Views, Reviews and PERSUASION

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Alice went through a looking glass into a wonderland of mystery, strange delights, and illogic. She swam in a pool of tears, ran a race of indeterminate length in no specific direction, attended a tea party with a hare and a dormouse, and met Humpty Dumpty. Alice's fairy tale is fanciful fun for young and old alike. It has a bizarre quality welcome on a child's bookshelf. But when the same bizarre quality appears in a speech by a U.N. official, there is cause for alarm. The world is not wonderland—not yet, at any rate.

On October 23, 1964, a New York Times headline read as follows: "U.N. Chief Urges Account By Khrushchev of Ouster; He Hails Ex-Soviet Leader and Voices Belief
Moscow Will Continue His Policies--Praises Successors." U Thant "voiced warm praise for the ousted Soviet leader as an effective worker for world peace and expressed confidence that the new regime would continue Mr. Khrushchev's policy of reduced cold war pressure and efforts to improve relations with the West. . . . He continued: 'I still believe that he [Khrushchev] will be long remembered as a man who tried his best to implement the principle of peaceful coexistence, and if I may say so, he did so with some degree of success in that he had been able to convince a considerable segment of public opinion in the West of his sincerity.'"

Evidently U Thant is convinced, I am not.

In fact, it seemed to me that this international leader had little more regard for the use of language than Humpty Dumpty of Alice's fairy tale:

"I don't know what you mean by 'glory,'" Alice said.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. "Of course you don't—till I tell you. I meant, 'there's a nice knock-down argument for you!"
"But 'glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knock-down argument,'" Alice objected.
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master—that's all."

In a fairy tale, Humpty Dumpty can assert that black is white and get away with it. Even at that, however, Humpty Dumpty fell! All the king's horses and all the king's men. . . .

How can U Thant hail as a lover of peace a ruthless dictator of an enslaved people? Is black black or isn't it? Why didn't this article cause an angry barrage of letters-to-the-editor in protest? Perhaps all the king's men are blind, or have just given up the idea that words should have meanings not subject to the whims of any speaker.

Is it possible that U Thant has forgotten: the brutal bloodbath in Hungary (1956), Khrushchev's shoe-banging at the U.N. (1960), the construction of the Berlin Wall (1961), establishment of Soviet missile bases in Cuba (1961)?

Are these the actions of an "effective worker for world peace"? Would men and women dig tunnels, climb walls, chloroform their children, and risk death to escape the clutches of an "effective worker for world peace"? Why were Soviet citizens afraid to comment when the peace lover was dethroned? The New York Times (October 25, 1964) reported one Russian's comments, "Things are complicated and one wants to think them over before sounding off. . . . The changes might effect one's job, . . . There is a certain discipline that we are used to, . . . About
things like these one talks to one's friends and certainly not to foreigners." Is it "discipline" or is it slavery?

If the dictator who sent tanks into the streets of Budapest can be praised as a sincere peace lover in the forum of the United Nations, what are our national leaders: predatory warmongers? Alice was right—the question is whether you can make words mean so many different things.

Putting aside semantics, an examination of the history of the concept "peaceful coexistence" is revealing. In his book (to which the following page numbers refer) The Soviet Design For a World State (Columbia U. Press, 1960), Dr. Eliot R. Goodman presents voluminous and conclusive proof that peaceful coexistence has always been considered to be one form (and an extremely effective one) of the war against capitalism by the Soviets. Lenin understood the advantages of compromise with the West as a means of furthering the cause of socialism. He stated in 1918, "We must make use of this breathing spell, which circumstance has given us, to heal the wounds that war has inflicted on the social organism of Russia." (p. 165) He urged Soviet leaders to make compromises to further their own ends.

Stalin, at the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR on December 30, 1922, viewed "peaceful coexistence" as a method to achieve "the amalgamation of the toilers of all countries into a World Socialist Soviet Republic." (p. 168) Lenin earlier that year pointed out the most important aspect of the "breathing spell"—the necessity of trading with capitalist countries in order for Russia to grow stronger economically. "... Trade with capitalist countries is absolutely essential for us (so long as they have not yet collapsed)." (p. 170)

In November 1947, four months prior to the Communist coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia, E.A. Korovin stated, "The Soviet people know that time is working in their favor and that each additional year of peaceful coexistence of the two systems, the socialist and the capitalist, strengthens the former and undermines the latter." (p. 179)

Since most of the Soviet economic effort was turned into the production of capital goods and a military machine, periods of active revolutionary activity (warfare, cold or hot) were a great strain on their economy. The breathing spell afforded by periods of peaceful coexistence allowed the Soviets to gain enough strength to fight the non-communist world at a later date, and to exploit the divisions in the non-communist community of nations.

As late as 1952 the International Economic Conference held in Moscow cried for more trade with Western countries. "The Conference abounded in assurances of the possibility of peaceful coexistence, insisting that 'differences in economic and social systems need not be an obstacle to the expansion of international economic relations.'" (p. 181)
During Khrushchev's régime, the concept of peaceful coexistence was extended—the breathing spells got longer, perhaps, but their purpose remained the same. In November 1955, Khrushchev stated, "We are confident that, even as things are now, in peaceful competition between the capitalist and socialist systems, it is we, socialism, that will win. . . . We have never abandoned, and never will abandon, our political line, which was mapped by Lenin." (p. 87) As Dr. Goodman states, "To those who remain in doubt of Soviet intentions, one can only say that candor is, indeed, the best form of deception."

Peaceful coexistence, under Khrushchev, became not just one device of world conquest, but the major device. It had worked well, after all. Khrushchev exploited two things: man's basic fear of war, and his longing for a peaceful world. He dealt in economic trade by intimidation, thus keeping his country economically alive by being a parasite on capitalist wealth. Also, by means of subtle influence upon neutral countries in the U.N., he showed his so-called love of peace by offering these weaker nations (and the frightened larger ones) the false alternative of peaceful coexistence or war: trade, or flight. They fell for it. In addition, he worked diligently to separate the NATO nations from one another. The result of these activities is that the NATO nations "now find themselves under the shadow of a potential Soviet-Afro-Asian majority." (p. 393)

Note that the crucial element in the success of the scheme of peaceful coexistence is the willingness of its victims to help it succeed. Russia needed trade and economic ties, capitalist countries provided them. We are still providing them—recall the wheat deal of 1963. Parasitism in the animal world depends upon a host willing to afford subsistence to a parasite. Parasitism in world affairs depends upon the same willingness—capitalism must produce in order that communism can plunder. One wonders how Western leaders have gone so long evading the meaning of the actions and words of Soviet leaders.

Existing peaceably in the world should be a value to all nations, but not peaceful coexistence at any price. Peace is an absolute state, not a conditional permission granted on the terms of one nation.

Every citizen of the United States who is a true lover of peace must re-examine his view of the United Nations and the role the U.S. plays in it. Russia has flaunted its aggression in the face of a U.N. Charter which is full of phrases about peace. It has worked actively for the admission of Red China, whose entire population lives in slavery. It supplies arms, technical assistance, and agents to subversive groups all over the world in an effort to overthrow governments. Its major goal—its stated goal—is world domination to be achieved at the expense of every productive man on earth. The U.N. and the U.S. are too terrified to take action against this menace. Russia counts on this terror.

As David Lawrence wrote in The Herald Tribune of December 3, 1964, "The
real issue is whether the free nations of the world are going to continue to pussyfoot and flounder in their relations with the Soviet Union instead of coming out in the open and setting forth the true facts about Soviet hostility to freedom and peace in the world."

This exposition of the true facts should also be the prime responsibility of the U.N. Secretary-General, if he is truly interested in peace. We must demand that he, above all others, use language in a precise manner. Peace means peace, not walls erected between slaves and free men. The fact that there was an absence of total war during the seven-year period of Khrushchev's reign does not mean that he was an "effective worker for world peace."

Humpty Dumpty's way of dealing with reality is to try to create it by playing with words. U Thant can call a red menace a peace lover, but he and the world will suffer (and are suffering) the consequences. Black is not white and never will be. Pretending that it can morally helps the world become Red all over.

--Joyce Jones

REVIEWS

TRANSACTIONS IN POWER

_The Making of the President 1960_,
by Theodore H. White, Pocket Books, Inc. 1961

On Tuesday, November 8, 1960, 68,832,818 (as of December 17, 1960) Americans went to the polls to cast their vote for the President of the United States. The choice was between two men: John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon, as candidates of the two major parties.

It is, of course, no secret that Kennedy won the election. But in the fall of 1959, his hopes for winning were very slight. In his own Democratic Party, no less than four other men of wider experience and more fame were thought to have a better chance. In the Republican Party, Richard Nixon was considered a shoo-in for the nomination and an unbeatable candidate for the office of President. Only Nelson Rockefeller challenged his right to the nomination.

What, then, happened between 1959 and Election Day 1960? How did Kennedy win?

_The Making of the President 1960_ does not fully answer these questions, perhaps because the author is a journalist. Although he is perceptive—especially in the areas of psychology and motivation—he leaves any overall interpretation of the
events to the reader. He characterizes his book as "the effort of a contemporary reporter to catch the mood and the strains, the weariness, elation and uncertainties" of the men who set their sights on the office of the Presidency. In this effort he succeeds admirably. All the excitement—the furor—the heartbeat—the hard work—of the campaign is captured in these pages.

"The root question of American politics," says Mr. White, "is always: Who's the Man to See? To understand American politics is, simply, to know people, to know the relative weight of names—who are heroes, who are straw men, who controls, who does not. But to operate in American politics one must go a step further—one must build a bridge to such names, establish a warmth, a personal connection."

The book tells the story of seven men—John Kennedy, Richard Nixon, Lyndon Johnson, Nelson Rockefeller, Hubert Humphrey, Adlai Stevenson and Stuart Symington—in the throes of political ambition. It begins with the first stirrings in the camps of both Democrats and Republicans, when the hopes of these seven men were first verbalized to their friends and associates. The initial focus of these men was on the first climax of the elective process: the Party nominations. To win, each of these men had to concern himself with marshalling the forces within his own party that could win him the nomination: the forces of money, friendship, loyalty and influence.

The planning, the calculation, the strategy—all were handled differently by these seven men. Each man had to analyze his strengths and weaknesses, to use one and overcome the other. How each man did this depended on his personality and character, his organization and his "political instinct" (his ability to turn events to political advantage).

Kennedy demonstrated his ability to use situations to his advantage during the primaries in Wisconsin and West Virginia, when the religious issue became an important factor in the race for the Presidency. He dealt with it skillfully—and in the process completely cut off Humphrey's chance for the nomination. Humphrey's character and strategy is revealed as ineffectual, bumbling and actually comical in several instances.

Where Humphrey was ineffectual, Stevenson proved indecisive. "He felt the Party must beat Nixon, the country would be unsafe in Nixon's hands." But as for the nomination, "He would not demand it again, nor would he reach for it. Nor would he declare himself out of the race. He was not trying to stop anyone, or help anyone—why was not all this clear?"

Stevenson loyalists would not give up. A Stevenson campaign was waged without him. The campaign was taken right to the Democratic Convention, and still Stevenson refused to commit himself. Crowds of supporters roared and yelled "We want Stevenson." And he never refused, nor did he try for it. He just let it swirl
around him like a whirlpool, waiting to be sucked in or rejected, like a piece of driftwood with no direction of its own.

As for Johnson and Symington, neither had a real chance after the Kennedy organization began rolling at high speed. Johnson never managed to lose his identification as a Southerner, and throughout the campaign he was distrusted by both the North and the South. Symington's hopes were pinned on a deadlocked Convention, at which time he could be brought forth as a compromise candidate. But by Convention time Kennedy had 600 certain votes on the first ballot.

Much of what Mr. White has to say about the Republican Party is interesting and valuable to those who want to know its composition. He points out that although many people think of the Democratic Party as the party of splits and dissidence, Democrats have a greater ability to compromise behind a winner. The book accordingly explores the "Republican schizophrenia which for a century has baffled all observers." He characterizes the Republican Party as "twins—fratricidal, not fraternal, twins." One wing of the Party is made up of the regulars, the "men who, with unflagging loyalty and granite resolution against the future, hold the Party together, do its grubby daily duties, raise its funds, maintain its discipline and, through the long lean season of politics, perform its essential tasks." These men are basically anti-intellectual by nature, but they are the men who control the machinery of Party politics. The other wing of the Party is called by Mr. White "the citizen-progressive wing," which is almost indistinguishable from liberal Democrats. This wing of the Party has generally been ineffective, with the exception of Eisenhower and, in a negative way, Rockefeller. It is this wing that is struggling for power today, after the defeat of Goldwater.

Rockefeller's impact on the Party in 1960 is clearly dissected. In the fall of 1959, Rockefeller set out to explore the possibilities of becoming the Party nominee. He was blocked effectively by the men who hold the purse strings. But he refused to give up and leave the Party leadership to the "regulars." He began to attack the leaders of the Republican Party, his main target: Richard Nixon. With this assault, the civil war between the "twins" of the Party began anew. Rockefeller denounced the leadership of his own Party bitterly and contemptuously. His purpose? "I have to get my hands on the decision-making apparatus." His weapon? His ideas—"care for the aged, rights for Negroes, stimulation of capital investment for growth of the national economy, foreign affairs; above all... national defense..." All of which served to repudiate the Eisenhower Administration.

Rockefeller's ideas swept across the Republican Party, causing chaos, uncertainty, division. All during the writing of the platform at the Republican Convention, Rockefeller forces refused to give in on their main points. They threatened to bring the platform fight to the floor of the Convention—on nationwide TV—thereby giving the Democrats ammunition to use later on in the campaign. (In 1964
we were witness to the effectiveness of a convention floor fight and the manner in which the Rockefeller forces conducted it. Nixon wanted to avoid the fate that later befell Goldwater when he opposed Rockefeller over the platform. The fight culminated in the infamous "Compact of Fifth Avenue," which damaged Nixon's prestige within his own Party and gave Rockefeller a powerful voice in national politics.

The author's analysis of Nixon's character is devastating and rings true. He shows that Nixon's campaign had "neither philosophy nor structure to it, no whole picture either of the man or the future he offered...Nixon's skills in politics were enormous, his courage unquestioned, his endurance substantial. But they were skills, courage and endurance of the sailor who knows the winds and can brave the storm and recognize the tide. There was missing in him always the direction of the navigator...."

This lack became more and more apparent once Kennedy and Nixon were nominated—as Kennedy began to gain confidence and develop style and leadership; as Nixon began to reveal his moodiness, his inability to rely on staff strategists, and his steady move toward the defensive position.

The TV debates of 1960 were really the climax of the campaign. This is when Kennedy showed the American public his "image" of decisiveness and style. And when Nixon showed the public his "me-tooism." It wasn't the issues that were important; they weren't seriously discussed. It was the personalities of the two men that became the issue—perhaps the deciding one on Election Day.

After the debates, the campaign became almost colorless and routine, an anticlimactic round-up of all the loose ends. And then came Election Day and victory for Kennedy.

A word of warning must be given to prospective readers of this book. The author is obviously biased in favor of Kennedy and the Democratic Party. He admires Stevenson, Humphrey, and Rockefeller (perhaps as a natural Democrat?), for the ideas they hold. But he does not, as far as I can judge, obscure the mechanics of the campaign process nor the events that shaped the election. As a reporter, the author followed "as many of the men as possible, both in travel and in thought." He has many quotes from, interviews with, and anecdotes about the seven men who sought the presidency.

The Making of the Presidency 1960 is a fascinating backstage view of the political scene and is told in a narrative style that is dramatic, perceptive and timely. It is not just about the presidential race of 1960; it is about the multitude of individual actions and choices—both encouraging and unpleasant—that lead to the making of a president. It is a picture of how things work—whether we like it or not.

-- Elenore Biddy
GIVE TILL IT HURTS

Last month's issue of Persuasion included some dire quotations from issues of the New York Herald Tribune about the lack of effectiveness of New York City's public programs in Welfare, Education, and Rent Control.

The city's problems are not unique. That something is basically wrong with the whole concept of taxing those who work, to provide public assistance for those who do not, has now been underlined by the recently reported fact that (while New York City is in the throes of a strike among welfare workers and is considering a city income tax to meet expenses) Newburgh, New York, has gone bankrupt.

"A City Gone Broke Over Welfare" reads the headline over a story by Paul Weissman in the New York Herald Tribune of December 13. Three years ago, Newburgh became famous when the then city manager, James Mitchell, announced a 13-point welfare code which aimed at eliminating "chiselers" and at putting able-bodied welfare recipients to work. Mr. Weissman reports that "the code, among other things, put a three-month limit on relief payments; denied assistance to unwed mothers who bore illegitimate children; demanded food and rent vouchers; said newcomers to Newburgh could collect relief for only one week and insisted all able-bodied men on relief work 40 hours a week for the city's building maintenance department."

All of these points were among those declared illegal by the State Supreme Court. Only one provision of the original code was sustained - "physically able recipients were required to report to the department once a month to pick up their checks."

Mitchell's successor as city manager, Thomas E. Rose, is now faced with the following contradictions: He fired 30 city employees in an economy drive, but must "hope none of them wind up on welfare." He realizes that a sales tax would "destroy downtown shopping," but is in the process of merging the city's welfare into the County program, a move which (at present rates) will cause the county taxes paid by Newburgh residents to rise substantially. The city which could not require able-bodied welfare recipients to work on building maintenance is fortunate enough to have an able-bodied Welfare Commissioner who is "frequently lauded for shoveling snow himself at the City Home." And while the casework supervisor in Newburgh's welfare department, when asked what rehabilitation work was being done by his caseworkers, could only answer "with a quick smile, 'sometimes you have to tell them where the unemployment office is!'" at the same time the financial situation will not allow for the construction of a new sewage plant, despite the fact that the State Board of Health has complained about the 4 million pounds of raw sewage dumped daily into the Hudson River.

What is the "general welfare" anyway? The total population of Newburgh has
dropped 3 percent since 1950. The number of people on welfare was 1,646 in 1962 and "has risen drastically since then, the welfare department says." The real estate taxes are rising, and are scheduled to rise further next year. Meanwhile, real estate values are dropping—"Newburgh's $53,6 million in assessed property will drop another $900,000 next year." Attempting to solve a situation like this by government action means raising taxes further to pay for it, which can only cause more taxpayers to move elsewhere. Newburgh is said to be considering urban renewal hopefully, but Professor Martin Anerson's recently published The Federal Bulldozer exposes the mistakes of that government program, and ends with the unequivocal statement that only private enterprise can solve the problems of poor housing. Government programs on all levels that attempt to provide solutions to various economic problems are proving wasteful, incompetent, and inefficient. If what is meant by the general welfare is those conditions which will maximize the health, well-being and productivity of all citizens, so-called welfare programs seem now to be leading communities to disaster instead.

Now that the city of Newburgh is broke, what will happen to the people on relief there? So far, welfare checks are still being issued—it is only general services, such as parks and playgrounds and sewage plants that are being curtailed. But suppose things get worse—you can't, as the saying goes, get blood out of a turnip. Ultimately, by the strict logic of the situation, everyone perishes in a set-up such as this, and the example of Newburgh demonstrates it clearly.

Of course, it won't happen for a while yet. Before it does, the burden will be distributed to a larger group—the county, then the state, then the Federal Government. But until we recognize that it is not an insult to an able-bodied man to expect him to work for the money he gets—that it is an insult not to—we all potentially have a millstone about our necks, and any of us who are not yet suffering from it will ultimately suffer.

THE CULTURE VULTURES

There was a controversy in the Norwegian Parliament in December, when it was decided to support culture by raising the sales tax by two percentage points.

That is not the whole story, of course. Three things were involved in the controversy: The fact that the cultural fund was to be created specifically by taxing periodicals which were formerly exempt; the fact that political, scientific, religious and cultural periodicals were to remain exempt (but which were they?); and the fact that many members of Parliament were alarmed to see the sales tax, which started in 1935 at 1½, become 12½ with this latest increase.

The issue of freedom of the press has been raised by some newspapers, who, according to a report by James Feron in the New York Times of December 12, "say that applying definitions and categories to publications will lead to a subtle form of censorship."

Although the subsidy has been voted, the allocation of it—that is, who decides which periodicals are "cultural" and which
are entertaining, and how the exempt categories are to be defined—will be decided in the Spring.

The issue is becoming: What is entertainment? Mr. Feron quotes Guttorm Hansen, a labor member of Parliament as well as a journalist, who decided that despite the ruling of an American court that Playboy was mainly literary, the magazine should be defined as entertainment. "When I see an elephant, I know what it is," he added amid laughter, presumably from M.P.'s who had read Playboy and never seen a single elephant displayed therein.

Will Norway have a culture Czar, equipped to decide once and for all Norwegians whether McCall's is entertaining or dull, and the degree of religion in the pages of the Christian Science Monitor?

Or will they have a committee which waits like a group of vultures for a publication to exhibit some signs of life and be classified as entertainment?

In any case, the new tax will act as a kind of punishment for people who aren't cultural enough, for if they persist in reading material which is non-political, non-scientific, non-religious, and non-cultural, they will have to pay extra to support "struggling writers, artists and sculptors."

The recipients of the subsidy can't even get together and support themselves by starting a magazine, for there is no question but that it would be tax-exempt.

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