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To the memory of

HARRY ELMER BARNES

Without whose incredible energy, diligence and persistence there might not have been any revisionism

and

JEAN HUTCHISON BARNES

Who in her quiet and gracious way provided an indispensable measure of encouragement and support to it
Publisher's Preface

Several of the essays gathered together in this volume received worldwide circulation, despite having been published originally in journals of extremely limited circulation. They drew a wide variety of complimentary comments from figures of some importance. Characteristic of the European commentaries was that of Dr. Edmund Marhefka, one of the representatives of Germany at the Versailles Treaty proceedings following World War One. "The intrinsic and formidable style of Prof. James J. Martin interested me very much," he reported to one correspondent. Confessing to be "fascinated by the sagacity and striking way of expression" employed, Dr. Marhefka remarked, "He has got the way to talk to statesmen and politicians of nowaday's sort."

Although a number of readers of some of these articles were personalities of some political standing, they were not written with the intention of drawing the attention of power-holding celebrities or in the hope of influencing policy in any way. In large part they were exercises in historical writing for the record, directed to persons of student age brackets, if to anyone in particular, and to those too young to have been on the scene when the events described had transpired.

Though these essays are historical in nature, they concern matters of importance to the contemporary scene, and involve unresolved matters growing out of the great world conflict of 1939-1945, issues so complicated that they have not lent themselves to any substantial settlement and furthermore have tended to reappear in the new wars of the last quarter of a century. Contemporary concern over such matters as conscription, the morality of strategic bombing, the concept of "war crimes," the interlocking relationships between politics, industry, finance and the military, the resurgence of talk about "Fascism," the economics of war and the origins and consequences of the Cold War, as well as the significance of Revisionism as a school of historical interpretation, are all to be found under consideration here. The emphasis is upon the continuity of such phenomena since at least the preliminaries of World War Two, as a corrective to contemporary tendencies to find the modern versions of these subjects peculiar to the last few years.

It was in 1955 that Dr. Louis Morton, then Chief of the Pacific Section of the United States Army Office of Military History, declared insofar as it concerned the Second World War, that "Revisionism reached the status of a mature historical interpretation of events that no serious student of prewar policy could ignore," as far back as 1948. A formid-
able library of works has accumulated since that time which has made Revisionism's point so emphatically that one finds more and more of this view gaining ground even in official and essentially defensive narratives.

This volume is another contribution in the Revisionist tradition, more oriented toward the subject of opinion and opinion-making rather than exploration of diplomatic papers, concerned with where populaces get their ideas, how such matters go into the fabrication of popular support for war and the policies which eventuate in wartime, and which often continue in force long after formal hostilities have ended.

Acknowledgments


I

On the "Defense" Origins of the New Imperialism

Introductory Essay

The time must come when the defense program passes from being a gigantic pump-primer into being the main engine. — Walter Lippmann, New York Herald Tribune, September 19, 1940.

It is important to notice that the recent recovery has been in the main a war boom and an armament boom. — Editorial, "Mr. Roosevelt on Production," New York Times, October 25, 1940, p. 20.

There will be 4,000,000 persons employed in this country in June, 1941, as the result of National Defense orders which were awarded up to November 1 [1940], according to a preliminary study made by the Division of Industrial Economics of the National Industrial Conference Board. — The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, December 14, 1940, p. 3486.

Roosevelt . . . is pointing the national policy toward a world leadership, toward a merger of British and American interests. What Roosevelt sees: England, even if saved, will be unable to maintain an immense fleet and a large army; will be unable to hold together the British Empire. The U.S. will be in a position to inherit much of the British power, will then become the senior partner in empire, with Britain the junior partner. — United States News, December 27, 1940, p. 4.

To be blunt about it, the United States has become a military state. — Editorial, "Wehrwirtschaft in America," Business Week, January 4, 1941, p. 48.

Periodically we are told that in the United States we now have a $90 billion defense industry establishment.¹ It is surely somewhat

¹"The Course of Empire," National Observer (February 12, 1968), p. 8. There appears to be a tendency to confuse federal outlays for "defense" in fiscal 1969 with the size of the "defense" industry itself. The former total is $89,515,000,000 (First National City Bank of New York Monthly Economic Letter, March, 1968, p. 32), which is hardly the capitalization of all firms engaged in such production. This latter information is bound to be elusive.
more than that. It is difficult to find a careful breakdown of this industrial colossus, and to determine, for instance, if the many firms producing exclusively for the Vietnam war are included; there were already 5,000 of them two years ago. One might also be edified to learn what firms skim off most of the cream of foreign aid money, which is obviously spent mostly in the U.S.A. and then dispatched as material largesse to favored governments in many parts of the world, as a palpable adjunct of "defense." The delicate avoidance by even the most determined and stubborn anti-foreign aid forces of investigating or publicizing this side of the problem to any serious degree is puzzling, to say the least. We do know considerably, however, about the generous portion of foreign aid money trimmed off at the start by American legal firms acting as advisory counsel to the recipient countries, often over 15 per cent of the total allocation. The cooperation of private business in the export of socialism through such programs is another side of the picture, and equally unemphasized. Undoubtedly a considerable part of the "space race" industrial complex fails to qualify as "defense" activity in the narrow definition of the latter, though it certainly deserves to be so identified. And finally, a generous part of the total industrial community receives "spin-off" benefits from the purely "defense" sector in a large number of ways; one need not dwell in addition on the legion of incomes earned in a peripheral relationship to "defense" while appearing to be utterly alien to it. Though it is customary to read denunciations by various captains of industry of "government in business" and the pervasive penetration by the state into all areas of economic activity, it is not common to encounter criticisms of the government by them when it comes to its function in allocating "defense" contracts. All but a very few who do express reservations are usually found ultimately taking part, in the spirit of a puritanical maiden aunt's poorly concealed delight upon being taken out on a round of night club visitations.

There seems to be an immense multitude who believe that this vast system is a product of this decade, intertwined in some way with the Vietnam war. There are many others who are of the impression it has always been this way to a greater or lesser degree. But "defense" was an invention of the last six months of 1940. It had no precedent despite the superficial similarity to the "preparedness" boom of 1916. In 1940 defense had only a limited relationship to the army and navy preparations for war; it was the first step of a prodigious American planetary expansion which has yet to stop.

Where once a policy was adopted, and followed to the limit imposed
by specified resources, with “national defense” the reverse took place; policy tended to extend as far as the immense appropriations and provisions of military and other materials could stretch. One may note as a partial illustration a comparison of the modest number of American military and naval installations in the world in 1940 with the many thousands of these scattered over the planet over a quarter of a century later. Another area, fully as illustrative, concerns the political: the modern involvement by treaty or otherwise in the internal affairs of half the governments of the world’s states, as against the absence of such relations in 1940.

The 1932 platform of the Democratic Party, on which Franklin D. Roosevelt campaigned for the presidency, heartily denounced the military spending of the administration of Herbert Hoover, and flatly called for economy in this area, “that the people in time of peace may not be burdened with an expenditure fast approaching $1 billion annually.” Ironically, the first billion-dollar budget for the army and navy occurred early in Mr. Roosevelt’s second term, and it never fell below that figure again, nor has it to this day; in fact, in recent years such budgets have been fifty times as high as those of the pre-World War II Roosevelt era. But it was especially ironic that Mr. Roosevelt should say, in his celebrated speech in Buenos Aires in December, 1936, the first year the billion mark was passed in military spending in this country:

We know, too, that vast armaments are rising on every side and that the work of creating them employs men and women by the millions. It is natural, however, to conclude that such employment is false employment, that it builds no permanent structure and creates no consumers’ goods for lasting prosperity. We know that nations guilty of these follies inevitably face the day either when their weapons of destruction must be used against their neighbors or when an unsound economy like a house of cards will fall apart.

While Mr. Roosevelt was intoning these peaceful sentiments his regime was already spending on the army and navy in “peacetime” a sum exceeding the total of all federal government costs in 1917, and which nearly equalled what it cost to fight the last year of the Civil War. But the spending on arms at this point had barely begun. And it was through the wondrous device of “defense” that it grew to proportions, from 1940 on, which made even the expenditures during previous wars seem frugal penny-counting by comparison. The invention of the abstraction “national defense” was an innovation in American statecraft comparable to that of relativity in physics. While
it did, and still does, require a potential enemy lurking on the horizon, what this concept permits on the home front and makes possible in the form of intervention in the domestic affairs of others, limited only by resources and interveners, makes the old-style imperialism appear limited and naïve when juxtaposed. Though it is unquestioned that the most awesome device for the redistribution of wealth within a country and the destruction of it in another’s country is war, modern “defense” approaches and passes all but the most protracted of martial enterprises in the former category.

As the New Deal began to crumble badly around the edges between the late summer of 1937 and the fall of 1938, and the momentum of the domestic welfare state programs sagged, the attention to sin abroad increased sharply. One notes in the histories of the Roosevelt era an abrupt switch of attention from domestic matters to “foreign affairs,” or, to put the latter another way, the domestic affairs of other parts of the world. With this shift in emphasis is a parallel change in army and navy budgets, markedly upward, but dwarfed by the “national defense” appropriations which were made starting with the last six months of 1940.

It took less than three years for Mr. Roosevelt to get rid of his revulsion for an economy based on “armaments.” By the late months of 1940 the world began to get an idea of what an economy heavily dependent on the hardware of war could really be like. And it was a “democracy,” not a “totalitarian power,” that showed the way, in the same manner that Britain’s Lt. Gen. Sir Francis Tuker, K.C.I.E., later was to explain to the defeated German enemy how “total war” was so much more effectively conceived by “a democracy.” “Total war is the war that is made by a democracy that has thrown its conscience to the winds,” declaimed General Tuker. “It is solidly pursued, relentless and ruthless.” (It is obvious that a “democracy” could not engage in such gestures as that of Hitler in allowing the trapped British army at Dunkirk to escape safely back to England.)

It must be evident to most that a bureaucracy the size of that existing in the United States is quite unthinkable without the cooperation of a

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2In review of Major General F. W. von Mellinthin’s *Panzer Battles, 1939-1945: A Study of the Use of Armour in the Second World War* (London: Cassell, 1955), in *The Twentieth Century* (December, 1955), pp. 523-524. One of the quips in the first three years of the war, when the British revealed an uncanny genius for losing, was that the British generals as a class “showed an indecent exposure of jaw and an incredible lack of forehead.” The smug, interminable lecturing on their part to the defeated enemy since 1945 has grown very tiresome.
large and healthy segment of the business world. Those who make an enterprise out of railing at "bureaucrats" and "politicians" invariably evade facing the fact that the great majority of them are from influential industrial, financial, and commercial circles, and frequently complicate the picture with legal and military experience as well. Whichever party assumes control of national affairs, one finds people of the same background and occupation. And the similarity is never more evident than when "foreign relations" is the subject under consideration. What goes under the heading of "internationalism" is erected upon a solid bi-partisan structure of nearly three decades of existence, both wings of which flap in unison ("politics stops at the water's edge") on almost all occasions involving basic aspects of "America's role in the world." This is one of the most enduring inheritances of "defense."

As Congress, in the summer and early fall of 1940, began to vote into law one massive panicky "defense" appropriations bill after another, with virtually no one in opposition, the civil war which the state builds within the business community by its interferences spread some more. While one sector of business, finance, and industry writhed in painful anticipation of the harmful consequences of "defense" upon it, another salivated in expectation of the lush consequences of producing in a protected market, with disposal of the product guaranteed and all costs and overhead taken care of in advance by a single predictable customer, the state. There were people in the business world unable to adjust to the swift movement to military production and who were aware of the situation almost at once, as manpower and materials began to drift out of the civilian market to "defense." However, there were far many more who were unaware, and learned to their dismay only with the passing of time.

But, for those able to get on board, things were exhilarating. Industrial output in the country established an all-time high peak in 1940, exceeding the boom year of 1929 by ten per cent. The machine-tool industry alone between September, 1939, when the war broke out, and December, 1940, expanded capacity by 50 per cent. And with scores of shell, gun, and powder plants going up all around, one could understand Newsweek's blaring headline, "New Plant Facilities Permit Gigantic Production for '41." There was nothing new about this moder-

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3Newsweek (January 6, 1941), p. 37. An interesting accompaniment to this development was the address of Dr. Benjamin M. Anderson, professor of economics at the University of California, before the California State Chamber of Commerce on December 6, 1940, titled "Some Essentials of an Efficient Preparedness Program," in which he asserted, "I think most of us would like it better if we had a much larger munitions industry. I think that the way to
ate national crawl toward war and the economic dislocations it caused. The famed author of *Treasure Island*, Robert Louis Stevenson, in his article “The Day After Tomorrow” in *The Contemporary Review* in 1887, seemed to have boiled it all down in a single sentence: “Great powers are slow to stir; national affronts, even with the aid of newspapers, filter slowly into popular consciousness; national losses are so unequally shared, that one part of the population will be counting its gains while another sits by a cold hearth.”

At this time one is also able to observe the relationship between the extension of power at home and the control of the citizenry’s attitude toward distant areas. The manufacture of foreign enemies, to the end of domestic political survival in consequence of propaganda exploitation of such, is a low-visibility maneuver which deserves special attention. Michael Hermond Cochran, one of the most formidable of the revisionist historians in the between-the-wars decades of 1919-1939, condensed the issue into a single sentence in an article in H. L. Mencken’s *American Mercury* in December, 1932, when he wrote, “The plain fact is that foreign policy is always based on internal policy, that the men who make this foreign policy belong to groups whose main and often only interest lies in acquiring, preserving, or strengthening their control at home.” And the political tenure-seekers had another advantage, Cochran pointed out; “public opinion in every country, whatever its form of government, is always almost completely at the mercy of the groups that happen to dominate that government.”

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have a bigger munitions industry would be to have a general policy that permits unusual profits in wartime, in view of the fact that profits in munitions in peacetime are not great enough to justify adequate capital outlay.” Address reproduced in *The Commercial and Financial Chronicle* (December 14, 1940), pp. 3492-3493. Apparently there were those able to realize Professor Anderson’s ideal; when John McCone was being considered by Congress for appointment to the post of director of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1962, the General Accounting Office spokesman testified that McCone and his associates made $44,000,000 on an investment of $100,000 during the Second World War, building ships for the Navy. David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The Invisible Government* (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 193. Taxes undoubtedly absorbed much of this, and, in terms of the total situation, the enterprise of McCone and his associates was really quite modest in size.

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Cochran, “The Real Cause of War,” *American Mercury* (December, 1932), pp. 410-417. Professor Cochran actually anticipated by more than fifteen years the principal thesis of George Orwell’s 1984, the use of foreign policy to control domestic policy. (It is universally ignored that Orwell was not writing science fiction but describing what was already fully developed in 1948, and that his publisher persuaded him to go along with the transposition of the last two numbers of the date as a sales device.) As Cochran and Orwell evaluated state practice, particularly with respect to the exploitation of history, it did not matter any longer whether anything was true or not; the important thing was whether
The big German offensive of May-June of that year had placed Western Europe from Norway to southern France under their control and expelled the English from the continent. The bug-eyed panic which promptly ensued in certain circles in the United States was accompanied by the trembling bawls of terror of the most respected loud-speakers of the academic, political, journalistic, and radio world in all the land. It is, insofar as it persists as a literary relic, something which subsequent arrivals to maturity examine with incredulity. But all during the last six months of 1940 the invasion scare maintained its influence, and had much to do with such policy actions as the passage of the infamous Smith Act in July, the transfer of fifty ships of the U.S. Navy to Britain in September, the ominous adoption of conscription in peacetime for the first time in American history in October, and the repeated but sophisticated use of war threats to continental United States in Mr. Roosevelt's campaign for a third term as president, all of which undoubtedly had a part to play in his success in the first week of November. One wit reacted to the reelection with the couplet

The Son of God goes forth once more
with all assistance short of war,

a play on administration spokesmen and their constant reiteration that Roosevelt's position relative to the struggle in Europe was to provide Britain with "all aid short of war," which accompanied Roosevelt's loudly proclaimed promise in his Navy Day address in Boston just before the election that the parents of America's young men need never fear that he would send the latter off to any "foreign wars." The entire sorry trail of deception was reminiscent of Voltaire's recommendation to his cronies during his attack on the Président de Brosses: "Lie, my friends, keep lying; I shall do the same for you if the occasion requires." (The voluminous attention to the "credibility gap" of the Johnson regime in handling the Vietnam war has diverted atten-
tion from the far greater "credibility gap" of the Roosevelt machine before and during World War II, but there are too many opponents of the current war who luxuriated in that of 1939-1945 and its preliminaries and as a consequence do not care to examine the problem in any greater depth than that which suits their immediate political interests.)

Not long after the election, while the liberal cliche factories were still whinnying about the grave dangers to "Western civilization," and the New Dealers were quietly climbing out of steam shovels and farm tractors and trying on torpedo boats and bombing planes for size, at the same time still talking about the beauties of peace, one of the first blunt, honest expressions of what was really in store for the citizenry was put on the record. It came from Dr. Virgil D. Jordan, president of the National Industrial Conference Board, probably the most prestigious economic policy think-tank in North America in those times, and was ostensibly meant for the august assembly of the Investment Bankers Association of America at their annual convention in Hollywood, Florida, on December 10, 1940.

This meeting had been advertised for some time. Early in November and again in December, the IBA's president, the Detroit banker Emmett F. Connely, had revealed its agenda. "Its central theme," he announced, would be "the big financial and economic problems arising out of the war," and the staid and influential Commercial and Financial Chronicle predicted that it would be "the most important meeting the organization has ever held." The topic of Jordan's address, "The Capital Needs of Industry for National Defense," was announced December 1, at which time it was revealed that two other national figures would speak before the bankers, Dr. Harold G. Moulton of the equally influential Brookings Institution, and Elmo B. Roper, research director of the Fortune Magazine survey of public opinion, the famous Fortune polls.

The handling of Jordan's long and in many ways quite sensational dissertation was rather curious. It was not even mentioned in Business Week, Nation's Business, the Economist, or the Banker's Magazine (this journal did not even mention the IBA convention in a long list of December bankers' gatherings), nor was it a topic for news note in the business and financial sections of Time, Newsweek, or the United

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7On the history of the National Industrial Conference Board and its more than half-century of influence and importance, see the profile of the organization written by its 1964 president, H. Bruce Palmer, in Encyclopedia Americana (New York: Americana Corporation, 1964), XIX, p. 736.

8The Commercial and Financial Chronicle (November 16, 1940), p. 2886; (December 7, 1940), p. 3334.
"DEFENSE" ORIGINS OF THE NEW IMPERIALISM

States News. It was not commented on in the Nation or New Republic, but managed to make the back pages of the New York daily press.\(^9\) Ignored by Vital Speeches,\(^{10}\) it was published in full only by the Commercial and Financial Chronicle on December 21, in ten long columns of tiny type,\(^{11}\) and may have had a mere handful of readers. Ten days later, the Communist weekly New Masses printed part of the speech with minimum (for them) comment; indeed, with Stalinist Russia a neutral at that moment, the New Masses was a momentarily "detached" observer of the war's competing sides. But except for these, the Jordan address went unnoticed.

Jordan's speech was delivered before bankers and purportedly was supposed to concern banking and financial topics and policies. But the first half of the address barely mentioned finance at all; it was a discourse on world economic grand strategy and a forecast of global political eventualities such as one might have expected from the White House, or at least the State Department, with the possible omission of Jordan's harsh remarks about the public relations practices of governments at war, which in many ways sounded like an updating of Jonathan Swift's Treatise on the Art of Political Lying (1727). Perhaps it was too close to an election (and a pre-election campaign filled with massive efforts at dissimulation on such subjects) to expect a major public official to sponsor such views publicly. The country was heatedly engaged in the controversy over deeper involvement in the war and the mass of the citizenry wanted no part of it.

This mood was best expressed in the American Institute of Public Opinion (headed by George Gallup, himself a member of a number of pro-war organizations) survey on the last day of December, 1940, in which 88 per cent of those questioned declared they would vote against war if the question were raised in a nation-wide referendum. After the close call of January, 1938, this is undoubtedly the last thing the war-bound New Deal regime would ever have permitted. Too many people still remembered the resolution proposed by Rep. Lewis

\(^{9}\)In a story almost a column long on Jordan's speech, the New York Times (December 11, 1940, p. 24) omitted entirely references to the sensational first half. The Herald-Tribune and World-Telegram published somewhat briefer reports on the IBA convention.

\(^{10}\)This journal did publish Jordan's address of May 20, 1942, before the NICB, though this was couched in elementary moral rhetoric, reminiscent of something that might be delivered before Boy Scouts. Jordan, "National Mobilization for Victory," Vital Speeches (July 15, 1942), pp. 599-601.

\(^{11}\)Pp. 3611-3616. See also the lead editorial, "The Financial Situation," in the issue for December 14, pp. 3436-3438, and the reprinting of the abbreviated United Press summary of Jordan's address in the same issue, p. 3494.
Ludlow of Indiana in the fall of 1937, requiring a national popular referendum before a declaration of war, unless continental United States was attacked. Its defeat in the House of Representatives in mid-January of the next year, 209-188, stirred feverish comment for weeks thereafter. (A shift of only 11 votes would have put it across, and it aroused immense curiosity that 55 congressmen, 52 of them Democrats, had previously signed the petition to bring the resolution to the House floor, and then voted against the resolution. It was generally credited to Roosevelt personally in getting this voted down, as a consequence of his strong condemnatory letter to House majority leader Bankhead, described at the time as "a most unusual resort for any President in defeating undesired [by him] legislation." But it was a very narrow escape.)

Still, many of these people were now being torn in another direction, a stake in a job directly related to the war drive cloaked at the moment under the label "defense." A Twentieth Century Fund study, published three days before the A IPO survey disclosing massive unwillingness to fight, concluded that the "defense program" could be expected to provide 6,000,000 new jobs in industry. Said the New Republic at the time of the defeat of the Ludlow Resolution, "It can be said that the masses of the people throughout the country who favor Roosevelt's social program are opposed to participation in any war on foreign soil." Three years later they still were opposed, but "defense" was complicating matters for them by then.

Jordan did not cringe in fear of Hitler appearing over Keokuk, as the most influential contingent of brain-warpers of the press, radio, and screen pretended to be doing. He was a composed and confident exponent of America's role, already well established for most of the twentieth century, of opposing change in the world, wherever it might threaten to take place, but particularly if it involved the old buccaneer Britain surrendering even part of the loot of three centuries to any rising young pirates in the national state system.

Speeches on public affairs with Jordan's candor were not common in the late months of 1940. His address was particularly revealing, little attempting to hide behind the propaganda of the day, featured by simulated fear of continental invasion and defeat by the Germans.

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12United States News (December 27, 1940), p. 30. In this connection it was instructive to note that the first official act of Walter D. Fuller upon becoming president of the National Association of Manufacturers for 1941, a few days later, was a call upon all industrialists to do their "patriotic best" to speed up "defense production." “Week in Business,” Newsweek (January 13, 1941), pp. 44-45.
and the need to build strong barriers against them via “national defense.” In his view, “defense” was merely the preliminary stage of world-wide imperialism, in which he anticipated Henry Luce and his *American Century* editorial of the spring of 1941. A variety of English notables had already suggested an Anglo-American partnership to police the world, with the United States as the junior partner. Jordan was about the first to diagnose the economic situation and declare openly that the only likely relationship would have to be the reverse. And he was even more honest in using the term *imperialism* several times to describe the consequences. He was perfectly aware that “defense” was going to be the smoke-screen behind which this American global expansion was to proceed for years to come.

Jordan is further significant in that he came to the point at once. While a number of prescient observers concentrated exclusively on what defense was doing on the purely domestic side, Jordan was the first prestigious economic analyst of national repute to describe the international political consequences of “defense.” Though the largest part of his audience of eminent bankers surely thought of “defense” as a policy tailored to continental dimensions, Jordan was telling them that this was the smaller and lesser side of the matter, the preliminaries to a prodigious global expansion, the second stage of Manifest Destiny. Jordan's message was a sophisticated and technical version of that of the national commander of the American Legion, Milo J. Warner, who had announced two weeks earlier that the Legion was fully behind an America “prepared to do our fighting outside the United States.” “A new and great destiny is ahead for our country,” Warner had asserted, and “that destiny is necessarily bound to sweep us beyond the actual boundaries of our continental United States.” Jordan spelled out the potential politico-economic consequences of this new conception of our “destiny,” a remarkably astute estimate of the likely results, looking back from the vantage point of a generation spent moving in the direction of his prediction.

Jordan’s only apprehensiveness concerning this defense program was the fear of it being stoked and fired by government credit. He hoped the program might be handled by the resources of the banking system plus new capital formation resulting from savings and taxes, though this was obviously not the way things were going. Seven weeks before Jordan’s speech, the *New York Times* (October 25, 1940) had observed editorially that “the armament program is being financed entirely by deficit borrowing.” However, his estimates of the magnitude of this grand expansion were ludicrously short even of what was to be spent
only in 1941-1945, and his prediction of a colossal financial debacle at war’s end if deficit spending was employed as the principal financial motive power was, of course, never realized. What a state can do without gold apparently was not an unknown factor to him, especially the example of National Socialist Germany, in possession, at about the time of the outbreak of the war in 1939, of just a little more than one fourth of 1 per cent of the total gold bullion in all western European banks. One has an even more graphic demonstration of the issue when the German gold is calculated against planetary totals; the reliable Chicago Daily News reporter John T. Whitaker, in a discussion on the subject cabled from Rome on July 23, 1940, observed, “The United States already possesses about 80 per cent of the world’s holdings.”

It was even more obvious in the case of the more than twenty years of managed money by the Leninist Communist state in Russia, the demise of which had been predicted on a weekly basis for the same period of time by conservative financiers. But the significance of these two, or of Italy or Japan, he ignored; they were rustled together in a package of abhorred “totalitarianism,” not to be imitated at any cost. What Jordan apparently wanted was a total mobilization within the framework of democratic niceties and “private” finance capitalism, and the carrying on of a genteel planet-wide imperialism after all the horrid totalitarian dragons in the world had been slain, although his nearly 10,000-word address never once referred to Stalinist Russia.

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13 Gold bullion in European banks, January 6, 1939, expressed in British pounds:

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Total: £1,098,642,128


14 On the evolution of state-controlled and managed economies outside the Soviet Union and antedating that of National Socialist Germany, see Nicolas Montchiloff, Ten Years of Controlled Trade in South-Eastern Europe (London: Cambridge University Press, 1944).

15 The most effective war propaganda tactics in both the prelude to and during World War Two were, as in the 1914-1918 war, atrocity themes, to which there were hardly any limits, and the massive sagas of the boundless cruelty of
Though one may point to the subsequent vast loss of life and property in the war that Mr. Jordan was confident, and for some reason, we were inextricably enmeshed in, though we spent more in defeating the enemies of the British and continental colonial powers than the value of all the real and personal property of these wartime opponents combined, all this is peripheral to the matter at hand. It was through this war that we were thrust out into the world upon our course of imperialism, as Mr. Jordan so confidently predicted to the country's investment banking fraternity.  

“What happened to the dreamworld?” began a famous Fortune magazine editorial early in 1947, “what happened to that thermoplastic, aerodynamic, supersonic, electronic, gadgetonic world the admen promised during the war?” It was their conclusion that “a thorough search for genuine postwar creations in the consumer-goods field yields only the ball-bearing pen.” We are in a position to see that part of this “dreamworld” has materialized in the last twenty years, in fits and starts, but hardly in the grand manner suggested by the advertising copy writers of 1940-1945, who were keeping alive the names of firms with virtually nothing to sell, unless one was in the market for an aircraft carrier, a submarine tender, or an anti-tank gun. One of the most striking trends one notes in the advertising pages of the enemy peoples. We have been swamped for thirty-five years with concentration camp literature, and the end is not in sight. (The anthropologist Clark Wissler in his Indian Cavalcade [New York: Sheridan House, 1938], suggested that the Germans might have gained the idea for theirs from the American Indian reservations, in Wissler’s opinion about as cruel an institution as men had ever dreamed up.) Albert Jay Nock was one of the few who mildly reproached Americans for their hypocritical horror at violence in Germany in the period prior to American belligerence. Nock said of the American record, “The American mob’s grim reputation for savagery is equalled only by that of the revolutionary mobs of Paris. At the outset of the German government’s movement against the Jews, an American visitor asked Herr Hitler why he was making it so ruthless. The Reichskanzler replied that he got the idea from us. Americans, he said, are the great rope and lamp-post artists of the world, known to all men as such. He was using the same methods against the Jews that we used against the loyalists of ’76, the Indians, the Chinese on our Western coast, the Negroes, the Mexicans, the Filipinos—every helpless people, in fact, whom we ever chanced to find underfoot. This may be a rank exaggeration, but the barb in it sticks.” Nock, “The Jewish Problem in America,” Atlantic Monthly (June, 1941), p. 703.

Books such as Our Future in Asia by Robert Aura Smith (New York: Viking, 1940), set the tone among journalists and publicists. This and others pushed the message of the beauties of defensive participation in the war against the revolutionary powers of Europe and Asia in order to preserve already acquired economic privileged status in South America, Africa, and Southeast Asia, and lacked almost entirely the expansionist vision painted by Jordan.

the most influential periodicals from the autumn of 1940 onward is the increasing domination of industrial promotion copy by "defense"; the accent had already markedly departed from "selling" the civilian customer. While there was little to do but describe the awesome properties and dimensions of the super-weapons contracted for via "defense," the "admen" promised the sky for later on, "the golden postwar future," in the words of one agency, whose works *Fortune* apparently did not forget.

One will have to admit that for some of the cooperators in "defense," the war era itself was pretty wonderful. Few things angered the mouthpieces of the new internationalism more during the war than charges that it might also be, and was, profitable to its political exponents and their business and legal associates. But there must have been something to the charge, especially after Controller General of the United States Lindsay C. Warren's testimony before the House of Representatives in 1943 and 1944, that more than *fifty billion dollars* of "slush" had already been skimmed off some war contracts, and that extensive lobbying in behalf of war production firms was going on conducted by officers after leaving the armed services.17 (This latter has become a veritable industry in itself, in the last quarter of a century.)

No decent study of this aspect of the matter has ever been made, nor of its obverse, that part of the economy which prospered little or not at all during the high days of wartime "defense production." Prodigious government wartime use of the railroads, for instance, did not even begin to bail out the railroads. In January, 1944, President A. T. Mercier of the Southern Pacific Railroad revealed that "today 27 per cent of the total United States railroad mileage is still in receivership."18 Undoubtedly many other sectors of economic activity languished during this time when everyone supposedly was getting fat, even though a combination of "defense" and conscription (14,000,000 men entered the armed forces, and 6,000,000 ended up overseas in that foreign war that Mr. Roosevelt promised no Americans would participate in) ended the mass unemployment which had plagued the country under Republicans and Democrats alike. "One of the first things we must realize is that in the 1930's we never did find the answer to full employment," admitted the formidable New Dealer Chester Bowles nearly a decade later. "Only the defense program in

17See also the article-editorial "War Profits," *Christian Century* (April 12, 1944), pp. 456-457, a summary of the Truman Committee's third annual investigation of the "national defense program."
1940 put our people to work and only the war and the cold war that followed have kept them at work."19

"We all know that this was a commercial war," declared President Woodrow Wilson in his post-World War I speech at St. Louis on September 5, 1919. We are still waiting for an honest history of World War II (starting at least with 1933) based on the same approach, especially one dwelling on conflicting material interests as the principal cause, exacerbated by national political decisions on the part of the largest states to solve their local problems by dissolving them in a much larger one. One can only speculate on what might have resulted had the war ended in a negotiated peace well before most of the killing and destruction had taken place, but it is hard to imagine a worse situation than that which has grown out of "total victory."

No war in history has produced so much talk and writing as World War II, nor has there ever been a time of so much wartime literature and palaver which said nothing. The eminent doyen of journalism in America at the end of the war, Henry L. Mencken, described the coverage of the war as having been done not well but "wordily." Mencken characterized the war correspondents collectively as "a sorry lot, either typewriter-statesmen turning out dope stuff drearily dreamed up, or sentimental human interest scribblers turning out maudlin stuff about the common soldiers, easy to get by the censors." "The primary duty of reporters is to tell the truth until it becomes dangerous," Mencken insisted, but concluded gloomily that as far as the reporting of the war by Americans to Americans was concerned, "there wasn't much of that."20 "The pens of the journalists are made of the same steel as the cannon," observed Aristide Briand, the famous French foreign minister of the 1920's (co-sponsor of the fateful Briand-Kellogg

19"No More Liberal Clichés," The Reporter (January 19, 1954), p. 6. There is a remarkably similar admission by an even more famous New Deal functionary, Rexford Guy Tugwell, in his recent book, The Brains Trust (New York: Viking, 1968). Bowles's most prestigious job in the New Deal bureaucracy was that of administrator for a time of the notorious wartime Office of Price Administration. In a long address in New York City on February 29, 1944, he admitted that OPA price controls on food alone were being evaded to the tune of $1.2 billion annually, that 5 per cent of all gasoline sales were also being made on the black market, and that there were many millions of dollars of "overcharges" on numerous non-food items as well. The real situation was undoubtedly somewhat worse than this. See verbatim report of the address in New York Times, March 1, 1944, p. 13.
pact to "outlaw" war). While wars are going on, one should expect that reporters of that war will be serving largely as civilian combat auxiliaries, concentrating on home-front morale instead of a description of what is actually going on.

Undoubtedly the area in which maximum evasion and calculated obscurantism occurred was that of war aims. If one takes the wartime tonnage of print and millions of radio words on the subject at face value, excluding the bellowing about "saving civilization" and the like, obviously intended for the unsophisticated or the pre-occupied, we come to the realization that as far as the non-Communist side of the "Allied" partnership against the Axis powers was concerned, there really was just one tangible war aim, the preservation of the British Empire (and possibly those of the French, Belgians, and Dutch as well).

However, it is very rare to find an honest declaration of this objective. Jordan's was the first of any significance by a public figure, and probably the best of all in so few words. It is a mystery why it was so thoroughly ignored. As the war progressed, the objective of empire preservation was even more occluded, particularly after the United States entered as a belligerent. British spokesmen, mainly Winston Churchill, took on the task of telling the world, sandwiched in between the pious claims to be fighting for "civilization," "morality," and such classic mysticisms as "the national interest" (a recent one is "world responsibility"), that come what may, the last thing the war was being fought for was the liquidation of the Empire. It is ironic that it became one of the war's very first casualties. The cost of defeating the challengers guaranteed that.

Leftists in and out of Churchill's coalition government concentrated on other alleged goals of the war, the majority of them preposterous but momentarily beguiling. But they rarely fooled the realists. Even as early as December, 1940, the Very Rev. William Ralph Inge, the celebrated "gloomy dean" of London's St. Paul's Cathedral, declared, "Those who prate about a better social order after the war are talking mischievous nonsense. However the war ends, we shall be an im-

21In a speech at the banquet honoring the new lord mayor of London, Sir Samuel Joseph, on November 10, 1942, Churchill made his most famous remarks on the subject: "Let me, however, make this clear, in case there should be any mistake about it in any quarter; we mean to hold our own. I have not become the king's first minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British empire." See Francis Neilson, The Tragedy of Europe (5 vols., Appleton, Wisconsin: C. C. Nelson, 1940-1946), III, p. 384; "Churchill Retorts," Newsweek (November 23, 1942), pp. 46, 49.
"DEFENSE" ORIGINS OF THE NEW IMPERIALISM 17

poor nation."\textsuperscript{22} The best brief official statement confirming Dean Inge's prediction came from Brendan Bracken, British minister of information (Britain's equivalent of Germany's Josef Goebbels and the U.S.A.'s Elmer Davis). In assessing the cost to Britain of five years of war, on November 28, 1944, he announced, "We have sacrificed most of our Victorian inheritance. What was the treasure of our grandfathers has gone, and it has been well and gladly sacrificed."\textsuperscript{23} The last sentence was hard to believe, for no one "gladly" becomes impoverished, but it was an instructive commentary on a brand of "conservatism" which could bring about impoverishment as a substitute for affluence, and call it "survival." The realities of the situation which Bracken hailed so poetically were spelled out late in August of the next year by Oliver Lyttelton, minister of production in the same Churchill government, when he declared that "the standard of living of every citizen in this country, and nearly every citizen in the British empire, depends upon our receiving sympathetic help and a large measure of financial aid from the United States."\textsuperscript{24} Mendicancy had replaced solvency some time before this, however. Lord Woolton, minister of reconstruction, had calculated on July 6, 1944, "We have sold all we have and have incurred overseas debts double the amount of our previous overseas investments."

But all is never lost, apparently. One of the recent trends in English historiography is the development of a kind of positive-good theory on the impact and consequences of the twentieth-century world wars on England. They are now being viewed as necessary (particularly World War II) to bringing "democracy and socialism" to England. Historical works by English writers critical of becoming involved in these wars are gently dismissed as being "Whiggish."

A catalog of everything of American initiative that went awry during the great war to shore up the Western colonial system would be a multi-volume project. Even such apparently generous gestures as Lend-Lease performed mightily in visiting ruin to Britain's foreign trade, which began to seep through to some of the more astute even before the war ended. But it was obvious to many of those with long years of living experience under European imperialism that the United States was not going to be a successful "heir and residuary legatee" (Dr.

\textsuperscript{22}In London Evening Standard, quoted in Christian Century (December 25, 1940), p. 1624.
\textsuperscript{23}Cited in Neilson, Tragedy of Europe, V, p. 100.
\textsuperscript{24}In Neilson, ibid., V, p. 524. The wartime "austerity" program in England continued long after the war. Food rationing lasted into 1954 and coal was rationed until July 14, 1958.
Jordan's description) in the classical manner. Probably the bluntest and least evasive of all the critical commentaries was that of Hadj T'hami el Glaoui, pasha of the Moroccan city of Marrakesh, in 1944:

American policy today stirs up everything and settles nothing. The result is that it creates a void, opening the way to new tyrannies instead of new freedoms. At the bottom of America's attitude is the assumption that all the world wishes to be American. And that assumption is false.  

"Britain is a sunset country, dying a slow death," remarked the contemporary English novelist John Fowles to New York City reporters in an interview early in 1966. Fowles is just one of many who have been describing this drawn-out process of demise since 1945. It is a course the hectic action of one American political regime after another has been unable to do more than delay. Saving the British state (as opposed to the English society) has been a top priority item ever since the war of 1914, but the vast cost incurred has not prevented change, saved the Empire, or even prevented England from "going socialist," a course which all English politicians have followed. (One need only recall Churchill's twenty-page, 5,000-word Conservative Party policy manifesto in the late spring of 1945, while he was campaigning for re-election, in which the opening point was the "Conservative stand for free enterprise as against Labor socialism," which was followed by a list of eight major areas of massive government intervention and control that Britons could count on if Churchill and the Tories won.)  

Protracted industrial warfare between national states has done more to spread and entrench socialism than the efforts of all socialist zealots in recorded time combined and compounded.

When it comes to imperialism in the old style, it is obvious, and has been for nearly three generations, that Americans are no good at it.

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27"Churchill in Dreamland," *Newsweek* (June 18, 1945), pp. 58-59. Churchill's defeat was one of the most stunning political upsets of all time. The press media on both sides of the Atlantic expected him to be reelected by a vast margin, and confidence exuded from all the other agencies of communication as well. Lord Moran, Churchill's physician, commenting during the campaign, suggested that even Stalin's favorite was Churchill: "It is not easy for anyone to get into Stalin's mind, but as far as one can make out, Stalin thinks that the prime minister is a broth of a boy. Stalin doesn't like a man who lives on nuts and soda water." (Undoubtedly a reference to Churchill's opponent Clement Attlee, though it might also have been applied to the moralist and vegetarian Sir Stafford Cripps, with whom Stalin had wartime association.)
and have no noticeable talent for it. In fact, the different ways of administering lands far from continental United States led to a large apologetic literature denouncing the term *imperialism* when applied to the deeds of Americans in distant places. And the trained seals employed in the writing of official history and related materials concerning public and world affairs, who of late have had to jump a little less high every year for their fish, have become wondrously expert in implanting this semantic conditioned reflex.

But the kind of imperialism Dr. Jordan predicted to the investment bankers nearly twenty-eight years ago has long been a fact of international life. The military expansion accompanying “defense,” now a global, and likely to be soon an extra-terrestrial, affair, and the economic explosion across the planet, are its current manifestations. The present-day “defense” industry sector is a necessary complement and accompaniment to both. And there is a world stirring of unrest against both today. Best sellers complaining of the latter, such as the recently published *The American Take-Over of Britain*, a rich periodical literature assay of the subject in several lands, and the headaches of the American dollar overseas, are some of its measurable expressions. The American difficulties in Southeast Asia, the pending disintegration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and recurrent growls about enclaves of United States armed forces and weapons in far-away areas presumably enjoying being “defended,” are harbingers of rebellion against the former. For many, the critical estimate of the Moroccan pasha in 1944 has never lost its validity.

As World War II (the “great patriotic war,” as Soviet politicians refer to it) recedes into the past and the volume of propaganda bombast bawling huzzas to its great conquering chiefs abates, more and more sobered estimates of its significance emerge, even if the world political scene built on its remains largely intact. That of the famed English literary figure Malcolm Muggeridge is a fitting summary not only of the substance of the war but of its “hallowed” aims.

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28Between the bitter and abusive *Moonshine America* by Leonard Wayman (London: Golden Galley Press, 1948) and the above title, by James McMillan and Bernard Harris (London: Leslie Frellin, 1968), there has been a constant flow of literature devoted at least in part to a hostile analysis of the impact of the new American imperialism upon the fortunes of Britain and the steadily shrinking empire, with malice and envy managing to surface generously in most of them. In the eyes of many this is not grounds for resentment but evidence of “arrival,” in that the successful in imperialistic pursuits can always expect such reactions. But it is common to read loud complaints in the American press over the lack of affection and gratitude on the part of distant peoples, who in the popular mind are simply the recipients of American largesse.
not the least of which was the hope of salvaging the old imperial system: \(^{29}\)

In all the immense literature about the 1939-1945 war, one may observe a legend in process of being shaped. Gradually, authentic memories of the war—of its boredom, its futility, the sense it gave of being part of a process of inevitable decomposition—fade in favor of the legendary version, embodied in Churchill's rhetoric and all the other narratives by field marshals, air marshals, and admirals, creating the same impression of a titanic and forever memorable struggle in defense of civilization. In fact, of course, the war's ostensible aims—the defense of a defunct Empire, a spent Revolution and bogus Freedoms—were meaningless in the context of the times. They will probably rate in the end no more than a footnote on the last page of the last chapter of the story of our civilization.

"The contemporary world has turned its back on the attempt and even on the desire to live reasonably," wrote the famed philosopher George Santayana at the height of the Korean war. \(^{30}\) The level of international insanity has not abated in the fifteen years since the uttering of these words: the decay described by Muggeridge in recent days is one of its reflections. In an important sense it plots out a development peculiar to modern universal industrial war, the essence of defeat brought down on victor and vanquished alike. It is almost always forgotten how thin and fragile are the conventions upon which rest such abstract sentiments as national patriotism and military discipline, to give just a pair of examples, in modern national states. We are familiar with the spectacular and sudden rupturing of these in lands which are the losers of wars, and cognizant as well that sometimes they are never regained or restored. This has become accepted as a commonplace consequence of defeat. But we now are beginning to realize that the spiritual weariness and morale breakdown of the defeated are no longer self-contained, that variations of these, with the same virulent potency, may incubate among the triumphant. The glorious world empire vision described by Virgil Jordan, heaping up in the imagination like the serried piles of sun-tinted cumulus clouds on a summer sunset horizon, has long lost its romance. A large part of what people have been told was worth fighting for has turned out to be little more than words, the substance for the most part amounting to hardly anything but illusion. More than a generation ago the poet Prescott Chaplin observed, "We

\(^{29}\)Esquire (February, 1968), pp. 32, 141.

live on a crazy planet, our backgrounds sketched in blood, the story
told by prostitutes, idiots, or innocents. We have been ruled by fools,
tutored by liars." Santayana has referred to the great wars of this
century as "adventures in enthusiastic unreason." But the same specious
verbiage and spinal-cord reactions which helped prepare populaces for
participation in them are with us today, helping to re-emphasize the
timelessness of Chaplin's analysis. All we lack at the moment is a
restatement of Jordan's policy essay, projecting a great outer-space im-
perialism as a substitute and replacement for the planetary adventure
which has now run full course.

The "Report from Iron Mountain"

No account of where "defense" has taken us in the last three decades
should conclude without some attention to the Report from Iron Moun-
tain on the Possibility and Desirability of Peace (New York: Dial
Press, 1967). As the purported product of the ruminations of a com-
mittee of fifteen experts called together by the United States govern-
ment, it is, on the basis of internal evidence, a hoax. All its sources
are mentioned in its text and notes, and the entire study is obviously a
summarization of past and not new research, with a concluding in-
versionary emphasis of the "findings" with the presumed deliberate
intent to shock and stir: George Orwell did precisely this two decades
ago with his Nineteen Eighty-four (London: Seeker and Warburg,
1949).

A large part of what is in this much-discussed "report" has appeared
over and over in a different format in revisionist writing for about the
same period of time that Orwell's book has existed, and is consequently
rather tame material for those acquainted especially with World War
II revisionism.

Report from Iron Mountain takes less than two hours to read, and
could hardly have taken much more than a week to write, probably
by a single person conversant with the sources cited. To suggest that
fifteen academic specialists needed to spend two and a half years in
sustained labor to come up with this tidbit is itself a spoof, but a
necessary one, in order to carry out the bogus solemnity by which it is
characterized.

There is as much imaginative insight into the likely nature of a
warless world system in some of the better works of science fiction as
there is in this "report"; such masterpieces of the latter as The Space

Merchants\textsuperscript{32} by Frederik Pohl and C. M. Kornbluth, and Player Piano\textsuperscript{33} (reprinted under the title Utopia 14)\textsuperscript{34} by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., come directly to mind.

The seminal ideas in this “report” have also been turned over for some twenty years or more by Lawrence Dennis in his newsletter Appeal to Reason,\textsuperscript{35} in a different context. In fact, the discussion of war as a form of make-work project along the lines of “pyramid-building” sounds uncannily like bits of Chapter XVI of Dennis’ early World War II book, The Dynamics of War and Revolution,\textsuperscript{36} which was titled, “After War, Pyramid Building.”

The “report” is a brilliant mixture of some of the most tortured and infuriating academic baffle-gab ever committed to print, interspersed with astonishingly effective and lucidly-written passages, though it also contains an alarming amount of repetition for such a brief work. Its pretentiousness is without doubt its most deceptive quality. But the suspicious auspices under which this “report” has been launched do not diminish the ominous quality of its contents.

It has as its fundamental thesis the proposal that the modern world order of national states is based on the war system, which is, of course, a theme of some venerability. It concludes, however, that there are no workable substitutes for war in the foreseeable future, and that all possible alternatives taken up in the “report” have grave shortcomings, and if undertaken are very likely to fail in keeping the state system healthy and functioning; they can be completed in too short a time, with too few people and too little spending. In substance, “the price of peace is, simply, too high.”

Among the services attributed to war in the enhancing and entrenching of the state system are (1) its reliable function in destroying a substantial fraction of the economic output without equivalent contribution, thus providing reasons for sustained employment in guaranteed

\textsuperscript{32}New York: Ballantine Books, 1953.
\textsuperscript{33}New York: Scribner’s, 1952.
\textsuperscript{34}New York: Bantam Books, 1954.
\textsuperscript{35}Published since 1946 in Northfield, Massachusetts, the successor to his pre-World War II Weekly Foreign Letter, which was issued in New York City.
\textsuperscript{36}New York: Weekly Foreign Letter, 1940. This book had a curious history. It was originally printed and bound under the auspices of the publisher Harper, and was ready for publication early in May of 1940. At this moment, the German drive through the Low Countries and France got under way, and for reasons which were never made public, but which become very obvious if one reads the book, Harper decided not to publish it at all. Dennis thereupon bought the plates and the already finished books and issued it under the imprint of his newsletter. It is still one of the outstanding pieces of realistic political thinking which has been done in this country in the twentieth century.
production which is not subject to market imponderables; (2) providing employment in the armed forces for a large number of otherwise unemployable types among both officers and enlisted men, and (3) serving as an effective brake on population expansion when the war system moves from a "cold" to a "hot" stage, though in a disgenic fashion. The latter is conceded to be a major long-term weakness of war, but one which strategic bombing and other methods of carrying the war to the entire civilian community is overcoming. The discussion of the subject of atomic warfare follows closely the favorable speculations published during the last half-dozen years by the new breed of state policy advisors known in some circles as the "megadeath intellectuals." "To make too common a use of fear is to destroy its efficacy," Emile Faguet pointed out long ago. The tactic adopted by the more recent official speculators on what atom bombs are likely to do to the home front no longer follows the horror line of the era of 1945-1960, but tries to convey the notion that it might not be so bad after all.

Whatever may be said about the devil's advocate style and intent of the "report," it has stripped away the cloak concealing "defense." It is revealed here to be an integral part of the war system, a vital sector of war preparation for a campaign to be carried on to an enemy or for expansionist intentions (this essentially is what Dr. Jordan was trying to tell the investment bankers in December, 1940) masked under the guise of a "good word," since all but a small fraction of the populace see virtue in defending oneself. It is no accident that the most characteristic trait of every empire in history is that it has been endlessly and tirelessly preoccupied with "empire defense," that is, the protection of its loot in the areas it has "liberated," the most appealing and effective propaganda term yet fabricated to disguise conquest and theft.

To further dismay the multitude whose thought has been circumscribed by the propaganda verbiage of the war state system, the "report" scoffs at the assumption that wars result from "conflicts of interest," and mysteriously omits all reference to the traditional mechanisms of popular political control; its emphasis is on the survival of the war system and the state which depends on it regardless of the wishes of electorates. Perhaps the phantom fathers of the "report" might

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38 There is a tone of studied superiority in the makeup of the "report" which reflects in part the flavor of Bulwer-Lytton's satiric romance *The Coming Race* (1870), in which an American discovers a utopia populated by a very advanced people who were extremely scornful of democracy, which they called "Koombosh," government of and by the ignorant.
have cited in their extenuation the celebrated John Stuart Mill and his observation that an efficient and well-managed democracy was impossible without experts who were given full freedom to do what only they could do.

*Report from Iron Mountain*, though it may appall the more idealistic and optimistic among libertarians, can be read as a succinct accounting of where we have been taken by “defense,” and a rationalization for the route we are likely to take from here. Others detect in it the same tongue-in-cheek quality which James Burnham pointed out in Nicolò Machiavelli’s *The Prince*, in his *The Machiavellians, Defenders of Freedom.* However, our concern for the moment is with where and when an important element of all this began, not with what it has brought to pass nor with what is still likely to eventuate.

“At some point the war racket will just wear out,” predicted John T. Flynn over a dozen years ago in a trenchant critique titled *Militarism—The New Slavery for America.* “It will come to an end, as it has in every country that has used this evil thing called militarism to generate prosperity.” In view of current tendencies, one may be inclined to suggest that it is somewhat early to start watching for its demise. In the 1920’s there were American armed forces in three countries. During the Second World War they were in thirty-nine countries and as of the summer of 1967 they were in sixty-four. This latter figure is also the approximate percentage of the world total of direct foreign investments currently owned by United States Americans, a fact which has no necessary direct relation. The “new” imperialism must be analyzed with complex tools and methods.

40 (New York: America’s Future, 1955), p. 14. Flynn revealed the influence of Major General Smedley D. Butler of the United States Marines, who wrote a pointed little volume upon his retirement which was published under the title *War Is a Racket* (New York: Round Table Press, 1935). Though General Butler spent over thirty years in military service and won two Congressional Medals of Honor in his career, which he whimsically described as that of a “glorified bill-collector,” he obviously gained nothing out of being an American pro-consul in the Caribbean. He died on June 21, 1940, in Media, Pennsylvania, leaving an estate of only $2,000; *Los Angeles Times*, July 19, 1940, p. 15.
41 Agency for International Development, *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945 to June 30, 1967* (Washington D.C., March 29, 1968), cited in Harry Magdoff, “The Age of Imperialism,” *Monthly Review* (June, 1968), pp. 11-54. This useful study might have been made much stronger by an examination of Russian and Chinese imperialism since the end of World War II, but is understandably limited as a result of the Marxian guidelines which it follows.
Virgil Jordan’s Speech

CAPITAL NEEDS OF INDUSTRY FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE


Before we can understand any of the needs of industry for national defense, we must first try to comprehend what this thing we call our “defense program” really means. We have not yet been willing to look the phrase squarely in the face. We vaguely recognize that it has something to do with the world war raging in Europe, Africa, and Asia, the depressing news of which we read in our morning paper, but I am afraid that most of us still have only the dimmest idea about the relation of our defense program to this planetary struggle.

When it began in September, 1939, we could not be blamed for feeling that we did not know enough of the facts about this war to be sure of the part we should play in it. Since then we have learned more, but not much, and even today few people, if any, know the truth about conditions in any country involved in it, or even in our own; and if anyone does, no one is telling it. In peace time it is the accepted custom and normal manners of modern government to conceal all important facts from the public, or to lie about them; in war it is a political vice which becomes a public necessity. People in every country, including our own, have more or less reconciled themselves to being pushed around by their public employees and treated as though they were helpless wards or incompetent inmates of some vast institution for the indigent and feeble-minded. It is much in this spirit and atmosphere that the chatter and prattle about our national defense program proceeds in this country today.

Whatever the facts about this war may have been or are now, it must be unmistakably clear to any intelligent person that we are engaged in it. Our government has committed the American community to participation in this war as the economic ally of England, and as her spiritual, if not her political, partner in her struggle with the enemies of the British Empire everywhere in the world, to help prevent, if possible, their destruction of the Empire, and if this should not be possible, to take her place as the heir and residuary legatee or receiver for whatever economic and political assets of the Empire survive her
defeat. To meet this commitment our government has been, or will be, compelled to assume control of the lives, property, resources, and productive organization of the American community, and to do so more completely than it anticipated would be necessary in carrying out the program of socialization upon which it was engaged during the six years before the war began.

In broad and blunt terms, that is what the national defense program really means, and it is in the light of this fundamental fact that all problems of economic policy, as regards business, investment, consumption, labor, and government, must be considered henceforth. Whether this colossal commitment, of which the American community was, and still is, largely unconscious, was a wise one for the future of the American people, is a debatable but now utterly idle question, and I for one am not willing to debate it any more.

We should realize, however, that even the job of winning the war, with England or alone, is only part of the task to which America has committed herself for the future. Whatever the outcome of the war, America has embarked upon a career of imperialism, both in world affairs and in every other aspect of her life, with all the opportunities, responsibilities, and perils which that implies. This war inevitably involves a vast revolution in the balance of political and economic power, not only internationally but internally. Even though, by our aid, England should emerge from this struggle without defeat, she will be so impoverished economically and crippled in prestige that it is improbable she will be able to resume or maintain the dominant position in world affairs which she has occupied so long. At best, England will become a junior partner in a new Anglo-Saxon imperialism, in which the economic resources and the military and naval strength of the United States will be the center of gravity. Southward in our hemisphere and westward in the Pacific the path of empire takes its way, and in modern terms of economic power as well as political prestige, the sceptre passes to the United States.

What this implies in terms of economic expansion for an indefinite period in the future no one at this time can even imagine. From the pages of British experience, however, we know some of the things that this white man's burden may mean when we assume it. We know that it implies a vast responsibility of assembling, applying, and conserving the financial resources upon which it rests. We know, too, from some of the darker pages of British experience in the past century, that it implies an enormous task of expanding and maintaining a vast organization of man-power, machines, and equipment, not merely for national
defense, but for effective and continuous exercise of international authority in the maintenance of peace and order. We should realize, too, that before this part of our new imperial responsibilities can be performed, they must rest upon the solid and broad base of internal unity and domestic prosperity, which will imply intelligent and courageous reconstruction of our own economic and political life after the immediate war effort is over.

We may be afraid of the unfamiliar and forbidding word "imperialism" in connection with the commitment we have made. We may prefer, in the current American fashion, to disguise it in a vague phrase like "hemisphere defense." But, consciously or unaware, America has been destined to that career by its temperament, capacities, and resources, and by the drift of world events, not merely in recent years but since the beginning of the century, and certainly since the last war. The confused and often infantile financial adventures of the 20's, of the depression, and of the New Deal period, as well as the disintegration of Europe in the past decade and the desperate plight of England, have driven us along that road, and provided us not only with the occasion but with the economic tools, the social attitudes, and now the political manners and customs of modern imperialism. In fact, in the event of a German victory there is no escape from that responsibility except by a relapse to a position of inferiority, which is inconceivable. We have no alternative, in truth, than to move along the road we have been traveling in the past quarter century, in the direction which we took with the conquest of Cuba and the Philippines and our participation in the last World War.

All this is what lies beneath the phrase "national defense"—some of it deeply hidden, some of it very near the surface and soon to emerge to challenge us. Both the immediate task of defending Britain and perhaps saving her from defeat, and the more distant responsibility and opportunities of imperial inheritance, will require the immense effort and vast sacrifice which any great destiny demands if it is to be fulfilled. We must be prepared, as we are not yet prepared, for such effort and sacrifices, but if and when we make them willingly, we must be equally determined that they shall not be made in vain. We shall regard the effort and the sacrifice necessary both to win the war and to fulfill the responsibilities of empire as an immense investment in the future of America, and perhaps in the future of civilization.
II

A Look at Conscription, Then and Now

Not long after the national nominating conventions named President Lyndon Johnson and Senator Barry Goldwater as the contenders for the presidency in the election of 1964, both men astounded large elements in the country by pledging to work for the termination of conscription, if elected. These promises were headline news in several of the country's largest newspapers in the middle of the summer, and excited a goodly volume of discussion and comment.

One hesitates to suggest that either candidate or his entourage considered such a policy move a majority desire. But undoubtedly it was prompted by the feeling that enough people were of such persuasion as to represent a juicy parcel of votes. A Gallup poll released just before Christmas, 1964, corroborated this surmise. It revealed that 23 per cent of their national sample believed the draft should be abolished, while another 14 per cent were in doubt as to the wisdom of continuing this institution.1 These two combined constituted a rather tidy fraction of the national community, and indicated a significant deterioration in a state of mind which, over the last quarter of a century, seemed growingly committed, with few dissenters, to this totalitarian service for its young men as far ahead as anyone might care to peer.

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The revival of conscription as an arguable issue has been an electrifying event, at a time when it seemed as though the paying of the Confederate debt was more likely to gain the agenda as a discussion topic, so many people having become adjusted to compulsory military service as one of the endurable pillars of the American way of life. Of course, these would not include the number acquainted with the eloquence of Daniel Webster during the War of 1812, denouncing suggestions that this country adopt such a program then, as little more than reliance on the artifices of distant tyrants.

The state everywhere owes a profound debt to this handiwork of the French Revolution, brought to a high polish later by Napoleon I. But it was not until the First World War that the modern industrial national states perfected it into the science which it has become. And it has been the complement to universal suffrage in the evolution of the ant-hill society; the common man has had proffered to him the ballot in one hand and the rifle in the other; the two have usually accompanied one another, even if at an irregular pace.²

As far as today’s collegians are concerned, perhaps there is an aspect of confusion and mystery connected with this stage of the situation, since an overwhelming majority seems to believe that a period of compulsory military service has been a thing American males have always had to look forward to. And some of those fighting for its dissolution know so little history that they imagine they will be the first eligible youth free from its grasp since colonial times, if not from those of Genghis Khan. But there is a goodly fraction of their teachers whose whole college careers, graduate work and all, were spent entirely in an era when the cold breath of the draft did not blow on the nape of anyone’s neck.

The writer belongs to the last college generation (four years, the usual time span necessary to attain the bachelor’s degree, is considered a generation in this context) which were able to spend at least part of their undergraduate life unconfronted by compulsory military service in peace time. Possessors of one of the original draft cards, issued in mid-October, 1940, have become as elite a “club” as those holding Social Security cards beginning with an “001” number.

²See especially Hoffman Nickerson, The Armed Horde, 1793-1939: A Study of the Rise, Survival, and Decline of the Mass Army (New York: Putnam’s, 1940). It is obvious that Nickerson’s subtitle was too ambitious, in view of the fantastic expansion of the “armed horde” in the six-year planetary bloodbath which followed its writing.
The majority at that time trudged off to register with the morale of a steer being led into an abattoir. But at least there was the general atmosphere that something unusual was happening, and a widespread unhappy and depressed sentiment prevailed; the circumstances under which this revolutionary change in policy was taking place charmed very few of those involved.

"The Panic Is On" was the title of one of the swing-music hits of the time. And indeed it was, though the peace-time draft was a reflection of a somewhat different one. This panic was the one induced by the successes of the German military machine in Scandinavia, the Low Countries, and France in April, May, and June of 1940, before which the vaunted forces of the French and British had folded like an oriental fan, despite enjoying vast material and manpower superiority.

Bi-partisan supporters of the foreign policy of the Roosevelt administration, with its powerful favorable predisposition toward these latter countries' regimes, promptly contributed to the hysteria by helping to float scare stories of imminent invasion of this country. Before the end of the summer, eyes were already being raised skyward, in expectation of seeing Adolf Hitler's paratroopers descending on Des Moines, Keokuk, and points elsewhere. Life magazine, just over three years old at the time and ready to try anything, had a generous hand in this spate of palpitation, publishing on the heels of the Anglo-French debacle three pages of sketches, drawn as far back as March, 1939, and based on advice from "the best available military advisers in Washington," which described an easy aerial and naval invasion of the United States from both West and East simultaneously. It was obvious that there was no objection from high places to this incubation of morbid anxiety and consternation, and its contribution to popular panic which helped depress opposition to "defense" appropriation legislation was never estimated, let alone its part in diverting attention from the flurry of conscription proposals, which events of that moment also inspired.

\[\text{Life, June 24, 1940, pp. 16-19. Roosevelt himself entered the arena of fright propaganda in his address before the Navy League dinner in Washington late in October, 1941, when he told the audience he had gained possession of a "secret map" prepared by Adolf Hitler which showed South and Central America carved up into five vassal states of Germany, and also a "secret Nazi document" which revealed the intention to "abolish every religion in the world" and replace them by an "international Nazi Church" and with Hitler's Mein Kampf to take the place of the Bible. Time, November 3, 1941, p. 11, soberly reported this as fact and no one laughed.}\]
A formidable team of journalists, aided by radio and newsreel commandos, and supported by a contingent of completely unhinged educators, shrieked of our utter inability to fend off the horrid "Narzies," to use the pronunciation of Britain's Winston Churchill. Though unable to cross the twenty-six miles of the English Channel, by some magic they were expected to drop unopposed upon mid-America, 4,000 miles away. (One route which they were expected to take was via the hump of South America, in which case the Germans would have been performing a stunt comparable to moving back to Istanbul for a running start. One must keep in mind, of course, the limitations of the propeller-driven aircraft of over twenty-five years ago.) It was of interest to those who resisted these efforts to dissipate their skeptical judgment to learn in 1945, when General George Marshall filed his final report as chief of staff, that no evidence could be found that the Germans even had a coherent plan for controlling Central Europe, let alone entertaining grandiose schemes for overpowering the United States.

This was part of the emotional climate prevailing when Congress undertook debate on bills to provide vast "defense" spending.

An idea of the effect of this invasion-scare program can be gained from observing the behavior of the representatives of the people, who argued long and cantankerously over an appropriation bill of $363 million for building warships in 1933, but passed an appropriation bill of some $8 billion with scarcely a murmur in the summer of 1940. Of course, an immense conscript armed force to use the martial hardware which would presumably result from this "defense effort" was also on the legislative agenda; the thesis that if the country was really in danger, such manpower would have been readily forthcoming via the volunteer system, was never allowed a test. The fact that majorities of 80 per cent and over stubbornly refused to support entry into the war by the administration right to the day of the Japanese attack on Hawaii on December 7, 1941, indicates the degree to which the scare propaganda of imminent invasion of continental United States (Hawaii was an island possession 2,000 miles away, not a state, in those days) was discounted.4

4The state usually finds printed limitations on the exercise of power, such as constitutions, particularly expendable in war time, and all states when feeling especially endangered resort to such means as they consider they must in order to sustain themselves and preserve their life and tenure. Reproaching the citizenry at large for its lack of devotion to this goal is a widely-employed tactic in modern times. One may recall David Lawrence's scolding and rebuke to the faint-hearted during the war: "To refuse to assist the State is to con-
In any event, by the end of the summer of 1940 the representatives of the people had passed and Roosevelt had signed the Selective Training and Service Act, often referred to as the Burke-Wadsworth Act, from the names of the bi-partisan pair who introduced the bill, Senator Edward R. Burke and Representative James W. Wadsworth. This was the first compulsory peace-time military service bill ever passed in United States history, and with a number of modifications in the more than a quarter century since, it remains our basic conscription law. The Burke-Wadsworth bill was not the only measure proposed, but it ended up being the one adopted. With Roosevelt’s signature September 16, it provided for the registration of all men between the ages of 21 and 36, and for the training for a calendar year of 1,200,000 troops and 800,000 reserves. On October 16 was begun the job of registering 16,400,000 men. Those selected were drawn in a lottery, beginning October 29, and the first draft notices began to be received in November. (This writer remembers being one of the first to receive the famous “greetings” but recent recuperation from a near-fatal illness, involving pneumonia and various complications, did not make for ready acceptance.)

A fantastic amount of undercover work was represented in this conscription act; many persons of diverse political persuasions contributed their labors in its behalf. The work of a powerful and wealthy Anglophile “conservative” element drew much attention in the four months before the work ended in law. An influential “liber-
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al" sector of opinion makers, after first backing a universal training suggestion, also found their way to this side of this draft proposal. Undoubtedly, the former element, in addition to their ardent sensitivity toward the cause of certain British Tory leaders at grips with the Germans at that moment, also thought of conscription as some kind of political therapeutic. As Lawrence Dennis analyzed them in his acerbic critique, "Many, for example most of the members and supporters of the Civilian Military Training Camps Association, favor conscription because they believe it will be a force for conservatism and an antidote for the subversive isms and for revolution. In this belief they are 100 per cent wrong." Dennis, of course, was proven absolutely right. But probably the most concise analysis had occurred forty years earlier. "Universal, conscript military service with its twin brother universal suffrage has mastered all continental Europe, with what promises of massacre and bankruptcy for the Twentieth Century!" exclaimed the celebrated French historian Hippolyte Taine, in 1891, in his *Origines de la France contemporaine*. One could only remark in extension that the slaughter of 1914-1918 had proven insufficient illumination of M. Taine’s vision, apparently, as everyone began to get ready for another round of murder, robbery, and destruction.

The new conscription act promised to be somewhat more grimly and stringently enforced, if its stipulations were to be believed. Though Roosevelt on registration day spoke expansively about this being a reviving of “the 300-year-old American custom of the muster,” this must have caused his speech writers as much heartburn as Robert E. Sherwood confessed to have suffered every time he heard the part of Roosevelt’s 1940 Navy Day speech in which the promise

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5For the people and the arguments supporting conscription in those heated months, see in particular Porter Sargent, *Getting US Into War* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1941), pp. 396-432, 442-447, 470-488. This book, by the author and publisher of the celebrated *Handbook of Private Schools*, undoubtedly contains the most formidable compendium of material relating to the war drive of the Roosevelt administration between 1939 and 1941, and the sources of its opposition.

6Dennis, *Weekly Foreign Letter*, August 24, 1940. This crisply written, privately circulated publication infuriated pro-war elements as much if not more than anti-involvement newspapers with circulations in the millions; apparently they did not forget, once the war so dearly desired was a reality, for in a matter of months thereafter Dennis was indicted for "sedition" and became one of the defendants in the ludicrous trial which collapsed with the death of the trial judge in 1944. The best account of the disintegration of this politically motivated legal burlesque is the book co-authored by Dennis and Maximilian St. George, *A Trial on Trial* (Chicago: National Civil Rights Committee, 1946).
was made "again and again and again" that no Americans would be sent off to "foreign wars," Sherwood having written this succulent tidbit. In the case of this conscription procedure, there really was no one kidding anyone; this was compulsory, and utterly unrelated to the colonial muster. A violator was guilty of a felony, not a misdemeanor, as had been the case in the First World War; the law provided for a penalty of five years in prison or a fine of $10,000 or both.

There is little material on the subject of evasion during World War I, and little more on the subject of conscientious objectors. There had been about 1,300 of the latter in the First World War, and something was known about their treatment during the war years. What remained an obscure subject was the degree of evasion of the law by those who "joined the forces of General Green," as evasion and desertion had been so picturesquely described in the Civil War. Apparently it had been substantial in 1917-1918 as well, since even textbooks in the 1940's declared that evasion had been the major handicap to proper enforcement in that time. But far better police methods and improved transportation and communication in 1940-1941 were expected to make both evasion and desertion much more difficult and their incidence much less, though we have little to work with on these subjects for the Second World War as well as the First. Looking for material on such subjects is in a class with trying to prepare a faithful account of the extent of violations of wartime rationing and price control and the operation of the "black market." The successful in such enterprises are most unlikely to become sources of documentation.

A literature does exist on the fate of those who challenged conscription, on various grounds; after the United States became a belligerent, their treatment was anything but gentle. Should anyone think that the vaunted liberal Roosevelt regime treated intellectual or religious objectors with kind and gentle hand, a rude surprise is in store. * Far more Americans spent the decade of the 1940's in

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jails and work camps on account of their resistance to compulsory militarization than is generally assumed, and still another contingent spelled out the era in assigned labor tasks of one sort or another which did not differ in principle from the forced-labor programs of Hitlerite Germany or Stalinist Russia. The fate of such as the Jehovah's Witnesses is another aspect of the story. The mauling, maiming, and even lynching of members of this inoffensive sect by outraged "patriots" for their attitude toward conscription and other outward trappings of the state was later matched by their imprisonment by federal authorities, with federal judges refusing to grant them hearings even on writs of habeas corpus. The experience of the Jehovah's Witnesses alone shreds the tiresome liberal bromide that the excesses of the First World War did not make their appearance during the Second. (To be sure, there were no repetitions of such lunacies as the uprooting of German as a school subject and the changing of the name of sauerkraut to "liberty cabbage," but there was a special venom and covert totalitarian viciousness to the World War II social in-fighting when compared to the ignorant exuberance of the war enthusiasts of 1917-1918.) But strangely enough, there has been only very modest circulation of the writings of the CO's of the Second World War, as compared, for example, to the reception of Harold Studley Gray's "Character Bad." At the start of registration, only a few religiously-motivated residents dared to refuse to "cooperate," principally a group of students at Union Theological Seminary. It was instructive to note the position of the two major voices of liberalism in America in those times, the *Nation* and *New Republic*, once the leaders of anti-militarism and all related sentiments, now enlisted emotionally in the European war and straining every nerve to spread belligerent feelings in the intellectual community. Both rejoiced over the situation in October, 1940, while reserving harsh words for the handful which refused to register, hinting that stern measures were likely to be taken against them. It seemed a bit grim that such a position should be taken,


for the country was not in the war, and most of the proponents of conscription, including the President, were hailing a peacetime draft as just another of the steps "short of war" necessary to keep the country out of it. Not everyone was taken in by this soothing explanation, however; as Senator Henry F. Ashurst of Arizona remarked, "Men do not jump half-way down Niagara Falls."10

The high emotion and hysterical climate which prevailed during the time the peacetime draft became national policy, steadily deteriorated in the twelve months that followed. For one thing, the war in Europe developed into a stalemate, and it apparently took some effort to keep it alive. As the spirited liberal academic warrior Hans Kohn declared late in 1942, "If Britain had wished to make peace with Germany, she could have done it easily in 1939, in the summer of 1940, and again in the spring of 1941."11

While many opinion-makers in the country began to work themselves into cheering squads for or against Stalin in the summer of 1941, after Hitler's Germany went to war with the Soviet Union, the state of mind prevailing among the drafted in the makeshift army camps of the day began to darken, and this first contingent of draftees began to get restless. The one-year period of service was drawing to an end, and the law needed supplementation in order to keep the process going. Threats of mass departure were heard, and the sepulchral acronym OHIO (Over the Hill in October) began to appear on barracks walls and elsewhere as the Congress began to debate a bill extending the original period of service. And it was accompanied by a new variety of invasion hysteria. It was advanced, with a straight face that now that the Germans were invading Russia, they would soon sweep across Siberia and then be poised for an invasion of Alaska from Vladivostok, thus making it even more imperative that a big conscript army and extended military construction take place to forestall this portending foray. There was prompt seconding of this variant on Mr. Roosevelt's widely advertised German air-drop on Iowa by the profoundly pro-war weekly

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10Quoted by Sargent, Getting US Into War, p. 444. Some sources were not in the slightest way inclined to indulge in this kind of coyness. Time (November 10, 1941, p. 13) referred admiringly to Roosevelt as the man who "was waging the first great undeclared war in U.S. history," and summarized his press conference the morning the news was revealed that the destroyer Reuben James was sunk by a German submarine as a statement describing the United States as "far into the unknown waters of war." The attack on Pearl Harbor was still weeks in the future.

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Time, which announced in trembling tones, “With Russia’s Siberian bases in German hands, Alaska could become another Norway,” presumably fully equipped in advance with “quislings,” undoubtedly.\(^{12}\) It was reported that the President relished the revival of invasion threats as an aid to pass supplementary conscription legislation, spending a large amount of time drafting his address to Congress pleading for their action, while insisting that the country was in “infinitely greater danger” in the summer of 1941 than it was in the summer of 1940.\(^{13}\)

There was substantially more difference of opinion on this question now than there had been a year before, however. A widespread attitude of skepticism prevailed, pro-war propaganda was selling very badly (a Gallup audience survey at the moment the President was active with the second annual invasion scare revealed that there was no audience outside of New York City for anti-Hitler and anti-German moving pictures, and that almost all propaganda movies into July, 1941, had “fizzled at the box office”),\(^{14}\) while a re-


\(^{13}\)Time, July 28, 1941, p. 7. One of *Time’s* most pointed bits of unconscious humor, and, at the same time, superb double-think, appeared two weeks before. The editors, responding to a correspondent who sought to find out whether *Time*’s dictum of June 9, that “every man is a propagandist, whether he knows it or not,” also applied to *Time*, announced, “*Time* makes no claim to being unbiased and impartial,” which they promptly qualified, “But *Time* does set as its goal to be fair in reporting and never takes sides in partisan affairs.” (July 14, 1941, pp. 2-3.) Actually *Time* was enlisted in the war on Germany and Japan well before much of the rest of the country, and in 1941 reported anti-war or neutralist activity as though they were barely noncriminal enterprises. It gloated when Senator Burton K. Wheeler (D.-Mont.), a liberal leader in the non-interventionist camp in the U.S. Senate, and the famed flier Charles A. Lindbergh, the most notable speaker in anti-involvement circles, were denied the opportunity to speak in behalf of these views in Atlanta and Oklahoma City, respectively, in July and September. This made good accompanying copy to hypocritical groans over the suspension of free speech in Germany, Soviet Russia, and Vichy France. To be sure, there must have been substantial differences of motive to be found in *Time*’s pro-war stance when one compared the Anglophile tendencies of its publisher, Henry R. Luce, and the fervent pro-Soviet emotions of two of its most influential editors, Whittaker Chambers and T. S. Matthews. Matthews’ memoirs, *Name and Address* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), are revealing; Chambers’ case is known the world over.

\(^{14}\)See report of Gallup’s Audience Research Institute, headed by David Ogilvy, “Biz Meets Facts,” *Time*, July 21, 1941, pp. 73-74. The real bonanza on World War Two propaganda films was struck after the war; television has shown almost all of the propaganda films of 1938-1945 many hundreds of times all over the country in the last fifteen years.
doubtable contingent in the Congress was fighting the extension of the period of service of the draftees with dogged determination; part of their attitude was that such an extension would constitute a violation of contract, in that the full period of service had been spelled out in the original law. But the extension of the period of service for another eighteen months squeaked through by the astounding margin of a single vote, 203-202, in the House of Representatives, and Roosevelt promptly signed the bill on August 18, 1941.

The closeness of the vote and the division which it represented nationwide was a sobering experience for FDR and many of his most closely adhering supporters in high places. The drive to make the U.S. a formal belligerent had sputtered badly as well, though in the eyes of some legal figures, the country had become one technically for sure, as a consequence of its vast military and other aid to England beginning about the time of the first draft law with the dispatch of some fifty so-called "over-age" destroyers to help augment the British navy. By the time of the supplementary conscription act, the economies of the U.S. and Great Britain had drawn quite close together; probably something between two-thirds and three-fourths of America's export trade were going to this destination at this moment. And the academic and intellectual world was stepping up its calls for war as a compensatory step for the decreasing zealosity of the general populace. The first outright declaration by an organized group of American educators for full participation in the war came from the Progressive Education Association in the form of a manifesto signed by twelve of the fourteen editors of its journal, Frontiers of Democracy, about a month before the supplementary draft act was passed.15 The growing bellicosity of the senior faculties in many colleges was a revelation in its own right.16

By this time, also, the economic effect of the "defense" activity

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16Anti-war Harvard students, picketing a pro-war rally by a fellow-student organization, the Militant Aid to Britain Committee, in the Harvard Yard in December, 1940, carried a placard reading, "Let's Send 50 Over-age Professors to Britain." The success of the militant interventionists in capturing the strategic editors' chairs on college student newspapers tended to reflect a much more heated eagerness for combat than one was likely to encounter among the student bodies at large. Already-enlisted journals such as Time worked hard to create the former impression by calling attention to student newspaper editorials rather than to unspecialized student opinion; see for example its article "Switch" in the issue for October 13, 1941, pp. 68-69.
was being felt everywhere, and the spreading stake in a "defense" job was having a noticeable and in some cases profound effect on political behavior. Between-the-wars liberal spokesmen had taken upon themselves the task of covering themselves with shame for the "egregious profits" made by American businesses out of various World War One enterprises, and the "merchants of death" theme had been enlarged upon with great effectiveness and éclat. But liberalism having split to its core on the issue of this new war, only the anti-war sector was paying attention to the profits being amassed out of "defense," on which subject there was now barely an occasional squeal from the interventionist (and majority) faction, many of whom were moving toward the assumption of important jobs in the future war administration, of which a few had already been taken by such as Archibald MacLeish.

17 The term is Frederick Lewis Allen's; see his "The Lesson of 1917," Harper's, September, 1940, pp. 344-353 (350). The leftist New York newspaper PM was one of the few to report a speech by Senator Ashurst on August 21, 1940, in which he asserted the First World War had made 23,000 millionaires, while many senators left their seats in embarrassment. (PM, August 22, 1940). Shortly after June 22, 1941, PM would no more have printed such news than they would have praised Hitler.

18 MacLeish, the new Librarian of Congress, had already emerged as a top war propagandist, and spoke of war in such glowing terms as almost to embarrass a career man in the Army, while bitterly condemning the young men of the time for their resistance to emotional mobilization in the British cause. But, a few years before, in 1934, as the editor of Fortune magazine he had been responsible for approving Eric Hodgins' famous article, "Arms and the Men," which for all practical purposes launched the whole "merchants of death" era. His personal sentiments were best expressed in response to a questionnaire from the editors of the Modern Monthly, published in June, 1935. In reply to their questions, "What will you do when America goes to war?" and "Would a prospective victory by Hitler over most of Europe move you to urge U.S. participation in opposition to Germany in order to prevent such a catastrophe?" MacLeish replied emphatically, "I should do everything in my power to prevent the U.S. going to war under any circumstances. There is only one possible position against the menace of militarism: absolute hostility. Any other is romantic." Fellow liberal (but sharply anti-war) Edmund Wilson, commenting on one of MacLeish's most aggravating war calls in the 1940-41 period, estimated him as the outstanding intellectual turncoat of that time. (See Wilson's article, "Archibald MacLeish and 'The Word,'" New Republic, July 1, 1940, pp. 30-32.) An equally effective dissection of MacLeish as a profound ideological somersaulter was that by Morton Dauwen Zabel in the first two issues of the Partisan Review in 1941. MacLeish as a darling of the American Stalinists during the 1935-38 period was examined with considerable verve by Burton Rascoe in his famous November, 1940, American Mercury article, "The Tough Muscle Boys of Literature." Probably it was the difficulty of making sense out of MacLeish's contradictions, obscurities, and sudden emotional and intellectual conversions and repudiations that provoked the Hearst columnist...
However, there is a counter-lesson to the doctrine of economic determinism in observing the sectional vote on the subject of the extension of the draft. The congressmen from the South outdid all other sections in their enthusiasm for more conscription and voted for it almost to a man. Yet they came from a section which was enjoying little of the new income flowing from “defense.” For instance, the state of New Jersey alone at one time in 1941 had more “defense” contracts than the entire fourteen states of the South combined. 19 (It is ironic also to note that the South was more incensed at Hitler Germany and its racial policies and more anxious to fight than any other section of the country, again illustrating another American tendency, the penchant for becoming furious at some place elsewhere.)

Far from accepting the situation, indeed a healthy segment of American industry, commerce, and finance was vastly troubled by the rapid transformation of America. David Lawrence, in his famous July 4, 1941, editorial in the United States News called loudly, “The United States is on the threshold of national socialism,” adding, “The inroads of national socialism are unchecked by either Republicans or Democrats who have hitherto defended our system of private initiative.” For sure, the discipline and planning of industry was geared more then, as always, to the success of the national state in warfare, as is also increased state regulation of the economic system, than to gain any other alleged objectives related to the “welfare” of the citizenry. And, a short time later, Lawrence, coaching businessmen to be alert and cash in on the vast reconversion of industry to war, admitted this in his issue of August 22, 1941: “Government isn’t a respecter of individual interests, isn’t too much concerned about individual hardships, so long as its own purpose is served.” Shortly after, Lawrence himself smoothly and effortlessly

George Dixon to write the satirical spoofing verse (prior to his “elevation” to government employ MacLeish was best known as a poet):

Oh west is west and
each is each

And so is Archibald MacLeish.


19There is more to be learned concerning what World War Two was about in the “Business and Finance” sections of Time, Newsweek and U.S. News, and half a dozen major daily newspapers in Boston, Chicago, New York, Washington, and Los Angeles between 1930 and 1945 than from reading the propagandistic books of any number of the inhabitants of Academe.
joined the forces which obliterated the distinction between war and peace; "defense" was the key word in this successful assault, and the resulting state of affairs continues to the present day. Conscription was simply its other face. The eventual entry of the U.S. into the war via the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941, ended all talk about the wisdom or necessity of compulsory military service, while just the first six months of intensive military production and conscription in 1942 did more to take the "bends" out of the already much-socialized U.S. economy than the eight years of peace-time New Deal tinkering, combined and compounded.

For a long time, the Second World War and the leaders of the victorious side have been as sacred a herd of cows as has ever been known to graze in the meadow of history. A handful of novels have dared to discuss its dark and seamy side, while a few recent television shows have undertaken to tell the viewers that it was funny, but an almost solid lock-step exists in the scholarly world on this immense and complex subject, faithfully clinging to as many of the fables and propaganda yarns and emotional smotherouts as possible, in an effort to keep from getting tarnished by revisionist revelations and having their dearly-cherished fairy tales controverted. This makes it extremely difficult to examine the conscripted army under fire in the manner that Dlight be described as sociological analysis. Picture and print still deal only with the heroic and the semi-celestial.

But a Harper's magazine story of nearly twenty years ago is a faint inkling as to the scope of the story which still remains to be told. It is obvious that evasion of conscription by failure to register was no doubt the course chosen by a small minority, while the tiny band which defied it undoubtedly were steeled by a deep faith in some principled ethic or strong religious conviction. For the vast majority, registration and superficial cooperation was the route taken, with the objective in a staggering number of instances being that of gaining a discharge from the armed services or seeking a status of incapacity. In an extended comment on this side of the picture, John McPartland, in the article in the above,20 related that at one time the Army decided that bedwetting was sufficient reason for a discharge, and that shortly after that the incidence of bedwetting went up twelve hundred per cent in one Texas training camp. A "wave of psychoneurotic discharges" followed, and it was

only stemmed when the War Department issued a circular which removed bedwetting as a justification for discharge. But there were a number of other avenues open to unenthusiastic conscriptees; "MR 1-9, the army manual for spotting malingering, was never better than a lap or two behind the ten to twenty per cent of our troops who hit the sick book in high hopes of home." "There were more AWOL's than civilian strikers during the war, more hours lost owing to desertion," declared McPartland, "than were lost because of strikes." "This was not a generation of heroes," he summed it up glumly, concluding with an analysis of the country and the times which is in a class all by itself:

By the end of the war it was plain that the only people we were really angry at were ourselves. We knew that we had gone into a war without any great cause we believed in; we had avoided military service when we could, and we were neither ashamed nor criticized for it. . . . We were unregenerate, unashamed, and uninterested. We weren't even surprised or too angry when all the vaunted postwar planning that had been paraded through our periodicals—had achieved spectacular failure. . . . Nobody thought that this war was going to make the world safe for democracy, that this was the war to end war, or that we were going to succeed in our postwar plans. . . . We receive the courtesy of the extravagant lie, and we return the courtesy by buying the merchandise. But we don't expect very much. This strange relationship of the lie, the lie known and discounted, and the incredulous public that doesn't believe and hasn't believed for a long time but goes along anyway, pervades our politics and our religion as well as our commerce. . . .

But what of the performance of that part of the conscript army which managed to get to the fighting fronts? Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall and a group of 350 co-workers, investigating the European Theatre of Operations in World War Two, interrogated hundreds of "outfits" fresh out of battle, and, on the basis of what they heard, "fixed the percentage of men who actually fired their rifles against the enemy at 12 to 25 per cent." In other words, Brig. Gen. Marshall's report to the Operations Research Office concluded that anywhere between one man in eight and one man in four did all the shooting which resulted in "victory" in 1944-1945. This is confined entirely to combat soldiers who were armed and in a position to fire their weapons at their enemy. But even this is a very generous estimate, when one examines some of the case studies mentioned by Brig. Gen. Marshall in his book *Men Against Fire*,21

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of a reinforced battalion of over a thousand men ambushed by Japanese on Makin Island, only thirty-seven fired their weapons, and in a later engagement on Chance Island in the Marshalls, where a crack unit of over 100 men engaged in a fight with Japanese forces, only fourteen did all the firing against them. Even elite forces had little better records; Brig. Gen. Marshall declared that no more than 25 per cent of the best air-borne troops actually fired their weapons at the Germans in Europe.

In the early stages of the Korean War, the record was even worse; Brig. Gen. Marshall reported one instance of remnants of an infantry division trapped by the Chinese in North Korea, during which engagement the division commander reported seeing only one soldier returning Chinese fire. A platoon of another infantry regiment which broke and ran, allowing a serious break-through, arrived in the rear with nearly all of its ammunition unfired. By the end of this latter war, it was claimed that the percentage of those engaging in fire fights had risen to one out of two combat soldiers, but the figures submitted by Brig. Gen. Marshall to the Operations Research Office after five months of observations in Korea in 1952 were not very convincing.

Particularly interesting as techniques used to increase involvement in battle were suggestions from psychiatrists. "The most efficient method is to prompt them to lose their individual identities by promoting a mob psychology," wrote one journalist who summarized the program of breaking down inhibitions against killing, though he admitted the "remolding" via "emphasis on mob-psychology techniques" carried "disturbing implications."22 Seeking advice from clergymen he was reassured by all he consulted that there was nothing to fear, while one was quoted as saying:

In a life-and-death struggle, it sometimes is necessary to lift the curtain of morality and civilization from men's souls to expose the brute beneath. But when the crisis is over, if the curtain is old and solidly designed and substantially built, it will easily drop back into place again—to mask the brute forever.

Undoubtedly, this is the same kind of spiritual advisor who is endlessly heard intoning in dread despair concerning "the moral crisis of our age," and indulging in similar mind-wrenching agitation. If the "life-and-death struggle" is long enough, or if there is

22For this and related materials above and below see Bill Davidson, "Why Half Our Combat Soldiers Fail to Shoot," Collier's, November 8, 1952, pp. 17-18.
a succession of them, there usually is not enough left of "the curtain of morality and civilization" to bother to talk about.

Throughout the emergencies which have prevailed from the late 1940's to the two-thirds mark of the 1960's, conscription, has maintained its Svengali-like grip on the American imagination. By far the most important reason for this has been the Cold War. Beginning with the efforts at "containment" of Soviet expansionism in 1947, and continuing through to the present day's similar efforts to stem that of Red China, a state of endemic semi-war, breaking out now and then (especially 1950-1953 in Korea) into full-scale hot war, has persisted. The failure of peace to break out in the more than twenty years since the end of World War Two and the existence of one emergency after another since that time have had much to do with the fact that the draft has never sagged as policy, at least until recent times. A high level of sustained military activity, the development of a prodigious complex devoted to preparation for waging atomic war and defending the country from a similar enterprise, and the vastly increased importance of military personalities in politics and business (we have long been familiar with the general or admiral-turned-politician become chairman of the board), have all helped to contribute to a favorable climate of opinion supporting one of the main props of this system, conscription. We have even seen a spell of politicking by the spokesmen of the armed forces for the great totalitarian dream of Universal Military Service, a structure which goes well beyond the draft.23

For a time in 1940 there was a rash of talk about such a system and FDR was reported in favor of this rather than a conscription act modeled on that of 1917, which is what the country eventually got. It would have involved the policy of two years of compulsory service for all, young women and young men alike, most of it devoted to home-front labor services not unlike what was being done then by the Civilian Conservation Corps, and which has been extended in recent years to foreign countries via the Peace Corps. In other words, military training was definitely subordinated to this other objective.24 It did not succeed in gaining the necessary sup-


24The liberal press in particular flowered with editorials all during the summer in praise of UMT schemes attributed to Roosevelt; one of the most adulatory was the New Republic's "Universal Military Service," July 1, 1940, pp. 6-7.
port in 1940, nor have variations on the theme of universal service suggested from those times to the present. The only serious move in this direction during World War Two was Roosevelt's suggestion in his message to Congress in January, 1944, that a "national service" law be passed. Apparently this was under study for some time because the Army and Navy Journal for January 8, 1944, leaked out that such a proposal would be made by the President. However, it lost support rapidly under the charge by "liberals" that it was really a front for a strike-breaking agency; their zeal for such schemes had abated markedly in four years. After the Korean War, in General Dwight D. Eisenhower's first term as president, the proposal of universal military training again went the rounds, especially after Eisenhower's message to Congress in support of such a policy in January, 1955. This did not get off the ground, either.

But the idea is anything but new, despite its revival in still another form by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara in a speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Montreal on May 17, 1966. "It seems to me that we could move toward remedying the present inequity in the military draft system," McNamara said on this occasion, "by asking every young person in the United States to give two years of service to his country—whether in one of the military services, in the Peace Corps, or in some other volunteer development work at home or abroad."25

The far more pronounced favorable psychical atmosphere toward sophisticated totalitarian collectivist proposals today than a quarter of a century ago rules out any jaunty confidence that we shall never see universal service of this sort. The same Gallup poll referred to above on the subject of conscription revealed that "large majorities" were in favor of funneling those physically or mentally incapable of meeting current armed forces standards into a "Domestic Peace Corps," and heavy popular support has also been noted for a revival of the CCC youth work camps of the 1933-1943 period, which in turn were really little more than a version of the para-military

25 This address was made front-page news all over the country; the Denver Post's sensational promotion (May 18, 1966) can be taken as characteristic of the major newspapers. Undoubtedly this had something to do with the appointment by President Johnson on July 2, 1966, of a commission to study the draft and to determine if it is possible to "establish a practical system of non-military alternatives" to it, a rather peculiar turn of events, since just a few days before, a draft survey which took two years to complete was filed by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower Thomas Morris. This was supposed to be the last word on the subject for some time to come, and flatly stated that the draft would be needed for another ten years.
youth institutions functioning contemporaneously in Stalin Russia, Hitler Germany, and Mussolini Italy, but molded in harmony with American rather than Russian, German, or Italian traditions. A free society is inevitably one in which government is big enough to do its job properly," declared Professor Julian V. Langmead Casserly, of Seabury-Western Theological Seminary (Evanston, Illinois) before the University of Denver International Colloquium on Logic, Physical Reality, and History the same day Secretary McNamara's plea for universal service made headline news all over North America, an assertion which was warmly received. It would seem that in a political environment in which Prof. Casserly's dictum can be looked upon as high wisdom, the introduction of universal service ought to be little more than moderate technical problem, at worst. To be sure, such a scheme would be far milder than the total mobilization order of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia upon the outbreak of hostilities with Italy late in 1935, which, strangely enough, has been going the rounds among Pentagon officials for the last year, and a framed copy of which hangs in the office of General Lewis Hershey, United States director of Selective Service from 1940 to this day. It reads:

Everyone will now be mobilized and all boys old enough to carry a spear will be sent to Addis Ababa.

Married men will take their wives to carry food and cook. Those without wives will take any woman without a husband. Women with small babies need not go.

The blind, those who cannot walk, or for any reason cannot carry a spear are exempted.

Anyone found at home after the receipt of this order will be hanged.

In part, the circulation of such a primitive and ferociously barbarian document, authored by an African politician who has been

26On the European origin of these work camps one should see Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, Out of Revolution (New York: Morrow, 1940) and Kenneth Holland, American Youth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1940). Rosenstock-Huessy, who had a strategic role in the beginning of such institutions for German youth during the Weimar regime in Germany, was repeatedly credited with having played a similar function in bringing about the launching of the Civilian Conservation Corps by the New Deal.
extolled for over a generation by “scholars” as the very distillation of “democracy,” is perhaps a reflection of exasperation and a feeling of harassment growing out of the sharply stepped-up tempo of conscription as a result of the amplification of the undeclared war in Viet Nam and the remarkable amount of resistance to it, in a wide variety of ways, which surely has not made the conduct of the Viet Nam campaign weigh any easier upon those responsible for carrying it out. Whether Goldwater or Johnson got the votes of the people opposed to or cool toward conscription will probably never be known. But one thing is definite: there was no more talk by the latter about winding up conscription once the election was in the bag. In fact, the election had barely cooled off before it was discovered that the draft would have to be reinvigorated, not terminated, and a loud wrangle has prevailed ever since over many aspects of the institution. Though the casual talk of 1964 which referred to it as expendable is a thing of the past, the President continues to show his indecision, as in the incident in July, 1966, while talking to a group of young people, during which he spoke of the draft as “a crazy-quilt” and remarked, “We are not wedded to it.”

There have been high and low points in the history of conscription in the United States. In many ways the nadir of the institution was somewhere between 1929 and 1935, during which years profoundly depressing anti-war pictures* such as “Journey’s End,” “All Quiet on the Western Front,” and “What Price Glory” exerted such dramatic influence on a multitude of viewers, while books such as Squad, Company K, The Horror of It, and Lawrence Stallings’ The First World War and Dalton Trumbo’s Johnny Got His Gun, plus a scattering of realistic revisionist works from the academic world, all helped to reduce the prestige and attraction of war and the warrior to a twentieth-century low.**

*An indispensable source for understanding the function of the film as both pro- and anti-war influence is the little book by Winifred Johnston, Memo on the Movies: War Propaganda, 1914-1939 (Norman, Oklahoma: Cooperative Books, 1939). Undoubtedly, there was a pungent aroma of insincerity surrounding the anti-war products of the Stalinist and Stalinist-sympathizer contingent entrenched in the film industry, particularly among the writers. Their sudden somersault around 1937, in harmony with the newly discovered virtues and glories in military combat by the home base at Moscow, is just one of the several ludicrous lurches performed by those in America with unshaken loyalty to what genuine radicals derisively christened “Bolo Heaven.”

**The emphasis in much of this film and print was not that “military men are the scourges of the world,” as Guy de Maupassant expressed it in his fiercely critical essay on war in Sur l’Eau, but on the frightful destruction of property and loss...
Late in 1931 Albert Einstein in a celebrated nationally circulated article expressed the conviction that the moral decline of the white race began with the adoption of conscription. But he and most others of like views in that time made the trip to Canossa in the subsequent decade, and eventually became competitors in the production of belligerent manuals. It was especially ironic to see Einstein, the eloquent detractor of conscription, eagerly lend his assistance in the production of the atomic bomb, a device for the carrying of barbarian warfare against non-combatants on a scale which made the efforts of conscripted armies seem quite selective and restrained, by comparison. At any rate, it has been some thirty years since the last sustained critique of conscription as a moral catastrophe. Of the major world powers, today only Japan, painted by a trainload of Western journalists and propagandists between 1920 and 1945 as a people with a bloodstream filled with martial truculence, is barred by law from employing conscription.

of life of ordinary men. Extremely little of this has appeared in the more than a quarter century since the Second World War began. The glorying and the gloating over the murder and destruction in this war, particularly that suffered by the defeated, has literally become a major industry, and not a few fortunes in the publishing, moving picture, and television fields have been built on it in the "Free World."


The tough nationalists of one's own neighborhood are usually designated as "patriots"; the tough nationalists of another land are generally written of as "jingoes," "extremist zealots," and "chauvinists." When General MacArthur forced on Japan after World War II a constitution forever renouncing conscription, it was acclaimed in the American press in most vociferous terms. Twenty years later, sectors of this same American press were wailing that the once-so ferociously nationalistic and militaristic Japanese had grown so unwarlike and apathetic that they were unable even to staff fully a home defense force of a few thousand. (A Washington, D.C., opera company which put on a performance of Gilbert and Sullivan's The Mikado a short time after the Pearl Harbor attack distributed program notes to impress the viewers to the effect that the show depicted the Japanese "in the light that history now records—sly, wily and deceitful, unconscionably corrupt and treacherous." Time, December 22, 1941, p. 36). It apparently is a case where the state game had been played "for keeps" so viciously that the defeated no longer wanted to play. But the persisting dislocations caused by the war are multitude. A Los Angeles Times reporter visiting the Palaus twenty years after they had been smashed by American forces, and the portions undamaged by war subsequently systematically demolished, reported in the summer of 1964 that these islands, once a prosperous and bustling Japanese winter resort, looked approximately the way they had at war's end, in a state of unrelieved forlorn and tattered disorder. That is what "liberation" has meant there. Another curious consequence relates to so-called "reparations" from the defeated; a Manila journalist has recently disclosed, "Reparations payments to the Philippines by Japan are a rich source of swindle. This is known to everyone here—and in Japan....
Undoubtedly, no moral case will be revived as an accompaniment to any drive which might derail conscription in the time to come. The new rationale likely will be strictly "practical," built around the horrendous new weapons with their mass-killing powers, rendering the Armed Horde quite unnecessary. And there is a possible concomitant, that the new technical weapons are so complex and expensive that it is unwise to trust them to any but persons of superior intelligence, thus bringing to the fore again the idea of a relatively small well-paid group of professionals handling the business of "defense."

Meanwhile, "brush-type" guerrilla warfare has again become the vogue, with its propensity for enrolling the energies of ununiformed irregulars and many related amateur tactics. Though armed with more wondrous devices, it appears that these behind-rock-and-tree, hit and run activities are making the present-day conduct and problems of a line company in Asian jungle warfare not much different from what they were in colonial American Indian wars. In view of this development, it will be interesting to see how this contradiction, of warfare conducted in the neo-primitive manner, in an age of gigantic weapons capable of impersonal obliteration of millions in an instant, is reconciled. A serious conflict appears to be arising.

One should not be so fascinated or bemused by the spectacle of conscription and its vast social and other consequences and implications so as to neglect to glance at the politico-economic system of which it is a part. It has been suggested many times that conscription has a function in serving as a blotter for unemployment among the youthful uneducated and/or untrained. Granting this for the moment, while posting a reservation to the effect that surely there are more constructive activities for the young than two or more years of compulsory military service, itself one of the best forms of training for existence in a socialist order, one must take a long, hard look at the industrial and other sectors of the community which have become adjusted to an economy in which there is always a generous cut of the melon for the producers of the goods.

Through the years, since its inception in 1956, reparations payments have more often than not been diverted to line the pockets of public officials and reparations smart boys who make it a point to be in Tokyo every time procurement orders are out," and "resulted in little visible benefit to the country." Ben Javier, "New Twist for Reparations Payments," Examinér (Manila), May 15, 1966, p. 12, and "Reparations Headman," July 3, 1966, p. 23.
consumed in what seems to be an endless series of "defensive" adventures beyond the country's shores.

It is plausible that the populace, in a Gadarene gesture, might endorse such a plan as Universal Service, military or otherwise. But the suspicion lingers that conscription may not be as deeply rooted in American ways as the galloping military socialism that has evolved out of "defense," and which "conservatives" are supposed to be so enamored of, as opposed to the "creeping" socialism of non-martial sorts, allegedly the preserve of "liberals." In actuality, it appears that there is a powerful combination of both to be found in the former, and this is a predictable upshot of "bi-partisanship" in foreign policy, now nearly a quarter century old. The National Observer on June 13, 1966, revealed that the production lines of some 5,000 firms in this country were devoted exclusively or almost entirely to war production as a consequence of the expansion of the armed forces' needs in the Viet Nam conflict.\(^3\) A political analysis of this formidable group of enterprises would indubitably reveal that the affiliations involved were quite well dispersed, from the point of view of either ideology or party. The modified warfare state is steadily homogenizing them all. If there is a single dramatic thesis in Donald I. Rogers' recent book, The End of Free Enterprise,\(^4\) it is that, as of this moment, business is barely more than a handmaiden to big government. Many highly placed individuals and influential institutions are cheering this process on.

Martin R. Gainsbrugh, senior vice president of the National Industrial Conference Board, in attendance at a Washington symposium in April under the sponsorship of the American Bankers' Association, released figures fully as ominous as that cited above:

1. One-fifth of the gross national product is bought by governmental bodies.
2. Twenty-six out of every 100 employed in the country today are directly or indirectly working for one or more governmental bodies.
3. Twenty-eight per cent of the national income is collected in taxes alone by various governments: federal tax collections now

\(^3\)Undoubtedly, only a small percentage of this has consisted of actual munitions and military hardware. It is sometimes overlooked that about 80 per cent of the American "loans" to its "Allies" in World War One were spent on non-war goods such as food, clothing, raw materials, and many other products found in ordinary channels of economic life.

exceed the total of the country’s entire output of goods and services as recently as 1941. The combined spending of all levels of government today is close to $185 billion, about seven times what such spending was at the outbreak of World War Two.

4. Government of one sort or another is responsible for supplying seven per cent of all personal incomes “free” to individuals each year, by way of Social Security, disability and military pensions and benefits, unemployment compensation, and a number of other programs.\textsuperscript{55}

The question that comes to mind is this: are we so far along the road in the evolution of this sophisticated form of socialism that outside imbroglios, which rest squarely on conscripted manpower for “solution,” are necessary to keep up the level of intervention already achieved and possibly provide excuses for additional intervention? It is impossible to examine the issue of conscription apart from economic realities. It has become an explosive subject off and on for fifty years in this country, and it has been inextricably intertwined with vast foreign wars and an economy more or less geared to these struggles. The magic word has always been “defense.” Probably the big government called for by Prof. Casserly, that it may do its job properly, still is not big enough. In which case, it is little more than speculative diversion to talk about the pros and cons of conscription at all. A ray of hope does exist, growing out of the discovery of the bottomless pit of outer space, and the ensuing space race. This has provided for vast socialist expenditure; there are no privately-sponsored space shots or explorations anywhere yet. But neither has it required any conscripted personnel yet, though this might occur if it were discovered that evil forces in the galaxy require the extension of “defense” into the extra-terrestrial reaches.

An apathetic majority of about two-thirds still entertains the notion, even if somewhat vaguely and confusedly, that there is something faintly heroic and noble about conscripted service, indulging in reservation primarily on such occasions as when they are informed by the military authorities of a dead son somewhere in a distant land. The interrelation of business, the military, and the state seems to be beyond comprehension. Should there occur, however, a concentration of yet imperceptible circumstances which

\textsuperscript{55}See summarization of these figures by Sylvia Porter in her column, “Government Role Past Reversal,” e.g., \textit{Denver Post}, April 13, 1966, p. 86.
result in the dismantling of conscription, a train of consequences and concomitant adjustments are in store which may produce almost as many tensions, even though much different ones, as the present state of affairs is responsible for. A socialist omelet exists which will not be resolved into its constituent elements with any degree of ease.

At least one formidable conservative, Dan Smoot, has recognized the problem, and taken a resolute and unequivocal stand. In his Report for October 24, 1966 ("The Great Society’s Red Guards," p. 212), Smoot declared flatly, “Instead of expanding draft laws to create a national service corps, Congress should let the laws expire on June 30, 1967, and abolish conscription altogether. We do not need it.”

Smoot followed this with a consistent prescription: “If we concentrated on the kind of homeland defense we need, it could be manned by a relatively small group of professionals who could be hired in the open market for salaries attractive enough to compete with those offered by private industry, and who could be given the intensive, extensive training necessary for their duties.”
III

The Unresolved Question Of Fascism

"Marxists and many liberals . . . have completely misunderstood fascism as an extreme rightist reactionary movement. Others have obscured its peculiar characteristics by seeing in it nothing more than a particular manifestation of totalitarianism, a brother under the skin of bolshevism. Still others have tried to explain it in terms of a particular national character, especially that of Germany, and have searched the historic past for antecedents. It is the great merit of Hannah Arendt's pioneering The Origin of Totalitarianism to have shown that fascism cannot be understood through the traditional categories of politics, that it is neither right nor left, neither authoritarian nor democratic, but in truth 'a new form of government,' trying to stem and reverse the disintegration of modern society."—Professor Hans J. Morgenthau (Political Science, University of Chicago), in Book Week (February 13, 1966), p. 5.

A perceptive commentator at the end of the Second World War in 1945 remarked that every figure of importance in world affairs in the twentieth century (to that time) had been born in the nineteenth. One could go into great detail also in pointing out the immense and continuing influence of the nineteenth century in the area of political vocabulary. There probably has never been another century like ours in its degree of dependence upon that immediately preceding. But, in reference once more to politics, there is one verbal flower of the last forty-five years which is quite independent of the earlier time. Unlike communism, socialism, democracy, monarchy, utopianism, and most of the rest, it belongs to our time. This is the word fascism and its various derivatives and other forms.
Superficial observers think fascism was what the Second World War was fought to eliminate, but what has been quite remarkable has been the survival of the word in political talk and print ever since. An impressive number of invocations took place in 1966, to the puzzlement of many young people, to whom definitions of the word are simply received opinions of their elders. We had the spectacle, for instance, of Russians jailed in Communist Russia for calling the Soviet Union “fascist.” Street demonstrators in the United States repeatedly denounced the United States as “fascist” for its conduct of the war in Viet Nam; President Charles de Gaulle of France was yelled at as a “fascist” on his state visit to Poland, while various sources and personalities have been denouncing Prime Minister Harold Wilson of Great Britian as a “fascist” ever since his July, 1966, economic decrees, and the Russians capped it off by denouncing the December, 1966, changes in West German politics as “fascist.” In addition to this there has been a steady outpouring of books and smaller studies seeking to analyze fascism, including one which drew attention and comment in 1966, Ernst Nolte’s *Three Faces of Fascism.* But it would seem to a number of students that the confusion on the subject seems to increase with the passing of time, almost rivaling in a way the hilarious clutter and disarray which occurred every time an effort was made to clear the air on the subject during World War Two, though it is unlikely that they will reach the depths plumbed by the celebrated radio commentator Cecil Brown late in 1943.

Brown, who gained international repute as a result of his eyewitness report of the sinking of the big British battleships *Repulse* and *Prince of Wales* by Japanese torpedo bombers off the coast of Malaya on December 10, 1941, later undertook an assignment from *Collier’s* magazine to gather American definitions of fascism all over the country. This was supposed to be a psychological aid in prosecuting the war in which the United States was now engaged, by presenting some clear and unified picture of the nature of the enemy as understood by the general run of the citizenry. But Brown’s report of his national survey came to just about the reverse; his general conclusion, published on December 11, 1943, stated, “From coast to coast, Americans, in high-income brackets

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1New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966. This was originally published in West Germany in 1963 by R. Piper Verlag of Munich under the title *Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche: Die Action Française, Der italienische Faschismus, Der Nationalsozialismus.*

2See Brown’s “Stand By For Torpedo,” *Collier’s* (January 17, 1942), pp. 55-56.
or low, either could not agree on a definition of fascism or had no
definition whatever."

This seemed hard to believe, in view of the fact that for over
ten years the mass communications media had been bawling like
an off-key air-raid siren about the subject, but Brown admitted en­
countering persons who had not the slightest idea what the word
meant. Many of the definitions he put on record seemed to have
been prepared by script writers for comedians, and he had the
thoughtfulness and consideration to conceal the names and addresses
of those he quoted.

In his reply to Brown’s quiz, a Kansas radio executive declared,
“A fascist is usually a radical type of thinker such as a New Dealer.
It is someone who favors a limited form of government,” while a
Virginia typist, keeping in the track of the first of his statements,
opined that “fascism means being ruled by a government and hav­
ing part of your salary taken by the government,” which she fol­
lowed by the observation, “We just about have fascism in Amer­
ica now.” To a Maine shipyard worker, fascism meant “compulsory
military training”; “I don’t know of anything else fascism means,”
he concluded.

To a Kansas cattle raiser, fascism meant “the belief in a big in­
dustrial enterprise”; “anyone who thinks that way is fascist-minded,”
he confided. A Wisconsin factory worker and union member an­
nounced to Brown, “Fascism is a political party backed up by an
army and enforcing its wishes on the people”; said a North Dakota
broker hesitantly, “Fascism, I think, is about half-way between com­
munism and democracy,” while to a Tennessee housewife a “fas­
cist” was “a man in the business world who doesn’t pay his people
a living wage.”

From this point on, the definitions approached slapstick or in­
coherency. A Boston housewife remarked, “It doesn’t mean much
to me, except a group of people rabid about something, but I
wouldn’t know what,” while a Wisconsin housewife, a bit more
specific, figured out that “fascists are apt to be where the Italians
are located, and we never did have many Italians up here in this
part of the country,” sentiments which were nearly repeated by a
Women’s Army Corps member. A Massachusetts wholesale food
dealer volunteered that a fascist was “anyone who is a dictator, a
pirate or an isolationist,” while a Virginia machinist came close to

3For this and subsequent quotations below, including the definition of fascism
attributed to Roosevelt, see Brown, “Do You Know What You’re Fighting?,”
Collier’s (December 11, 1949), pp. 14-15, 52.
parroting the newspaper editorials or such empurpled radio bazookas as Gabriel Heatter, Alexander Woollcott, and Walter Winchell by defining fascists as "enemies of all that is good and righteous and just." A handful simply described fascists as "dictators," mentioning only Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini as examples, but studiously omitting Josef Stalin, since Soviet Russia was at the moment Our Gallant Ally. As for the others, three farmers from Maine, Iowa, and Texas, respectively, replied almost in identical words by begging off, "I don't know what it is," while two California longshoremen, one Negro and one white, added emphasis to this ignorance by responding, respectively, "The word doesn't make any impression on me; it doesn't strike any reaction whatever," and, "I don't know what fascism is, and I wouldn't know a fascist if I saw one." One could only remark in conclusion that it was a shame that so many of the speakers and writers of the time, who insisted on being wrong at the top of their voices or in book-length themes on this subject, lacked this last-cited respondent's refreshing candidness.

To note that Brown was appalled by this profound denseness on a subject which he thought should have evoked accuracy and brilliance is quite superfluous. Personally, he subscribed to a definition which he credited to President Franklin D. Roosevelt and which was supposed to have been announced on April 29, 1938. Brown quoted Roosevelt as saying:

The liberty of a democracy is not safe if the people tolerate the growth of private power to a point where it becomes stronger than their democratic state itself. That, in essence, is fascism—ownership of government by an individual, by a group, or by any other controlling power.

In view of the private nature of American political parties, it was strange that they were not included by specific mention, but this might have spoiled this glib analysis.

It is quite obvious that the employment of the terms "fascism" and "fascist" as related at the beginning of this study, and as transcribed for posterity by Cecil Brown nearly a quarter of a century ago, have vast common ground. They were political swear words then and they have been revived as political swear words today, in which capacity they may remain. But there is a historical problem involved, and the effort here is directed to the subject of economic analysis, the main concern of this investigation. Though the term appears early in the 1920's, it is probably only applicable to the regime of Mussolini in Italy, particularly since it was the only one
which used it as self-descriptive term. But "fascist" was used indiscriminately to apply to over a dozen regimes in the 1920's and 1930's, monarchies, military dictatorships, and one-party systems, but not applied to the one-party dictatorships of communist origin. This alone rendered useless the notion that any authoritarian political state could be designated as "fascist" for the purpose of analysis. This is just one aspect of the difficulty in fighting past the immense layer of incendiary invective and deliberate political obfuscation in order to examine measurable economic realities. But even now, the economic aspect is avoided or evaded. Political science Professor Hans J. Morgenthau of the University of Chicago, reviewing Nolte's recent book in Book Week early in 1966, declared, "In order to understand fascism fully, one must be a sociologist, a historian, and a philosopher at the same time," but omitted any reference to economics.

Separate economic analysis has always been hampered by the emotional and ideological ingredients which have invariably been stirred into the picture from the beginning. At the time Cecil Brown conducted his lugubrious survey into the abject ignorance of ordinary Americans on the subject of what fascism was, a peak was being reached in public communications following ten years of dinning into the national ear that fascism was a variety of rightist politics; communists, socialists, and fellow-traveling liberals had seen to that. It is a commentary on the ineptness of the American conservative that he sat around in a virtual coma all this time and let it take place, and it is evident that he has not entirely succeeded in getting the aroma dispelled, despite nearly twenty years of organized penitential explanation and textual exegesis.

Major credit for this achievement must go to the communists, not only those of the Bolshevik regime of Lenin and then Stalin but the various communist organizations outside Soviet Russia. All during the 1920's, the regimes in Italy, Poland, Hungary, and Rumania were facilely referred to as "fascist" by their domestic communists. Long before the appearance of the National Socialist regime of Hitler in Germany, the communist verbiage on these rival systems reached almost classical form and expression. In their hands the expert mixture of political and economic terminology took shape, and even today there are substantial vestiges of their description in circulation.

One of the earliest communist definitions of fascism set the tone

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*Book Week* (February 13, 1966), p. 5.
for two decades. Fascism was simply a particularly degenerate form of capitalism, inevitably doomed to collapse, and soon, because of the crushing internal contradictions it allegedly harbored. The implication was that it was simply a delaying action, with communism sure to follow it upon its demise at its own hand. For a time this definition appealed to many non-Soviet leftists everywhere, and comforted those who thought that watching fascism fall apart without aiding in this disintegration was a particularly pleasurable and painless form of political action.

To reproduce all the communist metaphysical visions masquerading as analysis would be excessive, but a few deserve note. The *New Masses* self-styled Marxian specialist George Novack defined fascism as "the political form of the rule of monopoly capital"; others described it as a "dictatorship" which resulted from crushing the class-conscious proletarians, and which kept itself in power by "maintaining its power over the working class by force and terror." Another popular communist gambit was the declaration that fascism represented the capture of the state by the "upper class." Who had it before that, was usually neglected as a topic of discussion. Two other theories along the capture-of-the-state line also got exposition: one of these described the capturers as an adventurer type, while the second identified them as a hard-eyed, financial-industrial-commercial combine.

In the period roughly rounded out by the four years prior to United States involvement in World War Two, non-Stalinist socialists and some liberals came up with another diagnosis of fascism: now it was the product of a ruined, poverty-stricken middle class, the victims of the First World War and the postwar dislocations and inflations. Instead of a dictatorship of Big Business, a specter consisting of a powerful plutocratic clique extending its power and engaged in grinding those who were down a little lower down, now we had a totalitarian order of the *lumpen-bourgeoisie*, with a vague program made up of a hash of populism, nationalism, hostility to unionized labor, and other not too clearly defined or outlined elements, with racism a part but not a necessary part of the total picture. What most of these new analyses omitted or suppressed was the anti-Marxist aspect which occupied a prominent position in these loathed systems. As will be noted later, this factor has returned

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5For the definitions abstracted below, and several others omitted for space considerations, see this writer's *American Liberalism and World Politics, 1931-1941* (2 vols., New York: Devin-Adair, 1964), vol. 1, pp. 36-43.
to prominence in recent discussions and estimates, particularly in
that of Nolte.

The striking thing about the score upon score of analyses, defi-
nitions, and interpretations of fascism in the decade before World
War II and all during the war itself was the tiny bit of economic
analysis of this form of organization which made any sense. Such
as did take place was mainly heated and angry Marxist moralism,
and probably came closer to metaphysics, or probably the term
might be metapolitics. Detached examination was a rarity. There
was an occasional liberal economist such as Stuart Chase who poked
fun at the communist nightmare portrait of a fascist state as one
installing an economy of scarcity bulging with gouging landowners,
robber barons, and bloated misers; Chase’s New Deal, published in
the summer of 1932, nine months before Franklin D. Roosevelt
was inaugurated President, was one of the few studies which in-
terpreted a fascist economy as one built on the theory of compen-
sating for underconsumption. But it was still a bit premature for
extended underconsumption theories to get much attention, as the
early 1930’s were the peak period of popularity of the apocalyptic
prophecies of Marxist Pythons.

Even the publication of John Maynard Keynes’s General Theory
of Employment, Interest and Money in 1936 and its almost simul-
taneous appearance in Hitler Germany in a German translation that
same year aroused barely a feeble note. It was not until the
European war was underway and German successes in 1940 stim-
ulated investigations of the German system as a war economy (and
gravely overestimated as such by Germany’s enemies) that some
detached examination began to appear, with a minimum accompani-
ment of the usual anti-Hitler tirades. To be sure, occasional brief
items dealing with the similar elements in National Socialist and
New Deal economies are to be found in various sources over thirty
years ago, and Germans under Hitler in those times were known
to have referred to the New Deal as “American National Socialism”
on more than one occasion.

Early in 1939 the liberal economist Eliot Janeway came up with
an economic analysis of fascism of more than ordinary insight for
the time; even though it rested on the armaments theory, it offered
some sobering material for others as well.

6New York: Macmillan, 1932. This first appeared as a series of articles in the
New Republic under the general title “A New Deal For America.”
7See preceding article for contents of Keynes’s prologue to this German edition.
8Janeway, “England Moves Toward Fascism,” Harper’s (January, 1939), pp. 111-
First, the government becomes the chief customer of industry. Second, because the orders it places are for specialized and ever more efficient equipment and materials, they soon outrun industry's capacity. The government becomes the financier of this expansion. Then, as in the way of most financiers, it begins to share control and actual ownership of industry with the industrialists.

Among the several examinations of the economics of fascism published early in 1941, that by Dal Hitchcock in Harper's was especially interesting. The author, a reputed economic analyst for a major New York firm of industrial and management engineers, concentrated on financial and fiscal policy in Germany, which he described as “revolutionary” and “successful.” He described the Germans putting elements of Keynes in operation three years before the General Theory was published. The beginning was simple: “The government issued short-term obligations to pay its expenses. This government paper was then sold to the controlled banking system or retained by industries and corporations as a form of liquid investment.” Hitchcock made a point of noting that National Socialism involved no nationalized factories or industries, that all business organizations were privately owned. But he also stressed the degree of elaborate government intervention, including subsidies for both import and export industries, which resulted in the increase of the internal national debt but provided acquisition of foreign exchange for desperately needed foreign products.

“The [Hitler] government is not dependent on tax income,” Hitchcock went on; taxes were as high or as low as the government wanted them. They happened to be high at that moment because...
of government expenses and the vast production of goods not sold to the public, leading to what he described as “excess purchasing power” not matched by available goods, promptly drained off by taxation, and further influenced by selective price controls on staple commodities. The concomitant policy for industry, the limitation of profit incentives, in part through the program of sales of government bonds to industries and corporations, not banks, also drew Hitchcock’s attention; “What the National Socialists have done in essence is to begin to chart the unknown realms of the dynamic use of government securities.” Another contemporary observer, Bronson Batchelor, writing in the Atlantic Monthly in the same month as Hitchcock, identified Keynes’s multiplier thesis with that of the German financial brain Hjalmar Schacht, “based on the same theory,” with a basic premise “that capital financing by the use of government credit increases national income by more than the amount so spent.” Government debt simply represented “deferred taxes.”

With the entry of the U.S. in the war a few months later, and the political marriage of convenience with Stalinist Russia which the unpredictable fortunes of war brought about, the economic analysis of fascism once more degenerated into Marxist barking and propagandist denigration. (Though this somehow failed to diminish the formidability of the enemy, it did make possible the development of a total politics for support of a postwar disposition of the world in harmony with communist objectives so thorough that nothing has jogged if for over twenty years.) And the leftwing liberals were back with their old definitions too; Freda Kirchwey, editor of the Nation, echoing that fascism was simply “a revolution of the right” and her erstwhile Moscow correspondent Louis Fischer describing it as “a government which acts without consulting the people.” But to contribute to the discommoding of the liberals were the syndicalist Industrial Workers of the World, whose weekly, the Industrial Worker, at about the same time, early in 1944, defined fascism as “the leftist movement of the middle or socially unproductive class,” with the further comment, “The Nation

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9Batchelor, “Big Business and Defense,” Atlantic Monthly (February, 1941), pp. 146-152. Batchelor was a one-time Washington correspondent. Also of interest in this same issue of the Atlantic is Harold M. Fleming’s “Living By Deficit,” pp. 153-159. Additional comments on several other similar economic investigations of that moment are listed by Porter Sargent, Getting US Into War (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1941) in the chapter titled “Why Germany Wins,” pp. 563-582.
and the *New Republic*, pulp magazines financed by 'socially conscious' international financiers, have always been the organs of this neo-fascism posing as 'advanced thinking.'

By this stage of the war, the liberal establishment, of which the liberal weekly press was an important auxiliary, had been in the political saddle for a decade under Roosevelt, and it was this segment of the community which was masterminding the war and providing the very largest part of the propaganda rationale supporting it. And it was also beginning to develop some serious adversaries of several shades of opinion who were beginning to issue economic critiques instead of rhetorical rodomontade. By far the most important was the war-time book of John T. Flynn, *As We Go Marching.* Flynn, an estranged former liberal, once the most popular columnist on the *New Republic*, and its financial commentator from 1933 to 1940, prepared one of the most telling attacks on the subject of state deficit spending, and many of his points applied to both sides in the war, embarrassingly enough.

Still another came from Ralph Robey, the writer of the column "Business Tides" in *Newsweek*, whose "Who Are the Real Fascists in America?" just before the national election in 1944, struck a note which has appeared in considerable volume in conservative circles particularly in the last two years. Robey found the New Deal planned economy-deficit spending regime, and that of Germany, as well as the Stalinist system, separable only through the employment of "finely spun theoretical differences." And he pounded the liberal press as the place to find the exponents of America's indigenous state-planned economy. (After all, as Keynes had told the Germans in 1936, what he was advocating was most likely to succeed in a nation-wide arena with a maximum of government interference and a minimum of *laissez-faire.*) At any rate, with the IWW, a liberal such as Flynn, and a conservative such as Robey all adding their contributions, the definitions of fascism were on the increase.

But the initiative was still in the hands of the Marxists, and though they were under attack within a year after the war ended, they enjoyed the momentum of several years and cheerfully traded back to their free-market critics the fascist label. A rather hesitant literature began to come forth shortly after Flynn's famous critique, principally consisting of Ludwig von Mises' *Omnipotent Govern-

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12 Reprinted, with caustic comment, in *Nation* (May 6, 1944), p. 539.
13 *New York*: Doubleday, Doran, 1944.
14 Robey, "Who Are the Real Fascists in America?", *Newsweek* (October 30, 1944), p. 76.
ment\textsuperscript{15} and Friedrich von Hayek's *The Road to Serfdom*,\textsuperscript{16} though they were hampered by their war-propaganda content, and were excessively gentle toward the "Allied" powers in their analyses of the consequences of statism. But they were largely the literature of an underground until the Cold War was solidly underway.

The bluntest statement of the Marxist position was undoubtedly that of the famous British slingshot of socialism, Harold J. Laski. In a speech at a three-day symposium in New York City sponsored by the *Nation* in December, 1945, on the subject, "The Challenge of the Atom Bomb," Laski flailed out:\textsuperscript{17}

Nazism in all its forms is the culmination of a society built upon the anarchy of free enterprise; when it subjects man to the economy of the market, it destroys his [sic] right to be a man. That is why we must alter the central principle of our civilization to planned production for community consumption.

If there was any doubt about what Laski meant here, it was thoroughly dispelled by his clipped utterance, "Free enterprise and the market economy mean war; socialism and planned economy mean peace."

So it seemed that the war was really fought to rid the world of the whole complex of the market economy and free enterprise, in this now-concluded struggle with Germany, Italy, and Japan; at least, Laski and his fellow ideologues such as J. Alvarez del Vayo now revealed that it was expedient to let people of these former persuasions know what they had been doing in helping achieve the great triumph. It was an early version of what the Soviet Union's V. M. Molotov was talking about a little over ten years later when he boasted of Communist Russia having precipitated a "civil war" among the "capitalist states" in 1939-1941. In any event, there was little doubt in the minds of such as Laski and del Vayo at the end of 1945 that communism or something very close to it was on the threshold of total victory in all of Europe.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{15}New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944. Some idea of the temper of the time may be gleaned from the last two sentences of the review of this book by Professor Frederick L. Schuman of Williams College in the *New York Times Book Review* for May 21, 1944, p. 22: "A return to laissez-faire individualism is about as probable as a return to the Holy Roman Empire. Omnipotent Government is less an indictment of tyranny than an epitaph from the pen of the most dismal practitioner of the dismal science of an age long dead and forever past recapture."

\textsuperscript{16}Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944.

\textsuperscript{17}Laski, "Plan or Perish," *Nation* (December 15, 1945), pp. 650-652.

\textsuperscript{18}When an editorial in the *New York Herald-Tribune* attacked Laski's speech as "silly and irresponsible," del Vayo doughtily defended Laski, and asserted that
With the setting in of the Cold War, the interest in definitions of fascism persisted, and various sectors of the press were still anxious to find out what a long, bloody war had been fought against. They got the shortest definition yet from the notorious Soviet journalistic hack Ilya Ehrenburg, at a press conference in Washington in April, 1946, while he was conducting an American tour. According to Ehrenburg, a fascist was simply "one who hates the Soviet Union." One might have expected that George Orwell applied the crusher in his June, 1946, *New Republic* article, when he urged that those using the word "fascism" either define it or stop using it. But, like "war criminal," the word still had plenty of political mileage left in it. And many others went bubbling along merrily, employing the word in the Soviet fashion, at the same time a vigorous and saturating anti-Soviet propaganda was under way. Every time the reds yelled "fascist" anywhere in the world preparatory to another confiscation, territorial grab, or hanging, their new adversaries and late lovers in the "West" usually mumbled in accord. It was one of the many ludicrous and painful sideshows of the early Cold War.

As Stalin began to square off with his erstwhile comrades-in-arms in the West in the spring of 1946, some unfinished business remained to complicate matters; not all the "fascist beasts" had been annihilated in the recently-ended war. The principal ones remaining were the regimes of Francisco Franco in Spain and Juan Peron in Argen-

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20 This piece drew national attention; much of it was reproduced in *Time* (June 24, 1946), p. 45.
tina. Both were barred at the outset from the precious club of the United Nations, and a vigorous propaganda seeking their overthrow went on into the late months of 1946. But these systems did not compare to those destroyed in 1945, nor to each other. Spain fitted the communist definition, but Stalin's Cold War adversaries apparently had had their fill of cooperating in the elimination of political orders which were promptly replaced by Stalinist slave states or came dangerously close to being so. Though it was hard to put down the parrotly wartime political slogan verbiage, the campaign to wreck Franco cooled off as the Cold War heated up.21

Peron's Argentina was another matter. Here, despite the U.S. State Department's concerted hostility through the medium of Ambassador Spruille Braden, the press efforts were mainly directed at discrediting the communist interpretation of fascism as a conspiracy of bankers and cartelized businessmen to impoverish the "workers," still a liberal fixation as well. Argentine reporters to New York City's major papers stressed that the wealthy constituted Peron's strongest opponents, that the middle and upper class were principally responsible for the anti-Peron campaign,22 while one reporter concluded after observing the crowds listening to Peron speak, "from their looks it would appear that Colonel Peron's appeal is mostly to the very poorest among the population."23 A pair of interpretative essays on Peron by Christopher Emmet in the liberal Catholic weekly Commonweal came to a similar conclusion,24

21The somersault in the American press began shortly after Churchill's famous March, 1946, speech at Fulton, Missouri, the conventional political signal that the Cold War with Soviet Russia was now to be considered a long run program. Time's cover story the week it reported the Fulton address was devoted to Spain and Franco (March 18, 1946, pp. 26-29), much of which read like extracts from a 1939 communist newspaper. But it closed on a wary note, detailing the job of the "democracies" as one which involved the search for a way "to oust Franco without letting the communists in." This kind of intrigue lasted but a short time, and the "fascist" verbiage gradually tailed off. (A voice of dissent along this theme was still raised well into 1947 by Emmet John Hughes in his book Report from Spain (New York: Holt), which contained the interesting thesis that the United States should undertake the overthrow of Franco at once, because his policies were responsible for a staggering increase of communists in Spain, who were sure to topple him in a revolt which was expected momentarily. Re-read twenty years later, with Franco still in power, Hughes's book reads like a whimsical tract.) The switch on Argentina took place almost simultaneously; the snarls of "fascist" slowly tapered off, and by the end of summer Argentina's Peron regime was being referred to as "anti-communist." (Time, September 16, 1946, p. 22.)
24Emmet, "Our Argentine Blunder," Commonweal (February 8, 1946), pp.
and fell back on one of the politico-economic estimates of the early 1930's: fascism was a mass movement of an organized minority of the lowest-income groups, anti-conservative, anti-capitalist, and nationalist and racist, hence hostile to both communists and Jews in their capacity as internationalists and/or capitalists.25

There is scant help to be found in reference works and dictionaries on the subject, where fascism is treated almost exclusively in political or philosophical terms and the subject of economics effectively overlooked or excluded. The 1948 Reader's Encyclopedia definition of fascism consists of this brief entry: "An authoritarian and totalitarian political system which considers the individual in every respect subordinate to the interests of the historical reality of the national state,"26 which is more a statement of intent than a description of what really prevailed in national states which were known as "fascist." There are several other definitions of this kind. The entry for "fascist" in the 1958 edition of the American College Dictionary, "anyone who believes in or sympathizes with fascism," sounds like lexicographical black humor. Strangely enough, the ACD's definition of "communist" rigidly avoided saying "anyone who believes in or sympathizes with communism," since this would have outraged a legion of ardent fellow travelers of communism who insist on the vast gulf which allegedly exists between being a communist and admiring, sympathizing with, or seeing eye to eye with communists.

In the last decade or so, many conservatives have discovered John Maynard Keynes, and in the last five or six years there has been a noticeable shift in emphasis to Keynes and the implementors of his policies and away from Karl Marx (but not to planetary war) as the most dynamic cause of our increasing socialization. A major feature of this revamped propaganda has been the counter-attack which has had as its principal feature the lumping together of the communists and fascists as variants of the "left." This has been a response to the charge of liberals and leftists that modern-day conservatives are a "radical right" of "fascist" ancestry. There have been


25Emmet made a curious admission, for a liberal. He maintained the fascist regimes in Italy and Germany had kept their promises, for they had "held labor support" after gaining power "by providing full employment, though its method of doing so led to war." He thought it significant that there was the "virtual absence of a labor underground under Hitler." "Our Future Argentine Policy," p. 450.

many retorts of the former kind, one of the more recent being that of Cyril Stevenson, Jr., former president of the California Republican Assembly, in an article late last year in the *American Mercury*:27

The two great threats to this country by the moderates' standards . . . are the communists on the left and the fascists on the right. Actually, the fascist-Nazi-racist is a first cousin to the communist and should be classified on the left.

And just a short time before, in the magazine of the conservative Young Americans for Freedom, the *New Guard*, a luridly-advertised series by Richard S. Wheeler, titled "The Fascist Threat to America,"28 resumed the indictment of American totalitarian liberalism as the "threat" which got a full trial run at the hands of Ralph Robey in 1944, as we have seen. Wheeler's study was also a piece of conservative counter-fire, directed at our long-dominant establishment, however. It is about the best thing done along such lines by conservatives recently, though it suffers from intellectual deficiencies which are not necessarily conservative weaknesses, the tendency toward superficiality and the impelling urge to read history backward.

One of the principal merits of Wheeler's analysis was his bringing up of the issue of the influence of Keynes's economic proposals in fascist systems, something usually dodged very assiduously even by most of the people who have made a career out of attacking Keynesianism. But he fell into the old rut of over-emphasizing the repressiveness and effectiveness of the fascist systems (the influence of the mature academic popular-front fellow traveler of thirty years ago is hard to discount). A careful use of Burton J. Klein's *Germany's Economic Preparation for War*29 might have had some impact on these conclusions, and a reflection upon Flynn's *As We Go Marching* would have proven salutary as well. But Wheeler's was a commendable bit of journalistic delving into some fundamentals concerning the features common to deficit-financed states which eschew nationalization of property and central planning,30 but em-

27Stevenson, "Republican Party: Suicide or Success?,” *American Mercury* (Fall, 1966), pp. 36-37. Compare this with Emmet's evaluation twenty years earlier: "Fascism in short is far more a bastardized leftist movement than a conservative movement." See note 25 above.


30The wartime British economy under the Churchill coalition government of Tories and Laborites presents a special problem to the economic analyst; the degree of frankly socialist interference is greater, and the presence of authoritarian intervention rivaling that seen in the enemy deserves some attention. Chur-
ploy dynamic fiscal policy and a variety of massive interventionist techniques to achieve their objectives.

Recent books are cause for both hope and dismay among those who look forward to a careful economic analysis of fascism which will be devoid of inflammatory and incensed invective, whether it be of Marxist, left-liberal, or conservative auspices. Noteworthy have been the volumes by Nolte and Klein, mentioned above, Arthur Schweitzer's *Big Business in the Third Reich*, and the little book by René Erbe, *Die nationalsozialistische Wirtschaftspolitik 1933-1939 im Lichte der modernen Theorie* (The National Socialist Economic Policy 1933-1939 in the Light of Modern Theory), a book not yet available in English.

None of these books is completely satisfactory because they either just deal with specific time spans, or neglect economic analysis to a large degree. Schweitzer, concerned with the German economy into 1936 only, almost entirely ignored Keynes, and further distracted the reader with excursions in the obscurantisms of Max Weber, through whom the whole study is strained. His obsession with the rearmament aspect of the German system gives no indication that it was a feature of a rearming world, an activity which was at an appreciable peak in neighboring countries well before the Germans began. Schweitzer collides head-on with Klein, whose study of wartime German industry, based heavily on the strategic bombing survey, concludes that Germany under Hitler did not go on a full war footing until 1943. Though Schweitzer contains val-

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chill was given the power personally to dismiss any businessman from his firm if he thought his conduct of affairs was unsatisfactory, while the Ministry of Agriculture announced late in 1941 that it had taken over tens of thousands of acres of land from farmers whom the Ministry had judged "inefficient" or who refused to plant crops the Ministry demanded. For one report see *Time* (November 10, 1941), p. 30. A preview of Churchill's embrace and endorsement of sweeping collectivist and government interventionist programs, while he campaigned for re-election in the summer of 1945, is to be seen in the late 1943 "left-wing" Tory pamphlet, *Forward—by the Right*, produced by the Tory Reform Committee. This took at least a dozen positions far more extreme than advanced by the Roosevelt New Deal of 1933-1938. Mallory Browne, "British Tories Look Ahead," *Nation* (January 1, 1944), pp. 11-12.


32 *Zurich, Switzerland: Polygraphischer Verlag, 1958.*

33 *Schweitzer, Big Business*, p. 679: "A fascist potential prevails when a lower-middle class is suffering from economic grievances, is fearful of losing its status honor, and attributes all these threats to its ideals and economic interests to one enemy that it hopes to destroy through one supreme effort of concentrated violence."

34 *Schweitzer also collided head-on with Nolte, who maintained that the Hitler regime took over Germany without any revolutionary breach of legality, while Schweitzer maintained that it did. That it took six years to overcome Germany*
able material on the operation of certain big businesses, his book is loaded with far too much propaganda, and several parts of his nearly 700-page volume are collectively just another sophisticated but dreary anti-Hitler tirade.

Nolte's book is the reverse; in a 561-page book there is very infrequent mention of economics, and he concentrates on philosophical factors. No book on the subject of fascism in a generation has

in war is as much a reflection on the organization of the “Allies” as it is a tribute to the effectiveness of the German system. The postwar years also testify to the vagueness prevailing among the “liberators” as to the nature of the order they destroyed; Nicholas Balabkins in his Germany Under Direct Controls (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1963) points out that the very largest part of the economic legislation of the National Socialist regime was kept in force for three years after victory.

Schweitzer is concerned also with large private enterprise, though there seem to be differences of opinion whether the Hermann Göring Werke might have been construed as a government firm (despite private financing). Compare, for example, the editorial “Uncle Sam, Inc.” in Collier's for March 30, 1946, p. 78, on the forty-one major government corporations which grew in the United States during the war, and the scope of their possibilities “in competition with private industry.” According to Collier's, the United States was developing into a system where socialistic enterprises work more or less amicably alongside private enterprises. Like it or not, that is the way things are moving here, and the man who can reverse the trend has not yet been discovered, to our best information.” Probably it was the government competition which Professor Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., was referring to when he boasted how the New Deal had developed the only effective control of “big business,” a formula which consisted simply of the directive: “Scare hell out of it.” Schlesinger might have been referring to something else, but the Mussolini-like innovations of industry-wide regimentation by the National Recovery Administration (based on the trade associations of the Hoover era?), and the intervention of the government as a third party into labor disputes via the ministrations of the National Labor Relations Board, hardly could be said to have “scared” any measurable portion of “big business.” In fact, when one considered the tens upon tens of billions of dollars gained by “big business” as a result of government contracts graciously handed down from the government of Schlesinger's adored FDR during the “defense” and war period, there was little if any grounds for asserting that any appreciable degree of terror of New Deal policing or regulation existed within the reigning circles of America's largest economic combines. It was revealing that Schlesinger made no reference to what a New Republic columnist once referred to as the “herd of tame capitalists,” typified by W. Averell Harriman, which almost from the beginning found the New Deal more a source of comfort than a cause of dread. See Schlesinger's “His Rendezvous with History,” New Republic (April 15, 1946), pp. 350-354, a contribution to a supplement titled “Roosevelt: First Appraisal by Those Who Knew Him,” on the first anniversary of FDR's demise. An interesting editorial definition of fascism in the Colorado Springs (Colorado) Gazette Telegraph for September 28, 1966, described it as “a form of socialism,” “a partnership between business and the political bureaucracy in which the businessman, having become a politician, ceases to be a businessman to the detriment of business, the individual consumer, and freedom itself.” This estimate might have been more complete by including a clause dealing with the politician who becomes a businessman.
been praised so highly, and Professor Morgenthau has hailed it as “a landmark in the history of political thought.” Some extended attention to “economic thought” might have made it much more useful. Of special interest, however, is Nolte’s definition of fascism: 36

Fascism is anti-Marxism which seeks to destroy the enemy by the evolvement of a radically opposed and yet related ideology and by the use of almost identical and yet typically modified methods, always, however, within the unyielding framework of national self-assertion and autonomy.

In other words, according to Nolte, had there been no communist successes in the first place, there would have been no fascism, the precise point Emmet made in his Commonweal analysis twenty years ago.

Erbe’s little book of under 200 pages is a beginning, though he appears to be somewhat reluctant, if not timid, when it comes to stating the conclusions which his materials lead to. (Interestingly enough, Erbe quotes from his correspondence with Gottfried von Haberler, in which the latter stoutly maintains, “I still think the Nazi policy can be called Keynesian. Large-scale deficit spending is, after all, the decisive factor.” 37) In view of the health and strength of basic Keynesian policies in the programs of the major countries outside the communist belt, we still could put to use a substantial, broad, and inclusive historical study of this phenomenon, based on economic analysis and not demonology, covering the last thirty-five years of world economic history. A careful examination of the fascist experience, the relationship with their ostensible adversaries, and the aspects which survive today under various forms of protective coloration, would be a necessary part of this study, and a major contribution to our understanding.

36 Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism, pp. 20-21.
37 Erbe, Die nationalsozialistische Wirtschaftspolitik, p. 167.
Late in 1967 there appeared a “Negotiations Now” movement in the United States attempting to influence government policy to the end of seeking a negotiated peace in the war in Vietnam. Related to this was the existence during the whole year of several spirited protests from many sources against the American strategic bombing of its North Vietnamese enemy. One would never know from exposure to the country’s mass communications of all kinds that there were interesting ancestors of both these gestures during the closing years of World War II, the electrifying “Peace Now Movement” of 1943-1944, under the leadership of George W. Hartmann, and the even more aggravating effort during the same time to halt strategic or “area” bombing of Germany by the Royal and American Air Forces. This latter was under the direction in England of Vera Brittain and the Bombing Restriction Committee, and fronted in the United States by a variety of notables in literary and clerical circles. Though both these campaigns excited a large contemporary literature, they have disappeared almost without a trace from works dealing with those times, and it is a rare moment when either of them is recalled. This to some extent is due to ignorance on the part of contemporaries, who imagine they are the first people in
history to become involved in efforts of this kind, victims of what Pitirim Sorokin calls the “Columbus complex.” But there undoubtedly is an element of studied fastidious oversight on the part of many of the elders taking part in today’s activities, who prefer to have the past effectively forgotten, especially insofar as it involves situations of this kind.

The separate campaigns carried on by Vera Brittain and George Hartmann stand out as about the only humanitarian protests against an all-out war against civilians fought by armies that had lost their horror of horror, and led by politicians who had done so as well. The negotiated peace and anti-strategic bombing efforts caused more than a ripple in England and the United States, though they were doomed from the start. The communist tactic of enrolling the civilian community in the war in Russia, China, and the various western countries occupied by the German armies by way of their underground “resistance” fronts, had long before destroyed the distinction between combatants and non-combatants. Saturation bombing of the civilian sectors of cities hundreds of miles from the scene of active fighting was so thoroughly a part of the new barbarism by late 1943 that it now seems to have been undue caution to conceal until recent years that the deliberate annihilation of congested urban districts had been a plan from early in the war. Charles P. Snow’s revelation, nearly twenty years later, somehow lost much of its striking power. The ability on the part of many to react had been destroyed long before by a steady barrage of words and photographs which had so cheapened human life that even by the end of the war in 1945 nothing could shock the blood-soaked populaces out of their semi-coma other than the fear of atomic disintegration, and even this was a modified reaction.

The liberal Catholic weekly *Commonweal*, hardly a pacifist organ, early in 1944 denounced the policy of strategic bombing as “the murder of innocent people and the suicide of our civilization.” It was one of the few expressions of concern over what the dulling of sensitivity was doing to the future of the world. But the biggest loudspeakers of the printed and spoken word were quite unmoved, and did their best to show that most others were similarly indisposed to react to such appeals favorably. The *New York Times* reported comfortably that the Hartmann and Brittain campaigns were opposed by reader response at a ratio of fifty to one. There were hundreds of

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attacks in the magazines, newspapers, and on the radio for each defense; those in such journals as the American Mercury, the New Republic, Life, and the New York Herald-Tribune were particularly noteworthy in their ferocity. In the latter, William L. Shirer, emerging in five years from journalistic obscurity to a front-page celebrity status, and whose opinions by then even drew attention as news events, volunteered that the anti-strategic bombing protests of the Bombing Restriction Committee and the Fellowship of Reconciliation were evidence that they had become mere dupes of the German national socialist propaganda chief, Dr. Joseph Goebbels.  

Efforts to stop the war at this moment were premature; a great number of the propaganda commandos had not yet drawn their sufficient measure of gore prior to joining in the great wailing over the threats to our “Judeo-Graeco-Christian civilization” in the years subsequent to 1945. In one instance, there was an ironic parallel incident to the denunciation of the anti-war and anti-bombing propagandists; Life, at the height of its vituperation against the Hartmann and Brittain enterprises, ran one of its most adversely commented-on specials, a photographic account of a fox hunt in Ohio in which 600 people eventually cornered one small tired animal, which was then beaten to death by a child with a club. That there were many people who saw nothing praiseworthy in such a caper and wrote at length in horrified tones marking it as an act of barbarity, was grounds for hope of a sort, but the massacre of non-combatant human civilians of enemy states in distant locations aroused no such general response.

The objections to halting the war or interfering with the bombing of non-combatant targets were many, ranging from the ingenious to the devious. Typical of the “practical” kind were those of the Christian Century, America’s outstanding voice of liberal Protestantism and the New Yorker, the weekly journalistic paragon of American sophistication. In their view it was too late to make “ground rules.” The idea was to prosecute the war in full savagery until victory was achieved, after which it would then be proper to dream up restraints on future behavior in war, while nobody was doing anything.

Peace Now had few defenders, but Miss Brittain enrolled a goodly brigade. One of the most formidable was the Rev. James M. Gillis, editor of the monthly Catholic World, held in substantial respect by

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2New York Herald Tribune, March 12, 1944.
3March 22, 1944.
4March 19, 1944.
members of this faith despite his persistent and unwavering opposition to the war ("Father Gillis is by all odds the ablest Catholic editor of our time," wrote the fiercely pro-war Catholic professor Theodore Maynard late in 1941). In the late spring of 1944, Rev. Gillis wrote the most devastating indictment of Miss Brittain's attackers in the press and pulpit, the most thorough exposure of the utter moral bankruptcy of her antagonists. The largest and fairest coverage of both the Hartmann and Brittain movements took place in the weekly Christian Century, however. They were the only widely read journal in the country to give Peace Now a chance to make an extended statement of their contentions, objectives, and recommendations, possibly because the editors were more inclined to be influenced by the Brittain appeal, since her first widely circulated publication, Massacre by Bombing, contained a preface signed by twenty-eight Americans, many of them Protestant clergymen of national and even international repute.

Trygve Lie, the Norwegian socialist politician who became the first secretary general of the United Nations from 1946 to 1953, declared, shortly after World War II ended, that an armistice could have been negotiated a number of times between the "allies" and the "axis," but that nothing was allowed to interfere with the winning of a lasting victory. That this "lasting" triumph lasted less than six months is perhaps peripheral to this account, but it suggests that terminating the war on a basis short of the obliteration of the enemy could hardly have become the prelude to a worse "peace" than has prevailed since 1945.

Talk of possible negotiations between one or another party of both sides involved in the war was part of political gossip at various times during hostilities. Perhaps both the Germans and Japanese would have been willing to call fighting to a halt were some some kind of tolerable conditions made available, even as early as the spring of 1943. The very largest part of the loss of life and property in the war would have been prevented had the war ended then. But the unconditional surrender dictum of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, acceded to by Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, made such an end impossible, and guaranteed the long, grinding struggle which left much of Western Europe and Eastern Asia a vast rubble strewn

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6Catholic World (May, 1944), pp. 97-104.
with the corpses of millions, a mutual achievement of the various belligerents.

A hint as to the likely acceptability of terms occurred at about the time Mr. Churchill was about to leave London to meet with Mr. Roosevelt at a conference at Quebec late in the summer of 1943. A reporter for Time wrote, "Everybody laughed over a gag credited to Churchill before he left England. Interviewer: 'Will you offer peace terms to Germany?' Churchill: 'Heavens, No! They would accept immediately.'" This was considered a humorous political incident, but there probably were a number of discussions going on of ways to bring about the end of the war short of "total victory." Rumors of this kind flew around the world on various occasions, and the most alarming and disturbing was that of late January, 1944, launched by the Soviet news organ Pravda. Two stories actually were loosed in America, both involving the British and Germans. In one, the communist publication charged that two British representatives had met with Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German foreign minister, to discuss a separate peace in Spain, while the other alleged that the British and German foreign ministers had conferred in Cairo on the same subject. The Soviet never apologized about it, the British never admitted it, and the Germans remained non-committal. But for a moment, a fluttering occurred in Anglo-American circles such as had not been seen for a long time. Even if utterly false, the story did much damage to the glowing picture which had emerged from the famous Anglo-Russo-American gathering at Teheran November 29-December 1, 1943, at which time the celebrated participants, apparently pledging eternal love and mutual cooperation, had fashioned the framework for a vast eon of internationalist political bliss which was to follow as soon as the enemy was drowned in blood and hot metal. The American periodical press worked overtime on the populace for weeks with what was sometimes humorously described as the "oh-gawd-let's-avoid-the-creation-of-suspicions" line, and to keep up the belief in the indivisibility of peace and the great dividends sure to follow from collective security pacts with the Stalinists, even

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though the faintest admirers of collective security were more and more convinced that nothing had been agreed upon at Teheran except military commitments.

The fact that the uneasy "allied" partners ultimately did not adhere to unconditional surrender as a practical policy—the Russians in dealing with the regimes of Eastern Europe which they overran, the Anglo-Americans in dealing with conquered Italy—indicates that it might also have been dispensed with in the cases of Germany and Japan, both of which were clearly beaten in mid-1943 at least, thus saving the blood and lives and treasure frittered and dissipated away in the following eighteen months. Whether such turnabouts might have been politically possible or feasible in view of the hate propaganda which had been so generously employed to whip up popular support for war against the Germans and Japanese is another matter.

No good study of domestic war propaganda in the United States during World War II has ever been published, as against the output which stands on World War I. It is unlikely that one will be for generations to come, and one that is critical may never appear, since it seems likely that World War II, barring a catastrophic realignment in world politics, may become as formalized a story and as unsusceptible to revision, alteration, or reassessment as the ancient account of the struggle between the Hebrews and the Philistines. For a vast multitude it is the One Good War, rejoiced in and defended vociferously by even a large majority which now finds the current war in Asia so heart-rending and indefensible. Contemporary accounts might induce visitors from another planet to think that it was the only war ever fought between humans and some variety of lesser creatures on the evolutionary scale, so vicious and inflammatory was the portrayal of the enemy, in which enterprise the prize must go to the scribes and mouthpieces of the ultimate victors, as it surely did to the same forces during the struggle of 1914-1918.

Said a *Life* editorial in the fall of 1942, "Despite the diplomats and the secret talks and the intrigue, opinions held by the run of the citizenry are largely responsible for what is done in the field of foreign affairs." These opinions are also responsible for what is *not* done, and they had much to do with the abuse, denunciation, and repudiation of Peace Now and the Brittain campaign against strategic bombing of non-combatants.

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It is possible to argue that, after all, the massacres of civilians in Germany and Japan did not approach by a wide margin what civilian propagandists had called for as a proper fate for these lands. Bernadotte E. Schmitt, professor of modern history at the University of Chicago, in a speech before the twenty-first annual meeting of the National Council for the Social Studies in Indianapolis on December 1, 1941, before the United States was even an official belligerent, advocated, among other things, for Germany, a reduction of its population by thirty million, method of disposal unspecified but starvation indicated, since he also recommended the country’s reduction and confinement to a strictly agricultural economy. “Since there are only 45 million Britons, 45 million Italians, 40 million Frenchmen, and 30 million Poles, as opposed to 80 million Germans, the equilibrium of Europe would be more stable if there were only 50 million Germans,” Schmitt concluded. However, he did not disclose how many Russian communists were too many Russian communists for Europe’s welfare and stability.

Few Germanophobes subsequently approached Schmitt’s standard, though a few months before, it was exceeded by one Theodore Newman Kaufman, who published a book, Germany Must Perish!, a plea for sterilizing the entire adult German population, a project which he calculated might be achieved in about three years. Though privately published, this book received an amazing amount of attention in the spring of 1941, including a major uncritical review in so widely dispersed a journal as Time. Strangely enough, two years earlier Kaufman, as chairman of the American Federation of Peace, had suggested sterilization for all adult Americans should Congress permit the United States to become involved in another European war.

Once American participation in the war which began in 1939 became a reality, hate literature directed against the enemy became a major industry, and a large contingent became specialists in it. The full story will surely be a multi-volume effort, and can only be mentioned in passing, though it was the major obstacle which stood in the way of acceptance of appeals for negotiated peace and a halt to “area” bombing. In wars between modern national states,

11See long story in Time (December 1, 1941), pp. 57-58, headed “History Lesson.” Also useful to the subject is Schmitt’s What Shall We Do With Germany? (Public Policy Pamphlets, No. 38, University of Chicago Press, 1943).
12Newark, New Jersey: Argyle Press, 1941.
13Time (March 24, 1941), pp. 95-96.
there are experts in hate found in all groups, classes, and interests, though some may be more accomplished than others. In the United States, the sector of liberalism's spokesmen who advocated war-breeding policies for many years before they bloomed into reality led the field in zeal for the big bloodletting of 1942-1945. Their bellicose admonitions flamed from the pages of even the multi-million circulation family magazines, and their voices were heard on the radio by tens of millions. Lack of devotion to spreading interest in the arts of killing is a charge which can never be placed on their doorstep. It is worth noting, however, their amazing conversion to peace, coexistence, the beauties of negotiation and compromise, even pacifism, in the period from 1945 to the present, in the case of those who are still active merchants of the printed and spoken word. Their pious early postwar books such as *Lead Kindly Light* and biographies of such peace figures as Mahatma Gandhi and Albert Schweitzer, their whole literature of mercy and compassion, while figuratively still knee-deep in German blood and Japanese radioactive ashes, stand out as still another of history's great contradictions. One cannot accuse them of inflexibility.

Charles E. Montague, in his little post-World War I book, *Disenchantment*, made a classic comment on the home-front literary and microphone warriors whose martial chores consist of verbal weaponry: "Hell hath no fury like a non-combatant."\(^\text{14}\) In the United States a large number of persons would be competitors for the civilian who most closely fitted Montague's general observation. Norman Cousins, editor of the *Saturday Review of Literature*, might have been a strong contender early in the war, but the ferocity of several other journalists soon relegated him to the rank of moderates in this venture. His outstanding achievement was his famous defense of the necessity of deep, burning hatred of the enemy in order to fight effectively, in "The Time for Hate Is Now," published July 4, 1942.\(^\text{15}\) But others came along who were somewhat more effective and frightening than Cousins, particularly Rex Stout and Clifton Fadiman of the War Writers Board, an adjunct of the Office of War Information, the wartime government's principal propaganda agency. Stout, a famous writer of detective fiction, and Fadiman, a prominent New York


\(^{15}\) Cousins, "The Time for Hate Is Now," *Saturday Review of Literature* (July 4, 1942), pp. 13-14. Eleanor Roosevelt defended the negative. All concerned were sure such a hate campaign could be turned off promptly at the conclusion of hostilities.
literary figure and among other things a book reviewer for the New Yorker, were two of eighteen members of the WWB, described at one time as "the semi-governmental agency that serves as a clearing-house for writers willing to work for the war and government agencies needing specific writing jobs done." 16

Fadiman was regarded by some as the most towering Germanophobe throughout the war, while others had as their outstanding figure in this field of action such as Lord Vansittart of England, and such Americans as Shirer, Kaufman, Quentin Reynolds, Walter Winchell, Ben Hecht, Stout, Louis Nizer, and Henry Morgenthau, though a full roll-call would number in the hundreds. The most explosive incident involving exhortations for mass hate occurred at the meeting of the famous literary organization, the P.E.N. Club, at the Ambassador Hotel in New York City on October 28, 1942. On this occasion Stout and Fadiman made spirited calls for indiscriminate hate of all Germans (for some reason the Italians and Japanese were slighted by neglect) in such incendiary tones that they were reproached by literary friends who really did not lack interest in a tooth-and-claw struggle. Stout's insistence on "the need for a propaganda of hate" and Fadiman's "sweeping indictment of the German people" ("The only way to make a German understand is to kill him, and even then he doesn't get the point"), 17 drew reproaches from such eminents as Henry Seidel Canby and Arthur Garfield Hays, and ultimately an editorial scolding from Cousins, who was clearly outclassed as a hate-monger in this encounter. 18 But Cousins in turn was chastised by a correspondent who said in conclusion, "What we need in this country are more good haters like Mr. Fadiman." The P.E.N. meeting got completely out of the control of its president, Robert Nathan, and ended in an angry, noisy hubbub. But Mr. Fadiman was unruffled by the experience and repeated his dictum verbatim on the need for killing all Germans as a means for expanding their understanding, in a review of John Steinbeck's The Moon Is Down in the New Yorker a few weeks later. 19


17 Quoted in another report of the meeting in Saturday Review of Literature (November 7, 1942), p. 9.


19 Time considered Fadiman's review as news and quoted his recommendation (December 21, 1942), p. 108.
Bernadotte Schmitt also came to Fadiman’s defense, attacking Cousins for deploring Fadiman’s hate-Germans propaganda. And Fadiman went on for years developing his thesis of the ageless criminality of the entire German ethnic stock. We even find during this same time a revival of the recommendation of mass sterilization of Germans, this time by no less than Ernest Hemingway in the preface to the collection of short stories titled *Men at War*. “Germany should be so effectively destroyed that we should not have to fight her again for a hundred years, or forever,” said Hemingway, though his suggestion was specific compared to Kaufman’s, confined just to the membership in Hitler’s party organizations, most of whom were civilians even then. Apparently Hemingway did not think the German Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe, navy, and general staff of much consequence as fighters, only Hitler’s home-front storm troopers and secret police. Nor was Stout quiet or disengaged in subsequent months. His famous article, “We Shall Hate or We Shall Fail,” was given prodigious exploitation in the *New York Times* in 1943, and through the spring of 1944 he was pushing a vigorous hate program in the pages of the *Times* through his organization. His main opposition by this latter date was largely furnished by clergymen, particularly those connected with the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace of the Federal Council of Churches.

By this time the hate campaign had formidable aid from England in the form of the contributions of Lord Vansittart, whose books *Black Record* and *Lessons of My Life* contained the most highly refined and sophisticated Germanophobic literary poison yet seen originating in the English tongue. Actually, Vansittart’s participation in the fashioning of hate literature aimed exclusively at the Germans preceded the war’s outbreak, but the period of hostilities was a time of exceedingly favorable circumstances for maximizing production, and he wasted no time, as the printed record testifies. For an American market he prepared a famous twelve-point program for dealing with the Germans *in toto* which must have warmed the hearts of such *simpaticos* as Stout, Fadiman, and Schmitt, to mention just a few of the major participants. It was given top billing in an issue of the *New York Times* magazine in January, 1944, and subsequently

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20Quoted in review in *Time* (December 21, 1942), p. 108.
given further publicity in abbreviated form by *Time*. By this time there were many contributors to the plans for what-to-do-with-Germany; Vansittart's fell somewhere between that of Schmitt at the beginning of the war and that attributed to Henry Morgenthau toward the end, which latter appears to have been the working model which functioned in large part as the program of the "liberators," at least in the non-Soviet-occupied portions of German territory, between 1945 and 1948. Vansittart's message encountered a small amount of reservation in the United States, though about the only specific rejoinders at that moment were those by Francis Neilson in his *Hate the Enemy of Peace: A Reply to Lord Vansittart,* and by George Bernard Shaw.

Shaw, on being asked for his views on a postwar plan for the permanent disablement of Germany at this same time, exploded in anger, denouncing it as "cowardly rubbish," "impudent and pretentious and so deliberately wicked that if it were not fortunately quite impossible to put it into practice it would justify a holy alliance against any power giving the slightest countenance to it." Shaw was a little too optimistic, in view of the subsequent enforcement of the Morgenthau Plan in postwar West Germany, abandoned after it threatened not only to make the area a howling wilderness but to make possible its dropping into the lap of Stalin as the early Cold War took shape.

The concurrent propaganda of Japanophobia was of a different order, featured by a variety of racist venom which still is in a class by itself in the history of such matters. Here the success of the hate builders was an unqualified success compared with the program directed at the other enemy peoples. For all practical purposes the Japanese were reduced below the human level, and there undoubtedly existed the notion in most circles of lowest intellectual attainment in this country that American armed forces were actually engaged in a struggle against a lower species. No special literature was needed to achieve this end, and the task seemed to be handled most adequately by the radio, moving pictures, and oral folk-lore.

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21 *Time* (January 24, 1944), p. 21. By far the largest part of the American left approved of Vansittart's hate views on Germans, one of the rare exceptions being Reinhold Niebuhr. His reservations on Vansittartism were parried by several of the Vansittart persuasion, one of the most ferocious being Erika Mann, the daughter of the novelist Thomas Mann, and a Stalinist admirer of ardent intensity. See her three-column letter to the *Nation* (March 11, 1944), p. 318, in ringing defense of Vansittart.

The segregation of the resident mainland Japanese population in special concentration camps, mainly in the West, was the most striking evidence of an attitude in this country based on the theory of special, and lower, creation in their case. Though news from the Pacific war fronts was expertly and severely filtered for the home audience, and though evidence seemed to suggest that Americans were at grips with a tough, intelligent, resourceful enemy possessing a technical facility of a high order, it was still possible to broadcast a propaganda suggesting that they were barely above the level of insects. An indication of the nature of the fighting was suggested in the news early in 1944 that after over two years of combat, American forces had taken less than 300 Japanese as prisoners of war.\(^\text{23}\)

Though all this is but an inkling as to the real dimensions and proportions of the state of mind prevailing at the midway point of the war, it is necessary to be aware of this when examining the incipience of the negotiated peace and anti-strategic bombing movements of that time.

The Peace Now Movement was launched in Philadelphia on July 11, 1943, at a time when the war had taken a decisive turn in favor of the Anglo-Russo-American “allies,” what with the turning back of the German armies in Russia, after the German disaster at Stalingrad, the defeat of the Germans and Italians in North Africa, and the overwhelming of the Japanese navy in the Pacific. The invasion of Sicily by American and British forces was a day old when Peace Now began its official existence. Quakers and other peace figures were the principal elements involved at the beginning, though adherents and supporters were gradually attracted from many persuasions, which had much to do eventually with the violent attack directed their way from the preponderant supporters of a war fought to “unconditional surrender” of the enemy.

One of the chief organizers and ultimately the principal spokesman for the PNM was George W. Hartmann, professor of educational psychology at Columbia Teachers College at the time the war broke out, and serving in the same capacity at Harvard when this venture was initiated. Hartmann, associated with the Socialist Party of Norman Thomas for some time, and its candidate for mayor of New York City, had been in the news on two other occasions prior to emerging as a prime worker in fashioning Peace Now. His part in opposing the infiltration of the Teachers Union in New York by the

\(^{23}\)\textit{Nation} (February 5, 1944), p. 147.
Communist Party had earned him much publicity, little support, but the profound hostility of the CPUSA, and CP publications and their satellite journalists in the left-liberal sector of the newspaper and periodical press, who had a big part to play in the smearing of Hartmann and Peace Now; undoubtedly they had this score to settle with him still on the agenda when he surfaced on the national scene in this new capacity. Hartmann, along with Clyde R. Miller, also on the Columbia Teachers College faculty and director of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, had further excited publicity because of their anti-war stands and their subsequent departure from there after challenging Columbia president Nicholas Murray Butler, a major Francophile and proponent of interventionism in the war in the period shortly prior to American involvement.

Hartmann, a handsome man with the physique of a professional football player, was an attractive chairman and chief speaker. He was also responsible on at least one occasion for putting the objectives of Peace Now in the fewest words. “The advocates of Peace Now,” he said, “want the United States to proclaim fair and reasonable peace terms at once as a basis of an immediate armistice and simultaneously invite representatives of all nations without discrimination to a world conference for achieving these conditions.”24 This statement was made in May, 1944, after the PNM had been under a specially hostile publicity barrage from the entire American political spectrum for six months because it called for the declaration of political war aims to supplement the military course of action, and embarrassed many war supporters, since there really never had been any such pronouncements, at least from the American and English leaders, other than an intention to fight to “victory.” The more idealist supporters of the war had suffered much heartburn over this from the very beginnings of the war. While the political objectives of Stalinst Russia were overt and obvious, it was becoming increasingly plain that Stalin’s partners had none of any significance. Fritz Sternberg, a Marxist economist whose views were regularly proclaimed in the weekly Nation in the war years, put it very bluntly at about this time, when he commented, “The Anglo-Saxon powers have no positive program in Europe; the destruction of the Nazi state is their only clear aim.”25

24Christian Century (May 24, 1944), pp. 646-647.
The late winter and early spring of 1944, when Peace Now began to make its only serious impact, was a time when numerous pathetic and querulous calls were leaking into the American and English press, seeking to learn what it was all about. The London Sunday Observer sponsored one late in February, 1944, which condensed the whole literature on the subject, titled “What Are We Fighting For?” The editors, tiring of five years of what they called “‘win-the-war-first-and-find-out-afterwards’ propaganda,” wanted some tangible political proposals:

War is politics. We fight for principles or war is madness. If we deny this, we deny all that the war has cost us and our Allies; we ought never to have begun....

In one way this was simply a symptom of the restlessness and malaise which had invested a large contingent of this country’s major opinion fashioners as well; Dorothy Thompson and Arthur Krock were already loosing their fears that the Atlantic Charter had been “buried” by Churchill, and that Soviet Russia was sure to “dominate the post-war structure,” while Anne O’Hare McCormick, James B. Reston, Hanson Baldwin, William Philip Simms, and even Samuel Grafton were all lowing in protest over American no-policy, and the jovian Walter Lippmann had just come forth with a book titled U.S. War Aims, which in impeccable prose informed the readers that there were virtually none. Time concluded that Lippmann’s message was, that since no one knew what was going on, it was best that “no one should say anything in particular.”

But by this time, a national exposure to the war aims of Peace Now had occurred, and they had stirred up a mighty storm. It was not until a meeting sponsored by PNM which took place in New York City’s Carnegie Hall the evening of December 30, 1943, that more than local attention to the organization and its aims was gained, and the very largest part was fiercely hostile. First to hit PNM was the communist weekly New Masses, in a two-page editorial five days

Reprinted in Time (February 28, 1944), p. 34. In a whistling-in-the-dark conclusion, the Observer reassured itself at least on all points by declaring tremulously, “We are fighting to make the world safe for democracy. We are fighting for homes fit for heroes [one of the most hooted-at objectives announced during the war of 1914-1918]. We are fighting for ‘freedom and progress.’”

For summary of above, see lead story, “Cause for Alarm,” in Time (March 20, 1944), pp. 17-18.
later, titled “Hitler’s Doves.”28 The communists, thanks to wartime partnership with Stalin, “wrapped so tightly in the American Flag,” as one ironic observer had noted, “that the hammer and sickle were barely visible,” sounded precisely like a post-war anti-communist right-wing organ, used the same language, and recommended the same action. PNM’s program was described as an “incitement to sedition and treason,” and the communists urged the Department of Justice to investigate it. Hartmann was blasted as a “red baiter” leader in the Teachers’ Union,29 demonstrating that they had not forgotten his part in that pre-war imbroglio. A series of later editorials in this journal dwelled on the same theme, that of a month later selecting the Peace Now Movement as best typifying a spreading “intellectual ‘left’ defeatism,” “steeped in hatred of Russia and the Teheran program.”30 The New Masses recommended Hartmann’s dismissal from Harvard and his indictment for sedition.

This latter recommendation had apparently already been done, by Life magazine. In its story on the Carnegie Hall meeting, accompanied by the most unflattering pictures of the proceedings they were able to select, the editors delayed publication for three weeks after the event, and ran it back-to-back with a similar lurid spread on the people just indicted for sedition by the Justice Department for conspiracy to violate the Smith Act.31 A banner one-fourth of an inch over Hartmann’s picture read “U.S. Indicts Fascists.” Hartmann wrote a short but heated letter to Life over their smear, and pointed

28New Masses (January 4, 1944), pp. 7-8. Hartmann’s first widely circulated call for a negotiated peace was issued the week before Christmas, 1943, and given prominent notice in the New York Times (December 19, 1943), p. 3.
29Pravda’s Warning,” New Masses (February 1, 1944), p. 21.
30“Smoking Out Treason,” New Masses (February 8, 1944), p. 17. Along with Hartmann and the Peace Now Movement, the editors included Norman Thomas, John Haynes Holmes, the Progressive, the Call, Common Sense, Sidney Hertzberg, Alfred Bingham, Milton Mayer, and Granville Hicks for special attack because of their anti-war and peace talk. Bruce Bliven’s “The Hang-Back Boys” in the New Republic (March 5, 1944), pp. 305-307, charged resisters of this sort with being “spiritual saboteurs” who were “sitting out” the war; “Their hearts are not in it,” The New Republic’s former editor-in-chief complained. There was a similar but more generalized attack by Norman Cousins, in which he characterized such behavior as “intellectual treason,” and he mourned that in such circles, “mention of the coming peace is greeted with the enthusiasm of a lost soul waiting for the fog to close in.” There really was every reason for the resisters to feel this way. See Cousins, “Never Call Retreat,” Saturday Review of Literature (January 1, 1944), p. 14.
31Life (January 17, 1944), pp. 18-19. The New York daily press reported the meeting promptly, of course; a full account was carried by the New York Times the next day (December 31, 1943), p. 3.
out that “such old-established societies like the National Council for the Prevention of War, the War Resisters League, and the Fellowship of Reconciliation are also vigorously pushing a Wage Peace Now campaign,” but that Life had pointedly omitted paying any attention to them. Life apologized lamely for the juxtaposition of the lurid headline and Hartmann’s picture, offering the preposterous excuse that it was all a “typographical error,” but concluded, “Life believes that, at this critical time when united effort is necessary to gain a worthwhile victory and a worthwhile peace, ‘Peace Now’ is not only dangerous but subversive to that end.”

Life did not meet Hartmann’s challenge to discuss the other peace groups and their demands for a negotiated peace, but did show that as far as Peace Now was concerned, they agreed with the New Masses on what subversion was. They also admitted indirectly that of all these campaigns, they considered that of PNM most formidable.

However, they had plenty of company in this venture. The New York Post was one of the leaders in imputing that the leaders of Peace Now were little more than subversive and the Saturday Evening Post published a vigorous editorial some two months after the Carnegie Hall meeting, repudiating the PNM. The liberal weeklies, both running high fevers over the war and entertaining fervent pro-Stalinist sympathies, both launched ugly attacks on Hartmann and Peace Now, that in the New Republic being especially offensive. Being “a tool of axis diplomacy,” a vicious guilt-by-association, content-analysis charge, was the kindest accusation leveled against it. The editors hoped Peace Now was being investigated by the FBI, and that it would be destroyed regardless of what the investigation revealed.

So spoke one of the traditional voices in defense of minority views and a grand champion of free speech and the diversity of opinion in a democracy.

On the subject of government investigation of PNM, the liberal weeklies were divergent. The Nation, famous for its many bellows of pain about the Dies Committee and this House of Representatives agency’s periodic investigation of communists and other favored leftists, thought that this committee’s announced intention of investigation of Hartmann and Peace Now was quite fine, and accorded

32 Life (February 17, 1944), p. 11.
33 Saturday Evening Post (February 26, 1944), p. 100.
34 “Peace Now,” New Republic (February 7, 1944), pp. 164-165. For the New Republic one of the two principal reasons it opposed negotiated peace was that it would deprive the “allies” of the satisfaction of exacting vengeance.
its approval.\textsuperscript{35} But the \textit{New Republic} sniffed editorially, "Peace Now has already been 'investigated' and completely discredited."\textsuperscript{36} Apparently the editors spoke too soon, since the movement gained attention rather than lost it, and they soon followed with a ferocious special dispatch of some length by their Washington correspondent, Helen Fuller,\textsuperscript{37} which quoted at length from an attempt at literary assassination of Peace Now by M. M. Marberry of the New York afternoon tabloid, \textit{PM}, referred to by wags as "the uptown edition of the \textit{Daily Worker}.” Ever since the \textit{Life} pictorial adventure and a long and fairly restrained commentary in \textit{Newsweek},\textsuperscript{38} Peace Now’s national press coverage had spread widely and rapidly, although the stir in the New York City daily press was probably the wildest, and a new tack was being taken in the war of innuendo on the organization. The Fuller vignette was in the main a personal attack on the founders, Hartmann, and the executive secretary of PNM, Bessie Simon, who had connections in both the organized pacifist and pre-Pearl Harbor anti-war organizations, principally the America First Committee. But the emphasis now was swinging away from the reprehensibility of Peace Now’s negotiated peace objective to an \textit{ad hominem} denigration of specific people known for or suspected of having become affiliated, but only those of conservative reputations, the casting of suspicions as to the sources of their funds, and allegations of guilt by association with such organizations as the Christian Front and America First, even though the latter no longer existed.

There was little doubt by the spring of 1944 that, even if the Peace Now Movement had not yet made any appreciable impact on policy makers, they surely had made their mark upon the opinion-makers. A torrent of incensed and infuriated print had flowed from coast to coast, and though PNM claimed to have members in nearly every state at the beginning of their national notoriety, which may have been doubtful, there were few areas which could claim to know

\textsuperscript{35}\textit{Nation} (February 5, 1944), pp. 146-147.
\textsuperscript{36}"The Dies Committee," \textit{New Republic} (February 7, 1944), p. 166. The Dies Committee eventually branded the action of Peace Now as "treasonable and seditious"; \textit{New York Times}, February 17, 1944.
\textsuperscript{37}"Peace Now," \textit{New Republic} (February 14, 1944), pp. 203-204. Miss Fuller disclosed that PNM was working out of a small office on East 40th Street in New York City.
\textsuperscript{38}"Behind Peace Now," \textit{Newsweek} (February 7, 1944), p. 80. This summary, which contained less malice than most, emphasized the part played by Quakers in its origin.
nothing about it by the end of the spring of 1944. Those most firmly
devoted to the unconditional surrender doctrine as the ultimate in
war aims were by far the most hostile, and to them Hartmann and
his associates, whether from the Friends, the Catholic Worker, the
Socialist Party, surreptitious supporters from other peace organiza-
tions, or the lately-defunct America First Committee, were as bad
if not worse than the alleged seditionists, whose Washington trial
was going on simultaneously. The conservative Saturday Evening
Post, the American Century press of Henry Luce, Eugene Lyons' 
fiercely anti-Soviet American Mercury, the pro-Stalin but anti-
CPUSA Nation and New Republic, and the Stalinist American or-
gans, the Daily Worker and New Masses, all had something in com-
mon in the period ending with the Anglo-American invasion of
France: a generously-proportioned and nearly identical antipathy
toward George Hartmann and the Peace Now Movement.

Of singular significance was the effect upon, and the response from,
the organized peace forces in the United States. Of the mass of
periodical publications in the country the only one of national repute
which gave Peace Now serious and dignified attention and permitted
its spokesman to explain their position at length was the Christian
Century, and its editorial position was not friendly toward pacifism.
The editors gave Peace Now publicity but did not support it, and
argued against all pacifist and peace organizations, PNM and the
older ones alike. They spent most of the spring of 1944 in making
ironic sallies at the expense of the established peace groups, which
without exception shied away from Hartmann and his associates as
if they were leprous. Their particular target was A. J. Muste, a
repeated attacker of Peace Now, whose main objection was that the
organization was not selective about who were permitted to join it,
and accepted anyone who was against the war and wished it brought
to an end through a negotiated peace. In this tack Muste was fol-
lowing a rather generalized and ceremonial anti-war leftist response.
Granted that the communists and the vast majority of liberal-left
forces in America were in firm support of the war, and probably
would have favored its prosecution far beyond the time it did take
to bring it to a halt, a significant part of the peace societies and
pacifist organizations also consisted of those of left-wing persuasions.
Since it was part of their dogma that it was almost impossible for a
non-leftist to be for peace, it followed that the membership of peace
groups, whether actionist or not, had to be screened with great thor-
oughness in order to maintain ideological purity, and that anyone without impeccable leftist credentials seeking to join a peace organization was obviously a likely agent-provocateur or trying to attain sinister and ignoble goals of a selfish and personal order. It was impossible to be a conservative or other non-leftist and be sincerely interested in peace.

Muste was firmly captured by this form of conspiratorial suspicion, and responded in the expected conditioned reflex when allegations began to be made (mostly in circles just as hostile to Muste on account of his general anti-war stand) that Hartmann and his associates were attempting to find financial support in unorthodox places and from people who lacked the patina of established pacifist respectability. Muste began to repeat these charges, accompanied by warnings to his own Fellowship of Reconciliation, and to other older organizations, that they stay away from Peace Now and all its works and pomps. Far better was it to let the war go on than to cooperate in bringing about its cessation through the media of such auspices as these.

In mid-March, 1944, the Christian Century, in a major editorial, “Pacifists Want Peace—But When?” took Muste and other critics of Hartmann and Peace Now to task in rather stringent fashion. “Nothing illustrates the political naivete of American pacifists better than their current embarrassment over what is called the ‘Peace Now Movement,” it led off, and flayed Muste for his attacks on PNM and his denunciation on the grounds it “was receiving the support of reactionaries’ and possibly other rather dubious characters.” The implication to the editors was that “pacifists should decline to associate with such people when they advocate peace, even though pacifists are supposed to stand for peace, first, last and all the time.” The editors also included a solid rebuke to the Socialist Party for its hasty scurrying from association with Hartmann, once a candidate for office by their nomination. They reminded the SP that their memories were deficient. “The Socialists seem to have forgotten that their party, which was then stronger than it is today [1944], held to the position in the First World War which Dr. Hartmann takes now.” It was a mark of political ineptness of a high order to the editors for all the veteran peace organizations to shun Peace Now, in the hope that the same thing might be done by themselves somehow, while at the same time maintaining their innocence. “The pacifist in time of war lives in a dream world,” they concluded. “Their present effort to put
as much distance as possible between themselves and 'Peace Now'” “provides another proof of their own political incompetence and irrelevance.”

The *Christian Century* was not registering pique over pacifist rejection of Hartmann and the PNM, but merely demonstrating that to achieve peace was, in wartime, a political affair. The older groups, by shunning PNM (which was obviously trying to influence policy), because it had mobilized people the established peace elements considered impure in their motives, were voluntarily approving of the war continuing because it could not be ended in their way with their kind of political solution, proving that they really were not for peace under all circumstances. When Dorothy Detzer, national secretary of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, one of the most respected of the older peace organizations, admitted in a comment on the editorial that “all the old established peace organizations have withheld cooperation from the Peace Now Movement as an organization,” while sturdily maintaining that there was still “political relevance” to pacifism, the editors responded,

The *Christian Century* has not challenged the political relevance of pacifism in peacetime—as an effort to prevent war. It challenges its relevancy only in the midst of an actual war. Every pacifist and every pacifist organization, including Peace Now and "all the old established peace organizations," are working for either victory or defeat in this war—there is nothing else they can do.

The *Christian Century*’s editors argued that once a state became involved in a war, its citizens could only work for its victory or its defeat, and even war opponents contributed to the “war effort” by working on their jobs from day to day, even when engaged in the more or less forced labor of the conscientious objector. Hartmann argued that there was an alternative, stalemate, which might be construed to be more in the “national interest” supporters of the war talked about than victory, in which sense he sounded to some as though he had been influenced by Milton's declaration, “Who overcomes by force hath overcome but half his foe.”

Pacifists Want Peace—But When?” *Christian Century* (March 15, 1944), pp. 324-325. It is instructive to note that a few months before, the editors of the *Christian Century* (October 27, 1943, p. 1236) also expressed their support for a negotiated peace “at any time,” based on a statement of post-war aims by the allies at once, so that the enemy might know what they were and thus could evaluate them as against the costs of continuing the struggle.

THE BOMBING AND NEGOTIATED PEACE—IN 1944

Muste promptly returned to the dispute with another elaboration on the reason why he was against a negotiated peace, maintaining that such a settlement would stabilize the “existing power relationships” between the two combatant combinations of states then fighting, which “would contain within itself the seeds of World War III.” The editors promptly took after him again, and demonstrated to their satisfaction that Muste was no pacifist in this war, that he was for “active participation” in it; “Mr. Muste wants to see his country victorious and makes a strategic suggestion to that end.” They were referring to Muste’s hope for civil war breaking out in Germany and Japan, with the rebellious element bringing about the end of fighting after overpowering the regimes prosecuting the war, a finale strongly suggesting Lenin, the Bolsheviks, and the Russia of late 1917, though the Christian Century made no point of it. Muste “plainly prefers the continuance of the war to any attempt in the name of peace to ‘stabilize the existing power relationships’ between the belligerents,” the editors remarked in closing. He was for a different kind of political situation, and preferred struggling and hoping for this even if the war had to go on indefinitely.

Muste was back with a two-column letter in rejoinder the next month, trying to elucidate further on the veteran pacifist organizations and why they took the position they did on Peace Now, but it added up to about the same as before; PN contained people Muste and the others of traditional pacifism disdained to work with. All the while he insisted that the latter were for “peace now” and had been “constantly working for that,” even though rejecting the possibility of working to that end “with a specific organization named Peace Now.”

The editors then gave Hartmann space to comment on what had been said on the subject over the previous ten weeks. He scolded those who had backed off from working for Peace Now “merely because some wholly respectable conservative non-pacifists also endorse it for good rational, humanitarian, patriotic or even ‘selfish’ motives.” He also reproached those pacifists who preferred “armed revolution or civil war among the enemy peoples” to negotiated peace. “A pacifism that does not mean peaceful social change comes dangerously near to meaning nothing.”

Hartmann then addressed himself to the assertion, made directly in a number of quarters, and by inference in the Christian Century, that Peace Now was essentially in favor of the “Allies” suffering military defeat. Said Hartmann, 44

The charge that the Peace Now Movement is “defeatist” is faulty. All we assert is that there is no decent national objective that could not equally well be reached by group negotiation in place of combat to the death. It is wholly unscientific to say it can’t be done until we try—and we haven’t tried. Since when is it more democratic or Christian to seek certain worthy goals—incidentally, what are they?—by clubbing another into submission because one is stronger? Factually, our administration’s demand for the unconditional surrender of the foe also includes the unconditional surrender of the American citizen, who is asked to sign an international blank check, pledging his blood and treasure in behalf of commitments he knows nothing about, and might not approve of if he did.

And in a parting observation on the opponents of negotiated peace, Hartmann remarked, “Presumably all who are opposed to Peace Now are in favor of peace-the-day-after-tomorrow. Until then, millions more must be slaughtered. Why?” 45 Apparently the Christian Century, though officially opposed to Peace Now and all other related efforts, thought there was something about the former worthy of more extended attention. Three weeks after publishing Hartmann’s rejoinder to Muste and themselves, they published the only sober and extended exposition of PNM’s full position that appeared in a nationally-circulated periodical, written by Dorothy Hewitt Hutchinson, a prominent member of the Society of Friends 46 and one of the founders and associate chairman, along with Hartmann, of the organization. “The Peace Now Movement urges that the United States, recognizing the requirements of permanent peace, as set forth

44Letter to editors, Christian Century (May 24, 1944), pp. 646-647. Hartmann wrote from his Harvard address and not from the PNM headquarters in New York City.

45Wrote one informed activist to the editors, “I was delighted with your ‘Pacifists Want Peace—but When?’ in the March 15 issue. Only you don’t know half the pacifists in the country want ‘Peace Now’ and are with it. The opposition of the old so-called peace organizations is economic—the simple old source of evil. There is just so much money for peace in the country and the Peace Now Movement is diverting some of it.” Letter, Yoné U. Stafford to the editors, Christian Century (April 28, 1944), p. 532.

46Mrs. Hutchinson, born in 1905, was a graduate of Mount Holyoke College and held the Ph.D. degree from Yale (1932); she was active in the field of various biological studies and was involved in a number of humanitarian enterprises as well. She authored two pamphlets in the peace campaign, A Call to Peace Now and Must the Killing Go on?
in the Atlantic Charter, promptly formulate fair and reasonable peace terms and invite her allies and her enemies to negotiate for peace on this basis at once," she declared. "It is the contention of the Peace Now Movement that such an immediate peace proposal is a practicable and honorable alternative to the indefinite prolongation of the war," and one "which could be made only by a nation which is sure of victory but whose consciousness of superior strength is tempered by a realization of the material and spiritual cost of a complete military triumph and by a sense of responsibility, before God, for the welfare of mankind."47

"Like a mouse transfixed by the paralyzing gaze of a snake, the American Christian watches the relentless approach of D-Day," the Hutchinson statement went on. "In dumb horror he sees at least half a million of America's sons groomed for sure death in the bloodiest invasion of history because he sees no honorable alternative to the continuation of the war." "It is to such agonized souls that the Peace Now Movement offers its alternative to the anguish of war and the disillusionment of victory," this long manifesto's concluding appeal, was already by-passed by the course of the war, for D-Day was already a week in history when the document appeared in print. It was possible to object that Dr. Hutchinson had anticipated a somewhat larger loss of life than actually took place, in the invasion of western Europe in June, 1944, but there was little to quarrel with other than that, and least of all her prediction of "disillusionment" with the "victory," for no war in history has produced such a mountain of print and length of talk complaining of the vast hiatus between expectation and realization, though no war in history has also known so many who found every moment of it high adventure, who relished it with savor and glee, and who regretted profoundly its termination. For all who contemplated the saturation of Europe with war in June, 1944, with "dumb horror" there probably was an equal number which waited for it in high anticipation.

But the vast spread of the war and the preponderant part in this spread played by Americans wiped out the discussion and writing on the merits of negotiated peace as a substitute for one following "victory." Of the world's notables only Pius XII called for what Peace Now campaigned. In a speech delivered to the College of Cardinals on June 2, 1944, just as the Anglo-American armies were about to enter Rome, the Pope called for "a speedy opening of peace

negotiations," predicting the enormous increase of death and destruction in a war prolonged "endlessly and senselessly," "a war whose economic, social and spiritual consequences threaten to become the scourge of the age to come."48

The Peace Now Movement quietly disappeared from view, most of the calamities they predicted came true, and a large part of the citizenry which looked upon them and pronounced them good for a few months, has been wailing about their evil consequences ever since. Before sagging out of sight under the weight of the massive spreading of the war in June, 1944, it was subject to a savage attack in the American Mercury by two vigorous pro-war propagandists, who summarized what had been said in denigration of PNM in all circles for the previous six months, and succeeded in sounding like the Stalinist press at its worst in an organ devoted to anti-Stalinism.49 Unfortunately, the article was loaded with factual errors, but if its object was the portrayal of the personalities of the movement as psychotics and lightheaded traitors, it was possible to consider it a success. (The authors were especially delighted in the infiltration of the PNM headquarters by an employee of the pro-war leftist New York Post, and its subsequent publication of correspondence which was filmed on the sly. In a time of national sanity Peace Now might have sued the Post successfully for heavy damages for perpetrating this stunt.)

Hartmann responded with a long letter to the Mercury the following month deploring this marathon performance of "name-calling distortions." "For sheer cruelty to harmless individuals and for crude misrepresentation of a humane outlook, your May article on 'Peace Now' takes the prize," said Hartmann in reproach. "It is a repugnant model of totalitarian intolerance toward minorities which should cause authentic liberals some severe conscience pangs."50 But not

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48 The editors of the Christian Century in a full-page editorial called attention to the similarity in content between the Pope's appeal, and the "authoritative statement" on the objectives of the Peace Now Movement. "So far as we can see, the Pope is a Peace-Nower in full standing," they concluded, and cautioned, "No such warning as Pius XII has given as to the consequences if the war is greatly prolonged can be dismissed lightly." "The Pope Is For Peace Now," Christian Century (June 14, 1944), pp. 715-716.

49 Russell Whelan and Thomas M. Johnson, "'Peace Now' Rests in Peace," American Mercury (May, 1944), pp. 589-595. Whelan was a publicist for United China Relief, while Johnson was a military writer for the Newspaper Enterprise Association. What qualified these journalists as experts on the subject of Peace Now is a mystery.

50 Hartmann, letter to editors, American Mercury (June, 1944), pp. 766-767.
right away. The war was the great totalitarian liberal triumph, and no incidental were to stand in their way in enjoying it to the full, while they showed the enemy how "total war" was really supposed to be fought. The grieving and anguish over being the victims of the treatment accorded Peace Now was to come their way in the first decade of the Cold War, when it became totalitarian liberalism's turn to plead for the consideration of the value of negotiated peace.

The most vicious of all the smears of Peace Now came, strangely enough, over a year after the war had ended, in the anonymously-written book *The Plotters,* an account which glowed with simulated indignation and bogus patriotism, and gave indication of having been written while the war was still in progress, in what might be described as Teheran-era *Daily Worker* "unity" style. As far as its relevance for that moment, the fall of 1946, was concerned, the publishers might just as well have included as many pages concerning the menace of the Seljuk Turks.

The tens of thousands of lives expended and the hundreds of billions of dollars spent in the last score of years trying to repair the consequences of the "victory" which seemed so much better than a termination of the war short of such a conclusion is another story. Raymond Aron, in his *The Century of Total War,* in 1954, came up with a fitting epitaph to it all when he pointed out, "The goal that Western strategy has set itself in Japan as well as in Germany is not very different from the situation that would have arisen of its own accord if peace had been concluded before the entry of Soviet troops into the Reich and Manchuria, and before complete destruction of both armies and countries. We are trying to efface the consequences of a too complete victory, and get back to a victory compatible with the resurrection of the vanquished." What Aron is lamenting is that the war was not brought to an end by a negotiated peace, though it would seem that the easy part has been the achievement of the objective he described; the undoing of the profound dislocations which

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51New York: E. P. Dutton, 1946, pp. 179-182. The author, Avedis Derounian, used the pseudonym "John Roy Carlson." His previous book of this kind, *Under Cover* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1943), was the subject of a famous Chicago lawsuit just a few weeks before *The Plotters* was published, at which time United States District Court Judge John P. Barnes said of Derounian-Carlson, "I wouldn't believe him on oath, now or any time hereafter." Westbrook Pegler, interested in other aspects of the book than its caricature of Peace Now, included the court transcript of Judge Barnes' remarks of September 25, 1946, in his King Features Syndicate column published in the Albany, N. Y. *Times-Union* and elsewhere on November 13, 1946.
remain as unaltered today as they did more than twenty years ago is an achievement no one alive will live to see. "The war is the peace," enthusiastically proclaimed the New Republic's editor Michael Straight, in his book Make This the Last War, published late in 1943. World War II will undoubtedly be the last war of its kind; we have reverted to guerrilla war and civil war, the most primitive and brutal kinds of war, respectively, as General J. F. C. Fuller maintains. But the significance of Straight's dictum, anticipating the famous commandment of 1984 society in George Orwell's novel, is what is most compelling. His calling attention to the simultaneous construction, step by step, of the world to come while the war destroying the previous one was in progress, long ago deserved attention from the numerous clan who believe war is a means of preserving a status quo, when it is unmatched as machinery for effecting change, profound, sweeping, irrevocable, and invariably degenerative.

Walter B. Pitkin, in his A Short Introduction to the History of Human Stupidity, suggested that "not all the discoveries and inventions of mankind since the close of the Pleistocene age have benefited the race as extensively or as intensively as the war morons and war maniacs have harmed the race." It was obvious he was not referring just to professional soldiers, few of whom have ever expressed any great zeal over the beauties of war, particularly if they had ever done any fighting. The civilian politicians, zealots, vengeance-seekers, propagandists, and the army of the ignorant taxpayers and supporters with their single-hypothesis theory of the origins of war, had their way. The Peace Now adherents were able to take comfort, if they wished, in the many rueful indirect testimonials to the correctness of their assertions when it was all over.

On the last day of 1945, Time's commentary on a goalless war began, "World War II had ended badly." "Except on the military side, where allied might and allied generalship were crushing and supreme, it had never been fought well. The why of the fighting had

53 One of the few discussions of this aspect of Straight's book, published by Harcourt Brace, is to be found in the Times Literary Supplement (February 12, 1944), p. 74.
never been adequately spelled out.” This latter remark was at the core of Hartmann’s position throughout the brief day of Peace Now; no one seemed to know what the war was being fought to achieve. A year later, the U.S. News published an even bleaker summary of the existing anti-millennium the political and ideological warriors in mufti had never contemplated as the sum total of all their efforts.

The world’s worst war is being followed by the world’s worst peace. The present peace the elementary details of which have not been framed a year after the cessation of fighting in Europe, is not a peace at all. It is a dismal orgy of violence, looting, oppression, of slave labor and starvation, of mutilation of historic ethnographic frontiers and of defiance of natural economic law.

So ended the second great crusade against political sin, in which the “utter destruction” of the enemy was set down as the principal prerequisite to the creation of “a decent world,” and, as General Fuller encapsuled the situation, “the second American crusade ended even more disastrously than the first.”

Unlike Peace Now, the campaign against obliteration bombing of the enemy’s cities began in England, a logical development, since England was the place where obliteration bombing was first shaped into a practical policy. From there it filtered to the United States, and created a stir of about the same duration as Peace Now and at the same time. To some extent the people involved also came from the same general sector of the community, with the exception that there were more personalities from the clerical world involved in the protest against the bombing of the enemy cities.

Like Peace Now, the protest against aerial massacre of enemy civilian urban populations had to struggle against a hostile public opinion of many years’ standing, and a mixture of ignorance of what was going on and an obtuseness toward brutality which were objectives of propagandists seeking to firm up home-front support for about anything which may have been decided was a “military necessity.” (The senseless, pointless and fruitless destruction of the

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55 Time (December 31, 1945), p. 16. Hartmann proved to be no better at predicting the future than anyone else; in a speech before the War Resisters League on February 27, 1945, he thought the world was on the verge of a long era of peace, if only war between Russia and England could be prevented. “Permanent Peace Via the Triple Alliance,” Vital Speeches (March 15, 1945), pp. 341-343.

56 Franklin P. Hammel to U. S. News (December 20, 1945), p. 66.

Benedictine Abbey of Monte Cassino in Italy by American and British bombing planes and artillery in January-February, 1944, is a case in point, as General Fuller put it, "not so much a piece of vandalism as an act of sheer tactical stupidity."\(^{58}\)

Aneurin Bevan, wartime Labor Party member of parliament and subsequently minister of health and housing in the British government in 1945, once declared, "Remember that when you put a man in uniform, you reduce his intelligence by fifty per cent."\(^{59}\) But in view of the political decisions made during the war, there were grounds for suspicion among strictly military men about the amount of intelligence existing among the decision makers, even assuming they were not subject to any subsequent reduction at all after election to office. And one of the decisions made was the "military necessity" of area bombing.

No account of the reasons for the grudging bit of headway made by the campaign to halt this program in 1944 is understandable without some knowledge of the success of popular, but not official, Anglo-American propaganda in convincing the vast majority that, even if the results of strategic bombing, particularly of Germany, were dubious, at least it was justified because the Germans had commenced it all, and therefore this was justifiable retaliation, a primitive level of rationalization where most of the talk and print on the subject stayed. A well-exploited saga of the early war years was the German bombings of Warsaw, Rotterdam, London, Coventry, and Stalingrad, even though the first, second, and last of these cities were under assault and also were defended, and the activities of the German air force were tactical operations in conjunction with ground fighting in a war zone. London and Coventry were strategically bombed by the Germans in 1940-1941, and the issue as understood by almost all at the time plainly depended on a propaganda insisting that in all cases unprovoked attacks had been made on these communities, and that therefore what was to happen to some seventy German cities of 100,000 population or higher was at worst only retribution.

Rotterdam, attacked in the second week of May, 1940, as German armies were beginning their sweep of the Low Countries, was the first to be exploited. A certain amount of attention to the German attack on Warsaw had preceded the whole affair, in September,


\(^{59}\)Quoted by Quentin Reynolds in his profile of Bevan, "Rebel in the House," Collier's (December 29, 1945), p. 36.
1939. British apologists for their subsequent demolition of Germany frequently cited this as the precedent for their action, rather than what the Germans inflicted upon English towns in the spring of 1940 and thereafter, again daintily avoiding the distinction between the bombing of cities under direct attack and the bombing of cities hundreds of miles behind the fighting lines, the concentration of fire upon military objectives as against the annihilation of whole communities as policy, with hardly any pretense of special attention to targets of military importance.

But Rotterdam received the first major publicity, and the numbers game properly begins here. Over two months after the attack, the Royal Netherlands Legation in Washington with casual aplomb announced to the world via the New York Times that German air attackers had killed 30,000 people in seven and one-half minutes. Americans in particular were horrified by this story, and it became part of the folklore in Anglo-American circles, and has actually been little jarred by the research of a quarter of a century, though David Irving, while writing his The Destruction of Dresden, obtained figures from Rotterdam authorities in 1962 that the verifiable loss of life was 980, not 30,000 and that most of these persons were killed in fires which were set by the bombing, which was to prove to be the case in German cities also in subsequent years. As Irving says, “Dramatic exaggerations die hard—not least those that are generated in the dire necessity of war-time morale-boosting.”

In the summer of 1940 came the German attacks on England, particularly the blows struck to London and Coventry. In the case of the latter city, from the popular press stories and radio broadcasts which blanketet America, one might have gathered that the Germans had bombed this place only to destroy its cathedral and its civilian population. Again the account suggested immense loss of life, while it turned out that a total of 380 persons were killed. Almost always unmentioned was that Coventry was a major center of vital war production industries, many of which were destroyed or damaged, including twelve which were engaged in military aircraft manufacturing.

In the case of London the volume of reportage was astounding, and Americans in particular were able to start off each day listening to the sepulchral voice of Edward R. Murrow, describing new de-

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struction day by day, with the impression being gained by most listeners that hardly anything of the town existed by the end of 1940. One would never have known that at the same time the Germans were making nightly visits to bomb London, similar excursions by the Royal Air Force to Italian but principally German cities were taking place, but the last thing available to the yet-uninvolved Americans was a correct picture of the total situation. Nor would one have guessed that the exaggeration of the damage was on a scale just short of breath-taking.

Especially interesting in connection with this was a report made in the *Saturday Review of Literature* late in 1943 by one of its house book reviewers, Henry C. Wolfe, just back from a visit in London. “If you go to London,” revealed Mr. Wolfe, “you will not find a city in ruins. You can walk from Picadilly to Oxford Circus without seeing a building that shows marks of the blitz. Or from Trafalgar Square to the House of Parliament and hardly come across a reminder that the Luftwaffe has been over London.”61 This was rather strange news for a recent eye-witness to be relating, while still trying to tell an American reading public that England was under “concentrated devastation.”

As for the total damage achieved in England by the Germans, as compared to that achieved in Germany, the summary by Allen A. Michie, a one-time *Time-Life* reporter, in the *Reader’s Digest* in the summer of 1945, is particularly dramatic and succinct: “The combined damaged areas of London, Bristol, and Coventry and all the blitzed cities of Britain could be dumped in the ruins of just one medium-sized German city and hardly be noticed.”62 Coventry was many times cited in the popular propaganda as the excuse for obliteration strategy applied later on in Germany. Michie estimated that by comparison Berlin suffered 363 Coventrys; Cologne, 269; Hamburg, 200; and Bremen, 137. Few believed that this was an excessively weighted retaliation, or that such prodigious damage was not absolutely necessary.

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62 Michie, “Germany Was Bombed to Defeat,” *Reader’s Digest* (August, 1945), pp. 77-78, the first popularized summarization of the overall report of *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey* which, though an accurate account of the damage done by bombing, came to specious conclusions which no longer are supported.
In the case of Stalingrad, here we have a prime instance of the diligence and assiduousness of Soviet and pro-Soviet word merchants. In a city fought for block-by-block and even house-by-house, the damage is bound to be utterly appalling, but most Americans went through the war believing the destruction was a malicious product of German air attack, and inclined to forget that the Red Army had anything to do with a goodly share of the wreckage. In such circumstances it is conventional to blame it all on the enemy. The exploitation of it for propaganda purposes was almost fulsome, and tended to be brought up every time there took place a discussion of the part played by the Soviet in the war against Hitler Germany. And the objective was well reached before deflation of the legend took place. William L. White, one of America's most prestigious reporters in World War II, is principally responsible for the deflation. As a traveling companion to Eric Johnston, the president of the American Chamber of Commerce, on the latter's celebrated tour of Stalinist Russia in the second half of 1944, White was permitted to see a number of things barred to other American correspondents, who themselves read about the war in Soviet newspapers, and wrote the stories they filed to America and England from their hotels in Moscow, not from the front, where most readers thought they were. One of White's treats was an air tour of Stalingrad, a long, narrow community winding mostly along one bank of the Volga. The purpose was obvious, to impress White with this destroyed place, and thus get more wordage placed before American readers. White, who had been in London during the German bombing of 1940-1941, and thought that was considerable, soured on Stalingrad as a site of vast destruction. Said he with a sniff in his subsequent book Report on the Russians, on what he was shown, "If you coiled [the ruins of] Stalingrad up and set it down in the ruins of London there would still be plenty of room for Stalingrad to rattle around."63

So we have some interesting wartime eyewitness stories on the relative damage of air attacks: Stalingrad a bagatelle compared to London; London and the entire damaged areas of all Britain combined virtually nothing compared to any one of seventy German cities alone, and one interesting traveller who hardly was able to find any

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damage in parts of London he visited at the very height of the war. The Anglo-American propaganda picture of this interesting business was just about the reverse.

But who had started it? This was an important question, because at the core of what might be called vulgar propaganda, whichever side “started” any particular maneuver (be it explosive bullets, gas warfare, tanks, submarine attacks, and the like, as has been seen prior to this time) was sure to be blamed by the later side on the scene, not only for its prior actions but those of its antagonists in similar enterprise later on. Another standard staple, particularly of the *ex post facto* vulgar propaganda, was the self-righteous claim that the area bombings were retaliation for German concentration camp excesses, as though the people killed in these massacres from the air were the same people in charge of the concentration camps. One of the repetitious charges used to counter Vera Brittain, particularly in England, her home, when she headed up the critique of allied area bombing, was that those whom she sought to be spared had undertaken this policy first. Public opinion was prepared for years to support such action, and nothing ever came up which diverted the English and American policy makers from it. But it was a false charge.

There is no doubt of the English origin of both strategic bombing, directed ostensibly at military objectives, and area bombing, a variant of this, in which the goal was to destroy as much of the enemy’s civilian housing and as many inhabitants as possible, both these kinds of targets being far behind the fighting lines, if any. Many printed sources by important participants and functionaries who figured in the decisions exist, in which the authors boast of their deeds. General Fuller has pointed out that a form of area bombing against the villages of rebellious natives of Waziristan in Northwest India was carried out by the Royal Air Force as far back as 1925, even though a ruling established at the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments of 1922 had stipulated, “Aerial bombardment for the purpose of terrorizing the civilian population, of destroying or damaging private property not of a military character, or of injuring

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64 See for example Martin Caidin, *The Night Hamburg Died* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1960), for impressions of this sort. Compare this with Prime Minister Churchill’s July, 1943, Guildhall speech, in which he declared, “We entered the war of our free will, without ourselves being directly assaulted.” Quoted in *Time* (July 12, 1943), p. 35.

65 Fuller, *Second World War*, p. 221.
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non-combatants, is prohibited.” (The English did not adhere to this ruling, nor did the French, who repeatedly bombed the Syrian city of Damascus in 1925 and 1926.)

A book which appeared early in 1944, by J. M. Spaight, principal assistant secretary of the Air Ministry, Bombing Vindicated, was the first inkling for many that such a policy was of English origin. Mr. Spaight, who launched the incredible slogan, “The bomber is the savior of civilization,” dated the decision to engage in such warfare from May, 1940, and bluntly declared, “We began to bomb objectives on the German mainland before the Germans began to bomb objectives on the British mainland.” This is a historical fact which has been publicly admitted. Spaight went on to explain why it had been suppressed from general news so long: “... because we were doubtful about the psychological effect of propagandist distortion of the truth that it was we who started the strategic offensive, we have shrunk from giving our great decision [of May, 1940] the publicity which it deserved. That surely was a mistake. It was a splendid decision.”

But Spaight was far from alone, nor was he first. As far back as September 13, 1941, in the London New Leader, the celebrated military analyst B. H. Liddell Hart had the following to say:

On May 10, 1940, the German offensive in the West was launched and the Royal Air Force in natural reply, launched attacks on the communications of the invading enemy, first in the invading territory, and then extending into Western Germany.

On the night of May 17, the policy of confining air operations to what might be roughly described as the battle zone was abandoned, and air attacks were made against targets at Hamburg and Bremen; on the following nights targets at Hannover were attacked. This new policy of attacking military objectives in the interior of Germany was continued in the weeks that followed.

On May 24, the Germans dropped their first bombs on English soil, although only a few of them, at scattered places on the East Coast. This was not repeated, however, until British night raiding had been in process for a further three weeks.

On the night of June 17, the first considerable German air raid on England took place—and then continued nightly, although on a moderate scale, and with evident care to confine the aim to military objectives. In August the massed German daylight air offensive was launched and defeated.

Just how careful either the German or English air forces were in their discrimination is not just a matter of opinion, for hitting specific targets from great altitudes at night was exceedingly difficult throughout the war, and rarely more precise in daytime, and under some situations the aim was made even worse by the increasing speed of the aircraft. The mutual bombings of London and Berlin were so unsuccessful in this respect that one English observer suggested ironically that it would have been simpler to have the opposing air forces stay home and bomb military objectives in their own cities; in that way there would be a much higher degree of accuracy and far less punishment meted out to men, women, and children non-combatants, on both sides.\(^{68}\)

One need not belabor this matter; there is a substantial literature which is no longer squeamish about the issue, and it is freely discussed. Spaight’s book; *Bomber Command* by Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris; Liddell Hart’s *The Revolution in Warfare*; F. J. P. Veale’s *Advance to Barbarism*; General Fuller’s history of World War II; Irving’s book on the bombings of Dresden, and many other books by

\(^{68}\)The Butt Report to the Royal Air Force in August, 1941 (prepared by David Bensusan Butt, secretary to Professor F. A. Lindenmann) revealed that only one-third of the aircraft striking German targets came within five miles of striking it, and in the case of well-defended ones, the bombs of only one tenth of the attackers came as close as five miles. (Irving, *Destruction of Dresden*, p. 32.) But the degree of error continued very high even after scientific sighting became universally employed. In the summer of 1944 in the fighting in France, eye witnesses reported heavy bomb loads aimed at the Germans landing six or more miles inside the Anglo-American lines, and one American air group attacking a German position missed it by eight miles and scored a direct hit on a Canadian divisional headquarters instead. (Fuller, *Second World War*, pp. 303-304.) The record on churches seemed to be better; McCawley (see note 67 above) concluded that bombing destroyed 10,000 of the 12,000 Catholic churches in Germany, while Walter W. Van Kirk, a member of a deputation representing the Federal Council of Churches, the first civilian commission to visit Japan after the war, reported to the *Christian Century* (December 19, 1945), p. 1409: “It is impossible to describe in words the catastrophic damage to the churches resulting from air raids.” Van Kirk calculated that 300 of the 600 Christian kindergartens in Japan had been demolished too. Yet the strategic bombers in Japan missed “ninety-seven per cent of Japan’s stocks of guns, shells, explosives and other military supplies,” either as a result of wide dispersal or underground storage, where they were “not vulnerable to air attack.” Fuller, *Second World War*, p. 388, quoting from *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific War)*. On the other side, it now appears that the bombing of the German town of Freiburg by three planes on May 10, 1940, killing fifty-seven, of which thirty-five were women and children, was done by German bombers as a result of a navigational error. (Irving, *Destruction of Dresden*, pp. 19-20; Hans Rumpf, *The Bombing of Germany* [New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963], p. 24.)
English writers go into various phases of this early English strategic or “precision” bombing and the nature of the German retaliation. The wonder is that there is so little general admission of it even in the most advanced intellectual centers in the United States; it is to be assumed that the mass of the citizenry will continue to incubate the same old fables, mainly as a consequence of having them drummed home weekly via repeated showing of twenty-five-year-old propaganda moving pictures on television.

Mr. Spaight told the world about the “splendid decision” of May, 1940, in England to engage in strategic “precision” bombing, in 1944. It took somewhat longer for other Englishmen to reveal when the decision was made to move on to the far more comprehensive “area” bombing. There was little doubt the “precision” stage of bombing was “a grotesque failure,” in the words of General Fuller, if the object was the ruination of German war industry. The index of combat munitions output (including aircraft, ammunition, weapons, tanks, and naval construction) by German industry shows a steadily rising curve reaching a high point in mid-1944, and maintaining a very high level into the last four months of the war; at the moment of defeat it was still well above anything in 1941 and equal to most of 1942. Hence, the move to area bombing, to destroy the homes and if possible the persons and families of industrial workers in Germany, was fully as much a failure if set against persisting production of the means whereby to fight. But one must credit the program with awesome success if the standard is the demolition of the built up centers of major cities and the massacre of civilians; General Fuller described them as “appalling slaughterings, which would have disgraced Attila.” It is interesting to note how the top radio, newspaper, and magazine propagandists in the United States, who took such delight in reporting all this destruction and carnage and gloried in it as evidence of American “might,” shuddered so violently at the end of 1945 over the possibility of a new war resulting in the “destruction of civilization.” Apparently they looked on the tens of millions killed and mutilated, and the hundreds of billions of dollars in property damage of 1939-1945, as not having resulted in the slightest in the “destruction” of civilization, but in its saving (vide 69).

69See Fuller, Second World War, p. 227, for the Strategic Bombing Survey chart on 1942-1945 German combat munitions output. General Fuller was a persistent contemporary critic of strategic bombing in his wartime columns in Newsweek.
Spaith and the role of bombing planes). By such standards, a third World War could only “save civilization” that much more.

“Area” bombing also had another goal, the undermining of German morale, in the hope that subsequent disaffection would encourage various forms of breakdown leading to collapse and surrender. Various staff papers and directives on the subject were filed in 1941, and a number of separate investigations into possibilities of maximizing personnel injury by bombing were conducted, the best known being those of Professors Solly Zuckerman, P.M.S. Blackett, and F. A. Lindemann. Zuckerman and Blackett were both pessimistic about the possibilities of causing any formidable degree of harm to the German populace via area bombing. But Prime Minister Churchill turned for advice to Professor Lindemann, who, according to Irving, “was asked to propound a bombing policy by which Britain could effectively assist her ally in the East,” Stalin. It is instructive to note that the Earl of Birkenhead’s special plea in defense of Lindemann, The Professor and the Prime Minister, makes no reference to this. However, Churchill had taken the initiative in pushing through as policy a twenty-year treaty of amity and alliance with Stalin, and was under some pressure to create a second front in Europe against Hitler, pressure which grew to immense proportions later in 1942.

The Lindemann report, filed on March 30, 1942, as Irving puts it, “suggested that there was little doubt that an area bombing offensive could break the spirit of the enemy provided it was aimed at the working-class areas of the fifty-eight German towns with a population of more than 100,000 inhabitants each.” As things turned out, Lindemann’s prediction of the number that area bombing would kill or leave homeless was remarkably close to what was to transpire.

When this report, and the gruff controversy which it provoked, principally between Lindemann and Sir Henry Tizard, was disclosed by Sir Charles P. Snow in his Godkin Lectures at Harvard in 1960, subsequently published as Science and Government, it was a revelation which produced widespread shock. Undoubtedly both the Earl of Birkenhead, in his official biography of Lindemann (and

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72 Lindemann’s “minute” submitted to Churchill is reproduced in Birkenhead, The Professor and the Prime Minister, pp. 261-262; Lindemann was mainly concerned with the number who might be rendered “homeless” by bombing.
the *Times Literary Supplement*, also defensive of Lindemann), had a point in taking Snow to task for his account of the fight, in which Lindemann came out a sinister villain and Tizard some kind of hero. "Both men were avid for power, but in the eyes of Snow that was fitting in the case of Tizard, but reprehensible in that of Lindemann." Actually the two men were not supporters of vastly different approaches to the subject; "there was far less difference between the views of Prof (sic) [Lindemann, as he was known to intimates] and Tizard on strategic bombing than Snow would have us believe," asserted Birkenhead. Sir Charles Webster, one of the co-authors of the official British history of strategic bombing, also came forward with the declaration that Tizard "did not disagree fundamentally" with the bombing policy recommended by Lindemann. If anything it was a violent personality conflict and a struggle for power. As Birkenhead admitted, "Both men were intensely ambitious to dictate the scientific policy of the country, and, in their grapple for power, there was room for only one at the summit." Lindemann won.

And this was the policy adopted by Churchill, and with modifications became general "allied" policy after the January, 1943, Casablanca meeting, while official propaganda fed to the British (and of course American) publicity organs of all types insisted in highly moral terminology that only military targets were being attacked, and all others scrupulously avoided, even in 1944 and 1945. And Irving points out that the Churchill government was "able to safeguard its secret from the day that the first area raid had been launched," "right up to the end of the war."

Probably the only serious regret the authors and executioners of the area bombing policy had concerned the failure to involve the Stalin regime in support of our collaboration with it. No attention was ever called to a Soviet strategic bombing attack on a German city during World War II, and there was no indication that one ever took place, other than nuisance raids conducted by one or two planes. One of the few times the subject ever was mentioned occurred late in the war, in the House of Commons on March 6, 1945, when M. P. Richard Stokes conducted an incensed attack on the Churchill government for the Dresden holocaust, in which he pointed

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74 For the critique of Snow and observations in extenuation of Lindemann, see Birkenhead, *The Professor and the Prime Minister*, pp. 258-261, 265-267.
out the Soviet was not conducting such "blanket bombing" destruction of German cities, and would very likely make expert political capital out of it after the war ended, a remarkably astute prediction.76

The failure of the so-called "responsible" communications media in the United States to discuss at any time the political consequences of the no-bombing policy of the Russians is indeed impressive. In fact, there can be found numerous complaints in American papers criticizing the Reds not only for abstaining from these big bombing runs, but also for their refusal to cooperate with the RAF and USAAF by not allowing them to use bases in Russia, and later in Poland and other captured areas as the Red Army rolled West. So permitted they might conduct shuttle raids, hitting the German towns on eastward flights, refuelling and reloading in areas under Russian control, striking the same or other targets on the way back, to maximize use of the aircraft, which had to fly back empty on unproductive return flights. A particularly heavy flurry of wistful hopes began to appear in the American press in the fall of 1943 when the Red Army moved westward to within 450 miles of the big industrial cities of both Germany and Italy. Again it was felt that the Soviets would allow American and British bombing attacks from these closer Russian bases, and apparently the idea had travelled about in Anglo-American circles that the Reds were in full harmony with mass bombing policies. Some RAF-AAF bombing flights to East Prussia and western Poland had already taken place, and the returning fliers expressed wonder that no Russian fighter escorts had risen to defend the bomber fleets.77

77"Russia as Allied Air Base," United States News (October 22, 1943), pp. 20-21. Rumpf, Bombing of Germany, p. 141, describes one such shuttle raid in June, 1944, however, involving American bombers landing at Red bases in Poltava and Mitgorod after attacking synthetic oil plants at Kottbus. From the Soviet locations they flew to attack oil fields in Galicia, proceeded to Italy, and then returned to their bases in Britain, attacking railway yards in southern France in transit. Rumpf claims this was the first time this was ever done, but mentions no others.

It was part of the propaganda of May-June, 1945, to proclaim with great force and velocity the delicious sense of comradeship prevailing between American and Soviet troops following their meeting in Germany in the closing days of the European war. Fellow traveler and communist fable-makers extended themselves to the limit in publicizing these capers, but paid no attention whatever to the fact that Red and American soldiers had already enjoyed three and a half years of intimate contacts in their joint activities on the supply routes of the Persian Gulf Service Command in Iran. Sidney W. Morrell, former London
What the English-speaking world in alliance with "Stalin the Great,"\(^7\) as he was once toasted by Churchill at a banquet, did not know was that not only did the Russians apparently want no part of this program, but they had systematically interned fliers of the "allies" who had inadvertently wandered across Soviet frontiers and landed there, either mistakenly or because of being disabled. Information of this sort was as systematically and effectively suppressed as the policy of area bombing, and only in the budding Cold War days did it also leak out, to join the mass of other disheartening evidences of wartime bad faith. Americans had to escape from Soviet internment camps in about the same manner that they made their getaways from German prisoner of war camps. The American public did not learn anything about this until the publication of General John R. Deane's *The Strange Alliance* (New York: Viking, 1947), subtitled *The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Cooperation with Russia*. General Deane, the chief liaison negotiator in Moscow from October, 1943, to the end of the war, in this book detailed among other things the struggle to get American airmen who made forced landings in Soviet territory released from internment by their "gallant Red allies."

There is no point in trying to set the stage any further at the time the protest made by Vera Brittain stirred up its little storm in England and the United States. The heaviest part of the area bombing damage in Germany had already been achieved by the early months

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\(^7\)The bacchanalia at the British embassy in Teheran celebrating Churchill's 69th birthday during the November, 1943, conference was described by *Time* as "the most spectacular meal since the Last Supper." There were somewhere between thirty-five and fifty alcoholic toasts during the festivities, and Stalin was reported to have participated in all of them, "amiably ambling around the table to clink glasses with the person being toasted." It was at this occasion that Churchill's toast to the Red leader was addressed, "To Stalin the Great." The party then "roared on in high good humor." *Time* (December 13, 1943), p. 28.
of 1944; the centers of scores of old German cities had been gutted and hundreds of thousands of people already killed or injured, though most important German industry had hardly been hit, war production was still rising to new peaks, and no sign of civilian morale breakdown was surfacing, despite the wishful thinking. There was evidence only that the war was being stretched out, not shortened. But the citizenry at large knew none of these things in either England or the United States; a combination of the propaganda of the enemy and their own had succeeded in masking the very largest part of the real situation, making discriminating judgments virtually impossible. Most people still believed military and industrial targets were the sole striking points of the air arm of the "allies."

The reprinting of the Italian General Giulio Douhet's 1921 classic, *The Command of the Air*, in England late in 1943, with its enthusiastic message of mass bombing of cities to ruin morale and destroy industries, and Spaight's book a few months later, announcing to Britain's home front that they could rest assured that this was all being done in generous fashion, in addition to the Air Ministry's tireless propaganda, were enough for most, even though they were contradictory. The attempt to tell people that multitudes of German non-combatants, half of them women and children, were dying in fire-storms in bombed cities, where temperatures approached 1500°Fahrenheit, and the scores of other revolting consequences, was bound to encounter open-mouthed stares of disbelief. Furthermore, the demands of wartime partisanship upon the news dispensers resulted in preposterous non-sequiturs being used to divert attention from the main issue. When the official Stalinist photographic agency Sovfoto supplied American papers and magazines with pictures of dead Russian civilians, these were published here and invariably accompanied by charges or imputations that the dead were victims of German "atrocities." But when a German picture arrived here in September, 1943, of a vast collection of bodies of women killed in an allied air raid on Cologne, laid out in rows to facilitate identification by surviving relatives, it was disparaged as an example of the "lengths to which the Nazis have gone in building up the horror

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79Published in London by Faber and Faber, and lauded in the *Times Literary Supplement* (January 8, 1944), p. 14, as a great masterpiece which was being vindicated by events. It was expectable that the TLS would also welcome Spaight's book in similar fashion (March 3, 1944), hailing it as a great contribution to the study of modern warfare.
aspects of the allied bombing offensive against the Reich” (News-
week, September 20, 1943, p. 38). Apparently the experiencing of “horror” by the enemy was possible only as a by-product of propaganda.

The first influential voices raised in England against the area bombing of civilian targets in Europe by the RAF Bomber Command were those of Dr. George Bell, Bishop of Chichester, and Cosmo Gordon Lang, Archbishop of Canterbury, in the House of Lords early in February, 1944. Dr. Bell had learned of the frightful fate of Hamburg and the full horror of the raids on the other big German cities from neutral sources while in Sweden on a visit. Their denunciation of these achievements of course produced only public scoffing and scorn, for the official releases of Sir Archibald Sinclair’s office in the Air Ministry adhered tenaciously to the line that military targets alone were being bombed, and these releases were what was available in the form of “reliable” information.

A month after the protests by these famed English churchmen came the alarming arraignment of bombing policy, Massacre by Bombing, by Vera Brittain. First published in the United States in the February, 1944, issue of Fellowship, the organ of the pacifist Fellowship of Reconciliation, it actually had first appeared in London under the title Seed of Chaos: What Mass Bombing Really Means. It was an essay of about 20,000 words, prepared in a non-emotional style but packed with facts and revelations which soon showed, by the fantastic volume of extreme attacks upon it, that it was a formidable and upsetting surprise. The author of this little literary ambush was the wife of a well-known professor and author, George E. G. Catlin, and a writer and lecturing personality in her own right, as well as being a veteran participant in peace society activism. Though her plea for a major protest against area bombing fell mainly on the unheeding and the hostile, it shattered the wall of silence which wartime censorship had been able to prop up against such reports to that moment. Its distribution in a ten-cent reprint began its

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60“Revolt Against Bombs,” Newsweek (March 20, 1944), p. 86.
61Irving, Destruction of Dresden, pp. 53, 225, ff.
62It was subtitled The Facts Behind the British-American Attack on Germany.
63London: New Vision Publishing Company, 1944, under the auspices of the Bombing Restriction Committee. The specific aspect of the name of the English organization is significant: they were not against all bombing, and had no opposition to the bombing of military and industrial targets in German-held areas.
period of national attention, at about the time its publisher’s chairman, A. J. Muste, was mounting his campaign against cooperation with George Hartmann and Peace Now, which helped to complicate the scene somewhat.

Part of the reason for the sober attention Massacre by Bombing received in the United States was due to the preface, consisting of a statement graced by the signatures of twenty-eight prominent American writers and clergy, a testimonial to their belief in the Britain message and an affirmation of their conviction that obliteration bombing was a barbarian enterprise and should be abandoned at the earliest opportunity. Among these signers were Allen Knight Chalmers, J. Henry Carpenter, Harry Emerson Fosdick, John Haynes Holmes, Rufus Jones, Kenneth Scott Latourette, Clarence Pickett, Edwin McNeill Poteat, and Oswald Garrison Villard.

As Newsweek described it, “The reaction was immediate and one-sided.” Attacks on Miss Brittain occurred from coast to coast by the hundreds in every imaginable medium of communication; the printed condemnations alone would have filled a number of volumes. The New York Times reported its mail running fifty to one against it, and notables entered the arena repeatedly. Because so many of the signers of the preface of Massacre by Bombing were renowned Protestant clergy, it appeared as though there were a compulsion on the part of those clergy of similar faith supporting the obliteration bombing to come out immediately in rejection of Miss Brittain and her small company of supporters. Famed Episcopal Bishop William T. Manning denounced Miss Brittain in a letter to the New York Herald Tribune, and the Rev. Daniel A. Poling, editor of the quarter-of-a-million circulation Christian Herald, a major in the Army Chaplain Corps and president of the International Christian Endeavor Society, was especially bitter, charging the entire group involved in the protest against bombing with “giving comfort to the enemy,” which turned out to be a common, expectable, and widespread charge. Still another national figure, Bishop Garfield Bromley Oxnam, leader of the Methodist Bishops’ Crusade, rose to the counter-attack, incensed at the prominent part played by Methodists in the protest. He was given a choice launching platform, no less than a

84Newsweek was itself upset; it editorialized in the story on the upheaval caused by Massacre by Bombing, “The military necessity of mass bombing must be left to the decision of Allied military leaders.”
major radio spot on the "March of Time" program.\textsuperscript{85} (there was little doubt where the sentiments of the Luce empire lay).

One of the gems in the pro-bombing array which came from the clergy was sent in protest to the \textit{Christian Century} by Rev. Paul Koslowski, rector of the Polish National Catholic Church of New Britain, Connecticut, who was especially incensed at the Brittain message. "There is no other way but to attack these beasts in their lairs—that is, in the German cities—where they plan further mass murders of innocent people," thundered Rev. Koslowski. "Christ's saying, 'If one smite thee on one cheek, give him the other,' is a beautiful theory, but not with human beasts, drunk with vengeance and conquest."\textsuperscript{86} A generous sample of other blood-curdling attacks on the Brittain group was assembled by Rev. Gillis, editor of the \textit{Catholic World} and an opponent of strategic bombing; it was one of the most ferocious samples of opinion from the followers of the Prince of Peace since Ray H. Abrams had produced his \textit{Preachers Present Arms}, the saga of clerical belligerency during World War I. Rev. Gillis was appalled by the ethics of nearly all the critics and characterized that and their logic succinctly: missionaries should eat cannibals because cannibals eat missionaries.\textsuperscript{87}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{85}L. O. Hartman, "What is Disturbing the Methodists," \textit{Christian Century} (April 12, 1944), pp. 458-460. Bishop Oxam was the subject of a long and adulatory tribute in \textit{Time} two months later (June 26, 1944), pp. 88, 90, 92, which demonstrated how far he had moved from his anti-militarist days when, as president of DePauw University in Indiana in the early '30s, he had abolished the ROTC campus organization. A three-time visitor to Stalinist Russia, his effusive enthusiasm for the Soviet had "earned" him one and half pages in Elizabeth Dilling's \textit{Red Network} (1934), Time insisted on pointing out. It was the culminating irony of the moment that anti-communist Mrs. Dilling was on trial for sedition in Washington while Bishop Oxam was flying around the country making militaristic patriotic speeches; nothing better illustrated the fact that such words as "sedition" and "treason" have only subjective definitions, formulated by whatever element happens to be in power at the time.

Rev. Poling's \textit{A Preacher Looks At War} (New York: Macmillan, 1943) received an ample and sympathetic review in \textit{Time} (July 5, 1943), pp. 44-45. In this book he denounced pacifism as "immoral and un-Christian" and listed a number of "holy causes" for which war should be fought.

\item \textsuperscript{86}Letter, Rev. Koslowski to editors, \textit{Christian Century} (March 22, 1944), p. 372.

\item \textsuperscript{87}See note 6. Another contemporary critic of obliteration bombing, in addition to his opposition to Vansittartite Germanophobia, was Francis Neilson; especially useful are his wartime diaries, published contemporaneously (\textit{The Tragedy of Europe: A Day by Day Commentary on the Second World War}, 5 vols., Appleton, Wisconsin: C. C. Nelson Publishing Co., 1940-1945).
\end{itemize}
The *New York Times* and *Herald Tribune* both condemned the Brittain group editorially, and an especially outraged statement was issued by the formidable propaganda front, Freedom House, which numbered among its signatories Bishop Henry Hobson, Wendell Willkie, and Dorothy Thompson, grimly announcing its support of "all available means" to defeat the enemy, an echo of Churchill's famous declaration, "There are no lengths of violence to which we shall not go," and his Minister of Information Brendan Bracken's "bomb, burn, destroy" dictum issued at the 1943 Quebec Conference. A denunciation was even obtained from Eleanor Roosevelt, wife of the President. The attitude of the two most prestigious voices of liberalism in those times, the *New Republic* and the *Nation*, was what might be expected from such concentrations of civilian battlers. On March 13 the latter discounted the whole endeavor, making the usual plea of military necessity and denying that area bombing, as far as its editors were "aware," was taking place, embellished with the propaganda rhetoric of the day, such as "Those who take up arms to end aggression by others against humanity must do what is necessary to win." The *New Republic* concluded, "It is late in the day to appeal to the codes of warfare appropriate to the romantic times when war was a sort of game carried on by professional soldiers and 'noncombatants' had no part in willing the war, in carrying it on, or in willing its end." The editors, snugly secure in their New York offices from any possible retaliation in the form of German bombing attacks, obviously felt that there no longer were any "non-combatants." The *Nation* came up with a remarkably restrained critique of the Brittain statement, but complained that it was "hardly objective or reliably documented" (though in retrospect these were the least vulnerable aspects of the entire publication). Nevertheless, the editors supported Bishop Oxnam's position that obliteration bombing was "a revolting necessity," and concluded, "Deprived of the weapon of mass bombing our armies might easily be so handicapped that the war might be stalemated. That, perhaps, is what the protestors have in view, for what they are really attacking is not a weapon of war but war as a weapon." And if there was one thing the left-wing liberal warriors had in common with their Tory-warrior contemporaries and colleagues, it was their determination to saturate
the planet with unlimited and endless war, in order that “victory” be realized.88

On Good Friday, in April, Cyril Foster Garbett, Archbishop of York, in a New York City interview, countered the views of his counterparts in England by supporting the urban bombing of Germany.89 There were many expectable retorts to the opponents of obliteration bombing, and some quite ingenious; probably first in this class was that of Royce Brier of the San Francisco Chronicle, who doubted that any obliteration bombing had occurred, and implied that the Brittain pamphlet was a hoax.90

One of the most lyric defenses of the bombing was by Cousins, editor of the Saturday Review of Literature, though his eloquence was largely spent in embellishing the crude schoolboy argument that the enemy “started it” (citing Warsaw, Rotterdam, London, and Coventry as examples of communities devastated by obliteration strategic bombing), and that what was happening in Germany now was merely just retribution. On April 30, 1944, on the prestigious “Town Meeting of the Air” radio program, Cousins and the military analyst Major George Fielding Eliot defended the affirmative against Norman Thomas and C. G. Paulding of the liberal Catholic weekly Commonweal, on the question, “Should We Continue Mass Bombings of Enemy Cities?” For material Cousins depended upon his five-column SRL editorial critique, “The Non-Obliterators.”91. His main counts against the Brittain group were, “They would like to mark out sanctuary areas which would receive immunity from our fliers,” and “We fail to see how anything short of a negotiated peace itself could bring about the type of agreement necessary to enforce such a plan.” For Cousins, the Hartmann and Brittain programs

88See summary of New York City press and other comments on Brittain in Christian Century (March 22, 1944), p. 380; (March 29, 1944), p. 412. Most of the signers of the preface remained silent during the uproar, though there was an occasional exception, one of the most notable being Ralph W. Sockman, minister of Christ Church, who came out with a blast at Miss Brittain’s attackers during this time. On the liberal weeklies, see “Massacre by Bombing,” New Republic (March 13, 1944), p. 332; “A Revolting Necessity,” Nation (March 18, 1944), pp. 323-324.
89Report on the Archbishop of York’s interview with the New York City press in the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in Christian Century (April 19, 1944), p. 507. Ironically, Dr. Garbett was the subject of a cover portrait and story in the April 17 issue of Time, with the cover bearing his dictum, “The Church’s great function is to arouse the conscience of the State.”
were complementary. After the atom bombing of Hiroshima, one of the most terror-stricken voices in the English-speaking world was that of Norman Cousins.

One of the things which most offended American enemies of the anti-strategic bombing was Vera Brittain's reproduction of many shocking reports on the destruction of German cities by thousand-plane attacks and the annihilation of women and children which had appeared in the neutral press from their eye-witness reporters; the stories of contemporary bombing damage in North Vietnam are pallid child's play by comparison. But its was not just the Germans who were suffering from obliteration bombing. Anne O'Hare McCormick of the New York Times soon was in competition with her descriptions of the flattening of a long string of Italian communities, as the Anglo-American forces began their move up the peninsula, and protests began to file in from prominent churchmen in Belgium and France. Rev. John L. Bazinet of St. Mary's Seminary in Baltimore acted as the agent for Cardinal Van Roey, Archbishop of the Belgian city of Malines, in presenting to the New York Times his protest against Anglo-American mass bombing of Belgian and other European cities, in May, 1944, though the Times quietly rejected it for publication. On the heels of this came the May 14, 1944, Paris and Vichy radio broadcasts of an appeal to the Cardinals and Archbishops of the Catholic Church in the United States and the British empire to intervene against indiscriminate bombing of French and other European cities. The appeal came from Cardinals Lienart of Lille, Suhard of Paris, Gerlier of Lyon, and Archbishop Chollet of Cambrai. Not long after, Paulding in Commonweal engaged in a recital of Belgian and French cities from one-third to one-half destroyed by area bombing. Of course the appeal of the churchmen

92 Among those quoted were a Stockholm Aftonbladet reporter who described corpses everywhere after the July, 1943, Hamburg raid, even in tree tops; the Swiss National-Zeitung reporter for August 9, 1943: "The largest workers' district of the city was wiped out," news of which should have been disturbing to many American leftists with their long record of boasting about Hamburg's numerous Marxian radicals, but apparently was not; the Swiss Baseler Nachrichten for September 9, 1943, also on Hamburg: "The cellar shelters became death chambers" which "must have reached a temperature such as is not reached in the burning chambers of a crematorium" (many of the victims were reduced to tiny heaps of ashes).


in question received very little attention here, despite their eminence; after all, they were dignitaries associated with the church in regions controlled by the enemy, and the war was demonstrating that though Maxim Litvinov’s bromide, that “peace is indivisible,” was possibly so, the divisibility of Christianity definitely was so.

The most careful and unimpulsively-indignant considerations of the Brittain message and its implications were to be found in the voices of liberal Catholicism and Protestantism, Commonweal and the Christian Century. The former devoted its entire front page on March 17, 1944, to an evaluation; after disavowing pacifism, the editors suggested that although the great majority of the clergy signing the preface were Protestants, “they are thinking, perhaps, more in terms the Pope is thinking in.” They went on to deliver an ironic definition of area bombing: “the precision bombing of entire inhabited areas.” The military analyst Hoffman Nickerson a decade later was to dub strategic bombing “scientific baby-killing.”

In conclusion, Commonweal’s policy-makers declared, “This policy, which Mr. Churchill announces will not be abandoned by the United Nations, is in our opinion murder and suicide. It is the murder of innocent people and the suicide of our civilization.”

The Christian Century’s five-column editorial five days later was fully as sober and ruminative. “If the war goes on, with obliteration bombing continuing to wipe out whole regions and populations, it is quite possible that in the hour of triumph the victors will find that they have created so much destruction, so much hate, so much misery, so much despair that the very well-springs of Occidental life have been poisoned not only for the vanquished but for the victors also.” Their parting suggestion was, “The question which Miss Brittain’s pamphlet raises in the mind of every thoughtful reader is as to whether victory won in this fashion is worth having.” But the editors still thought it was too late to do anything about it.

Each weekly numbered one tenacious opponent of the bombing, Paulding in the pages of Commonweal, Oswald Garrison Villard, one of the signers of the Brittain preface, appearing in the Christian Century. Paulding scolded both the New Yorker and the Christian Century for suggesting that limitations on bombing constituted the

95 In Nickerson’s review of Veale’s Advance to Barbarism, in Faith and Freedom (May, 1954), p. 23.
96 “Area Bombing,” Commonweal (March 17, 1944), pp. 531-532.
making of "ground rules" and that it was impossible to do things of this sort, since the war was long under way and was running on an impulse and momentum of its own. Paulding called this "escapism" and "surrender to automatism" and retorted, "We might as well give up thinking about the purpose of the war—stand stupid and silent and with our eyes shut, until someone tells us that we may come out and play again, play at making rules." There was plenty of time to do something about bombing, "for it is when you are doing something that you must watch what you are doing." Late in May, he noted that the writing, speeches, and debates on obliteration bombing had had one big effect; the newspapers had stopped talking of the effects of bombing on the civilians. And when the famous SHAEO communique in February, 1945, admitted terror bombing as a policy, Paulding had the quiet satisfaction of vindicating himself at the expense of those who had been calling him a liar for a year.

Villard, in a denunciation of all bombing in the summer of 1944, including the new desperation rocket bombing of England by the Germans, established a record of some sorts by reviewing at length Spaight's book boasting of England's priority in beginning strategic bombing of non-combatants, one of its few notices in America. But the defenders in general won the day. The main escape they employed was the plea that surely "military necessity" warranted all these bombings, and that the continuation of the program would surely "hasten the end of the war." (A small library of works exists which agree that area bombing not only did not shorten the war a day but probably stretched it out considerably, in addition to failing to effect any substantial damage to German war industry, break the morale of their civilians, or contribute in any appreciable manner to the "allied victory." Some three-quarters of wartime German in-

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98Paulding, "‘Ground Rules,’" Commonweal (March 31, 1944), p. 582.
100Villard, "Bombs and Bombing," Christian Century (July 19, 1944), pp. 849-850. There was an ironic accompaniment to the publication of Massacre by Bombing. Though six of the twenty-eight persons signing the statement which preceded it were prominent Methodists, three months later a small, fast-talking and crudely propagandist minority, mainly laymen, succeeded in getting the Methodist General Conference to repudiate its unequivocal stand of 1940 against official endorsement, support, or participation in the war. See the long and interesting report in Newsweek, "Methodists at War" (May 15, 1944), pp. 88, 90. The Baptists remained on record against war in general but made support or repudiation of the present one a matter of individual conscience. See summary of the Northern Baptist Convention in Newsweek, "Yes or No" (June 5, 1944), p. 82.
dustry was not eliminated by bombing; it was made ineffective by dismantling by the victors after the war.)

In the late spring, Miss Brittain's first effort, *Seed of Chaos: What Mass Bombing Really Means*, made its tardy debut in London, and received an almost universal slight in the conventional press. The *Times Literary Supplement* probably spoke for all in scoffing at her "rebellion" against government policy and correctly predicted her campaign would gain little ground in Great Britain. Said the *TLS* in lofty disdain, "Miss Vera Brittain maintains in this book that unrestricted bombing will make peace impossible for a very long time. She disregards the instructions given to bombers to aim only at targets and does not suggest what we should do to win the war if we desisted from destroying these targets."\(^{101}\) It is hard to believe so sophisticated a source as this could have been so naïve, and so unaware or unheeding of what was on the record for them to see, available in the copious reports of the neutral press witnesses alone. The absence of a peace treaty with Germany twenty-four years after her prediction suggests some commentary on her prowess as a seer, though this situation results from complications even beyond her analysis at that time. It has been remarked that self-delusion is the cardinal English weakness, but Vera Brittain demonstrated her immunity.\(^{102}\)

The most striking aspect of the campaigns against obliteration bombing and for negotiated peace was the marked absence of young people from both. This was not entirely a consequence of the enrollment of America's youth in warring enterprise by the millions all over the world; by the time of the Hartmann-Brittain gestures, well over five million American males alone had been rejected for military service on various grounds, and individuals from this sector might have engaged in such efforts, without fear of the ordinary retaliatory ceremonials of the state. The reasons for abstention are

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\(^{101}\) *Times Literary Supplement* (June 17, 1944), p. 300.

\(^{102}\) Miss Brittain's novel *Account Rendered* (New York: Macmillan, 1944) was far more pleasantly received than her anti-bombing brochure; Ben Ray Redman in a full-page *Saturday Review of Literature* analysis (December 16, 1944), p. 9, called attention to the fact that it was "a passionate denunciation of war, all war, any war," and while noting that righteous warriors would not like it, "to others it will seem a brave and good thing that an author should speak out against criminal lunacy at a time when it is most rampant." Miss Brittain's attacks on strategic bombing continued after the war.
many and complex; the capacity of modern totalitarian nationalist
wars to accentuate the sheep-like traits of the race is just one of them.

A full-page advertisement by the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad
in the *U.S. News* for January 7, 1944, featured this opening sentence:
“One thing distinguishes American democracy most sharply from
other forms of government—and that is its regard for human life.”
The copy writers apparently did not realize that their masterpiece
was quite equivocal; excluding all considerations involving the na­
tional murder rate, the victims of American strategic bombing in
the enemy countries in the last two years of World War II might
have agreed, adding only that the question was whose lives were
being regarded, and how they were being regarded.

The American press carried vast spreads on the exploits of the
United States Air Force in Europe from 1943 on; its participation
as a partner to the RAF in the massive bombing raids on Hamburg,
Berlin, and Dresden\(^{103}\) have been documented in profusion. It is
for this among other reasons that some observers thought there was
something peculiarly anticlimactic when the New York *Herald-
Tribune* and other papers published on Sunday, February 18, 1945,
less than three months before the end of the war in Europe, a dis­
patch from the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary
Force in Paris announcing that “the allied air chiefs have made
the long-awaited decision to adopt deliberate terror bombing of
German population centers as a ruthless expedient to hasten Adolf
Hitler’s doom.”\(^{104}\) One might have been led to wonder that if “terror
bombing” was next, what possibly might be the name for what had
already taken place, and whether making sure of the doom of addi­
tional hundreds of thousands was necessary in order to make sure
of Hitler’s.

\(^{103}\) *World War Two in the Air: Europe,* edited by Major James F. Sunderman,
entry for “Dresden” in the index nor any mention of the raids carried out by
the Eighth Air Force in February, 1945. However, this is an episodic un­
official compilation.

\(^{104}\) This communiqué aroused a furious discommotion. It was suppressed in Eng­
land but filtered into the Associated Press traffic and was published in the
United States; as Irving says, “Thus, for one extraordinary moment, what might
be termed the ‘mask’ of the allied bomber commands appeared to have slipped.”
It was eventually “officially taken back,” but the damage was done. Irving,
*Destruction of Dresden,* pp. 218-222.
Most Americans, living anywhere from four to eight thousand miles from where the bombs were falling, had no conception of what area bombing was like, and still do not, with the exception of those who have taken part in it or who were able to see the stunning mass of wreckage in Europe at war's end. (Postwar tourists fortunately were spared the death and carnage.) What Vera Brittain was trying to do was as incomprehensible to the vast majority as an attempt to establish the reality of science fiction. This cannot be laid entirely to remoteness from the field of action; the English, already bombed and always in the line for more, were scarcely more moved by the Brittain appeal than were Americans. However, the feeling of relative immunity from any substantial retaliation surely had a part to play in the complacency. The progressive dulling of the public conscience with daily drippings of horror throughout the war such as newsreel episodes of Japanese flushed from caves with flame-throwers, with clothing and hair on fire, was hardly conducive to the development of public conscience against the savagery of distant, impersonal aerial bombing carried out against women and children. The 40,000 killed in Berlin in a single daylight raid, the 60,000 to 100,000 in the July, 1943, week-long raids on Hamburg, the 100,000 to 150,000 killed in Dresden in one raid in February, 1945, were all as hard to conceive as the most incredible of fairy tales, and undoubtedly still are. As Stuart Chase summarized it, while reviewing Donald M. Nelson's *Arsenal of Democracy*, the wars in Europe and Asia were won, "not by superlative generalship, courage, or cunning, but by literally overwhelming our enemies with shot and shell, a rain of steel and lead more dreadful than anything hitherto known. Where they sprinkled it on us, we let loose a continuous cloudburst on them." Indeed, to compare anything achieved in aerial bombing by the Germans with what later befell them is a travesty; English and American bombers dropped 315 tons of bombs on Germany for every one Germans dropped on England.

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105*Nation* (November 23, 1946), p. 587. Published by Harcourt Brace, this book, by the Sears Roebuck executive, and head of the wartime War Production Board, was an account of the technical side of American industrial achievements in the production of martial hardware.

106*An Encyclopedia of World History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), p. 1164. Though there is generous mention in this standard reference work to German bombing of Rotterdam, London, and Coventry, there is no evidence in its treatment of World War II that any of the area saturation bombings of Germany found in the books of Irving, Rumpf, Fuller, Caidin, and others ever took place.
The atomic bombing of Japan in August, 1945, broke through the general reverie for the first time, and modern protests against bombing have their intellectual and literary roots in this event and the vast attention it received. Such works as John Hersey's *Hiroshima* received a wide audience and immense publicity, with the attention always being directed to the horror and loss of life. Yet the stories about the conventional bombing of Hamburg, which terminated in a fire-storm six miles square with flames leaping 15,000 feet into the air, dwarfing that of Hiroshima, drew little more than a yawn. It was also strange that neither Hersey nor any other exploiter of Hiroshima fashioned a dramatic report about the B-29 raid on Tokyo six months earlier (March 9), where fire-bombs and a favorable wind burned to death or injured 185,000 people, and built a circle of fire within the city so high and hot that crews of later waves of bombers reported smelling burning human flesh at altitudes of two miles. It is little wonder that Norman Thomas was moved in April, 1945, to describe the American conduct of the Asian War as "an organized race riot" and "a wholesale slaughter of women and children to a degree which ancient Assyrians could not match."

It is hard to figure out whether the universal paralyzed shock over Hiroshima was due to amazement at how many were killed in such a brief moment, or whether it resulted from a realization that a weapon now existed capable of visiting annihilation upon one or all. But it really was a technical problem of magnitude, guaranteeing...
to achieve in minutes what it had taken hours to accomplish in Hamburg. Surely the residents of this latter community who died the slow, excruciating, fiery deaths inflicted by phosphorous bombs\textsuperscript{110} endured as much as if not more than those snuffed out at Hiroshima, or who died the slow, lingering way of radiation burns.

Loss of life alone cannot explain it. The piecemeal, unspectacular death of hundreds of thousands of Americans in accidents of all kinds during the war years of 1941-1945 produced hardly any notice. When the America Fore Insurance and Indemnity Group, an association of insurance companies, in a safety appeal at the end of 1944, announced that 97,900 Americans had been killed and 10,000,000 injured in industrial and other home-front accidents in 1943, and that 50,000,000 work days had been lost in production, it drew barely a glance.\textsuperscript{111} According to a \textit{New York Times} calculation two months after the end of the war, American loss of life in military operations during the entire war totalled 262,000 while accidents in the United States took the lives of 355,000; the logic of this suggested that the American civilian scene, even without bombing, was somewhat more dangerous than the armed services, averaging in all combat losses.

The insensitivity to misery and disaster befalling an enemy in wartime,\textsuperscript{112} which formed the vast reef of unconcern on which Peace Now and the Brittain appeal to halt strategic bombing ran aground in 1944, is a constant in the wars of barbarian antiquity and the religious and politico-moral crusades of modern times alike. Political efforts among the publics of ostensibly winning sides to end wars short of victory or to modify their conduct are increasingly inhibited and thwarted to the scope and degree of the victory which is impending. Such efforts may run smoother when no clear triumph is discernible, and a stalemate is looming, though concern for humanitarian considerations is as dimly registered then as at other times when mercilessness is considered to be an irreducible factor and an in-

\textsuperscript{110}One of the most grisly pieces of war reportage is Caidin’s summary of the suppressed story of the phosphorous bomb victims in the Hamburg raid, which forms the last chapter of his \textit{The Night Hamburg Died}, titled “Not in the Records.”


\textsuperscript{112}The readers of \textit{Life} rose to a towering rage in the autumn of 1945 over the picture of a beheaded rooster which was still being kept alive and denounced this as the epitome of cruelty, yet at the same moment were writing almost unanimously in savage delight over the pictures of German refugees streaming from areas under communist control, the victims consisting mainly of pathetic old women, children, and raped teen-age girls.
dispensable agent, primarily responsible for the predicament of the enemy.

It is obvious that decisions to stop fighting and end wars are political to the same degree that the decisions to start fighting and persist in prosecuting wars are political, and the employment of more or less terror is of little significance here. History is filled with the accounts of hopelessly beaten sides continuing to fight indefinitely. Even the atom bombing of Japan and its subsequent swift surrender does not constitute an exception; it is simply a case of a new catastrophe hurrying the decision to quit on the part of a regime which had long before decided to do so, and which had been desperately trying to arrange such a conclusion for many months without previous success. But efforts on the part of civilian non-combatants to influence such policy alterations stand much better chances of making headway in struggles fought with considerably less vindictive ferocity and fixed retributional obsessions than was true in the Second World War.
The Return of the “War Crimes”--“War Criminals” Issue

“The Second World War was prosecuted by the United Nations against Germany long after an equivocal patched-up armistice was possible. Impatience for the end of the war was not allowed to prevent the Allies from continuing until they had won a real and lasting victory.” Trygve Lie (first secretary general of the United Nations, 1946-1953), “A World of Patience,” New Republic, October 28, 1946, pp. 539-540.

“The Nürnberg court is a political court with a political job to perform.” Editorial, Nation, October 27, 1945, p. 418.

“Where there is a free press and academic freedom to teach history honestly, politically tainted trials tend to enshrine not the State’s evidence, however interesting, but rather the prisoner, however unpopular at first.” Editorial, “The Nürnberg Confusion,” Fortune, December, 1946, p. 120.

In recent months, particularly between the summer of 1965 and the spring of 1966, America’s press, radio, and television have been deluged with loud and angry complaints over the “war criminal” designation of captured United States military personnel by North Vietnamese, and the threat of their “trial” and execution. A few murders of this kind have actually been carried out. All such pro-
ceedings have been denounced as “farces” and “war crimes” in turn, and in truth they do not approach legal proceedings by the wildest stretch of the imagination. But an entire generation of Americans has reached voting and fighting age with only the mud-diest notion of what the whole affair is all about. Anyone even faintly acquainted with the process of Anglo-Saxon legal action indignantly repudiates such summary preliminaries to murder, but he gets little or no help from his own sources of information as to what a “war criminal” correctly is, and how such persons are to be recognized in the first place. The only obvious criterion seems to be that it is always someone among the enemy; one’s own martial colleagues never commit a “war crime.”

Before examining the problem within the limits imposed by the rules and verbiage of Mars, it is appropriate to observe that it was an unfortunate moment when the warriors and their civilian “statesmen” superiors began to indulge themselves in language inviting moral comparisons. For a long time there was no attempt to exploit any particular phase of the lengthy catalog of death and destruction, and the means whereby they were brought about, in warfare. While combatants could prosecute the mutual struggle with any and all devices and implements at their disposal, and press advantages with the same detachment exhibited by a housewife pouring a teakettle of boiling water on an ant-hill, there at least was the consolation of not encouraging the analysis of social, moral, and ethical critics. (It should be pointed out, however, that during the time of the feudal wars, churchmen sought to establish the immunity of even combatants who sought the refuge of a church, as well as sanctioning fighting only on certain days of the week, an idea which seems to have been revived, at least in principle, in the current war in Viet Nam, what with occasional cease-fires and postponements to facilitate the celebration of various holidays.) However, the fatal flaw in the effort to capitalize by way of propaganda maneuver was the invocation of the terminology of law, and the fabrication of the synthetic “war crime.” Once this gate opened, warfare lost forever the possibility of being exempt from examination in the same way individual behavior has been scrutinized since the so-called “dawn of conscience.”

For, of all the criminal institutions and procedures invented by the human race over the millennia since the Neolithic Age, by far
The one of first magnitude is war. As the Crime of Crimes, it has enjoyed a degree of relative immunity from moral and ethical condemnation unshared by any of its relatives.\footnote{The literature attacking war as a criminal enterprise is neither sparse nor of just recent vintage. But it has grown substantially in the last century; one might compile a stunning bibliography beginning with the noted Argentine writer Juan Bautista Alberdi’s \textit{El Crimen de la Guerra (The Crime of War)}, published in Buenos Aires in 1870.} Over the years it has served as the cloak for the perpetration of acts under the auspices of the collective herd which have been condemned and made serious crimes by nearly all peoples when committed by individuals. The anonymous herdist quality of war has served as a disguise for the violation of the last six of the Ten Commandments on a scale so towering as might cause even the mechanism of the most advanced computer to waver trying to compile them. Though killing, robbing, and raping are ferociously denounced and punished within the specific community, it has long been considered quite proper to engage in all these activities as long as they are inflicted on the persons of strangers, preferably a long distance from home and unknown to the perpetrators.

The only thing more repulsive than these crimes is the mountain of print and the billions of spoken words employed to justify them over the centuries, a nauseating literary and oral tradition most frequently engaged in by the very same people who wring their hands over crime in their own vicinity and profess to be prostrated by its existence. And thanks to the evolution of the mass national State and communications technology, these grand adventures in crime are generally masked by all involved, in turn, as expeditions in the advancement of moral and ethical purity of blinding whiteness and ineffable scope. The lust and greed for the land and possessions of the other, the anticipation of the power resulting from such acquisitions, and the slaking of hatred by means of the murder of the antagonists themselves? If such subjects ever are brought out into the open, they are exclusively ascribed only to the opposition. And over all is cast the cloak of anonymity through mob action, probably the most comforting concomitant of all. The escape from the indictment of individual responsibility is of first-rank importance, otherwise the residues of the received moral and religious values and taboos would limit the prosecution of these country-wide criminal essays by exercising restraining inhibitions on the behavior of the individual participants. Once these barriers have been breached,
indeed, it becomes a situation where “the sky is the limit.”

It is impossible to make a full analysis of the pressures and forces which make war attractive and exciting even to the vast number of those who gain little if anything from its conduct, and who most often are the ones who lose their lives during its transpiration. One will find excuses ranging from the desire to escape the prosaic and “boring” realities of “peace,” to possession by a powerful urge to satisfy irrational appetites. With the wondrous growth of mass communication there is a new element in the form of induced synthetic hatred manufactured by specialists and distributed among the populace in generous quantities. In addition, ferocity toward those in distant lands may serve as a substitute for that which might be incubated toward those near at hand.

Though the invention of conscription has brought on to the battlefield a multitude who have no heart for martial enterprise at all (professional soldiers have concluded on a number of occasions that one out of every two conscripts on the line of fire refuses to aim or is incapable of aiming his weapon at an enemy’s person), the criminal content of war has steadily risen in the era of the forced-military-service democratic national State. And the devices of national patriotism in all lands encourage the veneration by the citizenry of those who have been unstinting in sacrificing the lives of their ancestors in warfare. 2 It has been remarked that the masses everywhere most dearly love those who have been the most proficient in getting them killed. 3 This is made all the more dramatic in view of the invention of totalitarian strategic warfare and its prosecution far behind the battle lines against the women, children, the old, sick, and non-combatants of all descriptions.

It is puzzling, therefore, that as warmakers in this century have effectively obliterated the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, have made war become more herdlike and impersonal

2One is reminded of the grim observation of William L. White: “Very few of those who maintain that it is sweet to die for one’s country have ever done it.” White, “The Dying and the Buying,” Saturday Evening Post (October 18, 1941), p. 9. White, the son of the famous Kansas editor William Allen White, and then a roving editor for the Reader’s Digest, later became famous as a writer of wartime best sellers, They Were Expendable, Journey for Margaret, Queens Die Proudly, and These Are the Russians.

3“So runs the love of nations
   As old men specify
   The fitful love of nations,
than ever before, and have fought it on an ever-rising curve of ferocity and destructiveness, they should make a sickening invocation of the principle of personal responsibility in seeking to fasten upon their defeated counterparts the full blame for the hostilities and some of the things that went on during them, once the gunfire has terminated in "victory." (The immense destructiveness of and loss of life in modern industrial war also suggest a frightening expansion of the irrational component now present in such conflicts. The economic historian Fred Shannon concluded that since it cost the United States more to fight World War Two than the total value at the beginning of hostilities of all the real and personal property of its defeated enemies combined, it would have been cheaper to buy out these lands rather than fight with them. This indicates the degree to which the economic aspect involved in war has been altered. Instead of the goal of the occupation and use of his productive land and the immediate enjoyment of the enemy’s personal property [now mainly confined to the looting or "liberation" of personal items as souvenirs by the soldiers], the long-range aim appears to be control over productive properties, working forces, markets, and other capital, as well as giving the economy of the victor's State, more and more collectivized and centrally-controlled as a result of the pressures of war, an excuse for subsequent dynamism in providing for war damage repair and additional enlargement of "defense," which also extends and enhances power tenure.)

In returning to the theme of "war criminals," the term which has been used for over a quarter of a century to designate specific persons as more criminal than others in the welter of murder, theft, rape, and destruction which encompasses everyone in war, we are faced with a complex subject. "War crimes" seem to consist of two classes of offenses. The first is obviously political, and relates to the

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4The subject of atrocities in the Second World War is almost entirely a one-sided story to this day. A brief, preliminary commentary on American atrocities by Edgar L. Jones early in 1946 ("One War Is Enough," *Atlantic Monthly* [February, 1946], pp. 48-53) drew an angry, outraged reaction from the readers. This prompted Jones to comment, "I cannot blame the home front for being shocked, because censorship regulations during the war banned any mention of our own acts of bestiality, but anyone who knows war will assure the ivory-towered unbelievers that there is little room for Christian integrity in battle. The issue is not what Americans or any other troops did, but what the war did to them." Jones, rejoinder in "Atlantic Repartee," *Atlantic Monthly* (April, 1946), p. 31. Two other contemporary items of some interest are Jan Valtin, *Children of Yesterday* (New York: Reader's Press, 1946) and Austin J. App, *History's Most Terrifying Peace* (San Antonio, Texas, 1946).
alleged responsibility of certain persons for “starting” a given war, usually designated as “aggression.” There is an absolute absence of agreement on the meaning of “aggression” when used in the verbiage of statecraft, and no efforts to define it to the satisfaction of any significant part of the world have ever come even close to success. But this has not inhibited its subjective application by an almost numberless multitude of politicians and propagandists to acts of others with whom they have a conflict of interest. Effectiveness in making the charge stick, however, depends on unlimited success in battle; only when one has his hands on the defeated can he possibly go through the motions of instituting court proceedings to “try” these predesignated “war criminals.” It has never been known throughout history for a victorious war power to admit to any responsibility for the precipitation of hostilities. Therefore, the outcome of any “trial” for “war crimes” of this type is predictable on the part of almost anyone above the level of an imbecile; it is a more sophisticated and hypocritical way of annihilating the losers for the crime of having lost.

The class of “war crimes” which has drawn the attention of the people in the last nine months is of the second rank: presumably insufferable acts perpetrated by actual combat forces after the war has gotten under way. It takes a particular kind of mind to be able to distinguish, within this immense Crime, that there is a range of variable criminality among these offenses. Thus, for instance, shooting or stabbing to death a woman or child in the immediate combat zone may be designated as a “war crime” by one side but not the other, while the burning to death of a woman or child with a jellied gasoline bomb 1,000 miles from the combat zone may similarly be viewed by each of the contesting forces, in turn, as a “war crime” or a successful sortie of strategic warfare. Therefore, “war crimes” proceedings for this class of offense, unless there has been a knockout victory, rapidly descend to the level of crude mutual reprisals upon each side’s helpless personnel, a particularly savage type of crime itself.

Again, only if one side is completely at the mercy of the other can a genuine “war criminal” proceedings be carried out, and with the usual foreseeable denouement. But the result will hardly be of a moral order superior to that following any tribal clash of Stone Age people, after which the living vanquished are all massacred. These people deserve the nod, actually, in that they make no recourse to
the hypocritical balderdash of pretending to be putting their powerless enemy through a legal process prior to putting them to death. The effort to add dignity to these preposterous proceedings by presuming that there are "rules of civilized warfare" which contestants are bound to be governed by, violation of which being the grounds for indictment as a "war criminal," is mainly an essay in unintentional black humor. As if there were any more reprehensibility involved in killing a soldier with poison gas, flame throwers, or exploding bullets than there is in killing his wife and children by imposing a food blockade on his homeland or incinerating them by incendiary bombs dropped on their home, a thousand miles from the scene of combat. (Is there really any distinction between being done in with a pocket-knife and being converted into ashes by an atom bomb? By what kind of obtuseness must one be possessed to engage in long, tedious, hair-splitting discourses on the alleged vast, galactic differences between such fates?)

Even more engrossing than the incredible arguments over the degrees of criminality involved in the methods employed for killing people of various official and unofficial states and dress are the tortured, uneasy discourses of theologians on the abyss which separates the act of murdering a neighbor, relative, or intimate as compared to the slaughter of a total stranger in a distant land against whom one has no personal grievance whatever.

No introductory discussion of the subject of "war crimes" would be satisfactory without attention to that one known as "genocide," the neologism of the jurist Raphael Lemkin in 1943, now entered in our dictionaries (American College Dictionary: "Extermination of a national or racial group as a planned move"). This introduces a peculiar distinction in the area of mass murder, in addition to imposing the difficulty of proving such action as a product of conscious planning, namely, the apparent sanction of such exterminations as long as they are unplanned. As such, "genocide" has been with us for a long time, and again, we have no record of a victorious force or State undergoing prosecution for this "war crime." On the other hand, devious juristic legerdemain could be employed at the conclusion of all wars by the winners to lay this charge upon the defeated, and a specious though attractive case could easily be presented for approval by the populace representing the land of the victors. After all, if the leaders of a war believe that winning is impossible without planning to kill all the enemy, then they are obvi-
ously promoting "genocide." There is every likelihood that there will be as ugly a backfire some day on the issue of "genocide" as there has already been and will continue to be on the matter of other "war crimes" and "war criminals."

In essence, however, "war crimes" trials are political spectacles, and are basically continuations of the war after formal hostilities have ceased. Though draped with the toggeries of legality, the most repulsive aspect of them all, they are intended to perform in not much different manner from the guns which did the speaking until shortly before these "trials" began. The satiating of vengeance against the persons of prominent antagonists who survived the war is an obvious objective. Cowing the survivors of these "trials," that they will be amenable to the most crushing impositions of the victors shortly, is another; these tribunals represent, if nothing else at all, total power, subject to no review or appeal whatever. The supreme mockery perhaps is the immunity of the prosecutors and judges from the "law" they are enforcing upon the preconvicted "war criminals." (In a stage trial of this sort, the court is seeking to find out not if the accused are guilty or not, but how guilty, for the purposes of being able shortly thereafter to make political capital out of the event, emphasizing in tones of fake horror how unspeakable the condemned are, which in turn is presumed to release the conquerors from all restraint and permit any savagery to be visited upon the persons of the condemned as proper punishment."

There is still another objective of such "trials," in the classic sense, which the English observer F.J.P. Veale has referred to as "political biology." In this case, action proceeds almost devoid of emotion, and takes place with the same aplomb and objectivity which prevails when one is culling over vegetables for a stew. The situation is simply this: the new political dispensation that is to rise on the rubble of the just-concluded war is one which must make use of some of the defeated, preferably the thoroughly terrified, the venal, and those who change "principles" and ideologies in the

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5The writer John Dos Passos, in an article written for Life early in 1946 on his impressions of defeated and occupied Germany, quoted a U.S. Army lieutenant "of Jewish faith" who understood explicitly the operational consequences of the mandate of total power: "I've been interrogating German officers for the War Crimes Commission and when I find them half-starved to death right in our own PW [prisoner of war] cages and being treated like you wouldn't treat a dog, I ask myself some questions. All these directives about don't coddle the Germans have thrown open the gate for every criminal tendency we've got in us." Dos Passos, "Report on the Occupation," Life (March 11, 1946), p. 118.
same manner and with the same regularity that they change shirts. There will be an irreducible remnant of the late adversary, however, which cannot, for a variety of reasons, be considered as proper recruits for the New Order. They may have been too vigorous in their resistance, they may be stubbornly unwilling to change their views, they may refuse to work under the new "leadership." For these and possibly several other reasons, such persons are utterly out of consideration. And, being resourceful, intelligent, and possibly implacable, allowing them to remain in the "body politic" is akin to permitting dangerous disease carriers to remain at large in the community. Therefore, they must be excised, not necessarily because their executioners hold high personal animus toward them, but simply because they cannot by any stretch of their imagination be envisioned as subordinate partners in the next regime. And at the same time, the disposing of such individuals is an act of political decapitation, depriving the remnant of the vanquished of any possible leadership cadre of top rank and previous prestige.

It is obvious that simple summary execution upon capture is the easiest method of handling this problem. But there is believed to be an additional political advantage to be gained by keeping them alive, stripping them of their official dress, forcing them to don shabby clothes and subsist on poor food, incarcerating them under conditions forced upon only the most brutal and degraded law violators, and then shaming them before the world in a big propaganda extravaganza, preferably billed as creatures almost of a subhuman order, before finding "legal" grounds justifying their ceremonial murder. Nothing better pin-pointing such "trials" as political floor shows is the nature of the indictment. Those on trial are rarely if ever charged with individually doing anything, the very essence of legal process. Invariably, the issue involved is their responsibility in a generalized way growing out of their previous high positions. Of course, there are subsequent "trials" for those of lesser rank, down virtually to those employed as servants, maids, and kitchen help. There may be a greater degree of insistence in the case of the less highly-placed on their personal guilt, and in no case are such accused allowed to enter a plea of having followed orders from higher authority. Two sets of standards prevail during these "trials," and it is rarely illustrated better than when such matters are on the agenda. Though the victors sitting in judgment punish defiance of orders from superiors swiftly and drastically, the con-
viction they seek to impress upon those they are trying as “war criminals” is that they should have listened to the Higher Law instead of that of their superiors, presumably their personal conscience, and refused to carry out the order which supposedly resulted in the “crime” for which they are being tried. Neglecting for a moment the prodigious hypocrisy of the judges, this is a dangerous doctrine for all concerned, judges and judged alike. Sustained insistence upon the principle of individual responsibility and the subordination of authority to the Higher Law of individual conscience, as a universal constant, might easily undermine and make unworkable all statecraft built upon conscripted and otherwise impressed and dragooned military force. There would be the strong threat that such elements might disregard the hyperbole and the hyperthyroid gasconade of the propaganda departments and “vote with their feet” (as Lenin described the behavior of Russian armies in 1917) against further participation, and such mass desertion would be absolutely impossible to cope with. Even the ferocious Clemenceau, who had one out of every ten Frenchmen shot at random in units of their army infected with mutiny, disaffection, and desertion in the First World War, would have been in a grave predicament in a putative situation comparable to that described above. One may conclude, however, that insistence on individual moral culpability will invariably be confined for export to one’s enemies, as well as for keeping in reserve for invocation at possible “war crimes” trials.

Absolutely essential to a really effective “war crimes” trial is a psychical atmosphere brought to as near incandescence as possible by a hate campaign. This is quite out of the question if the contest among warriors is not fairly long-drawn-out, even though remarkable achievements of this kind are possible even in short encounters. The hate propaganda against the Germans in the U.S.A. in the short year and a half of participation in World War I reached a breathtaking peak, and its main themes have never disappeared. They were enlisted all over again for World War II, and combined with many new ingredients to make a product which shows little sign of abatement, even now, over twenty years since that war ended and since the Germans were enrolled in the American camp. The aura of hate built up by every means available as a prelude to the “war crimes” trials of Nuremberg, Manila, and Tokyo of 1945-46 is in a class all by itself in modern times, and made possible a public
temper of permissiveness and a remarkable lack of disagreement in which everything previously cited above went through with effortless efficiency. In the midst of the sweet twittering of public communications media on the subject at that time, one was able to detect few if any harsh bellows of disapproval, and the effect of such as were heard was quickly and effectively choked by neglect. In the course of this synthetic legal circus of vengeance and political biology were launched all the bothersome ideas which refused to be buried with the executed "war criminals" who were disposed of at its conclusion. They are returned again and again and again, to use the words of Franklin D. Roosevelt, are being tossed around today, and are likely to be present at every other war that will ever be fought.

A hasty murder of various numbers of the defeated enemy in 1945-47 for the commission of acts which in reality are universal to all parties to a war would have been in harmony with what has been going on for several thousand years, and probably would have been quickly forgotten thereafter. There were quite a few voices raised in favor of this procedure in those days. The ineradicable

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6 The "war crimes" trials were conducted on their part by the American prosecutors with the smug self-righteousness which has become the hallmark of American conduct of foreign affairs as hypocrisy has long been that of the British. Undoubtedly, the spirit of this adventure is more fully reflected in the companion to the trials, the abortive "denazification" policy of 1945-1948, about the most spectacular failure in the field of synthetic social revolution ever undertaken by one regime in the land of another. "Nothing but the spirit of hatred and revenge can explain our exaggerated, self-defeating zeal," declared Max Rheinstein, the Max Pam professor of corporate law at the University of Chicago, early in 1947. Prof. Rheinstein took part in this operation as part of American Military Government from the fall of 1945 to the spring of 1947. Rheinstein, "The Ghost of the Morgenthau Plan," *Christian Century* (April 2, 1947), pp. 428-430.

7 There were scores of suggestions for mass executions of Germans, in particular, upon the successful conclusion of hostilities, between 1940 and 1945. The ardent Stalinophile Alexander Werth, in his book *Moscow War Diary* (1942), cited S. A. Lozovsky, Soviet vice-commissar for foreign affairs, as favoring killing 300,000 opponents upon capture, and there were several other prominent Soviet proposals of this sort, down to Stalin’s recommendation that the top 50,000 officers of the German army be so dispatched. But the proposals were not confined to Soviet functionaries. All manner of persons of far milder cast and persuasion had ferocious solutions. Even the relatively detached Friedrich A. Hayek in 1945 called for mass killings. "Neither legal scruples nor a false humanitarianism should prevent the meting out of full justice to the guilty individuals of Germany," Hayek called out. "There are thousands, probably tens of thousands, who fully deserve death. All the Allies need to do is to decide how many they are prepared to put to death." Hayek, "A Plan for the Future of Germany," *Saturday Review of Literature* (June 23, 1945), pp. 39-40.
mistake was the adorning of this ceremonial blood-letting with the trappings of law, attempting to convince the world that a new era of high moral and ethical standards would henceforth prevail as a consequence of the benignant consequences which would surely flow from it, and become the cornerstone of new "law." One needs to know but a precious little bit of what has happened in the last twenty years to realize how staggeringly wrong such yearnings and predictions turned out to be. Were they alive in our time, Gilbert and Sullivan might easily have composed a shattering theatrical spoof of the whole sorry episode, but perhaps would have desisted from the effort because of the macabre nature of it all. The nearest thing one can find comparable to what they might have done is suggested by Charles Duff's sardonic commentary on Nuremberg in his trenchant A Handbook on Hanging.

Even if the pleas of the protagonists of the "war crimes" trials, that they wished to make new law applicable to subsequent wars, were to be taken seriously, there is no escaping that their making these laws retroactive to cover the war just fought was naked ex post facto, and all the sly word games and juridical nit-picking and the superbly skilled evasiveness of the international law barristers from that time to this have not succeeded in dismissing or obscuring this fact.

(One need not comment on the spectacle of this ad hoc "court" purporting to be a lawmaking body at the same time it was engaged in trying persons for having violated the very "laws" it was still fabricating. For all the vaunted belief in the "democracies" in the "separation of powers" dictum, the growing accommodation to judge-made law is a reality, but there surely must be a remarkable stretching of the imagination in order to get this offensive combination of tribal vengeance, Soviet legal and juridical practice, and retroactive decree in under the tent of international "law." Rather than succeeding in "charting bold new directions" and making new "law," and getting the succeeding circumstances and adaptation to this "law" described as "custom," the "war crimes" court mainly succeeded in constructing a terrifying blind alley, and the difficulty of backing out of it should become more evident as time goes by.)

Under the inept direction of Justice Robert H. Jackson, the Nuremberg process inscribed as criminal acts certain deeds which were not criminal acts at the time they took place, and the pious effort to gather them under the tent of such declarations of inten-
tion as the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 in order to validate them and make them binding was about the most unconvincing caper of the whole affair. (This pact, which found various leaders of political regimes in the world offering to desist from making recourse to war as an instrument of national policy, except if attacked, has been rightly described as an agreement not to raise umbrellas unless it rained.) The painful attempt of Justice Jackson to make a case against the arraigned German military and political personalities was about as distressing an exhibition as the entire gathering witnessed, and even his ardent supporters in the journalistic contingent in attendance had to admit that he was eminently unimpressive, in addition to being incredibly outclassed and deflated by one of the defendants, Hermann Goering. The trials in the Pacific were a veritable burlesque compared to their relatively dignified German counterparts.

8Janet Flanner, who covered the trial for the New Yorker under the pseudonym “Genêt,” cabled home on March 22, 1946, “... in that extremely important Göring-Jackson duel, it was, unhappily, Prosecutor Jackson who lost. ... There had been no ‘battle of ideas,’ because Jackson seemed not to be able to think of any.” “Letter from Nuremberg,” New Yorker (March 30, 1946), p. 76. Fortune (December, 1946, p. 121) commented that Goering “handled Mr. Jackson during cross-examination like a fiend playing with a well-intentioned lad.” No organ of the U.S. press was more chagrined at Goering’s suicide than Time, which lamented that his act of evading hanging at Nuremberg managed “virtually to destroy the positive psychological effect of the Nuremberg trial,” and successfully “wiped away ten months of painstaking work.” Time (October 28, 1946), p. 35. But Time had acknowledged months before Goering’s suicide that the work of the trial had been unsuccessful; in a comment on Jackson’s closing statement at Nuremberg, in which he pointedly avoided restating “the trial’s moral and legal basis,” it admitted, “The world public would be content to see the Nürnberg criminals die, but it had not got around to distinguishing between criminal and legal war,” and that until “a considerable part of it did that,” the convictions “would be a function of victory rather than of law.” This was a roundabout way of admitting that though the war actions of the defendants had not been successfully established as crimes, nevertheless it was met that they die because the world propaganda campaign which had preconvicted them prior to trial had become too ponderous to defy at this stage. “Trial by Victory,” Time (August 5, 1946), p. 31.

9There was usually a private and little-publicized mortification of prominent World War Two “war criminals” prior to the public spectacle. The least known perhaps was that of the Japanese premier, General Hideki Tojo, partially due to its peculiarly scandalous nature. It is best described by Captain P. J. Searles, USN (ret.), in his review of Clark Lee’s One Last Look Around (New York: Duell, Sloane and Pearce, 1946) in the New York Herald Tribune Weekly Book Review, June 8, 1947, p. 9: “One of the most shockingly brutal episodes in journalism is revealed in Clark Lee’s new book without any indication that the author or his colleagues felt the slightest bit of shame as participants. A few days after the occupation of Japan, Mr. Lee, with a fellow correspondent, Harry Brundidge, located General Tojo in Tokyo and had what was probably
It undoubtedly is extremely unnerving and disheartening for the parents of young Americans taken prisoner by the Communists in Viet Nam to hear them described as "war criminals" and threatened with trial and summary execution. Scores of angry newspaper editorialists have fulminated at such ominous proceedings as "farces," and indeed they are. Nevertheless, they are in close harmony with Communist concepts of group and ceremonial guilt, without any necessity to provide for individual protections nor encumbered by the principle of presumption of innocence unless and until proven otherwise. In this sense, the "war crimes" trials following the end of the Second World War also were the sophisticated offspring of the celebrated Moscow purge show trials of 1936-1938, though a thorough discussion of this aspect would be long and involved. But the silence of the country's major newspapers on the ancestry of these "war crimes" and the twisted verbiage and reasoning they have left us as a heritage has been as deafening as the barking and yelling over the most recent turn of events. Of the major papers, only the Chicago Tribune, which attacked the whole "war crimes" business twenty years ago and has never changed its position since, has been dealing with the current situation in a historical fashion, and acquainting readers who have come of age since those times with something of what prevailed when the whole episode had its inception.\textsuperscript{10}

If the "war crimes" trials of 1945-47 and after were intended as object lessons to the world and designed to serve as a curb on warlike propensities by demonstrating the fate of "war criminals,"

\textsuperscript{10}One of the best of the more recent editorial summarizations of the subject by the Tribune was the September 30, 1965 "War of No Quarter."
then they are a miscalculation of dizzying dimensions. The world has known nothing but wars, civil and otherwise, ever since. But none of them has been fought to a unilateral conclusion, nor have any of them been allowed to spread beyond local regions. The lesson is still bright and fresh before all military leaders and "statesmen." Nuremberg, Tokyo, and Manila did not outlaw war or establish new international law; they made losing a war a crime and stipulated the new look in neckwear for the losing military leaders and "statesmen": a tidy piece of sturdy hemp rope. For that reason, it is likely that it will be in the interests of such people in the future to keep their wars small, localized, and inconclusive, and in particular avoiding such counsels of insanity as "unconditional surrender" policies. The alternative to this is a war fought with unprecedented savagery and lacking in the employment of no weapon, no matter how destructive, if thereby defeat may be avoided, since the lives of all the prominent losers are forfeit anyway under the doctrine of "war crimes."

In the light of this, the behavior of the Viet Cong is pointless, and simply an incitation to reprisals against their own prisoners in the hands of their enemy. Each side lacks possession of prominent figures from the opposition, as was also the case during the Korean War (1950-1953), when both sides there also went through the motions of assembling lists of "war criminals." Regardless how far these mutual murders of each other's captives go on, they will be simply sordid and vulgar killing bees and a retreat morally to a point in time at least before that of Ashurbanipal, if not to that before Bronze Age man.

There is much evidence that a goodly number in this country in particular would like to forget all about "war crimes" and "war criminals." But it does not appear that the Communists, who seem to have introduced both these political epithets, intend to let them do it, since there is still a considerable amount of political mileage remaining in them.

After all, joint supervision of World War II German "war criminals" is about the only political enterprise in which this country participates today in full cooperation with the Soviets: the management of the huge Spandau prison in Berlin, where three Germans convicted but not hanged in 1946 constitute the entire incarcerated community, run at an annual cost in recent years of at least a quarter of a million dollars. But far more important than that, the world
political structure, West and East, for twenty years, has rested on the "war crimes" trials of Nuremberg, Manila, and Tokyo. It is not possible to raise one's voice too high over the basic fundamentals of the "war criminal" idea without creating a stupendous political problem. Russian and Asian communism, the principal victors in the Second World War, are likely to be the major gainers from any bedrock re-examination of the War Criminal Follies of 1945-1947.

From time to time, various elements at home and abroad have tried to make political capital out of Nuremberg. One of the most vicious allegations which has resurfaced on many occasions has attempted to tie in criticism of the trials with persons of "conservative" political persuasion, ignoring the broad spectrum of the critics' personal political affiliations. But there is no denying the forthright and blunt denunciation of Nuremberg and all its works by the very liberal Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, William O. Douglas. In a book written less than a decade after the hanging of the German defendants, Justice Douglas put the legal objection to the proceedings in a minimum of words: 11

No matter how many books are written or briefs filed, no matter how finely the lawyers analyze it, the crime for which the Nazis were tried had never been formalized as a crime with the definitiveness required by our legal standards . . . , nor outlawed with a death penalty by the international community. By our standards the crime arose under an ex post facto law. . . . Their guilt did not justify us in substituting power for principle.

VI
American Mass Media and Stalinism, 1941-1947, or, Where Do People Really Get Their Ideas?*

The study of history rather means to scrutinize the statements made by all writers of a certain period in order to obtain a fair idea of how the events of that time have possibly taken place.—Rabbi Solomon Schindler, "The Study of History in the Public Schools," The Arena (December, 1889), p. 47.

Little consideration seems to have been given to the truth that men, particularly in political matters, are not guided by the facts but by their opinions about the facts.—Sir Norman Angell [winner of Nobel Peace Prize, 1933], "Leftism in the Atomic Age," The Nation (May 11, 1946), p. 564.

A legend which is believed has the same value and effect as the truth.—Mr. Visconti, in Graham Greene, Travels with My Aunt (New York: Viking, 1970), p. 241.

Public opinion makers are as important as public officials. And they are often more powerful. People in office come and go, but editors and writers, columnists and newscasters, commentators and special feature creators, they remain, and frequently enjoy careers of 35 to over 50 years, while politicians have gone into oblivion or their graves by the freight-train load.1 Many of them owed their careers to the molders of 2

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*This essay in slightly different form will be the introductory chapter of a forthcoming book which will be titled Hands Across the Volga: American Mass Communication and the Wartime Affair with the Soviet Union, 1941-1947.

1 Many journalists and commentators of the World War Two era were on radio and television over twenty-five years after the end of the war; the names of Howard K. Smith, Walter Cronkite, Eric Severeid, Alex Dreier, Richard C. Hottelet, Charles Collingwood, Alexander Kendrick, Cedric Foster, Lowell Thomas, and Cecil Brown come to mind. World War Two journalists such as James Reston, Max Lerner, Joseph Alsop, Ernest K. Lindley, Marquis Childs, David Lawrence and a brigade of others were still writing profusely and very prominently in nationally circulated newspapers and magazines for the same time span after the cessation of formal hostilities. Other radio and newspaper opinion makers of the day such as William L. Shirer have retired to the making of "histories" of this period, and to this day can hardly write about anything else.
political opinion in the first place. Without friendly word-merchants in the newspapers and magazines, and later on the radio and television, what substantial percentage of them would ever have become known outside of the county in which they lived? In the area of public affairs and international relations the impact of the opinion maker is as sharp and often even more profound. The mass of gossip and rumor, innuendo and propaganda which they pour into circulation frequently stays in the information bloodstream of the world indefinitely, and no amount of subsequent research and revision succeeds in unseating these deeply implanted views and opinions. The result has been the evolution of what has been described as “instant history,” rarely subject to later alteration or any significant change resulting from a placing of pertinent new material on the agenda, or even a fuller exposition of what was allowed to see the light of day in the first place. In addition, this simultaneous account of the past is often made even less vulnerable to subsequent change by the fact that frequently there have been influential opinion makers involved in the regime in power when this or that series of events transpired. Not only were they responsible for the original version of these happenings as they appeared as historical narrative, but such individuals, by virtue of the vested interest they had in maintaining this account of the past, have tended to act as perpetual watchdogs, at least during their lifetime, to make sure that no significant alteration or replacement of their stories succeeded.

Within a dozen years after World War Two, the primary device for penetrating the home and consciousness of the American citizen for the purpose of forming his tastes and opinions on matters of public affairs and international happenings had become television; radio, once the occupant of this very strategic spot, had declined sharply. A market survey by the Elmo Roper organization in the spring of 1966 concluded that 58% of the total U.S. population turned to TV for news and information “‘about what’s going on in the world,’” and that 41% of the people interviewed declared that if given conflicting reports on such matters, “they would believe the TV version.”

What television has become as a salesman for products and personalities is another matter and is understood by even the dullest mentality, needing little comment here, though one may speculate as to what might have happened had this medium been available to the great political spellbinders of the 1932–1947 era. Senator William Fulbright of Arkansas, an influential politician in the launching of the post-

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war totalitarian liberal world represented in the numerous institutions of which the United Nations is just one, and himself another figure of the war era whose career still goes on into a second generation, recently remarked, probably with a trace of puckishness, that "If [Franklin D.] Roosevelt had had television he might have been proclaimed emperor by acclamation." What television might have been in the hands of the most seductive radio orator of all time, Adolf Hitler, boggles the imagination.

In view of the capsule nature of television presentation, and the necessity for superficiality resulting from the time factor pressures, it may represent a weaker medium than radio for the actual launching of opinion and interpretation, admittedly at a discount by the TV world. Printed sources for opinions and views on foreign affairs must be considered still the primary source for other communications media, even though what the former say often appears in an unrecognizable form after distillation through the channels of the latter.

The world over twenty-five years after the end of World War Two still reflected the historical windfall which set Hitler Germany upon Stalinist Russia, thus giving Germany's Western "democratic" enemies an ally which eventually won almost all the plums which were at stake during the combat, and a large number of others which were not originally at stake therein. No strategy was ever worked out during the struggle for dealing with the re-division of the loaves and fishes subsequent to "victory," and it appears that, given the determination to fight on to an unconditional surrender of the Germans, no other outcome than that of 1945 and ever since was really possible, other than a resumption of the war among the ultimately divided "Allies" upon the defeat of their original common enemy. The Norwegian Socialist politician Trygve Lie, who was the first secretary general of the United Nations between 1946 and 1953, bluntly declared in the fall of 1946 that "The Second World War was prosecuted by the United Nations against Germany long after an equivocal, patched-up armistice was possible," but that no sentiment for a negotiated peace was "allowed to prevent the Allies from continuing until they had won a real and lasting victory."

This really was one of the funniest bits of unconscious political humor of the immediate postwar period, for the "real and lasting victory"

had already vanished months before Lie expressed these words, and the "Allies" already were snarling and clawing at one another over the tangible and material effects which survived wartime destruction all over Europe and Asia. On the non-tangible side of things there was even less to show for the horrendous expenditure of life, military hardware, and general resources. No "real and lasting victory" was even faintly approached through the annihilation of the "enemies of freedom," which adventure did not advance the cause of freedom in the least. It simply created vacancies in the ranks of those who were to be counted as enemies of freedom. One cannot imagine how things could possibly have been as bad had the war been brought to an end via a negotiated peace two years or so before unlimited "victory" was achieved, but the regimented opinion-making industry rarely if ever allowed the idea to get loose, let alone permit any serious discussion or consideration of it. And the more Stalinophile the organ of communication, the more ferocious the attack on the opposition to a conclusion of unlimited, saturation power.

One may take Herr Lie's observation in another way, however, and agree to his correct analysis of the situation, in retrospect: a "lasting" victory was surely achieved by a world-wide interest group and specific ideological element which has in the main organized the largest part of the world as we have known it for over a quarter of a century. In view of the sixty or more wars of varying scope and intensity which have been fought since 1945 it is obvious that the permanent plateau of peace and freedom promised the publics of the "Allies" never even faintly approached realization. But one cannot deny that their "victory" propelled their leaders, political and military, into positions of impressive opulence and power, which remain relatively unimpaired to this day.

One may argue that kind words in behalf of the Soviet war machine were in order in view of the ostensible presence of the SU as an "ally," whatever the sheer chance and coincidence which brought this state of affairs about. But the millions of words of fulsome flattery of Stalin and Stalinism and the bawling acclaim of Stalinist Communism as a form of "economic and social democracy" and the general attitude of apology for this system, or the suppression and censorship of anything critical of it, as well as the systematic attack upon all who dared to challenge it as no better if not actually worse than the systems of the enemy countries, were all utterly unnecessary. They had a very large part to play in aiding the establishment of a form of self-deception and
credulity, which was grounded so firmly and entrenched so deeply that a quarter century of Cold War has still not succeeded in uprooting it or cancelling out its effect and influence.

Most of 1942 and down to the closing weeks of 1943 was the period of the "peoples' war against Fascism." The emphasis had always been one of being against something from the beginning, and, if for anything, had consisted mainly of platitudinous absolutes starting with Democracy.

The great genius of pro-Soviet propaganda, conscious and otherwise, was to keep the promotion of World War Two on a negative basis until the bacon was in the pot. As long as it was "anti-Fascist" there did not need to be a counter-statement of what the war was being fought for. "Victory," tribal revenge and a wide variety of other mindless objectives did not clutter the Soviet ideological cupboard as they did that of their "democratic allies." So all partook cheerfully of an unified "anti-Fascist" war which doubled the extent of Communism's planetary grip at war's end.

Whatever the knavery of the Communists the world over, they must be credited with knowing what they were doing all the time. They fought to save Communism where it already was, and to extend it at the expense of other systems no matter what sort in as many areas as possible. Stalin's Anglo-American allies got "victory," while Russo-Chinese Communism anchored down a third of the world.

To this day there is no intensive critical study of the propaganda of the winning regimes in the Second World War; it is still a holy subject, and taboo. With the exception of smug monographs on how psychological warfare was conducted against the enemy,6 universally reported as a smashing success, there is nothing yet on how the populaces in the "United Nations" were manipulated for the purposes of maximizing their support of the war and buttressing the policies and decisions of their rulers. It is obvious that in war the mass of those who do the voting, taxpaying, fighting and the dying is rarely acquainted with the real reasons for the conflict. It is important only that it has the right opinions on the facts, not necessarily know what they are.

It is a commonplace observation to note the distance from the real

6Particularly significant in this area is the book by the English journalist Sefton Delmer, Black Boomerang (London: Secker and Warburg, 1962). Of related interest is the English success in recording and splicing together of selected parts of Mussolini's speeches for counter-propaganda rebroadcast, as described by Luigi Villari in his The Liberation of Italy, 1943-1947 (Appleton, Wisconsin: C.C. Nelson, 1959). See comment by Fred Friendly, below.
situation by which modern publics are removed. In the Second World War, which witnessed the most fantastic efforts at mobilization of public support via propaganda ever known in the history of warfare, there even were occasional recognitions by those deeply involved. Less than three months before the end of the European phase of the fighting, Newsweek morosely observed, “In a war being fought for democracy and freedom, the millions of common men know less about the great decisions that affect their lives than ever before in the history of secret diplomacy.” Apparently the cause of “democracy” and “freedom” was so delicate and precarious that those who were going to be the main beneficiaries of both could not be informed as to how they were being secured for subsequent enjoyment. And the complaint came not from an opponent or disbeliever in the war but from one of the publicity organs already doing its best to entrench public support for it.

“We are living in a wonderful world, the world of propaganda,” wrote Rev. James M. Gillis, the editor of the Catholic World, in the spring of 1941. “And the most wonderful thing about it is that the propagandists can make it, wreck it, and make it over again and wreck it again in six weeks.” Rev. Gillis was writing at a time eight months before American involvement in the war already 20 months along in Europe, but just before the Russo-German phase was to erupt, on June 22, 1941. He was to see subsequently an expansion of what he had described which made everything prior to the latter event appear to be detached veracity by comparison.

Once Americans were a part of the struggle, the full dimension of the battle for the emotional commitment of the populace flowered. The most succinct statement of the matter was made by America’s first propaganda minister, Archibald MacLeish, Director of the Office of Facts and Figures, in a speech at Freedom House in New York on March 19, 1942: “The principal battle ground of this war is American opinion.” When Walter Millis, analyzing the German enemy in the

7Editorial comment in Catholic World (May, 1941), p. 136. Rev. Gillis was one of the most lucid of the critical commentators on U.S. foreign affairs and was among the top rank in that capacity during World War II. Time (October 27, 1941, p. 77) referred to the Catholic World as one of the two most influential Catholic magazines in the country, and along with Commonweal the most widely read by non-Catholics.
8See restatement of this in the letter from MacLeish to the editors of Life (April 20, 1942), p. 8.
summer of 1944, announced that "Hitlerism represents, in fact, the highly shrewd and rational discovery that great societies can be swayed, energized, and controlled by the manipulation of the irrational within them, by the direct appeal, in other words, to the psychological reactions, the emotions, of men," it was obvious that no national state involved in the struggle by this moment could have evaded precisely the same kind of analysis. The full scale assault on the sensibilities of the community in every warring power differed in degree only, a product of differences in local mores, and the fortunes of war.

As a study which is in part a history of the period between June, 1941 and June, 1947, or roughly that part of World War Two dating from the start of the Russo-German phase down through the setting in of the Cold War, the program for the "containment" of Communism and the parallel program of European revivification associated with the Marshall Plan, it is only slightly involved with the military prosecution of the war and its extension, and mainly concerned, among other things, with how this was reported to the United States reading public. Far more attention is devoted also to the political promotion of the war and the ideas which were loosed in the community while the war was in progress. It is also concerned with rumor and gossip and their part in the propaganda-public opinion picture. Since authorities ranging from Walter Winchell to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. have solemnly informed us that gossip is a part of history, and much gossip is related to rumor, this aspect deservedly must be examined, though care is being taken to prevent the logical consequence of total dependence on such sources, namely, an account consisting primarily of rumor and gossip. The main concern of this study however is with the rise and fall of the great unrequited political amour in this country with Stalinist Russia, from the involuntary and circumstantial alliance which the USA and USSR found themselves thrown into when their respective policies led to war with Germany and Japan, down through the time six years later when the consequences of "victory" split them apart and ranged them against each other as the great champions of two rival "ways of life." And the main emphasis is upon what was said for public consumption about the war and the subject of Russo-American relations. But the opinions on the events are considered of at least equal importance to the events themselves, and the guesswork, rumination, suspicion, gossip, prediction, sooth-saying and sheer fabrication

are part of the record. In a conflict which was so widely advertised by the "United Nations" as the only "war of ideas" ever fought in history, it is important to examine as many of them as possible.

No one studying the approach of World War II and on down through its end, essentially the 1931-1945 period, and the accompanying opinion-making on foreign politics in the United States, can grasp the situation without a careful examination of the role of the foreign newspaper correspondent. The almost universal belligerent partisanship of this formidable corps of journalists and their effect on the ideas of tens of millions is a factor matched only by the similar political commitments of the radio analysts and "commentators" of and on foreign affairs, though the latter became important mainly in the second half of this roughly fifteen year period. As Malcolm Cowley, veteran editor of the New Republic, and a formidable performer in the opinion-making sector himself, observed in April, 1943, "Back in 1935, foreign correspondents were merely tolerated by the great men of the world, but by 1940 they had become political powers capable of influencing their nations and helping to determine the outcome of the war." By the time Cowley wrote, their influence had grown a hundred-fold, and made more complicated by still another development.

At about the time the shooting phase of the war occurred, there had appeared in news reporting and newspaper evolution the news magazines and the columnist respectively, devoted frankly to opinionated reporting and dedicated to supplying the public with a switch from "factual, objective news reporting to a standard of mixing opinion with fact to approximate full truth," as Time, itself probably the outstanding exponent of this, put it, in reviewing Ken Stewart's News is What We Make It. Just as important an aspect is the reality of editorial judgment and selectivity, which the title of Stewart's book probably stated as clearly and with a minimum of words as one might expect. As Fred Friendly, an influential figure in the radio and television world during the Cold War, expressed it, "You can make a man say almost anything by editing."12

12Quoted by Dwight Newton, "An Interview with the Sergeant about SIN," San Francisco Examiner TV Log (April 6, 1958), p. 2. At that time Friendly was research director of the Edward R. Murrow television show "See it Now." Murrow was another of the radio-television personalities whose meteoric rise was related to an apprenticeship as a World War Two broadcaster. Most radio listeners heard his tremulous, poetic broadcasts from London during the German bombings of 1940. Americans heard no broadcasts of RAF bombings of German cities during this time, when the USA were not a belligerent.
Basic to the issue at hand is the frank recognition of the impossibility of isolating fact from opinion, and that furthermore, opinion is fact, and interpretation is news. And this was not confined to the newspaper and magazine press but integral to the other media, especially radio, government information agencies and the moving picture newsreels, seen every day by millions. Stewart's book bluntly admitted it and Time, matched at that moment in obvious and transparent opinionated news-purveying only by the new New York tabloid daily, PM, did not evade the implications.

The citizenry does not read about wars in books written by professors of diplomatic history twenty to forty years after the wars are over; they read about them while they are being fought on a daily basis, and they depend almost entirely upon newspapermen, radio reporters, and, more recently, television commentators, to tell them what is taking place. They also depend upon these same sources for the political interpretations of these conflicts, a matter of immense importance. It is this material, written in the heat of the moment, or shortly thereafter, which forms the entire sources in this study. It is necessary to spend some time on these sources in another sense as well. This consists of an examination of their authors and the background and orientation of their employers and organs of publicity. The commitments of an employer of a reporter and of the reporter himself are as significant as what they say, regardless of the professed dedication to "truth" or "objectivity." Furthermore, if a policy exists involving a decision to publish "all the news that is fit to print," it is highly significant that one know what was not considered "fit to print," and, if possible, who considered it unfit, and why. Policy and ideological commitments may have far more to do with whether they are published than whether they were "fit" or "unfit" (see note 26).

For sheer volume of words, no war in history was reported so intimately and exhaustively as World War Two. Hundreds of reporters, radio commentators and assorted writers covered the several fronts, turning out thousands of newspaper and magazine articles and score upon score of books, the sale of which made some of the authors rather affluent. For the most part their impressions in the heat of the moment made permanent impact on the readers. And the less accurate and more propagandistic they were, the more likely they were to resist any subsequent alteration by sober historical work in the post-bellum period.

The hyperthyroid reportage of the war in sensational and electrifying books by war correspondents and radio commentators started to pall
by the summer of 1943, even though most of the bloodshed and destruction lay ahead. "The saturation point is looming," predicted the publisher Bennett Cerf at this time. But at the same time it was announced that over 900 new correspondents and commentators were "said to have their credentials" and were "awaiting transportation to various fronts." Things quickly picked up again beginning in 1944.

It is unlikely that another war will ever be reported with such gusto, relish and delight as World War Two by Americans, a product in part of the realization of being on the side with insuperable material and manpower advantages, in addition to the long period of mutual conditioning prior to both the outbreak of hostilities in 1939 and American involvement late in 1941. By the time of the Korean war many of the same people were speaking more in a mournful whine than in the "On a Note of Triumph" gloating tones of a Norman Corwin in 1945.

An occasional contemporary examined this reportage and found it short of satisfactory, but not very often. One of the most telling critiques was that of the eminent elder statesman of American journalism, Henry L. Mencken. Early in 1946, Mencken blasted the coverage of the war by the press as having been done not well but "wordily." Mencken described the war correspondents collectively as "a sorry lot, either typewriter-statesmen turning out dope stuff drearily dreamed up, or sentimental human-interest scribblers turning out maudlin stuff about the common soldiers, easy to get by the censors." "The primary duty of reporters is to tell the truth until it becomes dangerous," Mencken insisted, while concluding that in the United States during World War Two, "There wasn't much of that." It would, however, have to be admitted that the situation tallied fairly closely to the analysis of Ernest Bevin, the foreign secretary of the post-war British Labor government, of what happened in England between 1939 and 1945. "A newspaper," declared Bevin shortly after Mencken's post-mortem, "has three functions: to amuse, to entertain, to mislead." It was a rare wartime day when any of these functions was not satisfactorily performed.

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15Sat\(\text{Saturday Review of Literature (June 19, 1943), p. 32.}

14Reference is to the famous declamation authored by Corwin which was read on radio nationally on V-E Day in May 1945. Corwin, one of the most prolific writers of radio plays, was an early recruit to war propaganda service. "In the fall of 1941," wrote Albert N. Williams, "we were at war, emotionally if not actually, and Archibald MacLeish, Pulitzer Prize poet and Librarian of Congress, was mobilizing the nation's poets and playwrights into a propaganda machine. Corwin, poet, radio dramatist, and "dean," fitted the need perfectly." Williams, "The Radio Artistry of Norman Corwin," \(\text{Saturday Review of Literature (February 14, 1942), pp. 5-6.}

15Mencken's remarks cited at length in "'A Sorry Lot'," \(\text{Time (January 14, 1946),}\)
Sharing the category described as "typewriter-statesmen" by Mencken with the reporters were the columnists, another journalistic development which reached maturity in the 1930s along with the picture magazines, the comic books and the foreign correspondent. The columnist evolved as a substitute for coherent editorial policy, and often became a shield to conceal a publisher's cowardice. Basically, the columnist was irresponsible, in the best sense of the word, and indulged in turning out material with incredible slants. Most of them did not drift off into flights of omniscience on the subject of foreign affairs until midway between the Russo-German and Cold Wars. Between fifteen and twenty of them dominated the area and as a group had access to a national readership of at least one hundred million circulation. According to Charles Eugene Fisher in his book *The Columnists*, the most influential was Walter Winchell, "the kingfish of gent's room journalism," as the veteran New York writer Stanley Walker described him in 1941. At an early stage in the war, Winchell, whom Fisher termed "the No. 1 propagandist ideologue for World War II" in the United States, was published in 800 American newspapers with a combined circulation of over 25,000,000 copies. His closest competition was Drew Pearson, an equally devoted journalistic warrior who frequently surpassed Winchell in ferocity, whose column appeared in 621 papers with more than 18,000,000 daily distribution.

In addition, both Winchell and Pearson were heard in weekly radio broadcasts which were considered to have from nine to ten million listeners each. Two other powerful radio ideologues with a general left position either exceeded or closely approached Winchell and Pearson: Raymond Gram Swing and William L. Shirer. Swing's career was already immensely advanced before American involvement in

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16 In the period roughly corresponding to the World War Two era and shortly thereafter (and a few years before the war, perhaps) the principal columnists comprised two nearly equal groups. The contingent usually sympathetic to FDR and the New Deal administration consisted of Walter Lippmann, Raymond Clapper, Drew Pearson, Robert Allen, Dorothy Thompson, George Fielding Eliot, Samuel Grafton, Ernest K. Lindley, Max Lerner, Marquis Childs and Walter Winchell. Their opposite numbers were Mark Sullivan, David Lawrence, Arthur Krock, Frank Kent, George Sokolsky, John O'Donnell, Frank Waldrop, Paul Mallon, Constantine Brown and Westbrook Pegler. *Time* (November 29, 1943, p. 19) reported that FDR read "columnists Clapper and Lippmann regularly."


World War Two. Just prior to Pearl Harbor his radio audience was estimated at 20,000,000. This was larger than that of any other commentator. Shirer's star rose after he returned from Hitler Germany, where his writing and radio broadcasts first brought him to American attention, especially after the publication of his book Berlin Diary. During the war his influence rose rapidly, both as a result of his analyses of the war which were featured prominently in the New York City press, and his radio program on the Columbia Broadcasting System. His Hooper rating indicated a regular audience of 5,000,000 down even to the spring of 1947, by which time the growing bi-partisan Cold War temper was making his views less palatable. On March 23, 1947 he was dropped by his sponsor, and he resigned from CBS the following week. But Shirer returned to radio on the Mutual Network at the end of November of that year. 19

A strong case can be made for the thesis that American opinion made by the radio, newsreels and the picture magazines out-performed the sector of the printed word. A special study could be made here, though the elusiveness and the high mortality rate of the source material would be a serious hindrance to documentation. But the facts of the total situation suggest its plausibility. There were more than 65,000,000 radio sets in the United States when entry into the war occurred late in 1941. Movies were attracting tens of millions every week, and the picture magazines, Life and Look, which appeared in November, 1936 and January, 1937 respectively, and which had half a dozen smaller competitors, had readers in the millions at the height of the war. They probably fixed more views for Henry Wallace's "common man" than any other printed material in existence with the possible exception of the Reader's Digest, which enjoyed a circulation of 8,000,000 at the height of the war, going on to 11,000,000 a short time after the end of hostilities in the Pacific. 20

19Richard Wilson, "Drew Pearson—He's Sometimes Wrong," Look (November 26, 1946), p. 21. The title had reference to Pearson's sensational "Predictions of Things to Come," the closing portion of his weekly Sunday night oration, which included from time to time prognostications which were hilariously short of the mark. There were occasional observations that there was almost no relationship between Pearson's credibility and his ability to maintain his listening audience. On Swing, see the extended plug in Look (October 21, 1941), "World's Most Important Contact Man," pp. 12-15. On Shirer, see Publishers' Weekly (April 10, 1947), p. 2125; (November 29, 1947), p. 2460.

20The Reader's Digest alone among the country's major periodicals supplied no figures to the standard source compiling them, N. W. Ayer and Son's Directory of Newspapers and Periodicals, published in Philadelphia. For stories on the Digest circulation figures cited above see the press section of Time (February
scriber audience of about 7,000,000 combined during the war, but as the result of a "total readership survey" in the summer of 1947 the trade journal Publishers' Weekly estimated their combined readership at nearer 42,000,000.21 By the early war period Life was the most influential magazine in the U.S.A.

A study of public opinion, on world affairs and international politics, in particular, should end with a study of public opinion polls, not start with them. Well before these often-rigged spectacles, which frequently have an intent to create as much public opinion as to describe or measure it, comes an examination of the sources of the information and influence which enable the people polled to have an opinion on the issue at hand to begin with. How do the people in Grundy Center come to have strong views on the Emir of Mongoositania or the Banat of Ocarina in the first place? The majority of Americans rarely left the state in which they were born, and many spent their entire lives in the county in which they were born. It is a consequence of what they read, hear and see, then as well as today. During the Second World War, probably the first two of these were of greatest importance, as television had not evolved past the pilot plant stage.

Allowance must be made for moving picture newsreels, however, and propaganda films, which undoubtedly had a vast influence. Of extreme importance in this category was the movie short subject "The March of Time," jointly produced by the editors of Time and Life every month, and distributed to virtually every movie theater in the land by Twentieth Century Fox. The makers of these films claimed that "thirty million minds a month" "focused" on these glorified newsreels and their potent editorial message, which was anything but sub-liminal.22 Films worked down the intelligence scale to serve with great effectiveness on the lowest levels, where reading skills tailed off to zero (adult illiterates numbered in the millions), and where a vocabulary of less than a thousand words made even listening to the radio with profit highly problematical. In one sense, everything that appeared on the screens of the nation's moving picture houses would warrant attention in view of the famed actor Orson Welles's dramatic telegram to the editors of Time a little over a year before the end of World War II, in which he declared, "Every movie expresses, or at least reflects,

21, 1944), p. 43; (December 10, 1945), p. 58. These figures concern the domestic circulation of this monthly.
22 See advertisement in Time (October 7, 1946), p. 115.
political opinion,"23 There was no need for Mr. Welles to call attention to the influential contingent of Central European refugees occupying key positions in the film making industry who were some of the war era's most effective political opinion makers, among others.

John U. Nef, in his *Universities Look For Unity*,24 spoke disparagingly of the "skimming public" of the "newspapers, picture papers, popular magazines, textbooks and best sellers." What he actually described was the overwhelming majority of the community in this country, and indirectly probably every other country too. It is impossible to over-estimate the importance of these mass circulation printed sources, from which the vast part of the semi-literate-to-literate populace derived the preponderant part of their views. No adequate history of public opinion on any subject, and foreign policies in particular, can be written from sources read by a fraction of one percent of the country's population supplemented by summaries of public opinion polls. The research for this study included a page-by-page examination of every article on the subject of world affairs in the weekly picture magazines, and every major weekly or monthly family magazine, with the exception of those directly angled at a readership exclusively of women.

Of the seven thousand periodicals being published in the United States during the 1940s, about 15 accounted for roughly one half of the combined circulation of all. In mid-1944, over 80% of all newsstand sales of American magazines were accounted for by just eighteen of them, nine of which are among the twenty-seven selected for examination in this study. Just five of them (*Life, Look, Saturday Evening Post, Collier's* and *American Magazine*), had by the end of the period under examination a total readership of nearly 77,000,000 persons. Gilbert Seldes' declaration, in the course of a review of Theodore Peterson's *Magazines in the Twentieth Century*, that "the magazine is too potent to be irresponsible," is a highly debatable thesis, but potency and influence of magazines are beyond any possible doubt. Their impact is even heightened in significance if one keeps in mind their effect not only in forming or changing opinion, but in sustained mass reflection of opinion originating elsewhere, one particular area of great importance. In this sense the multi-million circulation family and picture magazines served as transmission belts for a wide assortment of opinions, views and convictions on the subject of Stalin and

23Welles's wire reproduced in *Time* (March 6, 1944), p. 6.
the Soviet which originated elsewhere, most frequently in journals of extremely modest circulation, but in many cases related to the daily press, their columnists and the news magazines.

The latter was one of the most striking innovations of twentieth century magazine journalism. Nothing of its kind existed until well into the post-World One era. *Time*, the prototype of this branch of opinion makers, led a field of three in 1941, and dated back to 1923. Its rivals, *Newsweek* and *U. S. News*, both founded in 1933, were steadily gaining influence, but flagged behind. *Time's* circulation exceeded three quarters of a million when the U.S. became a belligerent in the war, while the combined total of its competitors barely exceeded half a million. Considered as a unit, however, the growing strength of these journals was evident, and with the adding of special columnists of their own who concerned themselves entirely with opinion on the news being reported, their influence was documented on a week-by-week basis throughout the war. In essence they became America's first nationally-circulated newspapers. Though all three presented news in a format which rarely made possible the identification of the writer, the content of what appeared did not necessarily reflect the same kind of impersonal "objective" detachment. In fact, there was frequently a direct correlation between the sharpness of the views expressed and the protection furnished by the anonymity of the journal's policy of unsigned material. "Bylines" were reserved for opinion columnists, while frequently dispatches from foreign correspondents were attributed to them directly. Thus the specious Olympian appearance of news stories succeeded admirably in getting launched as completely impartial and impassive stands a surprising collection of pure opinions and emotional convictions, and in getting them entrenched as presumably unmovable, permanent "fact."

It cannot be denied that opinion-makers of the most determined kind flourished under the mantle of faceless journalism. *Time* at one stage of the 1930s had so many Communists on its staff that they were able to get out a parody edition of the parent organ which specialized in Stalinist propaganda versions of the stories being carried in the regular editions. This was also true of the Hearst newspapers but a large majority of the papers and magazines in in New York City were heavily staffed with Communists and fellow travelers, however. *Time* carried no signed material by columnists, but did identify its foreign correspondents' work when the editors considered it particularly exemplary. In *Life* and the other main organ of the American Century Press, *For-
tune, founded in 1930, most of the work was signed, but important editorials in both frequently were anonymous. By the time America became involved in World War II the lead news section "National Affairs" had become Time's most important department, and the staff of Time overwhelmingly leftward-inclined. "National Affairs" was as much an opinion-manufacturing precinct as it was a news department, and was employed massively in 1940 in the unsuccessful effort to get Wendell Willkie elected president. No account of the world of journalism and its infighting during this time should overlook the testimony of T. S. Matthews in his autobiography Name and Address. Matthews, a product of New Republic training in the 1920s, served Time in all capacities between 1929 and 1953, including stints as managing editor and editor in chief, and shared editorial chores with Whittaker Chambers during the war. At one stage Matthews denounced bitterly "the distortions, suppressions and slanting of political 'news'," which he said seemed to him "to pass the bounds of politics and to commit an offense against the ethics of journalism." This complaint was made by Matthews against his own colleagues who put Time together every week during the early 1950s. One need not only imagine the forces at work tailoring the foreign news in Time between 1941 and 1947, just because Matthews says little of significance about it. Nevertheless, that so many of the largest, wealthiest and most influential opinion-making publications were staffed at so many of their most strategic posts by persons whose basic interest was the welfare of Stalinist Communism is not a reflection upon them. It is far more an

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26In the celebrated December 18, 1947 election for officers of the American Newspaper Guild in New York City, the Communist-backed candidate, ANG executive vice president John Ryan, carried a majority of the votes from fifteen of thirty-two publications whose chapters took part. Ryan lost by a total vote of 2042 to 2042. The New York Times chapter voted for the Communist-backed candidate, 510 to 260, while the Time, Inc. chapter voted against him by the narrow margin of four votes, 179-179. The Associated Press chapter voted anti-Communist by almost as close a vote, 110-104. See the interesting analysis of the struggle for the control of the newspaper union by the Time/Life reporter and researcher, Jeanne Perkins Harman, Such is Life (London: Hammond, Hammond & Co., 1959), chapter 12.

On the subject of highly placed Communists in the news media in those times and what is "fit to print," Mrs. Harman remarked, "there is often as much sin in omission as in commission. A zealous Party supporter would be just as roundly congratulated for keeping something out of the public eye as he would for getting something in. And that, given the high casualty rate on stories anyway, is comparatively easy to accomplish."
indictment of their opulent and in many cases nationally prominent employers, who must be assumed to have had enough intelligence to know whom they were hiring and to understand what they were saying in print after their employment. The propaganda may have originated abroad or in small and exotic domestic journals, but the really important purveyors of the views involved in this propaganda were the prosperous mass circulation publications, which was true as well for the agencies of the picture, film and spoken word.

*Newsweek*, which bore the banner slogan over its head each week, “A Well-Informed Public is America’s Greatest Security,” underwent a reorganization in 1937, accompanied by a change in ownership and “publicity direction.” Beginning with the issue of October 4 of that year, it presented a much enlarged opinion and editorial emphasis in its reporting. It also featured columns, that by Raymond Moley being the first, followed by that of Ernest K. Lindley after the European War broke out on September 3, 1939. Several columnists were added to supply “inside” analysis of the war, but confining themselves to military matters almost entirely. A column devoted mainly to economic criticism was written by Ralph Robey.

*U. S. News* followed the format of *Time* in presenting unsigned news columns, but each issue was decorated by a full page editorial by its founder, David Lawrence, material which sometimes appeared first in daily newspapers but some of which did not. A feature of *U. S. News* nearly every week was a question on some current issue submitted to a wide variety of knowledgeable or prominent men for their comments, a type of specialty public opinion poll confined to those considered informed enough, and familiar enough to the general readership to exert some influence in opinion-making. Another unique *U. S. News* feature was a column or two of summarizations of editorial opinion of the daily press nationwide on events and controversies of the moment.

No account of the electrifying innovations in the field of mass communication of the 1930s, just in time for the astounding wartime expansion and influence, would be complete without a mention of the evolution of the book club. It deserves equal status with the news and picture magazines and the sound newsreels. In 1931, book clubs accounted for a negligible part of the total of book sales; fifteen years later, as the Cold War began to set in, the book clubs sold half as many books as the total of the nation’s book stores and department stores put together.
By the 1945-1947 period there were six prominent ones: the Book League, the Dollar Book Club and the Literary Guild of America, all controlled by the publisher Doubleday; The Book of the Month Club; the People’s Book Club, controlled by Simon and Schuster; and the Book Find Club. Together they enrolled 3½ million members in the spring of 1946 and sold 75 million books at that moment.27 The Literary Guild sales were in excess of half a million. About 450,000 of the Book of the Month Club’s 925,000 members took its selection of the month. The People’s Book Club, with 300,000 members, reached a vastly larger audience, in that its promotional literature went out to 28 million receivers of Sears Roebuck catalogs as well.28 Doubleday’s three clubs distributed 15 million pieces of direct-mail advertising in the last year of the war. One can understand the critical importance of the place of the book club when it decided to make one of its choices a book of serious concern in the field of foreign politics, especially if it carried a strong factional slant. (It was the nationally read literary critic Harry Hansen who pointed out as early as January, 1943 that America’s eight best-selling books on Stalinist Russia were “first hand reports” “characterized by their sympathetic attitude toward the Soviets.”29) And its impact can be calculated to be even more profound when action resulted from collaboration with such a wartime propaganda agency as the Council on Books in Wartime, or the War Writers’ Board. Even the staid and unexcitable Publishers’ Weekly could voice the observation that “The Council on Books in Wartime has been one of the most powerful influences in promoting the sale of war books.”30

“Books are Weapons in the War of Ideas” was the slogan suggested by the publisher W.W. Norton, chairman of the Council on Books in Wartime. This was later rephrased and popularized by President Roosevelt, and a book nominated by this Council as a recommendation promptly was given copious national attention and sold in vast quantities. A book did not need to be the beneficiary of such an immense national spotlight to gain major attention as an influential and signifi-

c pertinent opinion-forming force. As Curtice Hitchcock, president of the publishing house of Reynal and Hitchcock, pointed out in a speech in London in the fall of 1942, “The small slim volume, which has a circulation of only 500 or 1,000 copies, may easily be of far greater intrinsic importance than the great best seller.”31 But, for the most part, the significant opinion-molding books of World War Two and after were the massively promoted and widely sold books of the major publishers. Such enterprises had been coming into business at a rate of better than one a year since 1924, and they continued to do so into the early years of the Cold War.32 Though these organizations were accompanied by much larger numbers of smaller publishing houses, the output of significant books by the latter was far smaller. In England, some 200 new publishers went into business in the year 1943 alone.33 The shortage of paper and skilled labor seemed to be no obstacle to this burgeoning enterprise in Britain or in America.

A most dramatic example of the process is seen in the case of the book *One World*, by the prestigious Republican political figure Wendell Willkie.34 It was published on April 8, 1943 by Simon and Schuster, and sold almost a quarter of a million copies in less than one week. An appearance by Willkie on radio’s best known talk show, “Information Please,” four days after the publication date, helped out. On July 1 Willkie was a guest on the radio “Words at War” program sponsored by the Council on Books in Wartime, and received several other strong radio plugs by such luminaries of the air in those times as Alexander

33See story by London publisher Stanley Unwin in *Times Literary Supplement* (February 12, 1944) p. 79. According to Unwin the Publishers Association had numbered only 130 firms for the entire country in 1939. Unwin’s account was challenged by L. Shenfield (TLS, February 19, 1944, p. 91) but vigorously reasserted by Unwin the following week (TLS, February 26, 1944, p. 103).
34Rumors began very soon that the book was actually written by Joseph Barnes, foreign editor of the New York *Herald Tribune*, and Gardner Cowles, publisher of *Look* and a member of the massive domestic propaganda agency, the Office of War Information. These two men accompanied Willkie on his impressive world tour and appeared with him in a succession of photographs taken at various places, including the Kremlin, where Willkie visited the Soviet Premier Stalin. Cowles left the OWI on June 20, 1943. It has been suggested whimsically from time to time that there is a need for a study which might be titled *A History of the Ghost-Written Books of World War Two*. 
Woollcott, Gabriel Heatter and Walter Winchell, reaching additional millions of the citizenry.

By April 24, it had sold 400,000 copies, breaking all American publishing records. On May 6, One World was named by the CBW as its third "imperative" book of the war, and its sales now made a bewildering leap. On May 3 the publishers announced that 880,000 copies had been printed; this was adjusted upward to 1,115,000 copies on May 15.\(^{35}\) The Council's citation of One World declared the book "A vivid picture of the leaders and people of many of the Allied nations and their views as to the future. Its publication marks a definite turning point, a new starting place, in our attitude toward international affairs."\(^{36}\)

In July, the publishers ran an advertisement for One World in the newspapers for ten consecutive days which consisted of one sixth as many words as were in Willkie's entire book, in actuality, a digest of the book. By this time there were a million and a quarter copies in print, and the publishers announced that actual sales totalled 1,186,577 less than five months after publication.\(^{37}\) And a translation was already a best seller in the Danish underground at the same moment.\(^{38}\) One World, whatever one might have said about its naïveté and smile provoking oversimplifications, was the most vigorously promoted political book in United States history. It was also the major initial propaganda effort employed to prepare the American public to contemplate favorably a new global political organization to replace the League of Nations.

\(^{35}\)The CBW had become a permanent agency on June 18, 1942. Its first two "imperative" books had been William L. White's They Were Expendable, and John Hersey's Into the Valley, books about combat in the Far East theater in the Philippines and on the island of Guadalcanal, respectively. There were occasional critics of the "imperative" idea. The best known was the ace Herald Tribune book reviewer Lewis S. Gannett. He attacked the CBW's scheme in a radio broadcast on New York's station WMCA on March 23, 1943, less than two weeks before the launching of the Willkie book, and again in debate with the publisher Bennett Cerf on WQXR on March 31. He thought the Council was "indulging in too much propaganda" and that the public was "in danger of being regimented." A full report on Gannett's talks was carried in Publishers Weekly (April 10, 1943), pp. 1502-03. The only thing of the magnitude of the Willkie edition during the war was the report in Newsweek that "pro-Communist groups are having 1,000,000 abridged copies of the Dean of Canterbury's pro-Stalin book The Soviet Power rushed off the press for distribution at five cents each." Newsweek (July 21, 1941), p. 8. No formal verification of this press run was made.

\(^{36}\)Publishers Weekly (May 8, 1943), pp. 1805-06.


\(^{38}\)Publishers Weekly (September 25, 1943), p. 1163.
Extended attention to radio dissemination and mass circulation magazine distribution of ideas during the Second World War should not persist to the point of ignoring potent sources of the ideas themselves, often in journals with very limited but extremely influential readership. Of considerable significance were venerable literary monthlies such as Harper's and the Atlantic, and the two leading weekly voices of liberalism, the Nation and the New Republic. The latter two, probably no more firmly in the grasp of the warrior and world interventionist sector of liberalism than the former, with a pronounced list of a favorable bent toward Stalinist Russia and toward various collectivist solutions of American policy questions as well, deserve special scrutiny. They, and their close newspaper cousin, the New York City afternoon tabloid PM, founded in 1940 principally to insert into the journalistic world a pro-war opinion voice unhampered by the restraint and circumspection of other equally belligerent but less reckless papers, can hardly be over-estimated as fountainheads for a constant flow of pro-Stalinist propaganda which did not slacken in their pages until the outbreak of the Korean War in mid-1950.

Testimony to their influence is not hard to find; a few citations may suffice. Roy Roberts, managing editor of the Kansas City Star, in a syndicated column published shortly after the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt, reported on his wartime observations of their impact in the nation's capital in this manner: "PM, a left-wing newspaper in New York with small circulation, the Nation, and the New Republic, were gospels of the New Deal. . . . They were bibles in Washington." A similar tribute was delivered a few weeks earlier by one of the veteran senior reporters of the Chicago Tribune, Alex Small. "Like Harper's and the Atlantic these weeklies [Nation and New Republic] are read by people who have weight in their communities," Small observed, adding the appraisal "If asked which has the more effect on policy, the Saturday Evening Post with its 3,400,000 circulation or The Nation with its 42,000 my choice would be the latter."39

39Small's story on the influence of the four magazines was published in the Chicago Tribune for March 18, 1945. He went on to assert with respect to the Nation and New Republic, "They are for war, war anywhere and with everyone who is not of their religion. An itch for mischief especially seems to possess the dynamic Freda Kirchwey, today the dominating spirit of The Nation. If there is anything anywhere to add to the misery of this tortured world, any blazing injustice, any despicable sham, any foul deed, you may be sure that the New Republic and The Nation are for it." A summary of the views of Roberts and Small appeared in "T.R.B."'s Washington Notes column in New Republic (April 30, 1945), p. 586.
Probably the most pointed tribute to the impact and effect of the liberal weeklies was their use by the organization of Edward L. Bernays, described by Time as "the country's outstanding counsel on public relations," and "U. S. publicist No. 1." The Bernays efforts to influence the formation of wartime and postwar policy on broad levels were promoted every month in full page discourses printed on the inside front cover of both. "Our monthly messages in The Nation and The New Republic attempt as a public service, within the limits they can, to bring to the attention of 65,000 thoughtful and influential readers the public relations aspects of certain vital problems," said Bernays in the spring of 1943; "we choose The Nation and The New Republic as media, because through them we reach an opinion molding public which translates ideas into social action."40

Just what kind of "social action" the liberal weeklies were expert at, as referred to by Bernays, may have been buried in political rhetoric for all an untrained onlooker might have known, but the anti-Stalinist leftwing Partisan Review a year later spared no steampower in analyzing it. "We have in our midst a powerfully vocal lobby willing to over-ride all concerns of international democracy and decency in the interests of a foreign power," spoke its editorial "The 'Liberal' Fifth Column"; "The foci of this infection are the newspaper PM, and the liberal weeklies The Nation and The New Republic."41 The fifteen-page editorial created only one misconception: that this ardent concern for the welfare of Stalinism was a recent development in liberal centers. Liberalism's weekly press had a more than fifteen year record of Stalinist apologetics at the moment the Partisan Review took it to task, and only seemed to be lopsided in its promotion of this concern in the spring of 1946. It had created a deep separation within the ranks of liberalism in plumping so exuberantly for war in the period prior to American involvement in December, 1941. And it had worked away with a sure and steady pro-Soviet orientation throughout the war. What provoked the attack in Partisan Review was primarily the refusal of the American liberal weekly press, with all its prestige and influence, to adopt the anti-Stalinist stance called for by the Cold War. In this sense it was more consistent than its new critics; Stalinist "social action" moving abreast of the Red Army had put the capitals of twelve European countries squarely under the control of the Soviet. It was foreseeable

40The Bernays messages usually occupied the entire inside front cover of the Nation and New Republic; that of March 19, 1945 was typical.
and expectable consequence of the great “Last War,” as one febrile liberal editor sought to name World War Two.

A very large part of the problem, from the point of view of American ideology, emotion, opinion and sentiment, consisted of the split personality which had fought the war. Especially after June 22, 1941 when Stalinist Russia became a formal belligerent against Germany and was promptly hailed with acclamation and promises of aid from Britain’s Winston Churchill and America’s Franklin D. Roosevelt, a long standing division in the USA became extended to new dimensions. Even the spectacle of Churchill and FDR and their various lieutenants standing on the deck of H.M.S. Prince of Wales off the coast of Newfoundland in August, 1941, singing Onward Christian Soldiers,42 did not allay the disquiet felt in large circles in America over the new “ally” in Eurasia. Even the promulgation of the new set of war aims in the ill-fated Atlantic Charter failed to help out here.

Undoubtedly the massive pro-Soviet propaganda program of 1942-1945 did change the views of many Americans and induced a level of mellowness toward Soviet Communism among a sizable number who had never entertained such views before. But it would appear that most of the new pro-Soviet feelings were incubated by the most advanced sector of the populace from the point of view of formal education. A Fortune magazine survey in September 1945 noted that about 200 books concerned with Russia had been published in the USA since the beginning of 1943 to that moment. Furthermore, of all the newspaper editorials in US newspapers concerned with foreign affairs in the first half of 1945, more than 20% dealt directly with Russia. The journal concluded from the tone of all this print that “In the mind of the U.S. public there is little doubt of the importance of friendly relations with Russia.” Elmo Roper, who conducted this poll, further concluded that “Russophobes” were “in a minority of less than 10 per cent,” and that “those cool toward Russia” were a “mere 11 per cent.”43

42Time (August 25, 1941), pp. 11-14. The issue of aid to Stalin was mentioned by Roosevelt in his first press conference after returning from the policy meeting with Churchill, with the objective of keeping the Soviets fighting into the spring of 1942. The United States was not yet a belligerent.

43“U.S. Opinion on Russia,” Fortune (September, 1945), p. 233. This famous sample of American opinion on the U.S.S.R. came just a short while before a sensational Roper poll, published in Fortune (January, 1946), p. 222, which asked the question, “Do you think we [the USA] did or did not deliberately provoke Japan into making war against us?” The replies:
The swiftness of the about-face in most circles of the American populace on the subject of Stalinist Russia, once the propaganda spigots began to supply unfriendly instead of sympathetic substance, suggests that a vast underground existed throughout the war which never accepted this aspect of the war program and swiftly rejected it once given a chance to do so without running too severe a risk to personal safety.

Perhaps Roper had not extended his survey on attitudes toward Stalinism far enough down the educational ladder, and he surely had chosen to ignore nation-wide expressions of pessimism about the failure of the domestic propaganda. As early as September, 1943 Palmer Hoyt, director of the domestic branch of the Office of War Information, had been quoted as observing that "This war has not been sold to the American people—believe it or not."44

A major and very gloomy roundup of the whole subject was made by the editors of Life in an outraged editorial six months later.45 Most of the left wing ideology behind the war had failed miserably to sell itself by then for sure. Scores of sources in 1943 and 1944 had reported the apathy and even sharp anger at the war fronts at attempts to get across the slogans and verbal reflexes of 1939-1942. Though there were no reflections cast upon the bravery and determination to win among the armed forces, the political fixations of European émigrés and the compact of powerful pro-war ideologues seemed never to have got off the ground even by this late moment.

Though liberal journals and journalists had been bewailing this for

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The question was timely, in that the administration was conducting its investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack four years earlier. Despite the propaganda of righteousness which had saturated the field since the time of Pres. Roosevelt’s "Day of infamy" address and the largely whitewash proceedings of the various Washington investigations, it was a little surprising that nearly 30% of those polled either agreed that the Roosevelt regime had provoked the Japanese attack on Hawaii or were sufficiently unconvinced as to the administration’s innocence to refuse to give it a vote of confidence on the question.

The nearly one out of four on the Pacific Coast who believed the Japanese had been goaded into attacking Pearl Harbor may have been especially sobering. In any event the Roper organization did not ask such a question again, and from this point on the salvagers of the wartime propaganda made a substantial industry out of defending the administration against the persistent little contingent of revisionists during the following quarter of a century.

44Quoted in New Republic (September 6, 1943), p. 335.
45Editorial, "Last Call For War Aims," Life (March 6, 1944), p. 34.
some time, the *Life* call for the instilling of pro-war politics in the
armed forces managed to outdo the previous ones in pathetic quality.
The plea contained the usual retreat into hopes for a "durable peace"
based on "continued agreement among the Big Three." But enough
sentiment was already loose in March, 1944 to convince even an editor
of *Life* that such "agreement" was going to have one of history’s shortest
life spans.

Churchill’s speech the week before in which he had declared that
military expediency governed Allied political behavior toward Europe
and that “This is not a time for ideological preferences” further discom­
moded the editors. They were sorry that the Moscow and Tehran
conferences had produced such a thin dribble of insubstantial ma­
terial on the politics of the war. They were also ready to concede that
the Atlantic Charter\(^{46}\) was not to apply to either Poland or Germany;
part of the former was sure to go to Communist Russia, and part of the
latter to Poland, as compensation. The editors further lamented that
Roosevelt “had never ventured to express an American point of view
about postwar Europe,” and they were quite impatient with the “moral
globalisms” of Secretary of State Hull, especially his reiterations about
the “peace-loving” nations. The editors were circumspect enough to
make no observation to the effect that such sloganeering made Hull
sound like a 1937 Communist newspaper editorial.

The editors did not involve themselves with the subject of growing
apprehensiveness in the country over the likely outcome of the war in
Europe, but it had been gnawing away at the consciousness of the
American Century publications for some time. The administration’s
press opposition, in particular the Hearst newspapers, had been scored
many times for their scare headlines warning of the threat of a “Red
Europe” at hostilities’ end. *Time*, in scoffing at the Hearst predictions
in their issue of the same week which contained their sister journal’s la­
ment over the poor state of political sentiment in the armed forces, even
had the bad taste to cite *Pravda* and the *Daily Worker* in rebuttal of
Hearst.\(^{47}\) In *Time*’s view, this was premature and vulgar anti-Com-

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\(^{46}\)It was a moment of increasing woes for the Atlantic Charter and its defenders,
especially after President Roosevelt admitted that it was not a formal document
but a set of notes handed to the radio operators of the U.S.S. *Augusta* and
H.M.S. *Prince of Wales* as a sort of press release. This stimulated the following
bit of doggerel from the *Chicago Tribune*: "For three long years you let us
think/The famed Atlantic Charter, 
Was signed and sealed and guar­
anteed/By which all nations would be freed./But now we’re told the docu­
ment/Was just a memo of intent/An idyll written on a boat/When you were
fishing for our vote."

munism on the part of Hearst, too close to the similar warnings derived from the German propaganda minister, Josef Goebbels. Furthermore it emanated from unsympathetic centers, and supporters of the administration had not entirely shed their conviction that opposition was a first cousin to treason. The only anti-Communism approved of by *Time* was that of the Social Democratic Federation’s organ the *New Leader*, which excluded Stalinists, Trotskyists, Norman Thomas Socialists, and the American liberals whom the *New Leader* designated the “Kremlin set.”\(^{48}\) All in all, whatever appeared on the surface, a delicate business was going on throughout all sectors of opinion in the last fifteen months of the European phase of World War Two, with incredible consequences growing out of the new policy of military expediency.\(^{49}\) Its outcome was being freely predicted by seers from right to left, including both, and the preponderant majority of them were proven correct by events.

As a force which had looked upon it all with a mellow gaze while it was transpiring, the liberal press was in no political or psychic state of mind to reverse itself in the Spring of 1946 when Winston Churchill formally called upon the “free nations” to try to undo what they had done so admirably while in concert with Communist Russia. Samuel Grafton, a far-left columnist who enjoyed a meteoric rise to popularity during the war, expressed the basic situation about as good as one might hope for even before the United States was formally engaged in combat. He saw the western powers ranged against Germany hoping to gain the manpower and resources of the Soviet in bringing Hitler’s regime down without having to allocate any of the fruits of this victory to Stalin, a hope which Grafton put in the same class as that of expecting water to flow uphill. So when the liberal press and its

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\(^{48}\) *Time* (March 20, 1944), pp. 60, 62. The *New Leader* at that time was run by Samuel M. Levitas, Daniel Bell, William E. Bohn and Liston Oak. While the war was on, this journal and the *American Mercury* under Eugene Lyons were the only domestic journals whose continuous criticism of Communist policy influence in liberal organizations enjoyed relative toleration.

\(^{49}\) Another amusing commentary in verse form in the *Chicago Tribune* in July, 1944 on the incredible jungle which events of the war had made out of American foreign policy spoke volumes:

> “Who’s a friend? and who’s a foe?/It’s so difficult to know/Once we praised the honest Finn/Now we find him steeped in sin/In the spring we spurned de Gaulle/May embrace him in the fall/Hear the gentle Stalin purr?/Once we called him murderer/Italy, once damned as bloody/Now is welcomed as a buddy/Franco, Mussolini’s chum/Rates no longer as a bum/We are still against Benito/But (pro tem) we’re fond of Tito/Who’s a foe? and who’s a friend?/It’s embarrassing, no end.”
leftist cousins (with the exception of such anti-Stalinist standouts as Common Sense, Morris Rubin's The Progressive, The New Leader, Partisan Review and the Call) stood by the Soviet Union in the enjoyment of its war booty as it had hailed the taking of it in the first place; it was not engaging in a sinister new maneuver; it was standing by a policy position supported, with a few lapses such as during the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939-1941, for almost a generation.

When the editors of Partisan Review, in their attack on the Stalinist tendencies and propensities of the liberal weeklies and PM, spoke of "the subtle internal politics of book reviewing that goes on week by week," they opened up once more a subject of prime importance in the world of opinion-making. In this field there occurred a concerted "slanting" almost continuously in many more influential papers and magazines than those under attack, and no study of the portrayal of the Soviet Union in the United States between 1941 and 1947 could do more than faint justice to the subject without extensive attention to the reviewing of significant books pertinent to the issue during that time. There is massive evidence that the attack on books hostile to editorial ideology and the parallel effusive promotion of books in harmony with editorial ideology was not exclusively a property of the liberal press or other journals specializing in opinion. Frequently, much more aggravated examples of these techniques could be found in sources which at least gave lip service to detachment or "objectivity." Especially influential were the Sunday book review magazines of the New York Times and New York Herald Tribune, which, combined, reached a circulation of over a million and a half every Sunday at the end of the war, and the weekly Saturday Review of Literature, which reached a subscriber audience about the size of either of the liberal weeklies. These three concentrated exclusively on reviewing current books at length and in considerable number. But all 27 journals under examination in this study reviewed books, frequently just particular volumes intended for mass opinion influencing, which received prodigious publicity.

Far more people read reviews of books than they do the actual books. Reviews of a book may appear in daily, weekly, monthly and quarterly journals with a combined circulation of fifteen to twenty million copies and a combined theoretical total readership of several times that number. The book in question may sell no more than a few thousand copies and still exert tremendous influence upon opinion because of the impact of the reviewer's opinion of the book. By the time a po-
tential reader has read from five to ten reviews, all of one kind or another, it is unlikely that even reading the book would do much toward altering the view he has already acquired. So, although it may appear that the function of book reviewing is to acquaint the potential buyer with what is being presented for sale by a publisher, over the years particularly in the field of books on public affairs and international relations, a major unstated objective is to fix views on the book and its contents among the multitude which will not read it.

John Maynard Keynes once observed that economic policy was invariably the result of the putting into practice of ideas of economists which were first expressed in books which the practical policy makers never read. In a similar fashion, views on foreign political systems, world politics and international political personalities are often the basis for action, and the support of that action, by people who know nothing about the subjects other than the opinions they have encountered, launched in turn by other people whose information is derived from still other people's books. Again one must keep in mind Sir Norman Angell's discourse on political action as a consequence of opinions on facts, not understanding of the facts themselves. A grasp of this situation helps one to understand better the fundamental strategic importance of a well-planted book review, as well as the Partisan Review editors reference to "the subtle internal policies of book reviewing" in the periodical press.

There is one area of research in opinion-making in which it is exceedingly hard to work: that in which views are formed by leaving things unsaid. Agreements to suppress embarrassing or compromising facts are uncommonly hard to uncover, and sometimes there are broad general agreements by various media which are unpublicized, such as that of the newsreel companies in the 1930s not to show films of President Roosevelt trying to ambulate, presumably in the desire to conceal his physical handicap and preserve the illusion of great strength and vitality which his posture during speeches and radio broadcasts reflected. But this is of an altogether different cut from other kinds of alteration of the record by means of leaving things unsaid.

In matters involving the Soviet during the Second World War there was for instance the studious avoidance by almost all sources and publicists of the issue of Communist concentration camps, which the Cold War period investigators found to be as numerous, more lethal, and containing far more people than those of the Hitler regime in Germany. Only a tiny scattering of references to this phenomenon ap-
peared in print between late 1941 and the blooming of the Cold War, and even very few well after the latter date. As noteworthy as this, and one which made its way to the surface while the war was still in progress, was the revelation of the origin of the war news on the Russo-German front in Eastern Europe.

Despite the tons of printed material on the fortunes of the Red Army and its war with the Germans which appeared in the United States press between June, 1941 and May, 1945 very few people reading it knew that not a single reporter to the American or British papers was actually at the front the entire time. The frustration of some finally brought about the explosion at a reception in Moscow in October, 1944, for foreign journalists given by VOKS, the Soviet cultural relations bureau. The highlights were the bitter complaints over confinement in Moscow hotels and forced dependence on stories culled from the Communist newspapers, further subjected to censorship prior to being filed to America and Britain, by Paul Winterton of the London *News Chronicle* and Alexander Kendrick of the Philadelphia *Inquirer*. Kendrick, whom even the Stalinophile *New Republic* described as a “strongly pro-Russian correspondent,” subsequently had himself recalled to America “in disgust at his failure to get any real news.” But the situation did not improve, apparently. “The Russians keep our reporters on ice in Moscow, won’t let them go to the front,” complained Frank Gervasi of *Collier’s* in mid-February of the next year. (There were few reporters more kindly toward the Soviet than

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50The ironic report by *Newsweek*'s Moscow correspondent, Bill Downs, titled “The Orel Sweepstakes,” documented this situation fourteen months before the famous blowup in Moscow. Downs’ account (August 2, 1943, pp. 82, 85), concerned the “correspondents covering the Battle of the Orel Bulge from the Metropole Hotel and the [Soviet] Foreign Office Press department.” He described with some humor the frantic scurrying through maps and timetables by those who had “risen early to collect their Red Stars, Izvestias and Pravdas,” and the using of these to piece out where the latest Russo-German battle was going on. The result: eight different accounts by eight correspondents to US papers. Downs admitted that “no one” knew where the battle was going on except the combatants. Three weeks later (August 23, 1943, p. 28) *Newsweek* declared, “The Russians seldom allow correspondents—or any other foreigners—near the front lines.” It was an introduction to Downs’ latest story, which his editors claimed was “one of the first to be published on the present fighting in the Soviet.” But a study of the three column story revealed that he got no closer than 25 miles to the front lines.

51 *Time* (October 16, 1944), p. 73.

52 “Poland, Russia and America,” *New Republic* (January 8, 1945), p. 36.

53 *Time* (October 30, 1944), p. 64. The *Time* story identified Kendrick as of Georgian (Caucasus) birth, also the birthplace of Stalin.

Gervasi. Nor did things clear up as the Red Army burst across Poland and into Germany two months after Gervasi’s cry. Said Eric Sevareid in the *Nation* on April 14, 1945, “Up to the present there has been no indication that the Russians intend to allow free journalists to work in Poland.”

Such lapses were uncommon, since the usual presentation of the situation ascribed military secrecy and security policies as being responsible for the censorship; only on such rare occasions was it learned that it was Stalinist policy to keep the newspapermen of their loudly-hailed “Allies” confined to the Hotel Metropole, digesting the current Soviet press on a daily basis in order to have anything to send home. And when such reports did leak out, they were usually buried deep in the back pages of the journals that bothered to report it.

On the whole, however, the American journalists in Moscow did not let confinement to the local area affect the ardent or imaginative quality of their prose. Russian-born Markoosha Fischer, wife of Louis Fischer, longtime Moscow correspondent to the *Nation* who became disillusioned about Stalinism a short time before America became a belligerent, got around to appraising their output in a sobered article in *Common Sense* in December 1945, which was given additional publicity by chastened *Time*. It was her conclusion that “much of the wartime writing of the U. S. correspondents in Moscow” during the 1941-45 war time “might have been signed by a *Daily Worker* editor.”

Her ungentle admission that the American public had been deluged with a solid stream of Communist propaganda about Russia by essentially non-Stalinist writers was tempered by the claim that they had been intimidated from writing critiques of Stalinism for fear of being smeared in the United States.

By this time even the correspondents themselves had screwed up their courage. A letter incorporating a formal complaint by the Anglo-American Correspondents’ Association was filed with the Soviet authorities, bitterly resentful over their persistence in maintaining “strict wartime censorship of news written by foreign correspondents.” The letter was reputedly written by Bruce Atkinson of the New York *Times* and signed by all the members, even Anna Louise Strong, whose pedigree as an uncritical adulator of things Stalinist was surpassed by no one.

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The puzzling aspect of this episode revolved around whether there had been any official involvement or not. After all, it had been characteristic of the friends of Stalin in the American press to boast of the superior security of the Soviet to that of all other regimes and to commend them for their swiftness in annihilating their internal enemies, as in the case of the 1936-38 Moscow purge trials. One could not miss the tone of quiet pride in the *Time* story "Russia Will Hold Out," published three months after the outbreak of Russo-German hostilities in June 1941, over the tight grip on information in the Workers' Fatherland: "Any news out of Russia is what the Russians want the world to know. Their censorship makes the German censors look like children playing with paper dolls."58 Russian policy had not changed at all. But the journalists who once admired and praised this policy and submitted to it the entire war with very little complaint had effected a surprising about-face.

There were many other considerations involved in this belated demonstration of valor than just whole-souled concern for access to "news" and freedom of expression, undoubtedly. The dark clouds of the Cold War were already rolling in over the countryside, and a new stance and working vantage point obviously was called for, as the era of official intimacy with Stalinism began drawing to an end. The time was at hand to start accumulating "anti-Communist" dossiers, undoubtedly, now that bawling uncritical acclaim no longer needed to be considered an essential credential. An amazing time was just about to close out.

The printed record does not support the charge made by both nationalist-patriot liberals and conservatives after 1945 that a "Communist menace" to the United States grew out of a conspiracy of American and Soviet Communists in America.59 The steady and generous feeding of pro-Red propaganda in the country throughout the Second World War was preponderantly the work of multi-million circulation news-

59 The postwar alarm over Soviet agents in the nation's capital during the war years did not extend to the presence of large numbers of nationals of other countries also there, working for their particular interests. It was *Newsweek* (July 7, 1941, p. 13), which observed in the early summer of 1941 that there were "more British in Washington than captured and burned it in 1814." The first inkling as to the real scope of British interference in American affairs long before the USA became England's war partner really did not come until the publication of H. Montgomery Hyde's book *The Quiet Canadian* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1962), which detailed the activities of the British intelligence center in New York under the direction of the "quiet Canadian," Sir William Stephenson. Hyde's book was published in the U.S. under the title *Room 3603* (New York: Farrar and Straus, 1963).
papers and magazines, the efforts of the multi-billion dollar radio and moving picture industries, supported by the effectiveness of the largest and most prosperous book publishers in blanketing the country with profuse literary tributes to Stalinist, Maoist and Titoist Communism, often signed by millionaires and well-paid representatives of the non-Communist mass media of all descriptions. The country's threadbare Communist apparatus beamed in approval, of course, and responded to these steady, frequent, unbelievable windfalls with loud choruses of approbation, but the solid mass of pro-Communist sentiment which became a large factor in American opinion on world politics and economics was prepared and swallowed with modest assistance from direct Communist agencies and institutions.

In actuality, during the decade of the 1940s the CPUSA and all its publication adjuncts might just as well have gone out of business entirely, because their total contribution to the creation of the mountainous pro-Communist bank account of good will in the Western Hemisphere is barely perceptible, despite their usefulness in aiding the understanding of wartime Communist policies. The bawls of praise directed to various aspects of global Communism during this time from American and English heads of state, industrial, financial and commercial leaders, aristocratic diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic, and by opulent figures in the newspaper, magazine, book-publishing, radio and moving picture enterprises, collectively dwarf the efforts of formal Communist participation and render them relatively insignificant.

If there is one thing which can be established with little difficulty it is the self-doping of the capitalist English-speaking world with massive and profound delusions concerning European and Asian Communist aspirations and realities. In view of the obliterating avalanche of pro-Communist propaganda of all kinds which buried the United States during the Second World War, the amazing thing is that any kind of resistance to it maintained itself during this same time, and that it managed to get on the record and constitute a minority opposition with a respectable degree of achievement, even though a vast number remained suspicious but inarticulate. And when it became respectable and subsequently imperative to reverse the wartime stand and to act as if the Communist triumphs in the war were an utterly unanticipated disaster, it was just as revealing to notice who performed the pirouette soonest and with greatest éclat and effectiveness.

It has been related that the boast of V.M. Molotov for many years has been that the genius of Stalin in large-scale statecraft was his success
in precipitating a civil war among the capitalist countries. No participant in this civil war took part with more zest than the United States, nor worked harder to convince itself that its fortuitous partnership with Stalinist Russia was the opening bar of an overture to an endless era of peace, joy and profound international good will and understanding. [See Robert Edson Lee, *To The War* (New York: Knopf, 1968) a very brief but probably unexcelled memoir representative of the overwhelmingly preponderant majority of Americans for whom World War II was an incredibly rich and exciting experience and one which they have never begun to forget.]

The years of generalized promotion, by every device of mass communication, of "hands across the Volga" were hardly intended to provide just an accompanying sentimental obbligato to a short range tactical collaboration for the achievement of an incidental military triumph. The degree of profound and favorable conviction in the majority of pro-Stalinist testimonials prepared in America and Britain is transparent. It is this aspect that made it so hard to reject, so difficult for its fabricators to acknowledge as false and self-deceptive. Though many former adulators somersaulted with celerity to a hostile position toward Stalinism between 1945 and 1947, the depth of the convictions of the wartime era helps to account for the unwillingness of many others to accept the Cold War. From the point of view of the latter, there was no reason for it. The Stalinist regime had done nothing different or hostile or changed its policies or stance in any way; it was their late capitalist allies who had altered their perspective and in this sense the persistent anti-Cold Warriors, Stalinophile or otherwise, were correct. It really involved a rejection of the war, and a repudiation of everything for which the war was fought, to perform the about face called for by Churchill in his March, 1946 Fulton, Missouri speech, by the Truman Doctrine of March, 1947, by the program outlined by Secretary of State George C. Marshall in his Harvard address of June, 1947 and by George Kennan's "Containment" doctrine in his famous pseudonymously written position paper for *Foreign Affairs* in the same summer. It is little wonder the Cold War made no sense then or since

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60 One of Molotov's more polite ways of phrasing the matter is the following: "Thanks to the Stalinist foreign policy, the Soviet Union was able to prevent the creation of a united front of capitalist states against the U.S.S.R. in the period preceding the second World War." Quoted in *New York Times*, international edition (June 24, 1956), p. 5.

61 Probably the closest Mr. Truman has come to admitting the bankruptcy of all this complicated global policy was at the dedication of the Harry S. Truman Center for the Advancement of Peace in Independence, Missouri in mid-
to these self-powered persons, and they have enjoyed a sense of semi-satisfaction in observing the discomfiture of those who persisted in relishing the war to the hilt, while indulging in subsequent schizoid laments over its political consequences.

But American and to some extent English supporters and opponents of the Cold War shared one thing in common, the stupendous wartime partnership when both repeatedly attained prodigious heights of eloquence in behalf of the internal and foreign politics of Stalinist Russia. This gratuitous contribution to the welfare of a foreign state had no parallel whatever in that war, and for that matter is quite unique in the history of warfare involving coalitions of disparate states. And only a tiny sliver of the whole emanated from the formal organs of the Communist Party. It is unmatched as an adventure in mass-conditioning of this magnitude; its effects are still being felt and seen.


"First, Mr. Truman said, it seemed that the steps he had taken as President toward peace appeared 'to have been in vain.'

Then he observed: 'Memories are short, and appetites for power and glory are insatiable. Old tyrants depart. New ones take their places. Old differences are composed, new differences arise. Old allies become the foe. The recent enemy becomes the friend. It is all very baffling and trying.'

Still, he said, 'We cannot lose hope, we cannot despair. For it is all too obvious that if we do not abolish war on this earth, then surely, one day, war will abolish us from the earth'"
VII
Revisionism and the Cold War, 1946-1966:
Some Comments on Its Origins and Consequences

Realistically, all wars have been for economic reasons. To make them politically and socially palatable, ideological issues have always been invoked. Any possible future war will, undoubtedly, conform to historical precedent.

—Office of Naval Intelligence,


The end of something is always the beginning of something else, and the Cold War is no exception. It was a logical extension of the politics of the Second World War, the political consequences of which were obvious to a multitude of commentators of all kinds in
this country in the more than two years that preceded American involvement. These observers, most of whom opposed active participation, were hardly rewarded with acclaim for their perspicacity in this time or later, however. Frequently denounced as shadowy friends of the enemies of England and Stalinist Russia, their day was to be delayed to the closing hours of hostilities and after. Then even the most dense enthusiast of war for the obliteration of Germany and Japan became aware that the only likely forces capable of filling the vacuum thus created in Europe and Asia would be Stalinist Russia and a China in grave danger of becoming a Communist state itself. This was so obvious a case that no time was required to provide proper perspective; many contemporaries quickly recognized and commented on this great but mindless triumph. Probably the most succinct was that of the Labor Party M. P. Richard H. S. Crossman. "The Second World War," observed Crossman in March, 1946, "by the total elimination of Germany, destroyed the European balance of power."¹ But the problem involved many other things besides this, even though two decades and scores of billions of dollars have been devoted to restoring it.

The Second World War undoubtedly shaped the politico-economic face of the world for a long time. The world politics of twenty years has rested squarely on its consequences, and promises to do so for many more years to come. The presumption is that in the age of national states, conflicts of interest among them bring about wars. Though these are not inevitable, collisions occur when all other efforts at resolving their rivalries have failed or have been avoided or neglected. Once under way, these wars bring about greater or lesser alterations of the economic and social fabric of the world, and the greater the war, the more profound the alterations. As the greatest war of all time, World War Two also produced an upheaval of unprecedented proportions, dwarfing the settlements of any war all the way back to antiquity.

"Battle doesn’t determine who is right. Only who is left," Peter Bowman observed in his book, Beach Red.² It is another form of stating Spinoza's declaration that wars are not conflicts between right and wrong, but between right and right, as well as intimating

¹Crossman, "A Strategy for Britain," New Republic (March 18, 1946), pp. 371-374. Crossman was a former assistant editor of the London New Statesman and Nation, and deputy director of psychological warfare, first in North Africa and then in France with SHAEF. He has been a formidable politician in England over the last twenty years.

the immense part played by chance circumstances and pure luck in determining the outcome of combat. It is a foregone conclusion that the winners resolve in their favor the interest conflicts with the losers, but in the desire for a better “peace” than prevailed before hostilities, they ideally seek solutions which will not incubate hate and revenge sentiments, nor lay the foundations for the reopening of the struggle. Thus, the citizenry may once more resume the multitude of pursuits which characterize a complex community, in an atmosphere of improved tranquility and reasonableness.

One can conclude without reservations that such an objective was not paramount in the eyes of the Anglo-American leaders in this war, despite the rodomontade of the Atlantic Charter and the foggy, evanescent dream propaganda of the “United Nations.” It was quite obvious from the context of these military morale nutrients for the civilian sector that their beauteous comforts and consolations were not to extend to the opposition, if and when defeated (vide the Casablanca “unconditional surrender” doctrine); they were simply designs and devices to aid in the restoration of a status quo rudely shaken by these upstart enemies. Unfortunately, the Anglo-American leadership team never found a formula to incorporate their chance ally of the unpredictable fortunes of war, Stalinist Russia. Though they tried to bind the Communists with the paper twine of vague pronunciamentos at various times during hostilities, it was evident to almost all who cared to see that World War Two was at least three separate wars, and trying to ride them all to a common conclusion was in the same class with trying to ride the same number of wild horses home into a single stall. The consequences of the pointless military victory achieved were too powerful to confine within the feeble “peace” policies devised near its conclusion.

It would have been grand if Roosevelt and Churchill had been able to enlist Soviet manpower and war material in bringing about the wreck of Germany and its version of a united Europe run by Germans, without Stalin seeking anything for his regime in the natural outcome, the division of the swag of victory.3 A review of

3John Foster Dulles, participating in the first diplomatic caterwauls following the end of the war, started the preparation of the visionaries for a return to reality with his philosophical observation, “Fellowship based on a war coalition usually disintegrates after the enemy’s defeat.” Dulles, “The General Assembly,” Foreign Affairs (October, 1945), pp. 2-11(2). It is regrettable Dulles and others equally prestigious did not begin making such incisive remarks during the last two years of the war, instead of issuing long streams of soothing, narcotic visions of coming everlasting amity with Stalinist Russia.
the oratory of Roosevelt and Churchill in particular describing the world that was expected to take shape out of this planetary bath in hot metal and blood is excessively depressing today. Down through the Yalta conference, a bare three months before the end of the European phase of the fighting, there is a persistent theme of visionary promise of a permanent plateau of eternal peace, the “broad, sunlit uplands” cliché so dear to Churchill. Its usual implication was the expectation of frank and wholehearted cooperation in such a project from Stalin, and the assumption was that no dismal and base quarrel over such things as land, markets, oil, marine lanes, world air traffic, and scores of other important material considerations and facts of life would be permitted to interfere with the attainment of this latest in a line of pet schemes for establishing immediate and perpetual peace, mirages such as had followed every big war in the previous 400 years.

What did these eminent men really think at the time about such possibilities? It is tiresome and unrewarding work to fight through the opportunistic and self-serving ex post facto memoirs of “statesmen,” looking for an answer to this question, in this instance as well as in others. One must fall back on the dictum that public men must be judged by their public actions, and in Churchill’s case in particular it is impossible to erase from the record a succession of mawkishly adulatory tributes to Stalin, as well as a generally favorable reaction to a postwar settlement in most of Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe in conformity with Soviet demands. His encomium to Stalin after his return to London from Yalta is particularly distressing, read today, and his multitude of “conservative” adulators prefer to wipe from the record Churchill’s Stalinophile period, in their urgent necessity to retain at least one towering figure in which they can vest their faith and verbal reflexes. (Churchill as the leader of a vast national socialist “war effort” tailored to British and not German mores is another incident such numerous folk must forget; it is indeed instructive to note how they have rigorously avoided coming to grips with such books as Francis Neilson’s The Churchill Legend and Emrys Hughes’s Winston Churchill, British Bulldog. “Liberals” have had to be depended upon to attack such efforts at balancing the picture.)

Furthermore, the Churchill-Roosevelt leadership must have been sufficiently cognizant of history to know the essentially preposterous nature of any eternal peace scheme; one can be reasonably sure that they at least understood the essence of Disraeli’s proposition
that "finality is not the language of politics." Therefore, it was deception on a scale almost beyond measurement to oversell so prodigiously the world-peace-forevermore campaign, particularly from the gathering of the Dumbarton Oaks conference down through the ratification of the Charter of the United Nations by the United States Senate.

It is customary to note, increasingly in the period since the French Revolution, the expertness with which the wartime lies and preposterous promises of the winners are mitigated or erased, if not completely forgotten by those to whom they were made. One calls to mind the dignified phrasing of the famous British politician, Lord Alfred Milner (1854-1925), of this lamentable business: "In the heat and hurry of a resort to arms, and under the natural impulse to justify so extreme a measure, much is promised which, even if intended, it is afterward found impossible to perform; and such non-performance is, within reasonable limits, readily condoned by the public opinion of mankind."5

One may conclude that an immense amount of self-delusion was indulged in also by many of the key figures engaged in this grandiose adventure, but one of them certainly was not Stalin. "Every time treaties are made concerning the realignment of forces for a new war, these treaties are called treaties of peace," the Soviet leader declared twenty years earlier. "Treaties are signed defining the elements of a future war, and always the signing of these treaties is accompanied with a lot of claptrap about peace."6 From the record, it appears that both the Russian and Anglo-American leaders were engaged in a complex double game against their own publics and each other.

4It took some while before a sophisticated propaganda appeared which was able to present, albeit in a rather specious way, the reasons why the expansionism of Germany under Hitler and of the Soviet under Stalin were of the same order. Even Dulles had not come to this conclusion in the fall of 1945. "There are always people who would like to make change in the world illegal," was the way he referred obliquely to early postwar complaints about the Reds in Europe. Dulles, op. cit., p. 3.

5This citation from Lord Milner's speeches has been publicized a number of times. Amusingly enough, it was repeated at the height of World War II by Professor Lindsay Rogers in his review of Wendell Willkie's hyperbolic One World, in which he detected the same kind of florid, impossible pie-in-the-sky Lord Milner was referring to, while at the same time attempting to save Willkie from subsequent scorn and his readers from the pangs of disillusion. Saturday Review of Literature, April 17, 1949, p. 11.

6Speech before Fourteenth Congress All-Union Communist Party, December, 1925.
In truth, action had already begun which gave the lie to these incredible maneuvers. While seeking to plant in circles of public opinion the conviction that a genially cordial entente with Stalin to supervise a warless world had been gathering in San Francisco in April, 1945, the first stages of a shooting war with Stalin were already months under way at that moment.

Though it is commonplace to date the official beginning of the Cold War with Churchill’s famous “iron curtain” speech at Fulton, Missouri in March, 1946, it began in actuality with the British efforts at preventing the Communists from overrunning Greece in November, 1944, at a moment when these two contenders were in warm agreement on other objectives. It is just another commentary on the political expediency of Churchill to see him in the forefront of the movement to elevate the Yugoslav Communist Tito to the position of a combination of Robin Hood and William Tell, at the very same moment he was committing British soldiers to frustrate Tito’s Greek Red neighbors from extending communism just beyond Yugoslav borders. One must conclude that Churchill did not object to seeing a dozen European lands go Communist under regimes subservient to Moscow, but he felt that for Greece to go, too, was excessive, as well as being a direct threat to British interests in the Mediterranean. A Communist regime breathing upon the Suez Canal and Near East oil apparently was too gruesome an apparition to imagine, though it was hardly in the imaginary stage in late 1944.

So, while the mass media and the politicians brayed of the new era of changeless, heavenly peace which was to be erected upon the mountainous rubble of Europe and Asia, the almost-ended war meshed quite effortlessly into another, as a new collision of interests emerged from the liquidation of the previous one. The world was on the verge of the next stage in what Charles A. Beard was to describe as “perpetual war for perpetual peace.”

It undoubtedly was unnecessary for Churchill to announce to the world in March, 1946, that an “iron curtain” had descended across Europe from Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic. Hundreds of publicists saw it coming down for more than two years preceding, and only a paltry handful emitted any alarming noises about it. Some of them had even used the term “iron curtain” well in advance of Churchill (for one example, among several, see Herbert L. Matthews, “What Russia Really Wants,” Collier’s [November 24, 1945], p. 74), as had the German propaganda ministry before the war ended, though this had been dismissed when
first broadcast as a crude anti-Bolshevik canard, seeking to under­
mine "the sincere unity of the Western Allies and their gallant
democratic partner in the East." One will search long and diligent­
ly in the newspaper and periodical literature of Britain and America
from late 1943 to late 1945 to find serious criticisms of this descend­
ing "curtain." Most of the more influential saw it happening, and
pronounced it good. (See, for example, the long series of approving
columns by Raymond Moley on this subject during the period men­
tioned above, in Newsweek.)

The lame and ludicrous aspect of the whole affair is the late ex­
post facto discovery that it was a mind-rending catastrophe. What
triggered this delayed recognition of reality is still obscure. Was
it the final realization by the denser part of the community that
Stalin was hardly going to allow Anglo-Franco-American interests
to regain political and economic influence in the vast area of Central
and Eastern Europe wrung from the Germans? David Lawrence's
U.S. News soberly predicted such consequences to its businessman
readers all during the last eighteen months of the war. Surely, it
was not the superficial expressions of moral horror over the exten­
sion of communism; too much had been said by the Reds' late allies
in the West to the contrary while the fighting was going on, to make
this excuse or explanation stick. Of great interest, from the point
of view of propaganda, was the spectacle of Churchill returning
to his much earlier description of Red Russia as "an enigma inside
a riddle wrapped in a mystery," one of his most famous outbursts
of colorful corn which his idolators repeatedly mistook for pro­
fundity. This clashed discordantly with his diagnoses of Stalin and
Soviet ambitions in the last two years of the war, during which times
he radiated clear understanding. This vault backward made him
appear to be a gulled dupe, but, knowing something of Churchill's
tastes and predilections, it cannot be utterly ruled out that he savored
the opportunity to continue a state of affairs in which he took great
delight and flourished while feigning political innocence and puzzle­
ment; a Newsweek portrait thirteen years earlier had borne the
title, "Churchill Revels in War and Loves a Political Rumpus."

Churchill, in seeking to make a joint Anglo-American undertaking
out of the world confrontation of communism, was indirectly telling
the world that, though he had announced at the Lord Mayor's
banquet in London in November, 1942, that he had not become His

7Newsweek (April 1, 1933), pp. 16-17.
Majesty's first minister in order to supervise the liquidation of the British Empire, in March, 1946, it was a physical impossibility to prevent it without American help. John Maynard Keynes, just before his death this same year, put it far more honestly and bluntly by declaring, "We have become a poor nation and must cut our foreign policy accordingly." Crossman put it somewhat differently but even more darkly in the same year: "Britain ended the Second World War as France ended the First—a victor, but a victor who could never afford to fight again." The declaration by Clement Attlee, Churchill's successor as prime minister in 1945, that Britain did not "fight to victory in the war only to be defeated by economics," was a shallow-pated slogan on a par with Senator Homer Ferguson's incredible dictum that war should be "above politics." The superiority of Keynes and Crossman to Attlee in judgment and acumen has been verified by the experience of over twenty years; no politicians have bailed out the English from the economic shambles the Second World War made out of Great Britain and the Empire.

Nor did teamwork with America either save the Empire or halt the advance of communism. It is one of the ironies of the maturation of the Cold War imperative into the "containment" policy, the latter so persuasively described by George Kennan in the semi-official organ of Anglo-American interventionism, *Foreign Affairs*, in the summer of 1947, that shortly after, the vast stretches of China swiftly went Maoist. In between these events Hungary and Czechoslovakia similarly underwent Communist revolutions.

Whatever the technical difficulties, the momentum of the Cold War can be seen to gain perceptibly with Churchill's turgid appeal before a Westminster College audience, barely a year after he had returned to London from Yalta to extol Stalin, his "great and good friend," and hail his probity. As far as political somersaults were concerned, in a career full of them, this was undoubtedly Churchill's "finest hour." The prompt and savage dressing-down he received from Stalin shortly after Fulton was all that was needed to close out the strange and strained opportunistic partnership which had fought to victory in World War Two, though who or what really won has been the topic of extended controversy these last twenty years. "To triumph in a struggle at the cost of one's fundamental

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8Crossman, *op. cit.*
values is the height of vulgarity—and futility,” Sidney Hook has observed. 9

What the long, impressively destructive, and alarmingly bloody war just concluded had done to the winners was only partially being realized at this moment, though well-understood by a few onlookers. As Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn put it in a long essay on the significance of the war published just about at the time of the Fulton speech, “Democratic efficiency in wartime is often nothing other than the ability to turn swiftly totalitarian and drop, in the fraction of a second, constitutional liberties”; a moral problem of great magnitude had resulted from fighting Hitlerite totalitarianism with identical methods, resulting in what he bluntly described as “the failure of the moral objectives of the Western Powers.” 10

Undoubtedly the herd enthusiasms which helped propel the dynamism of the recently-concluded war had not entirely cooled when Churchill issued his stirring call to mount for battle again in March, 1946. Since many were not inclined to consider the modest British campaign against the Communists in Greece as the first frontier of this new struggle, and with much of the aftermath of the old war not yet reconciled, there was a sluggish response to Fulton. The more ardent Stalinophiles in America and England were utterly appalled and revolted, and this sentiment vaulted across conventional political lines. Reluctance to enlist was seen from one end of the ideological spectrum to the other, from Senator Robert A. Taft and former Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy to William Z. Foster, but, as in the case of the Second World War, emotions and sentiments favorable to belligerence did not respect political lines either, and were seen to crop up in all camps. A “left”-“right” coalition favorable to a “halt the spread of communism” policy was only a few months in the making, after a shaky start. Conservative politicians, members of the business world, and prominent church dignitaries soon found themselves cheek-by-jowl with ex-Communists, Trotskyites, Menshevik Social


Democrats, Socialists, and contingents of the well-left-of-center totalitarian liberals, who had devised and produced most of the rationale behind American participation in the global bloodbath of 1941-1945. And once again this new projected combat was clothed in high moral idealism and eloquent talk, while at that very moment such protagonists labored shoulder-deep in the debris of the shattered and betrayed moral and ethical promises and commitments made so breezily and brazenly before and during the hostilities.

As the approach of World War Two found its propaganda support in extended statements, so did the Cold War. A new literature suggesting an even more profound planetary grapple appeared on the scene in a manner which almost suggested timing with Churchill's "noble address." It presented the citizenry with a more painful prospect, however. Many years had been spent convincing the community that Hitler and the Japanese represented evil of a sort exceeding Beelzebub in his worst garb. But the new propaganda called for a sudden about-face on one with whom great efforts toward "waging peace" presumably were going on simultaneously, and one who enjoyed an immense bank account of good will, thanks to the diligent sympathetic propaganda of 1941-1945.

The amazing thing is that the renversement took place as soon as it did, and with so little psychic damage to those who performed the flip-flop. It suggests that a massive underground survived throughout the war, particularly in America, which allowed the administration's pro-Soviet wartime propaganda appeals to go in one ear and out the other, and which never accepted the tale of partnership with Stalinist Russia. In England, where testament to fervent Soviet admiration was undoubtedly more genuine, the Cold War appeal gained ground far more slowly than in the United States, despite Churchill's sponsorship. Churchill's erstwhile wartime Labor Party collaborators in the war against Germany and Japan were his fiercest critics when he directed a phase of the war against the Communists. The Labor M. P. Aneurin Bevan (later minister of health and housing in the British government in 1945) called Churchill "a wholesaler of disaster" in December, 1944 for his Greek anti-Communist policy (Quentin Reynolds, "Rebel in the House," Collier's [December 29, 1945], p. 36), but one may wonder at Bevan's lack of courage and/or candor in failing to assess Churchill along similar lines in the five years before that.

A ponderous volume can be prepared on the early pro-Cold War literary propaganda alone. Some of the most widely read were
ghost-written works by recent defectees to the "West" from the Soviet Union, mainly former military and political functionaries. But there were two particularly significant works which contributed to thinking of the showdown with the Communists on the level of global strategy, William C. Bullitt's *The Great Globe Itself* (New York: Scribner, 1946), and James Burnham's *The Struggle for the World* (New York: Day, 1947). These might have supplied most of the propaganda fuel for the Cold War by themselves, had no other works along such lines ever appeared.

The response to them cut across all lines of thought in the country, and long analyses appeared, with illustrative material calculated to maximize hysteria, many of them redressing the "Hitler-is-trying-to-conquer-the-world" pronouncements in the accouterments called for by casting Stalin and the Russians in this role now. Their influence in one form or another is with us to this day. Bullitt, a prestigious diplomat during the Roosevelt era, had a "well-known pedigree as an anti-Soviet strategist; his book contained the first dress rehearsal of the rationale of "containment." It was eclipsed by that of Burnham, whose background as a Marxist scholar and Trotskyite proponent disclosed no notable previous anti-Soviet works. Burnham's *Struggle* was published and reviewed the same month President Harry S. Truman announced his government's decision to take up the British "burden" of supporting the Greek and Turkish governments (March, 1947).

Despite owing a very heavy intellectual debt to Arnold J. Toynbee and his "challenge and response" theory, Burnham's book gained wide readership and was one of the first bridges thrown across to the American left and liberal-left to aid in mobilizing them in substantial numbers in behalf of the latest political offensive. It also had an important part to play in the sharp division of left-liberal politics, since many of the latter were most remiss about abandoning their decades of championing the post-1917 dispensation in Russia.

An example may be seen in the whooping enthusiasm for the Burnham thesis of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. in his review for *The Nation* (April 5, 1947, pp. 385, 398-399), though Schlesinger shuddered a bit at the thought of Burnham as secretary of state. The editor, Freda Kirchwey, was so distressed by the eager belligerence of the reviewer that she wrote a special editorial chiding him for his excessive zeal. What the Cold War did to liberal-New Deal politics, especially after their crushing defeat in the November,
1946 congressional elections, followed by the creation of the Americans for Democratic Action, the public repudiation of American Communists, and a sharply stepped-up support for Cold War policies, especially as represented in the tactical extensions known as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan of March-June, 1947, is another story. But writers such as Burnham and converts such as Schlesinger helped direct a path over the barrier consisting of the pro-Soviet good will efforts of the war years, into the anti-Soviet Cold War camp. There they joined many other groups and elements similarly disposed, an uneasy coalition, supported by its fractions for a widely differing number of reasons. The falling-out among them in the years of the Korean War helped demonstrate the substance of Senator Arthur Vandenberg's observation, in another context, that "unshared idealism is a menace."11

There is no need to review the mountain of published and broadcast abuse of Communist Russia and its leaders in the period following Fulton. There had always been an irreducible minimum of this form of attack all during the period of maximum cordiality, ranging from the spirited polemics of the Rev. James M. Gillis in the Catholic World and the occasional ill-tempered growls in the Hearst, McCormick, and Patterson press, to the assemblage of ex-Reds, former Soviet well-wishers, and disaffected Mensheviks who were published in the American Mercury during the editorship of Eugene Lyons, or in the Social Democrat weekly New Leader. Now its steeply increased output reflected the change in policy, and found its way into every journal of any importance in the land. Undoubtedly a large part of it was true, but much of it sounded hollow, and unconvincing. It was just too much to expect the intelligent and

11Time (February 3, 1947), p. 19. Some idea may be gleaned as to how the Churchill-Truman Cold War "containment" policies scrambled American ideologies by perusing Walter Lippmann's little book, The Cold War (New York: Harper, 1947), and the slightly larger one by the former member of the House of Representatives (R., N.Y.), Hamilton Fish, The Red Plotters (New York: Domestic and Foreign Affairs, 1947). Lippmann, whose somersaults on questions of American foreign politics have established him as this country's most formidable journalistic acrobat in the twentieth century, was one of the most incandescent newspaper warriors urging this country to become a belligerent between 1939-1941. In this book, however, he attacked "containment" of Communist Russia bitterly and considered it "neither practical nor wise." Fish, one of the half-dozen best known opponents of American involvement in World War Two, though a fierce anti-Communist, attacked Truman's aid to Greece and Turkey "containment" program as "dollar imperialism." Even more incredible combinations than this may be found among the early supporters of these policies.
the critical to believe that the murderous, untrustworthy, knavish, and scurrilous propensities of the Communists were such recent discoveries; what was one to do with the millions of ardent words to the contrary spoken, many of them by the same people, in the five years prior to the Cold War? One might even agree that all the denigration and accusations were true, but at the same time it should have been admitted that those who had insisted on this all the time and had never abandoned these views deserved belated honor and vindication.

But this was rarely the case. For the most part, two separate airtight compartments were constructed; one to hold the fulsome comments on Soviet communism and its ineffable leadership during the Second World War, when these latter and the Anglo-American counterparts were pictured in grinning embraces during the alcoholic sprees which occurred at their much-publicized wartime strategy meetings, the other to contain the alleged high intelligence of the immediate postwar months, when the boundless rascality of the Reds presumably was first discovered by their chastened late "allies" and admirers. A vast majority gradually accepted this schizoid picture, affording impressive support to the comment by Sir Norman Angell, Nobel Peace Prize recipient in 1933. "Little consideration seems to have been given," wrote Sir Norman in the spring of 1946, "to the truth that men, particularly in political matters, are not guided by the facts but by their opinions about the facts."12 It was the job of the regiment of turnabout publicists to provide them with these opinions.

The most peculiar aspect of the early years of the Cold War is the sharp separation between Russian and Chinese communism. "Thirteen European capitals are in the power sphere of the U.S.S.R.," wrote Kuehnelt-Leddihn in February, 1946, and the obvious message of the Churchill call to the world was one of resistance to further spread of this "power sphere," and, if possible, its harnessing and subsequent reduction in scope. But the idea seemed to be that Communist success in China was most unlikely, if at all possible, and no political faction in the world enjoyed a better press in America in particular than Chinese communism at the moment the nation was being urged to get its back up against the Russian brand. The 1945-1947 period was the time of the maximum output of fawning fairy-tales of the Maoists as "agrarian re-

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formers." A score of outraged fulminations in book form were published in the United States by authors who raked the Chinese Nationalists for not entering into a "coalition" with the Chinese Reds, and American policy makers for not pressuring such a course upon Chiang Kai-shek. (The most influential undoubtedly was Thunder Out of China [New York: William Sloane Associates, 1946] by Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby.)

The Cold War was not extended to the Chinese Communists until they had successfully swept into power a few years after Churchill had peered at the world and found only Russia a menace to "Western civilization." Shortly thereafter, they replaced Russia as the principal antagonist. President Isaiah Bowman of Johns Hopkins University, in defining "statesmanship" in Foreign Affairs early in 1946, put down as its first characteristic, "looking ahead."13 By this criterion, the Anglo-American leaders possessed an alarmingly small amount of this quality. In fact, a good imagination is needed to give them credit for any at all.

The Cold War era may be interpreted in various ways. That it is and has been the backbone of world politics and the central political fact for the past twenty years is not in question. What it means is another matter. Actually, it has been two affairs, not one, and the most inflammatory of the two was the latest to emerge and mature. However, both struggles take turns in dominating the attention of the planet. Undoubtedly Churchill did not consider the Far East a very important problem to handle when he came forth with his proposal for a joint Anglo-American endeavor which in essence amounted to a commitment to shore up a new global status quo to replace the disintegration of 1945. In many ways this status quo has long emerged in Europe, challenged and tested by probing ventures periodically but essentially unchanged from the

13Bowman, "Strategy of Territorial Decisions," Foreign Affairs (January, 1946), p. 193. Dr. Bowman, an eminent geographer, and frequently publicized in the last fifteen months of the war as President Roosevelt's more regularly consulted adviser on such subjects, does not seem to fare very well in this department, either, in view of the furious fulminations that swept the land after the war ended, upon revelation of the territorial settlements made prior to Roosevelt's demise. The penchant for dividing countries in half is the most curious tendency observed at the end of World War II. It seems to have created enough possibilities for future wars to keep the United States engaged for many decades to come, as well as the two already involved in since 1945. These arbitrary hackings have reminded some observers of the Biblical story of Solomon and the disputed baby, except that in these latter-day cases the objects of contention were severed between the contestants with dispatch.
times the Red Army established Soviet control over the lands still referred to as "behind the iron curtain." Where the continuous threat to the status quo exists is from the area least considered a locus of disturbance in 1946. For more than fifteen years it has been the site of the only serious bloody contests aiming at such results; yet, discounting the demise of the Anglo-Franco-Dutch colonialism, even here the frontiers between the contesting Cold War sides have changed little from those prevailing after the triumph of Chinese communism in 1949.

Looked at from the point of view of geopolitics, the "free world," long led by the U.S.A., ever since the catastrophic debility of Britain became an admitted fact early in 1947, has occupied a foothold on the continent of Europe, and a handhold on the fringe lands of the periphery of Asia. These precarious perches remain to this day hardly more than American beachheads. But vast expenditures of wealth have been laid out to maintain these places, and a continuous public relations has been utilized to explain why they are maintained. There is little evidence to support the view that any substantial part of the American people favor withdrawal from these positions. And there is even less evidence that either the Russian or Chinese Communist regimes are likely to make any significant alterations in theirs. The idea of either side rolling the other back is now confined to fantasy, despite the occasional spate of colorful talk. It appears that both sides, particularly in the Western sector, have gotten adjusted to this condition. This brings up another aspect of the matter.

To what degree have the Cold War antagonists come to depend upon the continuance of this conflict as an integral part of their domestic politics? Few care to investigate this subject, but the economic and political significance to all concerned is immense. Are any of the major states implicated in the Cold War interested in seeing it end, or ready to move on to an alternative should it end? Undoubtedly this will be the beginning of another gigantic wheeling action of world politics, if it ever occurs. But as long as disequilibrium prevails in Asia, and Americans and Communists struggle to work out an Oriental status quo equivalent to that which seems relatively tranquil in Europe, there is little need to be concerned about what might follow the Cold War; there will be no significant concessions made, despite all the talk of the necessity of "negotiation." The interest conflicts of the major national states seem unlikely to diminish in intensity or scope, even should there
develop a world-wide "Yankee and Communist Both Go Home" campaign. One is left to wonder whether the division of the world and the ensuing status quo occurring during the last twenty years is to become semi-permanent, lit up occasionally by limited "hot" wars, a sort of "perpetual endemic local war to make attractive by comparison a state of fitful, halting peace," to paraphrase and elaborate upon the famous Beardian formula.

It is conventional, of course, when dealing with the Cold War in the polemical sense to blame it all on the Communists. This in turn has inspired a variety of revisionism which places the onus particularly on the United States, in view of the vastly greater proportion of American arms, personnel, and material commitments involved, especially since 1950. Churchill's part and the original British emergency which played so heavy a role at the start have almost been forgotten, as has the knockout military victory of 1945 which brought about the concentration of power and which in turn set up the confrontation that persists to this day.

An additional factor has been added to the other ingredients which go to make up the complex called the Cold War: the prodigious escalation in armaments, especially in their quality. Efforts to improve these will not stop, and here we have the most unstable aspect of the matter, if one has concluded that a largely quiet world condition has emerged from the Cold War, and that the area of conflict has now moved to other than that of the military. Therein lies the only real possibility of a future breakthrough and an essay in seeking preponderant "victory," for which we have been told many times there is no substitute. In either case, a perpetuation of the Cold War for the purpose of enjoying its limited consolations resulting from relative status quo circumstances, or a massive effort on one side or the other to win saturation victory, the prospect for freedom is obviously very dismal. Each side may go on describing the other as sinister, unprincipled rogues indefinitely, and its leaders in turn insisting that only they sincerely desire "peace." And endless, wearisome mutual accusations of "aggression" fly back and forth; the use of this exclamation becomes more reckless and indiscriminate than ever before. Yale's famous professor of international law, Edwin M. Borchard, referred to the word in 1933 as "essentially a dishonest and mischievous term calculated to mislead the unwary and the uninformed"; "Aggression is a concept

without any precise agreed content," declared John Foster Dulles in 1945; a committee of the League of Nations spent the interwar years trying to define the word without success; the U.N. has spent the same amount of time trying to do so too, and with no more success. But its employment seems to increase in direct ratio to the number of years spent in futile efforts to define it.

But few concern themselves with the consequences of the Cold War in extension for additional decades as a force converting the contesting sides into psychical and philosophical similarities. When one has "gone Communist" in the struggle against communism, when the outcome of the power struggle has been to convert the contestants each into vast totalitarian national socialist combines, the time may arrive when once more it will be pertinent to ask the question, "What price victory?"

Revisionist scholarship, with respect to the aftermath of both the World Wars of this century, had much the same object. In brief, it sought to balance the propaganda accounts of the coming of these conflicts, by demonstrating through emphasis on the part left off the record by all the belligerents, the mixed nature of the problem and the universal fact of responsibility on the part of victors and defeated alike. Revisionism also sought to stress the absence of any real success and the mutual impoverishment which totalitarian industrial war had brought to all involved, as a corrective to the more elementary nationalistic propaganda which tried to conceal the essentially pyrrhic consequences upon the nominal "winners." It had the additional objective of revealing the leaders of all the warring States as men in various states and stages of emotional and mental turmoil, compounded by misinformation and conflicting goals, all of which helped bring on the struggle which scarred them all, rather than accepting the wartime propaganda which divided these men into categories of devils and angels.

Revisionism, in short, was engaged in setting the record straight, just as Dulles, op. cit., p. 3. Dulles credited British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden with uttering these words at the San Francisco U.N. conference in April of 1945, but Dulles had said the same thing, in more blunt fashion, in a number of magazine articles between 1935 and 1938, and he had gone into detail on this subject in his book, War, Peace and Change (New York: Harper, 1939). It was quite dismaying to many with good memories to witness Dulles in the 1950's using precisely the same political terminology he had deplored in the 1930's and 1940's. (See also this writer's booklet, Meditations Upon the Early Wisdom of John Foster Dulles (Mercer Island, Washington, 1958.)
regardless of the resulting impact upon all concerned, and ground no ax in behalf of any special interest. It had to labor under such a charge, however, because anything said in extenuation of the vanquished invariably drew such accusations from “victorious” interests. Coming on the scene after the successful had already written the first version, revisionists undertook their work with such a hazard as one of the expectable risks of their literary occupation.

Revisionists after both wars produced a formidable bibliography, but the circumstances under which this production took place and its effect in both cases were remarkably dissimilar. Conditions in the world following the First World War encouraged revisionism. The evolution of the League of Nations into a Franco-British mutual insurance company, the creation of a Europe with Germany and Soviet Russia standing on its fringes as pariahs, the withdrawal of the United States to the Western Hemisphere, despite its participation in many international gatherings between the Washington conference of 1921 and the London conference of 1933, and the existence of a vast political free-for-all in Asia, all help to account for this. Such efforts as were made to promote international peace were unilateral, and no State took upon itself the job of enforcing its will over vast areas under the name of “keeping the peace,” other than the European colonial powers. On top of this, many intimate disclosures of immense consequences were made by politicians and governments which provided much material for revisionist studies. No wartime regimes survived intact anywhere, a political fact of striking significance as well; few if any efforts were made to suppress embarrassing revisionist narratives which cast serious reflections upon individuals and wartime governments with cheerful equanimity. Defenders of the orthodox and official stories there were aplenty, of course, but they enjoyed no monopoly anywhere; actually, between 1920 and about 1937, official accounts which tended to shore up the wartime propaganda were under steady discount. Mass circulation media devoted generous space to revisionism and the revisionist outlook, the result being that even national policy was influenced by it, at least in part. Even the frequent international conferences which dealt with such subjects as war debts, disarmament, reparations, conflicts of interest, and proposals for peace reflected to a degree the influence of the impartiality of revisionism.

The breakdown of international sanity and the coming of a longer, bigger, and much more destructive war is a story which is outside
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the scope of this analysis. The main concern is with what this latter war and its continuance in another form had to do with twisting the nature of revisionism and choking its influence. The Second World War never really ended; twenty years after the cessation of gunfire, its principal issues had not been settled to the satisfaction of anyone. But the most significant difference between this war aftermath and that of the First World War was the almost immediate outbreak of a planetary political war among the parties which had fought to “victory,” a war with occasional martial phases which never were allowed to escape local confinement. This struggle of maneuver and world strategy has long been known as the Cold War, and it has been the central political fact in international affairs for two decades.

With the winners of the Second World War divided into the two camps comprising the Cold War antagonists, a political situation confronted revisionism utterly unlike that which followed the struggle which ended in 1918. Despite their seeming mutual hostility, there was no interest on either side in having the origins of the war questioned and any kind of detached history coming out of such investigation. The foundation of the Cold War was the mutual propagandas of the now-divided winners of the previous cataclysm. In the “free world” and “iron curtain” sectors everywhere, a variety of synthetic political “revolutions” were carried out swiftly after hostilities were suspended in 1945. The overthrown regimes were exterminated physically, either by outright execution programs, or through the fantastic “war crimes trials” morality pageants. Then the victors rapidly assembled local regimes amenable to occupation by their conquerors, and a massive new propaganda came into existence in both areas to describe these new puppet states as the fruit of “liberation.”

In view of this, it was absolutely essential that nothing be done to undermine these new ersatz political organizations, and this meant that the forces which were responsible for their existence were not to be seriously discommoded by historical research, especially if this research undermined the total depravity doctrine of the overthrown forces as was maintained with scrupulous agreement by the now quarreling “victors.” Therefore, revisionism enjoyed a maximum lack of welcome everywhere. It undermined the entire fabric of postwar politics.

In essence, though seemingly a profound conflict, the Cold War really functioned as a structure to make effective a new status quo
replacing that which was wrecked in the second World War. This was and is the reality underneath the rival propagandas. Despite the many years of frightful threats, menacing gestures, and belligerent talk, there is still no solid, convincing evidence that either side seriously wishes to see a fundamental showdown to demolish this now-twenty-year-old status quo.

But the Cold War has been a wonderful weapon to use against one's own public. Both sides have been able to cite the opposition in trembling tones as reason and excuse for increasingly massive political interference in all manner of areas from economic life to the field of movement and expression on the part of their citizenry. New taxes for immense military construction are made palatable by suggesting the horrendous consequences of failing to keep up with similar enemy expansion. A host of other forms of genteel blackmail are made possible by this division of the political world into two staggering collections of power; but one of the undeclared objectives surely is the suppression of unilateral action on the part of subordinate constituents on both sides. One has only to notice the resentment on the part of the rival leaderships when one of their stable shows signs of vacating the corral.

Americans have been particularly vulnerable to a Cold War propaganda which has maintained that it has been an effective device for "containing" communism. Nobody knows whether this means the expansionist ambitions of Soviet Russia or collectivism as a way of life. There is evidence that in neither case has there been any remarkable achievement, least of all in the case of the latter. The United States has been as effective in exporting collectivism with its massive government aid programs as one might expect of its collectivist enemies operating unhampered. Going socialist to avoid going communist has been advanced to the position of an imperative. Its equivalent has been described as the avoidance of murder by committing suicide via self-dosage with periodic limited amounts of poison.

Revisionism has not only been blunted by the political dispensation of the world-saturation Cold War but also by the effect of this war upon its own people. A respectable fraction of revisionists has been distracted into support of the Cold War, and thus has lost the initiative which their discipline involves in remaining detached and insisting on straightening the record, regardless of its effect. Emotional commitment to the goals of one side or another of the Cold War seriously weakens the impact of the work of any revision-
ist, and makes it that much more difficult to fight through the thick screens of evasions and half-truths which are prominent in the output of the Cold War rivals. One ends up seduced into accepting their version of world history this last quarter of a century; on this the Cold War antagonists have little to quarrel about.

The existence of a limited hot war in the Far East does not undermine this analysis. There the lines of the status quo have not settled, and no one can predict when this will occur. As in Europe, where the United States is still engaged in a maneuver with Soviet Russia seeking to reach a satisfactory boundary between their respective German satellite enclaves, a similar operation goes on with Red China attempting to set limits to that country's operable confines. It is preposterous to support for a moment the notion that these immense power conglomerations seriously seek to undertake each other's demise. The overriding consideration facing all three constituents of the Cold War is the suppression by the most efficient and effective means of any force or tendency which endangers the relatively stable status quo, whether these involve the ambitions and efforts of Germans, Poles, Yugoslavs, French, Japanese, Chinese Nationalists, Israeli, Arabs, Africans, Pakistan, or Hindustani. The rather formalistic, cut-and-dried fulminations of the Russians, Red Chinese, and Americans take place in a very sedate and predictable environment. One sees to the core of the problem, however, whenever someone not of this precious club of three begins to muddy the international political stream. The near hysteria that promptly breaks out among them and in the United Nations soapbox center is all one needs to observe. Immediately they begin scurrying about, with at least two showing signs of advanced prostration at the prospect of the status quo being ruptured by violence which has not been condoned by the Cold Warriors. While agents of the U.S. and Red China murder each other in the swamps of Southeast Asia, or while agents of the U.S. and Soviet Russia pot each other on the beaches and approaches of Cuba or in downtown San Domingo, they all find time to cluck disapprovingly of similar homicidal festivities in Kashmir or in various places in Africa or the Gaza Strip or the Israel-Syria frontier by purely local forces. The Cold Warriors demand a monopoly of violence, that "peace" may not be "endangered." Nothing has done more to emphasize this than the famous July 14, 1965 letter of the late U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai E. Stevenson. Stevenson not only frankly outlined the status quo quest thesis, but went on to describe its
final achievement, East and West, as the jumping-off point for subsequent teamwork between the two adversaries toward the realization of the many-millennia mirage-dream, the World State.*

The Cold War has done more to hobble revisionism than all other influences and forces combined.** It is for this reason that revisionism, if it is to have any significance henceforth, must not only become involved more deeply in investigations of how the world went to war again in 1939-1941 and what really went on during that war, but also devote increasing attention to the Cold War and illuminate its spurious and artificial origins and dimensions.

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*Stevenson's recommended policies: "The first is to establish a tacitly agreed frontier between the Communist and non-Communist areas of influence on the understanding that neither power system will use force to change the status quo. . . . The second is to move from this position of precarious stability toward agreed international procedures for settling differences, toward the building of an international juridical and policing system, and toward a whole variety of policies designed to turn our small, vulnerable planet into a genuine economic and social community." Stevenson went even further in comparing the degree of status quo between the "free world" and the Russians and Chinese: "The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 may have convinced the Russian leaders that interventions . . . beyond the tacit frontier of the two worlds are in fact too costly and dangerous. We have no such line with the Chinese." (Quotations from Stevenson letter as published in National Observer, December 20, 1965, p. 2.)

**One will concede the immense importance of Germanophobic influences in the book, magazine, newspaper, stage, radio, moving picture, and television industries, but they relate to just part of the total picture. Obviously, they help shore up Russian, Polish, and Czech Communist politics and make support for any proper settlement of German territorial and property claims and national reunification of Germany extremely unlikely. But the influences of Germanophobia have little or nothing to do with the Asiatic phase of the Cold War, certainly the vastly more important sector of this phenomenon for over fifteen years, where tens of thousands of Americans have died and billions of American dollars have been wasted trying to repair the colossal folly of wrecking Japan as a factor in Asian affairs, in behalf of a European colonialism that went down anyway. The cover-up for this Far Eastern fiasco since before the Korean War has involved far more extensive though different repressions of revisionism, because of the more dynamic nature of the situation.

Also, more investigation is needed into another aspect of mass-communications Germanophobia, which is overwhelmingly based on atrocity themes. To what extent is this a response by the producers to an extensive market provided by sadists and psychopaths, criminal and otherwise, who have almost no understanding of nor interest in the historical aspects, but who gobble up the substance of such literature and spectacles, for utterly different but obvious reasons?
APPENDIX I

J. M. Keynes’s Famous Foreword to the 1936 German Edition of the General Theory

Introduction

Historians write about economics with a fearful and trembling hand, but economists brashly and cheerfully tackle historical enterprises as if they enjoyed some special commissioned prerogative. What follows this brief introductory material is not an expository essay but a document for all to examine, economists, historians, and the general reader alike. It may be of some embarrassment to both Keynesian and anti-Keynesian partisans, to both those who have never known of this subject and those who have known of it but who have been inhibited by psychic pressures, ranging all the way from an exaggerated sense of delicacy to intellectual cowardice, from ever saying anything about it.

One can read whole reams of economic literature written by both fervent followers of John Maynard Keynes and his attackers as well and never know that there was a German language edition of his profoundly influential General Theory late in 1936, for which Keynes wrote a special foreword addressed solely to German readers. By that time the National Socialist regime of Adolf Hitler was four months short of four years in power in Germany. Even the perfumed and sanctified Life of John Maynard Keynes by R. H. Harrod, a book going on to almost 700 pages, never even faintly alludes to the fact that Keynes had a German publisher, nor that the General Theory appeared in Hitler Germany a few months after it was published by Macmillan in England in 1936. (Keynes’s foreword to the English edition was dated December 13, 1935.) Perhaps it would have thrown readers offstride for Harrod to discuss such a matter.
since his book was published in the heat of the immediate post-World War Two years, appearing in 1951. But incongruous and ill-fitting matters such as this are almost always left out of romantic and poetic essays passing as biography. Two prestigious English economic periodicals, the *Economic Journal* and *The Economist*, with meticulous coverage of European and world economic affairs, failed to make any reference to a German edition when they reviewed Keynes's *tour de force*, nor did subsequent issues in the immediately following years, as far as I have been able to determine. In recent years only Henry Hazlitt has called attention to this important matter.

Some economic scribblers hostile to Keynes want too much to attack him personally as if he created the modern state, but appear to be most hesitant about challenging the state themselves. Keynes did not create the modern state. He found it the way it is, and, obviously, from the context of his German foreword, prepared a scheme or system to work within its confines; the greater and more total the state employment of his *General Theory*, the better. The core of Keynes is found in two consecutive sentences in the German foreword: "The theory of aggregate production, which is the point of the following book, nevertheless can be much easier adapted to the conditions of a totalitarian state than the theory of production and distribution of a given production put forth under conditions of free competition and a large degree of laissez-faire. This is one of the reasons that justifies the fact that I call my theory a general theory."*

We are deep in an age of scriptural exegetics devoted to Keynes and a plethora of what-Keynes-really-meant glosses akin to the tidal wave of similar print which deluged us on Marx in the 1930's. But it ought to be interesting to see what kind of sinuous evasion must be employed to discount the very clear testament involved in this declaration by the Master.** The main purpose for this publication

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** In a letter to Sir Percival Liesching of the British Board of Trade dated October 8, 1943, Keynes also made the following clear and unequivocal declarations: "Thank you for your note on state trading. If in this matter you leave loop-holes in your scheme, it will not upset me. Indeed, the more loop-holes you leave the wiser you will be in my opinion. "As you know, I am, I am afraid, a hopeless sceptic about this return to nineteenth century laissez faire, for which you and the U.S. State Department seem to have such a nostalgia."
is to make it available to students of all persuasions and to general readers who might have an interest in original documentation, for a change. The original German text is included to aid those who wish to make a careful examination of their own.

"I believe the future lies with—
"(i) State trading for commodities;
"(ii) International cartels for necessary manufactures; and
"(iii) Quantitive import restrictions for non-essential manufactures. 
"Yet all these future instrumentalities for orderly economic life in the future you seek to outlaw."

This letter was quoted by Harrod, for reasons which are hard to fathom. In fact, his effort to extricate Keynes from his position and to assert that the latter underwent a fundamental and total conversion to a position contradictory to the views expressed here is quite unconvincing.
VORWORT ZUR DEUTSCHEN AUSGABE


Ich kann mir aber vorstellen, daß all dies die deutschen Leser etwas verschieden berühren mag. Die orthodoxe Überlieferung, die im England des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts herrschte, hat nie eine so starke Macht auf das deutsche Denken ausgeübt. In Deutschland hat es immer wichtige Wirtschaftsschulen gegeben, die die Zulänglichkeit der klassischen Theorie für die Analyse zeitgenössischer Ereignisse stark in Frage gestellt haben. Sowohl die Manchester-Schule wie der Marxismus
Foreword to the German Edition

Alfred Marshall, on whose Principles of Economics the education of all contemporary English economists has been based, took particular pains to call special attention to the relationship of his thought to that of Ricardo. His work consisted for the most part in stuffing the law of limited use [Grenznutzen] and the law of substitution into the Ricardo tradition, and his theory of production and of consumption as a whole—contrary to his theory of producing and distributing a given production—has never been laid open. I am not certain whether he himself ever perceived the need for such a theory. But his immediate successors and disciples surely have abandoned it and evidently never perceived its absence. I was educated in this atmosphere. I have taught these doctrines myself and it was only in the course of the last decade that I became aware of their inadequacy. In my own thought and development, this book, therefore, presents a reaction, a transition and a disengagement from the classical English (or orthodox) tradition. How I have stressed this and the points in which I deviate from the recognized doctrine has been regarded by certain circles in England as extremely controversial. But how could someone educated in English economic orthodoxy, who was even once a priest of that faith, avoid some controversial emphasis, if he becomes a protestant for the first time?

I can, however, imagine that all this may concern the German readers somewhat differently. The orthodox tradition which reigned in the England of the 19th century never had such a strong influence on German thought. In Germany there have always been important schools of economics which strongly questioned the adequacy of classical theory for the analysis of contemporary events. The Manchester School as well as Marxism, have, after all, stemmed from

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1[The expert assistance of Robert H. Beebe and Mabel E. Narjes in the preparation of this translation is gratefully acknowledged. The German text is reproduced with the express permission of the publisher, Duncker & Humblot (Berlin and Munich), from whom a 1955 edition of Allgemeine Theorie der Beschäftigung, des Zinssned des Geldes containing this foreword may still be obtained. The full extent of the circulation of the German edition will probably never be
stammen letzten Endes von Ricardo ab — eine Folgerung, die nur bei oberflächlicher Betrachtung zu überraschen braucht. Aber in Deutschland hat es immer einen großen Teil der Meinung gegeben, der weder zur einen noch zur anderen Schule gehalten hat.

Es kann jedoch kaum behauptet werden, daß diese Gedankenschule einen gegnerischen theoretischen Aufbau errichtet hat oder auch nur versucht hat, dies zu tun. Sie ist skeptisch, realistisch gewesen, zufrieden mit historischen und empirischen Methoden und Ergebnissen, die eine formelle Analyse verwerfen. Die wichtigste unorthodoxe Erörterung auf theoretischer Ebene war jene von Wicksell. Seine Bücher waren in deutscher Sprache erhältlich (was sie bis vor kurzem im Englischen nicht waren); eines seiner wichtigsten war in der Tat in deutscher Sprache geschrieben. Seine Nachfolger aber waren hauptsächlich Schweden und Österreicher; die letzteren verbanden seine Ideen mit wesentlich österreichischer Theorie und brachten sie so in Wirklichkeit zur klassischen Überlieferung zurück. Deutschland hat sich somit, im Gegensatz zu seiner Gewohnheit in den meisten Wissenschaften, während eines ganzen Jahrhunderts damit begnügt, ohne eine vorherrschende und allgemein anerkannte formelle Theorie der Wirtschaftslehre auszukommen.


Trotzdem kann die Theorie der Produktion als Ganzes, die den Zweck des folgenden Buches bildet, viel leichter den Verhältnissen
Ricardo—a conclusion that need cause surprise only when super­
fectly considered. But in Germany there has always been a majority
of opinion which adhered neither to one school nor the other.

However, it can hardly be contended that this school of thought
ever established a theoretical counter-structure, nor did it ever
attempt to do this. It has been skeptical and realistic, satisfied with
historical and empirical methods and results which reject a formal
analysis. The most important unorthodox discussion on the theoreti­
cal level has been that of Wicksell. His books (until recently not
available in English) were available in the German language; one
of his most important was in fact written in German. His successors,
however, were mainly Swedes and Austrians; the latter linked his
ideas in with a substantially Austrian theory, and thus in reality
actually brought them back to the classical tradition. Germany thus
has—in contrast to her custom in most fields of science—contented
herself for a whole century without a dominant and generally rec­
ognized formal theory of economics.

I may, therefore, perhaps expect to meet with less resistance on
the part of German readers than from English, when I submit to
them a theory of employment and production as a whole which
deviates in important particulars from the orthodox tradition. But
could I hope to overcome the economic agnosticism of Germany?
Could I convince German economists that methods of formal
analysis constitute an important contribution to the interpretation
of contemporary events and to the shaping of contemporary policy?
It is, after all, a feature of German character to find satisfaction in a
theory. How hungry and thirsty German economists must feel hav­
ing lived all these years without one! It is certainly worthwhile for
me to make the effort. And if I can contribute a single morsel to a
full meal prepared by German economists, particularly adjusted to
German conditions, I will be satisfied. For I must confess that much
in the following book has been mainly set forth and illustrated in
relation to conditions in the Anglo-Saxon countries.

The theory of aggregate production, which is the point of the
following book, nevertheless can be much easier adapted to the

[known. According to a letter from the publisher of November 4, 1966, figures
on the distribution between 1936 and 1945 are missing because all pertinent
documents were destroyed during the war. An edition of 1,000 copies
was printed in 1952, and one of 2,000 copies in 1955, with another printing
of 2,000 copies to appear in 1967.]
eines totalen Staates angepaßt werden als die Theorie der Erzeugung
und Verteilung einer gegebenen, unter Bedingungen des freien Wett-
bewerbs und eines großen Maßes von laissez-faire erstellten Produktion.
Das ist einer der Gründe, die es rechtfertigen, daß ich meine Theorie
eine allgemeine Theorie nenne. Da sie sich auf weniger enge Voraus-
setzungen stützt als die orthodoxe Theorie, läßt sie sich um so leichter
einem weiten Feld verschiedener Verhältnisse anpassen. Obschon ich
sie also mit dem Blick auf die in den angelsächsischen Ländern geltenden
Verhältnisse ausgearbeitet habe, wo immer noch ein großes Maß von
laissez-faire vorherrscht, bleibt sie dennoch auf Zustände anwendbar,
in denen die staatliche Führung ausgeprägter ist. Denn die Theorie der
psychologischen Gesetze, die den Verbrauch und die Ersparnis mit-
einander in Beziehung bringen; der Einfluß von Anleiheausgaben auf
Preise und Reallohne; die Rolle, die der Zinsfuß spielt — alle diese
Grundgedanken bleiben auch unter solchen Bedingungen notwendige
Bestandteile in unserem Gedankenplan.

Ich möchte bei dieser Gelegenheit meinem Übersetzer, Herrn Waeger,
danken für seine vorzügliche Leistung (ich hoffe, daß sich sein Voka-
bularium am Ende dieses Buches über seinen unmittelbaren Zweck
hinaus als nützlich erweisen wird), sowie meinen Verlegern, den Herren
Duncker & Humblot, deren Unternehmungsgeist seit den Tagen, als
sie vor nun sechzehn Jahren meine Wirtschaftlichen Folgen des Friedens-
vertrages veröffentlichten, mir ermöglicht hat, die Führung mit den
deutschen Lesern aufrecht zu erhalten.

7. September 1936.

J. M. KEYNES
conditions of a totalitarian state [eines totalen Staates] than the theory of production and distribution of a given production put forth under conditions of free competition and a large degree of laissez-faire. This is one of the reasons that justifies the fact that I call my theory a general theory. Since it is based on fewer hypotheses than the orthodox theory, it can accommodate itself all the easier to a wider field of varying conditions. Although I have, after all, worked it out with a view to the conditions prevailing in the Anglo-Saxon countries where a large degree of laissez-faire still prevails, nevertheless it remains applicable to situations in which state management is more pronounced. For the theory of psychological laws which bring consumption and saving into relationship with each other, the influence of loan expenditures on prices, and real wages, the role played by the rate of interest—all these basic ideas also remain under such conditions necessary parts of our plan of thought.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank my translator, Mr. Waeger, for his excellent effort (I hope that his vocabulary at the end of this book will prove useful beyond its immediate purpose), as well as my publishers, Messrs. Duncker & Humblot, whose enterprising spirit ever since the days sixteen years ago when they published my Economic Consequences of the Peace\(^2\) has made it possible for me to maintain my contact with German readers.

7 September 1936

J. M. KEYNES

\(^2\)[The English language edition of this book was published in the United States by Harcourt, Brace (New York) in 1920 under this title.]
APPENDIX II

Meditations Upon the Early Wisdom of John Foster Dulles

A short time before the outbreak of World War Two in September, 1939, the respected publishing house of Harper brought out a volume written by John Foster Dulles, titled War, Peace and Change. It received a kind and approving reception from most of the reviewers, with copious quotation from some of its more striking sections bearing on the crisis of world politics at that moment. But it won no Pulitzer Prize, nor is there much evidence that more than a handful of the multitudes who were crowding into the motion picture houses to see the contemporary Academy-Award-winning film "Gone With The Wind" ever heard of it, let alone knowing who its author was. But it apparently had its share of readers, since it went into two editions.

Be that as it may, Mr. Dulles was at the moment as well-known in the higher echelons of law, politics and finance as he was little-known to the celebrated American Man-On-The-Street. His public record already stretched back two decades, to the time he had been counsel to the American Peace Commission at Versailles, and subsequently a member of the Reparations Commission in 1919. At the time his book was published he was senior member of the famed Wall Street law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, an establishment which was to serve later on as the launching platform for the public career of Dean Acheson as well. His repute as an expert in international law and as a trustee of numerous foundations was already widely known. Hence, general ignorance of the author of this book did not square with his already considerable fame among the highly-placed, a situation which has become a consolation to many public figures. (One may recall for instance the staggeringly high proportion of a Gallup Poll group while the Korean war was in progress which did not even know who Mr. Acheson, then Secretary of State, was, or what he did in public life.)
Among the enthusiastic reviewers of *War, Peace and Change* was the many-times Socialist candidate for the Presidency, Norman Thomas. In a loud call of praise in the September 1939 issue of the extremely alert liberal monthly *Common Sense* (a journal no longer being published) Mr. Thomas declared that it was a valuable and useful book for furthering an understanding of the crisis of the time. Included in the kind observations of the noted reviewer were the following: “Emphatically he is not one of the chorus of those who cry for an irresponsible collective security, having learned nothing from Wilsonianism except to repeat its worst mistakes,” and “He recognizes that change is the law of life in the relations of nations, that it cannot be blocked forever by treaties or agreements, and that no provision against war is sound which does not permit change.” Especially commendatory in Thomas’ view was Dulles’ “magnificent job in considering the role of mass emotions and their relation to the personified entities, the Nation-Hero-Benefactor and the Nation-Villain.”

What Thomas and others did not recall or consider worthy of mention, perhaps, was the fact that the main themes of this book had been part of the author’s intellectual apparatus for quite a time before publication, and were not a hasty hash of ill-considered opinions issued on the spur of the moment to capitalize on the immediate situation, as is frequently seen when the well-known write about a complex current problem. Furthermore, a number of these themes had already been loosed in trial-balloon fashion under his name. The first of these ascensions was a substantial article in the September 1935 issue of the *Atlantic Monthly*, titled “The Road to Peace,” a second in the April 23, 1938 issue of *The Nation*, as part of a famous symposium, “A Foreign Policy For America,” when he had been identified for the readers as “a prominent liberal” and “Expert on International Law and Finance.” An examination of these highly interesting views is particularly in order in view of the eminence of their author today, and his immensely important contemporary position.

Both of Mr. Dulles’ articles were published at the time of ominous events abroad: the *Atlantic* piece at the time Mussolini’s legions were beginning Italy’s adventure in African colonial expansion with their assault on Ethiopia; the *Nation* contribution shortly after the occasion of Hitler Germany’s spectacular Anschluss with Austria. The American press resounded with agitated calls on these occasions from numerous emotional adherents to a world order frozen into the shape of 1919. A battalion of American Anglo- and Francophiles shouted their dis-
pleasure and urged all manner of desperate acts to forestall these changes in the world's maps. These people were exceeded in zeal only by the slightly louder contingent whose devotion to the welfare of Communist Russia occupied first place in their hearts.

A great season of disquiet was in full progress the world over during these times. Not only were Germany and Italy aiming at producing substantial adjustments in the settlements of 1918-1921, but two great civil wars were raging in Spain and China, both with far-reaching international complications and consequences. Italy, Germany and Russia had all intervened in the former, while the latter featured a war-within-a-war. The nominal enemy of China since 1931, Japan, also engaged in fundamental map-redrawing in Asia, was at grips with Soviet Russia as well, with whom the Japanese fought some 2400 border “incidents” in the Manchuria-Siberia sector by 1939. The civil war part here was being supplied by Soviet Russia's Communist Chinese partners, long in control of a considerable portion of China since before 1935, who were as much at war with their Chinese Nationalist adversaries as they were with Japan, the ostensible “invader.”

In truth, the war season had never stopped in 1918, despite the League of Nations, the World Court, the Briand-Kellogg Pact, and half a dozen dramatic major international treaty agreements. Propagandists shouting “Hitler threatens the peace” in 1938 should have been asked, “What peace?”, in view of the fact that in the two decades after the Armistice of 1918 there had been on the average slightly better than a war a year somewhere in the world. In the absence of a workable peaceful alternative for the reconciling of conflicting claims and ambitions, war was still the Great Adjustor.

But this did not diminish the religious faith of those who felt that the refurbishing of “collective security” via the League of Nations was the one viable policy to produce peace, and no amount of failure in this had any significant effect in dampening their enthusiasm. Actually, after Communist Russia had been admitted to the League in September, 1934, the collective security contingent gained a formidable protagonist, at least for five years. The machinery of the world Communist movement had swung behind the endless shrilling for “collective security” (the favorite Communist slogan, let loose by Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov, was “peace is indivisible”) with gusto, as Russia went about its task of converting the League for the time being into a Communist front and preparing alternative policies to deal with the resurgent Germans, depending on what direction events proceeded. But,
superficially, the bulk of the burden of reassuring the virtues of the
League of Nations' collective security provisions (Bruce Bliven, editor
of the New Republic and a vigorous opponent, preferred the term "col-
lective insecurity" in those times) was being borne by the nominal
beneficiaries and majority stockholders, so to speak, England and
France, whose hope of using it as a barrier to the changing of the im-
possible world of 1919 still ran high.

In America, however, the urge to join this diplomatic construct built
in the spirit of Andrew Maginot was at its lowest ebb in the years when
Mr. Dulles' first article appeared, and not much change had occurred
by the time the second was published, despite the ominous adminis-
trative shift of foreign policy footing by the President, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, as a consequence of his Chicago speech of October 5, 1937,
giving the issue a slightly different hue. The case in opposition was
never put in better form by anyone than by Dulles, who essayed as an
analyst and prescriber of realistic attitudes from an aloof vantage point
where his detachment was quite obvious.

Said Dulles in 1935:

The most deep-rooted instinct is the instinct to relinquish only when
compelled to do so. Thus, in the field of international affairs, change
and force are largely synonymous. History shows that it is force, or
the threat of force, which principally accounts for the evolution of the
world to its present state.

According to him, the "inevitability of change" was a "fundamental
fact" which had to serve as the starting point of any realistic discussion
of plans for peace, which later had to be amplified by the awareness
that "we must recognize that force, actual or potential, has historically
proved to be the only mechanism which can be relied on to effect
international changes."

The main objection Dulles apparently had to all the talk about
"peace" in that year was the unwillingness to face up to these chilling
realities, plus "the present lack of any adequate substitute for force
as an inducement to change." He was utterly dissatisfied with the
League and all the ponderous paraphernalia which had been erected
to promote peace since 1918. "The postwar peace efforts have, as we
have seen, been uniformly based upon the projection of the present
into the future. It is always the existing status which is to be preserved.
It almost seems as though force were sought to be abolished because
of its being the historic mechanism for change and in the hope that, if it could be abolished, changes would no longer occur.”

He then went into a merciless dissection of the language of the peacetakers cum-status-quo protectors in a most unflattering manner:

It is easy to explain the confounding of peace with stability. Those whose lives fall in pleasant places contemplate with equanimity an indefinite continuation of their present state. “Peace” means to them that they should be left undisturbed. “Aggression” becomes the capital international crime and “security” the watchword. The popular demand for peace is thus capitalized by those who selfishly seek to have the world continue as it is. Knowing that change is inevitable, they nevertheless seek to postpone it by identifying “peace” with the existing status and rallying to its perpetuation the forces that are opposed to war.

This must have been like cold water thrown upon the verbiage of the burgeoning “Popular Front” movement then being pushed vigorously by some of America’s nearly 300 Communist-front “innocent clubs,” as the German Communist politician Willi Muenzenberg had once so aptly dubbed them. (The interested should also consult the article by the one time Daily Worker editor Clarence A. Hathaway, “On the Use of ‘Transmission Belts’ in Our Struggle for the Masses,” in The Communist, May, 1931, pp. 409-423). There was no doubt that the Communists had a world to protect from change in 1935, just as much as they had a projected world to gain.* But it must have been just as chill comfort for the growing chorus of shouters for the Anglo-French-inspired League of Nations “sanctions” against Italy to read Dulles’ words. The users of this softboiled circumlocution for the grim reality of economic warfare were prominent among the manipulators of the “good” words Dulles exposed to derision and skepticism.

Dulles looked out upon the disintegrating world of Versailles, and felt no need to display any profound agitation or apprehension; the behavior of both the contented and the dissatisfied was fully understandable to him:

It is not mere coincidence that it is the presently favored nations—

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*Especially vociferous in this campaign of championing the cause of Russia in the United States was the Communist-saturated “American League Against War and Fascism,” in actuality an organization dedicated to promoting a world-wide war against “Fascism,” meaning Russia’s German, Italian and Japanese antagonists, and whose monthly magazine was significantly titled The Fight.
France, Great Britain and the United States—whose governments have been most active in devising plans for perpetual peace. If other countries like Germany, Japan, and Italy, adhere only reluctantly if at all to such projects, it is not because these nations are inherently warlike or bloodthirsty. They too want peace, but they undoubtedly feel within themselves potentialities which are repressed and they desire to keep open the avenues of change. They appraise the “peace” plans presented to them as schemes to eliminate the only effective mechanism of change.

Here Dulles was launching into a towering heresy, since Anglo-Franco-American public communication, with a generous push from the Communist propaganda machine (which Dulles now and later seriously under-rated as a force pushing for “war through peace” talk), had already spent the better part of the previous five years implanting the firm conviction of “good,” and “bad,” “war-like,” and “peace-loving” nations in the public mind. (One may recall with irony the famous speech of the then Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944, in which he monotonously repeated the “peace-loving nations” slogan and sounded much like a Communist editorial of ten years earlier, although the nations which he meant the term to be applied to had been involved in approximately five times as many wars as his juxtaposed “warlike” states of the moment).

Yet Dulles did not flinch from boldly denying the validity of personifying nations, the ancient escape hatch of all those seeking to avoid dealing with conflicts of interest by begging the question. In addition, the futility and fatuousness and the cross-sterilizing effects of all the plans for promoting peace since 1918 caused him to express no amazement or wonderment; one had simply to observe their sponsors: “Since it is the powerful, self-satisfied nations which exercise the initiative in international affairs, it is not surprising that there has not been put forward any major programme which seeks peace through the framework of change.”

It was all very well for the proponents of the status quo to suggest analogies between the internal government of a given nation and a hypothetical world government serving the same function in the international community, the Great Liberal Mirage which had persisted for centuries. Dulles simply stated that there was no such organ in existence, and the international insurance company with headquarters located in Geneva was far from being even an approximation of this planetary policeman:
When we turn to the community of nations, we find no superstate qualified to repress war and to order a state of affairs such that international changes can occur without the pressure of force by one member upon another. In international law, each state is sovereign. Its status is fixed by treaties which generally run in perpetuity. No changes can be made without the consent of all parties. Such unanimous consent is rare, since nations, like individuals, are not prone to recognize their own decline, or the increased merits or needs of others, and voluntarily make abatements accordingly.

Not only did Dulles think the pretensions to world regulation and policing as seen in the functioning of the League were futile; he was quite emphatic in his belief that patching it up and shoring its shaky foundations were bound to be just as futile. In quite frank manner he chose to doubt the effectiveness of all such collective police efforts, and concluded that it was better to abandon them once and for all in a world of national entities, since he was convinced of the superior efficacy of direct negotiation between conflicting powers:

So long as the world is organized along national lines, it is, I think, impracticable to attain peace through the establishment of an international tribunal empowered to dictate momentous changes. There is certainly a useful role for mediation. But it is a natural instinct to resent third-party interference. Important changes can usually be best effected through the direct interplay of opposing tendencies.

Such a statement left little doubt in anyone's mind that Dulles had anything but the most restrained admiration for the Geneva forum, or anything in its image at some other time, as an arena in which to conduct the 'interplay' of rival national claims; in 1935, he obviously preferred none at all as an alternative to direct negotiations between the interested parties to a dispute.

As for the number of peace schemes of varying degrees of ingeniousness which enjoyed fluctuating amounts of favor at the time, Dulles had a blunt and direct proposition to advance as a test of their probable honesty and workability:

Peace plans, if they are to be effective, must be constructed so as to take into account these two fundamental facts—namely, the inevitability of change, and the present lack of any adequate substitute for force as an inducement to change. Every peace project should be tested by this inquiry; if its pledges are scrupulously and honorably
observed, will there exist any adequate means to assure for the future change comparable to those which history has shown to be both inevitable and desirable in the past? Unless this inquiry can be answered in the affirmative, the project will fail. It will, indeed, be actually provocative of war.

Dulles' contribution to the Nation symposium in the spring of 1938, which included William H. Kilpatrick, Morris Ernst, George Fort Milton and President James P. Baxter of Williams College, revealed that he had not changed his basic position an iota; in fact, he was now even more emphatic in his conviction, although he displayed evidence of sensitiveness toward the word "isolation." This India-rubber word had acquired a sinister stipulative definition in the parlance of a vociferous and highly articulate group of liberals, as well as many Communists, who had been preparing the public in the years since 1934 for eventual participation on an active basis in the world conflict. One of their major objectives was the discrediting of those who frowned on collective security agreements and who sought to keep the interests of the United States clearly in mind in all international actions as "isolationists." Even Dulles showed that he had become mildly intimidated by the ugliness of this attack, although he was utterly unimpressed by the newer frenetic "peace" propaganda talk, and the frown of 1935 toward it had deepened, if anything. He still considered this talk of peace through "sanctions" and defiant gestures as unwise and dangerous. He did not mention the folly of thinking that one's antagonists were cowards and could easily be bluffed by belligerent posturings; of greater concern was the fact that no one was talking the language of simultaneous adjustments of grievances through non-violent change, and he was sure peace would not be reached in any other way:

Human history is the record of constant struggle between the dynamic and the static—the urge to acquire and the desire to retain. Force, actual or implicit, is the primitive recourse of dynamic elements. It is their inevitable recourse unless there is provided some social order which adequately permits of peaceful change. But if peace be equated with the indefinite perpetuation of an existing status, then peace will never be achieved.

The annexation of Austria by Germany just six weeks before this was published was a dramatic underscoring of Dulles' main point concerning the persistent absence of any machinery for the facilitating of
peaceful change. He ignored the Anschluss deliberately, it seems, to heighten the abstract effect of his argument, even though he was writing in a journal which had been printing some of the most reckless and inflammatory prose in the history of twentieth century weekly journalism in condemnation of the German actions. (Strangely enough, Austria’s Marxists of varying hues, whom American liberals seemed so concerned for at this time, had been themselves enthusiastically for such a rejoining with Germany, until the advent of Hitler.)

Dulles now not only persisted in dousing the whole idea of “collective security” with cold water. He suggested in strong language that this country should specifically avoid any drift toward joining any international posse of this type, undoubtedly under the apprehension now of what reckless action might be taken as a consequence of the agitation caused by Mr. Roosevelt’s “quarantine the aggressors” speech six months earlier:

In the international field there exists as yet no adequate provision for peaceful change. Peace has in fact been equated with the status quo. “Collective security” represents essentially an alliance of satisfied nations to preserve their existing advantages intact. This is not merely futile but is worse in that it means that any one of many inevitable changes may precipitate a war of world-wide scope. So long as “collective security” means an attempt to achieve the impossible, the United States should remain aloof. Stripped of the romanticism which attaches to the phrase, “collective security” is to be judged as a defensive alliance. For the United States such an alliance is more of a liability than an asset.

He then genuflected in the direction of those who had invented a spurious state of behavior called “isolation” by declaring that this would not achieve the desired goals (he obviously did not consider the recommended course above to be “isolation”), but quickly righted himself by reasserting his faith in the necessity of an order permitting change, and he seemed quite sure that those doing most of the loud shouting for “peace” and “collective security” and denouncing “isolation” were uninterested in a particle of change. As far as both peace and security were concerned, Dulles concluded:

We can only achieve these by realizing, in international affairs, a system which can strike a fair balance between the static and the dynamic and afford the latter an adequate opportunity for peaceful expression. We should strive to conceive of such a system, and if any
practical plan is devised, be prepared to cooperate to give it practical realization.

Mr. Dulles tells us in the introduction to his book, written in November, 1938, that the bulk of its content was in form before the Munich crisis in September of that year. However, his book contains references to Munich, and he nowhere condemned the settlement arrived there. He said at one occasion (page 163), “One of the most striking facts developed by the Czechoslovak crisis was the enormous sense of relief felt by the peoples of all countries involved, not excluding Germany and Italy, at the passing of the crisis.” He did not think the partition of Czechoslovakia had anything to do with the aggravation of world conditions or would help to bring on war when this was written. His book also contained one of the most sober and non-hysterical summaries of Italo-German-Japanese action between 1931 and 1939 ever published (pp. 143-148), although he felt constrained to follow with a hasty statement that no defense of these powers was intended on his part in explaining why they had acted the way they had in this period.

In *War, Peace and Change* his attitude toward the League warmed slightly by comparison with his previous stands. “The conception of the League is a noble one,” he now declared, but he went on to make it plain that the only part he really thought commendatory was Article 19, because of its potential in leading to peaceful change, and pointed out unhappily that it had never been invoked or utilized. This led to another sharp arraignment of the French, among “the victors of the world war,” for having used the League almost exclusively “as an instrumentality for perpetuating the status quo” (pp. 81-84). And once more he felt called upon to condemn a nowhere-existing policy called “imposed isolation” as a war-breeder, but once again balanced the picture with the observation that despite this, “there are many so-called ‘isolationist’ arguments which are sound as antidotes to an excessive internationalism” (p. 78).

Continuing his examination of the platitudinous slogans in which foreign affairs were then being dressed, Dulles had the following to say about “self defense” and “aggression”:

“Self defense” is a much abused term. Generally a clash of nation personalities is due to causes to which both peoples have contributed and for which both must accept responsibility though perhaps in varying degrees.
Much effort of a high order has been devoted to securing agreement upon a definition of "aggression" which would be susceptible of practical application. The term has so far eluded such definition.

It is probably superfluous to comment that in a similar manner, the United Nations has wrestled fruitlessly in trying to define this obstreperous word. Today, however, Mr. Dulles conducts foreign policy by using the term "aggressor" in essentially the form in which it was defined by the Russian Communist Foreign Minister, Maxim Litvinov, in 1933-1934.

Until the Spring of 1939, it may be observed, John Foster Dulles' contribution to foreign policy thought was marked especially by sobriety and restraint. But in a widely-reported debate on United States foreign policy with James P. Warburg before the New York Economic Club on March 22, 1939 he revealed that he had grown more outspoken in his criticism of verbiage which sounded like peace while meaning little more than war. In the course of his remarks he now appended sharp strictures and premonitory observations on the handling of American foreign affairs and public-opinion formation by the "peacemakers" and the Administration. The following excerpts are pertinent and revealing:

... Every pretext has been availed to arouse by provocative words the emotions of the American people ... We talk only ... of "sanctity of treaties," "law and order" and "resisting aggression" ... which are always used by people who desire to hold their position intact, without concession to the inevitable requirements of change ...

If our policy were based upon a genuine understanding of the causes of the present crisis and was intelligently designed to achieve a world order whereby recurrent crises might hereafter be avoided,

Dulles went on, then the demand for "action" might have some justification. But, he said,

Unfortunately this prerequisite to affirmative action seems ... to be non-existent ... I do not find in our public opinion, official or private, any comprehension of the true nature of the problem. Our reactions seem to me to be impulsive and emotional, wholly lacking either that intellectual content or that idealism which alone would justify the risks which would be involved.
The upshot of action based on these faulty views of the total situation, he concluded, was quite plain: "The goal of our policy seems to be to regain the power to make over again the same mistakes," getting involved in a war to "repress a revolt which the policies of the democratic powers have made inevitable, and which a continuance of those policies will make recurrent."**

In October, 1937, the United States was launched on a foreign policy aiming to maintain the status quo of that time all over the planet. The program did not work. The policy of bluff, based on the theory that the enemy is a coward and will always retreat before a forthright stand, proved as porous then as it always has done when the enemy is proud, tough, and also thinks he has a righteous cause. There was subsequently let loose in 1939 a cataclysmic war which resulted in changes so vast as to make those which occurred or were threatened in the 1931-1939 period look positively picayune by comparison. Europe, Asia and Africa exploded, and the pieces are still coming down. Yet we have as a legacy of that time all the verbal reflexes which served as excuses for thought in foreign relations. Under Democrats and Republicans alike we have continued to try to make permanent stabilization of the relations among the world's nations work, with little or no success. (The word "compromise" has disappeared; it was rewritten by a battalion of pro-Soviet opinion-makers in the autumn of 1938 and came out "appeasement," uniformly used today by the spokesmen of any nation against any pending or proposed change). However, two questions may be proposed at this point: 1. Are Americans prepared to stand forever the expense of preventing change from taking place among the affairs of other nations, and 2. Is the world doing anything toward realizing Mr. Dulles' excellent point of a quarter century ago, a workable, practical substitute for war to replace it as a major means of bringing about needed or necessary changes in the international community? The answer cannot be "the United Nations," for Korea proved that about the worst thing that can happen to a nation today is to be defended against aggression" by the United Nations.

John Foster Dulles proved to be a formidable oracle; events have vindicated him in all the major areas of his diagnosis. But in view of what he has done in a position of power himself these last five years, one can hardly say that he developed any appreciable immunity to the

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**This debate was reported in the New York Times, March 23, 1939, p. 9. The citations above are extracted from a summary of the remarks of both the speakers on the occasion in Porter Sargent, Getting U.S. Into War (Boston, 1941), p. 133.
same disease of language and action which he so trenchantly criticized some twenty to twenty-five years ago. And even more impressive has been the complete somersault in his own views on the world situation. He now uses the very language he subjected to such scathing disparagement in that time, and follows courses of action nearly identical with those he considered the height of folly in the decade preceding our entry in the Second World War.

The press has recently reported that Mr. Dulles has passed the 500,000-mile mark in his diplomatic travels since 1953. In view of what has been demonstrated concerning his views and positions of other days, as contrasted with those he now affirms and supports, two of the unadvertised stops on his stunning odyssey have been Damascus and Canossa.
Dulles Warns of War Peril In Policy of Appeasement

NEW YORK, Aug. 18, 1958—(UPI) — Secretary of State Dulles warned tonight that a policy of appeasement by the United States today would lead to war as surely as it did in 1939.

Dulles, speaking at a Veterans of Foreign Wars banquet at which he received the Bernard Baruch Medal for his contribution to peace, said the United States would not and could not embark on such a policy.

He recalled that in 1939 former Soviet Premier Stalin criticized the United States, Britain and France for making “concession after concession to the aggressors” and abandoning collective security with smaller nations.

“Today, roles are altered,” said Dulles. “The Soviet Union, in March, 1939, was fearful of the power of the then aggressors. But now it is itself a great military power. The Soviet Government, in concert with its alter ego, the international Communist movement, seeks to dominate the world.

“It now denounces the policy of collective security. It now wants each of its prospective victims to be left to stand alone.

“But it is as certain now, as it was in 1939, that a policy of falling back, of making concession after concession, will not lead to peace, but to war.

“The United States rejects that policy.”

Dulles said the United States also rejects a policy of expediency or “power politics” and strives instead to “seek to secure peace by promoting the reign of law and justice in the world.”

Dulles accused Russia of making nuclear missile threats “not designed to prevent any alleged plan of attack against the Soviet Union, but rather to intimidate other nations so that they would not oppose Soviet policies in relation to third countries.”

He said the problem of dealing with indirect aggression, such as Lebanon, should be so far as possible assumed by the United Nations.
APPENDIX III

History and Social Intelligence

I. Barnes, Liberal Optimism, and Cultural Lag

In a literary comment on the decay of liberalism, at the midway point of the Second World War, Malcolm Cowley declared that liberals were “the people who believe in the possibility of progress through the application of intelligence to social problems.”

If one were limited to a single sentence in describing the goals of the scholarship of Harry Elmer Barnes, it would be very difficult to improve upon this. He frequently asserted that this could and should be the greatest public and educational service of the New History. It is to be seen in all his major works on history and social problems, which include his most famous and most widely read books. From The New History and the Social Studies of 1925 down through Society in Transition of 1952, and including every important book in between, one encounters the “tentative theory of progress” and its principal barrier, “cultural lag,” in a variety of civilized and restrained statements. In his strictures against the “erudite” writers of history are displayed his unhappiness and impatience with scholars unable and unwilling to put their work to use in the battle for human betterment, and who are satisfied with pallid understatement rather than run the risk of criticism for indulging in modest overstatement or dramatic imperatives.

In his works on social problems the treatment of each main topic is always preceded by a succinct historical introduction, which dwells on the steadily widening gap between the technical proficiency of Western culture and its tardy ideas and institutions, resulting in a proliferation of new difficulties while eliminating others long overdue for overhauling. Years of writing in this vein encouraged occasional impatience, sharpness, and rough handling of people, ideas, and accepted ways of doing things, a stance that sometimes appalled and exasperated the smug and the timid. Barnes’ career from the middle 1920’s to the middle 1960’s is liberally dotted with a formidable series of vital controversies in many magazines and newspapers, as well as in several books, testifying to his ability to arouse hostile reactions and to combat adversaries. One will never know how many people had their outlook widened, or even how many of the participants in these running intellectual encounters were significantly impressed by the knowledge and insights poured out in their promotion.

Like most of the liberals born in or around 1890, Barnes reflected the urbane skepticism which in many ways is the hallmark of the entire group, even though their strong championship of and zeal for reform often had overtones which sometimes assumed an almost religious devotion. Their deep commitment to evolutionary views involved a similar approach to the Western social system in general, which was believed to be on the verge of complete secularization. This is an important clue to any understanding of the propagation of societary reform. The result, as we have seen, has not been unencumbered by undesirable side effects. Harold Laski admitted, in his Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, the reincarnation of the Seventeenth Century religious sectarianism in the political sects of the Twentieth, with the result that the increasing secularization of life has brought about a concomitant and steadily growing assumption of ecclesiastical characteristics by the State.

Probably Barnes overstressed the scientific and mechanical at times in reiterating the responsibility of faulty institutions and outmoded ideas for being the principal barriers to the evolution of a humanistic better world. As outlined in a series of volumes between 1924 and 1942, the case he prepared for the idea of cultural lag and its implications was indeed impressive. Some students have felt that he did not present a clear or complete portrayal of the processes by which the community might get out of the grip of these stultifying and stagnating forces. This was partially due to the formal language of sociology and its primary emphasis on group considerations. This lack of dogmatic conviction about “sure-fire” remedies for the obsolescence of social institutions and ideas reveals one of the numerous dualities in Barnes’ work. He made it evident in his historical work that individuals of exceptional abilities had been the sources of the inspiration behind most progressive achievements in the past and presumably would bulk large in times to come. In still another sense he was not too far from Albert Jay Nock’s conception that the obligation of the individual to “society” was, first of all, the obligation to present to it one improved unit, and that many more blessings might flow from this than were likely to result from generalized ascensions via mass attempts at bootstrap-lifting.

Nietzsche once spoke, in another context, of there being “no more grievous and more thorough enemies of freedom” than “liberal institutions.” But one may have to search a very long time to uncover recommendations more humane and gentle than those of Barnes, especially in cases when individuals are the subject of improvement for the total good, so to speak. One might mention here in particular his work in the field of criminology. In other fields as
Barnes, as a social reformer, repeatedly interspersed his numerous suggestions for institutional change with comments and cautions about the actual or possible losses of personal liberties.

One also finds in his works on social problems, after a generation, the recognition that other ways of looking at things than through the cultural-lag frame of reference might be important. Though he was unchanged in his outlook in the 1952 revision of his 1939 *Society in Transition*, enough resistance had occurred to warrant a quiet sentence in the preface, stating that those who no longer accepted this approach would “find no difficulty in interpreting the problem material according to their own ideas and convictions.”

Another of Barnes’ contentions was that excessive reverence for “past wisdom” had, over the years, acted as a powerful inhibition of necessary change, particularly when such drastic changes had taken place in the material realities that previous “wisdom” was actually insufficient to serve as a practical means for dealing with the new problems. For this reason his biographical work frequently had a strongly irreverent quality, which in the mid-1920’s and 1930’s found a much more receptive audience than subsequently.

He was one of those who, like H. L. Mencken, W. E. Woodward, and such literary figures as Sinclair Lewis, Ford Madox Ford, Andreas Latzko, Ernest Hemingway, and several others, were assailed as “debunkers” at a time when pressure was being applied to bring American opinion into a belligerent state in the three years prior to entry into the Second World War. They were just part of the group who came under mass indictment on the ancient Socratic charge of having corrupted a new generation of youth. It was obvious that the salesmen for war, loaded with much new “bunk” to market, had to discredit those who had done such yeoman work in discounting the old “bunk.” It can certainly be concluded with assurance that those brought up on the reverent and adoring work in political biography of these last twenty years, in particular, would find Barnes’ treatment of the Revolutionary generation, the Founding Fathers, and some of the presidents of the pre-Depression period, in *History and Social Intelligence*, exceptionally strong meat.

II. The New History and the New Obscurantism

Barnes’ tireless promotion of the New History, in the train of his deeply respected mentor, James Harvey Robinson, involves again his commitment to historical writing as a force leading ultimately to changed behavior for intelligent and melioristic ends. It included an appeal to abandon “erudite” history, devoted largely to military and political reportage, stripped of imagination or interpretation. In
The New History and the Social Studies and The History of Historical Writing, in particular, there are urgent calls to others to write the New History. But the accompanying insistence on a much broader regimen in training for such work, including wide acquaintance with anthropology, sociology, archeology, biology, and especially psychology, undoubtedly appalled the traditionalists. Barnes’ own History of Western Civilization (1935) is in a class by itself as a general treatment of world history in the New History manner, but except for a few imitations, the New History movement stalled at about that point. Though several of the battles fought by Robinson and Barnes have long been won, and have invaded the social studies as fundamental material, the authors of most recent general textbooks on world history show many signs of never having been grazed by the New History, or having utterly repudiated it, if perhaps they were once acquainted with it.

In one sense The History of Historical Writing is a testament to a happier time when belief in progress was more firmly established in the psychic apparatus of intellectual life than in the first two decades of the latter half of the Twentieth Century. Instead of pursuing the ambitious program of the New History, as outlined in the last chapter of The History of Historical Writing, the historical craft has been going in a straight line in the opposite direction. Training in the many disciplines that Barnes exhorted aspiring historians to master has become so minuscule and so burdened with exotic trivia that even some of the “erudite” historians upon whom he once poured scorn seem utter encyclopédiste popularizers by comparison with the situation today.

For one thing, the movement has seen a New Obscurantism. The separate disciplines have become more isolated by the year and have erected such formidable walls of technical and verbal reflexes among themselves that intercommunication has been reduced to a trickle. One need but refer to the professional journals of history, government, anthropology, and, particularly, sociology, social psychology and economics, which have all become virtually unreadable, on both technical and stylistic grounds, to the outsider. For that matter they have been of no particular lucidity to “insiders,” either.

Decidedly characteristic of the decay of professional journals especially in the social studies has been the decline of the book review function. The journals have steadily become agencies through which select revolving cadres of academic politicians of congenial ideological persuasions gather to log-roll each others’ books, award each other prizes, and offices in academic politics, and promote job agencies for hiring each others’ sycophants. The only breath of fresh air in the journals is Current Anthropology, edited by Sol Tax. In this,
a book is assigned to be reviewed at length by sometimes more than twenty reviewers, and at the conclusion of these often very different estimates, the author is given ample space to comment on these reviewers and their product. This is an elementary courtesy which is utterly missing in all the most thoroughly entrenched organs in such fields as history, political science and sociology. It makes possible the carrying out of malicious professional and ad hominem character assassination attempts, with no fear that the intended victims will gain access to an opportunity in the same sources for a decent redress of the damage done. On the other hand, weary rehashes and superficial trivia by “right-thinking” members of the guild can expect lavish and immoderate praise from friends or protective patrons, and minuscule deviations from currently accepted conventional views are upheld as models of new thinking or memorable scholarly breakthroughs. (“Run as a pack, and you will be masters,” wrote Voltaire to d’Alembert and the other Encyclopédistes.) There once was a function for conventional book reviews; they were intended to inform potential readers what the books in question were about. But there is no longer such a place; today they tell us far more about the reviewer, frequently much more than we really care to know. As far as the recognition of new books is concerned, the journals might just as well go back to the purely descriptive and simple accounts long ago established by the Journal des Savants.

In both economics and sociology, calculus has replaced expository dialectic, and pompous benediction has been substituted for theoretical formulations. “The first duty of an economist is to describe correctly what is out there,” declares the eminent Keynesian economist Paul A. Samuelson: “A valid description without a deeper explanation is worth a thousand times more than a clever explanation of nonexistent facts.” To comment that the latter situation has been the rule rather than the exception is perhaps unnecessary. As for sociology, no one has surpassed for economy of words Professor Frank H. Knight’s estimate and summary of its recent substance: “Bad talk drives out good.” In the second place, the concentration of bizarre specializa-


3. In his searching critique of the 1965 meeting of the American Political Science Association, the distinguished journalist (and graduate in political science) Lee E. Dirks, fighting through the maze of “unintelligible” terminology and computerized formulae presented at the various sessions, declared caustically in conclusion, “Perhaps the political scientists are indeed marching to Armageddon to do battle for the Lord. But does anyone really care?” “Listen to That Language!” National Observer (September 13, 1965), p. 12.
tions has begun to approach the point where President Clarence Little's hypothetical expert on the suspenders of Henry VIII is not entirely out of consideration for future appointment to a major university chair. A historian trained primarily in the disciplines of the New History would be virtually unemployable in the academic world today.

There is, however, an even more formidable and sinister reason than the ones mentioned above. The "New" History that has emerged in the past twenty-five years or so has not developed from a mellow marinating in the social and biological sciences, ranging from anthropology through comparative zoology, but is a purely literary form that has consciously sought to make history a branch of literature, and a not too impressive branch at that. Moreover, it has sought to drive all others from the field, in its choicest examples going to the opposite of the "erudite" narratives, heavy with fact but weak in interpretation, toward dramatic and eloquent overinterpretation of materials, in which the streamlined style is a concomitant of the light factual cargo.

Anatole France once declared, "History is an art and should be written with imagination." We now have a popular historical establishment which apparently believes that the product should consist mainly, if not entirely, of imagination, while a broad swath of academic historians, who specialize in writing books directed to one another, continues to turn out a stream of dreary treatises nearly bereft of imagination. The current and prodigiously promoted journalistic history, characterized by the work of Cornelius Ryan, John Toland and Barbara Wertheim Tuchman, which contain well-written sections, to be sure, appears to be the way things are moving in historical writing read by any substantial part of the populace.

This development suggests a review of Barnes' early work in

4. Clarence Cook Little, who became President of the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor in 1925, and subsequently headed the world-famous Roscoe B. Jackson Memorial Laboratory at Bar Harbor, Maine. One phase of this has been the passion for historical scholarship based largely, if not entirely, on unpublished letters and similar private and intimate documents. A scale of snobbish pretension has grown along with it, with top rank reserved for those scholars who have been granted exclusive access to these materials. Though there exists in the historical guild the conviction that work based on such sources is vastly superior, for some vague and unexplained reason, there is often a mawkish, sentimental, and fatuous quality to the output, noticeably in biographies, which makes it distressing to read. Though very useful to historical novelists, and for gossipy memoirs, such accounts often do no more than add footnotes to a story necessarily based to the largest extent possible on the record. As Bertram D. Wolfe has put it, "Public men must be judged first of all by their public actions." "Marx—The Man and His Legacy," American Mercury (September, 1947), p. 371.
historiography. In a pathbreaking and extended essay, "History: Its Rise and Development," written in 1918 and published in the 1922 Encyclopedia Americana, he announced in the very first section, in no uncertain terms, that history had emancipated itself from literature and grown into a serious science, and indeed he was, of course, far from alone in this view. Now, over forty-five years later, the fashion is once more growing to dismiss the scientific view and to relocate history among the minor handmaidens of literature. Inasmuch as history has been captured to a greater and greater extent, following the outbreak of the Second World War, by journalists and politicians, this might be considered a predictable outcome and is likely to be so esteemed for some time to come in opinion-making circles of high status.

There has been more and more evidence accumulating to support the occurrence of such a relapse, ranging all the way from the published deliberations of the P.E.N. Club in 1956 to the nihil obstat by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in his article "The Historian as Artist" in the Atlantic Monthly for July, 1963.5 Pressures grow from several sources to continue to view historical writing in this way, and they are given prodigious thrust by the noisy applause accompanying the dexterous promotion of the works of journalist-politicians.6 This

5. A totally different argument, and a far superior one, is Samuel Eliot Morison's History As a Literary Art (Old South Leaflets, Series II, No. 1: Boston, Mass., 1948). It should be understood that the gems of wisdom of P.E.N. (Playwrights, Poets, Essayists, Editors, Novelists), "The world's most exalted literary club": (Time [September 29, 1941], p. 88), are likely to include plenty of paste items; its tendency to take on the trappings of an Anglophile front is incidental. One may recall its fantastic 1941 meeting in London, which gathered primarily, it seems, to depose Jules Romains from its presidency, to mobilize its membership into a war writers' typewriter regiment, to listen to Erika Mann's monologue on how German education after the war had to be directed exclusively from centers outside of Europe, and to send a "friendly greeting" to the Soviet Writers' Union. Romains' response was to scoff at it as a meeting representing nobody, consisting of delegates "picked up on the streets of London."

6. In the tireless promotional propaganda of the Book of the Month Club, which, at the time of Churchill's death on January 24, 1965, had distributed over five and one half million copies of his The Second World War and A History of the English-Speaking Peoples, it is always strikingly emphasized that the books won the Nobel Prize for literature. Life (May 19, 1947, p. 26) in a full page "advance notice" of the publication of Churchill's War Memoirs in 1948, intoned, "This combination of statesman and historian has had no parallel since Caesar wrote his Gallic War." Undoubtedly it was considered indecent to observe in this comparison of Churchill and Caesar that the latter's writing described a course through which he had led his land to a point where it was about to become an empire ruling the world for centuries, whereas the former was relating how he had led his country to a "victory" which cost it the world's largest empire and led it to a shabby second-class status.
"New History" is probably best illustrated by the works of Sir Winston Churchill, and it would become even more portentous should we develop a new class of historian-politician to follow in the traces of Woodrow Wilson.

Churchill is without doubt the epitome of the literary relapse, in which once more the felicitous expression and the heroically turned phrase have gained the nod, never more than faintly importuned by awkward or troublesome facts which might disturb the prefabricated thesis. Many other new dabblers manage to skim along cheerfully, jettisoning whole categories of discomforting events in the proliferation of new twentieth-century fables. Barnes' one-time strictures against those historical writers who had neglected the interpretative function of their craft have reaped an unanticipated dividend in this new crop of literary structuralists, whose dramatic story-telling has almost dispensed with research, since they can work on such a threadbare factual loom. Schlesinger tells us, with little current evidence to support any such trend, that "the time for romantic history has passed," with Churchill "its last great master." What the future may bring need not necessarily be favorably anticipated. Rather than expect wondrous and inspiring growths from the parent stock of Clio, it may very well be as reasonable to consider history in the dark vision of Professor Avery Craven of the University of Chicago during the Second World War as "a profession slowly dying from dry rot."

7. An implication in the first volume of Churchill's A History of the English-Speaking Peoples is that if the legendary events connected with the heroic age of King Arthur and the Knights of the Round Table did not really happen, they should have happened. It is instructive to note that Barnes does not mention Churchill in either the 1937 or 1962 edition of the History of Historical Writing.

8. One may rest in comfort that Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., omits from Churchill's masterpieces of this nature, morsels such as Sir Winston's stunning eulogy of Benito Mussolini in the September 3, 1938 issue of Collier's, the sober, restrained and unpropagandist portrait of Hitler in his Great Contemporaries (1935), and his praise of Stalin during the Second World War.

9. Saturday Review of Literature (June 6, 1942), p. 14. Of great relevance to the question this brings up is Chapter 8 of James C. Malin's On the Nature of History (Ann Arbor, Mich.: J. W. Edwards, 1954). In the light of the problem Professor Craven posed nearly a quarter century ago, it may be that we are at the threshold of a new oral tradition which may depress written history even further, as far as a mass audience is concerned, with the evolution of tape and long-playing records, to say nothing of television. Witness the achievement of the late Professor Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., in compressing the entire history of the United States through 1865 on a single LP disc (Lectern label #101, issued June, 1961) and the nearly twelve hours of Churchill's memoirs and speeches, 1918-1945, issued on twelve LPs by the London label in January, 1956. As ingeniously one-sided as these Churchill "documentaries" are as historical raw materials, they are no greater
Some idea of the astounding progression of this disease may be gained by an examination of the discussion on the television program "Open Mind" between the well-known English historian A. J. P. Taylor and the eminent Professor Eric Goldman of Princeton University, which was seen in various parts of the country in 1966 and 1967. Professor Goldman was the supporter of the conviction that "most historians" were "in agreement" that history was a "weapon" and that "the way history is written is important," that it is mainly employed in "determining people's ideas and attitudes" and that "there is a certain responsibility on the part of a historian for making sure that he writes history in such a way that it will bring about the kind of action that he wants." It is to Taylor's credit that he flatly repudiated this role of the historian as total political propagandist as "a shocking doctrine," and responded with an assertion very rarely encountered any more:

There is only one profound responsibility on the historian, which is to do his best for historical truth. If he discovered things which were catastrophic for his political beliefs he would still put it in his books. He has no responsibility whatsoever to fiddle the past in order to benefit some cause that he happens to believe in.

III. Revisionism: Triumph and Frustration

Inasmuch as Barnes' use of history to promote social intelligence and human betterment in such areas as religion, social problems, crime, education, civil liberties, and the like, is treated at length in other essays in this volume, an account of his role in the so-called revisionist episode, which brought him more directly into public attention than any other phase of his historical activities, will be of major concern now.

The period during which Barnes was most actively involved in spreading the message of the New History came during the two decades prior to the outbreak of the Second World War. It was paralleled by fully as vigorous a campaign to modify the warped and exaggerated history of the causes, nature, and results of the First World War, the most famous "revisionist" impulse in historical scholarship and writing in the modern era. It was to flow logically into a similar...
effort to alter the even more propagandistic accounts of the Second World War, and from there into a third stage untangling the contemporary Cold War. This is all part of a single garment, and it grows out of another of the dualistic aspects in Barnes’ career.

His enthusiasm for history written in the broadest and deepest possible sense, involving a restrained long-view socio-cultural approach as an account of the evolution of the race, has been simultaneously accompanied by the short-term view and immediacy of Revisionism for contemporary politics. In one sense, this has seemed to many to be contradictory, since a large part of Revisionism has consisted of diplomatic history, often written in a form almost identical to that which drew his reproaches when discussed within the context of the New History. For the major weakness of almost all diplomatic history has been its casual assumption that the diplomats are the exclusive actors on the stage of international public affairs, thus neglecting a public opinion formed by dynamic economic, cultural, and racial factors underlying surface politics, as well as the complexities responsible for the basic clashes of interest and policy.

Barnes has recognized this apparent discrepancy or contradiction between his New History attacks on political and diplomatic history and the fact that he has devoted a great deal of his time and writing to a revisionist history that has consisted in considerable part in strictly diplomatic history. He has sought to answer this objection in two ways.

First, he points out that at least in the concepts of Robinson and himself, if to a lesser degree in the attitude of Becker and Beard, one of the main imperatives of the New History is to promote a better life for mankind now and in the future. Since Barnes has regarded war as the most dangerous challenge to human security and well-being, it is only natural that he would give attention to the causes and results of wars. Wars are usually anticipated and precipitated by diplomacy, whatever the more fundamental causes. Hence, if one wishes to understand the responsibility and results of warfare, it is difficult to avoid an examination of the diplomatic history connected with the genesis and outbreak of wars. Viewed in this fundamental manner, the study of diplomatic history within this frame of reference is a legitimate phase of the New History. It is not concentration on diplomatic history for the virtues of diplomatic history in itself, but as the means of throwing light on the welfare and destinies of the human race according to the tenets of the New History.

So far as his own entry into the revisionist field is concerned, Barnes frankly admits that the above would only be an expedient rationalization. Actually, he did not get into Revisionism in any such
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logical fashion in his work on the First World War. It came about as an accident. He was fully aware of the horrible wastes and cruelty of the First World War by the time of the Armistice of 1918, but this did not immediately lead him away from the New History into Revisionism. His first notable gesture did not come until Herbert Croly asked him to review Charles Downer Hazen's *Europe Since 1815* in the *New Republic* in March, 1924, and George W. Ochs-Oakes invited him to summarize the facts about the responsibility for the First World War for the literate public in the *New York Times Current History Magazine* in May of the same year. Once started, there was no very good way of abandoning the task until Revisionism on 1914 had been vindicated.

With respect to his Revisionism on the Second World War, Barnes' activity, however, was no rationalization or sudden accident. He was well aware of the menace of war and its propaganda and he literally and deliberately began his World War II Revisionism following 1937 in opposing Roosevelt's efforts to involve us in war, and he has never deserted it since. Barnes himself regards his first stroke for Revisionism in anticipation of the Second World War as being his foreword to H. C. Engelbrecht's and Frank C. Hanighen's *Merchants of Death* (1934), and he had no more than got well started on Revisionism and the Second World War when the Cold War came on in early 1947 and engaged his attention.

Barnes has also sought to counter the criticisms of those who have alleged that he turned away from the New History after 1924 to write or encourage the writing of diplomatic history. He has correctly called attention to the fact that during the period in which he was engaged in Revisionism from 1924 into the early 1930's, he wrote far more books strictly in the New History field than in that of Revisionism: *The New History and the Social Studies, History and Social Intelligence*, *Living in the Twentieth Century*, the *Twilight of Christianity*, and *World Politics*, among other books eminently qualifying as the New History.

This preponderance of production in the New History and Social Problems studies was also true of any revisionist work he did on the Second World War. However much attention his revisionist writings may have attracted from others, Barnes has always regarded them as a side issue in his career as a historian, and his published record fully bears him out in this. Furthermore, in dealing with the nature, causes, and results of wars, Barnes has looked upon diplomacy as secondary to the institutional factors involved, such as social and economic issues, psychological pressures, and the like. The pages he has devoted to these matters far exceed those devoted to the diplomatic causes of
either World War. Barnes' emphasis on the importance of propaganda and opinion-forming in causing, waging, and concluding wars was surely an important contribution in intellectual history, his favorite forte within the general field of the New History. These are his answers to charges of dualism and contradictions in his historical perspective and ideology when he turned to revisionist studies. They at least require serious reflection.

This suggests one other line of reasoning on Revisionism that is worth considering. Probably one can truthfully say that Barnes contemplated both social problems and historical Revisionism in the light of generalized or large-scale criminology. "War is, essentially, crime on a larger scale," he declared in Can Man Be Civilized? (1932).\(^9\) It would be very difficult to find anywhere a more drastic condemnation of war than the eighth chapter of this book, written completely in the nonsentimental style of the outraged scientist, aghast at war's cost in human life and wealth of all kinds, as well as the permanently lost complex of amenities of civilized social intercourse. His interest in domestic reform naturally widened into the area of world affairs, since a substantial degree of international tranquillity is absolutely necessary for advancement in one or more nations to mean anything in the long run to the world at large. "There is little gain from working for a better social order within national boundaries if such efforts are to be wiped out in a few months of useless carnage," Barnes observed in his History of Western Civilization (1935). "Hence the elimination of war is a basic prerequisite to any hope of a decent world order and to any assurance of enduring civilization."\(^{11}\)

Thus, within the criminological orbit, social problems and social pathology could be attributed to crimes by individuals against individuals, or of social, ethnic, or racial groups against one another. War, on the other hand, involved crimes committed by national states, though here there were difficulties of a far more complex sort. Barnes and the other major figures who did the significant work in "Revisionism" for the two World Wars were seeking to correct the outrageous disparities between fact and fiction created by the historians and publicists on the side of the victors. The latter, in the vast majority of cases, simply institutionalized the propaganda circulating before and during these cataclysms as the ultimate history of them, thus guar-

9. (New York: Brentano, 1932), p. 182. In many ways, Barnes' philosophy on the subject was in the spirit of the celebrated Argentine Juan Bautista Alberdi's El Crimen de la Guerra (The Crime of War), written in 1870.

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anteeing continuous sources of grievances, resentments, and hatreds to help make future clashes inevitable and predictable.

Revisionism tended to concentrate on the origins of the wars in the proximate sense. Hence, investigation at least superficially appeared to evolve as a criminological "whodunit," the "war criminals" usually turning out to be the diplomats of the belligerents, with varying degrees of guilt. Though there were significant exceptions, the bulk of the revisionist case rested on the revelations provided by new diplomatic studies. And to that degree Barnes' work specifically on war Revisionism did constitute a deviation from the very complex culturological emphasis which one finds in such impressive works as the History of Western Civilization or Society in Transition. Yet, it is true, as Barnes has maintained, that nobody who reads Chapter 8 in his above-mentioned Can Man Be Civilized?, Chapter 10 of his Social Institutions, or the extensive treatment of the background of the two World Wars in his World Politics and History of Western Civilization will be likely to believe that Barnes ascribes more than a very secondary role to diplomats in creating and perpetuating the war system.

Most of Barnes' work in Revisionism consisted not in original research, but rather in the appraisal and synthesizing of the careful investigations of others, for which he had a particular and unexcelled skill. This activity took account of various significant institutional contributions to the starting of wars, but still used diplomatic studies for the foundation and much of the superstructure. For many this led to the conclusion, sometimes to an excessive extent, that had the diplomats of the various Powers been different men, or had they acted differently, these gigantic international collisions might never have occurred.

Barnes has, however, always asserted the primary role of specific diplomats for the outbreak of a given war, especially the First World War, where he treated this problem in detail in his Genesis. Whatever the broad intellectual and institutional causes of a war, it is his contention that it is the diplomats who start them. He has repeatedly contended that there would have been no World War in 1914 if Caillaux had directed French policy rather than Poincaré and Viviani, or if Georges Louis had been representing France at St. Petersburg instead of Maurice Paléologue, or if John Morley had been in the British Foreign Office instead of Sir Edward Grey. Not only do such momentous decisions turn on the policy of particular diplomats, Barnes maintained, but even on their changing states of mind during a great crisis, citing as examples Sazonov's hot temper and confusion over mobilization details, the eruption of the Tsar's vanity on the afternoon of July 30, the Kaiser's excitement and disorder at critical
moments, Viviani's momentary exhaustion and confusion, and Sir Edward Grey's prolonged vacillation produced by his mental lethargy and duplicity.

From the printed evidence and from a large number of additional indications, Barnes did devote a staggering amount of time and energy to Revisionism in each of the two-decade spans following the World Wars of this century, although in the later World War II Revisionism he was mainly occupied in editorial work and promoting the writings of others. Most of his revisionist writing following 1945 took the form of substantial brochures. Of these the most important were the first, *The Struggle Against the Historical Blackout*, and the latest, *Revisionism and Brainwashing*. The former first thoroughly alerted the reading public to the Historical Blackout, and the latter indicated, nearly a decade and a half later, that the blackout is probably here to stay for an indefinite period. No other phases of his life experiences contrast so sharply as the impact and public reception of these two campaigns for the historical balancing of international accounts. That following the war of 1914-1918 was a success by almost any standard. Aided by systematic revelation of diplomatic secrets following the collapse of the Central Powers and the overturning of the Czarist regime in Russia by the Bolsheviks, the redressing of the Allied propaganda by the revisionists was achieved in record time, using an abrupt and blunt technique which stirred up a fierce intellectual and literary battle still going on in part at the eruption of World War II. But, in the main, the field was carried by Revisionism, its position being adopted generally throughout the country by the majority of the nation's most influential journalists and publicists. A very large part of the academic world as well accepted its general conclusions of divided war responsibility.

It is not evident, however, that Revisionism extended very far down the intelligence scale or the ladder of formal education. The general popular vulnerability to propaganda for participating in a new war was soon demonstrated in the latter half of the 1930's. Nevertheless, it can be offered in extenuation that the stubborn unwillingness shown by an immense majority of Americans to become totally immersed in the war until the Japanese attack on Hawaii on December 7, 1941, was due in large part to popularized revisionist lessons, disseminated between 1924 and 1937.

Revisionism made Barnes famous in both America and Europe; his name became well-known in the classroom, on the public lecture platform, and in the newspapers. And it must be admitted that his social goals were given a generous push as a consequence. Barnes did not, however, consider the struggle over, or a warless world anywhere
near in sight. Enough wars had been fought during the period of greatest revisionist activity to warrant his declaring in 1935, "War has become the chief scourge of the human race and the main challenge to the stability of civilization," once again cautioning that "advanced Western civilization" was unlikely to survive in the event war was not "eliminated."\(^{12}\)

Not enough study has been devoted to the interrelationship between the political climate prevailing at the time history has been written and the schools of historical interpretation flourishing in various lands and at various times. To a large extent, the collapse of the entire political structure of the world after the First World War, as well as the universal objection to American involvement in international alliances bearing a politico-military commitment, explains why Revisionism took root and flourished in the period between the World Wars. Politically, Revisionism following the First World War had a relatively serene time of it and managed to impress influential people of all ideological persuasions. An America vigorously prosecuting an industrial, commercial and financial expansion and penetration of the world, while seeking at the same time to limit world tension and disorder by various multilateral agreements outside the machinery of the League of Nations, helped to provide a favorable climate.

Outside of certain financial circles, and the remnants of the Wilson administration, the war left no one in America with a major war-induced preserve to protect from attack, while the proliferation of realistic reassessments of the war in many other countries gave Revisionism an international quality and a forceful momentum. Furthermore, the dozens of small wars that blazed throughout the 1920's and 1930's were sufficiently well-publicized to disabuse almost anyone of the belief that the First World War had actually been fought to "end war." Twenty years after 1914 the victory of Revisionism seemed irreversible. A prominent journalist's assessment in a leading liberal journal on the twentieth anniversary of the outbreak of hostilities was titled "They All Lied."\(^ {13}\) But only five years later the world became enmeshed in a far greater and much more destructive war, accompanied by overtones and reverberations which are very likely to impinge upon all alive in the world today to the end of their lives. Ironically, this new war was accompanied by a propaganda which made that of World War I appear noble and truthful by comparison, and which once more sought to get the various national populates to believe that this war was also being fought to "end war." An

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\(^{13}\) Lewis S. Gannett, in The Nation (August 8, 1934), pp. 149-150.
alarmingly large part of the Anglo-American world revealed that it had learned nothing from the exposures of the propaganda of the First World War by believing almost all of that of the Second.

IV. Clio Captured and Enslaved by Politics

There was little resemblance between the revisionism of World War I and that of World War II. While the former was immensely influential, the latter, in many ways even more substantial factually, has remained in the chilly anteroom of public opinion during its extended existence. The changed political climate following the second global immersion in hot lead and blood accounts for much of this situation. In the post-World War II period there has been no political vantagepoint from which Barnes and other revisionists might work. The hope of effectively influencing public policy was almost completely out of the question. An effort to produce a verdict of divided guilt on the causes of this war ran counter to the politics of all the major states sharing the "victory" of 1939-1945.

A Communist world engaged in solidifying its massive planet-wide gains; a Britain equating the liquidation of its gigantic colonial empire, of its immense world capital investments, and of its world dominance in insurance and shipping, with the achievement of enduring defensive glory in a military sense; a France similarly stripped of its vast colonial holdings and well down in world esteem, bailed out even in its own land only by a stupendous coalition of invading foreign powers; and a United States trying hard to present the fantastic political blunders of its wartime leadership and its many frightfully expensive postwar duties as something to be proud of, and as reflections of a net gain coming out of the war—all these concerns and considerations had less than any use for an historical approach which attacked the thesis of unique Italo-German-Japanese responsibility for the hostilities, and proposed to put every country—the victors as well as the defeated—before the bar of world judgment as co-defendants on the charge of war guilt. Whereas after the first World War the defeated countries, Germany, Austria, and Hungary, worked hard to refute the charge of their sole responsibility for the coming of war in 1914, there has been little of this since 1945. Japan has shown some revisionist inclinations, but the official Italian reaction has been slight, and the Bonn Establishment has rivalled the victors in proclaiming sole German responsibility for 1939.

Another reason for the failure of the revisionist case to take root, despite its factually sound and eminently reasonable basis, was the almost hysterical determination to make the United Nations "work." After the mountains of invective poured out by the enthusiasts for
and the protagonists of collective security between 1920 and 1945, blaming the return to global war on the failure of the United States to join the famous mutual insurance company created at Versailles and based in Geneva, the time had now come to demonstrate by deed that all this talk had been correct, by total commitment to its lineal descendant. Though far shakier and shabbier, both intellectually and structurally, and more hypocritical, than the League of Nations, and even more patently a club of the winners seeking to freeze the world in yet another flimsy status quo, the fright let loose by the atom bomb provoked a fierce and intolerant effort to make the UN’s still-born machinery grind out world “peace.”

But the outbreak of the Cold War, even more than these factors, erected a wall of unscalable height against Barnes’ Revisionism following 1945. The freezing of the world maps into a situation eminently satisfactory to both world Communism and to the maneuvers of the United States as the occupant of planetary fingerholds on the cliff-edges of this vast Communist empire, and devoted henceforth to what appeared to be endless harassing operations, had as its foundation the unquestioning acceptance of the Allied version of the causes of the war and of the political decisions made during hostilities. The official histories of the period between 1941 and 1945 have been essentially the same on both sides of the Iron Curtain, with only a tiny area of disagreement. Barnes has stressed this point in substantial brochures; especially in Revisionism and Brainwashing he has shown in detail the remarkable identity in the views of responsibility for the Second World War held even by Moscow and Bonn. The two immense power-holding-and-wielding groups in both camps have been more or less committed to agreement on their mutual righteousness with regard to the causes and conduct of the war. Only with the end of the fighting did the two colossi begin to indulge in wholesale official charges and countercharges of faithlessness, sinister intentions, power-greed, and a whole category of related knaveries. Indeed, the attitudes of the Communists and of a large part of those who are known as “conservatives” among the “Free Nations” differ but little on the nature of the war ending in 1945; witness their mutual exploitation of the alleged evils of the much execrated “appeasement” at Munich in 1938.

The one common problem on both sides of the Cold War has been to convince the rest of the world that each is telling the truth and the other prevaricating on the events since 1945. On the crucial prior decade there has been little discussion and no significant difference. But it has been precisely on this prewar period that Barnes and the new revisionists have concentrated almost exclusively, to the annoyance and irritation of both sides in the Cold War. Many American
historians, journalists, politicians, and publicists, some deeply involved personally in making or propagandizing public policy through war's end, have been eager to sanctify the leaders and policies of that time for posterity. Not for them was the admonition of St. Thomas à Kempis, "Fawn not upon the great." Along with European and Asiatic Communists in like occupations, defending their own massive gains, all directly traceable to that war, they were affronted and angered by Revisionism.

When the factual integrity and legitimacy of both power groups were challenged by revisionist studies in a fundamental and radical manner, denunciations from the official circles of both the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. became expectable and understandable.

The attacks of Barnes and his colleagues on the allegations of the unsullied innocence of the main residuary legatees of world power astounded and infuriated official and unofficial spokesmen of both powers and their "allies," for these critiques undermined the very foundation of postwar politics. In some academic and journalistic circles, malicious hints that Barnes had some personal ax to grind became one of the more offensive staples in rebuttal, though it was obvious that such a charge could not have been further from the truth. And repeated but unproved declarations by adversaries that Germanophile predispositions accounted for his spirited redressing of the record lost most of their substance because of the transparent Germanophobia of these same adversaries.

Barnes was personally more directly occupied with the subject of U.S.-Pacific relations, including the train of events that brought this country into the war by way of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, than with the European aspects of the coming of World War II. The Pearl Harbor affair, in his scheme of things, is the most fateful event of Twentieth Century American history, the pry that opened the Pandora's box of the present form of "internationalism," which may well reign as public policy until exhaustion of American resources gradually chokes off America's self-appointed multiple role of world schoolmaster, lawgiver, policeman, jailer, and Santa Claus. Barnes and his fellow Revisionists long ago demolished the elementary legend of an innocent Roosevelt-led America treacherously attacked by a sinister and unprovoked enemy.14

14. The editors of the Nation, in a famous extrapolation of Machiavelli in the summer of 1944, declared, "One essential for mutual understanding between two countries is a sympathetic grasp of each other's mythology." The occasion was a rebuke to Britain's wartime Minister of Production, Oliver Lyttelton, who had insisted in a speech in June of that year that it was "a travesty on history" for Americans to maintain that the United States had been "forced" into the Second World War.
One may, however, entertain reservations on one particular implication of the revisionist case: that had proper alertness been vigorously insisted upon in Washington, the attack and the war might not have occurred. Recognizing that the American economic noose had become tightened steadily around the Nipponese neck—especially during the two years prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor—and largely in behalf of Anglo-Franco-Dutch Asiatic colonialism, the shooting would almost surely have been precipitated elsewhere in its own good time. But the circumstances would certainly not have been anywhere as dramatic, and the almost tribal unity brought about in America by Pearl Harbor could hardly have been forthcoming. Pearl Harbor determined the way that the United States would fight in World War II. A slip and a slide into hostilities, as had happened in that of 1914-1918, would never have produced the enthusiasm and determination which washed out the formidable opposition to involvement that prevailed to the very day of the Japanese bombing. Furthermore, the grim and total prosecution of the war itself was a direct corollary of the way in which the United States had become involved, according to the Roosevelt Administration's propaganda explanation. Norman Thomas' characterization of the Pacific war as "an organized race riot," in a *Commonweal* article as hostilities were drawing to a close, has yet to be surpassed as a realistic appraisal.  

The liberal editors wrote it off as "ineptitude" on Lyttelton's part for having overlooked momentarily the American "myth": "We entered the war as the surprised victim of unprovoked aggression." It was further suggested that Lyttelton was distracted by the fact that the British officially propagated a completely contrary "myth," that of having eagerly declared war on Hitler first, "because of his aggressions against others," something of which many British boasted, as evidence of their superior morality. (The editors would have been on far safer ground had they confessed that "mutual understanding" between international interest groups of political ideologues, and not "countries," is facilitated by agreement on "myths.".) The "myths" in question at the time (1944) have long been cemented into official historical writing, of course. For a full account of this incidental crack in the wartime propaganda monolith, see the *Nation*, July 1, 1944, p. 3. Compare the eel-like evasiveness above with the blunt frankness of the editorial commentary in the *U. S. News* for September 7, 1945 (p. 80): "There now is general military agreement that, except for the lives lost, the attack on Pearl Harbor turned out to be in this country's favor, because it jolted the nation into all-out action, without any squabbling about reasons or cost."  

15. Norman Thomas, "Our War with Japan," *Commonweal* (April 20, 1945), pp. 8-10. Thomas further characterized the Pacific war as "a wholesale slaughter of women and children to a degree which ancient Assyrians could not match," and he went on to discount the widespread belief that the United States was an "innocent bystander" attacked by a "thug" in the Far East. On the contrary, Thomas insisted that the Pearl Harbor assault was a logical consequence of the Roosevelt Administration's economic war on the Japanese and its parallel attempt
A most forthright and graphic summation of the outcome of political considerations and forces gaining control of American historical writing was that of A.J.P. Taylor, in an article in the *Manchester Guardian* for July 19, 1961. Commenting on the book *Between War and Peace* by Herbert Feis, a State Department employee before and during World War II, and one of the most respected and productive of the current Establishment historical guild in the United States, Taylor called it “a State Department brief, translated into terms of historical scholarship,” and went on to declare that “Dr. Feis’s conclusions were not derived from the evidence; they were assumed as self-evident before the book was begun.” Then he made the following damaging charge against those of the current generation of American historians, whether in their university departments or in official posts, working, for the most part gladly and proudly, in tacit co-operation with or directly in the employ of what Orwell calls “The Ministry of Truth”: “The academic historians of the West may assert their scholarly independence even when they are employed by a government department; but they are as much ‘engaged’ as though they wore the handsome uniform designed for German professors by Dr. Goebbels.” The insight of the noted British writer Henry Fairlie into the nature of this question is considerably sharper and more fundamental:

The most serious consequence of the vanity of the intellectual is that he is so pathetically flattered by power. The politician is the most guileful of flatterers, the intellectual his most guileless victim. As long as the politician can be seen to be what he is—a trader for votes—the intellectual does not find it difficult to remain untouched by him. But as soon as the politician dresses himself up in fancy clothes, glamorizing his office and his power, the intellectual is a sucker for his favors . . . .

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16. Feis resigned early in November, 1943, from his post as chief economic advisor to the State Department, which he had held since 1931. *Time*, in its comment on the resignation, remarked, “Of expert Herbert Feis it was once said, ‘He looks like Harpo [Marx] and talks like Karl.’” *Time* (November 8, 1943), p. 16.

17. Fairlie, “Johnson and the Intellectuals,” *Commentary* (October, 1965), pp. 49-55, reprinted as “Poets and Professors in the Political Wonderland” in *National Observer*, October 18, 1965. It would appear that Nietzsche compressed the issue into a minimum of words in *Human, All-too-Human*; “To scholars who become politicians the comic rôle is usually assigned; they have to be the good conscience of a State policy.”
V. Social Intelligence in World Affairs: A Dim Prospect

The increasing politicalization and conformity of historical writing in the past two decades, once more failed to affect Barnes, nor did the wearisome clichés of the new permanent-war liberalism. He also made the absolute minimum of concessions to the post-atom bomb reverence in America. His was still the old-line internationalism of the Edwin M. Borchard or the John Foster Dulles\(^{16}\) of the middle 1930's, now rendered obsolete as America exploited its wartime experience to essay forth as a modern Rome, its provincial officials scattered all over the world, filling their roles in the complex paraphernalia created by the exigencies of global "defense."

Despite all this, Barnes' efforts to straighten the record on the origins of and responsibilities for World War II goes to the top of the list of Twentieth Century campaigns for devotion to pure history regardless of consequences. It involved a total rejection of the literary oversimplifier, with on-this-conclusion-I-base-my-facts as his fundamental premise. Very damaging to Barnes' efforts at reassessment has been the mobilization of history as a serving-man of contemporary politics to a degree perhaps not seen since the time of Charlemagne. And history as a craft continues to move in the direction of the embellishment of political myth in gracious and mellifluent phrase, while current public policy more than ever before requires its historical apology, buttress, and testimony.

No politician active since the end of the Second World War could have been expected to use more than a fragment of Barnes' work, and he drifted into public and professional eclipse, while a surreptitious campaign was undertaken to demolish the respectability of all his previous work as well. This was a variation of the kind of professional assassination attempt made earlier on Charles A. Beard, but it was carried on more intensively and persistently, for Beard died when World War II Revisionism was just getting under way, while Barnes has never ceased or paused in his revisionist work during over a decade and a half. After all, Barnes, like Beard, incensed and offended "rightists" and "leftists" alike with his Revisionism, and on several occasions he has rendered the new breed of totalitarian centrists (with a slight list to portside) almost trembling with rage. But there has been no political orthodoxy in Barnes' current revisionist

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16. Most illuminating to those who think of Dulles only in his "brinksmanship" as Secretary of State under President Dwight Eisenhower, would be his book *War, Peace and Change (New York: Harper, 1939)*. This is more completely discussed in this writer's *Meditations upon the Early Wisdom of John Foster Dulles* (Mercer Island, Washington, 1958).
writings; he has been published and praised or damned, mainly the latter, by "Right" and "Left" journals and newspapers in America, Germany, Italy, Britain, Japan, and elsewhere. And he has had the dubious, if understandable, distinction of being called both a "leftist" and a "rightist" in the same sentence, a fitting commentary on the bankruptcy of contemporary political verbiage and its practitioners as well.

Der Spiegel, the German newsweekly equivalent to America's ineffable Time, also caught in the strait jacket of current political verbal reflexes, in a commentary on a revisionist book, attempted to bundle Barnes, Beard, Charles Callan Tansill, and other revisionists into a politically activist "conservative" camp of its own creation. The editors thereby not only committed a simple-minded mistake, but drew from Barnes a celebrated letter, which, besides establishing the relatively detached political pedigree of several outstanding revisionists, declared that Revisionism was not aiming to advance the momentary fortunes of either the Right or the Left, but was simply trying to set the record straight and to let those who would make what they could of it.19 This was a notable departure from the expectations of Revisionism following the First War, which was calculated to play a specific function in forming and reshaping attitudes and convictions all over the world, and did so, as we have been.

This altered perspective can also be credited to changes that have taken place in Barnes' own attitudes. His long-sustained confidence in progress, as reflected in his writings on public affairs and social problems, has been at least partly a casualty of the almost continual warfare since 1939. A mark of the change was his bleak "The Outlook for Rationality in the Present World" in The Humanist in 1961.20 Here he rivaled the pessimism of the Santayana of a few years earlier on the possibilities of humankind's making its way through the thicket of irrationalism that has grown so luxuriantly in the past quarter century. He also marked the progressive failure of the race to react in horror to horror, a characteristic of our creeping re-barbarization.

Once again Barnes was in collision with a profound but largely undetected alteration in the manner of portrayal of the world and with the social psychology underlying this alteration. "Great economic and social forces flow with a tidal sweep over communities that are only half-conscious of that which is befalling them," John Morley wrote in his Life of Richard Cobden. In like manner, it is unusual for even the trained observer to be fully conscious of imperceptible

20. In Volume 21, No. 3.
ideological transitions; an example is the gradual conversion of traditional liberalism in America into the peculiar form of liberal totalitarianism which matured in silent and irregular fashion during the 1930-1950 era. Embellished by several additional jungle-like excrescences, it has since not only managed to cover the country but has also succeeded in penetrating to the most remote reaches of the planet, while establishing itself entirely in the American public consciousness and memory as a substitute for the original article. (Barnes partially detailed the nature and development of this momentous trend in his spirited brochure, *The Chickens of the Interventionist Liberals Have Come Home to Roost.*)

A contemporary companion trend of fully as great importance has been the restructuring of the intellectual foundation of the historical writing concerned with international politics and world affairs. For many years before Barnes' career began, it had been considered significant and sufficient if historical writing in this field answered affirmatively the question, "Is it true?" This was the climate prevailing in his formative years as a productive scholar, and was an encouragement of incalculable dimensions to intellectual honesty.

But the exigencies created by the peculiar political circumstances that took shape between 1939 and 1945, and which were extended throughout the world in the subsequent two decades, resulted in the gradual alteration of the fundamental historical query to "What effect will it have?" It would not do to tell the whole painful story if it were to cause much heartburn to the widely diffused new political dispensation, and even possibly produce several other consequences of more drastic import. These might range all the way from making the tenure of the Establishment precarious to—horrors!—the "rehabilitation" of the formerly defeated and discredited, a particularly lamentable eventuality, and considered a catastrophe beyond measure, even though they had long since been physically annihilated and systematically calumniated thereafter and could gain from this "rehabilitation" only a revised and partially enhanced stature in the eyes of posterity.

The effect that this revolution has had on the psycho-social underpinnings of historical work, determining the direction such writing might take before it was even underway, can be understood only by careful students of the trend and its operations. The resulting across-the-board barrier to interfering with the mythology of the Second World War and the sustained political edifice erected upon its dead was responsible for achieving, with rather considerable success, what Barnes so appropriately and effectively designated as the "Historical Blackout." Barnes not only aptly christened this term, but
immortalized it in his famous brochure *The Struggle against the Historical Blackout*, which had a very wide circulation, and in the first chapter of *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace*.

Revisionist history is now more frequently condemned by the dominant historical circles for its unpleasant and undesirable effects than for the possibility that it may not be the truth. Indeed, it is especially suspect and deplored to the extent that it appears to be the truth. This reaction was well underlined by Professor Bernard C. Cohen of Princeton University in reviewing *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace* in the *American Political Science Review*. The most recent and spectacular example of this new mode in historical values was, of course, the panegyric tributes to Churchill by historians at the time of his death, which were virtually unanimous throughout the literate world, particularly in the English-speaking group. To have called attention to his political record down to May, 1941, would have had a most sobering effect.

This giving political effect precedence over truth in historical writing pushes historical values and practices well over into the framework and pattern of Orwellian or "Nineteen Eighty-Four" historical techniques, methodology and procedure, in which historical material is constantly destroyed and rewritten on the basis of its immediate effect upon readers, and embarrassing, compromising, or challenging evidence is thrown down the "memory hole." Barnes has called attention to this fact in his first chapter in *Perpetual War*, in the 1962 revision of his *History of Historical Writing*, and with more background in his *Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World*. Two impressive illustrations of this strategy from recent United States history come to mind: The first is the fate suffered by key documents involved in the Pearl Harbor investigations; the second is the similar disappearance from the record of substantial items from the published documentary collections of the World War II Teheran and Yalta.
Conferences, and the dismissal from the State Department of Dr. Bryton Barron and Professor Donald M. Dozer for protesting these deletions.

The increasingly usual method employed by this country during the present century for settling local problems has been to dissolve them into much larger ones, more and more on a global plane. On the level of international politics, the conflicts of policies and interests in limited parts of the world have twice been handled by extending them all over the globe. By the conclusion of the second occasion, the accumulated tensions had made the eves of the two world wars seem like peace and quiet by comparison. Since the world is now saturated...
to its outermost confines with wars waged in varying degrees of intensity, there is no further level here on which to transfer the planetary problems; therefore, we are in the first faltering stages of projecting the Great Unresolved Dispute to other space-time magnitudes. The limitless expanse of outer space is becoming the newest arena of the Cold War as a function of this Dispute of the Nations, and it may well become its burial ground while the sterile diplomacy of the world's traveling circus of "negotiators" continues its inept course.

World collaboration to conquer the obstacles of interstellar exploitation might well be the world-unity appeal that has not yet been essayed. Harry Elmer Barnes has rather mordantly hinted at discourse in the November, 1966 *Ladies' Home Journal* on the peripheral amour of the late President Roosevelt, and his short history of love in America for the January 28, 1967 *Saturday Evening Post*, it would now seem that Ann Landers and Abigail van Buren are the ones most likely to run into his competition.

Henry J. Taylor in his syndicated column of August 10, 1965, summarized rather darkly the reaction to Schlesinger in Washington from published statements: "a coattail rider and fast-buck artist, arrogant but sycophantic, ambitious but susceptible," though Taylor considered most objectionable "Schlesinger's calculated pretenses in presenting himself as a historian." Lest one brush off Taylor as simply a hostile conservative inclined by nature to critical views of so pure a liberal as Schlesinger, we might also pay attention to the conclusion of the liberal columnist Inez Robb. Commenting on the revelations in William Manchester's *The Death of a President*, she declared bluntly in her article of March 4, 1967 that Schlesinger's calling together of a luncheon less than 24 hours after Kennedy's assassination, at which he proposed the dropping of Lyndon Johnson as the head of the 1964 Democratic party ticket, was "the ultimate example of vulgar and unseemly haste." "Schlesinger's instant plunge into power politics sets some kind of record," she concluded; "No Manchester revelation of the tangled reactions to the assassination is more repellent." An argument could be advanced that is was mildly uncharitable to estimate Schlesinger thusly. On the other hand, when Henry Fairlie concluded in *Commentary* (see note 17) that "the American intellectual, although one should assume he is beyond the age of consent, was raped by President Kennedy," it was the picture of Schlesinger which immediately sprang to the minds of many as the fugleman of the contingent which marched up the stairs. For sure, his undeviating and steady partisan predictability and his skill at obfuscation have convinced an increasingly larger group that he can be considered a historian in the same sense that a bullfighter can be listed as part of the ranch labor pool. Others have preferred to describe him as "that notorious Harvard pamphleteer" or as the court poet of the Kennedy government-in-exile. All the corroborating evidence one might need is to be found in his book *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), a book that received the usual vociferous puff from most organs of the establishment liberal press and the customary delirious huzzas from liberal Academe's professional journals, though some of the reservations are worth noting; Malcolm Muggeridge (in *Esquire* for September, 1966, p. 37) dismissed it as "a butter-slide" by one of John F. Kennedy's "adulators," while to Gore Vidal it was "Mr. Schlesinger's lovely threnody" and "the best political novel since Coningsby." ("The Holy Family: The Gospel According to Arthur, Paul, Pierre and William
something like this in his comments on the possibilities of “astro-baloney,” an extension of Clare Boothe Luce’s famous “globaloney” remark of 1943. (In a letter to this writer, December 3, 1962, Barnes described as his “pet aversions” over the years “pedantic and routine historians, Fundamentalists, hypocritical Puritans, worshipers of past ‘wisdom,’ censors, warmongers and interventionists, blackout boys, and above all Cold Warriors and Space Race idiots.” See also the frontispiece to Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace [Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton, 1953]). Of course, the breakthrough, if it comes, will be on a scale to stagger the imagination of even the most broadly trained

and Several Minor Apostles,” Esquire [April, 1967], pp. 100-101.)

Major efforts at establishing him as a national town crier have been made by the influential Luce publications and the National Broadcasting Company, the former particularly by way of a Time magazine cover story in the issue for December 17, 1965 (as well as by various grandioso essays in Life), and the latter through the medium of guesting Schlesinger on the prestigious “Meet the Press” program on November 28, 1965. Despite the distressing bad taste of the exchange of charges of lying between himself and the sacrosanct New York Times, (“I, at least, had the excuse that I was working for the government”), after listening to his restrained and polished evasions, and after studying them in printed form, one could appreciate how far he had come from the crude collectivist handbill he had composed for the Partisan Review in 1947, so dolorously exploited years later by “conservatives,” let alone his The Vital Center (1949), the bible of totalitarian liberalism. (“The idea that truth lies always in the mean position between two extremes, however attractive we may feel it to be, is of no practical use as a criterion for discovering where the truth lies, because every view can be represented as the mean between two extremes,” Robert H. Thouless pointed out in his celebrated Straight and Crooked Thinking [London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1930], p. 67; “When we have two extreme positions and a middle one between them, the truth is just as likely to lie on one extreme as in the middle position.”) It would be hard now not to add one more occupational attainment to his others, that of “statesman.” Indeed, he blossomed into one of the most pompous of unofficial advisers on the handling of the war in Southeast Asia in 1966-1968, in which capacity he was able to trade generously on the experience of his career as a prompter at the elbow of the previous president, during whose abbreviated tenure such foreign policy triumphs as the accession to the Berlin Wall, the Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba, the Alliance for Progress extravaganza, and the missile showdown with Communist Russia’s Nikita Khrushchev transpired. Schlesinger’s shortcomings as a counselor to the mighty, “dispensing advice through cigar smoke,” have been related astringently by Roger Winship Stuart in his The Thought Brigade: America’s Influential Ghosts-in-Government (New York: Obolensky, 1963), but the most effective deflation of Schlesinger in this capacity has been at the hands of the National Observer. In a long editorial on April 15, 1968, after describing him as “one of the main Poo-Bahs of the intellectual left” and “a self-styled expert on all things,” the editors had much merriment over his particularly bad guesswork with respect to Vietnam military tactical recommendations. Now that his Arabian Days tales of life at the court of President John F. Kennedy have been log-rolled by the intellectual Establishment into still another Pulitzer
astrophysicist-politician. And for those dedicated to "defense," there should be the limitless possibilities for preparing against hypothetical foes "out there," which, by comparison, should make mobilization activity, as we have grown accustomed to know it, resemble the protective efforts of paleolithic cave men. The coming slogan to replace "The Constitution follows the Flag" will undoubtedly be something along the line of "Aid follows the Telescope," which in its early stages may take the form of beefing up space station colonies in danger of Communist invasion, and lead to vast Marshall Plan-type investments in outer space. Under such compulsions the Great Liberal Mirage of the World State may yet take shape, but it will be an apparition that may well start our worst nightmares on the road to realization.

Prize, few worlds remain for him to conquer, if any. He stands a good chance to become the grand vizier of still another Kennedy regime, should it materialize. But he is also overdue for a critical reassessment by enterprising scholars half his age who may have been able to reach this way-station in life without having suffocated in the grip of the mythologies and pseudo-religious political taboos set up by the Roosevelt cult entrenched in universities across the land, and who know enough about the properties of aluminum silicate to recognize clay feet when they see them.

"There is no more valuable American tradition than that of not permitting anyone to get away with anything," Schlesinger smugly intoned in his testimonial to Murray Kempton's book America Comes of Middle Age. This astounding misreading of what has happened on our continent since the time of Columbus, during which more people have "got away" with more than have any similar number in any other part of the globe, may be ignored. But it might be a useful text for some young researcher who wants to examine the highly touted product of Schlesinger himself over the last quarter of a century or more.