JULY, 1967

VOL. IV, NO. 7

PERSUASION

VIEWS

PERSUASION GOES TO A PARTY

REVIEWS

CHURCH, STATE, AND ECONOMICS

a review of R.H. Tawney's
Religion and the Rise of Capitalism.....by Joan Kennedy Taylor

JOAN KENNEDY TAYLOR, editor

50¢
Persuasion

Goes to a Party
In late 1963, a group of New Yorkers who had become convinced that it might be possible to support *laissez-faire* capitalism from within the Republican Party and who were interested in supporting the candidacy of Barry Goldwater for President of the United States gathered together the requisite number of members, studied *Robert's Rules of Order*, wrote a club constitution, and applied for a charter from the New York State Association of Young Republican Clubs.

In early 1964, having received its charter, the Metropolitan Young Republican Club held its first public meeting and invited friends of the original charter group to join. Although it was formed during a specific political campaign, and although many people who were drawn to the Club during that campaign later became inactive, the Club was from the beginning unusual in political circles, as it was primarily devoted to political ideas rather than political action. The Club supported Barry Goldwater and other selected candidates because those candidates supported the ideals of *laissez-faire* capitalism in some measure, and the members' enthusiasm for these ideals did not fade with the passing of these candidates. Even today, every member is required to sign an affidavit stating that he wishes to work for the total separation of State and economics.

This June, the Metropolitan Young Republican Club once again rallied in support of an idea. Only one week after military conscription in the United States had been extended for four more years, the Club held a National Conference on Forced Service,
in Washington, D.C.

"Isn't it a little late to express opposition?" asked Club President David J. Dawson in his keynote speech. "No, it is just the right time. ... We will need all these four years—and very possibly more—to mount a full, intellectual opposition to the draft."

The Club's opposition to the draft was not new. In February of 1966, two unconnected events took place which were to affect the members' future activities profoundly. David J. Dawson started work on a series of articles on the draft which were to be published in *Persuasion*, beginning in April. And Howard Katz (who had just moved to New York City from Providence, R.I.) joined with a friend named David Baumann to institute a civil suit which sought to enjoin the President of the United States and other officials from enforcing the Universal Military Training and Service Act, on the ground that the Act was unconstitutional.

"Howie Katz had seen *Persuasion* in Providence," reminisces David Dawson. "When he came to New York, he dropped by the *Persuasion* office to take out a subscription, and ended up with information about the Metropolitan Young Republican Club."

One thing led rapidly to another. In no particular order, Howard Katz became a candidate for membership in the Club, and the Club formed a subcommittee called the Committee for the Abolition of the Draft. This Committee was often a committee of the whole of the entire Club.

By the end of June, the Committee had decided to handle the publicity for the Katz case, which
was to be heard in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. By July 12, the date of the hearing, a press list of several hundred newspapers, magazines, columnists, and radio and television broadcasters had been compiled, and a first news release had been readied. A subsequent news release was sent out all over the country with each significant legal development of the case. The Committee, through one of its Vice-Chairmen, Emilia Nordvedt, contacted groups in other areas of the country that might be interested in initiating local educational activity against the draft, supplied them with printed materials, and in some cases even lent out tape recordings of speeches. The case was discussed on several college campuses by various speakers, notably David Dawson.

In August, just as the District Court Judge, Judge Tyler, decided on technical grounds not to convene a three-judge court to rule on the constitutionality of the draft, *Persuasion* published an article on the case, "A Case Against Conscription," by Lawrence A. Scott. Mr. Scott has since moved to California, but was at that time a New York resident and Vice-Chairman of the Committee for the Abolition of the Draft. In August, also, Mr. Dawson was interviewed extensively about the case and about the work of the Committee on the Steve Allison Show, a Washington, D.C., radio show.

Later in 1966, Howard Katz' lawyer, Henry Mark Holzer accepted another draft case. *U.S. v. Wood* was a criminal case in which the defendant refused to be inducted upon receiving his draft notification. On the very day that Howard Katz had been standing before Judge Harold R. Tyler, Jr.,
in the Foley Square Court House in New York City, David Bradley Wood of Newton, Massachusetts, reported for induction to the Boston Army Base as ordered by his local draft board, but then refused to be inducted. While Judge Tyler was saying in dismay to Mr. Holzer, "You want to shoot down the whole Act? You'd certainly have us in a fine way if you succeeded," David Wood was being taken into custody as a criminal, facing a penalty of a possible five years in prison, and/or a fine of $10,000. Mr. Holzer took his case, and the Committee for the Abolition of the Draft agreed to support it also.

Toward the end of 1966, the Metropolitan Young Republican Club decided to raise a Legal Defense Fund to aid the Katz case and the Wood case, as well as similar cases that might arise in the future. Up to this time, the Committee for the Abolition of the Draft had successfully defrayed its own expenses for postage and paper by giving fund-raising parties to which members and friends of the Club were invited, and by selling copies of the briefs in the Katz case. Now it was thought that it might be possible to aid the cases even more directly.

And so it was. An appeal was filed with the United States Supreme Court in the Katz case on January 11, 1967. In order to file such an appeal, it is required that the plaintiffs have it commercially printed. The Legal Defense Fund of the Metropolitan Young Republican Club raised the money to pay for this printing bill in the Katz case. It was considered especially fitting that the Club members be the ones to finance this Supreme Court brief. All of the Committee's most active mem-
bers (and an overwhelming majority of the Club membership) took the stand that they did on the draft and were working for its repeal because they had been influenced by the philosophical work of Ayn Rand. And the Katz Supreme Court brief, by special permission, contained, in their entirety in an appendix, a lecture and three essays from Miss Rand's book, *The Virtue of Selfishness*. The lecture was "The Objectivist Ethics," and the essays were "Man's Rights," "Collectivized 'Rights,'" and "The Nature of Government." Thus the Club was instrumental in the first presentation of these concepts to the Supreme Court of the United States.

In both the Katz case and the Wood case, Mr. Holzer presented basically the same constitutional argument (the argument is discussed in some detail in "A Case Against Conscription," *Persuasion*, August, 1966). He held that any draft law, and specifically the current Universal Military Training and Service Act, was unconstitutional in that it violated both the Ninth Amendment guarantee of unenumerated rights and the Eighth Article of the so-called Nuremberg Charter, which as a treaty would have supremacy over any conflicting law of the land. The Ninth Amendment argument was the most fundamental one, and Mr. Holzer has stated, "I'm arguing that the Ninth Amendment brings the Declaration of Independence into the Constitution--the right to Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness." To give a solid base to his contention that the right to one's own life must of necessity be the most fundamental right of all, Mr. Holzer wished to discuss the philosophical basis for the concept of rights, and it is in this context that he found it necessary to cite the works
of Miss Rand.

In February of 1967, the *Katz* case was refused review by the Supreme Court, and some months later, David Wood's sentence of three years in prison (with a recommended parole after one year) was upheld, also without comment. The constitutionality of the draft in the face of a Ninth Amendment challenge was not upheld, and it was not denied.

But the work of the Committee for the Abolition of the Draft did not abate. In trying to publicize the *Katz* case, the Committee had succeeded in publicizing itself, also. A front-page article on February 2, 1967, in the *Village Voice* of New York City (perhaps one of the most influential newspapers, intellectually, in the country) was devoted to the work of the Committee, attempting to demonstrate that the Committee represented "The New Right," described by the *Voice* reporter as sharing with the New Left "a reaction against the manipulation of the individual without his consent." Although by no means totally consistent nor totally fair, the article did offer the following summary of what its author considered to be the similarities and differences between the New Left and the "New Right" (as represented by members of the Committee for the Abolition of the Draft):

"The New Left says people should be given what they need without having to be humiliated by welfare department rules and policing. They want the poor to control any poverty money they receive instead of having their activities restricted by Washington or local politicos. The assumption behind their view is that people are capable of man-
aging their own lives.

"The opposing radicals—the ones on the right—say that people are capable of managing their own lives and therefore don't need welfare. Behind this conclusion is a set of premises that add up to a more flattering view of man than that held by the humanists.

"They believe that man is a rational animal who can control his actions through reason, rather than an irrational animal who is driven by emotions, fears, and needs. They believe that man has free will and is not simply a helpless product of social and psychological determinism."

The Committee received several interested inquiries and some contributions as a result of this article.

On the weekend of April 14-16, the Princeton University Symposium on World Affairs held its annual Response weekend. These weekends have become an institution since they first started in 1961. The form is always the same. A theme is set, panels are formed on various topics relating to the theme, and speakers who are considered to be the most representative of various points of view are invited to appear on the panels. Literally thousands of people attend.

The theme of Response 1967 was "Man in the Maze of the Masses." In the course of examining what the official program characterized as "the plight of individual identity and freedom in the context of the mass society," panels discussed topics such as Censorship, Sexual Mores, Civil Disobedience—and the Draft.
Speakers on the Draft panel were George Reedy, former special assistant and part-time press secretary to President Johnson, and a member of the President's National Advisory Committee on Selective Service; George Willoughby, of the Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors; Tom Hayden, one of the founders of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS); and David J. Dawson, Chairman of the Committee for the Abolition of the Draft and President of the Metropolitan Young Republican Club (and, incidentally, publisher of *Persuasion*).

The conclusion which can be drawn from this fact is in our opinion a hopeful one. Here was a very small Young Republican Club, not long established, certainly not rich, represented at one of the intellectual events of the year at an Ivy League University. Why? Simply because they were working constructively for an idea. It may not be as hard as one might think, to start to change a culture.

So, on June 23, 1967, despite the fact that the draft had just been extended for four more years, *Persuasion* went to a party, along with about 110 people from all over the United States. It was the National Conference on Forced Service, presented by the Metropolitan Young Republican Club at the Hotel America Washington, located in downtown Washington, D.C.

The Conference opened with an evening-long reception and cocktail party, which served such lavish canapes that many people substituted them for dinner. Others preferred to combine the cocktail party with a visit to some of the sights of Washington, either earlier or later.
On Saturday, an opening speech was given by David Dawson, followed by a choice of five seminars on various aspects of the draft. A long break for lunch gave people time for a dip in the hotel pool, or more sightseeing. Many groups lunched beside the pool at the hotel's Hawaiki Pool Club. The afternoon session began with a speech by Phyllis Tate Holzer, who had been associated with her husband, Henry Mark Holzer, as an attorney on the Katz and Wood cases. She spoke on the constitutional history of the draft and the important aspects of the Ninth Amendment challenge to it. The morning seminars were then repeated. In the evening there was a banquet, and a speech by Dr. Leonard Peikoff, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn and Associate Lecturer in Philosophy at the Nathaniel Branden Institute.

On Sunday morning there was an unscheduled addition to the program. So many people wanted to hear the seminars they had not heard that tape recordings which had been made the previous day were played, starting at 8 o'clock, for those who wished to listen. This was followed by brunch, and the Conference was then officially closed.

The seminars, which were of course the heart of the Conference, were five in number. Dr. Martin Anderson, Associate Professor at the Columbia University Graduate School of Business and author of the well-known indictment of the federal urban-renewal program, *The Federal Bulldozer*, gave a seminar on the economics of the draft, in which he showed that the Department of Defense had analyzed its own statistics as to the feasibility of a volunteer army somewhat misleadingly, and that such an armed force would not be exorbitant in cost. David J. Dawson gave a seminar on the principles of effective argumentation, with
particular emphasis on the subject matter of the draft. Robert Hessen, Associate in Economics at the Columbia University Graduate School of Business, analyzed and criticized proposals to use the draft for non-military purposes, showing how they were all logical extensions of the principle of the draft itself. Henry Mark Holzer discussed the specific provisions of the Universal Military Training and Service Act and the way in which the Selective Service System actually operated. He pointed out that few people are aware of those provisions of the Act which might benefit them, or of the appeals procedure within the Selective Service System. Dr. Leonard Peikoff had the most crowded seminar, both for the morning and the afternoon sessions, and he discussed the relationship of philosophic theories of the nature of value to advocacy of, or opposition to, the draft.

Now that the party is over, what will happen next? Many of the achievements of the Committee for the Abolition of the Draft were really the achievements of individual members. Without Howard Katz's perseverance; or the articles and talks by David Dawson; or the organizational skill of Judith Rosenzweig, who was Chairman of the Conference itself; or the condensations of the briefs and the multitudinous correspondence of Emilia Nordvedt; or the tireless and lucid work of Larry Scott; or the endless time put in by Berlin Bosworth, second Vice-Chairman of the Committee and Secretary of the Club; or the hours of work by all the committee members, spent addressing envelopes, giving parties, printing news releases, planning programs, and running the Conference itself—without all these people, it would surely be a different story. And yet, all of these individual efforts and achievements have built not only individual reputations but the reputation of an organization. There is a joint record that has been made,
which will persist even though many of these individuals may resign, move away, or turn primarily to other interests. Their individual actions have been magnified and made in a sense permanent by being taken in the context of the Committee.

And what of the next four years? There is even more intellectual work to be done. In his opening speech at the Conference, David Dawson raised just a few of the questions which will have to be answered before we can expect the American people to fully discard the idea of a draft.

What is a proper foreign policy for the government of a free society? What are the objective war powers necessary to the Chief Executive? What are the standards for setting up treaty relationships with other governments? To what degree may the U.S. seek to protect its citizens abroad? What are the characteristics of a fully volunteer professional army? What is the proper strategy for military forces whose only purpose is defense? What is the proper relationship of a free society's government to other governments which do not fundamentally recognize the nature of the rights of man? Why is a volunteer armed force superior at waging defensive war? Studies, discussions, debates, and public attention are needed, on all these questions.

The avenue of constitutional challenge to the draft seems to have been explored to the full. But although the Katz and Wood cases are over, the Metropolitan Young Republican Club is not about to give up the issue of the draft. Now there are other avenues to explore. Whoever tomorrow's members of the Committee for the Abolition of the Draft may be, there will be plenty for them to do. And they probably will do it.

And when the draft is abolished in the United States, they can go on to something else.
THE SPEAKERS

David J. Dawson

Dr. Martin Anderson

Dr. Leonard Peikoff

Robert Hessen

Henry Mark Holzer

Phyllis Tate Holzer
lunch at the Hawaiki Pool Club: Dr. Martin Anderson, David J. Dawson, Joan Kennedy Taylor (Mrs. David Dawson) and Mr. and Mrs. George Silverman of New York City

Bea Hessen, Eva Lieberman, George Lieberman and Robert Hessen

David J. Dawson, Lewis Little and Judith Rosenzweig, Conference Chairman
PARTIES

Henry Holzer and Howard Katz discussing old times

Joan Kennedy Taylor (r.),
Editor of Persuasion

Howard Hood, Vice-Chairman of the Conference,
toasts the future with Dr. Leonard Peikoff
THE SEMINARS

attentive students in a seminar

Persuasion author Lawrence A. Scott ("A Case Against Conscription," August, 1966) looks for a seat

Emilia Nordvedt, Vice-Chairman of the Committee for the Abolition of the Draft, pauses in her note taking

Persuasion author Aubrey Robinson ("My Name is Ishmael: Some Thoughts on Racial Collectivism," December, 1966) records a seminar

Dr. Martin Anderson (r.) ponders a question raised by George Lieberman of New York City

photos by Earl W. Good
"The criticism which dismisses the concern of Churches with economic relations and social organization as a modern innovation finds little support in past history. What requires explanation is not the view that these matters are part of the province of religion, but the view that they are not." (p. 228)

So states the author of this book, the late, distinguished Professor R.H. Tawney, who taught economic history at Glasgow and Oxford and was a member of the British Labour Party for fifty years. This book is his explanation of how the view arose that economic and social matters are not part of the province of religion. Mr. Tawney equates that view with the idea that riches are the ultimate goal in life, and says, "Such a philosophy, plausible, militant, and not indisposed, when hard pressed, to silence criticism by persecution, may triumph or may decline. What is certain is that it is the negation of any system of thought or morals which can, except by a metaphor, be described as Christian. Compromise is as impossible between the Church of Christ and the idolatry of wealth, which is the practical religion of capitalist societies, as it was between the Church and the State idolatry of the Roman Empire." (p. 235)

What this book might have been titled, then, is Why Did Religion Allow Capitalism to Rise? The answer, according to Mr. Tawney, is to be found at least in part in the economic and political turmoil of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England—although he is loathe to explain history by either a one-sided materialistic or a one-sided "spiritual" approach. "History is a stage," he says, "where forces which
are within human control contend and cooperate with forces which are not." (p. 230)

Before discussing the background and history of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century religious thought in England (which is what this book is concerned with in scholarly detail) it may be clarifying to establish what Mr. Tawney is referring to as "capitalism." He does not mean by the term a political system based on rights, nor does he mean a laissez-faire economic theory, nor does he mean a complicated industrial system based on credit and contract, though this last is perhaps closest to what he has in mind. The nearest he comes to a definition is the following:

If capitalism means the direction of industry by the owners of capital for their own pecuniary gain, and the social relationships which establish themselves between them and the wage-earning proletariat whom they control, then capitalism had existed on a grand scale both in medieval Italy and in medieval Flanders. If by the capitalistic spirit is meant the temper which is prepared to sacrifice all moral scruples to the pursuit of profit, it has been only too familiar to the saints and sages of the Middle Ages. (p.76)

This description seems so woefully inadequate, to any advocate of a society based on rights, that one is tempted to find it unrecognizable, and call the book, Religion and the Rise of What's-Its-Name. But in any case, it seems safe to agree with Tawney (whether or not we consider that this description names the essentials of capitalism) that what he is describing is both inimical to what is generally thought of as the spirit of Christianity, and is an attitude that is older than the Reformation and the Industrial Revolution.
There are, according to Professor Tawney, four attitudes which it is possible for religious opinion to adopt "toward the world of social institutions and economic relations." These are (1) an attitude of ascetic aloofness—there can be no dealing with the concerns of the world and they must be totally escaped; (2) an attitude of "indifferentism"—religion is one thing and business is another, and morality has nothing to say about economic relations; (3) an attitude of secular reform; and (4) an attitude of mingled acceptance and criticism, in which religion will "tolerate and amend, welcome the gross world of human appetites, as the squalid scaffolding from amid which the life of the spirit must rise, and insist that this also is the material of the Kingdom of God. To such a temper, all activities divorced from religion are brutal, or dead, but none are too mean to be beneath or too great to be above it, since all, in their different degrees, are touched with the spirit which permeates the whole." (p. 23) It is this attitude that Tawney finds to be most characteristic of medieval thought. In order for the search for pecuniary gain to cease being "squalid scaffolding" and to become respectable, since there is no room for any positive endorsement of economic activities in Mr. Tawney's list of possible attitudes, a change had to be made, from the general attitude described, to a general attitude of indifferentism. And it is this change which this book discusses and documents.

In the Middle Ages, religion, it was assumed, embraced all aspects of human life. This led in turn to what Tawney calls "the functional view of class organization," that is, the view that society is an organism analogous to the human body, with different classes representing different limbs or organs, and performing different functions. The lower classes (peasants and craftsmen) represented the arms and feet and did the work, the ruler was the head, and so forth. According to this view, it was as impossible for a per-
son to change his status as it would be for a foot to become a head. And according to this view, if a person was born rich, that was part of his function and entailed corresponding obligations. But if he became rich through his own efforts, he must have done it at someone else's expense, and must have tried to change his status in the bargain.

It follows that the chief social sin of the Middle Ages was avarice. Avarice led to usury, a term used to indicate, not merely the lending of money for interest, but a variety of so-called economic evils: selling goods at a profit, monopoly, charging high rents, and deviating from the established "just price." The problem was that the medieval mind could not find a place for the merchant in the established system. "Finance and trade . . . were not easily interpreted in terms of social function." (p. 28) They were necessary, of course—the papacy denounced usury but could not do without it; kings and popes used the international banking houses. A society of credit was beginning, and nothing could stop it, any more than excommunication could stop the local money-lenders. But still, the economic ethics of the time held profit as separate from honest labor, and it was suspect. Livelihood is one thing, but to medieval minds "the unpardonable sin is that of the speculator or the middleman, who snatches private gain by the exploitation of public necessities." (p. 38) This doctrine has, according to Tawney, more modern heirs. "The true descendant of the doctrines of Acquinas is the labor theory of value. The last of the Schoolmen was Karl Marx." (pp. 38-39)

What does Mr. Tawney think of the system of economic ethics whose final exponent was Karl Marx? "So merciless is the tyranny of economic appetites, so prone to self-aggrandizement the empire of economic interests, that a doctrine which confines them to their proper sphere, as the servant, not the master of civ-
ilization, may reasonably be regarded as among the pregnant truisms which are a permanent element in any sane philosophy. Nor is it, perhaps, as clear today as it seemed a century ago, that it has been an unmixed gain to substitute the criterion of economic expediency, so easily interpreted in terms of quantity and mass, for the conception of a rule of life superior to individual desires and temporary exigencies, which was what the medieval theorist meant by 'natural law.' (p. 59) 'What the medieval theorist meant, and what the Marxist means, and what Tawney seems to agree with, is political laws enforcing "a rule of life superior to individual desires and temporary exigencies." In other words, he holds that it has perhaps been a mistake to substitute economic freedom of choice for a planned, government-regulated economy. Which is, of course, the view of the Labour Party to which he belonged.

The need that kings and popes had for bankers caused banking to thrive in the late Middle Ages, and the discovery of new lands in the Americas brought treasure to Europe. This did not seem to raise the general standard of living—on the contrary, wars broke out, and governments were poorer than before. But the bankers had prospered. This was the background against which Martin Luther challenged the power of the Catholic Church, and preached reform. But he did not, contrary to the opinion of many scholars (says Tawney), criticize the economic ethics of the Church. On the contrary, according to Tawney, Luther was attacking laxity and corruption, and was even harsher on usury than the established authorities. However, he was willing to "maintain the content of medieval social teaching, while rejecting its sanctions," (p. 88) which Tawney says was not a consistent position.

After Luther came Calvin, who was to be a much stronger influence, particularly in England. Calvin lived in a time of economic complexity, relative to the med-
ieval period, and his social teaching recognized that reality. He no longer mistrusted all economic activity. Riches are not the enemy of religion, only their misuse is. Credit is normal. Possibly "the very qualities which economic success demanded—thrift, diligence, sobriety, frugality—were themselves, after all, the foundation, at least, of the Christian virtues." (p. 97) But these virtues were still charity and brotherhood in economic matters, and required community regulation and enforcement. "As both the teaching of Calvin himself, and the practice of some Calvinist communities suggest, the social ethics of the heroic age of Calvinism savored more of a collectivist dictatorship than of individualism." (p. 100)

Some historians argue that the doctrine of _laissez faire_ was the result of the spread of Calvinism among the middle classes, but Tawney hastens to point out that if it did, "it did so, like tolerance, by a route which was indirect." (p. 100) To implement Calvin's social ethic, the government of Geneva became a combined Church and State, which primarily emphasized discipline. People might not gamble, swear, dress ostentatiously, and above all, engage in unregulated economic transactions. The penalties imposed were severe. A child was beheaded for striking its parents. The result of a social doctrine which made some accommodation to the moral acceptability of an economic life was thus a greater and more efficient tyranny than that practiced by the medieval church, who doubted that a man of business could be saved, and saw nothing in economic transactions but cheating and profiteering: "the struggle of wolves over carrion." (p. 23)

During the Reformation in England, the Church of England, which replaced the Catholic Church, took a position entirely consistent with the Christian view of preceding ages. However, economic conditions had changed. To those in power, it was now apparent that trade was necessary, that England needed a woolen in-
dustry, and possibly a linen industry. The view of the Church was that the government should be a "pious mercantilist," and encourage and regulate these new activities itself. But some Englishmen were more concerned with property and economic self-interest than with adhering to the teachings of the Church on economic matters. The Reformation in England was, according to Tawney, a political success but a social disaster. He puts it this way: "The upstart aristocracy of the future had their teeth in the carcass, and, having tasted blood, they were not to be whipped off by a sermon." (p. 122) Shocked churchmen realized that what they had to attack was an idea. "They sprang to the attack, less of spoilation or tyranny, than of a creed which was the parent of both. That creed was that the individual is absolute master of his own, and, within the limits set by positive law, may exploit it with a single eye to his pecuniary advantage, unrestrained by any obligation to postpone his own profit to the well-being of his neighbors, or to give account of his actions to a higher authority. It was, in short, the theory of property which was later to be accepted by all civilized communities." (pp. 125-126) Against this, the Church of England invoked the concept of property which had been held by the Schoolmen (and later, as Tawney points out, by Karl Marx), that the use of property "was limited at every turn by the rights of the community and the obligations of charity." (p. 127) Usury was still dealt with by ecclesiastical courts, which also did such things as "punishing the man who refused to 'pay the poor men's box.'" (p. 138) And the Tudor Privy Councils established an elaborate system of economic controls. "Wages, the movement of labor, the entry into a trade, dealings in grain and in wool, methods of cultivation, methods of manufacture, foreign exchange business, rates of interest—all are controlled, partly by Statute, but still more by the administrative activity of the Council." (p. 142) 

So we see that the first wave of the Reformation left
untouched the medieval approach to economic ethics, although accommodations were made to increasing economic activity. Where in medieval times the Church controlled and punished most economic crimes directly, the economy now became more a matter of State control—albeit State control with strong religious overtones. "The history of the rise of individual liberty—to use a question-begging phrase—in economic affairs," writes Tawney, "follows somewhat the same course as does its growth in the more important sphere of religion, and is not unconnected with it. The conception of religion as a thing private and individual does not emerge until after a century in which religious freedom normally means the freedom of the State to prescribe religion, not the freedom of the individual to worship God as he pleases. The assertion of economic liberty as a natural right comes at the close of a period in which . . . the supernatural sanction had been increasingly merged in doctrines based on reasons of state and public expediency." (p. 149)

The Elizabethan age was an age of economic expansion. Foreign trade, banking, investment in textiles and mining all led to an almost modern money-market. And people were becoming economic individualists "without the formal enunciation of any theory of economic individualism." (p. 151) They disliked government price-fixing, and they were formulating a political approach to the sanctity of property. "By the seventeenth century, a significant revolution had taken place. 'Nature' had come to connote, not divine ordinance, but human appetites, and natural rights were invoked by the individualism of the age as a reason why self-interest should be given free play." (pp. 152-53) The State began to reverse its economic policies. The Church offered little guidance for new problems. And indifferentism, the theoretic separation of Church and economics, began to arise.

And against this background, the Puritans arose. Early
Puritans held, as strongly as did the varieties of Christianity that preceded them, that faith implies certain ethical standards, that business should be a public service, that property primarily entailed obligations. They did not rush to the idea that business is business and is none of religion's business. But the power of the State was not yet theirs, and therefore they resented the existing enforcement of beliefs which in principle they agreed with. "The transition from the idea of a moral code enforced by the Church, which had been characteristic of early Calvinism, to the economic individualism of the later Puritan movement took place, in fact, by way of the democratic agitation of the Independents." (p. 182)

But even this was by default. "The capitalist spirit," writes Tawney, "is as old as history, and was not, as has sometimes been said, the offspring of Puritanism. But it found in certain aspects of later Puritanism a tonic which braced its energies and fortified its already vigorous temper. At first sight no contrast could be more violent than that between the iron collectivism, the almost military discipline, the remorseless and violent rigors practiced in Calvin's Geneva, and preached elsewhere, if in a milder form, by his disciples, and the impatient rejection of all traditional restrictions on economic enterprise which was the temper of the English business world after the Civil War. ... Like traits of individual character which are suppressed till the approach of maturity releases them, the tendencies in Puritanism, which were to make it later a potent ally of the movement against the control of economic relations in the name either of social morality or the public interest did not reveal themselves till political and economic changes had prepared a congenial environment for their growth." (pp. 188-189)

The Puritan, according to Tawney, "sacrificed fraternity to liberty." (p. 191) He derived from his sense
of responsibility for his own soul a theory of individual rights, and he admired business enterprise as being in the service of God and considered poverty an indication of moral failure. This made him susceptible to influence by political theories which were then developing, theories which were soon to reach their final formulation in the political writings of John Locke. The Puritans had a brief fling with power under Oliver Cromwell's Commonwealth, but when it was overthrown they were returned to the position of dissenting minority and the collectivistic elements which they had inherited from Calvin dropped away. Finally, "Individualism in religion led insensibly, if not quite logically, to an individualist morality, and an individualist morality to a disparagement of the significance of the social fabric as compared with personal character." (p. 211)

Tawney ends his discussion of the Puritan Movement with an account of the doleful effect of what he considers the abandonment of idealism to money-making in the treatment of the English poor. No longer was charity a virtue—beggars were whipped, vagrants were put to work, the Elizabethan Poor Law remained in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries an inadequate stop-gap, originally conceived but as the last link in a chain of brotherly measures which also included the prevention of evictions and price control, also aimed at preventing poverty. He tells us that pauperism increased between 1640 and 1660, and implies that it perhaps continued to do so in succeeding centuries, as if nineteenth-century England were manifestly less populated and poorer than Elizabethan England. He even tells us that "Bishop Berkeley, with the conditions of Ireland before his eyes, suggested that 'sturdy beggars should . . . be seized and made slaves to the public for a certain term of years,'" and adds, "When philanthropists were inquiring whether it might not be desirable to re-establish slavery, it was not to be expected
that the sufferings of the destitute would wring their hearts with social compunction." (p. 224) All of this is to indicate the evil consequences which befell from the separation of religion and economics.

But were the consequences so evil? It is easy to establish that nineteenth-century England was in fact vastly more prosperous, healthier, and more populous than the England of two or three centuries earlier. Many more people survived, the average life expectancy was increased, and the poor were certainly no poorer than they had been in the past. Why then would a scholar like Tawney be so concerned with the remaining poor's condition that he sounds at times as if he is tempted to turn back the clock to the Middle Ages, where, at least, for all the lack of progress, "the denunciation of vices implies that they are recognized as vicious"? (p. 33) Why do Tawney, and men like him, consider the Middle Ages in some sense superior to ages obviously richer, more sanitary, and with more hope, mobility, and opportunity for those at the bottom of the scale? Tawney gives just a hint of what the answer might be.

"In the little communities of peasants and crafts­men which composed medieval England," he says, "all, when Heaven sent a bad harvest, had starved together, and the misery of the sick, the orphan and the aged had appeared as a personal calamity, not a social problem." (p. 216) What this implies is that the element to be resented is not that the poor were poorer (which was not true), but that the rich were richer. If one person starves, all should starve; it is not a cause for rejoicing that only one starves now where ten did yesterday, it is a reproach. If five men are trapped in a pit and they huddle together until they die, this is ethical; this is the brotherhood of the Middle Ages. But if one man should manage to climb out, he is because
of that very fact considered a monster. He should presumably starve with his brothers.

It is interesting in this respect to notice Tawney's scorn of individualism. He is not saying merely, as other opponents of capitalism have said, that the individual should not survive at the expense of his fellows, and that that is what capitalism will lead to. Tawney is saying that the individual has no right to survive without his brothers, even if his downfall could not benefit them at all.

One can derive from this an attitude toward property which would be logically consistent—nobody should have any property until everyone has. And that in fact seems also to be Tawney's position. The individualistic concept of ownership, he says, "denied both the existence and the necessity of a moral title. . . . Once accepted, it was to silence the preaching of all social duties save that of submission. If property be an unconditional right, emphasis on its obligations is little more than the graceful parade of a flattering, but innocuous, metaphor. For, whether the obligations are fulfilled or neglected, the right continues unchallenged and indefeasible." (p. 127)

Advocates of a secular political theory based on the rights of man may well take a long look at the ethics involved in hating a man merely for being safer and happier than all of his ancestors were, and than some of his contemporaries are. If Christianity requires that we all huddle in a pit, perhaps it is capitalism that must be indifferent to Christianity, and not vice versa.

—Joan Kennedy Taylor