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From Our Readers

Our Contributors

Robert Donlevin recently spent close to six weeks in Indo-China, most of the time in the field with the French and Vietnamese fighting forces. In addition to daily talks with officers and men, he interviewed many top officials in the army and government. When the Communists launched their new offensive late in December, we asked him to give us a report based on his own experience and knowledge. In it he explains the nature and aims of this strange war and points out how it differs from the struggle in Korea.

Harrison Negley's story of the Henry Street Settlement Credit Union illustrates in practical as well as human terms what private initiative is capable of achieving even under the most adverse conditions. The remarkable success of this “bank” in a neighborhood of exceptionally low incomes is an effective answer to proponents of a government dole.

Henry Hazlitt defines a term in present use for the enlightenment of a contemporary critic and others who seem to have been away when the word came into being.

With Stanley High's report on Peru in this issue we begin a series of articles on various Latin American countries currently in the news. They will endeavor to present the major economic and political developments in the countries discussed.

William D. Peterson was introduced to Freeman readers in our November 16 issue with his frank-spoken article (“If Management Walked Out”) on our double standard of labor-employer relations. His present analysis of public and private planning answers some questions that are especially in our minds this month with the reconvening of Congress and the various economic reports and messages of the President.

Lucy S. Dawidowicz is well known through her articles in Commentary, The New Leader, and other magazines as an authority on various aspects of the ways in which Communism appeals to minority groups. She learned of the story of Pavlik Morozov, the boy hero of Soviet children, through a schoolbook brought to her by a recent refugee from Poland. The book has been introduced into the schools of the satellite nations—thus spreading further the perverse Communist conception of “morality.”

Walter Newlin's almost accidental discovery of an odd bias in some of the entries in the Reader's Encyclopedia is not intended to discredit this work in its entirety. However, any encyclopedia becomes a reference work for years, to be used by students and researchers, its facts accepted as truth. When it fails in this responsibility, that should not pass unobserved.
FROM OUR READERS

"Who Invented McCarthyism?"
I confess to some surprise at your editorial anguish (December 14 issue) over the use of the term "McCarthyism." The epithet, your researches show, "is a Communist invention." This may be true, but if it is you may be obliged to enlarge your target to include the Senator and at least one of his adoring supporters.

A year ago McCarthy brought out a book which he fondly entitled: McCarthyism: The Fight for America. And Joseph P. Kamp, of the Constitutional Educational League, has proudly labeled his pro-McCarthy organization the "Committee for McCarthyism." I would not suspect McCarthy or Kamp of being "semantic dupes" and mere dilletantes but you might consider warning them, too, to "be a little more cautious concerning whose line they pick up and parrot."

May I add a footnote? You say: "... the term 'McCarthyism' is a Communist invention with a definite date. It was first used by Owen Lattimore on May 4, 1950..." following the day, May 5, 1950, an article appeared in the Daily Worker... using 'McCarthyism' in the headline and text."

In some recent researches on the junior Senator from Wisconsin I encountered a Herblock cartoon in March 1950, which uses "McCarthyism." The cartoon shows the then Republican National Chairman and three Republican Senate leaders coaxing, pushing, and pulling their elephant toward a leaning tower of tarbuckets, the topmost of which is labeled "McCarthyism." The caption on the cartoon had the elephant saying, "You mean I'm supposed to stand on that?"

This, I hope, will set at rest your concern for those who have been "duped" by the Communists into using McCarthyism, for certainly Herblock is clearly established as the creator of the expression—and few more effective foes of the tyrannies of Communism and Fascism are abroad in our land.

Madison, Wisc. MORRIS H. RUBIN
Editor, The Progressive

"Warmed-Over Spy"
The letter from William Beechhurst in your December 14 issue reminds me of a similar letter I saw in another publication recently, venturing the guess that in the next election campaign the voters will not be interested in "warmed-over spy."

Perhaps not, although I doubt it, but I don't think they will ever be any more sick of "warmed-over spy" than several millions of us have been over "warmed-over depression." Yes, as recently as 1952, Democratic Party orators were still relying heavily upon the great depression of twenty years ago for material. On that basis, the Hiss and White cases should still be good Republican campaign material in the 1968 and 1972 campaigns.

GLENN R. WINTERS
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Mr. Beechhurst Replies
I am slightly amazed at the interpretation Mr. Winters gives to my letter. I do not recall having ventured "the guess that in the next election campaign the voters will not be interested in 'warmed-over spy.'"

The New Year
You and your admirable staff and contributors are doing work of inestimable and lasting value in exposing the preposterous fallacies which hoodwink a large section of the masses—and, sad to think it, many intellectuals—and so I wish you more power and progress in the new year.

S. HARCOURT-RIVINGTON
Les Aspres de Grasse, France

Index to Volume 3 Available
The Index to Volume 3 of the FREEMAN (October 6, 1952—September 21, 1953) is now available at a cost of $1.00. Libraries may receive a free copy upon request.

We are also able to announce that bound copies of Volume 3 may now be obtained at a cost of $15.00 each.

In addition, a limited number of bound copies of Volume 2 (October 8, 1951—September 22, 1952) and Volume 1 (October 2, 1950—September 24, 1951) are still available. Because of scarcity, the price of bound Volume 2 is $25.00, and of bound Volume 1, $40.00.

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The Fortnight

The series of Presidential messages to Congress will end with the annual Economic Report on January 28. Until all messages are issued, legislators and public opinion share an attitude of anxious waiting, and final judgments must remain suspended. However, President Eisenhower’s State of the Union message, discussed elsewhere in this issue, has given an impression that is disturbing to many who voted in 1952 for a real change. This feeling was not allayed by the observation of the President’s predecessor, Mr. Harry S. Truman, who noted that the message contained “a great many New Deal recommendations.” A large section of the press also noted the virtual disappearance in the President’s new program of his campaign opposition to welfare measures that were initiated by the Democratic administrations.

While the President endorsed the St. Lawrence Seaway, New York’s Governor Dewey announced proudly that “a federal license was issued for the New York State Power Authority to proceed with the vast hydroelectric project on the St. Lawrence River.” The Governor complained that a bill, “hurried” through the House of Representatives, was designed to “turn over Niagara Falls power to private interests.” Our readers are familiar with the Dewey-Niagara issue from Robert S. Byfield’s article “Why Socialize Niagara?” (Nov. 16, 1953), in which the Governor was quoted as once saying: “I do not believe government can run any business as efficiently as private enterprise, and the victim of every such experiment is the public.” Mr. Dewey would do well to reread some of his own speeches.

Freeman readers will be interested to know that Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia has apparently joined their number. In a statement written personally at his winter villa and distributed through the A.P., he showed he had read carefully Bogdan Raditsa’s article in our issue of January 11, “Tito’s Secret Alliance with Moscow.” Needless to say, he is not happy about what he describes as “slanderous writing about an alleged secret agreement.” He denounced it as aiming “to demolish the reputation of Yugoslavia in the international field . . . to frustrate future cooperation with the Western countries . . . to prevent further receiving of aid from the U.S.A., Great Britain, and France.”

As we go to press we have just received Mr. Raditsa’s comment: “Mr. Tito’s denial that Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union are drawing together is vague and general. It is significant of the sensitiveness of the Yugoslav government to this issue that the head of the state has felt it necessary to issue an official denial in his own name. He must be assumed to have the information with which to demolish effectively the report in question. But Mr. Tito’s statement does not deny a single one of the facts upon which I based my demonstration that the two Communist countries are drawing together. These facts are based on documents and on interviews with firsthand sources. It is typical procedure not unknown to totalitarian Communists to muddy the waters by calling into question the motives of a critic.”

We suggest that Marshal Tito continue his assiduous reading of the FREEMAN. If he does, he will find in a forthcoming issue additional evidence from his own Yugoslav papers that his heart has turned to Moscow, though his bank account may still yearn for the West.

Elsewhere in this issue we publish Robert Donlevin’s account of the present situation in Indo-China. Laos is a long way from Berlin, but it is interesting to observe that Communist psychological strategy ties the two together. West and East are about to “negotiate” in Berlin. Therefore—and we stress the word—it is appropriate for the Communists to strike a hard blow in order to create a suitable atmosphere: in order, that is to say, to soften up the “bourgeois” parties to the negotiation. This rather than anything in the local scene would seem to be the explanation for Ho Chi Minh’s New Year drive and for his advance across Laos to the Thai border. Diplomatic phrases in Berlin are punctuated by bullets in Indo-China.
At the end of the old year there took place one funeral at which the mourners were, we imagine, few and far between. Unlamented and unsung, that distorted monstrosity, the excess profits tax, was laid to rest. An excess profits tax is political demagogy, and nothing else. It not only lacks any positive economic justification, but invariably must lead to injurious economic results. May its sleep be long and undisturbed!

It's nice to know that the New York City Mayoralty election was all in good fun. When the "progressive" wing of the Democrats, backed by all the holier-than-thou national leaders from Averell Harriman to Adlai Stevenson, denounced Vincent Impellitteri as an incompetent, a fraud, and a crook, ran Robert Wagner against him, and forced him out of the race, it almost sounded as if they meant it. But evidently it was just a little family show put on for the entertainment and excitement of the public. On his last day as Mayor, Impellitteri appointed the Tammany and Wagner favorites to juicy jobs. On the day after, new Mayor Wagner made Impellitteri a $19,500 Justice of the Court of Special Sessions, with a guarantee of a $20,000 yearly pension two years hence. There's nothing like a good clean deal.

Although M. R. Masani is still a young man, his career is studded with distinction. He fought with Gandhi for the independence of his country. He has been Mayor of his native city of Bombay, and has served the young Indian Republic as Ambassador to Brazil and as Member of Parliament. He has another still more weighty distinction. He is perhaps the clearest and firmest anti-Communist in India. In every respect a patriot, he believes that the Soviet Union is a mortal threat to India. He shares many of the Asian criticisms of the United States, but he is sure that Indian policy requires friendship with us and defense against Moscow. These views are enough to have won him the enmity of Nehru. For four years Masani has been Chairman of the United Nations Subcommission on Discrimination and Minorities. His performance in this delicate post has been faultless. Earlier this month it was announced that the Indian government had forced his resignation. This announcement came within a day of another that told how the Indian government was officially sponsoring (and paying for) the grandiose propaganda tour of several dozen Soviet "artists and dancers."

We are sure that our readers join us in sending every good wish to Robert Morris as he begins this month a new stage in his career. As the result of an overwhelming vote in last November's election, Bob Morris is now Judge Morris in New York's Ninth District. Few men so young as he have mounted the Bench with so splendid a record of service to our country. When he became special counsel to the Internal Security Subcommittee at its formation, years of remarkable achievement with the Rapp-Coudert Committee and with wartime Naval Intelligence were already behind him. His work in Washington has been a model of method as of result. Although he understands the role of public opinion in a democracy, he has never aimed at one-day sensations and mere headline victories. He built a lasting structure on a solid foundation.

We are indebted to Mikhail Koriakov, a former Soviet army captain, in reviewing in the New York Times a new book by Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine, for reminding us of several quotations from the famous strategist, Karl von Clausewitz, which throw a brilliant light on present Soviet foreign policy: "War is merely the continuation of politics by other means. . . . A conqueror is always a peace lover . . . He would like to make his entry into our state unopposed."

It was a little overwhelming and more than a little confusing to read of all the nice New Year good wishes for the American people expressed by Malenkov, Voroshilov, and other members of the Kremlin oligarchy. The element of confusion is added by the contrast between these kind words and the consistent pattern of Soviet deeds. It is also noteworthy that Soviet broadcasts, accusing "American monopolists" of preparing war as a means of saving the capitalist system and glorifying the "majestic" strike wave of 1953 in this country and Great Britain continue full blast. Perhaps a message of acknowledgment to Malenkov, Voroshilov, and Co. is due. A suitable committee for preparing such a message might be composed of survivors of Korean torture camps and those two Americans, Private Cox and merchant seaman Towers, who recently experienced the good will of the Kremlin bosses as slave laborers in the Vorkuta concentration camp.

As the West begins a new series of meetings with the men of Moscow, we make the following offer. We will give a subscription to the Daily Worker and a second-hand umbrella to anyone who is able to name one (1) result beneficial to the democracies that ever came about through their negotiations with totalitarian states.

Before Christmas 1953 the Daily Worker urged its readers to send Yuletide greetings to Robert Thompson, one of the eleven top U.S. Communists. Thompson had only recently been apprehended, after going into hiding in 1951. The Daily Worker gave his present address as Federal Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pa. This is the first time in two years that the Communists have found it possible to disclose Thompson's whereabouts.
A Free Economy, But . . .

There was one outstanding section of the President's State of the Union message wherein his ease and mastery were manifest. While he read it to the Congress, his voice and manner were changed. His enunciation became firm, his tone forceful and convincing. It seemed obvious that here he was expressing his own ideas in his own formulations.

This was the section in which he explained the broad military doctrine upon which he proposes to base the defense of the nation. Here in his field of professional competence, General Eisenhower is at home. Under his leadership the United States is making a military turn of profound historic importance. We are abandoning the loose, amateur concept of a "balanced defense" that in reality was the reflection of our failure to decide on a coherent policy. We are moving toward that concentration of energy which has always been the secret of great strategists, and toward a military plan directly related to our resources and abilities.

Our armament is to rest on advanced technology, in particular on our vast arsenal of nuclear weapons, and on dominant air power. We shall economize, as we inevitably must, on manpower, and stress the development of a highly trained professional military force, disposed for maximum flexibility. We shall aim at industrial conditions that permit swift conversion toward or away from war mobilization. We shall devote more care to the defense of the continental base upon which all else depends.

It is possible to disagree with the President's military doctrine as exposed in the message, but the possibility of sharp disagreement is itself a tribute to the clarity and significance of the President's conception. On a problem of supreme difficulty and importance, he has come to a decision. This he is ready to stand by and, within the framework of his duties as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief, to carry through.

What decision and what conception lay back of the rest of that long message? What does the President really think should be done about the political, economic, and social state of the Union and the world? What kind of country and world does he really believe in? The answers are far from clear in what he said. (It can only be expected that they will be clarified in the detailed messages to Congress the President promised.)

The rest of the message was a rather frayed grabbag, with a little something for everybody. The threat to our survival will last so long as Communism exists—but we are now in an "improved position" to "discuss with the Soviet Union, and will do so whenever there is a prospect of "constructive results." "Unity of the free world" is the first requirement, but we will continue to support the Nationalist government of China, which most of the rest of the free world unitedly rejects. We will build a specifically national defense force and form special alliances, but the U.N. is the best hope for peace and will get our firm support.

We will throw in a couple of gimmicks in true merchandising style. Let's lower the voting age to eighteen, and declare forfeit the citizenship of subversives. It is difficult to believe that either of these proposals could have been seriously intended, though they were so received at least by some members of Congress. On the surface they sound rather like election bait from the high-powered advisers with whom the President too much surrounds himself.

As for the domestic economy, the words were obviously meant to please, the few concrete recommendations were not too reassuring. Of course, no one will object much to the minor tax changes he suggested, most of them—like the increased allowance for dependents and easier rules on personal deductions—designed for immediate voter appeal. Beyond that, we find that all along the line we are strongly for free enterprise, but . . .

Government cannot create ambition and enterprise, but the health and growth of the economy must be guaranteed by government, not left "to chance." We are "flatly opposed to socialized medicine," but the problem of health is too much for the citizens so that there must be government help, encouragement, grants, and reinsurance. We will not have government-controlled agriculture, but we cannot allow any abrupt downward swing in government price supports. Natural resources are the responsibility of local communities and regions, but the federal government will take care of them whenever projects are "beyond local initiative." Education is a state affair, but the federal government should "stand ready" to subsidize it. Housing is for private initiative, but we are all for the 1949 Housing Act and government support of a housing program. People should stand on their own feet, but social security and unemployment insurance should be extended.

It is not exact to say that the Administration has taken over "the New Deal program" in economics. Many of the New Dealers believe positively in socialism and statism as a goal and ideal. We do not believe that this is true of the President and most of his advisers. But this message gave no expression of an opposite set of ideals. It showed no confidence in the enduring strength of a free economy and the resources of a free and independent citizenry. Free enterprise is presented as a delicate child whom only Mother Government can shelter when the wind blows.
In some respects this unsure, negative attitude could be more dangerous in the long run than a more positive and outright statism. Americans reject statism as a positive ideal. Might they be frightened into accepting it as the only refuge against adversity?

President Eisenhower's method is to seek agreement, compromise, and conciliation. This cannot be done merely by glossing over issues and difficulties. In the technical military field, the nation was doomed to drift until at least a direction was established. The same rule holds for the domestic economy. The President can properly conciliate with respect to pace, timing, specific measures. But you cannot go in two directions at once. It will have to be this or that: either toward control and big government, or toward freedom, decentralized responsibility, and individual initiative.

**Warfare on the Docks**

The labor situation on the New York waterfront was never simple. But what has happened in the months since the A. F. L. expelled Joe Ryan's longshoremen's union (the I.L.A.) and chartered a new union of its own has not made it any simpler. For two unions now fight for supremacy where there was previously one. John L. Lewis, a consistent troublemaker in labor affairs, has entered the fray to complicate things still more. And Governor Dewey, operating what looks like an alliance with the A.F.L., has made the whole business a factor in New York's state, and perhaps city, politics.

The first problem of the New York authorities, state and city, once they became interested in the question, was to clean up the violence, gangsterism, graft on the docks. For this purpose they had at their disposal, first, the police and, second, the newly established New York-New Jersey Waterfront Commission. In the long run, the police may well be the more important, since it is they who keep the peace and detect and prevent crime, provided they are allowed to do their duty. The long history of crime in the Port of New York is due primarily to the indifference or opposition of public officials to its effective policing.

At the moment, stamping out crime and giving the longshoremen an opportunity to work free from physical coercion do not seem to be the most pressing concern of the leading actors in this labor drama. They are all busily engaged in promoting the interests of either the I.L.A. or the new A.F.L. union as the representative of the rank and file of longshoremen. This matter is, in fact, in the hands of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which several weeks ago took a secret poll to determine the longshoremen's choice of the union they wished to represent them.

In this election, in which some 17,000 unchallenged ballots were cast, the I.L.A. received a majority of 1,492. There were, however, 4,397 challenged ballots. On their disposition depends the final result of the poll. Meanwhile, the A.F.L., with the support of Governor Dewey, is trying to get the election declared invalid on the ground that the voters were intimidated by agents of the I.L.A. On these questions the NLRB may be expected to rule before the end of January.

However the board rules, it is too much to hope that the ruling will settle the dock problem. The union that wins will continue to be challenged by its unsuccessful rival. The two unions appear to be quite evenly matched. Proselytizing and organizing are rarely peaceful activities. They are much less so when one union is trying to snatch members away from another. And they are still less so when this struggle for supremacy goes on among such hardened warriors as the longshoremen of the great New York-New Jersey port.

All that has happened and will happen in this situation affords indispensable material for a commentary on labor relations in this country. The special kind of troubles the longshoremen have experienced and the use of force and intimidation in many other industries may be laid at the door of the local authorities who have failed to use their powers to keep the peace and to protect citizens against plain assault and battery. A good deal of this abdication of local responsibility followed the large-scale entry of the federal government into labor relations. As long as it continues, there will be little and ineffective law enforcement, and the conditions we deplore on the docks will persist there and grow elsewhere.

Shipping is clearly subject to federal regulation. Hence, labor on the piers and its unions and bargaining are likewise under federal jurisdiction. It cannot be said that the responsibility of the federal government has, in this case, made any contribution to the welfare of longshoremen, the shipping industry, or the inhabitants of New Jersey and New York. Everyone might be better off if responsibility were placed where it belongs—in the local government. Then there would be some point in Governor Dewey's recent remark that it is the duty of the State of New York "to protect the welfare of its working people."

In all that has been said and written about the evils of labor administration on the docks, no one has suggested limiting the power of unions or, at the least, scrutinizing their behavior. Mr. George Shapiro, Governor Dewey's counsel, is reported as believing that the Taft-Hartley Act ought to be amended to exclude "racketeer-dominated unions" from election privileges. Another Dewey aide, however, is said to think that it would prove difficult to draw a "foolproof definition" of racketeer domination. If that is so, we are a long way from decent labor relations.
Atomic Pool Dangers

It is hard to understand the apparent eagerness of Secretary of State Dulles to press for negotiations with the Soviet Union on President Eisenhower's atomic pool project. A less hopeful subject for discussion could hardly be imagined. Even the propaganda value of such talks, from the American standpoint, is very dubious. For the Soviet government, in its official reply to Eisenhower's speech, has shown that it can and will continue to play its familiar record: "Ban atomic weapons, together with the establishment of international control over this ban and an unconditional pledge not to use these weapons."

The Soviet reply is quite correct in the statement: "The acceptance of this proposal in no way limits an aggressor as regards the use of the atomic weapon for any purpose or at any time. Consequently this proposal in no way reduces the danger of atomic attack."

Indeed the Soviet regime is just as sincerely eager to bar the use of atomic weapons by the United States as Genghis Khan would have been to prohibit the use of gunpowder by any of his prospective victims. American superiority in sea power, in practical application of atomic research, and in bases from which Soviet military and industrial centers could be bombed is the offset to Soviet superiority in trained manpower and in stocks of such "conventional" weapons as airplanes and tanks. The United States is now going over to extensive tactical use of atomic weapons; this offers the possibility of compensating for less manpower with greater firepower.

The United States has little to expect, either in positive results or in propaganda benefit, from a discussion of atomic disarmament. Such disarmament is, in the first place, impossible to assure by foolproof inspection. If it were possible, the result would be, under present conditions, to tip the military balance of power heavily in favor of the Soviet Union.

It was at least a realistic feature of the Eisenhower proposal that it laid on the shelf suggestions for prohibition of atomic weapons, to be enforced by inspection and control. But the Soviet government may be expected to press energetically for this prohibition. From the Soviet point of view there is the prospect of everything to gain and nothing to lose if the outside world should be so incredibly naive as to believe that its security would be enhanced in the slightest degree by a Soviet paper pledge.

There are also grave objections to the atomic pool project, if it proves possible to confine discussion to this subject. Who is to insure that the atomic resources provided for such a pool are not made available for military use? And how reliable, politically, are the prospective "underprivileged" nations which would be beneficiaries of the pool? Is Red China to be eligible? If India is to benefit from the pool, where is the guarantee that Nehru will not succumb to a friendly impulse of Asiatic solidarity and pass along the available atomic knowledge to Mao Tse-tung?

Atomic energy is the parent of terrible weapons, in which, unfortunately, we must be as strong as possible in order to deter our enemies from using them. It would be wise to leave the subject at that.

The Conference Obsession

Is it a strange popular delusion that announcement of a conference with a totalitarian regime is considered good news. For such conferences, from Munich to Panmunjom, have been an unbroken series of disastrous defeats for the cause of freedom or, at best, time-wasting and futile deadlocks. Consider briefly the sorry record.

Munich did not produce "peace in our time." Yalta witnessed a holocaust of Atlantic Charter principles and elementary American and British security requirements. Potsdam put the seal on the evil deeds of Yalta, ratified for Germany a large part of the notorious Morgenthau Plan, and authorized one of the most inhuman acts of an inhuman age: the expulsion of some 14,000,000 Germans and people of German origin from German territory east of the Oder and Western Neisse rivers, and from the countries of eastern and southeastern Europe.

Postwar conferences between Western and Soviet statesmen were no happier in their results, except insofar as they ended more frequently in stalemate, less frequently in unconditional surrender. The tremendous political and economic improvement in West Germany after we gave up pursuing the will-o'-the-wisp of agreement with Moscow and began to build up Germany as if the Soviet Union did not exist is excellent proof that the conference method is expendable.

There are several reasons why the return to the conference table at Berlin, after an interval of more than six years, should be a cause of concern rather than of jubilation.

First, in the unlikely event that the Soviet government is inclined to offer serious concessions, it is very improbable that this would take place in the spotlight of an international conference.

Second, we are negotiating not from strength, but from weakness, since the indispensable integration of Germany with the West has not yet been consummated.

Third, the Soviet government enters the conference without the handicap of weak-kneed allies, whereas the United States is in the thankless position of being the senior member of a wavering and shaky coalition.

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The best means of averting the pitfalls of the impending conference is to chart a clear, definite course and stick to it. Molotov should be backed into a corner as soon as possible and required to give a “Yes” or “No” answer to the question whether the Soviet government will permit free all-German elections and will take part in a complete evacuation of Austria. If the answer is No or a confused fog of irrelevancies about admission of Red China to the United Nations, prohibition of the atom bomb, and dismantling of American overseas bases, American withdrawal from the conference should be quick and final.

And then, with the conference obsession satisfied, at least for the time being, we may be able to get on with the building of the West European union which is the indispensable preliminary to the rollback of Communist tyranny from East Europe.

Unconditioned Aid

In our January 11 issue we published the remarkable article of Mr. Bogdan Raditsa on Tito’s rapprochement with the Kremlin. Tito’s unexpected personal reply does much to confirm this story. In addition, Mr. Raditsa’s general conclusions are strikingly supported by public developments of the past eight months. That Tito has been moving away from the West and toward renewed solidarity with Moscow can hardly be doubted.

As an exile from Tito’s Yugoslavia, Mr. Raditsa found haven among us. He showed the politeness of a tactful guest in omitting from his article any mention of a fact that, with this new shift of Tito’s, turns most bitter to American taste. For Tito is “our boy”—or at least the State Department’s. Tito, we have been told by official as well as unofficial spokesmen, was going to solve our problems for us. His was a nice, decent, peaceful sort of Communism, with no harm in it for anyone. Other satellite nations, and maybe Moscow itself, were going to follow Tito’s example, and then everything was going to be rosy. We are not against Communism—God, and George Kennan and Charles Bohlen forbid! We are just against “imperialism” and “aggression.”

So we dished out more than a billion dollars worth of aid to Tito, much of it military, and we patted ourselves on the back because we gave it “without any strings attached,” unconditioned. The absence of conditions was going to prove to Tito (or Nehru or whomever) how generous and noble we are. He would then love and trust us, and be ready to stand stalwartly at our side. Tito’s current behavior is an instructive comment on the doctrine of “we are not against Communism,” which has been carried over intact from Dean Acheson’s day into the present State Department and Information Agency. At the same time Tito is pricking the utopian bubble of “unconditioned aid.” Let us hope that the bombs we have given Tito will not be dropped from our gift-planes on our own heads.

An Asian Leader

Ramon Magsaysay, who was inaugurated as President of the Philippine Republic on December 30, is the next best thing that has happened to the Philippines since the war. He may, indeed, turn out to be one of the best things that has happened in recent years to all of Asia.

For years India’s Premier Nehru has clothed himself in an oversized mantle of Asian leadership. Now, according to C. L. Sulzberger of the New York Times, “The dearest hope of Washington is that some new independent Asian leader will emerge to take the lead in accomplishing the plan for a coalition of free countries” in the Far East.

Magsaysay, as Sulzberger points out, could be such a man. In the United States he is best known as a staunch fighter against the Communist guerrillas who for eight years have tried unsuccessfully to take over the island republic. Like President Eisenhower, Magsaysay won his reputation as a top army man. Now he is faced with political and economic problems that have plagued U.S.-Philippine relations since the end of World War Two.

The island nation was made independent of the United States some seven years ago. However, American confidence in the political-economic stability of the Philippines has lessened steadily. Now, with Magsaysay in office, this confidence has a new lease on life. The new President will have to begin by cleaning up a notoriously corrupt government service that managed to waste some $2,000,000,000 of U.S. aid with nothing permanent to show for it. When Magsaysay decided to run against former President Elpidio Quirino’s Liberal Party, he spoke up against “the tolerance of corruption and the priority of personal ambition and greed above national interest.” He will have a big house-cleaning job to do, and to try and create a new moral climate in Philippine public affairs.

As head of the Nationalist Party, Magsaysay is also pledged to reduction in government activities that hamper free economic development. He is on record as favoring private rather than government-operated enterprises. As a start he plans to reorganize some twenty government agencies and make them pay their way.

Americans have long ties of friendship with the Philippines, and they want the islands to enjoy a stable, common-sense administration. Since their independence from the United States in 1946, the Philippines have struggled toward stability. Magsaysay can now make a firm move in that direction and prepare the basis for the kind of leadership in Asia that will have no truck with Communism.
Behind the Lines in Indo-China

By ROBERT DONLEVIN

A firsthand account of a strange war disastrous in its possible outcome both for the future of Asia and for an effective European defense plan

"They say it's not war, but it's war just the same."

The executive officer of the First Vietnamese Parachute Battalion thus summed up to me the feeling of many veterans of the fighting in Indo-China.

I had joined the battalion for a five-day pacification operation somewhere northeast of Saigon in territory held by Ho Chi Minh's Communist forces. A searing tropical sun blazed down upon us as we threaded our way through the dust-caked brush. Around us, invisible in the parched thicket, were Ho Chi Minh's Vietminh lookouts and scouts. In that area they dared not attack a whole battalion. With oriental patience they watched us, waiting for some one to fall behind or let down his guard. Then they would pick him off and in an instant melt back into the landscape they know as they do the palms of their hands.

That is the kind of war the Vietnamese First is fighting today, with the resumption of fierce jungle warfare across the narrow peninsula to Thailand (usually known in the West as Siam).

It is a strange and miserable war. Just as we were settling down for the night, we heard the sharp crump of exploding rifle grenades, followed by the jagged staccato of answering automatic fire. The rugged battalion commander, Captain Georges Verville, said simply: "Blue Company."

Sure enough, a few minutes later a report crackled in over the walkie-talkie from the Blue Company, a fighting advance guard that had preceded us. Its commander, Lieutenant Pierre de Haynin de Brie, had been hit in the shoulder, neck, and face by splinters from an enemy rifle grenade. I met him and talked with him later. He was surprisingly young—only thirty—to have spent about twelve years of his life fighting for France. He was in the army in 1940 and active in the brave, though brief and disastrous, resistance to Hitler's blitzkrieg; then with the Maquis; finally with the Allied forces in the full campaign from Tunisia to Italy to France to Germany. And now he was on his second twenty-seven-months' tour of duty in Indo-China—about as far from home as a man can be, engaged in a war in which a creeping, unseen enemy picks you off at noon from behind a dusty clump of bushes.

Lieutenant de Haynin de Brie was but one of many young French officers and soldiers I met in Indo-China, all members of France's fighting army, forgotten in the West, little heralded in their own country.

The United States government has granted an additional $385,000,000 for this year to build up the national armies of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, the three states comprising the Indo-Chinese Federation under French dominion. France has sent the vigorous General Henri-Eugene Navarre to Indo-China to help spark the French and local national forces to a conclusive victory. Yet in the end we must rely heavily on the collaboration of such young men as Lieutenant de Haynin de Brie. He and his colleagues will be in the front lines of this new assault. They will train the national armies to which America is contributing.

The Unknown War

Few people outside Asia know much about this war in Indo-China that many call a second Korea.

Ho Chi Minh was formerly a sickly photographer's assistant who spent some years in Moscow studying the theory and practice of Communist revolution. His great opportunity came when the Japanese occupied Indo-China during World War Two and in 1945 even succeeded in ousting all French officials. He set up his own government, the Vietminh ("coalition" party), in the northern part of Vietnam, the largest of the three states. Riding the crest of the wave of nationalism sweeping the Orient, he was able to take advantage of France's weakened position and loss of face following the defeat of Japan. He managed to obtain French recognition of his government on March 8, 1946. However, he remained unsatisfied with the terms of recognition, that his was a "free state having its own government, parliament, army, and finances and making up part of the Indo-Chinese Federation and the French Union."

The French retained control of Cochinchina, the southern part of the thousand-mile-long state of Vietnam, rich in rice and rubber. A plebiscite was promised for this area when the Vietnamese would decide whether they wanted to retain some sort of union with France or declare complete independence. Ho Chi Minh did not wait for this plebiscite before beginning his war on the French and those political parties in Vietnam that did not accept his leadership. In a telegram he sent to the cadres of the Vietminh at the time (which
Minh had moved colonial of Saigon in the south of Vietnam, I battalion Tonkin Communist regime, and on that date three hoth help so strongly had military authorities Under Fire commanding then Emperor Bao Dai has returned from enemy lines, minerals, be tanks night and spend several with China, facilitating the reception e~panding other our hands on French nationals out and prisoners him, but his job is still far from risks The black probably a mountains their way out. who only three weeks before me'll scrape former area. He French Vietminh or who ~rontier lies in the men themselves. The French commander's apparently guerrilla-fighting techniques were almost useless. This, however, gave the Vietminh undisputed control of most of the frontier with China, facilitating the reception of supplies through friends there.

Since then Emperor Bao Dai has returned from his wartime exile in France to head a new Vietnamese government. A Vietnamese National Army has been built up, including today 180,000 men and expanding both in size and efficiency under the generalship of the youthful (thirty-seven years old) Nguyen Van Hinh, who had a brilliant war record as a bomber pilot in North Africa and Europe during World War Two. In conjunction with the French military authorities and the help of French forces in Indo-China, a strong national army is being trained which will gradually take over more and more of the burden of fighting. But there are still many rough spots to be smoothed over.

Training Under Fire

"If I could only take this battalion out and train it for three months running," Captain Vervelle told me, "I could work wonders with it." But with the Vietminh close at hand, much of this training must be secured in actual combat with the enemy. The Vietnamese First has about fifty-five French officers and non-coms. The rest are Vietnamese. Their best Vietnamese cadres and troopers are former members of the French Army. But not all French commanders have as big a staff of European fighter-instructors as Vervelle. Take Sub-Lieutenant Marcel Defrasne, commanding officer of a 120-man commando unit. For a long time he was the only European in the outfit. Non-commissioned officers and soldiers were all Vietnamese, many of whom had little or no previous military training. He took them on the most dangerous missions behind enemy lines, where capture would probably have meant death by torture.

Defrasne now has half a dozen young French non-coms to help him, but his job is still far from easy. His main mission is to gather intelligence in enemy territory. Dressed in the commando's black fatigues he and a handful of his men may slip through enemy lines at night and spend several days reconnoitering Vietminh territory to learn about defense, morale, troop movements, etc. On such missions they will hide out during the day and move at night. Should the squad meet with opposition, they run rather than fight. But sometimes they have to shoot their way out.

One of the big risks lies in the men themselves. Most of them are recruited from the ranks of Vietminh prisoners or deserters from Vietminh forces. Defrasne said that at one time he had in his company men who only three weeks before had been fighting with the Vietminh. The chance of a Vietminh agent sneaking into the outfit is great. One commando unit famous for its exploits behind enemy lines in the Tonkin Delta was betrayed by the French commander's apparently loyal Vietnamese aide. But careful interrogation by loyal Vietnamese and the watchful eyes of fellow-troopers tend to reduce this risk. Defrasne has no hold over his troops. They are not regulars. They can leave any time they want to. But they stay; they are fiercely loyal to Defrasne. He pointed out to me several who had saved his life at one time or another in a scrape behind enemy lines. One of his most trusted men is a former lieutenant in the Vietminh forces.

All of these men who left the Vietminh or who were captured know what life is under Communist rule. From June to November 1952, 3,079 Vietminh soldiers and 100,000 civilians deserted the Communist camp. They voted with their feet for the Vietnamese administration.

The most pitiful aspect of the struggle in Indo-China, as in Korea, is the plight of the civilians caught in a cruel seesaw war. As in Korea, the front lines and control of many areas have changed many times. The peasants, afraid to compromise themselves, often maintain an attitude of sullen indifference toward the French and Vietnamese authorities. They know that when the latter leave, the Vietminh will come back with its political commissars and assassination committees to even up the score with anyone suspected of collaborating with the Franco-Vietnamese forces.

The Viets know the country and have men in every village. When the French come, they hide out in rice fields, often sticking their heads under water and breathing through a hollow bamboo. Or they descend into ingeniously built underground hideouts dug out of the dikes or high ground of the villages. The entrances to these hideouts may be through a pool of water with a siphon-system tunnel. They are absolutely impossible to find unless every square foot of the Delta is dug up or unless someone tells where they are. One such hideout, discovered under a road, was so strongly built that tanks had been passing over it all day without caving it in. The Viets are capable of
living in these hideouts for four or five days—until the French have "pacified" the village or passed on. And then they come out to launch their reign of terror.

Those who don’t hide in the dugouts infiltrate the French lines at night. A Vietnamese newspaperman who had formerly been a Vietminh soldier told me how Ho Chi Minh’s troops could travel fifteen miles a night across rice paddies, often hip-deep in water and mud. He said the Vietminh had guides in every town and hamlet, making a trip across “pacified” territory easy. The guides would take the soldiers at night from one village to the next.

Both French and Vietnamese authorities realize that the only way to pacify the Delta and the rest of Indo-China is by depriving the Vietminh of local support. The key to this is not simply extending operations. It means building up reliable local defense units in each village sufficiently strong to keep Vietminh terrorists from operating when the regular army moves on to pacify another area. It also means clamping down on the not inconsiderable traffic with the enemy in food and pharmaceuticals. For the most part, the Franco-Vietnamese forces still hold the big food-raising centers in Indo-China, but their security system is not tight enough on the local level to keep the Vietminh from coming every year and taking out both rice and recruits.

Both the French and the Vietnamese would like to see the Vietnamese Army able to take over the military burden of containing the Vietminh and keeping them from re-infiltrating already pacified areas. This would free the French forces for offensive action, relieving them of garrison duty in rear areas or on inactive fronts. If the French could then succeed in sealing off the frontier with China, the battle would be more than half won.

At present French intelligence sources estimate that 5,000 to 6,000 Chinese political commissars, technicians, instructors, etc., are serving with the Vietminh forces. In addition, Vietminh non-coms and officers are trained in Red China. Furthermore, a steadily increasing flow of arms is crossing the border from China. Vietminh divisions have radio liaison down to company level. Their infantry is as well equipped as the Franco-Vietnamese. They are still deficient in artillery, and in open combat they are no match for the French. But they fight like lions and can maneuver whole divisions in the field.

Both American aid and French and Vietnamese efforts to set up a Vietnamese National Army have counteracted the growing strength of the Vietminh forces. Technical schools and training centers for non-coms and officers have been established for the Vietnamese. Their pride and joy is the Vietnamese West Point at Dalat, efficiently run by a French staff. Here cadets spend eight months learning the profession of arms, adapted to local conditions. The big difficulty is still cadres for the army. Battalion commanders cannot be made in eight months or even a couple of years. Chief of Staff Van Hinh puts great store in his system of “vietnamizing” French units. Akin to a method used in Korea to train the R.O.K. forces, this consists of filling the ranks of French units with Vietnamese recruits who as they learn the art of war, slowly replace the French until the whole unit is transferred to the Vietnamese Army.

Little Chance of Truce

As the Big Four prepare for the first scheduled meeting of their foreign ministers since the truce in Korea, speculation is rife over what price Moscow may exact for calling off her dogs in Indo-China. Many thought a truce in Korea should open the way for a settlement in Southeast Asia, which might in turn be followed by an adjustment of all outstanding issues dividing the Communist and free worlds. There seems to be little foundation in fact for such optimism. The Communists had many good reasons to stop the war in Korea, none of which obtains for Indo-China. The Korean war was a drain on Chinese resources and trained military manpower, especially at a time when famine ravaged the country. In prestige China had gained about as much as possible out of the war by bogging down the U. N. military machine. And there was always the possibility that public opinion in the United States would tire of the endless negotiations and demand that the war be ended by carrying it to the enemy, as Generals MacArthur and Van Fleet wanted to do.

The war in Indo-China has been confused with the issue of colonialism, making the Franco-Vietnamese cause less popular in some parts of the free world than the U. N. action in Korea. It has weakened France to the point where that country may disown its brainchild—the European Defense Community — seriously prejudicing the whole NATO defense set-up. And, finally, Ho isn’t doing badly. Although Secretary of State Dulles was probably correct in putting a damper on the alarmist accounts the Vietminh invasion of Laos received in the American press, the situation of the anti-Communist forces there is far from happy. Once again the Vietminh has heavily infiltrated the Red River Delta, and once again General Navarre is planning the yearly mop-up in that vital region. In the meantime the Vietminh have secured rice and recruits and have broken down the painfully set up local administrations by terrorizing the peasants into not cooperating with the French and Vietnamese. Will this vicious circle be broken in 1954, or ever? It would seem not, unless the border with Communist China can be sealed off and an efficient local administration can systematically pacify the country and deny the Communists food and supplies.

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A New Kind of Saving

By HARRISON NEGLEY

George calls it a miracle. A 23-year-old helper on a delivery truck, he had been turned down as a "bad risk" by half a dozen bank and loan companies one December day in 1931. Yet that very evening he found a new kind of bank which not only granted him the $50 he requested but encouraged him to take $150 more.

And no one asked him, "Do you have a car—stocks—bonds—real estate? Can you find a cosigner?" Questions that George, who didn't even have carfare, had been answering "No" to all day long. Instead, a group of young men and women began with one kind question: "George, what's the matter—from the beginning?"

In two shabby rooms in an old brick building in one of New York's East Side slums, these people, the credit committee of the Henry Street Settlement Credit Union, carry on the work begun more than sixteen years ago by youngsters in their teens and early twenties, who chipped in $3.75 as a fund to fight the loan sharks who had a tight grip on their neighborhood. With no banking experience, following a credit policy so liberal it would make a banker blanch, they not only loosened the grip of the loan sharks but turned that shoestring into a thriving institution with deposits of $388,000.

To them George told what the bank and loan company interviewers had not had time for—the story of the furniture he and his wife had bought before they learned that a child was on the way. With the child came unexpected debts and now the finance company was going to take away the furniture.

No professional banker would have lent George a dime. But these amateurs made that loan and to give him a solid footing they refinanced his debts. Suddenly he had become someone who mattered.

George put his head down on his arms before the committee and wept like a kid. In making "reckless" loans, half of them to "bad risks" who couldn't find credit elsewhere, these part-time bankers have lent out over $1,630,000 with a rate of loss lower than that of commercial banks. They have proved that credit "ineligibles" can be the finest credit risks in the world.

Most of today's credit-committee members grew up in the slums around the Henry Street Settlement House. Theirs was a world of depression: unemployment, poverty, crime. Dominating it all was the loan shark.

"I remember seeing them beat one man," a housewife recalls. "They almost killed him but deliberately let him live."

"One man next door was working at two full-time jobs a day to keep up payments. He died of a heart attack," says another old resident.

These men and scores like them were kept in debt because the "vigorish"—neighborhood slang for interest rate—set by the loan shark was 1000 per cent a year.

Lack of money had crushed the spirit of the older generation and the kids realized that if the problem were to be solved they were the only ones who had the vitality and the will to do it. The spark that set them off was a scared eighteen-year-old who came into the Settlement House to see Nat Rafterman of the Boys Club with the confession that he had paid out $500 in interest—at $5 a week for two years—because he hadn't been able to raise the principal he had borrowed: $25. No longer able to pay the interest, and in fear of his life, he was planning to flee the city.

Washington Was Skeptical

The Settlement paid off the loan shark, but Nat, Sol Guralnick, and fourteen other boys of the Boys Club decided to attack the whole problem. Some kind of bank seemed the best way, and when they heard that they could apply for a charter as a credit union under the Federal Credit Union Act of 1934, they went into action.

The first hurdle was the $25 fee, big money in those days. To raise it the boys—who had jobs as countermen, busboys, and newspaper vendors—organized themselves into a savings club with dues of fifty cents a week. It wasn't long before their check, fastened to their application for a charter as a neighborhood credit union, was on its way to Washington.

It arrived with a dull thud. The Washington administrators, familiar only with the industrial credit union, saw here something new and dangerous. Unlike the industrial credit union, where members work for the same company, the neighborhood variety seemed full of pitfalls. How could anyone in such a poverty-stricken area with its shifting multilingual population, know enough about his neighbor to avoid large losses? Clinching it was the boys' lack of experience. The application was pigeonholed. After months of waiting the boys

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appealed for help to the Credit Union National Association. "Although we knew the boys had no experience," recalls Miss Dora Maxwell, a C.U.N.A. official, "we believed their enthusiasm would carry them through. At the same time we kept our fingers crossed." Under C.U.N.A.'s pressure, in January 1937 the Washington administrators reluctantly, predicting failure, granted the charter.

The boys, now joined by several girls, found themselves in business but with a total capital of $8.75—and besieged by people desperate for loans. Finding money for capital meant finding members who would invest in shares. How could they find them in a demoralized neighborhood such as theirs? The youngsters decided on a dramatic appeal. Several of the boys turned playwright, others painted scenery and rang doorbells.

The result was a melodrama, admission free, complete with loan-shark villain, that played to "standing room only." Its message was simple and direct: invest to help yourself and your neighbor—yourself by drawing a 2½ per cent dividend; your neighbor by creating a fund for those in need.

Listening was a cross section of the neighborhood. One third were immigrants from every country in Europe, with little or no knowledge of English. What they could not understand the other two thirds—first and second generation Americans—translated. Ten per cent were Protestants, one third were Catholics, a little more than half were Jewish.

"The next few weeks were exciting ones for the boys," says Miss Helen Hall, director of the Settlement House. "Dollar bills and coins flooded in, most of them out of socks, jars, and mattresses."

"And it wasn't self-interest that brought those savings in," says Maurice Blond, a credit-committee member. "It was a genuine desire to help your neighbor."

And helping neighbors who were crowded into the waiting room—truck drivers, factory workers, clerks, painters—sent the young amateurs on a lending spree. They set the interest rate at less than 6 per cent, which was lower than that of the banks, and they made loans without any of the usual banking safeguards. For credit references, investigations, job check-ups they substituted a short mimeographed application and the word of a neighbor: "Sam is okay" or "Bill keeps his word."

Usually a neighbor who was already a credit-union member brought in new applicants, but many came in alone. If the committee didn't know an applicant personally, it was easy to find someone who did. In an informal atmosphere, popping questions as they came to mind, committee members quickly sized a man up. He always got the benefit of the doubt. Almost anyone in the neighborhood could take away money, the same night he applied.

Rule number one was the federal limitation of $50 if the borrower could offer no security. However, with the signature of a member, appli-
who wanted “expansion” loans, could have gotten credit in the usual channels. But not so those who were planning to go into their own business for the first time. Most of them had already been denied credit elsewhere.

A husky forty-year-old taxi driver was one of the first. After a mild heart attack, doctors had ordered him to find a less strenuous occupation. Although he had only a few dollars saved and no business experience, the committee took a chance. With a loan of $300 he and his wife opened a hole-in-the-wall short-order counter. As they prospered they expanded, each time with a credit-union loan. Today their luncheonette, worth $20,000 and famous for its food, is a neighborhood landmark.

"I can make it on $600," said a veteran who wanted to open a commercial ceramic studio. His only asset, an ability to create the delicate and colorful pottery he was famous for in the Settlement workshop as a boy, was worthless in banks. For lack of business experience he had even been turned down for a G.I. loan. But here one committee member lent him $200 on a personal basis so that he could deposit it in the credit union. This made him eligible for the legal limit for unsecured loans, then $400. He now had his $600. To keep within this sum he built his own gas kiln, potter's wheel, benches, and tools and soon he was turning out lamps, vases, and bowls which today are earning him a national reputation and $10,000 a year.

Two thirty-year-old truck drivers, refused credit everywhere, borrowed one of the largest loans ever granted. Driving up to the Settlement one evening in an old truck bought with army savings, they requested $4,000 with which to buy two additional second-hand trucks. With these they hoped to start a trucking firm to serve the garment district. The committee knew the men to be able and trustworthy. Each one, with $250 on deposit, received $850 by the usual formula. To make up the difference between $1,300 and $4,000 the committee took chattel mortgages on the trucks. Not only did these men pay off promptly, but they now own six busy trucks which, one by one, the credit union helped them buy.

There is hardly a block in the Henry Street neighborhood now which hasn't a one-time "bad risk" who has become a successful small businessman. You'll find a pet-shop owner, a greeting-card wholesaler, tailors, jobbers, manufacturers. You'll find teachers, doctors, lawyers. And there are hundreds of other persons with lives a little richer for chances the committee took.

At Henry Street, on total loans of $1,630,000, the total loss is less than one-seventh of 1 per cent.

It can't be done over marble counters. It's as simple as one man's response to another man's trust. It's in the magic of ordinary people, with the same beginnings and the same problems, sitting down together and one asking of the other: What's the matter, George—from the beginning?"

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### SPEAKING OF POLITICS

#### Mr. Ickes' Secret Diary

**"The First Thousand Days"**

One interesting remark made by the President when he and Hopkins and I were alone was that the way the Government is being run now there is an inner Cabinet. He said the members of this inner Cabinet were Morgenthau, Cummings, myself, Miss Perkins, Wallace, Hopkins, Davis of the AAA and the man who would head up NRA.

*October 2, 1934*

On Friday at a Cabinet meeting there was some discussion of the notes that had passed between the United States and Russia. I did not hear anything very illuminating or very convincing on the matter. If Russia, officially or semiofficially, is encouraging communist propagandas in this country, nothing was offered to prove it...

*September 6, 1935*

I have felt from the beginning that the President is likely to find himself short of money just at the critical time before election. I have no confidence in the situation and I hate to see more money go down the Hopkins rat hole...

*December 16, 1935*

Until I came back from my talk with the President on Saturday I really did not realize the extraordinary powers granted to Hopkins. The huge sum of almost $1.5 billion is granted outright to the Works Progress Administrator, which means Hopkins.

*May 13, 1936*

As a citizen, I am very much worried about the four years to come. I regard Landon as a man of very mediocre ability... Roosevelt, too, would have his hands full. I am beginning to fear that he is too sure of himself, too certain of his own judgment, and less and less willing to seek or take advice from competent men. He is surrounding himself with men like Morgenthau and Hopkins and Tugwell, plus a lot of even less' lights. I rather shudder to think of what his Cabinet will be during his next term if he is re-elected. So, whichever wins, the country is likely to have to pay through the nose, and then God knows what will happen in 1940.

*July 21, 1936*

I took occasion to tell the President that if we only had a fair break of luck... his Administration would go down in history as one of profound and far-reaching social changes... He said that what we were doing in this country were some of the things that were being done in Russia and even some things that were being done under Hitler in Germany. But we were doing them in an orderly way.

*October 5, 1933*

From The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes

New York: Simon and Schuster, 1952
Twilight of the Utopias

By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

The golden age of utopias is before there is any attempt to put them into practical operation. So long as economic liberalism was the accepted orthodoxy of the civilized world, so long as there was no working alternative to the individualist capitalist system, the sky was the limit for the dreams of would-be social and economic reorganizers. Marx and Saint-Simon, Fourier and Edward Bellamy could imagine enormous gains in physical production, in human leisure, happiness and prosperity as a result of substituting public for private ownership as the motive power in getting the work of the world done.

But now, in the middle of the twentieth century, we are living in a time when utopias have been brought down to earth and put to the test of practical experience. And for this very reason, it is a time of twilight for these schemes. Utopian stock today is quoted at low levels and is showing a steady downward trend.

To be sure, the myth of the Soviet Union, biggest, bloodiest, and most terrible of the utopias, has died extremely hard. For some individuals, pathetic in their grasping for a secular substitute for a religious ideal, this myth of a workers' paradise, a land of ideal social justice, has survived everything: the massacre of the old Communists, the vast slave labor camps, the starvation of millions of peasants, the genocidal mass deportations, the sharp and visible increase in material inequality, the extinction of all human rights and personal liberties.

But defection from the Soviet Communist utopia has been proceeding at an accelerated pace. The majority of the surviving founding fathers of the Communist International can be found today in the anti-Communist camp. There is the unanswerable argument of mass flight from Communism in regions as diverse and distant as North Korea and East Germany. And it may well be recorded in history that the final blow to the utopian appeal of Communism was delivered when the workers of East Germany last June rose up against their Communist bosses and would have made an end of their oppressive regime if it had not been for the Soviet tanks which were brought in to quell the uprising.

No myth can survive indefinitely the refusal of the hero to play the role assigned to him. The dream of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a solvent for all social ills cannot persist when the proletariat openly rebels against what is falsely described as its own dictatorship.

The milder type of utopia represented by West European socialism has also been tried in the balance and found lacking. There was no limit to what socialist orators formerly promised as the result of the adoption of their pet dogma. Even the hardheaded Swiss were partly persuaded to nationalize their railways by the promises of a legislative spellbinder who assured them that they could ride free of charge after the railways became state property. Swiss railways are national property now; but fares are collected just as in the days of private ownership.

Drab Austerity

The new heaven and new earth promised by the early evangelists of Labor socialism in Great Britain have been deflated to a drab austerity regime of queues and shortages and innumerable restrictions on what Englishmen of former generations would have regarded as elementary personal rights. Even the General Council of the British Trades Union Congress, in a recent report, showed distinct lukewarmness about pushing nationalization farther. The Council also administered a dash of cold water to the dreamers in the ranks of the Labor Party by characterizing the belief that "workers' control" would solve wage and employment problems painlessly as "wishful thinking."

During the war it was widely accepted doctrine that poor countries could not "afford" capitalism. Postwar experience has proved the precise contrary. It is where orthodox capitalist methods of maintaining the free market and substituting credit restriction and similar indirect controls for planning and rationing have been followed most faithfully that recovery has been most striking and economic conditions are healthiest.

Probably there will be no immediate cessation of the crank letters by individuals and organizations with cut-rate, surefire schemes for regenerating humanity that form a normal part of one's daily mail. But one wonders whether masses of people will ever again, after the disillusioning experiences of our time, be induced to fight or even to vote for utopia. And should this doubt be well founded, it will be all to the good. For hell has no fury like the inevitable frustrated utopian in
power, who finds in the guillotine and the firing
squad the obvious and inevitable remedies for the
failure of people to behave as they should, accord­
ing to his pet theory.

Perhaps this time of twilight for utopias is
ripe for a revival of the eighteenth-century in­
tellectual virtues of coolheaded rationalism and
skeptical examination of the claims of doctrinaire
prophets. The robust common sense of Dr. Samuel
Johnson, the urbane skepticism that pervades Gib­
bon's great narrative of the decline and fall of
Rome may come into their own.

More About the Eggheads

By HENRY HAZLITT

In the December 12 issue of the Saturday Review
appeared a review by Professor J. Frank Dobie
of the University of Texas which is worth notice
chiefly as the latest example that comes to hand of
one of the favorite controversial tricks of the
left-wing intellectuals. This is the pretense that
the chief if not indeed the sole ground on which
the left-wingers are criticized by those who dis­
agree with them is their superior culture and
learning.

Certain writers, declares Mr. Dobie, "ignorant
themselves, discount all learning and all learned
people. These are the wits . . . to whom all scholars
and thinkers, particularly in the realms of politics,
are 'eggheads.' . . . The scorners of eggheads got
in some of their most telling blows on Secretary
of State Acheson through his Yale-Harvard asso­
ciations, and some of their 'I Like Ike' promotion
by emphasizing his like for mysteries and West­
erns, leaving the presumption that for him, as
for Henry Ford, 'history is bunk.' . . . Distrust
of cultivated intellect was never so popular in this
country in its entire history as right now."

Here Mr. Dobie manages to imply that the chief
reason Dean Acheson was disliked is that he is an
educated man and a "cultivated intellect," and
that the chief reason President Eisenhower is
liked is that he is an ignoramus. But if the chief
reason Acheson was disliked is that he went to
Yale and then to Harvard Law School, why didn't
the same people who disliked him dislike for the
same reason the late Senator Taft, who also went
to Yale and then to the Harvard Law School?

But perhaps the very learned Mr. Dobie doesn't
read the newspapers, and never heard of Acheson's
appalling foreign policies, his repeated sacrifices
of vital American interests, his appeasement of
Communism, his acts of omission and commission
which helped the Communists take over China,
his crucial role in blundering into an avoidable and
inconclusive war in Korea. His record in this
respect has been documented in many places,
notably including the FREEMAN, of which Mr. Dobie
will find back copies available on request.

It is true that in addition to all this Mr. Acheson
was lacking in candor and straightforwardness.
This absence of personal qualities is perhaps a
little beside the present point. More to that point,
however, was Mr. Acheson's unusual combination
of superficiality and superciliousness. It is this
combination that helped to make him an almost
perfect egghead.

As to the definition of an egghead, Mr. Dobie
seems to have been away somewhere when the
word first gained currency. We hope he will for­
give us if we again refer him to the FREEMAN for
information, this time to an excellent article by
Louis Bromfield in our issue of December 1, 1952,
titled "The Triumph of the Egghead." Here Mr.
Bromfield made the point, among others, that an
egghead is properly so-called not because of his
intelligence or knowledge but because of the gaps
in it. He ended with a set of definitions of
"egghead" which we partly condense and partly
amend as follows:

Egghead: A person of spurious intellectual pre­
tensions lacking in common sense. A left-wing
doctinaire, oblivious of actualities and contem­
uous of experience. A fuzzy-minded, starry-eyed New
Dealer.

Mr. Dobie is very sure that he is on the side
on the angels, and that those who disagree with
him, and who use the word "eggheads" to describe
eggheads, are obscurantists who "discount all
learning." We should advise him to embark upon
a somewhat wider course of reading. We rec­
omend, for example, William Hazlitt's essay on
"The Ignorance of the Learned," which is chiefly
concerned with calling attention to the kinds of
useful knowledge that so many of the pretentiously
learned have not learned. He would also find out
that the wise and cultivated of all ages have avoided
the vulgar error of confusing learning with wisdom
or common sense. He might read, above all,
Molière's Les Précieuses Ridicules, Le Bourgeois
Gentilhomme and Les Femmes Savantes, all of
which ridiculed mercilessly the pretensions of
false learning, and established beyond dispute
that a learned ass is an even bigger ass than an
ignorant one.
Peru’s Economic Comeback

By STANLEY HIGH

Because its government followed the simple proposal: “Abolish controls,” this country has become one of the most stable and prosperous in Latin America.

For years its state-controlled economy had been going downgrade fast. Then, five years ago, it made a sudden turnaround. Today Peru is one of the world’s best examples of the advantages—to a whole people—of a free economy. A veteran U. S. diplomat in Lima says: “Peru is on the road to becoming one of the most stable and prosperous countries in Latin America.”

Peru’s turn toward economic freedom came in 1948, in the wake of two brief but decisive uprisings. A weak reformist government had by then proved its inability to deal with the worsening financial situation brought on by its own policies. The first of the uprisings was an unsuccessful revolt on October 3, said to have been led by the radical Apra or People’s Party.

The second uprising came on October 27. This time the army garrison at Arequipa, Peru’s second city, revolted against the government. The revolt spread quickly but without bloodshed. On October 30 President José Luis Bustamante fled the country. The strong man of the uprising, General Manuel Odria, entered Lima and, as head of a military junta, took over the government.

The odds against Odria’s announced aim to restore economic freedom looked almost insurmountable. The trend in most Latin-American countries was toward more, not fewer, state encroachments. But Odria, deceptively mild-mannered, notably stubborn, and remarkably well informed on what was happening to Peru’s economy, was not intimidated.

Born of humble farm parents, in a village on the eastern slope of the Andes, Odria had firsthand knowledge of poverty. His military education was largely financed by his widowed mother’s skill as a seamstress. When, as an Army officer, he came to the United States for advanced military study, he got a revealing close-up of the achievements of free enterprise. He never lost his conviction that such a system had more to offer the people of Peru than any alternative.

Odria had been a cabinet member in the government which he had helped overthrow. He had resigned earlier that year, however, in protest against policies which he believed were ruining his country.

In his first press conference after taking over Odria announced that his policy was less state control, more self-help, no foreign aid. To date Odria has never sought a loan from the United States. He did, however, ask for U. S. experts, but not for the usual “government mission.” “I was only a general,” he told me recently. Instead, he hired Klein & Saks, a private American firm of economic consultants. The head of this firm, Dr. Julius Klein, served as chief of the Latin-American Division of the U. S. Department of Commerce during the Hoover Administration.

Free Market Lowered Living Costs

After intensive study, Klein and his experts came up with a plan based on one inclusive proposal: “Abolish controls.” In one sweeping decree on November 11, 1949, Odria did just that. Anticipating a temporary rise in living costs, he called for an across-the-board increase of 20 per cent in wages and salaries.

The lifting of controls did send prices up briefly. Then farmers who had kept half their produce off the market because of the government’s fixed prices began to sell—and food costs speedily adjusted downward. Between 1950 and 1952 Peru’s cost of living increased only 17 per cent, compared to increases of 29 per cent for Mexico, 55 per cent for Chile, 73 per cent for Argentina.

Much of Peru’s best land is used for the production of cotton and sugar, largely for export. These crops reached an all-time high in 1953. But important as they are, Odria recognized that Peru must become self-sufficient in food production. A law, therefore, requiring that 20 per cent of all cultivated areas be used to grow food for the home market was made operative.

In meat production, price-fixing had brought disaster. The country’s cattle population was reduced by nearly half. Where Peru had once been self-sufficient, meat had to be imported. Today the cattle industry is rapidly recovering.

Much of Peru’s best agricultural area has been controlled by large landowning families who often exploited both the people and the land. Odria did not attempt a forcible break-up of these estates. Instead he is giving favored treatment to the small farmer: first rights to fertilizer, crop loans at low interest rates, and liberal terms for farm workers who seek to open new areas and own their own farms.

In 1950 foodstuffs made up 20 per cent of the Lima say’s: “Peru is on the road to becoming one of the most stable and prosperous in Latin America.”

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In 1950 foodstuffs made up 20 per cent of
Peru's total imports. By 1952 that figure had been cut to 14 per cent. In that year, for the first time, sufficient rice was raised to allow a margin—after local demands were met—for export.

Peru is rich in natural resources. Already near the top in world production of silver, vanadium, and bismuth, it also exports lead, zinc, copper, and gold. There are good deposits of iron, tungsten, antimony, and manganese. There is an extensive supply of coal, largely undeveloped and there are known to be vast oil reserves.

State controls had all but throttled the development of these resources. Investment was discouraged by the requirement that exporters had to turn over 100 per cent of their dollar receipts to the government bank and accept Peruvian soles in return. Expansion of firms already in business was hamstrung by the outright prohibition against importing many necessary items like machinery.

On advice of the Klein mission, Odria abolished these prohibitions. Duty-free entry was established for mining machinery and equipment. The law requiring exporters to surrender their dollars for soles was repealed. And a new mining code eliminates, for a period of 25 years, practically all export taxes on minerals.

Industry Is Booming

Since enactment of these favoring laws Peruvian mineral production has been characterized, according to a U. S. government report, by "spectacular increases." Vast plans are already under way.

Cerro de Pasco, an American mining company, is investing some $160,000,000 in hydroelectric and other new projects. Plans of the American Smelting & Refining Company call for a $100,000,000 investment in developing copper deposits. French interests are financing the development of a steel industry. Dutch capital is being invested in chemical concerns. The Utah Construction Company is opening southern Peru's iron deposits, estimated at 100 million tons. At least six other mining companies have announced expansion programs.

In the Sechura Desert, on Peru's northern coast, and across the Andes in the upper Amazon Basin, there are hopeful indications of further oil deposits. The government has thrown these areas open, offering foreign firms virtually the same terms as Peruvian companies—a fifty-fifty split on earnings, and forty-year renewable concessions for exploitation. As a result, Peruvian, Canadian, and American firms have begun large-scale operations. Peru may become a major source of oil for the Western Hemisphere.

Better Schools and Housing

A ten-year program has been initiated for the improvement of public education; more new schools have been built in the last five years than in any similar period in Peru's history. In Lima and other Peruvian cities, acres of adobe slums are being razed to make way for attractive, low-cost housing developments.

Politically, Odria's government, though moderate, is still a dictatorship. The radical Apra party is outlawed. In the Peruvian Congress there is no formal opposition. Despite Odria's strong popular following, the core of his strength is probably the army.

But the trend toward more political democracy is unmistakable and will gather momentum. Having seized power, Odria, unlike most dictators, takes pride in the fact that he is not increasing the power of the state, but is steadily relinquishing it. In its discussion of public affairs, the Peruvian press is probably freer today than at any time in years.

"Democracy," Odria recently declared, "is neither left nor right—it is indivisible. The freedom we seek must be both political and economic."

Odria believes that, with freedom on the increase, the materials are all at hand for "creating the greater Peru of tomorrow." The record indicates that he has already helped to create a greater Peru—today.

Missing Dream

It did not come, so I arose,
Left my lonely room,
Went as a betrayer goes
To a guilty tomb;

Waded through a songless stream,
Climbed a barren hill,
There I found the missing dream
Strangled, cold, still.

"Will you never come again,
Early dream?" I said.
All I heard was dying rain
Falling on the dead.

HENRY MORTON ROBINSON
Private vs. Public Planning

By WILLIAM H. PETERSON

A glance at how business works reveals the error in the contention that the alternative to government planning is economic anarchy.

Back in 1952 when the Eisenhower Special was rolling up votes, we tossed away as mere campaign oratory such statements as “If signs appear of any depression... the full power of private industry, of municipal, state, and federal governments will be mobilized to see that it does not happen.” Today we are not so sure. Defense Mobilizer Fleming’s directive calling for procurement in areas of “labor surplus,” the new inflationary Federal Reserve policy of softening money and credit, Economic Adviser Burns’ pronouncement that the government will seek to “spread our economic system so we can prevent business recession,” and the President’s assurance that the government would “sustain the basic prosperity of our people”—all portend “planning.”

The advocates of government planning frequently imply that without such planning we are living in a sort of economic anarchy. Is the issue really government planning vs. no planning?

Since the opening of the twentieth century, the United States, with but one-twentieth of the world’s population, has achieved from one-third to one-half of the world’s total production. This did not come about haphazardly. It came through private planning—price and cost analysis, market research, and an untold number of calculated business risks. Intricately meshed into the economy of any American city are airlines and railroads, newspapers and broadcasting stations, banks and exchanges, factories and stores, powerhouses and telephones—all essentially privately owned and privately planned.

Thus the issue may be more aptly stated: private planning or government planning? Planners (government variety) would shift the locus of planning away from private hands over to the government, invariably the central government. Government planning ranges from what Britain’s former Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Gaitskell, describes as “democratic” planning (in varying degrees from “full employment” to outright nationalization) to totalitarian planning. Let us measure “democratic” government planning and private planning side by side against generally accepted Western values and standards to see which type is better for America.

1. Which type of planning best lends itself to scientific analysis? “Democratic” public planning is planning “up” as well as planning “down.” Affected parties are given a voice in such planning. But just as we could not expect the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct military planning by public referendum without the loss of objectivity, so too would “democratic” economic planning tend to lapse into a political tug-of-war. Consumer groups, producer groups, labor groups, government groups, each with different motivations, would subscribe to different goals. For example, the means—employment—could become the end, and production might be all but forgotten.

The very remoteness of the government planners, far removed from production centers, invites errors in planning of the kind which proved disastrous in England. Close coordination and on-the-spot judgments are not generally available. Moreover, planners tacitly assume a static technology and a rigidly controlled economy.

Groping in the Dark

The controls of government planning manifest themselves in rationing, allocations, priorities, exchange control, licensing, price controls, and all the other trappings of economic calculation on a scientific basis is no longer possible, and government planning becomes a matter of groping in the dark. Perhaps Ludwig von Mises best summed up this dilemma when he stated: “The paradox of ‘planning’ is that it cannot plan because of the absence of economic calculation. What is called a planned economy is really no economy at all.”

In 1947 the United States actually shipped coal to Newcastle when a coal crisis gripped England. This in spite of Aneurin Bevan’s remark in 1945 that “only an organizing genius could produce a shortage of coal in Great Britain.” England under the Labor government also had a financial crisis, a transport crisis, a balance-of-payments crisis, and a housing crisis. Government planning, however “democratic,” had managed to produce mountains of construction materials for 250,000 houses when there was lumber for only 60,000, huge stocks of eggs when there were practically no eggs, cups but no saucers, electric irons but no extension cords. “Socialist planning,” Sir Stafford Cripps gravely admitted in September 1949, “is a series of temporary expedients which have led to a series of crises as each expedient became exhausted.”

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The question of scientific criteria and knowledge is a vital one. How does the government planner equate such vague standards as “fair shares for all,” “equal,” and “adequate”? Even when knowledge was obviously deficient, British public planning doggedly went on. Prime Minister Attlee told the House of Commons in 1946: “Although we may have to plan without having all the data, it is better than having no plan at all.” But in 1952 a defeated Mr. Attlee sadly admitted: “We talked a good deal of theory but we did not know very much about practice.” This is the fundamental error in all public planning.

Private planning, on the other hand, does conform to scientific standards and analysis. The laws of the market place hold in a free economy, and private planning, unnumerable by central “coordination,” gets results. The key to its success is explained in the role of prices. Free prices guide producers and consumers, allocate scarce materials to industries with the greatest need, and provide strong incentives for high efficiency—all automatically, without “red tape.”

2. Which type of planning affords the greatest production and the highest living standards? Planners as a species seem preoccupied with “full employment,” forgetting the more realistic need for full production. If the prevalent contention that full employment and personal prosperity are synonymous were so, then the masses of India, ostensibly fully employed, would not be hungry. The Nazis achieved full employment by conscription into the army and labor battalions.

Though the New Deal achieved by 1937 a modicum of alleviation of the depression (“We planned it that way,” F.D.R. had remarked), the sheer abortiveness of the “planned recovery” was quickly evident in the depression of 1937-8. Years of planning and experiment, public works, money manipulation, pump-priming, tax schemes, utterly failed.

The enormous complexity of public planning—with its maze of quotas for industries, regions, firms, and workers—contributes to its unwieldiness. A failure in steel, for example, could produce a chain reaction of failures in the machine tool industry, in the farm implement industry, on the farms, and so on.

Private planning, on the other hand, naturally tends to high production. The heavy unemployment which government economists predicted for the United States through reconversion after World War Two never did materialize, while publicly planned societies overseas creaked and lumbered until American aid was forthcoming. It is now estimated that American wealth, other than land, marshaled under private planning approximates $1,500,000,000,000. This modern cornucopia has made “economic royalists” out of American workers by world standards.

3. Which type of planning is most compatible with freedom? Sir Stafford Cripps told the House of Commons in February 1946, “No country in the world, as far as I know, has succeeded in carrying through a planned economy without the direction of labor.” He thought that England could. By March 1949, however, the Ministry of Labor announced that “374 directions were issued to men who were in the mining industry, compelling them to remain in that industry, and 123 directions were issued to men in agriculture keeping them in agriculture.”

As the state assumes increasing power in the economic sphere, the consumer is no longer sovereign. The government executes economic action to further political ends. The public planners in Argentina, for example, choked off the paper supply through “allocation control” for the opposition newspaper, La Prensa.

The inevitability of using force to carry out a publicly planned society belies the public planners’ contention that their society is based upon benignity and cooperation and that the “jungle-law” world of private planning is based upon hardness and coercion. Private planning does not need to enforce its designs. Action on the part of producers and consumers is voluntary.

Public planning is intervention. It is the philosophy of the end justifying the means. It is a mask for socialism. It is, as F. A. Hayek said it was, “the road to serfdom.”

Boy Hero, Soviet Style

By LUCY S. DAWIDOWICZ

Pavlik Morozov, Soviet boy hero, died more than twenty years ago, but his memory is kept green. Today Pavlik serves as a model not only for Russian, but also for Polish, Czech, Rumanian, Hungarian, and East German children. Emulation of his deeds is set as a goal for Young Pioneers in the people’s democracies. And what were these noble deeds? Pavlik was an informer. He informed on his father, his grandfather, and his neighbors during the drive for collectivization of the peasants.

Pavlik was murdered by one of his own victims. On the twentieth anniversary of his death in September 1952, youth meetings honoring his memory were held all over the Soviet Union. Komsomol’skaya Pravda, the daily newspaper of the Young Communist League, marked the anniversary with this tribute:

He lives in our people, in the hearts of millions of Soviet Pioneers. Pioneers from all over the U.S.S.R. visit his monument and swear allegiance to the fatherland. . . . In the case of Pavlik Morozov the high moral quality of the Soviet Pioneer was revealed. Courageously and fearlessly he spoke out against our enemies—even his own father.

Pavlik Morozov was born in 1918, in the village of Gerasimovka in the Urals. His father was
chairman of the village soviet, which was in charge of organizing a kolkhoz, or collective farm, following Stalin’s order of December 1929 for “the liquidation of the kulaks as a class.” A kulak was defined as a well-to-do farmer who exploited peasant labor. But the measure of proof that a person was not a kulak was his willingness to apply for membership in the collective farm.

With the help of the secret police and the Red Army, local Bolshevik officials stripped farmers of their lands, homes, livestock, and tools. They were herded into boxcars and shipped wherever the regime needed labor, or left to die outside the limits of their former villages.

When Pavlik was twelve years old a Communist named Dymov in his village told the boy that his father was protecting the wicked kulaks, and asked Pavlik to watch what was going on under his nose. One night Pavlik overheard his father talking to a stranger and he crept out of bed to listen. His father was selling the stranger a faked certificate, with the village soviet stamp, to the effect that the bearer was not a kulak, but a poor peasant, hoping to leave his native Gerasimovka. Such forged certificates were apparently prepared for those who had escaped or hoped to escape from a nearby forced-labor camp. After his father went to bed, Pavlik stole his briefcase with the incriminating documents, and brought them to the Soviet inspector. Pavlik’s father was sentenced to ten years of hard labor and was never heard of again.

Young Pioneers of the village helped to “reveal kulak opposition” by posting placards on the homes of recalcitrant peasants. When one little girl was asked to post a placard on her uncle’s house, she cried, because this would single him out for punishment. But the other children reminded her of the example of Pavlik.

After Pavlik had informed against his father, he began to be known among the peasants as “Pashka Communist,” a name which, the official story says, he bore proudly—but which was obviously a term of opprobrium. One night about two years later, Pavlik overheard his grandfather conspiring with another peasant, Kulukanov, to conceal a store of wheat from the Soviet requisitioners. He also heard his grandfather say that he would get rid of the “little Communist” in case he should talk. Pavlik informed the authorities about Kulukanov, who was then deported.

Pavlik and his little brother were killed in the woods where they had gone berrying. Komso­mol’skaya Pravda attributes their murder to unidentified kulaks. But they were killed by their grandfather, according to the book Pavlik Morozov by Vasily Gubarev.

Gubarev’s book, a Russian-language reader prepared for school children in the satellite countries, was published in 1950 by the State Publishing House of Children’s Literature of the Education Ministry of the U.S.S.R. In a postscript the publishers ask teachers in non-Russian schools to inform them of “the reactions to this book.” The introduction, “Do Like Pavlik,” was written by Pavlik’s mother. She eulogizes her son: “His deed serves as a model for many generations of Soviet children. Like Pavlik, they too learn loyalty to the fatherland and hatred for its enemies.”

The story of the Soviet boy hero has also been dramatized by the same Gubarev, whose play opened in January 1953 at the Moscow Young People’s Theater. A review in Pravda highlighted the close relationship between Pavlik and Dymov, the village Communist: “Without people such as Dymov, there would be no Pavlik.”

The New Ethics

A life-size bronze statue of Pavlik was unveiled in 1948 in Krasnaya Presnya, a children’s park in Moscow. Thousands of school children, Young Pioneers, Young Communists, their teachers, and party leaders marched into the park for the ceremony, bearing banners and red flags. “He will be a model for us,” the Young Pioneers swore, and they wrote to Stalin:

The monument of the Pioneer hero Pavlik Morozov will always remind us of how we must learn to work to grow into heroic and masterful builders of Communism and become a worthy generation of Young Communists and Communists.

The New Ethics of the Education of the Children of the Soviet Union, Y.N. Medinsky, a member of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, declares: “Instruction in Communist morality is closely linked with the mental training and education.” It is this instruction that has made it possible for the children of Communists accused by the secret police of “sabotage,” “espionage,” or “Trotskyism” to denounce their parents publicly and clamor for their deaths. It is this “progressive” morality that has superseded the Fifth Commandment for millions of children behind the Iron Curtain.

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Pink-Tinted Knowledge

By WALTER NEWLIN

Even a dignified reference encyclopedia can foist pro-Communist propaganda upon the unwary reader.

The Reader's Encyclopedia was published in 1948 and was distributed by the Book of the Month Club as a gift volume about two years later. Edited by the late William Rose Benet, R.E. is an admirable and scholarly compendium of practically all the facts that the professional writer needs. It also happens to be an extraordinarily skillful example of pro-Communist propaganda. Calculated omissions, dexterous twists, the masking of prejudices as facts, the deprecatory phrase and the imputation of discreditable motives—all combine to lead the reader in a specific political direction.

This does not imply that such was Mr. Benet's intent. Encyclopedias result from the agglutination and merger of specialized reference works. A monumental political innocence or an utter disinterest in ideologies and intrigues might have led to haphazard borrowings from poisoned sources. There are doubtless other possible explanations. The thing that matters is the work itself—its power to guide the mind, without seeming to do so, toward Communism.

Is the political tendency of a reference work of any real importance? I believe that it is. Propaganda may be either a consuming fire acting on the emotions of the people at large or else a slow-acting and cumulative drug on the mind of the intellectual. Whatever is lost in fervor and breadth of impact may be compensated by a selective and covert influence on those who, either now or in the future, will be in the business of shaping policies or wholesaling ideas.

From this latter standpoint, the reference work is an exceptionally copious and durable propaganda vessel. It is not merely read and cast aside, but constantly consulted. Its scope is sufficiently broad so that its ideological drift, which might easily be recognized in a work with a single basic theme, is diffused among myriad other things and to that extent invisible. Reference works are not ravaged as ruthlessly by time as the ordinary topical book on economics or politics. They tend to be superseded by absorption, rather than refutation. The test that a topical book must meet is the grand jury of reviewers, whose verdict determines whether or not it shall be present on school and library shelves. As a rule, the consensus of reviewers will more or less fairly represent the political drift of any such product. But the encyclopedia or reference work is seldom subjected to such an ideological litmus test. In the particular case of R.E., the eminence of its editor and the cultural breadth that distinguishes it would preclude most reviewers from suspecting that it grinds a very sharp political axe.

As a matter of fact, R.E. was on my shelf for over a year before I became aware of this. Then one night I had an argument with my wife about whether or not the Covenanters' colors had been blue. For some strange reason, I checked The Reader's Encyclopedia under blue rather than under Covenanters. My eye meandered up the column. It rested on a familiar name—"Bloor, Ella Reeve, called Mother Bloor." Intrigued, I read the following entry: "American Communist leader and writer. Active in many strikes for betterment of labor conditions. After the Russian Revolution of 1917, she became identified with international socialist workers." While Ella Reeve Bloor contributed frequently to the Daily Worker and the New Masses, I had not previously realized that she had been part of the literary set.

"Crusading" Communists

Strangely enough, R.E. does not give the Daily Worker an entry. The New Masses, however, is mentioned. "Its editorial viewpoint," R.E. states, "continued in accordance with the policies of the Communist Party, and from time to time it crusaded for American civil liberties, the trade union movement, amelioration of the conditions of Southern sharecroppers, Negro rights, etc." The verb crusaded had a familiar ring.

R.E. considers Michael Gold, veteran Communist agitator and Daily Worker correspondent, worthy of an entry, but passes over Arthur Koestler in silence. Such leading anti-Communist writers as Jan Valtin, Walter Krivitsky, and Isaac Don Levine are not mentioned. Walter Duranty, however, rates ten friendly lines for his rosy portrayal of the U.S.S.R., Maurice Hindus gets ten, and Louis Adamic eight. Surprisingly, sixteen lines are devoted to Eugene Lyons. He is described as a former sympathizer with "the radical labor movement." His book The Red Decade (an expose of Communist fronts of the 1930s), R.E. continues, "was such a detailed invective as to bring a lawsuit against Lyons and his publisher from Corliss Lamont, settled out of court (1942) to Mr. Lamont's satisfaction. In 1948, he published a flattering biography of Herbert Hoover." The
reference to the Hoover book, one assumes, is the coup de grace. It is presumably supposed to put Lyons outside the pale of decent liberal society.

Literary enemies of Communism who are too outstanding to be ignored are generally handled as if they were still either sympathetic or neutral. Examples are: Ignazio Silone, Richard Wright, John Dos Passos, Edmund Wilson. The impression the reader gathers is that very few of the intellectual leaders of the West are anti-Communist. "This meaning is that Churchill bungled by breaking with the Communist apparently anticipated late glossed over often turn out to have weaknesses and discreditable qualities of which one had not been aware.

The entries on American philosophers give sixteen lines to William James, twelve to John Dewey, eight to Charles Peirce, and seven to Morris R. Cohen. With eleven lines of text, Corliss Lamont, that hardy perennial of fellow-traveler activities, moves into the big league of metaphysics, though it is difficult to see what he has done to deserve that honor. Outstanding scholars of philosophy, such as George Sarton and Richard McKeon, are ignored.

The appraisal of war leaders is also interesting. Winston Churchill, we are informed, was "... unpopular during World War I because of his conduct of naval affairs... and in the period preceding World War II because of his Conservative policies. During World War II, however, as Prime Minister... he became very popular both in England and the U.S. because of his personality and the confidence and encouragement of his speeches." This item is an admirable example of the art of propaganda. The apparent theme is the preposterous one that the central problem of Churchill's life was to overcome popular dislike. Actually, judgments are masked behind seemingly objective statements of fact. The real meaning is that Churchill bungled his job at the Admiralty in World War One, was a reactionary, and gained stature during World War Two merely because of personal qualities of mass leadership.

Chiang Kai-shek gets seventeen lines. We discover that his reason for breaking with the Communists in 1926 was "to get the support of Shanghai bankers." After an elegantly slanted account of the Sian kidnapping in 1936, R.E. states that Chiang "formed a so-called united China." In this particular item, the clenched hoof of the 'agrarian reformer' is all too plainly visible.

Originally Franklin Delano Roosevelt was given exactly four lines and the ambiguous verdict: "Still a controversial but doubtless a great figure in American history." Then at the last moment—perhaps because the Progressive Party was capitalizing on the F.D.R. tradition—a twenty-five-line eulogy of the late President was hustled into the Errata and Addenda section while the book was on the press.

No such afterthoughts were necessary in the eighteen-line treatment of Josef Stalin. "As a politician and great statesman," R.E. declares, "Stalin has demonstrated again the truism that a straight line is often the longest way from one point to another."

Emphasis on the Proletariat

Now as to topical entries. There is nothing on liberty, liberalism, conservatism, democracy, nationalism. Under republican, we read: "Black Republican, see under black." New Deal gets sixty-two lines, but when we come to the real revolutionary movement, brevity is cast aside. Thus communism and communist parties rate 101 lines of text, marxism gets fifty-four and proletarian and proletarian literature receive no less than 130. For the more serious student, there are twenty to forty related topics. While the Republican, Democratic, and Socialist parties are not covered, the Communist and Progressive parties are.

Proletarian Dictatorship is defined as "a period of strict control by the working-class revolutionaries which, according to Marxist doctrine, is to mark the transition from a capitalist society to a state of communal ownership..." This is followed by a discussion of the "withering away" of the state. The author of this item apparently anticipated that some stubborn reader might ask himself why the Soviet state hasn't withered away. Accordingly, he continued: "The dictatorship of the proletariat in the U.S.S.R. was supposed to have ended within a few years after the revolution, although some critics maintain that a political dictatorship continued as the government of the nation." Apparently, the furthest extent of the encyclopedia's objectivity on this particular matter is to concede that some unidentified people deny that the Soviet Union is a democracy.

The discussion of communist party of the U.S.A. deals chiefly with the alleged state of affairs in the thirties. "At that time," R.E. declares, "the American Communist Party devoted itself prominently to labor organization and defense of civil liberties and the rights of the Negro, and showed a resemblance to the indigenous American reform movements of the 19th century, such as abolitionism and populism. Its general policies, however, continued to follow those of the Soviet Union of Russia." Did the Abolitionists serve a foreign power? Did the Populists organize spy rings? On these matters, The Reader's Encyclopedia does not enlighten us.

The entry on proletarian literature rises to lyric heights. Its aim was, according to R.E.,... A sympathetic portrayal of the lives and suffering of the proletariat and an exposure of the injustices and economic inequalities seen by its writers in the society in which they lived, with a view toward inducing amelioration. A presentation of the aims and activities of labor organizers, revolutionaries, and members of the communist party, all regarded...
as representatives of the proletariat, was also an outstanding characteristic of proletarian literature, and a novel or play dealing with the privations of a family of miners, factory workers, or southern sharecroppers would often conclude with a burst of hope on the part of the characters as they went out to join a labor union or become Communists.

The reader goes to a reference encyclopedia with his guard down in the belief that its sole purpose is the dispassionate recording of facts. Where this simple criterion of objectivity is flouted, the cure is not censorship, but exposure.

**Terror on the Campus**

By M. K. ARGUS

Professor Owen Pratt MacRemlin, the noted progressive scientist, became highly agitated when I stopped him on the campus. "What do you want?" he asked me suspiciously.

"I'd like to interview you," I said.

"Impossible," MacRemlin answered vehemently. "Absolutely impossible, my friend. I've just spoken to Professor Albert Einstein, and he advised me to answer no questions. Let the reactionaries talk as much as they want, he told me, but progressives ought to keep their mouths shut. The witch-hunters are on the rampage, creating an atmosphere of suspicion."

"Suspicion among whom?" I asked.

"Suspicion among us progressives. Do you realize that it has become impossible for us to confide in one another? As soon as I begin to talk to a fellow-progressive, an ugly thought crosses my mind: maybe he is a potential Chamber, or a Budenz, or a Philbrick. Do you realize that there are more traitors among progressives than progressives among traitors? The very air in this country has become permeated with hysteria."

"Who is hysterical?"

"Everybody is hysterical. The finest progressives in this country are hysterical. Even I am hysterical. Look at me! I used to be the calmest man on earth. I used to be able to smile condescendingly at anyone who dared to call me a Communist or a fellow-traveler. Now I wake up screaming, and when I look in a mirror whom do I see?"

"Whom?"

"Hoover," Professor MacRemlin cried, and there was horror in his eyes. "J. Edgar Hoover, the Grand Inquisitor, the man who tries to stifle our spirit of free inquiry."

"Free inquiry into what?" I asked the Professor.

"Wouldn't you like to know!" he retorted testily.

"But I'm not going to tell you or any other snooper who pries into the private lives of progressive citizens. Mark my words, sir, in a year or two all our cherished freedoms will have vanished."

"What makes you think so?"

"I know. We liberals have an uncanny ability to look into the future and make predictions of things to come. Why, it's even become impossible now to join a decent progressive organization. Before you get a chance to sign an appeal for peace in Indo-China, the organization gets on the Attorney General's subversive list."

"Why do you join organizations that are bound to get on the Attorney General's subversive list?"

"Who do you think we are?" Professor MacRemlin replied angrily. "Mind-readers? Clairvoyants? Prophets? How do you expect us to know that an organization which is not on the subversive list today will get there tomorrow? Let me tell you something, my good man. I hold no brief for the Communist doctrine and I condemn the Communist methods. I am as much of an anti-Communist as the next fellow."

"Who is the next fellow?"

"I see you're trying to trap me again," the Professor cried. "Let me remind you that I am not a stool pigeon. Under no circumstances will I disclose his identity. Besides, it's none of your business. I emphatically resent the implications contained in your snide question. It is an attempt on your part to establish guilt by association, and I strongly condemn such methods."

"What methods do you approve?"

"Democratic methods," said MacRemlin. "We must abolish all investigations, all witch-hunts. We must abolish loyalty oaths, abuses of investigatory powers, the Fifth Amendment. No, no, pardon me, we must not abolish the Fifth Amendment, we ought to keep it, just in case. And we must stop smearing the reputations of innocent progressives by branding them as Communists, or smearing the reputations of innocent Communists by branding them as progressives."

"What will happen then?" I asked.

"The Communists will become so impressed with the new set-up that they will cease all opposition to our way of life. There will be no more fear or susp. . ."

The Professor stopped abruptly and looked around furtively. "I must go," he said. "People are staring at us, and I really should not be seen in your company."

"What's wrong with my company?" I asked.

"I'll tell you what's wrong with it. You are a notorious reactionary and redbaiter."

"But, Professor," I remonstrated, "I am positive that your progressive friends will not presume you to be a reactionary and redbaiter just because you are seen in the company of such a redbaiting reactionary as myself. Wouldn't that be implying guilt by association?"

"I decline to answer on the ground that—oh, shut up!" Professor MacRemlin shouted and briskly walked away.
Sigmund Freud, who made it so fashionable to gush about your sex secrets, was himself almost morbidly reticent. He never wanted anybody prying into his private life and correspondence, least of all his passionately sentimental letters to the girl he loved. His survivors respected this wish for a while, but finally decided to let Dr. Ernest Jones, his faithful British disciple, pry to the very bottom and tell the whole story. (The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, Volume I: The Formative Years and the Great Discoveries, 1856-1900, 428 pp., Basic Books, Inc., $6.75.) The book is a little tediously and repetitiously composed, but the information it contains is so surprising and significant that one is never impatient of this.

In my opinion its significance is very different from what the author, a Freudian fundamentalist, imagines. He presents Freud as essentially "a true man of science," but his book proves that Freud was exactly not that. Science, to be sure, is no supernal enterprise; it is nothing but the skilled, persistent, and appropriate use of the mind, and the stores of human knowledge, about any problem. It does, however, require at least three qualifications in the scientist: the discipline of suspended judgment, a mastery of the knowledge relevant to his problem, a sustained passion for verification. Freud had none of these qualifications. He jumped to conclusions with the agility of a trained athlete. He was (to quote Dr. Jones) "ill-informed in the field of contemporary psychology and seems to have derived only from hearsay any knowledge he may have had of it"—he did not even know, for instance, the elementary distinction between sensation and perception. He had a temperamental distaste for experiment, and no impulse at all toward verification. He found the idea of submitting his "insights," his "intuitions," his "explorations of the unconscious," to confirmation by someone else seems to have been particularly alien to his intensely emotional and recklessly inventive mind. His attitude toward other people's findings may be inferred from the ferocious demand he made of his sweetheart that she join him in hating her brother. He would break off his engagement, he threatened, if this happy consensus of opinion was not attained.

To me he was less like Newton, or Darwin, or any of the great men of science, than like Paracelsus—a man who made significant contributions to science, but was by nature given to infatuation with magical ideas and substances. Freud's contributions were, to be sure, immeasurably greater than those of Paracelsus. He played a major part in making psychology dynamic, bringing the wish into it, the instinctive drive, in place of the old unilifelike tale of stimulus-and-reaction, association and disassociation. And his discovery that these drives, when denied fulfillment and repressed out of consciousness, may take effect in hysterias, neurotic and psychotic symptoms, even in dreams, jokes, and little "slips and errors of everyday life," has given a new look to the whole study of mankind by man.

Freud was not content, however, to make momentous contributions to the science of psychology. His contributions had to be psychology—"Freud's psychology." Instinctive drives that survive in the organism without consciousness had to be the Unconscious, a mysterious under-region peopled by demons that move about in the unlocal dark, controlling our thoughts and actions. A whole demonology had to be invented; the ego, the superego, the id, the Oedipus complex—to name but a few—colliding and wrangling, all but scratching and biting each other, in a region that has no existence anywhere on this real earth, and can have none, for the very name of it—"unconscious mental action"—is a contradiction in terms. Brain action can be unconscious and largely is, but to be mind and to be conscious are one and the same thing. And of course what Freudians actually think of when they say "unconscious mental action" is another mind lurking behind, or beneath, or mysteriously in the vicinity of, the mind which we think of as ourselves. In short, a demon. And it is interesting that Freud himself once compared a wishful idea in the Unconscious to a "demon striving not to come to the light of day, because he knows that will be his end."

Certain things may no doubt be accomplished with these demonological concepts, if they are regarded as mere handy ways of talking. But that is not how Freud regarded them. He stated in his article on psychoanalysis in the Encyclopedia Britannica that "the future will probably attribute far greater importance to psychoanalysis as the science of the Unconscious than as a therapeutic procedure." Moreover, I had the privilege of watching him try—out of clever deference to my own attitude, I suppose—to adopt an instrumental view of these inventions of his, and fail. I had called
on him in Vienna, after some correspondence about a book of mine, and I put this very question to him as steeply as I could.

"I don't see why you talk about unconsciousness as though it were a thing," I said, "The only thing there, when we are unconscious, is our brain and body. Wouldn't it clarify matters if, instead of saying 'the Unconscious,' you should say 'unconscious brain states'?

"Well, haven't you read our literature?" he said tartly. "The Unconscious is not a thing, but a concept. It is a concept that we find indispensable in the clinic."

"It is a dangerous concept," I said, "because people inevitably think of it as a thing."

"Well, then, let them correct their thinking."

Having got this piece of adroit but uncandid disagreement off his chest, Freud relaxed into his own real thoughts, and ended by lecturing me in an almost fatherly way about the difference between the "psychic" and the "conscious." "Psychic entities are not necessarily conscious," were the exact words in which he contradicted himself.

Freud did not invent "the Unconscious," but German romantic philosophy did, and made it the vehicle of a good plenty of mystical and intrinsically unverifiable notions before Freud came along. It seems to me as important to exorcise the demons with which Freud peopled this unimaginable region as to recognize his epoch-making discoveries. Instead of a true man of science, I should describe him as about one-half scientist and one-half prophet of a cult.

The greatest value of Dr. Jones' book is its startling corroboration of this appraisal. Way back in the eighties when he was still working in brain anatomy, Freud got seized with the notion that cocaine, then newly discovered, was a "magic substance"—the phrase is Dr. Jones'—which would not only cure all sorts of ills, including morphine addiction, but would increase a healthy man's nervous and muscular strength without any bad effects, and without habit formation. He reached this conclusion "experientially"—again a word from Dr. Jones—that is, on the basis of his own experience. While enamoured of this substance, and convinced it would make him world famous and solve his dire financial troubles, he hit upon the idea that, besides all these interior miracles, cocaine might possibly be useful in eye troubles as a local anesthetic. He made this remark to a colleague, but did not himself bother—being all wrapped up in the internal miracles he was going to accomplish—to make the tiny experiment indicated. The colleague made the experiment and became world famous, while Freud, clinging to his unverified belief in the life-enhancing properties of his wonder-drug, damaged his reputation by killing a patient with an overdose of it.

This inclination to believe in occult hunches instead of trying out plausible hypotheses, is illustrated time and again in Dr. Jones' account of Freud's development. Throughout the ten years when he made his "Great Discoveries," Freud was in an almost pathological rapture of admiration for a quack philosopher in Berlin, a thoroughly phoney, who believed in numerology, and professed to have found the solution of all life's problems in the ratio between the numbers 28 and 23, which he derived in different ways from the periodicity in the sexual life of women. By manipulating these numbers, this Dr. Flies professed to explain the inner nature of almost everything, not omitting the solar system and the interstellar spaces. From the age of thirty-nine until he was fifty years old, Freud accepted and believed in this man's shamanistic lubrations, describing them as "your beautiful and sure biological discoveries," and Flies himself as "the Kepler of biology."

Dr. Jones quite frankly describes Freud's condition during these years of the Great Discoveries as a psychoneurosis—which is all right, most of us have a touch of that—but that Freud's psychoneurosis expressed itself in an avid disposition to swallow grandiose and uninvestigated occult beliefs, is a point whose significance escapes him.

Dr. Jones is contemptuous of Joseph Breuer, Freud's collaborator in the early Studies in Hysteria, for having got off the Freudian bandwagon as soon thereafter as possible. I do not know whether Breuer ever said what he thought of Freud, but what Freud said about Breuer pretty well tells the story: "...he always knows of three candidates for one truth and abominates every generalization as a piece of arrogance."

The principal "one truth" that Freud was believing in at the time when Breuer got off was that all hysterias are caused by the sexual seduction of an innocent child by an adult. Freud even deduced the criminality of his own father from this obviously improbable generalization. After clinging to it for over four years, he did begin to feel some doubts, but one little piece of "experiential" evidence reassured him. I quote Dr. Jones:

"When, finally, he had a dream about his American niece, Hella, which he had to interpret as covering a sexual wish towards his eldest daughter, he felt he had personal firsthand evidence of the correctness of his theory."

If this is "science," where shall we turn for organized common sense!

Another generalization to which Freud leaped from a single experience was that he had been all wrong about hysterical disorders—they are not caused by sexual assaults in childhood; those are only imagined by the hysterical. The real, but still universal, cause is the "Oedipus Complex" in the child. The "experiential" evidence in this case was an item in Freud's psychoanalysis of himself. Again I quote Dr. Jones:
He had discovered in himself the passion for his mother and jealousy of his father; he felt sure that this was a general human characteristic and that from it one could understand the powerful effect of the Oedipus legend. Evidently his mind was now working at full speed, and we may even speak of swift intuitions.

We may indeed, and I inserted the italics because I think it is well to remember how much empirical basis there was for Freud's original sureness about the universality of the Oedipus Complex, one of his most fixed and cherished obsessions.

Another example of Freud's easy grace in jumping to conclusions is provided by Dr. Jones in these words:

One day a patient suddenly threw her arms around his neck, an unexpected contretemps, fortunately remedied by the entrance of a servant. From then on he understood that the peculiar relationship so effective therapeutically [the "transference"] had an erotic basis.

When Freud first came out with his proclamation that sex traumas lie at the bottom of all neurotic disorders, it was generally inferred that his own sexual constitution must be a little abnormal, and I think this inference was correct. The abnormality, however, was not in the direction of lechery and loose living, but just the contrary. Freud was a prude and a puritan, a fanatical monogamist, not sexy by nature, and so "chaste" in speech and conduct that he "would have been out of place in the usual club room." He was, in short, the kind of man to be shocked into a new theory of therapeutics by a girl who jumps up unexpectedly and throws her arms around his neck. I surmise that it was this state of shock, the astonishment of a natural-born puritan at finding out how much frank and raw sexuality there is in the world, which led Freud to "proclaim"—again a word from Dr. Jones—that extreme and improbable "One Truth" which brought him so much obloquy and pain.

When he got hold of a simple but significant fact, he would feel, and know [sic] that it was an example of something general and universal and the idea of collecting statistics on the matter was quite alien to him. . . . that is the way the mind of a genius works.

So speaks his worshipful disciple, and we can only say: Yes, but a genius for what? Not science certainly. And not literature, either, although Freud was a gifted writer. Freud himself in a humble moment invented a name for his genius which, had Dr. Jones accepted it, would have made this a much wiser book than it is.

I am not really a man of science, not an observer, not an experimenter, and not a thinker. I am nothing but by temperament a conquistador—an adventurer, if you want to translate the word—with the curiosity, the boldness and the tenacity that belongs to that type of being.

 Spotlight on the Red Army

Soviet Military Doctrine, by Raymond L. Garthoff. 587 pp. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press. $7.50
Hitler's Defeat in Russia, by General Wladyslaw Anders. 267 pp. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. $4.00

It speaks well for American vigilance that there is now a steady stream of books analyzing the nature of the Communist enemy. The present two books unquestionably will improve our understanding of Soviet military power. Garthoff's work is a scholarly treatise on the conventional Soviet military doctrine. And though the author is somewhat in the position of a man digging for water in the Sahara desert, he comes up with a great deal of pertinent information. The great merit of his book is that it dissects the available documentation, including Soviet field manuals, most thoroughly.

Like its German model, Soviet doctrine places great emphasis on the "operational art" which is something of a cross between strategy and battlefield tactics. It pays attention to the need of maintaining the "momentum" of an advance (a principle which reflects the enormous manpower of Soviet Russia and which, in turn, is reflected in her large output of munitions), it warns against the "fallacy" of ascribing too much value to single "master weapons" and, more realistically than the doctrines of other countries, makes specific provisions for retreats. In addition, it stresses the function of reserves (which may include civilian "forces"), the need for combining all weapons systems, the requirement of positive morale building, the importance of a safe "rear," and the high value of deception.

Quite properly within the framework of his study, Mr. Garthoff restricts his inquiry to conventional military warfare. Hence, the bearing which conventional Soviet military doctrine has on modern air and naval warfare—on which the author possesses only fragmentary documentation—as well as on Soviet management of total conflict (which combines military with political warfare) is dubious.

While Garthoff's book is "must" reading for the professional, the general reader also will study it with profit. This is particularly true in the case of those who do not yet understand that the Soviet armed forces have become, in Frunze's words, the "main," i.e., ultimate instrument of Communist world revolution. These forces are led not in a defensive, but in an offensive spirit. In an appendix, Mr. Garthoff shows that in the Russo-German war of 1941, the Soviets failed to apply their own doctrine effectively.

That the Soviet Army cut a poor figure is essentially also the thesis of Wladyslaw Anders, the exiled Polish general. Based on his personal
experiences and full reading of available sources (mostly German), General Anders demonstrates that Hitler defeated himself on the eastern front. During 1941 and 1942 the Soviet Union’s vaunted military strength, according to Anders, was strictly mythical. Hitler could have won a stupendous victory against superior numbers except for his incompetence, obstinacy, prejudice, and hatred, and except for American aid to Soviet Russia, “General Winter,” and the stoical courage of the Russian soldier.

General Anders’ analysis of Hitler’s strategic blunders in the Russian campaign, in my judgment, is destined to become one of the classics of military literature. The confusing picture of some five hundred divisions locked in titanic battles in the eastern steppes is compressed in a tale unmatched for its clarity and incisiveness, brevity and completeness. The author, who in his long, brilliant military career has fought both Germans and Russians, criticizes Hitler most strongly for not having protected eastern Europe against Red seizure—after 1943—by adopting the “elastic” defense recommended by his generals. General Anders believes, perhaps a bit enthusiastically, that despite Allied pressure from the West, the Wehrmacht could have held the Red Army at bay.

Trying to spell out the continuing significance of Soviet military failure some ten years ago, General Anders evaluates Soviet Russia’s current strength and weaknesses. While most of the weaknesses he identifies no doubt exist, he is dangerously contemptuous of Soviet strength. His view is also influenced by the fact that he stopped his chronicle at Stalingrad. Boldly he discounts Soviet ability to apply the lessons of bitter experience. And, inexplicably, he fails to give due weight to the expansion of Soviet industry since 1945.

Thus he maintains that one of the shortcomings of Soviet industry is the “poorly developed precision industry.” Yet the Soviets are now in possession of nuclear weapons. Anders asserts that Russia’s uranium is “in short supply.” But surely this statement cannot be documented. On the other hand, the author avers that Soviet Russia “probably” has “large stocks” of long-range missiles. If this were true, the Soviet Union would have overaken the United States.

General Anders—suffering like Mr. Garthoff from lack of documentation on the up-to-date Soviet doctrine of intercontinental warfare—remarks that the “Soviet doctrine of warfare is a land doctrine which seeks the final decision in a victorious land battle.” Hence, the air force “or at least its greater part—is organized according to the requirements of the land battle.” But then he goes on to state that the Soviet strategic air force “is known to be developing speedily.” These two statements do not jibe. In any event, how can the military strength of the United States be destroyed in a land battle? General Anders’ statement that “at present the United States is still out of reach of large-scale Soviet strategic bombardment” may be true or not, depending on the definition of the term “large-scale.” Numerous American defense leaders have stressed that the Soviets possess both the planes and the bombs with which to attack American cities.

While the teachings of history are of great value, we must, nevertheless, be alert to the changes which have occurred since the time the events studied took place.

STEFAN T. POSSONY

Europe Looks to America

Americans Are Alone in the World, by Luigi Barzini, Jr. 209 pp. New York: Random House. $2.50

America Day by Day, by Simone de Beauvoir. 337 pp. New York: Grove Press. $4.00


Ever since a reluctant United States has been catapulted into the uneasy position of world leadership, a new and urgent note has entered Europe’s contemplation of America. European travelers and journalists, in the past, have regarded the United States primarily as an object of condescending curiosity, as a somewhat infantile country in which the most astounding and surprising things were possible. Today responsible Europeans, prodded by the hovering shadow of Soviet tyranny, turn to America with hope and apprehension. Can and will America assume the challenge of history? Is she mature, patient, and wise enough to exercise her fateful role as guardian of the Western world?

Luigi Barzini, an Italian journalist who has lived and traveled in this country at various times, seeks the answer to this alarming question “in the nature of America.” Yet, perhaps in defense of his own often not very profound narrative of impressions and conversations, he adds that “it is more difficult to know America than any other Western country.” Whatever Mr. Barzini knows about America, and, to be sure, he is a most sympathetic and articulate observer, boils down to a sharp and perhaps enlightening critique of America’s “unpredictable, erratic, contradictory, and unreliable” foreign policy.

Like many other anti-Communist Europeans, and, fortunately, some Americans, too, Mr. Barzini is most disturbed about the dangerous inconsistency, the stop-gap approach, and the apparently unrealistic attitude of U.S. policy. This policy, although successful in spots, he says, has been “defensive, weak, and too expensive,” and...
it has been motivated “mostly by fear and moral indignation.” As far as he probes into the causes of this vexing problem, Mr. Barzini finds them, again, in the nature of America, of a country that still believes in good will and morality, and, by its youthful exuberance, is prone to be annoyed at anything that cannot be solved fast and efficiently.

Yet, Mr. Barzini feels, it is not too late for the United States to grow up quickly and embark upon a clear and determined course of action. This, he says, should be a policy of “armed patience,” of an active and powerful “wait-and-see,” since neither a get-it-over-with-quick war, nor appeasement and retreat can solve the problems of the uneasy peace. Whether America can pursue an “armed patience” successfully, however, even Mr. Barzini does not venture to say.

If one were to consult Simone de Beauvoir’s immensely interesting, yet oddly distorted American diary on this question, one would, indeed, be forced to doubt that the United States could undertake such a policy at all. For the vivacious Existentialist French lady, though sad to leave this country after a four-months’ stay in 1947, found here little of the necessary virtues, namely wisdom and patience. Indeed, aside from the “tragic soil” of Virginia, where the “truth of evil” is rampant, aside from the “layers of fear” she penetrated on her excursion through New York’s Harlem, and aside from her discovery that “the very resemblance of democracy was fading . . . from day to day,” Mlle. de Beauvoir only found that American students “though they acknowledge their country’s responsibilities for the future of the world . . . feel themselves responsible for nothing.” And yet, in spite of her mostly preconceived opinions, Simone de Beauvoir could not help being fascinated by the power and possibilities of this country.

To like America or not to like her: these words have no sense. Here is a battlefield, and one can only follow with excitement the struggle she carries on within herself, the stakes of which are beyond measure.

The nine anti-Communist, and frankly “pro-American” European writers and intellectuals James Burnham presents in a well-chosen and important volume, also base their critically sympathetic, and refreshingly frank essays on the conviction that the stakes of the Western world are, willy-nilly, in the hands of America. And reasoning from a sober historical, political, and economic perspective, rather than from impressionistic observations or traditional European notions, they reiterate and expand Mr. Barzini’s criticisms, in depth as well as perspective. Raymond Aron, the French journalist, punctures the popular Marxist myth of America’s “economic imperialism.” And Jules Monnerot, Julian Amery, Sylvain Troeder, Guido Piovone, Vittorio Zincone, Yury Serech, and Joseph Czapski and Julius Mieroszewski contribute illuminating and mostly valid arguments to the embryonic beginnings of what Mr. Burnham calls in his introduction a “true dialogue Europe-America.”

It would, indeed, be a great accomplishment if such a most necessary, honest, and frank dialogue would get under way and put an end to the many misconceptions and foolish notions on both sides, which still endanger the alliance between America and the rest of the free world.

GUNther StuhLMANN

Mr. Hindus Rides Again

Crisis in the Kremlin, by Maurice Hindus. 319 pp.
New York: Doubleday and Company. $3.95.

According to the publisher’s listing, this is Maurice Hindus’ eighteenth book. Measured on a quantitative basis alone, this is a remarkable achievement. It becomes even more remarkable if one recalls that, in the not so distant past, Mr. Hindus has also been one of the tenacious group of writers whose apologies for the Soviet system did much to constrain American knowledge of Russian realities.

Born of Russian peasant parents, Mr. Hindus has always shown an instinctively warm appreciation of the character of Soviet peasantry—but he usually failed to show an equal appreciation of the ruthlessness of the Soviet regime, both at home and abroad.

Now, in Crisis in the Kremlin, Mr. Hindus diligently tries to come to grips, somehow, with his decades-old subject—and with his own position as a writer and interpreter of world events. He says, for instance, that in writing on Soviet Russia, “I committed my share of errors.” And he adds: “I had not foreseen the fury of the cold war nor the hate-America crusade that accompanied it, any more than the Russians did...” Yet, if the “Russians” did not foresee “the fury of the cold war,” who did? Was it not initiated by the very Soviet leaders Mr. Hindus interviewed in the past, and whose motivations and character he should have been able to interpret for his readers?

In this new book Mr. Hindus mostly rehashes facts and personalities in his sometimes informative manner of human interest journalism. He offers profiles of Maxim Litvinov, the late Western-minded Soviet diplomat; of Panteleimon Ponomarenko, Malenkov’s new propaganda chief; of the late Andrei A. Zhdanov; of Czechoslovakia’s Communist boss, Klement Gottwald, and of several of the Czech Communists who were executed or imprisoned for high treason in 1952.

His detailed account of the events involving Moscow in the Korean war is summed up with the phrase that Korea “was one of the most disastrous blunders Stalin ever perpetrated.” And he goes on
to state that, at this point, "the Kremlin leaders do not want war, cannot afford it, and can only dread it." Mr. Hindus predicts, too, that there will be no more "limited wars" in Asia.

Finally, Mr. Hindus believes that the Kremlin dictatorship "holds within it the seed for its own transformation" to something more accommodating to the true interests of the Russian people.

Following his past "errors," Hindus thus strikes a new note of wishful thinking, assuming that the men in the Kremlin will neither risk wars, nor remain the ruthless dictators which, as the Beria execution shows, they are to this day.

MARTIN ESON

Briefer Mention

In the Workshop of the Revolution, by I. N. Steinberg. 306 pp. New York: Rinehart and Company. $4.00

This book is so valuable a contribution to the history of the Russian revolutions of 1917 that one wonders why it was delayed until now. I. N. Steinberg was a leader, second only to Vera Spiridonova, of the party called "Left Social Revolutionaries," which formed a coalition with the Bolsheviks in the early days after the October seizure of power. He held the high and vital post of Minister of Justice in Lenin's first cabinet. His resignation, because of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, besides being a political mistake, was a misfortune to this book.

The Left SR's, although militantly revolutionary—known, indeed, as "terrorists" for their skill and persistence in assassinating Tsarist officials—were passionately anti-Marxist. This difference of belief in one so closely associated with the first Bolshevik government gives Mr. Steinberg's memoirs a unique value. He writes the history of the period between February and October with clear and intimate understanding. His attempts to stop Lenin on his headlong course toward organized terror; his clashes with Dzerzhinsky, the head of the Cheka, who should have been his subordinate, but wouldn't behave so, are illuminating. But that is true of his whole book. It is especially true of his attempt to glorify the bloody deeds of the heroes of his party, which he considers "ethical" and "beautiful," as opposed to the terror organized by the Bolsheviks, which he calls "logical cruelty." One emerges from the argument with a feeling that they all needed the attentions of a psychiatrist.

The Price of Freedom, by Dimitrios G. Kousoulas. 210 pp. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. $4.00

Accounts of World War Two have in general given too little attention to what happened during and after those years in Greece, a country whose geographic situation places her in a position of critical importance in world affairs. Mr. Kousoulas' careful and intelligent story of his homeland from 1939 to 1963 is, therefore, more than welcome. For Greece the price of freedom was indeed almost unbearably high. This little country, always handicapped by the poverty of her soil and resources, was twice overrun by two components of the enemy. First the Italians swarmed down through Albania into the peninsula. The Greeks fought back, with little aid from the outside, until in 1943 they forced the surrender of the Italian occupation army. Then Hitler struck. Again the Greeks fought back. Meantime a third enemy was growing in their very midst—a Communist organization, replete with an army, which under the banner of a resistance movement acquired followers and forces. Its aim, of course, was to take over the government when the Nazis would be defeated. It did not succeed, but it saddled Greece with what actually amounted to a third invasion at the end of World War Two. Its supplies, many of its leaders, and a good number of its soldiers came over the borders from Communist-dominated Albania, Yugoslavia, and for a time, Bulgaria. Once more the Greeks fought back, and at long last, in 1949, brought peace to their country. Mr. Kousoulas, who lived through the three invasions and served in the Greek Army during the latter one, has clarified various important points about these three episodes which in most other books dealing with this subject are confused and misleading. In describing Britain's role in these affairs, he has also made a contribution to diplomatic history.

In the Castle of My Skin, by George Lamming. 313 pp. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. $3.75

George Lamming, a young Negro born in 1927 in the British West Indies, has written a rich and poetic novel about a theme that, so far, has found little expression in serious literature. He has written a powerful and quiet story about a double adolescence. The adolescence of a little boy, a black Tom Sawyer in a way, in the colorless and impulsive world of "Little England," the island of Barbados. And the adolescence of a colonial people: their painful psychological departure from a primitive, self-sustaining social order, disintegrating under the impact of industrialization, and the resulting search for a new identity. There is little social and racial agitation in this book, but a great deal of honest searching, of sensitive description, and fascinating detail. And throughout the story runs a feeling of sorrow, embodied in the almost biblical figures of Ma and Pa, the eternal parents of the black man, who cannot comprehend or adjust themselves to the change of time, which not only makes their son a man, but a member of a new and different world.
14-Carat Golden Age?

By SERGE FLIEGERS

There is no doubt that French-born conductor Pierre Monteux deserves an official accolade for his activities on behalf of the Metropolitan Opera Company. Ever since his first appearance there, in 1917, he has been a friend and supporter of the Met’s work. And it is under his spirited baton that this, the seventieth anniversary season, got off to a brilliant start with a renovated production of Gounod’s Faust (which was the inaugural work, by the way, when the Met opened in 1883).

It is Monteux also who made possible the artistic triumph of the season, a superior presentation of Claude Debussy’s Pelléas et Mélisande. In a way, Pelléas represents an important turning point in the modern career of the Met and its director, Rudolf Bing. In our review last year (“The Met,” April 20, 1953) we pointed out how Mr. Bing and his herculean associates had, so to speak, cleaned the augen stables of the Met’s antiquated productions, thereby polishing and improving the physical presentation of musical drama in the United States.

The next logical step was to improve the artistic and musical level of the Metropolitan, which, in the opinion of some, had been quietly slipping and had threatened to turn the vast edifice on Broadway and Fortieth Street into a gigantic musical mausoleum. This is not to imply that the Met’s motto has been: “The play’s the thing, and hang the music.” On the contrary, there has been genuine and constant concern to improve the quality of stars, chorus, and orchestra.

George Szell was called in for the sole purpose of reorganizing the pit, and by firing some and hiring others, he managed to revitalize the department of orchestral accompaniment to the point where today it reacts with vim, vigor, and virtuosity to the batons of Monteux, Fausto Cleva, and Szell himself. Nevertheless, the Met still needed a musical coup de maître to satisfy the purists and delight the public. Last year, such an attempted coup resulted in the production of The Rake’s Progress, by Igor Stravinsky. After a season in town and on the road, it must be regretfully reported that the Rake’s progress has been slow, laborious, and unsuccessful. It is undoubtedly a great work, with some of the music evocative of the mystic transportation to be found in the Symphonie des Psaumes. But as an opera, it did not make a hit.

The courage of Mr. Bing and his general staff is therefore doubly to be admired when they chose equally esoteric Pelléas et Mélisande for presenta-

tion this year. Pelléas has been described as another La Mer—with dialogue. Typical of Debussy’s more thoughtful works, it is all mood and atmosphere, with no arias or well-defined melodies. Yet with the musicianship of Pierre Monteux, with top-notch singing, brilliant accompaniment, and satisfying staging, Pelléas became a hit; not a South Pacific type of hit, but an artistic triumph, the needed musical master-stroke.

We asked Maitre Monteux whether, as a result of his successful handling of Pelléas, it might yet turn out to be a popular opera. “Of course not,” the conductor replied. “Pelléas is not supposed to be a popular opera.” Monteux, however, is equally successful with popular operas, as proved by his sell-out performances of Faust, and of a racy version of Carmen that features Rise Stevens as singer, dancer, and great comédienne. Explaining this latest series of musical successes, Monsieur Monteux modestly shrugged his shoulders: “It was only possible because I have been surrounded by great artists—especially the young American singers.”

“Little by little,” Monteux explained, “there has been in this country an evolution of young American musicians—singers mostly. Naturally, they still go to study in Europe. But they come back here and have a chance to appear at the Metropolitan. This builds up a noyeau of excellent, experienced American voices...” Does this mean that we are entering a new golden age of opera? “Perhaps not quite yet,” said M. Monteux. As we left his dressing room, we heard him reciting almost reverently the names of Caruso, Pianco, die Reszke brothers... 

Less nostalgic circles at the Met feel that the noyeau of American singers mentioned by Monteux actually constitutes a present-day golden age, or its reasonable equivalent. If this is true, it signifies an event of historic importance in the world of music, America’s operatic coming of age. After seventy years, the reign of foreign stars at the Metropolitan has been broken. As Rudolf Bing expressed it: “We don’t cast by nationalities, but it so happens that many of the good singers of today are Americans.” Of the current roster, of twenty-seven sopranos listed by the Metropolitan, for example, eighteen are Americans, including such luminaries as Dorothy Kirsten, Patrice Munsel, Eleanor Steber, Lucine Amara, Nadine Conner, Margaret Harshaw, and Regina Resnik.

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The quality of our singers has now been fully recognized abroad, with Roberta Peters and Leonard Warren appearing in that temple of Italian bel canto, La Scala of Milan, and Harshaw singing Brunhilde at Covent Garden. In a gesture of recognition hitherto unequaled, the organizers of last summer's Wagner festivals in Bayreuth summoned Americans Eleanor Steber, George London, and Regina Resnik to supplement the local corps of Nibelungen.

But perhaps it is too early to speak of a new golden age of American singing. As John Gutman, the Met's assistant manager and V.P. in charge of bon mots puts it: "We like to put the emphasis on good opera rather than on gold. Otherwise people might mistake the Met for the Mint." And a look at the financial balance sheet will show that this is not so. For even with its new magnificent voices, the Met is still running at a deficit.

Extroverts and Introverts

Amid all the other excitement of Christmas week, Judith Anderson opened on Broadway in a new and rather puzzling play called enigmatically In the Summer House. Written by Jane Bowles (wife of the novelist-composer, Paul Bowles), the script seems to be about extroverts, introverts, and those between. I use the word "seems" advisedly. The play is in two long acts. During the single intermission I met up in the lobby with a friend who is an old theatergoer and reputable critic. "Do you know what this play is about?" I asked him. "No," he answered. The second act did little to clarify the situation for either of us. It is too bad, for the play is well-written with several good parts and many excellent lines.

The extroverts in the piece are a group of chattering, delightful Mexicans who are on a visit in Southern California from their apparently remunerative ranch below the border. The introverts are two American widows, as different in character as it is possible to be, and their daughters (the latter, however, so far gone in their neuroses as to appear actually demented). Those between are a dreamy boy from St. Louis and a lusty waitress, neither of whom displays sufficient intelligence to indicate they will ever alter their basic dubious status. As Mrs. Gertrude Eastman-Cuevas, Judith Anderson does pretty well throughout most of the play as a healthy introvert. A self-sufficient, independent woman, her chief hope is that her daughter might exhibit some of the enterprise and ambition her late father so notably lacked. The daughter, around whom the whole affair unfortunately revolves, is a thoroughgoing idiot, played to the hilt as such by Elizabeth Ross. As the play is in many episodes intelligent and amusing, it is incomprehensible why this smirking creature should be cast as a sort of heroine affecting disastrously—and as though it were a virtue—the lives of those immediately surrounding her.

It is a pity that so gifted a writer as Mrs. Bowles should have permitted herself to fall in with the Eliot vogue of concealing frustrations behind obscure symbols—worse still, of expecting the audience to figure out its own special and private meaning to what the author is trying to say. Why is it not possible to portray frustration, weakness, hostilities without wrapping them all up in a vine-covered summer house where what is happening is only dimly discernible to the onlooker? A major purpose of a play is communication. When it deliberately makes communication difficult, it ceases in one respect to be a play and becomes a cerebral, in this case psychiatric, exercise.

At any rate, so far as In the Summer House goes, this lack is somewhat compensated for by the presence of the refreshingly unobscure Mexican extroverts. Also by the fact that the acting, especially of Miss Anderson and of Mildred Dunnock (in the part of the second widow) is expert and altogether superior. And finally by the smoothness and excellence of the production itself—not to mention the suitable background music of Paul Bowles.

F. N.

Tensile Strength

How strong is steel?
The girders reaching high strain their black web against the morning sky.
The winches lift them as the cables reel.
How strong is steel?
How strong the atom?
So minutely small that one would think it had no power at all,
and yet the atom, fragmented, splits tempered steel
like filaments of thread.

How strong are love and hate?
They have no size, no weight, sinew or bone or nerve,
but their light breath bids steel and atom serve
for life or death.

CANDACE T. STEVENSON
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