Palefaces Or Redskins:
A Profile
Of
Americans

By Leonard P. Liggio

On the same day that tropical Pearl Harbor stood in flames, in the other part of the world in a snowstorm Russian divisions were first driving back the Germans from their advanced outposts near Moscow. Decem-
ber 1941 was the turning point of the Second World War. From that day onward the defeat of Germany, Italy, and Japan was assured.¹

John Lukacs indicates that the roots of the Cold War are to be found in the beginnings of World War II. Lukacs analyzes how Pearl Harbor resulted from the policy decisions of particular forces in the governments of Washington and Tokyo. Roosevelt’s demands on behalf of the US puppet Chiang prevented peaceful relations from prevailing between US imperialism and the Asian national bourgeoisie, for whom Japan had been the traditional spokesman. As a result of the United States’ provocative embargo on trade with Japan and its refusal to negotiate in good faith, the nationalist militarists in Japan became predominant over the peaceful traditional and business interests. Lukacs sketches the final efforts by the Japanese to gain US agreement to peace in the Far East, and indicates the central role of Chiang’s China Lobby in involving the American people in an Asian conflict which has lasted for the past twenty-five years.

There is no doubt that the Japanese Emperor and at least part of the Tokyo government really wished to

¹ John Lukacs, A New History of the Cold War (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1966), pp. 36-37
avoid war with the United States in 1941. Even though Roosevelt refused to meet Prince Konoye in Honolulu earlier, around 20 November the situation was such that a possibility for a compromise was discernible from the text of a so-called Japanese “Proposal B” that was not too far apart from an American _modus vivendi_ proposal already drafted. But between 22 and 25 November it was decided in Washington not to present the _modus vivendi_ to the Japanese; and the American note handed to them on 26 November contained conditions that, though excellent in principle, the Japanese government could hardly accept. ...The motives behind this American diplomatic reversal are still somewhat obscure. We know that Chiang’s friends, allies, lobbyists, and agents played a very important role.²

American intervention in World War II on the side of Chiang had a profound effect on American foreign policy attitudes, particularly upon Isolationism, as noted in Lukacs’ analysis of the development of the Cold War. Lukacs says:

Obviously Isolationism ceased to be respectable after Pearl Harbor. ...Yet, again, we may ask whether this development has been profound rather than superficial and even whether it has been so clear a gain at all?³

Lukacs then quotes President De Gaulle’s views on the manner in which the undercutting of American isolationism contributed to the origins and maintenance of the Cold War. Lukacs suggests that of all who have written about American foreign policy from World War II “there is but one who saw through Roosevelt’s global plans with profound insight. It is General De Gaulle” in his War Memoirs.⁴ De Gaulle declared:

a kind of messianic impulse now swelled the American spirit ...which concealed the instinct for domination,... It was true that the isolationism of the United States was, according to the President, a great error now ended. But passing from one extreme to the other, it was a permanent system of intervention that he intended to institute by international law. In his opinion, a four-power directorate—America,

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2. Ibid., pp. 84-85.
Soviet Russia, China and Great Britain — should settle the world’s problems. ...such an organization, according to him, would have to involve the installation of American forces on bases distributed throughout the world, some of which would be located in French territory. Roosevelt thus intended to lure the Soviets into a group that would contain their ambitions and in which America could unite its dependents. Among the ‘four,’ he knew, in fact, that Chiang Kai-shek’s China needed his cooperation and that the British, in danger of losing their dominions, would yield to his policy. ...the support offered by Washington and the existence of American bases would give rise to new sovereignties in Africa, Asia and Australasia, which would increase the number of states under an obligation to the United States.  

De Gaulle concluded by noting that given this limitless global domination by the United States, it was possible to satisfy the limited, defensive needs of the Soviet Union that there be no hostile regimes in Eastern Europe; in fact, as Churchill noted at the time, the recognition of Russia’s interest in that region was a perfect way to distract Russia from the areas of the world which were of greater importance to Western imperialism.

Yet the Truman Administration determined to impose Western imperialism’s aims upon Eastern Europe as well as on the rest of the world. As the author of The Great Powers and Eastern Europe, Lukacs is especially knowledgeable in Soviet-American relations in Eastern Europe. He concludes that the Soviet Union had made no attempt to interfere with America’s new domination of Western Europe.

Now Stalin did not particularly contest American power; he did not challenge America’s sphere; did it not seem to him, however, that the Americans were beginning to challenge his sphere?  

The Truman Administration had difficulty in rousing the American people to the Cold War crusade. The American people knew that more than six million Russians had been killed and the major industrial, agricultural and cultural regions destroyed by the war. Americans recognized that only “two of every thousand Americans” had had to die in the war because “fifty out of  

every thousand Russians" had died. It was remembered that "the massive bulk of this (American) aid did not reach Russia until after the Battles of Moscow and Stalingrad" when the tide of war had already been reversed, and that for every enemy division facing the Western allies there were three against the Russians. These facts were reinforced by distrust of Western imperialism "felt by Left-wing Democrats as well as by Right-wing Republicans." Furthermore, Lukacs adds, "the inchoate but deep and widespread inclinations of American isolationism had not yet been spent."

To overcome this opposition to the Cold War the Truman Administration called in the Old World to redress the balance of the New. From Winston Churchill to escapees from war crimes trials, the American people were deluged with propaganda totally lacking in the legitimacy of native birth.

The collapse of the Old Regime in Eastern Europe threw up on America's shores an intellectual Iron Guard to reinforce the US' administration's position vis a vis the American people. Lukacs distinguishes in American politics two main traditions: The Redskins and the Palefaces. This concept is transposed to ideology from one long familiar in American literature. The political Redskins, the mass of the American people, came here to flee the feudal systems of the old world to seek freedom from taxes, inspection, control, 'education,' conscription and foreign wars. The Redskin culture is an accumulation of individual decisions, individual desires, individual purposes which conflict with any imposition of grandiose organized schemes. The Redskin, the American, does not wish to be ruled, ordered, taxed or conscripted, but his flight from feudalism has meant a failure to confront the issue of domination by the Palefaces. The Redskins have not yet purged themselves fully by revolutionary experiences of the mentality of the emancipated slave or serf. Thus, the Redskins suffer from disunity and their leadership tends to be prophetic, lacking in the organizational talents necessary to lead a sustained assault on the citadels of privilege and monopoly, the "bureaucratic Welfare State" which the Redskins' weakness has allowed the Palefaces to construct.

The Palefaces represent those who seek to emulate the aristocratic society of Europe, that is, the ways of feud-
lism upon which the European ruling classes are based. Thus, the American Palefaces have viewed themselves as a divinely chosen elite who must paternalistically direct, educate and especially control the mass of the American people, the Redskins. To the Palefaces, the Redskins have no sense of the responsibilities and sacrifices outside their natural surroundings which the Palefaces’ nation-state’s call to greatness entails; thus, to Palefaces the Redskins appear ‘uncivilized,’ ‘uncultured,’ and ‘uneducated.’ For their role in the feudal system of being guides and guards, leaders and teachers, the Palefaces insist upon a sizable part of the productivity of the Redskins. The Redskins’ self-interest must be curbed, according to the Palefaces, by their own devotion to the ‘common good,’ the ‘general welfare,’ or the ‘national interest.’ With this rationale, the Palefaces’ ultimate role is the administrator—the inspector, the public school teacher, the welfare worker, the tax-collector, the policeman, the army officer. Lukacs asks whether the very organization of our societies, too, is not unconsciously moving in a “rightist” direction, away from Capitalism toward older, medieval institutions. Consider only the movement away from money economy, the dependence of the citizen’s position not upon birth or wealth but upon his function: a status rather than a contract society, and so forth.8

Capitalism has been historically the polar opposite of the Right. Capitalism, freedom, the Left, have challenged feudalism, restriction and status, the right, with all other possible positions falling between these poles. Capitalism, the self-determination of people to decide their own priorities, is precluded by the Palefaces’ feudal commercial system of mercantilism or state ‘capitalism’. The “rightist” direction, away from Capitalism,” has subjected Americans, the Redskins, to the Palefaces’ monopoly ‘capitalism’ or to “government intervention and to the extension of socialist patterns of life and thought.” 9 The feudal nature of American statism is best seen in the major instrumentality of Paleface administration – the draft. Control of people’s labor is an important element of feudalism, and it is control of people’s labor that is the major goal of the Palefaces. Defense Secretary McNamara recently made the ‘enlightened’ proposal in the face of the popular, Redskin, opposition to conscription, that a system of

9. Ibid., p. 296.
two-year national service for all youth be instituted. That is, a confiscation of two years' labor from most American citizens. Thus, in the tradition of feudalism, the rulers will have an expendable, cheap, and especially dependent (unprotected by the civil laws and subject to military and administrative slave codes) labor force. The term-of-years rather than permanent subjection is not alien to feudal institutions; indentured servitude and apprenticeship systems are refinements of the feudal system applied to advanced and complex economic relationships. The government, or to speak plainly, the Pentagon, is the largest consumer of capital and of labor in the country; compared to the Pentagon, all major industrial concerns fall to middle rank category where their profit margins are threatened by the rising firms associated with the Pentagon contract system. "United States industrialists in the name of Free Enterprise clamor for more and more government orders for their own enterprises." 10

Thus the United States, now the leader of the Free world, was ahead of the world in bureaucratization. This is an alarming development. ...Just as government, with its cancerously growing number of civil servants (and the less visible but more ominous growth of the number of people indirectly and partly employed by the government), suggests the transformation from the Legislative to the Administrative State, similar developments have taken place in every kind of enterprise and in wide areas of American life. The administrator rather than the producer has become the typical (and respected) American occupation. 11

The Palefaces' administrator-orientation has been expanded from domestic feudal-paternalism to foreign imperialist-paternalism "of the White Man's Burden, of Liberation, of International Policemanship." 12 With the dominance of the Right, the Palefaces, in the American government, twentieth century American foreign policy has been imperialistic, whether by T. or F. Roosevelt, Wilson or Truman, Eisenhower or Kennedy: "these Presidents were imperialists, imperialists of a new sort, covering up their concepts of national ambitions with high-flown moralistic oratory, eminently successful imperialists of a new kind." 13 The state nationalism at

10. Ibid., p. 298.
11. Ibid., pp. 294-95.
13. Ibid., p. 371.
the root of imperialism was the dominant ideology during the early modern period until challenged from the Left by the patriotism of the democratic revolutions, based upon Rousseau’s conception of human happiness lying in the natural institutions outside the state. To the revolutionary impulse of freedom, the statist or Rightist responded; “in the early nineteenth century, the state is put forward by certain German thinkers as a majestic end in itself.” The Palefaces’ nationalism, or state consciousness, is loyalty to the state, disregarding and often conflicting with the natural institutions, the traditions, and the specific locality of the people. The Redskins, patriotism, nation (patrie)-consciousness, is loyalty to the natural institutions, the specific locality and the traditions of the people. Thus, imperialism especially conflicts with the traditions of the mass of the American people, the Redskins. Lukacs notes the effects of the development of “an imperial society” based upon the “American world empire.”

here I am concerned with the effects of this worldwide transformation on American society. For this involved -- and it still involves -- great radical departures from previous American traditions. Together with the development of a welfare state, the bureaucracy of the American government increased in tremendous proportions. The proportionate increase of the personnel and of the powers of federal investigative and intelligence agencies was even greater.15

As Lukacs indicates, the FBI and the CIA are the two Paleface instrumentalities furthest removed from the traditional freedom of the American, the Redskin; they are direct transplants from European state nationalism. As typified in Nazi Germany, state nationalism was anti-patriotic, anti-communist and anti-tradition. Thus, in twentieth century Europe, ‘National’, designating expansionist, anti-patriotic, anti-communist movements, “became a byword for anti-patriotic treachery during the Second World War. This tendency is faintly discernible even in the United States (cf. the McCarthyite, pro-German and sometimes mildly pro-Fascist National Review).”16

The anti-patriotism and anti-freedom traditions of the Palefaces have been infused with new reserves from European feudalism since World War II. Having failed in

14. Lukacs, Decline and Rise of Europe, p. 149.
16. Lukacs, Decline and Rise of Europe, p. 159.
Europe with their anti-patriotic, anti-communist, and expansionist state nationalism, these strategic advisers have crossed over to America for one last gamble to prove their discredited theories.

It may be symbolic that among the myriad Experts of International Relations who have been berating and advising the American people ever since the beginning of the last World War, Americanized immigrant professors have played a large role; they have fashioned, defined, and proposed new kinds of American National interests, of an atomic Realpolitik tailored to what they state are America’s needs. Before me lies one of these incantations by a Director of a Foreign Policy Research Institute, consultant to the Government and Pentagon: “For the next fifty years or so, the future belongs to America. The American empire and mankind will not be opposites but merely two names for the universal order under peace and happiness. Novus orbis terrarum.” I regard this kind of thing not merely pompous but impertinent.  

These European emigre Foreign Policy advisors have become the intellectual vanguard in the State Department, Pentagon and universities for the Paleface Establishment. So far removed are these emigres from the American, the Redskin, traditions that irony is too weak a word to describe the transferral, the betrayal, involved when these men are appointed the judges of “Un-American” activities. Lukacs notes that “Americanism” had originally meant the instruction of immigrants in traditional American thought; but the “Un-American” activities committees have immigrants teaching their defeated feudal concepts to native-born Americans!

These Paleface emigres have escaped the judgment of the tribunals of their Redskin compatriots; since their state nationalism was allied with the imperialism of the Western Palefaces, the patriotic and traditional Redskin movements in their countries adopted the methods of communism to achieve liberation from Paleface dominion. Lukacs describes the Bolshevik Revolution as essentially a patriotic or isolationist movement which Lenin led to success: “the great and dreadful disgust of the Russian people with the European war, with Russia’s Western allies, including her own cosmopolitan and Francophile aristocracy.” Bolshevism was the modern Russian Redskin or isolationist (Slavophile or Eurasian) tra-

ution against the aristocratic Palefaces or Westernizers allied with Western imperialism. Thus, the Bolsheviks moved the capital from western St. Petersburg to Moscow in the interior. The same Paleface accusation of ‘agent of a foreign power’ hurled against the isolationists, the Redskin patriots, Debs, Senator LaFollette, and Congressman Lindbergh, was used by the Russian Palefaces against Lenin. Although Marx himself neglected the importance of the nation as opposed to the state, Lukacs indicates that contemporary communism is a system of achieving patriotic revolutions rather than a philosophical or economic theory, as the careers of Lenin, Mao, Ho Chi Minh and Castro well illustrate; Lukacs says: “A political Marxist, such as Castro, for example, declared himself to be pro-Communist because he was anti-American, and not the reverse.” 19

Cuban resistance to American imperialism is a major subject added to this revised New History of the Cold War. The Cuban Revolution was already over a year old when the first edition of the book was written. As in the case of such few perceptive historians of American foreign relations as William Appleman Williams (Tragedy of American Diplomacy) and John Gerassi (Great Fear in Latin America), Lukacs notes that nationalist movements tend to take on the ideological structure of the major opponents of Western imperialism - fascism before 1945, communism since. Cuba’s communism is the consequence of Cuban nationalism’s opposition to American domination; Castro adopted Marxism-Leninism as the leading philosophy of irreconcilability with American imperialism and to force the Soviet Union to protect Cuba against American military interventions after 1960. Lukacs is unequivocal in placing the blame for the October 1962 Missile Crisis upon the United States:

It was this threat of an American invasion and not the so-called Rocket Confrontation which culminated in the fantastic American-Russian crisis over Cuba in October 1962; the former led to the latter and not, as it is commonly believed, the reverse. 20

The Soviet installation of medium rockets in Cuba is explained as a cautious, defensive move to prevent a widely expected American invasion of Cuba and to stabilize American-Soviet relations. With the discovery of the missile sites, built “in an ostentatious manner, without any attempt to conceal or disguise them,” serious negotiations

led to their dismantlement in exchange for the major American commitment not to invade Cuba, and the minor one of removing American missile bases against Russia in Turkey and Italy. As the Soviets had hoped, the concrete solution of the crisis led to a detente between Russia and America, exemplified by the nuclear test ban treaty and by the wheat agreement. On June 10, 1963 at American University, Kennedy made what Lukacs calls "the most significant speech of his career"; he spoke out against a military and foreign policy of a "Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war."21 This was succeeded by initiatives in various areas of the world. A new policy reducing the American hostility toward China was about to be launched, along with the actual withdrawal of American troops in Vietnam preceding a negotiated settlement between the anti-Diem Junta and the National Liberation Front. Finally, restoration of amicable relations with Cuba was projected by Kennedy in a Miami speech of November 18, 1963, just four days before his assassination.22

A major new contribution by Lukacs is his treatment of the meaning of the 1964 elections. Johnson's electoral mandate was based upon an essentially isolationist program. Johnson's interests drew him toward domestic affairs away from international involvements. "True, this characteristic was inseparable from a certain parochialness of his views." but it was suitable since America "would do well to embark on a policy of broad and cautious retrenchment."23 This American mood of isolationism was challenged by the Republican candidate who offered, as Lukacs notes, the first clear choice since the isolationist-interventionist contest of 1920; Johnson's plurality was second only to that of 1920 when isolationism also triumphed. Of course, Johnson's isolationism was a fraud and he adopted Goldwater's expansionism soon after the election had repudiated it. Lukacs doubts that Goldwater's nomination represented an increase in "American conservatism":

It would be wrong to deduce therefrom (Goldwater's nomination) that the appeal for "American conservatism", that is, for an anti-Communist crusade, had grown during that decade; indeed, there is reason to believe that the social base of McCarthy's following was more solid than was Goldwater's.24

21. Ibid., p. 259.
22. Ibid., pp. 246-47.
24. Ibid., pp. 262-63.
This anti-communist crusading signifies "the weakness of American 'conservatism' - which is, in reality, nothing more than radical nationalism of a shallow and second-rate nature... Adlai Stevenson may be the American Mendes-France; but, mon Dieu, what do Barry Goldwater and Charles de Gaulle have in common? Nothing." De Gaulle is peaceful, patriotic, traditional - isolationist; "American conservatives" are expansionist, anti-patriotic, anti-communist - "National".

Involved in these matters is the civil rights revolution. Negroes in the Black Belt and Black Ghettos have shared with the mass of American people an adherence to patriotic nationalism against state nationalism as represented in their localities by the public welfare workers, school teachers, police forces, etc. In the Black Belt state nationalism has been supported by such community groups as the KKK. Lukacs notes that

in the South the demonstrations for the enforcement of the long overdue civil rights were resisted by brutal murders committed by members of the reborn Ku Klux Klan, a general sense of malaise appeared in many manifestations of American life, suggesting that the problems of this great people were deeper and more widespread than it has been generally believed; that perhaps it was not only the lack of world historical experience but also the superficiality of domestic cohesiveness which might eventually reduce that American role of world leadership...26

Yet, the weaknesses of the domestic foundations of American imperialism have been matched by increasingly wilder gambles on the international scene, especially in Asia. Lukacs indicates that "today that portion of the Russo-Chinese frontier is still along the Amur" where it was fixed by treaty in 1689; in contrast, while Boston and New York were experiencing the English Glorious Revolution, "in 1689 the American frontier was but a few dozen miles inland from the Atlantic coast; today the American flag flies in Okinawa, Japan, Korea, across the Pacific everywhere and even on the Asian mainland."27 On the Asian mainland, it was in relation to China that American expansion was most clearly evident after 1945, as it had been before; and Chiang's interest remained paramount, dragging the American people into the Cold War just as his interest had led to Pearl Harbor.

25. Lukacs, Decline and Rise of Europe, p. 262.
27. Ibid., p. 12.
American marines, and naval units helped to ferry advanced troops of the Nationalist government up North to establish their authority after the Japanese surrender... after all is said, the Russians did evacuate Manchuria by late 1946, turning its cities over not to Communist but to Chinese Nationalist garrisons. Russian support to the Chinese Communists cannot be denied; but, on the other hand, this support was far less than American supplies to the Nationalists during the same period... Stalin’s support of Mao was halfhearted. Remembering the occasional enthusiasm of certain American officials for Mao during the war, until mid-1947 the Russians feared that the Chinese Communists would be unduly close to the United States. This was at least one of the principal reasons why Moscow refused to break relations with Chiang’s regime even as late as 1948.28

Lukacs’ discussion of the American intervention in Korea seems relevant to today’s events; the inability of modern warfare to defeat popular Asian forces was evident despite the “undisputed superiority of American air power during the first phase of the war.” 29

The relative victor of the Korean War was not Russia but China; but her victory was one of prestige rather than of power...30

Checked in its crusade against China from the northern gateway, Korea, which Japan had used to invade China, the Pentagon shifted to the alternative route which Japan had also adopted, Vietnam.

American military and political influence was already superseding the French in southern Indochina when the Dien Bien Phu crisis broke... and in view of the experience of the Korean war, it is strange how Dulles and Admiral Radford could believe that the intervention of American air power alone could turn the tide of this guerrilla war fought in millet fields and rice paddies.31

Lukacs sketches the American intervention in Vietnam from its encouragement of Diem to violate the Geneva Agreement’s election terms “since they feared that they would lose such an election to Ho Chi Minh”, to the United

28. Ibid., pp. 90-91.
29. Ibid., p. 96.
30. Ibid., p. 102.
31. Ibid., p. 118.
States' escalation of the Vietnam War in 1965, which Lukacs notes did not at all mean that the Americans could do what the French had been unable to do more than a decade earlier: to defeat the Vietcong in the field and to eliminate the guerrilla warfare altogether. Reasonable estimates suggested that no less than one million American soldiers were needed to do the trick, perhaps... the Indochinese situation was different from the Korean one. ...In Vietnam the North and the Vietcong proved to be a match for the Americans without having to depend on the Chinese for their survival... (In Korea) there is every reason to believe that the aerial bombing of Manchuria would have led nowhere. Unfortunately there was little to suggest that Dean Rusk in 1964-65 understood these historical distinctions better than had his predecessor, the other Dean (Acheson), exactly fifteen years earlier; and it seems, too, that Johnson was not sufficiently aware of the singular ineffectiveness of strategic air power. ...like the strategic bombing of Germany during the last world war, or like the American air superiority during the first phase of the Korean War, this produced no worthwhile effects at all. ...the wooden diplomacy of Dean Rusk deserves most criticism; for, given the by now undoubtedly impressive endurance of the Vietcong and of the Ho Chi Minh regime in the North, it seems that even in the not too likely event of a decisive American victory in the South the Americans' present adversaries may have earned their rights to become virtually the principal power in Indochina in the long run.32

Lukacs wonders how many Americans, Left or Right, will consider Vietnam worth the bones of a single US marine. One is reminded of Bismarck's warning on December 5, 1876 during a major crisis between the Great Powers in the newly emerging countries of the Balkans: "They are not worth the healthy bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier." Bismarck and Eisenhower had the sense to stay the hands of the military from engaging in the loss of their people's lives. Bismarck's successors, as well as Johnson, lacked that discretion and have been marked in the ledger of history as war-criminals, as much for what they did to their own people as for the suffering they inflicted upon others.

32. Ibid., pp. 267-71.