D. F. Fleming on “The Origins of the Cold War”

by ALAN MILCHMAN

In the statist world in which we live there is a very real tendency to accept as fact all that the official organs of propaganda emit. Nowhere is this tendency more apparent than in the area of foreign affairs. The power of the State is such that the truth about the last fifty years has easily been suppressed. In allowing the State to write history as well as make it, we run the risk of surrendering all that remains of our fast vanishing freedoms. Are we to march into endless wars because the State has designated this or that nation to be the “enemy”? We have, unfortunately, done just that. Today we are poised on the brink of a new war; it may well be the last. Before we destroy ourselves forever in one vast nuclear holocaust, we should pause and ask ourselves this seemingly obvious question: Is there any reason to fight this war? We will not get a truthful answer from Washington nor from Moscow either, I venture to say. Only a searching analysis undertaken by countless individuals will produce the right answer. As yet few have attempted such an undertaking. One of the first is D. F. Fleming, Emeritus Professor of International Relations at Vanderbilt University, in his The Cold War and its Origins. This work deserves the attention of all who would concern themselves with the facts of the last five decades, not as seen from Washington or Moscow, but as seen by an individual whose first concern is truth.

In his effort to ascertain the origins of the Cold War, Professor Fleming goes back to the Russian Revolution of 1917. Here, at the very inception of the Bolshevik regime, are to be found the beginnings of the present conflict between East and West. At this point in their history, the Russian people were in almost unanimous agreement that the Tsarist autocracy had to be overthrown and that withdrawal from the First World War had to be effected. In the March Revolution, their first objective was achieved; but the unwillingness of the new Kerensky government to terminate Russian participation in the war made the subsequent November Revolution, in which the Bolsheviks took power, inevitable. Upon their assumption of power, the Bolsheviks moved quickly to fulfill their pledge to withdraw from the war. In March of 1918, the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed between Russia and Germany. However, Russia was not to know peace for long; three months later Allied troops landed in Siberia. The ostensible reason for Allied intervention was an attempt to restore a second front against Germany and to make certain that the vast stores of war material which the Allies had shipped to the old government did not fall into enemy hands. Yet, March of 1919, four months after the surrender of Germany and the end of World War I, found Allied troops not only in Siberia but occupying key seaports in the North and vast stretches of South Russia as well. In addition to
this occupation of Russian territory, the Allies provided the various “White” armies with generous amounts of money and war material. Without this aid the “White” forces could never have undertaken their large scale offensives against the new Bolshevik government. Moreover, it is important to note that the “Whites” did not represent a genuine popular uprising against the Bolsheviks, but rather they represented the very elements who had denied the Russian people the most elementary liberties for centuries past.

The end of the First World War had certainly removed any justification for the intervention as a wartime measure. What then were the real reasons for the Western intervention in Russia?

Professor Fleming offers two basic reasons for the Allied intervention, both of which played an important role in determining the action of the West. First was the imperialistic ambitions of Britain and France - their desire to maintain and extend their economic and financial control of Russia. Second was the fear on the part of the West that the social unrest stirred by Bolshevism would extend to the rest of Europe and perhaps threaten their own regimes, if it were allowed to take firm root in Russia. For both these reasons the West determined to crush the new government by whatever means were necessary. When it became apparent that limited numbers of troops and massive aid in money and war material would not be sufficient to complete the task, the West prepared for all-out war against the Bolsheviks. Yet, this massive intervention never took place. As Professor Fleming points out, the West was “held back and frustrated by the war-weariness of their own people and by the impossibility of inducing their troops to fight a new war.”

The most important point to note regarding the Western intervention in Russia is that “it constituted an official open and avowed attack on the Soviet government.” The new Soviet regime had taken no overt action against the West; moreover, in their war against the “Whites” the Soviets had the support of the overwhelming majority of the Russian people. In view of this, the intervention was an act of blatant aggression against both the Russian government and the Russian people. Is it any wonder, then, that the Soviets fear and distrust the West so much? The Western governments had sought to exterminate the Soviet regime and to reimpose the Tsarist autocracy upon the Russian people; only the extreme war-weariness of their own citizens had prevented them from accomplishing these ends. The origins of the Cold War can thus be traced back to the July of 1918 when the West, without provocation, invaded Russia and landed their troops in Vladivostock.

The failure of the West to crush the “Red” regime in its infancy did not lead to any relaxation of tensions between East and West. The Russians had every reason to believe that it would be only a question of time before the Western armies returned to complete their task. The Soviets were determined to waste no time in strengthening their regime so as to be able to withstand the expected Western onslaught. To this end all else was sacrificed, including the aspirations of the Russian people for a higher standard of living and a greater measure of freedom. The West, frus-

2. Ibid., p. 20.
trated in its endeavor at armed intervention, turned to the no less
hostile policy of containment. Around the borders of the Soviet
Union, a "cordon sanitaire" of hostile states was constructed.
If the "Red" regime could not immediately be destroyed, the West
was at least determined to encircle it with a ring of states in
Eastern Europe, which could be used as a forward base to mount
fresh attacks on the Soviets. That Eastern Europe, the invasion
route into Russia, should be in unfriendly hands was a constant
cause of concern to the Soviet leaders. If Russia was to be secured
from invasion, it was essential that the nations of Eastern Europe
have governments friendly to the Soviet Union.

An artificial and unprecedented power vacuum had been produced
in Eastern Europe by the defeat of both Germany and Russia in
World War I, and after 1918 neither was able to exercise its tra-
ditional influence in Eastern Europe. Excluded from the peace
negotiations at Versailles, the Soviet Union and Germany were
natural, if intermittent, allies. Fleming, in a section on "Russo-
German Friendship", describes the basis of this development:

We have never had any experience in the role of an outcast
nation. For both Germany and Russia the experience was
bitter in the years after 1920.3

The victorious Western powers moved into this vacuum in Eastern
Europe, and the new cordon sanitaire states created at Versailles
were controlled by London and Paris.4 Supported by the Western
powers, the economic, social and nationalities policies of the
Eastern European countries provided the conditions from which
World War II, and then the Cold War, were to develop. Western
monopolies were imposed upon a feudal social structure in which
an important aspect was the economic and ethnic oppression of the
German, Slovak, Hungarian, Ukrainian and White Ruthenian national
minorities.5 These policies speeded the inevitable regaining by
Russia and Germany of their natural influence in Eastern Europe,
an event which London and Paris could only forestall by going to
war.

The events leading to the Anglo-French declaration of war on
Germany during the Polish crisis of September, 1939 are examined
in detail by Fleming. The rejection by the ruling clique of Polish
colonels of Germany's suggested widening of the German-Polish
pact of 1934 led Germany to request negotiations to provide for
German defense of East Prussia. For, under the Versailles
treaty, East Prussia had been forcibly separated from Germany
by the creation of the Polish Corridor. Given a paper guarantee
by England against Germany, the Polish colonels declined to ne-
gotiate German transport rights to East Prussia. Fleming indi-
cates that "Poland was now the prisoner of her conquests".6
for, having aggrandized itself at the expense of Germany and
Russia, Poland was forced to acquiesce in the Anglo-French
policy of opposition to both of these Great Powers. Fleming indi-
cates the status of the regime for which the Western powers were
willing to launch a second World War:

This oligarchy of landlords and colonels also believed itself

3. ibid., p. 48.
4. ibid., pp. 190, 258.
5. ibid., pp. 25, 94, 492.
6. ibid., pp. 87-88, 94.
to be a Great Power. Impressed by its conquests, it adopted the impossible policy of balancing both of its huge neighbors against each other .... In this situation Poland might survive by close alliance with one of her great neighbors. Being unable to choose between her hatreds doomed her to sure destruction and in all probability to another partition.

It was the defense of this illiberal, vainglorious and impotent regime which Chamberlain chose as the *casus foederis* of World War II.  

Nothing, Fleming points out, would have pleased London and Paris more than a Russo-German war in which Russia would probably be destroyed. But, if, as Professor Fleming maintains, the West did indeed plan a Russo-German war, then its actions in the Polish crisis of 1939 are truly inexplicable. If Germany were to attack Russia, then a common border with the Soviet Union was essential. This, the Germans did not possess in 1939. Yet, when Germany sought to establish a stronger alliance with the anti-Russian Polish government, the Western powers promptly gave the Poles unconditional promises of support; hence the Poles became totally unwilling to negotiate with Germany. In short, the Western powers wished to prevent Germany from re-establishing its traditional influence in Eastern Europe, while still maintaining its cordon sanitaire against the Soviet Union. The Western powers hoped to re-enact the 1918 defeat of Germany without the aid of Russia, for Russian aid would require the abolition of the cordon sanitaire and the restoration of Russia's traditional influence in Eastern Europe. The Soviet-German pact of August 23, 1939, based on their common animosity toward Western imperialism, was intended to bring London and Paris to recognize reality and withdraw from the brink; but Neville Chamberlain encouraged Polish intransigence.

After August 23, there was but one hope of preventing the smashing of Poland. That was to fly to Warsaw and bring the extremest pressure to bear upon the Polish colonels to grant "self-determination" to Hitler in Danzig and the Corridor, accept the partition of their country and save it from the terrible rain of death and devastation which could not otherwise be prevented. All the arguments that had been used upon the Czechs now applied triple-strength to the Poles. Instead, British promises to Poland, never put into binding form, were hastily written into a formal Treaty of Mutual Assistance between Britain and Poland and signed in London on August 25. Never were names put to a more hollow instrument. Britain and France had not the slightest power to save the life of a single Pole, or even to fire a shot that would mean anything to Poland. If this treaty had any meaning at all it meant that finally the Allies would enlist the might of the United States to wear down Germany....

Furthermore, when, in 1939, Russia went to war with Finland, the West was prepared to finish what the intervention of 1918-20 had left undone. A powerful expeditionary force was readied to be sent to defend Finland. The French prepared for an all-out attack against Russia in the Black Sea area. As Fleming states,

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7. Ibid., p. 88.
8. Ibid., pp. 84-85.
10. Ibid., pp. 94-95.
"The two governments were saved from plunging into war with Russia only by the refusal of Norway, Sweden, and Turkey to grant transit privileges across their territories." 11 The West did not want Germany to destroy Russia; they wanted to do the job themselves! Thus, in order to secure Western domination of Eastern Europe, the Allies were suicidally prepared to fight both Germany and Russia at one and the same time.

When Germany invaded Russia in June of 1941, Britain promptly greeted her as an ally in the common cause. To the British, who had been fighting the Nazis alone for over a year, Russian participation in the war appeared as a godsend. The entrance of the United States into the war in December 1941 made victory over the Germans inevitable. Thus, by the beginning of 1942, it was no longer touch and go for Great Britain; there would be years of heavy fighting, but the outcome was no longer in doubt. Throughout the rest of the war, the British would fight, not with the single-mindedness of purpose that characterized the Battle of Britain, but with at least one eye upon the post-war status of Europe. The consideration which had led Britain into the war - continued control of Eastern Europe - would dominate her wartime thinking as well. Russian participation in the war might hasten the German defeat, but it also raised the specter of Russia as the major influence in Eastern Europe. Thus, Churchill fought the war with a dual purpose: to defeat Germany and at the same time to prevent that Russian hegemony over all of Eastern Europe which would naturally flow from the defeat and rollback of German arms. Rather than open a second front, the British hoped that the Germans would wear out the Russians in years of hard fighting deep in Russia, while the West defeated Germany with a massive air assault and sea blockade. The British managed to delay the opening of a second front in Western Europe for over two years. The "wartime friendship" of Britain and Russia was, from the British point of view, never genuine. As Professor Fleming points out, even at the height of the war, hostility towards the Soviets dominated British strategy. Yet, throughout the course of the war, Churchill was frustrated in his attempt to win American support for his anti-Russian plans. To the very end, Roosevelt turned thumbs down on the creation of an Anglo-American bloc against Russia.

The fundamental war aim of the Russians was control of Eastern Europe. This objective, above all others, dominated Russian thinking during the course of the war. As Professor Fleming points out, "It is not possible to begin to understand Russian motives and feelings without knowing what they think about Eastern Europe." 12 What are the motives of Russia in Eastern Europe? "Their first driving and continuing motive was, and is, security." 13 Here, in one sentence, Professor Fleming has summarized the guiding motivation of Russian foreign policy since the Revolution. It must be apparent to all that Russian security cannot be assured if Eastern Europe is in the hands of unfriendly powers. In both World Wars, as well as in the Polish invasion of 1920, Eastern Europe had been the invasion route into Russia. Using bases in this area,
hostile powers have been able to invade and lay waste vast stretches of the Soviet Union. Thus, the very existence of the Soviet Union depends upon making certain that the governments of Eastern Europe are friendly towards her. When one realizes that the West also desires to dominate and control this area, and that it precipitated the Second World War in order to maintain its primacy in Eastern Europe, the basis for the Cold War becomes apparent. Yet, Eastern Europe, so vital to the Soviet Union, is in no way essential to the West. For the Russians, control of this area is a matter of life and death; for the West it is but a luxury.

Would the West accept the most important result of the Second World War: Russian control of Eastern Europe? If the Soviet Union, which had suffered so grievously during the war, was to be free of the specter of another invasion, then control of Eastern Europe was essential. In the course of the war, her armies had occupied the area and the West had recognized the Soviet Union’s right to have friendly governments in these states. Yet, events now moved quickly toward an open break between East and West. War-time expediency had dictated that the Western governments remain on cordial terms with the Soviet Union. Once the war had ended, however, the crusade against Russia could begin anew.

The death of President Roosevelt and the formation of a new Administration ended the wartime cooperation and injected a spirit of hostility toward the Soviet Union which deeply moulded public opinion. Fleming notes the critical role of American socialists and ex-Communists in indoctrinating American audiences with the poison of their own disappointment with the variant of socialism developed in the Soviet Union.

The Left opposition to Russia had two themes: (1) that Soviet Russia is both tyrannical and imperialist, bloody and omnivorous in its appetites; and (2) that American policy under both Roosevelt and Truman has been a long course of appeasement toward this monster. 14 Fleming points to the regret of Walter Lippmann that the anti-Soviet drift of American policy made it possible for anti-Soviet opinion to gain a wide public hearing. Truman’s policy led the United States to depart from the position of Roosevelt’s foreign policy which had placed America in the role of mediator between London and Moscow. America had now become the major partisan of London’s imperial interests. In place of the wise reserve and self-limitation exercised under Roosevelt, America had now assumed an alarming role; for the difficulties between Britain and Russia extended from Eastern Europe to the oil concessions of the Middle East and Iran. 15

In March, 1946 Winston Churchill, in his famous Fulton address, called for a close alliance between Britain and the United States. Against whom would this alliance be directed? The menace from the East, the Soviet Union. Churchill, who had attempted to exterminate the “Red” regime during the Western intervention of 1918-20, had, when this failed, sought to encircle the infant Soviet state with a ring of hostile states. During the Second World War, Churchill had attempted the impossible feat of using the Russians to beat Germany while denying them all the fruits of victory. Now Churchill called upon the United States to use her

14 Ibid., p. 282.
15 Ibid., p. 281.
powerful resources to achieve what he had never been able to accomplish before: the destruction of the Soviet Union. What made this event even more ominous, was the presence of the American President, Harry S. Truman, at this occasion. Truman lent the dignity of his office to this blatant attack upon our wartime ally; indeed, he went further and applauded vigorously during Churchill’s speech. The move to construct an Anglo-American alliance against Russia, which President Roosevelt had wisely frustrated during the war, was now in full swing. What was the justification for such an endeavor? The Russians had committed no acts of aggression against the West, and had scrupulously kept all their wartime agreements with us. After the rigors of four years of bloody war, during which much of Russia had been laid waste, the Soviet government wanted nothing more than an era of peace in which to rebuild her war-shattered economy. Yet, powerful elements in the West, the President of the United States included, were determined to impose their will upon the Russians and to frustrate the construction of a durable peace based upon what to them was an unbearable fact; the very existence of a powerful Soviet Russia.

The Cold War can be said to have begun in earnest in March, 1947 when the President issued his now famous Truman Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine was a declaration of war on communism throughout the globe in which encirclement of the Soviet Union was arrogantly proclaimed. This Doctrine in effect made the policy which Churchill had enunciated at Fulton, Missouri, a year earlier, the official policy of the United States Government. Professor Fleming describes the situation in the following words:

... No pronouncement could have been more sweeping. Wherever a communist rebellion develops, the United States would suppress it. Wherever the Soviet Union attempt to push outward, at any point around its vast circumference, the United States would resist. The United States would become the world's anti-communist, anti-Russian policeman.16

This crucial event, the formal declaration of the Cold War by President Truman, receives from Professor Fleming the detailed examination that it deserves. The origin of the Greek civil war in the British attempt to install an unpopular rightist government in the place of the popularly supported resistance forces is thoroughly discussed by Fleming.17 Direct American intervention in the Greek civil war began in the summer of 1946. On September 9, carrier-based planes from the American fleet, which was stationed in Greek waters, flew over Greece in support of the rightist Greek government. Thereafter, American officials announced that the American fleet would remain in the Eastern Mediterranean within range of the Soviet Union and the Middle Eastern oil concessions of American companies. In a major policy speech on September 12, Commerce Secretary Henry Wallace asked Americans to look at world affairs through traditional American attitudes rather than with the imperialist outlook of Britain reflected in the pro-British, anti-Russian press in America. Wallace called for Soviet-American cooperation rather than American support of British imperialism in Greece and the Middle East.18

And I believe we can get cooperation once Russia understands

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16. Ibid., p. 446.
18. Ibid., p. 419.
that our primary objective is neither saving the British empire
nor purchasing oil in the Near East with the lives of American
soldiers. We must not allow national oil rivalries to force us
into war.\(^{19}\)

Wallace pointed out that Eastern Europe was not of special interest
to America although it was to Russia. But this fact was attacked on
the ground that America's special interest in Eastern Europe was
founded on England's pledge to support Poland in 1939; thus, Wallace
was accused of speaking the same language that the isolationist
Senators had been speaking before World War II. Truman there-
upon forced Wallace's resignation from the Cabinet.\(^{20}\)

By late 1946 America was providing Greece with surplus mili-
tary supplies and was preparing to extend foreign aid through
the dispatch of a high-level economic mission to Greece. At this
time, Russian concessions permitted completion of the peace

treaties with the German allies, and Russia hoped that the United
States would reciprocate at the forthcoming German peace con-
ference in Moscow in March-April, 1947. However, the prepara-
tory conference on the German peace treaty in January-February,
1947 was undercut when the State Department adviser, John Foster
Dulles, urged the construction of an anti-Soviet bloc in Western
Europe based on the revival of German power in the Ruhr (January
17, 1947). Less than a month later, Dulles again called for a policy
of excluding statesmanlike diplomacy and replacing it by negotia-
tions based only on positions-of-strength. American editorials
noted that any application of Dulles' German policies would prevent
the conclusion of a German peace treaty. Dulles' long association
with German industrial interests did not present a completely
disinterested picture of any Dulles policy on Germany, and this
critical fact was not overlooked in Europe or in Russia.

Echoing Winston Churchill, Dulles was trying to frighten the
rest of the world with "the ghost of non-existent Soviet expan-
sion". Later in the month Drew Middleton reported from
Moscow that perhaps nothing had so established the difference
of approach to the German problem as the announcement of
Secretary of State Marshall that Dulles would accompany him
to the approaching Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers,
as an adviser on German affairs.\(^{21}\)

When, during the preparations for the German peace conference,
Britain told the United States at the end of February, 1947 that it
would have to remove its army supporting the Greek royalists
against the guerrillas and to end its subsidies to the Turkish
army, the American government determined to assume Britain's
imperialist role in the Eastern Mediterranean. In a little more
than two weeks, President Truman had delivered his momentous
speech to Congress proclaiming the Truman Doctrine. Fleming
emphasizes the snowstorm that disrupted the British economy
in late January, 1947 as the cause of this crisis, although the
English notification of withdrawal from Greece was preceded by
weeks of frantic cables from the various high-level American
groups operating in Greece. The cables pleaded that heavy Ameri-
can military aid was imperative to preserve the collapsing
rightist Greek government.\(^{22}\) Fleming indicates that the immediate

\(^{19}\) Ibid., pp. 419-20.
\(^{20}\) Ibid., pp. 420, 421.
\(^{21}\) Ibid., pp. 434-35.
\(^{22}\) Ibid., pp. 438-39.
decision of the State, War and Navy Department officials to issue a public declaration of American policy to aid governments everywhere in the world against Communist-led opposition was the result of long-held official purpose. Truman had determined since the end of the war in 1945 to announce publicly his policy of opposition to the Soviet Union.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 440-42.}

To the fundamental question: why was the Truman Doctrine issued early in March, 1947, Fleming answers that Truman chose the opening of the Foreign Ministers' Conference which was to conclude a peace treaty with Germany. The question of Germany has been the major source of Soviet-American conflict, and the major question at the conference was whether America had entered these negotiations with the same self-sacrificing spirit that Russia had shown in concluding the peace treaties with Germany's allies a few months earlier, "Did the President mean to torpedo the conference?" Fleming asks, and he replies that the purpose of the Truman Doctrine was to create a position-of-strength atmosphere in which General George C. Marshall and John Foster Dulles could threaten the Russians with the alternative of accepting the harsh American conditions for a German peace treaty or forgoing the benefits of peace by facing continuing aggressive policies on the part of America. At the conference, Marshall emphasized not negotiations but the military power of the United States. Fleming quotes a contemporary account of the Truman Doctrine: "The place it was aimed at was the Moscow Conference."\footnote{Ibid., pp. 465-66, 444, 470.} Fleming concludes that Truman's declaration of the Cold War, represented by the American shift to positions-of-strength diplomacy that was completed at the Moscow Conference by Marshall and followed immediately by the Marshall Plan (June 5, 1947), caused the profound change to a hard-line in Soviet domestic life which characterized the final years of Stalin's rule. The Soviet Union had to deprive itself of the benefits of peace and gain a position of military parity as a defense against the positions-of-strength policy of the United States; only thus could it enter genuine diplomatic negotiations with America rather than accept Gen. Marshall's demand for American world hegemony.

The Russians had amply proved that they were tough, long, hard bargainers, but they had no thought of abandoning diplomacy and risking their remaining lives and resources on political war. It was the United States which did that.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 470, 474-76.}

Walter Lippmann's analysis of the Truman Doctrine, presented by Fleming, was an incisive criticism of the general premise of support for reactionary governments, whether in defense of Western oil monopolies or broadly throughout the world. Lippmann urged that the existing policy of no serious negotiations with the Russians be replaced by negotiations for a general settlement of issues with the Soviets. Fleming indicates the major errors in George Kennan's justification of the Truman Doctrine of containment which was published in July, 1947. While Kennan's first reaction to the Truman Doctrine was shock at the provocative language and at the proposal to send military aid to Greece and Turkey, his article was an attempt to rationalize, soften, and justify the Truman Doctrine. Kennan's recognition of the importance of Marxist ideology led him to underestimate the essential

23. Ibid., pp. 440-42.
25. Ibid., pp. 470, 474-76.

72
national interests of Russia. Although he realized that the Marxist view of the inevitability of the disappearance of capitalism led the Soviet Union to refrain from military aggression, Kennan failed to point out Russia's willingness to enter into negotiations to gain the immediate security of the Soviet Union. This failure led Kennan to accept Truman's virtual abolition of diplomacy. There would be no negotiations with the Soviet Union because the latter was not a state with essential national interests but only an ideological movement which could not be reasoned with or negotiated with, but only contained by military force. 26

Considering Fleming's masterful treatment of the development of the Truman Doctrine, it is difficult to understand his ultimate ambivalence on the question of whether the international political situation required such a doctrine. Fleming argues:

In Greece a political vacuum yawned ahead, and in Western Europe a much bigger one was already plainly discernible, Some action was essential if the danger that communism would fill these vacuums was to be averted. The obvious move was large scale economic aid....

....there was a good case for a ringing political pronouncement that would tell the European peoples that we were behind them, that we were coming to their aid. 27

Fleming suggests that since the problem was the growth of domestic opposition within the European countries, and not Soviet aggression, it was unwise to declare the American objective to be anti-Soviet or a world-wide anti-Communism. Nevertheless, by endorsing American intervention to prevent the growth of domestic Communist parties in Europe, Fleming comes down on the side of the same anti-Communist myths which it is the objective of his work to dispel. It was only the world-wide application of the doctrine which Fleming feels was in error. This was clearly a self-defeating policy, one fitted to squander our resources on the way to an immeasurable, unmanageable war. 28

Thus, Fleming ultimately rejects neither the doctrine of American intervention, nor the actual intervention in the Greek civil war, nor the use of the myth of a Communist danger to force a reluctant Congress to vote for foreign aid.

"...some action on our part in Greece was foreordained. Greece would not be allowed to fall into the Soviet orbit. Some anti-communist connotation was also advisable to secure quick congressional approval." 29

Professor Fleming indicates the important role of the election of the Republican Eightieth Congress in the Administration's decision to issue the Truman Doctrine, and he concludes in answer to the question whether a domestic political purpose was involved that "the domestic political advantages were very obvious." 30

Fleming's acceptance of the use of the myth of Communist danger by the Democratic Administration in order to gain foreign aid from the Republican Congress appears based on his belief that nothing could be worse, even if including a touch of anti-Communist hysteria, than the American people and their Congressmen espousing a policy of non-intervention and isolationism and re-

27. Ibid., p. 469.
28. Ibid., p. 474.
29. Ibid., p. 474.
30. Ibid., p. 469.
jecting further foreign aid. Thus, the principle of the Cold War, if not its every application, becomes a positive good in overcoming the natural isolationism of the American people. The Republican Eightieth Congress, which took office in January, 1947, had been engaged for two months in fulfilling election promises to reduce economic spending heavily, especially on foreign aid and military projects. This cutback included allowing expiration of the draft. It was in frenzied response to these cutbacks that the White House and the State Department initiated the campaign to impress, frighten, and threaten the Congressmen with a Soviet threat of which the Congressmen had seen no evidence. Congress did not fear the events in Greece, nor did it demand action to support what it considered a corrupt and reactionary regime. Therefore, the Congress was thoroughly subjected by the State Department to the geopolitical myth of the yellow press. The theory presented was that the removal of the rightist Greek government would lead inexorably to Russian domination of three continents, extending Soviet military rule through the Near East and Africa across to South America and up Central America to the American-Mexican border. Fleming notes that the Congressmen were thus given their "first exposition of the 'falling dominoes' theory which was to determine our actions at other stages of the Cold War." The State Department insisted that the Soviet threat to American dominance created the most irreconcilable world conflict since the Roman-Carthaginian struggles. The Congress received the Truman Doctrine grimly, resentfully and without applause. The Congress resented the whole crisis—approach which forced it to appropriate foreign aid for Greece and Turkey or else publicly repudiate the President's negotiating position. The Congress's opposition to being tricked into supporting America's assumption of the role of the major imperialist power in the Mediterranean is noted by Fleming under "Retalia-
in Congress."

In the last stages of the bill's legislative progress the House of Representatives took two steps which betrayed its resentment over the Greek crisis. On April 30, by a vote of 225 to 165, largely on party lines, it cut the European aid bill from $350,000,000 to $200,000,000, and a week later Secretary of State Marshall complained that the proposed $60,000,000 slash in the State Department's outlay for the coming year was very embarrassing to the government's drive for world peace. He hoped particularly that the "Voice of America" radio programs would not be silenced.

In addition to the Truman Doctrine, the West by 1949 had undertaken two more steps which warmed the hearts of the growing legion of Americans demanding a preventive war against Soviet Russia. In June, 1948 the West made the decision to break the deadlock on Germany and set up a separate West German government. Fleming points out that it was this "decision which precipitated a Russian effort to drive the West out of Berlin." Moreover, Fleming admits that the Russians had a firm basis for this endeavor. The decision to set up a separate government in the West was an open violation of the Yalta and Potsdam

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32. Ibid., pp. 460-61.
33. Ibid., p. 506.
agreements. Why then should the Russians have continued to live up to the very agreements that the West had deliberately broken; why should they have allowed the West to continue its occupation of Berlin, deep in the heart of the Soviet zone? The West could not have it both ways; we could not split Germany in two in violation of our agreements, and then defend our continued control of West Berlin by alluding to the sanctity of these same agreements. This Western decision to split up Germany was preparatory to a drive to rearm her and press her into the anti-Soviet bloc. The nation which had almost destroyed Russia a few short years before was now to become a menace to her once again, this time with the full and continued backing of the West. Fleming indicates the crucial importance of American military officials in the development, independent of American civilian officials, of American policy on Germany.

Walter Lippmann deplored the extent to which our German policy was being fashioned by our officials in Germany. General Clay was the prime mover, seconded by his advisers in Berlin and his immediate superiors in the Pentagon... After Clay had denied these allegations, Sumner Welles strongly supported the charges. He declared it was "notorious that General Clay has occasionally taken independent action which has shaped policy" and he was still permitted by Washington to retain the initiative in the formulation of policy. This meant control of German policy by army officers and investment bankers who had no real knowledge of European history or of the social and economic forces and national psychologies with which they were dealing...France especially was repeatedly brushed aside and the decisions made in Germany "provoked the present crisis with Moscow."34

These decisions were followed in early 1949 by the formation of the NATO military alliance. In addition to our vast stock of atomic weapons which so many in the West urged should be dropped forthwith upon Russia, we were now to build Europe into an armed camp and forward base - one more step in our plan of global encirclement of the Soviets. In regard to this, Professor Fleming raises one very important question which we in the West would do well to ponder. How would we react if the Soviets were encircling the United States with a global ring of military bases?

By 1950, American foreign policy had subtly shifted from the Truman-Acheson containment policy towards a more militant, almost preventive war, policy. Fleming subjects the background and decision to intervene in Korea to the same searching criticism which he applied to the Truman Doctrine, and for this purpose examines two fundamental questions: who began the Korean war, and was American intervention justifiable? As to who began the Korean war, Fleming believes that "there is grave doubt about Rhee's part in the origins of the Korean war," and that "it is increasingly probable that the invasion may have been touched off by an attempt by Rhee's forces to march to the North, or to provoke an invasion."35 Noting that at the time the war broke out the North Korean army had less than half its forces fit for combat, Fleming asks, "was it possible that the North Koreans

34. Ibid., p. 506, note 4.
35. Ibid., p. 656.
were the ones who were surprised?"  

The earliest reports of the outbreak of the war by UN observers and by the American headquarters in Tokyo described the South Koreans as having attacked North Korea.  

It is a matter of record that Rhee and his Defence Minister had been threatening to invade North Korea for months. It is further established, also, that Rhee had been decisively defeated in the election of May 30, 1950, an election which the American government forced upon him. His regime was "left tottering." He had no political future unless war broke out, and his will power was entirely sufficient to bring war about. His prewar threats to march north were discounted during the war, but after it began the report that Secretary of State Acheson "never was quite sure that Rhee did not provoke the Red attack of 1950" was amply justified.  

After discussing the development of the views of the American military commander and our allies in the Far East, Fleming treats the events immediately preceding the outbreak of the war (June 25, 1950).  

In the Spring of 1950 the MacArthur-Chiang-Rhee trio received a powerful ally in the person of John Foster Dulles.... Mr. Dulles visited South Korea on June 19.... The next day Dulles visited the 38th Parallel frontier and was photographed in the midst of a group of South Korean military officers looking over a map, while our Ambassador to South Korea looked through glasses over into Red Korea. This photograph, printed in the Herald Tribune, on June 26, 1950, carried the unfortunate suggestion that a military campaign into North Korea was being planned. It enabled Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko to hint strongly that the signal for the alleged attack by South Korea on North Korea had been given by Dulles.  

From Korea Dulles went to Tokyo for conferences with General MacArthur. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and General Omar Bradley, head of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, has just been conferring with MacArthur.... Why was Dulles so sure that "positive action" was impending, after his visit to the 38th Parallel, Seoul and MacArthur?..... This spate of top level activity by Dulles in Korea and Japan, and by MacArthur, Johnson and Bradley in Tokyo during the last half of June, with its accompanying publicity, suggested a change of American policy in the Far East.  

It is particularly unfortunate that the American decision to intervene in Korea is not discussed in detail by Fleming despite his doubts and the background facts he concludes that the decision was justified. Truman's intervention, which would "further our main aim of stopping communism was an objective worth some risk," although Fleming emphasizes that there was no careful study of the many factors and consequences involved. On the contrary, the decision reversed the carefully considered verdict of the Defense Department that Korea was not essential to our strategic security and that it was about the last place where we should fight a war.
It is difficult to understand Fleming’s justification for American intervention into the Korean conflict, especially when he condemns the continuation of the struggle into North Korea when American policy flatly denied the existence of the North Korean government. The US and the UN were now trapped in their earlier Cold War maneuvers which had denied the existence of North Korea. At that time the United States had ousted the moderate and leftist Korean government below the 38th Parallel and induced the UN to declare Rhee’s rightist regime the only lawful government in Korea. Fleming’s attempt to draw distinctions for justifying Truman’s intervention in Korea is negated by the American and UN policies against the North Koreans. UN Secretary General Trygve Lie thundered that North Korean withdrawal beyond the 38th Parallel was insufficient, and that American and South Korean troops must establish a united Korean government involving the elimination of the North Korean regime. Supported by British Foreign Minister Bevin and Canadian Foreign Minister Pearson, the UN General Assembly directed MacArthur to secure stability through all of Korea and to establish a unified government. The commitment to this unification policy was so deep that MacArthur was instructed to use only South Korean troops to spearhead the advance through northern Korea, and he agreed to use as many South Korean troops as possible up to the Yalu River itself. But when the American-South Korean forces continued to approach the Yalu in the face of repeated Chinese warnings not to attempt to destroy the North Korean government or to unify Korea by force, the Chinese troops delivered a strong rebuff to the UN forces. Under the pressure of this response, the UN determined to offer the Chinese the occupation of a buffer area in Korea during negotiations for a peace settlement, and Chinese Communist representatives came to New York to meet UN officials. However, MacArthur frustrated this meeting by launching two large armies toward the Chinese frontier, and he received President Truman’s complete support including Truman’s threatening to use atomic bombs against the Chinese and “calling for world-wide mobilization against communism,” as the Chinese hurled the American offensive back to the 38th Parallel. Among the critics of America’s irrational aggressive attempts to gain victory in an already lost war by escalating it towards the borders of China, Fleming notes “a responsible American writer, McGeorge Bundy, went further and plainly labelled MacArthur as a provocator.” To prove its “resolve” the Truman Administration declared a national emergency and appropriated huge military expenditures. It forced the UN to brand the Chinese government as an aggressor despite the warnings of America’s Western European allies that they would not support Truman’s position. They blamed China’s actions on the American government’s refusal to seat the Chinese government in the UN, the establishment of American military control of Formosa, and the placing of a counter-revolutionary force supported by American troops at China’s Manchurian border.

Among American critics of the continuation of Truman’s war in Korea, Herbert Hoover sought American recognition of the fact

41. Ibid., pp. 589-92.
42. Ibid., pp. 623, 614-21.
43. Ibid., pp. 622, 629-39.
44. Ibid., pp. 630-32.
that the Communist powers would never invade America and that America’s “land war against this Communist land mass would be a war without victory.” At the same time, Walter Lippmann, while disclaiming advocacy of traditional isolationism, indicated that the interventionist foreign policy pursued by Truman would logically lead the American people to accept a world war or a preventive war. Lippmann, also advised liquidating the American intervention on the frontiers of China.

Discussing “The Crisis of Confidence,” Lippmann asked again whether a succession of resounding global declarations and snap decisions to fight wars constituted statesmanship. In the place of a reasoned doctrine of national security we had the Truman Doctrine, in the application of which, and contrary to the considered judgment of every competent soldier, the American army and all its reserves had been sucked into a peninsula of Asia “in defiance of overwhelmingly superior forces.” Great doctrines must not be improvised merely to get some appropriations for Greece and Turkey and great military commitments must not be made “in a few excited days, reversing the whole strategic judgment of the past.”

By the Spring of 1951, the UN desired to modify its American-sponsored policy of a unified Korea and to gain peace at the 38th Parallel through comprehensive peace negotiations, including such questions as China’s UN membership and America’s control of Formosa. But the Truman Administration insisted that it would negotiate over Korea only, and thus committed itself to the terrible destruction of American lives which was to continue along the 38th Parallel for two more years until its defeat in the 1952 presidential election.

The Truman Administration was trapped by the premises upon which its original intervention into Korea had been based. Even when its military failures became evident, it excluded the basis for a meaningful diplomacy - comprehensive negotiations with China on all outstanding problems. This left only two alternatives: a drawn-out military conflict involving horribly large American losses, or an escalation toward the bombing of Manchuria or the landing of Chiang’s discredited forces on the mainland to relieve Americans of the heavy losses suffered in Korea. Given the Truman Administration’s premises, the large-scale controversy and popular discredit of Truman when he fired MacArthur was the logical result of Truman’s original error of intervening in Korea and his subsequent refusal to enter comprehensive peace negotiations with China. MacArthur’s policy was the logical culmination of Truman’s refusal to accept the reality of American failure, and the error of MacArthur’s policy merely reflected and compounded the original errors of Truman’s intervention into a civil war on the continent of Asia.

From 1953-59, American foreign policy was largely directed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. It was under Dulles’ direction that the policy of encirclement of the Communist bloc was put aside in favor of the more activist policy of “rollback” and liberation. One need only reflect for a moment on Dulles’ pride in the fact that he had taken us to the “brink of war” three times,

45. Ibid., p. 626.
46. Ibid., pp. 626, 629.
47. Ibid., pp. 625, 627.
to realize how close we came to World War III in those seven years. To those elements, who, as long ago as 1946, had advocated an atomic attack on Russia; to those who, like MacArthur, had wanted to extend the Korean War into a massive assault on China, the coming of Dulles to power was a unique opportunity to see their views put into practice. Professor Fleming points to two major reasons why Dulles was not able to push us over the "brink." First, there was the restraining hand of President Eisenhower, whom Fleming credits with an earnest devotion to the cause of peace. President Eisenhower did not formulate foreign policy; this he left to his Secretary of State. He did, however, have to approve the policies that Dulles proposed. In most instances, Dulles had no trouble at all in winning the President's support. Yet, fortunately, Eisenhower summoned the will to resist when Dulles threatened to lead us into a Third World War. Secondly, there was the refusal of our allies to follow our lead into what seemed to them certain destruction in a nuclear war. Once the Russians possessed nuclear weapons, it became apparent that the great nations of Europe would be obliterated in the event of war. This agonizing fact turned even so resolute a proponent of the Cold War as Winston Churchill toward the cause of peace.

1954 and 1955 were crucial years in the development of the Cold War. At that point the Russians were about to catch up to the West in nuclear weaponry, and to achieve a "nuclear stalemate." Hitherto the West could have attacked the Soviets without the prospect of incurring nuclear retaliation; after the point of "nuclear stalemate," however, a war would incur mutual destruction. The preventive war advocates in the West had strived mightily to bring about a World War before this point would be reached. Fortunately, more sober minds prevailed, but now the "war party" was determined to make one more try. Once the nuclear stalemate was reached, a trend towards peace would doubtless set in. If the West were to achieve the destruction of the Soviets, it would have to strike right then, while our casualties might still be numbered "only" in the millions.

Secretary of State Dulles made two attempts in this short space of time to lead the West into War. The first occasion was the imminent defeat of France in the eight-year-old Indochinese war. Dulles was prepared to jump into the breach and save the day for the West. All-out intervention, including a nuclear attack on China if she extended aid to the Vietminh, alone would save Southeast Asia from Communism. That such an endeavor would, at the very least, involve another long-drawn-out, Korean-type war did not bother Mr. Dulles in the least. Moreover, it is inconceivable that the Chinese would not have taken action in an area so vital to their security. Yet in this event, Dulles would calmly have ordered the nuclear bombardment of the Chinese mainland, an event which undoubtedly would have brought Russia into the war. In this calm manner, the Secretary of State was ready to put into motion the chain of events that would, in all probability, have started World War III. Professor Fleming points out that Dulles was frustrated in this endeavor largely by the unwillingness of Britain and France to risk a world war over Indochina. With the refusal of our allies to follow our lead, the United States was isolated and alone; Dulles was forced to halt at the "brink".

A year later the "war party" succeeded in convincing the President that forceful measures were necessary if the Red Chinese were to be kept from sweeping the corrupt Chiang government
off Formosa. Eisenhower went before Congress to secure a "blank check" which would enable him to take whatever measures he deemed necessary for the defense of Formosa.

In this charged situation, the desired authority was readily granted. It was to be but a short time before Secretary of State Dulles determined to cash this "check". A massive campaign was launched to convince both the people and the President that the defense of Formosa must begin on the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, literally within the harbors of mainland China. That these tiny and totally indefensible offshore islands should be in and of themselves the cause of war seems strange indeed. Moreover, could we really expect the Chinese Communists to acquiesce in Western control of territory that was in every respect Chinese? Obviously not. The islands meant nothing to Dulles; the opportunity to obliterate China if she attempted to occupy them, however, was too precious to pass up. Once again we advanced to the "brink of war" in another Dulles-created crisis. The planes, with their deadly cargo of nuclear bombs, were all in readiness and the long-awaited reckoning with China seemed at last to be imminent. Yet calmer heads prevailed; virtually at the eleventh hour the tide was turned. Both the President and the overwhelming majority of the American people suddenly woke to the realization that we were perilously close to war; a war to be fought over two small island groups to which we had, by no stretch of the imagination, any claim at all. Professor Fleming states that the Formosa crisis at last ended the dominance of the "war party" over American foreign policy. Ever since the Korean War, the preventive war elements had been a powerful factor in determining our policies; now at last their hold on us was broken.

1955, the beginning of the great "thaw" in the Cold War, saw both East and West armed with nuclear weapons; it was increasingly apparent that some way would have to be found by which they could live together in peace - the alternative of nuclear war was unthinkable. For a number of years now the British government had been in the forefront of a movement for a conference at which the outstanding differences between East and West might be settled. The year 1955 was propitious for such a conference. There were, according to Professor Fleming, four major reasons which together produced this long awaited first summit conference. Firstly, "the need to get away from the balancing on the brink of atomic war in the Formosa Strait was urgent and immediate." Secondly, the need to win the upcoming British elections; "The only thing which could easily defeat Eden was popular frustration over the long delay in meeting the Russians at the summit." These two, though, were only the short-range reasons which led to the conference; long-range facts were involved as well. The United States wished to end the growing fear around the world that she might initiate a nuclear war. Finally, there was the above-mentioned stalemate in the atomic arms race. "This was the final compulsion which made it imperative for the President to meet Bulganin at Geneva." Fleming holds that President Eisenhower, in a few short days, did more to end the Cold War than had been done in the previous ten years. Eisenhower earnestly desired to end the Cold War, we are told, and to that end he made every effort. "All during the conference he had private talks with the Russians, convincing them firmly

48. Ibid., p. 737.
49. Ibid., p. 738.
50. Ibid., p. 740.
that he was a man to be trusted and that there would be no war
while he was President.  
Nonetheless, the conference dealt only
in vague generalities. The heads of state produced the proper
atmosphere for a settlement of the Cold War, but it would take hard
work at the lower levels to reverse the trend towards war, and to
take advantage of the "thaw" that the summit conference had made
possible. The lower levels of the United States government, in-
cluding the powerful position of Secretary of State, however, re-
mained in the hands of the "Cold Warriors". Could we expect the
sabre-rattling John Foster Dulles to work seriously for a lasting
peace between East and West?

The year 1956 saw a continued thaw in the Cold War. In the
Soviet Union there was the dramatic denunciation of Stalin by
Khrushchev, and strides toward a top to bottom liberalization of
the regime. The Soviets undertook to reduce their armed forces
unilaterally, while in the Eastern European satellites a trend
developed towards moderation and reform, replacing the rigors of
the Stalin era. Yet in the United States no real effort was made
to carry the spirit of Geneva over to day-to-day policy decisions.
Dulles still talked of "liberating" Eastern Europe, with the threat
of war and the increased tensions that such talk entailed. American
policy remained rigid, in striking contrast to the flexibility of Soviet
foreign policy. Nevertheless, whether it wanted or not the United
States was being dragged by events and the universal desire for
peace towards an end of the Cold War.

Then, in October, a momentous event occurred which first halted
and then reversed the trend toward peace. In Hungary, the new
freedom of the post-Stalin days led to demands for the withdrawal
of Russian troops, the release of political prisoners, and the as-
sumption of the post of prime minister by the liberal Imre Nagy.
Vast crowds of people jammed Parliament Square to press these
demands upon the government. Soon, clashes broke out between
the demonstrators and the secret police. In this emergency, the govern-
ment called upon Russian troops to intervene and restore order.
Instead, the enraged Hungarian people turned upon the Russian
troops, and bitter fighting broke out. Five days later, the Soviet
forces agreed to withdraw from Budapest. The Hungarian people
had won acceptance for their demands. Moreover, the "liberals"
in the Kremlin led by Khrushchev had won out over the Stalinists
and were determined to accept a large degree of liberalization
in the satellite countries. Fleming feels, and he cites impressive
evidence to support this view, that the Kremlin was, up to this point,
genuinely prepared to accept the results of the Hungarian revolution.

Moving with the tide of change, however, Nagy uncritically widened
his government and announced that on this basis elections would
soon be held. The Russians understandably found these decisions
threatening. In the first election held after World War II, victory
had gone to a coalition in which the Smallholders Party held the
majority, but which included the Social Democratic, Communist,
and Peasant parties. The democratic nature of the new Hungarian
government was vitiated, however, by the entrance into the Small-
holders' Party of all the elements who yearned for the old regime,
e.g., landlords, military officers, clerical nationalists, and fascists,
all of whom had supported and benefited from the Horthy dictator-

51. Ibid., p. 751.
ship. In spite of their defeat alongside their Nazi allies in the invasion of Russia, such elements had retained their influence. After a similar setback in 1919 under a short-lived Hungarian revolutionary republic, these same reactionary forces had regained control through their dominance of the military establishment. Thus, there bloomed the hope of re-creating a counter-revolutionary coup whenever Russian forces should be withdrawn from Hungary.

A coup prepared by the rightist elements in the Smallholders' Party was discovered in 1947 by the Soviet occupation authorities, who were faced with the threat of a return to power by the very elements that had led large armies in the devastating invasion of the Soviet Union. The Russian authorities in Hungary therefore demanded that these reactionary elements be expelled by the Smallholders' Party, and this demand was fully supported by the other coalition parties, who well remembered what had befallen their predecessors upon the overthrow of the republic in 1919. The expelled elements continued to be represented in Parliament while the Smallholders' Party continued to lead the coalition. The Soviet authorities and the coalition parties drew from their experience with the forestalled coup the lesson that upon the withdrawal of Soviet forces, moderate parties might again become the vehicle for the reactionaries to return to power.62

The Russians therefore realized that Nagy's proclamation of elections, to be held precipitously following clashes with Soviet troops, would permit once more the return to political significance of the reactionary elements. These very elements had returned to the Hungarian political scene during the October, 1956 revolutionary distractions, and were forming about themselves support, not only from the military, but also among those unable to remember the realities of the Horthy regime. Cardinal Mindszenty, newly released from detention, was being seriously proposed as regent of the Hungarian State, thus sharply threatening the republican institutions. To prevent such an occurrence and to assure their security, the Russians felt compelled to resume their treaty responsibilities and once again prevent reactionary elements from entering the Hungarian government. Had the Hungarians been reasonable in their actions, as were the Poles and the Polish Cardinal Wyszynsky, they would have been left free to enjoy the success of their revolution. Instead, the revolution became anti-Russian and thus brought about the intervention of Soviet forces.63

Fleming, in his discussion of the reasons for the revolution's becoming more and more extreme, points out that the United States-controlled Radio Free Europe played at least some part in producing this effect. Radio Free Europe incited the Hungarian people to take ever more unreasonable measures and to turn the revolution into an anti-Russian uprising, all the time holding out the promise of American aid and support. However, Professor Fleming feels that the role of the United States propaganda media was decidedly secondary. Here serious exception may be taken to Professor Fleming's interpretation of events. The United States propaganda media played a real role in inciting the people to an anti-Russian frenzy; United States promises of support undoubtedly emboldened the Hungarians to take drastic steps which they never would have taken without confidence of United States aid.54
After these events in Hungary, the trend toward peace had been reversed and the Cold War was going full force once again. But, with Dulles' death in 1959, the advocates of conflict between West and East lost their most effective spokesman. To this must be added the increasing desire among the peoples of the world to begin where they had left off at the Geneva summit conference, and this time to end the Cold War once and for all. Unfortunately, however, the Cold War is far from being concluded. In 1959, President Eisenhower, on his grand world tour, once again stirred the hopes of the world for peace. With the Khrushchev visit to the United States, the world at last seemed to be moving in the right direction once more. All was in waiting for the summit conference that met in Paris in May of 1960. Yet in the aftermath of the crisis caused by the American U-2 flight, the move toward peace had failed. Once again, those responsible for the making of day-to-day decisions had pushed the American people closer to increased tensions and hostility with the Soviet Union.

In the years since the publication of Fleming's contribution to a thorough understanding of the Cold War, the crisis caused by American policies has increased rather than lessened. Even as this is written, explosives, napalm and poison gas are raining upon the innocent people of Vietnam, North and South. Professor Fleming's impressive examinations of American policy in the Cold War have been continuing, and he has applied his searching analysis to this most recent area of world crisis, American policy in Southeast Asia (Western Political Quarterly, March, 1965). Humanity now stands at the crossroads. The logic of the Cold War impels America onto one of two paths: either escalation upward to nuclear annihilation or repudiation of the Vietnam war and of United States imperialism. To that repudiation, the American people must now make their contribution.