Views, Reviews and

PERSUASION

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25¢
WHERE'S THE MAINSTREAM?

"This civil rights program, about which you have heard so much, is a farce and a sham -- an effort to set up a police state in the guise of liberty. I am opposed to that program."

"I am against the FEPC because if a man can tell you whom you must hire, he can tell you whom you cannot employ. I have met this head on."

"We in the Senate should learn the facts of life. We cannot legislate love."

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Who made these statements? Lyndon Baines Johnson, the Senator from Texas, in 1948 and 1949. Lyndon Baines Johnson, the President, obviously thinks otherwise.

Between 1937 and 1956 Johnson voted 100% with Southern segregationist forces in Congress, supporting not only the rights of Southern property owners to be shortsighted, but also supporting many much less defensible positions:

--He opposed Anti-Lynching Bills in 1937 and 1940.
--He voted against an amendment to the National Housing Act prohibiting discrimination or segregation -- 1949.
--He voted against an amendment to prohibit segregation in administration of the Federal Aid to Education Act -- 1949.
--He supported an amendment to provide segregation in the U.S. Armed Forces if a majority of draftees and enlistees expressed such a preference -- 1950.
--On numerous occasions he voted against attempts to impose cloture.

Twenty years is a long time. Senator Johnson's first pro-civil-rights effort came in 1957 when he voted in favor of the 1957 Civil Rights Bill. Two years later he introduced his own civil rights bill. In 1960, reviewing his record for a group of Democratic Negro leaders, Johnson calmly reported, "From the bottom of my heart, I have done my dead level best to make progress in the field of civil rights, though there have been problems in the Senate and at home at times."

"Dead level best"? "Problems"? Created by whom?

Today, President Johnson's oratory on civil rights is filled with clichés familiar to us all -- "human dignity," "fulfillment of liberty," etc. This about-face is a puzzle to some political observers. To others it simply represents a change of heart, as a result of a better understanding of the issues. Johnson's record of achievement in civil rights, they tell us, is answer enough to those who charge that he is inconsistent.

Could it be that Johnson has really had a change of heart? Could a man in the space of one year completely reverse his stand on an issue as fundamental as civil rights? (In 1956 Johnson voted against a motion which would have permitted the Senate to consider a civil rights bill. In 1957 he voted to allow the '57 Bill to come to the floor and was credited with aiding to line up the necessary votes.) Did he really have a "better understanding" of the issues?

What are the principles he now agrees with? His statement to the Senate on June 19, 1964, congratulating them on the passage of the Civil Rights Bill, implies that he now considers such legislation to be proper, Constitutional, and necessary. He mentions "full justice" for all citizens, "moral obligation to
respect and obey the law of the land," "commitment to human dignity," "blessings of liberty," and investing "the rights of man with the protection of law." What happened to the "police state"? Given any meaningful definition of these terms, what was Senator Johnson fighting for, in principle, when he opposed civil rights legislation all those years -- injustice, human slavery, human worthlessness? If so, it is horrifying to think of such a man as the current President of the United States.

No, Johnson was not opposed to civil rights legislation, in principle. The picture is simple. There's the White House in the distance, Texas and Congress in the foreground. The problem is how to travel to the far horizon as rapidly and directly as possible. Lyndon Johnson had Presidential hopes which were flourishing in the late fifties. Unfortunately, his connection with the Solid South seemed to cause him considerable embarrassment. On December 13, 1953, he stated, "I don't think anybody from the South will be nominated in my lifetime" for the Presidency. "If so, I don't think he will be elected."

Senator Johnson had decided to make himself a test case. To accomplish this, he seems to have done two things. He started to show himself as a man of more than regional influence, which he tried to do by stressing his western as well as his southern connections. And he started to change a civil rights stand which, although popular in Texas, might tell against him in a national election.

From 1957 to 1960 Lyndon Johnson's voting record on civil rights changed dramatically. On February 9, 1960, he joined the Western Democratic Senators' caucus, after having voted increasingly with Western majorities between 1957 and 1959. On July 5, 1960, he formally announced his candidacy for the President of the United States.

Lyndon Johnson was not nominated, was not elected, but he made it to the White House eventually, by accident. Once there, he hopes to try to stay there. This time, however, an election looms high on the horizon. He has yet to stand the test. Will the voters remember his segregationist past? Will they recall that on May 22, 1948, he spoke against an anti-lynching bill with these words: "I am opposed to the anti-lynching bill because the Federal Government has no more business enacting a law against one kind of murder than another."

Apparently Johnson thinks not. Apparently he thinks the voters do not notice that either his principles have changed from something specific to rather meaningless phrases, or he is no longer concerned with principles. In either case, it is convenient for him in an election year.

Contrast Johnson's questionable reversal with Barry Goldwater's record. Goldwater's first significant integrationist activity was on a private level. He desegregated his own department store. Johnson's first efforts came at a time when
it was politically expedient for them to be useful. On the national level Goldwater voted in accordance with the principles Johnson had abandoned, although he too wants to be President. (A future article in this newsletter will discuss why advocates of limited government and individual rights must oppose the Civil Rights Bill.) Evidently Goldwater doesn't think that the price Johnson is willing to pay for the "crown" is worth it. He prefers to take a chance on what he sincerely believes in -- the principle of limited government and freedom of the individual.

All voters should beware the politician who is governed by expediency -- the man who will sacrifice rights to get votes. The so-called "friend" of the moment may be lost when the political wind blows in the opposite direction.

--Joyce Jones

REVIEWS

WHY NOT DEFEAT?

J. Evetts Haley: A Texan Looks at Lyndon
Frank L. Kluckhohn: The Inside on L.B.J.
Booth Mooney: The Lyndon Johnson Story

Lyndon Baines Johnson is not an easy man to be fair to, and it is highly probable that none of these three authors is entirely fair. Haley portrays him as the crooked machine politician, sketching in a background of corruption that makes the Tweed Ring look like a little pantywaist by comparison.

Mooney frankly admires Johnson tremendously, and tells you what a wonderful chap he is. The scandals in the Johnson career are by and large ignored--which is no service to Johnson, for it would be far better to look for explanations of them than to imply, by not even trying to explain, that no decent explanations can be found. Things on the record, such as the Precinct 13 scandal, or the "key man" insurance policy (with premiums up to $12,000) which the LBJ Company holds on Johnson, who claims not to be a key man in that company, do invite some comment.

Kluckhohn concentrates much more on what Johnson has done in terms of his public life rather than on the machinery behind politics, which makes his book far and away the best of the three. It is aimed at the voter who believes, rightly or wrongly, that a candidate's past is none of his business, so long as he does the right kind of a job in office. Kluckhohn is not, however, as unbiased as one could wish, for though he makes a great show of objectivity, periodically he slips in nasty little digs of a kind that make one feel like slapping him. If Haley rules himself out as a rational interpreter by a ridiculous thesis and (among other things)
his apparent conviction that entertaining Negroes in the White House -- and even dancing with them -- is *ipso facto* wrong, Kluckholm doesn't help himself any by making snide remarks about Lady Bird's "innate fear" of her husband. However, since it is the most objective book of the three, it is the one on which I will concentrate, and all unattributed quotations in this article will be from *The Inside on L.B.J.*

From these three books, but most of all from Kluckholm's, a picture emerges. If there can be said to be a single theme to Johnson's actions as a legislator, administrator, and statesman, the theme is: Why not defeat?

"America today is going from defeat to defeat in almost every corner of the world," Kluckholm quotes *U.S. News and World Report*, and then proceeds to back it up. Take Latin America—Johnson has been responsible for the naming of every Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs since the beginning of the Eisenhower Administration, and our relations with the rest of the hemisphere have been going steadily downhill.

One of the things even his supporters have found difficult to put up with in Johnson is his weathervane attitude toward issues and principles. Most often, the weathervane has wound up pointing in the direction decreed by the then current administration—provided he knew far enough in advance what that direction was going to be. Cuba is a case in point. In 1960, some of the most violently outspoken protests against the Cuban situation were made by Johnson. Kluckholm quotes a speech he made in 1960 which might have been written by Barry Goldwater in spots. "If we want to keep communism out of the Western Hemisphere," he said, "we must make our weight felt at the capital of communism..." But two years later, only a day before Kennedy's ultimatum to Russia (of which LBJ had not been warned in advance, evidently), he was calling those who wanted to blockade Cuba "warmongers." After the ultimatum, he supported Kennedy, of course, and is still doing so. Kennedy never insisted on enforcement of the inspection agreement, and neither has Johnson.

This failure to deal adequately with the communist threat on our doorstep has not caused our stock to rise abroad. Where we have not, by gratuitous interference, offended our allies, we have given them serious reason to wonder how far they can count on our support if they give us theirs. Our senseless tinkering with Viet Namese internal politics has resulted so far in a military government which faces a war it probably can't win, and in which American citizens are dying unavenged. We failed to deliver Skybolt in accordance with our agreements with England. We have withdrawn nuclear bases from Turkey and Italy. We have meddled, we have appeased, and we have backed down time after time, in country after country, in every part of the world. Where once any country, however unfriendly, thought twice about interfering with our citizens, because it was known we simply wouldn't stand
for it; no country hesitates nowadays to harass, to interfere with, to rob, or even to kill them.

True, many of the things that have happened since Johnson took office had their roots in Kennedy's administration, but remember that Johnson did the unprecedented when he assumed the Presidency—he kept all of Kennedy's advisors and policy-makers, almost to a man. Furthermore, he has out-Kennedied Kennedy in accepting and acting on their advice.

"Under the Eisenhower administration," reports Kluckhohn, "we twice called a Soviet bluff. On Formosa and in Lebanon we threatened 'all appropriate retaliation' and the enemy backed down. For comparison's sake, take Laos, Viet Nam, the Berlin Wall, West New Guinea, Cuba, Cyprus, Zanzibar. . . ."

And take the results. Because of what looks like—and may be—our withdrawal of "nuclear guarantees" from Europe, all of our allies are being drawn even closer into trade agreements with Russia and China. After all, if they can't count on us, they have to do something. They can't stand alone against Russia and China. The trade won't do our allies very much good, for somehow trade agreements with the Communist countries have a way of turning out to be unprofitable, but they will do our enemies a lot of good. Supplies their crumbling economies could not produce, even with all the loot they've gotten out of their numerous victims, are being funnelled in to them at an ever-increasing rate.

If Johnson's aim seems to be the loss of the Cold War, he seems even less inclined toward victory in any possible hot one. Kluckhohn quotes U.S. News and World Report for March 25, 1963: "Nuclear bombers, medium missiles and some forces are being withdrawn from England, Italy, Turkey, Morocco, Spain, France, Alaska, and Guam," we have recently signed a test-ban agreement which will prevent adequate testing of smaller nuclear weapons such as might be useful in the little wars the Reds seem so adept at fomenting. Research, development, and production of short- and intermediate-range missiles and long-range bombers are grinding to a halt. We are being left with long-range missiles which have never been properly tested with nuclear warheads, and with which we can't fight effectively at distances under several thousand miles.

Provided these missiles work, one can fight a war with them, but one cannot hope to win it. To do that, you must be able to take the enemy's territory and hold on to it. What's worse—there's only one kind of war you can fight with them, and that is the nuclear holocaust everyone is supposedly trying to forestall. We are cutting ourselves off from all but two alternatives: World War III or peace at any price.

Domestically, the picture is much the same. We are suddenly engaged in a "war on poverty"—and like all Mr. Johnson's wars, his method of fighting it makes
the enemy stronger. The "battle" of Appalachia is a case in point. A Council was formed and given millions in "planning money." Last February, because the only results to date had been to plan roads "where no one wanted to travel," and recreational areas "miles from any substantial clientele," Johnson reorganized it. The New Appalachia Council promptly asked for another $250,000,000. At last report, they were still planning. "By now, they had expended enough funds in planning nothing to...supply every potential wage earner in the area with a few month's wages at $2.50 per hour."

While meddling in more and more of the farm economy, maintaining controls, instituting new ones, the Kennedy-Johnson trade bill has made these already self-defeating policies more drastically and rapidly self-defeating. Thirty-eight countries are now shipping meat into the U. S., driving prices down and "almost all of them have rulings or regulations which prevent the U. S. from selling meat or meat products in their markets." Whether restrictive tariffs and other import controls are the answer to a sagging farm economy or not, they certainly are necessary if you persist in trying to run that economy via a system of arbitrary controls. The Kennedy-Johnson-Freeman program, among other things, "proposed jail sentences for noncompliance. It expanded controls to almost every farm crop. It gave the Secretary of Agriculture authority to condemn farm lands for conversion to golf courses...without any local control. It would have increased greatly payments to farmers for not growing crops..." All this is suicidal enough, as witness the ever-increasing desertion of the farm by smaller farmers. But other legislation, such as the dropping of import restrictions makes it all the more untenable. We are now paying $3,000,000 a day for farm surplus storage—yet "we send Mexico $20,000,000 per year in loans to increase their wheat production—cutting down on our own shipments to that nation. And Mexico ships more wheat to Cuba than to any other nation."

Yet these are only a few things. Where will we be when all the various programs have been realized? A clue may lie in the fact that: "Representative Bob Griffin of Michigan offered an amendment to the 1962 farm bill which would have limited the number of Department of Agriculture workers from ever surpassing the number of farmers in the U. S. Once the amendment was supported by voice vote, LBJ rushed his forces to defeat it on a teller vote."

Why not defeat? Is that really what Johnson is after?

Let me ask you to consider the following hypothetical character. His name is Mr. X and he is a politician. He has a great deal of drive and ambition, but his vision is unusually limited—the only goal he has ever had is the vote, specifically the vote for Mr. X. Part of his means of getting where he wants to go has been, in fact, the failure to develop further goals. Deliberately. You get ahead in politics a lot faster, he has found, by knowing when your goals should match those of the powers that be. You must not be a rubber stamp, of course,
because that will limit you. By the "feel" of the legislation you deal with, you learn to know where it is good to agree and where it is safe to disagree "on principle," showing yourself an independent thinker.

Now imagine that Mr. X inherits—just as Johnson did—the office of the President of the United States. Would he, as Truman did, replace all his predecessor's advisors? Truman did so because he had views and political goals outside the mere achievement of office, and these did not coincide with those of Roosevelt on many points. He wanted, and got, advisors who would tell him how to implement his own particular views and goals. But Mr. X hasn't any. Not really. He has always gotten them in the past from someone else. It's a little late to start looking for some now. So he wouldn't throw out his predecessor's advisors; he'd keep them, and with them, all of his predecessor's views and aims. Don't forget—these are not the important things to him. What's important is the vote, the office, the power for its own sake, not what he can do with them.

Would he be very good at foreign policy? Perhaps—if he achieved the Presidency of a second-class power. But the United States is one of the two first-class powers. Therefore, he can afford to ignore all the lesser powers, to let the old advisors do pretty much what they wanted without caring very much. The lesser countries of this world carry no weight at the American ballot box.

Russia is a slightly different matter. There are a lot of Americans who are panicky about Russia—and it's quite true that she could start ill-temperedly throwing bombs around, thus decimating the ranks of his voters and perhaps annoying still others. A good idea is to keep Russia happy, so as not to scare the panicky. And so long as the advisors keep that in mind, he needn't watch them.

Mr. X wouldn't understand much about the free market economy, but he would understand this: a man who is on his own personal payroll or his own personal dole (in the form of supports, works projects, and aid) is much more likely to vote for him than some independent slob who doesn't owe him a dime. So he'd be inclined to do a lot of favors for people—even if it crippled them. Whether they liked it or not. He might be quite willing to see the Department of Agriculture presently outnumber the farmers.

Is Johnson's aim defeat? No, I don't think so, after reading these books. It's Victory—victory for Lyndon Baines Johnson.

But is it victory for the United States?

--Avis Brick
GOLDWATER'S RECORD ON LABOR

"Goldwater is the Unions' No. 1 Election Target" -- this headline appeared in The New York Times on September 12, 1964. The article reported that a top union official had remarked that Senator Barry Goldwater was the 'perfect' candidate for unions to oppose. "His record is 100 per cent against labor," this union official said, "and our people are realizing it." George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO also mentioned that Senator Goldwater never voted for a single bill favorable to labor--"not even by mistake."

The irresponsibility of such charges is quite apparent when one looks at the record:
--He co-sponsored a 1955 proposal to provide for increased benefits to longshoremen in case of disabling injuries.
--He sponsored a 1956 bill to forbid unions operating with union shop arrangements from making political contributions either "directly or indirectly." Under union shop arrangements, compulsory union dues are used by union leaders to finance politicians of their own choice. The individual union member is not consulted.
--In 1959 he voted in favor of the McGovern "Bill of Rights" amendment to protect union members against unfair actions by their unions.
--In 1959 he voted for a proposal to require secret ballot strike votes before any strike could take place. This was defeated by a 3 to 1 Democratic majority.

In view of these votes, even if they quarrel with his consistent opposition to increasing the minimum wage (which many economists think will also increase unemployment)--how can union leaders claim that Goldwater is 100% anti-Labor? Can it be that their objection is that Goldwater's support of the individual extends to the individual worker in conflict with his union boss?

In a Senate speech on September 24, 1962, Goldwater said: "The immense and ever-growing power of labor unions constitutes a grave danger to our economy... The labor bosses want no lessening of their power... I have been deluged with letters from workers in all parts of the country literally pleading for some kind of help from their government against the tyranny of their union bosses."

Is this why Mr. Meany is so upset?

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ALICE IN JOHNSONLAND

Senator Goldwater has been quoted as saying, in referring to the Bobby Baker investigation, "You can't sweep a hi-fi set under the rug." However, in view of the primary contest in which Lyndon B. Johnson received his party's nomination for Senator (when, according to some, an entire precinct was swept under the rug), perhaps a hi-fi set would not be so difficult to disguise, after all.

The 1948 Democratic Senate Primary in Texas had been close enough to warrant a second vote, a "run-off" between the two top contenders, Governor Coke Stevenson and Lyndon B. Johnson. Five days after the run-off, Governor Stevenson had apparently won by 113 votes—but Johnson was claiming victory.

The next day, it was announced that Precinct 13 in Alice, Texas, had been recanvassed. Originally issued 600 ballots, it had nevertheless managed to give 765 votes to Johnson, 80 to Stevenson. On the new count, it outdid itself by giving Johnson 987 votes—which meant that his statewide majority in the run-off over Stevenson was now 87 votes.

Informed that 200 names had been added to Precinct 13's voter list in a different color ink, Stevenson and two aides demanded to see the lists. They had to get a Texas Ranger to reinforce their demands, but they were finally allowed a glimpse of them. They managed to memorize the names of about fifteen of the new voters, which they then looked up. Of these fifteen, one was a man who had not been in the county at all during the run-off, another was a housewife who had never qualified to vote in any election, and three more had been dead anywhere from several months to several years before the run-off.

Judge T. Whitfield Davidson signed an injunction ordering hearings and appointed a commissioner to investigate. The ballot boxes, which were supposedly sealed, were opened and turned out to contain nothing but scraps of old newspapers. The men responsible for them were out of the state and could not be reached. Before the investigation could be carried any further, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Hugo L. Black issued an order cancelling Judge Davidson's injunction. The case was closed. Johnson had won.

We assume that he doesn't know how, any more than we do.

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