and alienation. Indeed, the new "class struggle" is not between capital and labor but between the informationally networked and the marginalized. The networked are the "included" (my term) and powerful; they have access to the networks underlying the Informational Society. The marginalized, on the other hand, are the "excluded," one might say—those used, then cast aside with the confidence that they bear no threat to the new order.

Though peripheral to the Network Society, the excluded are not going away. Instead, they resist. The new information order tries to bleach their identities and experiences to rid them of any remaining individuality. The excluded, then, become more aggressive, more assertive of what positions them in counter-distinction to the new age—their identities and personal experience, both of which are deemed irrelevant by the networked. This is why the volume is subtitled "The Power of Identity."

Here, some of Castells's observations are striking, indeed constitute the strongest portion of the trilogy. The cultural hegemony of the Informational Society is far from complete, he reminds the reader. Across the globe, social and political movements have emerged to combat the monolithic cosmopolitanism of the new world order and its increasing reach into the fabric of our daily lives. These cultural resistance movements fight to reinfuse their existential meaning into their own social worlds as well as the Network Society. Ironically, to do this, the excluded must mimic the networking and cultural codes of the dominant order, but with two exceptions: first, their code is near-tribal and individualistic instead of cosmopolitan, and, second, their networking is decentralized, from the standpoint of being outside the dominant networks and political alliances of the Information Society, even though unified in their opposition to the powerful.

The crosscutting power of the Information Society thus erodes the industrially-based political and cultural movements such as labor and political parties. New identity movements arise. They make use of the same Information Society technologies to create communities of opposition and call into question the legitimacy of the State itself. Hence, the nation–state faces difficult times in the Information Society. It is undermined from outside (networked global capitalism) and from within (internal networks spreading horizontally across a nation and the globe).

Castells identifies several varieties of identity movements. Cultural communes are defensive identity movements that typically offer a communal haven based upon common religious values, collective memory, or even territory.

They include religious fundamentalisms (Christianity, Judaism, Islam, etc.) and cultural nationalisms that retreat into a closed society in order to cope (chap. 1).

A second type of identity movement specifically organizes against the new global order (chap. 2). Among these, Castells includes Mexico's *Zapatistas,* who effectively—even brilliantly—utilized media information networks and the Internet to organize a global network of solidarity in their struggle against the Mexican government during the early 1990s. The American patriot and militia movements and the Japanese apocalyptic movement *Aum Shinryko* are other examples. Both of these latter movements effectively employ telecommunications, particularly the Internet, to organize networks of resistance.

Last, what Castells calls "project identities," factions such as environmentalists and feminists, work to reconstruct society in their own images (chaps. 3 and 4). These social movements occupy the new arena of cultural struggle, their power deriving not from territorial or class-based strength but from their ability to utilize their own and other' informational networks to shape and re-code even the networks of the "Included."

Volume 3, subtitled "End of Millennium," incorporates global transformations and futuristic speculations into Castells's theories—a synthesis of trends, one might say, set into motion by the dialectic between the globalization of wealth and information and the localization of identity and legitimacy.

Castells begins this final volume with a review of the collapse of Soviet-style communism and, from there, movesto the transformation of Chinese-style communism to global capitalism (chap. 1). Here, as elsewhere, his ideology fails him. With both, he ignores the inherent contradictions of command economies as pointed out by Mises (1981, pp. 97–105)—that is, the insurmountable challenge of having no basis for "economic calculation." Instead, he attributes their demise and change to internal contradictions of statist societies or the perversions of their governing ideology, not the logic of action underlying their economies.

He also reviews several other regions of the world, some of which he labels "Black Holes of Informational Capitalism" (chaps. 2–4). These are pockets of social exclusion from which there is no escape in the Informational Society. Poverty-stricken regions of central Africa and urban ghettos are examples of these. Other regions fitting into the "Black Hole" category include the Pacific Rim and the new European Union. He even explores the sociocultural impact of a rising global criminal class.

By the conclusion of his trilogy, Castells's broad reach has touched topics ranging from media to international politics to liberation movements to criminality. He predicts that the revolution in informational technology has attained an unstoppable momentum. Information-getting will continue its path toward decentralization through the Internet and such mobile technologies as cell phones, which will expand the reach of capitalism into all corners of the globe. Governing the economy will be multilateral organizations comprising their own network of influence and power. G-7 and the International Monetary Fund are two examples. The United Nations and NATO will be deployed as their policemen against increasingly irrelevant but still threatening nation–states. Those people excluded by these changes will opt for criminality or identity resistance movements as their lives become more out of touch with the logic and movement of the information age.

THE DEATH OF SOCIOLOGY?

Permit me to preface my answer to this question by noting that Castells's work is impressive, to say the least. It is dazzling in its comprehensiveness, aggressive in its rethinking the nature of contemporary society, and at times breathtaking in its breadth. His insights, especially those about cultural resistance in volume 2, are original and insightful. In so many respects, he captures the dialectical tension between self-ordered liberty and the tyranny that marks our statist age.

And yet, the trilogy also reflects the same political bias and epistemological confusion that plagues so much of sociology. The result is almost a kind of myth that purports to ask and answer the pressing questions of the information age, but in actuality cannot.

Political bias, for instance, seeps inevitably into Castells's classifications and analyses, especially when he discusses social movements in the Network Society. He denies them any role other than reactionary. They are what Mises (1985, p. 254) labels "refractory rebels." Environmentalism, feminism, and other so-called "progressive" movements are labeled "project movements" that seek reform. But fundamentalisms (religious, political, etc.), no matter how proactive, are labeled defensive and resistant. One might just as easily reverse the labels. In that case, the configuration of social movements in the Network Society would be quite different. Fundamentalisms would then be interpreted as fighters for diversity and human liberty against the monolithic global society, with environmentalism and feminism as revolutionary movements trying to impose collectivist agendas that undermine a prosperous and free society. In other words, Castells too easily dismisses conservative movements as being regressive and too easily accepts liberal movements as

progressive. This bias colors how he conceptualizes the dynamics of the Network Society.[3]

The Information Age also reveals a misleading use of sources. Sometimes, as Steve Fuller (1999, p. 162) of the University of Durham points out, Castells marshals aggregate data without commenting on the shortcomings of comparing summary statistics across nations. In other cases, he accepts the reports of such highly politicized organizations as the Southern Poverty Law Center and treats their statistics as valid without explaining the center's criteria of classification. This misleads the uncritical reader into accepting methodological artifacts as statistical fact supporting what is a questionable interpretation.

And, third, the books offer examples of poor argumentation—usually when the aggregate statistics fail to support Castells's interpretation. For instance, in volume 2, Castells describes the rise of militia movements and attempts to show (based upon unquestioned Southern Poverty Law Center data) their spread across America. When even those figures do not support his argument, he then throws in the following: "If we consider the Christian Coalition to be a part of the [militia] movement, then Patriots are present in the suburbs of most large metropolitan areas" (vol. 2, p. 95). Castells creates—out of thin air and without scholarly proof—a presumed, if not desired similarity and treats it as accepted fact. This sleight of hand allows him to magically pull rabbits out of a hat that isn't even a hat.

These problems expose the fundamental weakness of sociology's claim to being a science, for they reveal the political undercurrents of so-called scientific sociology and its inability to remain "value-free." For example, Castells writes that, "[The Informational Society] is "based on the historical tension between the material power of abstract information processing and society's search for meaningful cultural identity" (as if society can "search" for anything; it is individuals who act, not collectivities). "Statism," he concludes, "seems to be unable to grasp the new history" (vol. 3, p. 67). He then goes on to add that information technology gives networks of people the power to circumvent statist policies and structures. This new form of politics will render the state irrelevant, if not obsolete.

So far, so good. Castells cannot bring himself to stop there, however. His Marxist "tool" fails him, just as Mises predicted it would. Marxism, like collectivist sociologies, inevitably leads to polylogism (Mises 1998, p. 75; Gordon

[3]Castells violates one of Mises's chief maxims. In *Human Action,* Mises comments that "Those writers who consider historical events as an arsenal of weapons for the conduct of their party feuds are not historians but propagandists and apologists. . . . [They must] be neutral with regard to any value judgments" (1998, p. 48; see also, pp. 10 and 879–81).

1993, pp. 123–25). Castells's brand is no exception. He assumes that people have no individual minds. They merely think and reflect what the group thinks. The included think one way, and the excluded another.

Castells's polylogism thus blinds him to the fact that individuals engage in purposeful action, and that the logic behind such action will be similar regardless of their respective social positions—not just those individuals in identity movements. Like the identity movements, the guardians of the Informational Society and the State will reassert their identities and control, since their action, too, is purposeful. He does not consider the ever-present likelihood that the State will not readily accept its delegitimacy at the hands of the networked society, especially from those at its margins. It may either attempt to recentralize informational networks by exerting power through regulation, or merge with other states to create a global mega-State fully overwhelming the Informational Society and quashing, as revolutionary threats, identity movements of all stripes.

Castells manifests the collectivist's desire that history and materialism have an inevitable momentum that predetermines individual action and choice. It is these impersonal forces, not individuals, they would have us to believe, that act on the world stage. Had Castells taken human action as his starting point, his analysis would not have fallen into these traps. It is, after all, individuals engaging in purposeful action who comprise society. Castells would have understood the information age differently—and truly. The New World Order then would be seen for what it is: a complex phenomenon resulting from the interplay of human choices toward desired ends.

Sociology, to be a comprehensive human science, must focus upon individuals and their actions, not the social structures and collectivities that supposedly produce them. To do otherwise is to remove humans from the picture and erroneously emphasize the group over the individual. In other words, to discount individual action is to lapse into a one-sided determinative collectivism. As Rothbard notes,

> The true science of man concentrates on the individual as of central, epistemological and ethical importance; the adherents of scientism, in contrast, lose no opportunity to denigrate the individual and submerge him in the importance of the collective. With such radically contrasting epistemologies, it is hardly sheer coincidence that the political views of the two opposing camps tend to be individualist and collectivist, respectively. (1997b, pp. 22–23)

Indeed, we are reminded of sociology's exhaustion when we look at Castells's methodological starting point. There is nothing new here. Like earlier

sociologists, he treats society and events as if they can be examined with the same lens as a natural scientist would employ. But as Rothbard, again, points out, the natural and social sciences must be distinctive in their methodologies for a basic reason: The properties of their subject matters are different (1997c, p. 34). Human behavior is not mechanistic because "humans engage in motivated, purposeful action," Rothbard adds. Hence, any thought that social science can produce exact laws similar to those of the physical sciences is illusory, even dangerous. And yet, the holistic and deterministic dialectic employed by Castells suggests rigid laws of social physics wherein inevitability, not possibility describes the path of history and the future. Castells cannot help it. Once he tosses out individuals and replaces them with collectivities, sociological fatalism is set into motion. Unfortunately, there is nothing new here either; it is simply the same old flavor of sociology but with a cyber-candy coating.

In *Human Action*, Mises explains the inevitable trap into which these holistic arguments fall. They do not begin, as they should, with the self-evident axiom that "action is always the action of individual men" (Mises 1998, p. 143). Rather, holistic theories start with society or institutions. Because they presume collectivities as primary instead of derivative of individual action, they force the individual to reconcile with and integrate into society, thus stripping away the concrete and practical truth that individuals, not collectivities, act. With that accomplished, deterministic and linear theories are easy to construct, for they subdue the individual's ends—despite being a free and active being—to society's. By absolutizing both material and collective spheres, Castells slips into applying a universal method of interpretation for what is only a narrow, particularistic portion of social life. When individuals are treated only as by-products of collective influences, that is easy to do. It removes the inconvenience that real people in the real world (not some theoretical construction) actually think and act because of a variety of motives. It is then but a short step to telling people what they ought to do.

This is why such systems are not "science" at all. As Mises notes a few pages later, these holistic theories require a move from science to metaphysics and theology (ibid., p. 145). So we should not be surprised that sociology, when it eliminates human action from its interpretation, becomes an exercise in social and political metaphysics masked as "scientific" analysis.

When that happens, sociology becomes myth, not science. It fits the events of the social world into a preconceived interpretive framework that imposes meaning upon them. Hence, using *The Information Age* as an example, there are all-powerful, arbitrary gods (the Informational Society) who rule our lives,

moving us about as if we were pawns in their vast chess game. There are good spirits (environmental and feminist movements) versus bad spirits (those controlling and uniting through the information networks). There are the misguided spirits, deluded by their own sinfulness (fundamentalisms and patriotic movements). There even is a soteriological element in the model: as Castells writes, "the most fundamental political liberation is for people to free themselves from uncritical adherence to theoretical or ideological schemes, to construct their practice on the basis of their experience" (vol. 3, p. 359). Alas, if only Castells had followed his own advice.

At the turn of the last century, sociology held great promise. It had its perversions, certainly (the excesses of Durkheim come to mind). But two of its intellectual giants, Max Weber and Alfred Schutz, actually proposed the nomothetic agenda prescribed by Rothbard. Both Weber and Schutz believed that no science of society is possible without beginning with the conscious choices of individuals resulting in purposeful human action.[4] Unfortunately, they have been in the minority as the discipline has increasingly been captured by two sides of the same epistemologically erroneous coin—the positivists and the Marxists—who have pushed sociology to near irrelevancy through their obsession with quantification or collectivization. Is it any wonder, then, that sociology is dying? It cannot even focus its attention on what it should study—human action.

Sociology has been reduced to propagating a myth. Mythology is not the path of life, however, it is static, if not regressive. It condemns men to ignorance, inaction, and passivity before the relentless oppression of its worldview. Mythology brings, in other words, decay and death, for it suffocates the dynamism that advances societies, that is, the creative and entrepreneurial impulse within every person. "Society," Mises reminds us, "lives and acts only in individuals; it is nothing more than a certain attitude [of cooperation] on their part." He concludes; neither the gods nor a mystical "Natural Force"

[4]It is no coincidence, then, that Mises comments favorably on both Weber and Schutz. Both were moving toward a science of human action that considered methodological individualism essential to its epistemology, and an actor's process of valuation key to understanding his action.

Schutz regularly joined in Mises's famous private seminar in Vienna (Mises 1978, p. 100).

Mises and Weber became good friends during the last year of World War I, when Weber lectured at the University of Vienna. Mises considered the early death of that "genius" a blow to Germany (ibid., pp. 70 and 104). In Mises's judgment, Weber probably would have employed the term "praxeology" had he known of it (Mises 1998, p. 126)— yet not without problems. His error comes in distinguishing rationally based praxeology from other types of praxeology. All human behavior is praxeological; what differs is the valuation toward particular ends. Mises also was critical of Weber's use of "ideal types" (Mises 1978, p. 123).

created society, it was created by mankind. Whether society shall continue to evolve or whether it shall decay lies—in the sense in which the causal determination of all events permits us to speak of free will—in the hand of man (Mises 1981, pp. 468–69).

And therein rests the lifeblood of any true sociology—the study of human action.[5]

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[5]Though beyond the scope of this review, an intriguing question is: why hasn't economics suffered the same fate as sociology in the twentieth century? It, too, welcomed Marxian thought and positivism, propagated myths, and succumbed to political ideology.

A hint toward an answer may rest in the fact that economics has its roots in Aristotelian realism, thus giving it a stronger mooring to the real world of human action. During its formative years, economics had a clearly articulated alternative, emphasizing praxeology, upon which subsequent scholars of "realist" convictions could draw upon to save the discipline from itself, so to speak. Rothbard points out that, in the late 1600s, Sir Dudley North's methodology for analyzing trade incorporated a praxeological method later to be picked up by Richard Cantillon, Jean-Baptiste Say, Nassau Senior, and eventually Ludwig von Mises (see, further, Rothbard [1995, p. 324]). Thus, economics has not imploded like sociology thanks to its proffering of a paradigm quick to refuse the fallacies of polylogism, holism, and positivism.

Sociology, in contrast, has not been so fortunate. Its philosophical foundation rests upon the French Enlightenment optimism of Rousseau, and its intellectual origins extend to the philosophies of the madman Auguste Comte and the revolutionary Karl Marx, neither particularly committed to methodological individualism (except when it concerned their own "genius"). Subsequent to them came the methodological holist Emile Durkheim, as anti-individualistic in his method as is possible. Hence, sociology's lack of a grounding in realism has made it susceptible to further holistic variations and, in a sense, myth-spinning.

Because of sociology's holistic, antirealist premises, new theories remain holistic despite changes in concepts or emphases, leaving few avenues for an alternative methodology to emerge and develop. Indeed, even this review illustrates the problem. To critique Castells's sociology requires leaving the discipline for the fully articulated praxeology found in Austrianism. Other recent examples may be found in the excellent work of Kenneth H. Mackintosh (1999a, pp. 67–77; 1998–1999, pp. 103–23) and his review of Infantino's *Individualism in Modern Thought: From Adam Smith to Hayek* (1999b, pp. 87–92). All of this suggests the rich potential for a sociology reformulated on praxeological principles.

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