

FEBRUARY 23, 1953

25¢

Roofs Without Houses L. Albert Hahn

Changing the Labor Law
Leo Wolman


The Left Never Learns Lord Vansittart

The Man Who Made Harding
Herbert Corey

Let's Defend Capitalism An Editorial



From one point of view...




or another...

only one viewpoint is RIGHT!

Every question has two sides, but only ONE can be RIGHT! It is the tragedy of our age that moral principle is almost universally sacrificed to the promotings of expediency:

“BE OBJECTIVE!” “FORGET THE LAW!” “DISCARD MORALITY AND LEGALITY!”

The FREEMAN evaluates current issues on the basis of the principles fundamental to our traditional American way of life. Here is one of many testimonials to the effectiveness of its work, from a subscriber who is fighting leftism in our schools: “The enclosed newspaper clipping shows how I disseminate all factual material we can find, *especially those extra copies of the FREEMAN.*” . . . **BE INFORMED . . . KNOW THE TRUTH . . .** read the FREEMAN regularly and be sure your community leaders, clergymen, teachers, and libraries are FREEMAN subscribers. Subscribe now for yourself. Subscribe now for your friends and associates.



SUBSCRIBE OR SEND A GIFT SUBSCRIPTION NOW

Name

Address

City, State

6 Issues \$1.00 1 Year \$5.00 2 Years \$9.00

THE FREEMAN, 240 Madison Avenue, New York 16, N. Y.

Letters

Libertarians vs. Invective

Nowhere have I read a more comprehensible story of the fight of libertarians against Communist invective than is portrayed in the touching story of Taylor Caldwell in your December 15, 1952, issue. Her integrity and that of her husband in repulsing the bribes offered by Communist elements of plunder stand out as a hallmark of steadfast devotion to principles of right vs. wrong.

Washington, Ind.

A. G. BLAZEY

Robeson Records

The "Fortnight" column of the December 29th issue of the *Freeman* contained a statement that Paul Robeson's songs are "frequently featured on Voice of America programs."

That statement is completely incorrect and it is unfortunate that the writer failed to check its accuracy before publication. He could have learned by telephone that the voice of America does not broadcast Paul Robeson's songs nor does our Record Library contain any Robeson recordings.

I believe it is important that a complete correction of these facts be made in the next issue of the *Freeman*.

New York

ALFRED H. MORTON,

Director, International Broadcasting,
U. S. International Information Administration,
Department of State.

Income Tax Amendment

Because of my very high regard for the *Freeman*, I am all the more shocked on reading the first (complete) paragraph in the first column on page 258, issue of January 12. The language used in this paragraph could not possibly be more misleading. No state may have the opportunity to *ratify* an amendment which has not first been *submitted* to the states by Congress. The Congress can be compelled to submit (or to call a convention for the purpose of submitting) amendments when it is so memorialized or petitioned by the action of 32 states (two-thirds). After submission, action by 36 states (three-quarters) is necessary to *ratify*.

Maybe the income tax law "could be altered before the Eisenhower administration comes into power," but there is no chance that the Income Tax Amendment could be repealed and replaced before 1954. And more likely 1955. This depends on submission during calendar 1953.

The *Freeman* is still my favorite in spite of the "slip" causing the above.

Oyster Bay, N. Y.

ROBERT P. JONAS

Two of US Are Good

The best articles in your February 9 issue were William Henry Chamberlin's "Bankruptcy On The Left," and F. A. Voigt's "Germany, Key To Europe." Indeed I think these two men keep up the highest level of clear, honest, astute and informed thinking on political issues to be found in the English-speaking world. I congratulate

late the *Freeman* on numbering them among its steady contributors.

There is a note of rant, or perhaps I mean cant, which occasionally creeps into your columns—a right-wing cocksureness, as though all questions were settled when you speak the words "free enterprise" and one or two others, which arouses my distrust. It never happens in the writings of these two men. They know how to be positive without being dogmatic, self-assured and yet not snooty. Their thoughts are always on the subject-matter, never on themselves, and they are aware that the subject-matter is complex and confusing, and their responsibility in discoursing about it is very great.

JOSEPH PETERSON

St. Louis, Missouri

The Release of Alan Nunn May

From any libertarian viewpoint, correction is in order of the utterly irresponsible implications manifested by the editorial entitled "A Slight Case of Treason" in your issue of January 26. The writer of the editorial evidently believed the British had *paroled* Alan Nunn May while Alger Hiss was denied parole, with a patriotic moral accordingly; and that otherwise May got privileged treatment—such as protecting him from the press and assuring him that he could get a passport if he applied for one.

In fact, May was not paroled but released exactly as *any* prisoner in England must be released upon serving eighty months of a ten-year sentence—if his conduct in prison is satisfactory. Similarly, Hiss must be released upon serving forty-four months of the five-year sentence—if his conduct in prison is satisfactory. "Good time" is a *right*, not a *privilege*, of every prisoner regardless of his offense; while on the part of the prison authorities it is an exigent factor for maintaining discipline.

Further, it has been federal prison policy in this country as well as in England to prevent, insofar as possible, press exploitation of *any* notorious released convicts; and things are at a pretty pass indeed if avowed liberals are less considerate in this respect than prison wardens. Still further, if prisoners must—as the *Freeman* editorial suggests—expiate their crimes by admitting them, then there is rarely expiation of any felonies from murder to income tax evasion. Again, things are at a pretty pass if avowed liberals are less charitable in this respect than the penal authorities.

Finally, the right to a passport is inviolable in Britain for everyone, including ex-convicts. So for the Home Office to announce that May can get a passport if he applies for one is only to affirm due respect for the law.

It is perhaps debatable from some libertarian viewpoint whether May received a long enough sentence—under British law he could have got four more years—or whether the law should not be more severe as in the United States and the USSR, or whether Britain should copy American and Soviet policy to make passports only a privilege that the ruling politicians can grant or refuse. But to suggest that May should have been treated worse than other convicts in the matter and manner of releasing him after he had served his full time as a well-behaved prisoner is to advocate either a capricious disregard of law and custom or a revival of bills of attainder.

Winchester, Ind.

WILBUR BURTON

Contents

Editorials

The Fortnight	365
Let's Defend Capitalism	367
The Faith of the Freeman	369
Civil Rights	370

Articles

Roofs Without Houses	L. ALBERT HAHN	371
Poe, Political Seer	EDWARD HUNTER	374
Changing The Labor Law	LEO WOLMAN	375
The Left Never Learns	LORD VANSITTART	377
Balance Sheet of the Cold War ..	WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN	379
The Man Who Made Harding	HERBERT COREY	383
Profit on Canadian Dimes	MARTIN EBON	386

Books

Koestler's Twisted Arrow	MAX EASTMAN	387
No. 1 Fellow Traveler	EUGENE LYONS	389
A Patient Judge	MILTON EDELMAN	390
"Objectivity" vs. Facts	JAMES RORTY	391
Word-Juggling	FRANK MEYER	392
Second Harvest	EDWARD DAHLBERG	393

Poem

An Epitaph	ALEXANDER PUSHKIN	394
------------------	-------------------	-----

Letters	363
---------------	-----

Arts and Entertainments	RICHARD MCLAUGHLIN	385
-------------------------------	--------------------	-----

This is What They Said	J. B. MATTHEWS	378
------------------------------	----------------	-----

Worth Hearing Again	384
---------------------------	-----

HENRY HAZLITT, Editor FLORENCE NORTON, Managing Editor

THE FREEMAN is published fortnightly. Publication Office, Orange, Conn. Editorial and General Offices, 240 Madison Avenue, New York 16, N. Y. Copyrighted in the United States, 1953, by the Freeman Magazine, Inc. Henry Hazlitt, President; Lawrence Fertig, Vice President; Claude Robinson, Secretary; Kurt Lassen, Treasurer.

Entered as second class matter at the Post Office at Orange, Conn. Rates: Twenty-five cents the copy; five dollars a year in the United States, nine dollars for two years; six dollars a year elsewhere.

The editors can not be responsible for manuscripts submitted but if return postage is enclosed they will endeavor to see that manuscripts rejected are promptly returned.

It is not to be understood that articles signed with a name, pseudonym, or initials necessarily represent the opinion of the editors, either as to substance or style. They are printed because in the editors' judgment, they are intrinsically worth reading.

 11 Printed in U.S.A., by Wilson H. Lee Co., Orange, Connecticut

Our Contributors

L. ALBERT HAHN is an internationally known economist and has written extensively on economic theory and monetary policy. His most recent book is *The Economics of Illusion*, which exposes the fallacy of Keynesism.

LEO WOLMAN, professor of economics at Columbia University, is the author of a number of books on trade unions in America. He was formerly a member of the National Labor Board.

The article by LORD VANSITTART, "The Left Never Learns," appears in the *Freeman* by special arrangement with *Time and Tide* of London.

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN, a frequent *Freeman* contributor, is currently at work on a new book to be published by the Henry Regnery Company, of which his article, "Balance Sheet of the Cold War," will be a part.

HERBERT COREY has seen long service as a newspaper correspondent both in America and Europe. He is at present located in Washington, D. C., as associate editor of *The Nation's Business*.

RICHARD MCLAUGHLIN is a free-lance reviewer and critic of the theatre.

EUGENE LYONS rose to fame with *Assignment in Utopia*, describing his disillusionment with Soviet Communism after eight years as UP correspondent in Moscow. *The Red Decade* exposed the manner in which the American intellectuals were manipulated by Communist stooges during the thirties. He is now a senior editor of the *Reader's Digest*.

A Note to Subscribers

Notifications of change of address should include both the old and the new address, and should be sent to: Circulation Department, the *Freeman*, 240 Madison Avenue, New York 16, N. Y. Please allow 30 days for the change to become effective.

THE Freeman

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1953

The Fortnight

President Eisenhower's State of the Union speech marked a turning point in our history as decisive as that marked by the first speeches and actions of Franklin D. Roosevelt when he became President twenty years ago. Mr. Roosevelt proclaimed the birth of the New Deal; Mr. Eisenhower buried it. This does not mean, as the New Dealers would love to put it in their question-begging vocabulary, that our new President repudiated the "social gains" of the Roosevelt and Truman regimes. But he repudiated the worst evils for which those regimes were responsible—timorousness, vacillation, and appeasement in dealing with our Communist enemies abroad; and extravagance, inflation, and persistent pushing for controls and socialism at home.

What attracted most immediate attention, and rightly, was Mr. Eisenhower's blunt declaration that: "I am, therefore, issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China." His explanation was brief but unanswerable: "There is no longer any logic or sense in a condition that required the United States Navy to assume defensive responsibilities on behalf of the Chinese Communists, thus permitting those Communists, with greater impunity, to kill our soldiers and those of our United Nations allies, in Korea."

The real mystery is not why President Eisenhower terminated the incredible previous orders to the Seventh Fleet, but why those orders were continued for a single day after the Chinese Communists opened their attacks against us. And yet this one step in the direction of sense was met by cries of consternation in London and grave headshaking by some of our own strategists of the press. The most common complaint was that President Eisenhower's new order might "extend the war." One wonders whether the people who make this complaint are capable of reason. Are they sincerely confused by the double meaning of their own phrases? The only kind of extension of this or any other war that we have to fear is an extension by the enemy of *his* hostilities against *us*, not an extension of *our*

hostilities against *him*. Instead of immobilizing and rendering impotent the forces of Nationalist China against Communist China, we are at last releasing them.

Apparently the theory of those who are opposed to all this is that if we allow Chinese Nationalists as well as American G.I.'s to fight the Chinese Communists then Mao and Stalin will get *really* mad, and will cease to show us the patience and sweet consideration that they have been showing up to now. The rules of this chess game, we are apparently to understand, are that Stalin is perfectly free to equip and direct North Korean and Chinese Communists to attack and kill American soldiers, but that if we equip or even release Chinese Nationalists to fight back we have violated the rules of decency and discretion. We are to be allowed to have our little war in Korea, on this theory, so long as we consent to perpetual stalemate; but to try to win it is sheer recklessness and hysteria.

Those of our British friends who have been most vocal in deploring the new Formosa order are precisely the ones whose own past policy toward China has been thoroughly discredited. The results of that policy are described elsewhere in this issue by Lord Vansittart. These British critics might stop to remind themselves that American casualties in Korea have been running at a rate of forty to every one one of Britain's. It is up to them to choose whether Britain should make a far greater contribution of fighting forces to Korea or be content to have a great deal less to say about our policy there. Some reasonable proportion should exist between a nation's contribution to an effort and its voice in directing it.

No less important in its moral effect than Mr. Eisenhower's new Formosa policy was his declaration that he would call for "an appropriate resolution [of Congress] making clear that this Government recognizes no kind of commitment contained in secret understandings of the past with foreign governments which permit . . . enslavement" of any people. This courageous repudiation of such deals at Yalta and Potsdam purifies the air.

But in its immediate effect on our daily lives, and perhaps also in its long-run effect, what

President Eisenhower has already said and done about domestic economic policy may prove even more important than what he has said and done about foreign policy. For the first time in twenty years we have a man in the White House who both knows and says that inflation is created by government policy itself. He was not using a careless or accidental adjective when he demanded as a first step in our fiscal and economic policy that we "reduce the *planned* deficits and then balance the budget." He was wise and courageous, too, in spite of the protests in Congress and part of the press, in insisting that Congress must cut expenditures before it cuts taxes. Any other course, at a time when we confront huge planned deficits as we do now, would be inflationary.

The wisest and politically most courageous of all the new President's actions was his declaration that he would not call for a renewal of price and wage controls on April 30, followed by his sweeping executive order immediately suspending wage and salary controls. More than anything else this marked the end of the managed economy philosophy of the preceding twenty years and a rebirth of the philosophy of economic freedom.

The decision of the Secretary of Labor, and probably of the President, to have the Department of Labor continue to prepare and publish the "old" index number of the cost of living during the first six months of 1952, is a wonderful example of the recalcitrance of the labor problem. The index is nothing but an attempt to measure scientifically the changes in retail price of a carefully selected bundle of goods and services. Such a measure is widely used by business and labor. No one can properly question the skill and integrity with which it is compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Yet when the Bureau prepares a new index, designed to keep abreast of changes in living habits, Walter Reuther of the United Auto Workers Union quickly seizes upon this instrument of statistical progress as an excuse for breaking a five-year labor contract with the automobile industry which he signed two and a half years ago in good faith and with full understanding of what it meant. Hence President Eisenhower and his cabinet, with certainly other, more critical things to do, must now wrestle with an index number.

It took many years of meditation, a public scandal, and the revelations of the New York State Crime Commission to inspire the A. F. of L. to take action against Joe Ryan and his International Longshoremen's Union. It is inconceivable that the executive council of the Federation should only now have become aware of conditions that were common knowledge long before Chairman Joseph M. Proskauer and his associates began investigating them. Now that the A. F. of L. council has acted, there is no reason to be sanguine about the results. For the trouble on the docks is not accidental or unique. It

is related to the theory and practice of entrenched organized labor, which presuppose that public authorities are not expected to afford police protection, and that strong unionism reaches its climax as a device for collusion with employers.

In the campaign against racial discrimination, we should give generous recognition wherever we find spontaneous improvement. We hear from all over the South of the change in attitude, notably in states like Mississippi, where the problem has been most acute. Negroes in such states are acquiring more and more property and are to an amazing extent attaining a status that looks toward the elimination of any suggestion of a dependent or inferior race. In the state of Texas and in the small city of Taylor, the community conferred upon a Negro, Dr. James Lee Dickey, the honor of the city's outstanding citizen for 1952. For thirty-two years Dr. Dickey has labored to provide better and better medical attention for Negroes and to create better and better relations between the races. The benign influence of this man has done much to ease traditional tensions. In receiving this honor, he offered advice on the virtues of patience and understanding that might well be heeded by all who are grappling with the sharp angles of this issue.

An event that brought joy to our thrifty hearts was the reply of Secretary of State Dulles when Judge Learned Hand asked him whether the special loyalty review board appointed by President Truman to review the decision of the Civil Service Loyalty Review Board in the matter of John Carter Vincent should continue its work. The conclusions already on hand, the new Secretary said, "are adequate to give me guidance."

It would be impossible to calculate how much waste of talent and energy this simple and very true remark will save the nation. For there was no other alternative except to go on appointing loyalty review boards to review the decisions of loyalty review boards as long as time, or John Carter Vincent, might last. No loyalty review board, and no board whatever unless it was made of solid oak or hemlock, could, after examining the records of the IPR and his association with it, fail to conclude that John Carter Vincent was an enthusiast for the Soviet system and zealously concerned to defend its prestige and promote its interests. The unspoken intentions of those intimately concerned with the IPR are not subject to doubt, and have not been since Alfred Kohlberg addressed his carefully documented (and unanswered) letter to that body in 1944. Nor is there any doubt of the intention of the Truman administration to clear Vincent of the charge of "doubtful loyalty," if it took fifty review boards, and another fifty review boards reviewing review boards, to do it. Mr. Dulles, at least, is not going to waste weeks, months, and years of the time of our most able and valuable citizens inquiring into questions that any competent filing clerk, if disinterested, could answer in a day.

Let's Defend Capitalism

THE WORLD is locked today in a fierce war of ideologies, in some ways strangely resembling the wars of religion in the Middle Ages. The doctrinal points at issue in those wars have become unintelligible to most of us today, and there are some equally strange paradoxes in the present ideological war.

The Communists, who started it, not only know precisely what they are against—Capitalism—but precisely what they are for. On both questions the party line is laid down for them from the top. There can be no deviation, on pain of ostracism, penal servitude, torture, or death. But on the other side, most of those who do not accept Communism did not realize, until belatedly, that there even *was* an ideological war going on; and that no appeasement, no conciliation, no mutual attitude of live-and-let-live, was possible, because the Communists were determined from the start not to permit it. The non-Communists had no idea that they were engaged in a life-or-death struggle.

But this brings us to other paradoxes. The non-Communists are still not even united as anti-Communists. For there is still an influential group who say: "True, we should not allow the Russians to impose Communism on us, but neither should we try to impose our system on the Russians. Capitalism (or Democracy) is probably the best system for us, and Communism for them. If we stop arming against the Communists and talking against them, their suspicions will gradually dissolve, and each of us can live peaceably in his own way." This view persists, in spite of its untenability, mainly because it is a wish-fulfillment.

Moreover, even the anti-Communists are not united. They are all "against Communism." But they have no common definition or concept of Communism. Few of them realize that Communism is primarily an *economic* doctrine. Most of them regard it primarily as a political or a cultural system. What they hate about it is the despotism, the total suppression of freedom—political, religious, or artistic; the cruelties, the forced confessions, the systematic lying, spying, and plotting, the relentless campaigns of calumny, the existence or threat of military aggression.

All these things are indeed hateful. But what most anti-Communists still fail to see is that they are merely the inevitable consequences of the basic economic doctrine of Communism. These are what Karl Marx, writing of Capitalism, would have called the "superstructure."

The anti-Communists are also deeply divided in their ideas of the economic system they would prefer to Communism. They range from champions of the free market to left-wing Socialists, with every variety of New Dealer, planner, and statist in between. The New Dealers seem as eager to repudiate

"laissez faire Capitalism" as they do Communism. And when it comes to the basic economic organization they propose, the Socialists are actually at one with the Communists against Capitalism.

These violent divisions within the ranks of the anti-Communists have led to conflicting ideas concerning the proper "strategy" against Communism. There are those who think that "anti-Communism" is itself a sufficient ground for unity. Communism, they say, is not a doctrine that needs to be dissected, but a conspiracy that needs to be suppressed. What we must do is to ferret out the Communists—in the government, in the armed forces, in the U. N., in the schools and colleges—expose them and get rid of them. Anything else, they contend, is either unimportant or a diversion.

There is another group that is not satisfied merely with being against Communism, which concedes that the opponents of Communism must have a common positive philosophy, but which thinks that belief in "Democracy" is enough. This has been substantially the position of the State Department and the Voice of America under Truman. It is the position of the major part of the American press.

It does not stand up under serious analysis. "Democracy" is one of those sweepingly vague words that mean too many things to different minds. It can be stretched or compressed, like an accordion, to meet the controversial needs of the moment. "Democracy" as a unifying concept has come to be, in fact, little better than a semantic evasion. To some it means a political system under which the government depends upon the uncoerced will of the people in such a way that it can be peaceably changed whenever the will of the people changes. To others it means anything down to a system of unrestrained mob rule in which everyone is declared by fiat to be equal in merit and influence to everyone else; in which a minority has no rights that a majority is bound to respect; in which anyone's property can be confiscated at will, and distributed to those who did nothing to earn it; in which incomes are to be equalized in spite of glaring inequalities in ability, effort, and contribution. This second concept of Democracy must lead inevitably into a Communist system and not toward a free one.

"Democracy," therefore, has not only come to be so vague as to be almost meaningless; it has lost nearly all its value even as a semantic weapon. The enemy has taken it over and used it for his own purposes. The Communists call their own system (tautologically but beguilingly) a "people's democracy," and argue that capitalist democracy is a contradiction in terms.

Even if the concept of "Democracy" did not suffer from a fatal ambiguity, it would still refer

primarily to a *political* system. But Communism stands primarily for an *economic* system, of which the political accompaniment is mainly a consequence or superstructure. Therefore "Democracy" is in any case a false antithesis to Communism. It is like declaring west to be the opposite of north, or cold to be the opposite of black.

The true opposite of Communism is Capitalism. The Communists know it, but most of the rest of us don't.

This is the real reason for the ideological weakness of the opposition to Communism, and for the ineffectiveness of most of the propaganda against it—particularly the official propaganda, up to now, of the State Department and the Voice of America, and of the Western governments generally. All these set up "Democracy" as the antithesis of Communism, partly because they are confused enough to believe it is, and partly because they have neither the will nor the courage to defend Capitalism.

There are several reasons behind this reluctance. To begin with, the very word "Capitalism" was coined and given currency by Marx and Engels. It was deliberately devised as a smear word. It was meant to suggest what it probably still does suggest to most minds—a system developed by and for the capitalists.

The overwhelming majority of bureaucrats in the Western countries do not really believe in the basic principles of Capitalism. The economic freedom it involves is alien to their minds. It is not natural for the people in power in government to believe in less governmental power. Moreover, they do not really understand what makes Capitalism work, or what measures are conformable with it. Their natural tendency is to favor the incompatible system of the government handout. Hence they plump for huge foreign aid programs, Point Four, the International Monetary Fund, and interminable United Nations meddling. They do not realize that these measures and institutions actually retard or prevent the freedom of trade and the free international flow of private investment upon which real recovery, economic growth and productivity depend.

Finally, even when an American official understands and favors Capitalism, he is embarrassed by the fact that several of our most important European allies are addicted to Socialism. Therefore he does not dare to praise Capitalism in specific terms for fear of offending our Socialist allies by implication. The real case against Communism hardly even gets itself officially stated.

It is in large part because of the connotations built into the smear word "Capitalism" that, while millions are willing to die for Communist delusions, nobody has been willing to die for Capitalism—certainly not under that name. But Capitalism is merely the Marxist epithet for the system of the free market, for competitive private enterprise, for the system under which each is permitted to earn and keep the product of his labor—in brief, for economic freedom.

It is because of its freedoms and securities that Capitalism is incomparably the most productive system in the world. It does not have to "prove" its superiority to Socialism or Communism. It has already proved that a thousand times over, whether the standard of comparison is productivity or personal freedom. Capitalism is not the best system because it is best for the employer or for the rich. It is the best system precisely for the worker and for the poor. Under it the status, wages, and welfare of the worker have improved historically at a rate and to an extent that before the Industrial Revolution would have been considered incredible. They are still improving, at, if anything, an accelerative rate.

The answer to Communism, in brief, is Capitalism. And once we understand this, the problems of "ideological strategy" which we have been confusedly debating begin to melt away. We do not have to discuss whether we have been "merely talking to ourselves" or not. The very question is based on a false analogy—the analogy of the lawsuit, of "our side" versus "their side." This analogy unconsciously swallows the Marxist theory of a real clash of interest between economic "classes"—employers versus workers or rich versus poor. But once we recognize that the system of Capitalism is the only workable one, the only one that promotes the interest of both employers *and* workers, while it provides the maximum of opportunity for the poor to conquer their poverty, then the real distinction is between those who understand the system and those who do not. A man who is known to understand a problem is never merely talking to himself; all those who sincerely wish to understand it can be counted on to listen.

Another problem which melts away is whether we should confine ourselves to combatting Communism, because it is a conspiracy and a military menace, or whether we can disregard Communism, on the ground that it has been sufficiently exposed, and concentrate on combatting socialist measures because there is so much more real likelihood of their being adopted at home.

The solution is simple. There is only one right answer to the sum of 2 and 2, and an infinite number of wrong answers. Once we have shown that 2 and 2 make 4, we do not have to provide separate proof that every other answer is wrong. Communism is just one wrong answer to the basic social problem—though the worst and most dangerous. Socialism (which proposes the same basic economic measures as Communism) is merely another wrong answer, in the long run only a little less bad and a little less dangerous. "Planning," price control, inflation, Keynesianism, are still other wrong answers. As in arithmetic, there are an infinite number of such wrong answers. But once we have found the right answer, we can explain what is wrong with the other solutions from that basis.

In the social and economic realm, we must base our criticisms on a positive program. That program is the improvement and purification of Capitalism.

The Faith of the Freeman

FOR AT LEAST two decades there has been an urgent need in America for a journal of opinion devoted to the cause of traditional liberalism and individual freedom. The *Freeman* is designed to fill that need.

If we judge merely from the lip-service paid to it, the cause of "freedom" would not seem to lack defenders. But it is most often invoked today under some cloudy collectivist concept. An outstanding example is the "Four Freedoms." One error implicit in this phrase is the assumption that freedom, which is indivisible, can be cut into slices like a cake. A second error is that the individual is entitled only to the particular freedoms that the state is gracious enough to permit him. The true principle is the other way round: it is the state's powers over the individual that must be specified and limited.

"Freedom of speech" and "freedom of worship" were already embraced in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. But there they stand quite properly as specific limitations on the power of government. "Freedom from want" and "freedom from fear," however, are not liberties at all. They are commonly possessed by prisoners and slaves. They are guarantees of security—and spurious ones. They profess to guarantee what no government can in fact guarantee, least of all the socialist state or the self-styled "welfare" state.

It will be one of the foremost aims of the *Freeman* to clarify the concept of individual freedom and apply it to the problems of our time. Its basic principles and broader applications have long been embodied in the classic liberal tradition. That tradition has always emphasized the moral autonomy of the individual. Real morality can not exist where there is no real freedom of choice. The individual must be free to act as his own conscience directs, so long as he does not infringe upon the equal rights of others.

The true liberal tradition has always placed great emphasis on economic liberty. It is particularly of economic liberty that communists, socialists, government planners, and other collectivists have been most openly contemptuous. Yet it is not too much to say that economic freedom, as embodied in the free market, is the basic institution of a liberal society.

The free market means the freedom of everyone to produce, sell or buy whatever he wishes on the best terms he can obtain without deception or coercion. Free trade is the expression of the free market in the international field. Tariffs, quotas, exchange control, bilateral treaties, import and export prohibitions or restrictions, government price supports, subsidies or loans to favored industries, laws making it compulsory for A to "bargain" with B instead of C, wage-fixing, interest-fixing, price-fixing of every kind and in every field—all these are

violations of the principle of the free market. The free market economy not only provides the maximum of economic liberty but insures maximum production. All government interference with it tends in the long run to reduce and unbalance production.

Government must, of course, establish a legal and institutional framework of law and order. It must legalize violence, intimidation, theft, fraud, coercive monopoly and coercion of every kind. It must enforce contracts and protect the rights of private property, recognizing that property rights are among the basic human rights.

Wherever socialism is complete—wherever the government is the sole employer—there can be no economic freedom. And where economic freedom does not exist, there can be no freedom of any other kind. It remains as true as in Alexander Hamilton's day that "a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will."

True liberalism has always recognized that one of the most important guarantees of freedom is the rule of law, the equality of all men before the law, the subordination of the state itself to the law. True liberalism rests on the common law, on clear and definite statute law, and on a government of limited powers. It means a minimum rather than a maximum of "administrative law"—which is often a mere euphemism for rule by unconfined bureaucratic caprice. And true liberalism means local autonomy and the decentralization of political power. The *Freeman* will defend these principles.

The *Freeman* will also defend the central principle of democracy. Authentic democracy does not, as so often supposed, imply the absurd thesis that the majority is always right. But it does recognize that it is only by majority consent that internal peace and stability can in the long run be preserved. Democratic progress consists, on the one hand, in making the government more responsible and responsive to the majority will and, on the other, in making that will itself more informed and enlightened.

In the sphere of foreign policy, the *Freeman* will favor the constant growth of co-operation among free peoples. Its emphasis will be upon the development of mutual good will rather than upon the creation of an elaborate, unnecessary, and premature machinery of world organization. Any world organization that includes Communist or other totalitarian governments is obviously worse than useless, for such governments must inevitably prevent the organization from taking any genuine steps toward peace and friendship. The organization will be either paralyzed or corrupted by such members, who are there only to use it either to inhibit common action against their aggression or

as a platform and an amplifier for their own lying propaganda.

The only world organization that can serve a useful purpose today is one composed of the free nations for mutual assistance against the Communist terror that threatens their very existence.

In terms of current labels, the *Freeman* will be at once radical, liberal, conservative, and reactionary. It will be radical because it will go to the root of questions. It will be liberal because it will stand for the maximum of individual liberty, for tolerance of all honest diversity of opinion, and for faith in the efficacy of solving our internal problems by discussion and reason rather than suppression and force. It will be conservative because it believes in conserving the great constructive achievements of the past. And it will be reactionary if that means reacting against ignorant and reckless efforts to destroy precisely what is most precious in our great economic, political, and cultural heritage in the name of alleged "progress."

The *Freeman* is launched in the faith that there is a substantial body of readers in America who share these ideals, and who will rally to a periodical dedicated to their reaffirmation.

Reprinted from the first issue of the *Freeman*, October 2, 1950.

Civil Rights

THE AIR over the battlefield where the so-called "civil rights" issue has been fought for a good many years has almost miraculously cleared up since the November election. The clearing has been practically complete since the message of President Eisenhower on the State of the Union. Everything is now set for a new look at this perplexing problem and for the introduction of reason and moderation where violent prejudices prevailed before.

There is a good deal of evidence to justify this proposal. In the first place, President Eisenhower, with the immense prestige of his office, is apparently definitely of the opinion that an attempt to force Federal legislation on the southern states is not only unwise but unnecessary and impractical. He made the point that discrimination was certainly not confined to the South, and also that the whole matter must be subject to a careful and reasonable re-examination of facts. There can be no hope now among northern politicians to prevail against this attitude of the Administration, coupled as it is with the firm determination of the southern element in Congress to resist and the Republican majority in the North to desist.

The decisive defeat of the attempt at the opening of Congress to alter the rules regulating debate in the Senate has indicated the disposition of the Republican leaders in the North to abandon their advocacy of Federal legislation on the subject.

The time has come now to reduce this issue to

its basic elements, and the way to do that is to consider the items that have been the main factors in Mr. Truman's program and to decide what, if anything, can be done with each.

The first, and the one most bound up with emotional reactions, is the proposal for what is called "anti-lynching" legislation. The use of the term "anti-lynching" is, to say the least, inadequate. In many minds the purpose of such legislation is to move Federal police power into the jurisdiction of state and local criminal administration and virtually impose upon the South policing by Federal agents. If anyone doubts this, he should consult the report of President Truman's Civil Rights Commission. This would not only be a sure means of causing local law enforcement officers to relax their own efforts to maintain law and order, but would be an affront to the self-respecting communities of the South. Most important of all is the fact that lynching has very nearly disappeared. During the year 1952, according to the Tuskegee Institute, there were no lynchings. In 1951, there was one; and over several past years the number has been decreasing.

The second of Mr. Truman's items is the equalizing of the right to vote and to participate in party activities in the South. This, too, is rapidly remedying itself. The poll tax has disappeared in all states except six. Participation by Negroes in primaries is also rapidly increasing. When we consider the fact that in a state like South Carolina it was the large Negro vote that carried the state for Stevenson, it is a little absurd to maintain that Negroes are wholly deprived of political rights.

The most debatable item, of course, is the attempt to enact by Federal statute a fair-employment practice measure with punitive means of enforcement. Almost everyone has now recognized the impossibility of enforcing this sort of legislation by Federal means. Together with this recognition, the states have made their own fair-employment laws. A careful examination of the experience of some of the states in the North that have enacted this sort of legislation ought to be informative.

A final means of disposing of the whole issue should be the appointment by the President of a truly representative civil rights commission. On this commission should be notable leaders of the South, as well as the North. They should be men who, like the President himself, hope that this problem can be rationalized by a sober assessment of all the facts. Such a commission might well take very deliberate action and make periodic reports over the next year or two. The educational value of such a commission would be its major contribution.

The problem of race relations in the South is in major part a problem that the South as a region must itself solve. The great prestige of President Eisenhower down there can now be used to present this in a friendly manner to the leaders of the southern states, and undoubtedly they will respond to the challenge with a resolute determination to end the party strife that has rocked Congress so many times to no avail.

Roofs Without Houses

By L. ALBERT HAHN

The creation of international and supranational organizations aims at reducing or suppressing all or many of the calamities emerging from the co-existence of individual sovereign nations. Those who believe this to be the right way of achieving these aims can look with pride and satisfaction on the mushroom-like growth of such organizations during the last decade. The United Nations, the Bretton Woods Monetary Fund, the High Authority of the European Steel and Coal Union which is just now trying to extend its "authority" into other economic and even political fields, the Interparliamentary Union meetings in Strasbourg, all these have joined the prewar organizations, such as the Bank for International Settlements and the old League of Nations. And these are only what could be called the "parents" of innumerable commissions, committees, and subcommittees. They do not include the seemingly unlimited number of Marshall Plan agencies with their countless "liaison" departments.

A New Privileged Class

Whether the creation of all these organizations has indeed brought the world nearer to unification is doubtful. What is not doubtful, however, is that a new class within the existing societies has been built up—the permanent traveling members of international commissions. One meets them on ships, railroads, and planes as they rush between Geneva, Paris, London, New York, Strasbourg, or Luxembourg to attend urgent meetings. With some experience, one can easily recognize them, even without speaking to them, by their hasty and nervous professional tourism. Whereas the activities of these traveling supranationals are extremely diversified and reach out into almost every field of political and economic life, they have one feature in common that characterizes them not only as a class, but as a privileged class. Most of them enjoy freedom from taxes—as did, for instance, the privileged classes of the nobility and clergy in France before the Revolution. As may be remembered, the people's resentment against such freedoms for the few was one of the chief causes of the Revolution. The tax privilege of the new class is, incidentally, a paradox insofar as it is demanded and accepted primarily by the very same people who vote for higher and higher expenditures and therefore higher and higher taxes for others, especially American

Can the existing supranational organizations unite the world? How can European integration be achieved? A noted economist answers these and related questions in a discerning critique.

citizens. As for themselves, they obviously think their jobs would not be so attractive if they had to pay taxes on their remuneration.

The rise of this new privileged class is not only an interesting social phenomenon. It must also be taken into account when judging the reliability of what its members say on the importance or unimportance of supranational procedures. It would be superhuman if they were to recognize and confess that the basic concept that had led to the creation of their organization was faulty. This would be an admission that most of the tremendous effort and expenditures are really wasted.

Therefore, when listening to discussions about the success or failure of the new international superstructures, it must be kept in mind that huge personal vested interests are trying to prevent the dissolution of these organizations, and even pressing for their further expansion. The new privileged class uses all the means and tricks which all hierarchies during history have used when they wanted to remain in power, such as branding those not in favor of their work as heretics and mobilizing emotions against them. A favorite device is to denounce indiscriminately as "isolationists" all those who consider the present methods of internationalism basically unsound. Their position is strengthened by the mere existence of huge organizations, busy with taking votes, nominating commissions for study, etc. Most people can not imagine that if so many debate, write, and travel in or for an organization, all this effort could be other than necessary and useful.

The Basic Problem

While these facts make it difficult to examine the basic soundness of the new roofs that have been constructed, it is nevertheless important for us to do so, not only because the mushrooming of the many thousands of tax-free and highly-paid members of organizations is becoming quite costly for the taxpayer, who is not exempt from taxation (especially in the United States), but also because here, as in every other field, energies spent in the wrong direction are prevented from working in the right one. The whole idea of international integration will, furthermore, be harmed if wrong methods are allowed to be perpetuated.

The question that has to be answered is this: Will the building of supranational organizations

under present-day conditions be able to correct the evils—economic and political—which result from the fact that the world is divided into many nations with sovereign governments? These evils, I think, can be suppressed only by suppressing the disintegrating factors working within the individual countries. They can not be dissipated by great schemes of super organizations unless there is the will for change in the individual member countries themselves.

Just now, the drive for supranational organizations seems to have received a new impetus. Something like a supranational parliament seems to be in the offing in western Europe. This newest step toward so-called integration in Europe is paradoxical, for many Europeans have overwhelmingly a clear and rather negative opinion about the two most important integration schemes of the postwar period—the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund.

As for the United Nations, the overwhelming opinion in Europe seems to be that the history of the old League of Nations is repeating itself. Just as with the old League of Nations, the new United Nations is recognized—correctly, I think—as nothing more or less than a legalistic cover for the politics of the great nations, which remain the real moving powers. The will and the strength of these few nations alone are really decisive in international problems. The United Nations has indeed, if examined without prejudice, brought no substantial change in the old-fashioned diplomacy. None of the big powers has been prevented from doing what it wanted to do or been forced to do what it did not want to do. This is not by chance, but necessarily so. The votes at assemblies and commissions are entirely meaningless if they are not taken or confirmed by a body enjoying sovereignty in the territory where they are to be enforced.

Paradoxically, the only visible effect of the legalistic framework of the United Nations seems to be that the political influence of the United States, although the most powerful among the member nations, has been weakened. For on the one side it has, as the chief sponsor of the United Nations, to bow to a certain extent to the majority votes by otherwise quite uninfluential countries, with the result that others can dispose of the money of U. S. taxpayers. And on the other hand it has become involved in controversies like the one between France and the Arab states, with the result that it had to antagonize either the French or the Arabs. Furthermore, the United Nations gives the Russian foreign ministers every opportunity for spreading the most vicious anti-American propaganda west of the Iron Curtain, whereas no western diplomat is allowed or able to spread one word of truth east of the Iron Curtain.

As for the International Monetary Fund, its inefficiency and uselessness have become so obvious that were it not for a law of inertia that keeps obsolete organizations alive (like the superseded Bank for International Settlements, for example), it would

long ago have been dissolved. It is recognized that stability of currency begins at home, that an organization, not sovereign with respect to the entire monetary fiscal and economic policy within the various nations, can not fix the external value of the currencies. The Fund has had, in fact, only a negative effect, if any, in that for a certain time at least it tried to enforce the worst of all combinations, internal inflation of the currencies coupled with external stability. And where it did achieve some slight degree of co-operation, it did no more than could have been accomplished by a simple telephone conversation between Central Bank presidents. That this Bretton Woods organization was based on false conceptions was, incidentally, recognized and declared at the start by all who did not fall for the intense propaganda efforts of the U. S. Treasury headed by Mr. Morgenthau and the late Harry Dexter White, identified by Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley as a Communist agent.*

Is Integration of Europe Possible?

As for the widely discussed economic and political integration of Europe, all the steps which have been taken and those contemplated for the future assume that it is possible to eliminate the economic and political difficulties deriving from the existence of a multitude of national sovereignties by legalistic short cuts—by gadgets, so to speak. The Steel and Coal Union, based on the so-called Schuman Plan, is essentially nothing else but an international super cartel. Whatever the complicated provisions of the agreements are, the fact remains that international cartels, even if leading to the abolishing of protective duties, are basically protectionist and not free-tradish. It may be that production will be concentrated where the costs are lower. However, this will not be done by shutting down the less productive plants without compensation, as happens under a system of free trade. Rather, as in every cartel, it will be done with compensation to the plants or workers that become unemployed. And as in every cartel the consumer will ultimately have to pay the compensations through prices higher than would prevail under free trade. The creation of international cartels has, incidentally, always been the dream of French industry, which always preferred being protected by private price fixing rather than by import duties—which, after all, mean payments to the Treasuries. The natural way to integrate the European coal and steel industry would, of course, be to create a customs union for these products, i.e., simply abolish protection for them. After that, the relocation of pro-

*I myself wrote at that time in an article published in the *Commercial & Financial Chronicle*, August 22, 1946: ". . . for the stabilization of currencies the stabilization of underlying political and financial conditions is overwhelmingly essential, [whereas] technical devices and a stabilization fund as provided by the Bretton Woods agreements are of relatively small importance. Therefore one cannot help feeling that in all probability the Bretton Woods fund will not be essential for the stabilization of the postwar currencies. There is a good chance that for all practical purposes it will be replaced by individual credit arrangements coupled with certain guarantees to the creditors on the economic and fiscal policy to be followed by the debtor nations."

duction to where it is cheapest or most productive would take place in a truly liberal way. Practical experience during the next few months will show that there is no middle way between free trade on the one hand and a cartel on the other.

In order to judge how Europe can really be "integrated," one should keep in mind the reasons why this integration seems so necessary just now. Why was there scarcely a mention about the need for integration before the Second World War? Because before the war Europe appeared to be sufficiently integrated. The disintegration of Europe is essentially a postwar phenomenon.

It is, of course, correct that there was protectionism in Europe throughout the whole preceding century. But the tariffs never before appeared so cumbersome as to necessitate the "unification" of Europe. Lowering of the tariffs, either autonomously or by treaties, was considered the appropriate method of fighting the damages of protectionism. What really has disintegrated Europe during the last two decades since the Great Depression, and even more so since the recent war, are the currency restrictions, the quota systems, and the resulting bilateralism introduced as a means of covering up internal inflationary policies.

Integration can obviously be achieved only by changing the conditions which have led to disintegration. New super organizations could have success only if they could suppress the differences in monetary, wage, fiscal, and general economic policy in the various countries.

Within the boundaries of a single country, say the United States, the problem of integration never arises. This is not because there are no import duties to be paid within the country; the huge distances are probably much stronger impediments to American industries moving to the places of lowest cost than the inter-European tariffs. What really guarantees "integration" in the United States is the common monetary policy within the country. It is this that prevents "dollar gaps" or "exchange deficits." For the common monetary policy guarantees a more or less uniform price level. The cost level within the country can be different for various products. But this, because of the uniformity of the price level, results simply in the closing down of the higher-cost plants, since there are no Marshall aid or other devices to close "internal" dollar gaps.

Supranationalism and Disintegrating Forces

International super organizations are neither necessary nor useful in overcoming disintegrating internal conditions. They are not necessary because every country can correct these conditions autonomously; and they are not useful because if the internal conditions are not corrected, the consequences—foreign exchange gaps and high-cost production—are immediately evident in spite of all super international organizations. The Bretton Woods Fund in the monetary field and the Benelux Union in the field of international trade show this.

These organizations are popular, nevertheless, because they seem to achieve integration without correcting disintegrating conditions in the various countries. Belief in such possibilities is naive, and characteristic of lay thinking. But gadgets do not work in this field.

Before the Keynesian inflationary full-employment policy was consciously or unconsciously adopted in various countries, the cry for integration was not heard for the simple reason that the gold standard guaranteed, at least to a certain extent, a common monetary policy and prevented disintegration. It is logical to conclude that, as long as the various countries do not renounce their sovereign right to impose such a monetary full-employment policy, super organizations without sovereign rights can not change the situation. Who seriously believes, in fact, that the countries in Europe intend to give up their independent and widely divergent economic policies?

All that has been said about economic integration is even truer of political integration. If this term has any significance at all, it would mean that an identical concept, especially in regard to foreign policy, would prevail in each of the various countries. It is, however, quite utopian to expect that the various European countries could have such a common foreign policy. How, for instance, can France and Germany have the same aims concerning Russia, and England and France concerning Germany? No common high authority, not even a common army, will lead to a common foreign policy. Therefore, needless discussions leading nowhere will be the feature of every "super parliament"; and the "united" army will disintegrate when the important differences in the foreign policies of the various countries manifest themselves. Military alliances, highly desirable at times, remain in force only so long as the political constellation that has induced the member nations to enter into them holds together.

Integration of National Feeling

The economic and political integration of western Europe will and can be achieved only by integration of the particular national feelings within each country. In other words, it will be the result of a spiritual transformation, at the end of which Frenchmen and Germans, for instance, will no longer believe that they belong to different interest or power groups. A Frenchman must feel that what is beneficial to the German part of Europe is also beneficial to him, even if the French part is damaged. Such a common national feeling must be established before attempting economic integration. On this question of economic integration, also, a minimum condition would be some agreement as to the exact degree of socialism or capitalism that should prevail. Belgium, for instance, would have to tend as much toward socialism as England—a condition which hardly will be fulfilled in the foreseeable future.

Proponents of the super organizations often claim that the coming together of the statesmen of the various nations, as such, would foster development of a common national feeling. In reality, the contrary is the case. As becomes quite clear from the activities of the United Nations, the endless discussions that have as their aim the propaganda for one view or another, have destroyed rather than built up supranational feelings. The disappointments that the United Nations has brought about for many have seriously damaged the reputation, not only of the United Nations itself, but of all organizations proposing to combat nationalism.

It is sometimes said that in the case of the German Customs Union, the economic integration preceded and even created the unity of national feeling that led to the foundation of the German Reich in 1871. The example of the German Customs Union does not, however, contradict my thesis but confirms it. The Customs Union could be successful because a common national feeling had already been developed for decades or even centuries within the German states.

The cry for international integration comes loudest from those who have fostered the disintegration through so-called planning on the national level. Obviously they hope that the supranational organizations will guarantee integration without removal of the internal disintegrating monetary, fiscal, and other economic policies. They do not see that there is no short cut to integration. Integration begins at home. High authorities can never be the cause, but only the result, of common internal policy. The natural way of international integration is free trade and a common monetary standard that practically guarantees common internal economic policies.

Poe, Political Seer

Totalitarianism, and specifically the Communist variety, has made grimly prophetic a short story by Edgar Allen Poe entitled "Dr. Tarr and Prof. Fether." I once saw a bloody version of it in the horror theater of Paris, called the Grand Guignol. When I had to turn my head from seeing a man's eyes being realistically gouged out on the stage, I did not dream that twenty years later I would read in the press a matter-of-fact account of how the eyes had been gouged out of a prisoner of war in a United Nations camp in Korea, where the control mechanism had been shifted in as bizarre a manner as in Poe's story.

In the play, we saw an earnest group of highly intellectual gentlemen and smartly progressive ladies seated around a dinner table. They were the staff members of an insane asylum, and were enthusiastically relating their advanced ideas to a guest. Only gradually did we become restless over certain strange exaggerations in their mannerisms and speech, until finally we could not avoid under-

standing that they were not the wardens, but the patients who now dominated the asylum.

How long it took some people in the audience to catch on might be quite enlightening these days. Some undoubtedly did not get the point until they actually saw the fiendish course of treatment being meted out to the captive keepers.

In the dialogue, Poe, with a keen insight into what today we should call propaganda pressures, has the insane host refer casually to "Professor Tarr, of whom you have, necessarily, heard. . . and the celebrated Fether, with whom, if I mistake not, you have the honor of an intimate acquaintance." The visitor, in embarrassment, admits, "You have really—I must confess it—you have really made me ashamed of myself." He never heard of either of them! The host then presses the guest's hand, and tactfully offers him a glass of sauterne.

How often have I seen such scenes between Communists and normal people in real life!

In the story, Poe, displaying a prophetic feeling for modern psychiatric processes, has one of the madmen in power explain the horrible situation then existing, as if he were referring to evils of which not they, but their victims, were guilty.

"Fact—it all came to pass by means of a stupid fellow, a lunatic, who, by some means had taken it into his head that he had invented a better system of government than any heard of before—of lunatic government, I mean. He wished to give his invention a trial, I suppose, and so he persuaded the rest of the patients to join him in a conspiracy for the overthrow of the reigning powers."

The keepers are prevented from attempting a "counter-revolution"—Poe actually uses this word—by another modern expedient, the iron curtain. Residents of the neighborhood and visitors are kept out. As Poe describes it, the "cunning" head of the new regime "permitted no visitors at all, with the exception, one day, of a very stupid-looking young gentlemen of whom he had no reason to be afraid. He let him in to see the place—just by way of variety—to have a little fun with him. As soon as he had gammoned him sufficiently, he let him out, and sent him about his business."

Poe had no crystal glass, so he could not have known that he was foreseeing such present-day characters as the Dean of Canterbury with his naive visits to Soviet Russia and Red China.

The "particular species of treatment which the leader of the rebels put into operation," what today is called indoctrination and brainwashing, found its climax in the most refined and atrocious violences. "It was a very capital system indeed—simple, neat, no trouble at all. In fact it was delicious," explains the commissar in Poe's story.

Poe could not have suspected that the next century would present a political demonstration of his horror tale, acted out in real life, with entire populations involved. In his tale the sane break loose finally and regain their sovereignty as a matter of course, but "the lunatics had a jolly season of it—that you may swear."

EDWARD HUNTER

Changing the Labor Law

By LEO WOLMAN

Some inadequacies of the Taft-Hartley Act and suggestions for an effective federal policy.

High on the agenda of the new administration are plans for amending the country's basic labor law, the Taft-Hartley Act. This latest effort to revise a statute which was adopted in 1947 over the President's veto, is considered to be on a different footing from earlier attempts to rewrite the law. The proposed revision is believed to have the support of organized labor, or at least a large segment of the men who speak for labor unions. The demand for repeal, so vehemently urged during the campaign by both the CIO and the AFL, as well as by the Democratic Party, is deemed to have been withdrawn, at least temporarily. The quest, as it is now represented, is for fair, equitable, and just amendments. If these are found, everybody ought to be happy, and the country ought to enter a new period of labor peace and harmony.

Whether the intentions and hopes of those charged with changing the law will be fulfilled is a serious question. It all depends on what the amendments are for, what purpose they are designed to serve. In much of the discussion of the Taft-Hartley Act, too little has been said of the objectives of this type of statute. For a law defining the rights of individuals and the standards of labor relations is above all a statement of public policy. Unless and until the objectives of such policy are clearly stated and agreed upon, it will be futile to try to patch up the law here and there in order to make concessions to aggrieved interests. The outcome of such a procedure might well be more, not less, trouble in industry, and the granting of still further power to private organizations whose power is already excessive.

Failure of Taft-Hartley Act

The Taft-Hartley Act was such a restatement of public policy, based on the experience of twelve years with the Wagner Act. What the new law set out to do was: (a) redefine and curb the authority of the National Labor Relations Board; (b) protect the rights of the individual employee against the acts of unions as well as of employers; and (c) deal with the effects on the public interest of the rise of national combinations of organized labor.

It stands to reason that not all of the provisions of Taft-Hartley proved in practice to be equally effective. Of the many terms of this law only a few have substantially altered the practices which it undertook to regulate. The clauses dealing with the rights of foremen's unions have effectively denied this type of labor organization the benefits of the law. Clarification of the employer's right of free speech has influenced, as it was intended to do,

the attitudes of many employees toward joining unions. Finally, the prohibition of the secondary boycott has limited organized labor's use of this particular form of force and coercion.

For the rest it is hard to see that much has been accomplished in securing the rights and liberties of individuals and in reducing and curbing the power of the great aggregations that have grown up in the labor movement since 1935. If anything, the individual employee is more helpless today than he was in 1947. For a variety of reasons, compulsory membership, in the form of either the union shop or the closed shop, is receiving increasing government sanction. In either the large or small strikes called and managed by labor unions, only rarely is an employee protected in his right not to strike and to continue working, when that is what he wants to do. National stoppages, ordered by any union's officialdom, successfully and for indefinite periods of time shut down hundreds of plants, regardless of the employees' wishes, if, indeed, their wishes are ever consulted. In large parts of this country today, the right to work is left unprotected by either local or federal authorities against the most extreme forms of violence and intimidation applied by organized groups.

It is not clear, also, that the public interest has been any more effectively protected than has the interest of the individual. It is no use pretending that the emergency strike provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act have kept powerful national unions from doing what they are organized and equipped to do. These unions are certainly as strong, if not stronger, than they were six years ago. When it suits their purpose and is in accord with their policy, the Miners, or the Steel Workers, or the railway unions will continue to cut off the supply of goods or services which they control, regardless of the law.

All of this is no reflection on the terms, in this respect, of the Taft-Hartley, or for that matter of the Railway Labor Act. The point is that neither of these statutes, or any conceivable new draft, goes to the root of the difficulty. The cause of the emergency strike which imperils the national health and safety is the existence of a succession of unions strong enough to call such strikes. The record is clear that these organizations derived their powers, and continue to derive them, from the laws and interpretations of laws under which they operate. They are, in other words, a product of our public policy, past and present.

It is one of the striking anomalies of our labor policy that, while Congress and the President cudgel their brains for the means of dealing with the

excessive power of organized labor, they continually by other means add to that power. This is what Congress did when after a quarter of a century, during which the union shop was prohibited on the railroads, it amended the Railway Labor Act by legalizing the union shop. This gratuity granted to the railway unions certainly violated every sound principle of public policy and left the government worse prepared to handle emergency strikes on the railroads than it had ever been.

Congress has not been the only culprit in this process of augmenting the power and authority of labor unions. The executive branch of the government and its agencies have been equally culpable. It was an agent of President Roosevelt, appointed by him to arbitrate the issue, who conceded the closed shop in the captive mines to John Lewis and the United Mine Workers, after the President himself in most forcible terms held it to be against the policy of this country for a public official to sanction the closed shop. It was the War Labor Board of World War Two which, without statutory authority and contrary to all previous policy of such public boards, devised the scheme of "maintenance of membership" (a species of payment to unions for agreeing not to strike plants engaged in war production), a first and inevitable step toward universal compulsory membership. And it was the Wage Stabilization Board in last year's steel dispute which "recommended" the adoption of the union shop by the steel industry, as if the evidence was not overwhelming that the United Steel Workers was already a good deal stronger than it had any right in the public interest to be.

Amendments and Public Interest

If there is any force in these observations it ought to be clear what kind of amendments will and what kind will not serve the public interest and deal correctly with those problems of labor which have become increasingly the source of national concern. A new administration, eager to advance the public welfare, would surely be ill-advised to whittle away the few and mild inhibitions imposed on private power which the law in its present form contains. It would be no less mistaken if the changes it was prepared to endorse were calculated to induce recklessness and excesses of conduct. Few students of the Wagner Act are aware of the extent to which the provisions of that law and the decisions interpreting them increased the likelihood and frequency of strikes. Here, in fact, was an Act of Congress, aimed to produce industrial peace, which by its very terms and principles of administration so reduced the risk of striking as to promote industrial strife. It is no accident that the years since 1935 have been full of labor trouble in spite of the fact that labor unions have received from the law and its administrators unprecedented protection and support.

In handling the law of labor relations, the administration will be forced to deal with one of the

most baffling problems of modern government. In this, as in many other areas of government activity today, the behavior of administrative boards presents greater difficulties than do the laws from which they derive their authority. By this time it is pretty generally conceded that the troubles engendered by the Wagner Act were more the result of mismanagement than of the language of the law. Although much was done in the Taft-Hartley Act to improve this condition, it is safe to say that the temptation of administrative agencies to exceed and abuse their authority is so strong that no improvement brought about by changes in the law can be counted on to be permanent. Before long the boards and their agents fall into old habits, and nothing short of a complete overhauling of the theory, practice, and personnel of such pervasive and influential arms of the government will prevent the continuance of the damage they do.

Caution in removing the prohibitions of the existing law, which now act as a brake on the use and growth of private power, and reform of administrative law will not suffice to relieve the administration of the burdens to which it has fallen heir. Sooner or later it will be necessary to begin to reduce the power of organized labor which twenty years of public policy brought to its present point. For this purpose there is no legal magic or panacea. The problem, if it is to be met at all, must be met directly. The first step in doing so is to outlaw compulsory membership in unions. An American government or its agencies does not possess the right to join with unions in requiring American citizens to become members of unions as a condition of getting and holding a job. Labor unions are private organizations. No one has the authority to endow them with the powers of government. Unions, if they are to survive and prosper, should do so on their merits, through the services they perform and through their capacity to persuade men and women that it is in their genuine interest to become affiliated with them. They should not be given special privileges which empower them to use force, violence, and compulsion for the achievement of their ends.

The second direct remedy is to bring unions back under the anti-trust laws. Like business monopolies, labor unions as they exist in the United States today are great combinations of economic power. If anything they have at their disposal more potent means of coercion, restraint of trade, and control than are possessed by the common run of business combinations. It is no excuse for this condition to say that the aims of organized labor are worthy and in the public interest. Business monopoly, too, seeks to promote economic stability and prevent cut-throat, or "unfair," competition. But these arguments, luckily, have failed to persuade the American public, which has persisted in adhering to the traditional policy of dissolving aggregations of private power. It is surely time that the authorities in Washington contemplated applying this old remedy to our combinations of labor power.

The Left Never Learns

By Lord Vansittart

LONDON

In view of widespread unrest at the end of the First World War, it seemed well that Lloyd George, a man of the Left, should be in power. I attended practically all the postwar conferences with him, and liked him, but international affairs were not his forte, and he was too expensive.

After the Second World War, with the probability of industrial unrest and inevitable change in the structure of society, there seemed advantage in a Labor Government. As before I liked some of its members personally. No sensible person believed their claptrap about "Left talking to Left" in Russia—of all places—nor were they well qualified to maintain Anglo-American relations. They were lacking in men, but the interlude "might be just as well." And again I was wrong. This time the regime was not only expensive but ruinous. Unless and until Socialists can learn something of substance in the field of foreign affairs, their return to power would be both a national and international disaster. It is, for instance, now clear that their left wing would wreck Anglo-American relations.

Illusions and Acrobatics

The truth is that the Left Never Learns. It clings, for example, to the illusion that, by infinite conciliation, an "arrangement" is attainable with Russia. It might have been hoped that Hitler had at least taught the British people, in compensation for all their sufferings, that no abiding agreement is possible with any totalitarian power. The Left however will not face this fact—indeed we all have something to learn here too. Above all, the Left has refused to recognize that appeasement never pays. We need not here dwell in detail on the lesson everywhere, for example the folly of the premature socialist recognition of the Chinese Communist Government, which rendered negotiation impossible by playing a trump card too soon without taking a trick. That appeasing blunder committed us in advance to pocket every indignity. The Right has not reversed this offense against the most elementary rule of diplomacy.

Let us rather consider socialist acrobatics in the Near and Middle East. There is no need to dwell on their performance in Palestine beyond saying that, if the Russians think they have bought a winner by playing the Arabs against the Jews,

An Englishman states anew, in the light of recent events in the Near and Middle East, why appeasement with Russia never pays, and explodes some continuing illusions of the Left.

they have a nag which will win them no races. We will come straight to the keypoint—Abadan.

Before the danger materialized I warned the government that all they needed to do was to make it clear *beforehand* that it would defend British interests as well as British lives. Many Persians did not really want to ruin a paying business; moreover, they are not fighting men. We should probably not have had to land a man, if we had had the firmness to run a little risk, without which maneuver is impossible. Mr. Morrison half understood this; at the outset he mentioned British property, then—presumably under pressure from fugitive friends—he mentioned it no more. The Middle East saw that he was on the run. From that moment the Persians waxed bold, offensive, impossible. We were thrown out with consequences immeasurable from Morocco to Malaya. The whole East was endangered; the Persian Gulf and Commonwealth communications were laid open to Communist advance, and all from sheer funk.

This revelation taught the runaways nothing. The Egyptians, encouraged by the Persians, began at once to browbeat and kill us ignominiously. That was under Farouk. Now he has been replaced by Naguib, who is less a strong man than a violent one, being reduced to the old necessity of pandering to the mob. Our Foreign Office perseveres patiently, while new windbags threaten us with sudden death. We should have told Naguib long ago that we will not accept his "take it or leave it" postures, that no self-respecting power negotiates under duress. We should have said that we will pay no attention to the antics of The Dancing Major, whom we should never have let into the Sudan at all, if he was going to use the opportunity not for fact-finding but for trickery. We should have said that neither buffoonery nor intrigue will move us from our obligations to the Southern—and otherwise defenseless—Sudanese. We should further have told the Americans that the Egyptians alone are quite incapable of defending the Canal. The Israelis beat them hollow; how then should they hold the Russians? We should have made it accordingly plain that we will never leave the artery of the East to Soviet mercy, while the balance is still weighted against the survival of civilization, and that we will stand on our treaty rights, unless the Egyptians will negotiate an honorable and multilateral Defense Pact instead of insisting that we should get out with no provision at all. We should also have

told the Americans not to press us about the Sudan, of whose problems nothing worth while can be understood by a couple of fleeting officials from the New World.

A Rock-Bottom Minimum

Here was an opening for virile diplomacy. What then was the attitude of the Left? Hardly had the dilemma of Naguib's minatory nationalism been propounded than Messrs. Crossman and Mikardo were trying to teach us flying starts. Running is fine sport, but not toward the rear. They represent a large section of their party. There are reports that Albert Coldfoot has been "exercising" considerable agility in party counsels, and has deserved better than the late Harold Laski an intimation from Mr. Attlee that "a period of silence on your part would be welcome."

It is being said, moreover—perhaps Mr. Ewan Butler can confirm or contradict this—that his associates, Jack Softwood and Harry Hookit, have taken a week-end cottage on the outskirts of Great Umbrage in the hope of being within visiting distance of Great Missenden. It is therefore greatly to be hoped that Mr. Attlee will have a chance of impressing upon them and their constituents that you can not deal with blackmailers by retiring ungracefully before a clammy fist, and that negotiation does not consist in conceding the adversary's whole case before one begins to negotiate. Mr. Attlee's task would be greatly facilitated if the Foreign Office would also make it plain that the era of retreat is over and that we will countenance no more the unilateral denunciation of treaties. Major Salem is reported to have said in the Sudan that Britain is too weak to stand up to Egypt. Whether he used exactly those words or not, in that impression lies the source of many of our troubles and dangers.

We are still a great and beneficent power with a record enviable by all who desire the advancement of Man. We do not want to dwell upon it, but we have not forgotten it, though we had a period of amnesia between 1945 and 1951. In other words, we insist on being treated with ordinary courtesy and respect. Nothing more, but it is a rock-bottom minimum.

This Is What They Said

I repeat, then, that to an American the most striking fact about the attitude of the Soviet leaders to government is that the theories which they espouse . . . are an unending paean in praise of the virtues of popular rule.

WILLIAM MANDEL, in *American Sociological Review*, June 1944

The brain is a piece of apparatus which, unless it is tired or out of order, it is fun to use.

HORNELL HART, Duke University, in *The Science of Social Relations*

But at least through the United Nations we can go on with negotiations and pray for a pure heart and clean hands which may eventually bring us the confidence even of the Soviet Union and lead us to the desired results.

ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, *New York Times*, July 23, 1952

Some Clear, Crisp English

A role, then, is a sector of the total orientation system of an individual actor which is organized about expectations in relation to a particular interaction context, that is integrated with a particular set of value-standards which govern interaction with one or more alters in the appropriate complementary roles.

TALCOTT PARSONS, Harvard University, in *The Social System*, 1952

We must decide whether we are to stand on this silly shibboleth, national sovereignty.

OWEN J. ROBERTS, former U. S. Supreme Court Justice, speaking in Ottawa, Canada, April 30, 1952

Page Mussolini!

In the exercise by Congress of its powers to regulate commerce among the several States and with foreign nations, to establish post-offices and to fulfill the International Treaty obligations imposed by the Charter of the United Nations upon the United States, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to prevent the spread through the channels of interstate and foreign commerce or use of the mails of false and defamatory statements designed to arouse inter-group conflict. . . . The burden of coming forward with evidence upon the issues of truth, honest belief, reasonableness of belief, and lack of intent to create ill-will shall be upon the defendant.

HOUSE RESOLUTION 7717, introduced by Congressman Jacob K. Javits, May 2, 1952

And I purpose to use this position of high responsibility to discuss up and down the country, in all seasons and at all times, the duty of reducing taxes, of increasing the efficiency of government, of cutting out the underbrush around our governmental structure, of getting the most public service for every dollar paid in taxation. That I pledge you; nothing I have said in the campaign transcends in importance this covenant with the taxpayers of the United States.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, Speech at Sioux City, Iowa, Sept. 29, 1932

J. B. MATTHEWS

The Freeman invites contributions to this column, and will pay \$2 for each quotation published. If an item is sent in by more than one person, the one from whom it is first received will be paid. To facilitate verification, the sender should give the title of the periodical or book from which the item is taken, with the exact date if the source is a periodical and the publication year and page number if it is a book. Quotations should be brief. They can not be returned or acknowledged.

THE EDITORS

Balance Sheet of the Cold War

By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

"The existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end comes a series of frightful clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable" . . . Vladimir Ilych Lenin, in his Report to the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party, March, 1919.

"The commies are spreading all over the world and we are there to keep the commies from dominating the entire world." . . . Col. Frank Gabreski, American ace pilot in Korea, in the *Saturday Evening Post*, December 13, 1952.

Forty years ago Communism as a form of government and as an international political force did not exist. The dictatorship of the proletariat, the rule of the revolutionary élite, were still untried ideas in the minds of obscure fanatics.

Now one third of the population of the globe lives under Communist rule. The sequel to the First World War was the establishment of the Soviet Government in Russia. The Second World War was followed by the Communist seizure of power in China and by the open or veiled absorption into the Soviet empire of nine formerly independent European states: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania, together with considerable sections of Germany and Austria.

There are few parallels in history for such rapid expansion. It recalls the sweep of Islam during the decades after the death of the Prophet. Is Communism an irresistible wave of the future? This is the belief of V. M. Molotov, one of Stalin's chief lieutenants. He declared in a speech on the thirtieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, November 7, 1947:

"The feverish efforts of imperialists, under whom the ground is giving way, will not save capitalism from its approaching doom. We are living in an age in which all roads lead to Communism."

This is also the belief of a highly intelligent, passionate, and devoted fighter against Communism, Whittaker Chambers. When he quit the Communist underground he said to his wife:

"I know that I am leaving the winning side for the losing side. But it is better to die on the losing side than to live under Communism."

It would be grave folly, in the light of what has

The present conflict between the free and the Communist worlds may go on for decades, or it may erupt into a last decisive struggle. Mr. Chamberlin surveys and evaluates the strengths and weaknesses on both sides of this conflict.

already happened, to underestimate the strength of this new power that has conquered so large a part of the vast Eurasian continent. The principal elements in this strength may be summarized as follows.

1. With its scientific up-to-date technique of tyranny, its combination of unlimited terror, Communism is an extremely difficult form of rule to shake off. It numbs the mind and paralyzes the will even of those who are instinctively opposed to it. There can be no widespread secret organization of resistance when almost everyone is compelled to spy on almost everyone else.

2. Soviet Communism, in its present form, with its free use of primitive capitalist pressures and incentives, is a viable economic system. There is no foundation for the comforting idea that it is predestined to collapse somehow out of sheer incompetence. This system is being more or less closely imitated in all the satellite countries.

3. This economic system is well adapted for war and preparation for war. The individual as a producer is speeded up and exploited to the limit, and there is no need to take account of the tastes and preferences of the individual as a consumer. The Communist economy is a militarist's dream. It makes possible a tremendous concentration of effort on essential military goals and the swift development of heavy industries that are useful for war purposes.

4. Communism fills a psychological need of some minds. It is a system which claims with absolute authority to direct all the activities of the individual and to furnish all the answers to perplexing social and economic problems. Its appeal to the maladjusted, to the spiritually uprooted, to all those who consciously or unconsciously fear freedom is strong. Here is the explanation of much of its success in recruiting fifth columnists for acts of espionage and treason in other countries.

5. There are advantages as well as disadvantages in the absolute political authority which prevails in the Communist empire. There is no need to waste what may be precious time in preparing public opinion for such spectacular shifts of foreign policy as the conclusion of the Stalin-Hitler Pact, after years of fierce denunciation of Fascism and Nazism.

6. No word of defeatist pessimism is ever publicly uttered behind the Iron Curtain. For obvious

reasons no one in Moscow or Peiping or Prague or Bucharest ever publicly complains that the burden of armament is too heavy to be borne, or that a more conciliatory international policy would be desirable. There is no constitutional court to delay with pedantic legalistic objections the arming of East Germany. The contrast with the division, confusion, and delay prevailing in the councils of the western powers is striking and disconcerting.

7. Now in possession of what the British geologist, Sir Halford Mackinder, once called the Heartland of the World Island—i.e., the enormous spaces of western Asia and eastern Europe—the Communist empire possesses a very strong defense in depth. Large industrialized areas of this empire are quite outside the reach of sea power and may be outside the effective range of air power. It is in the Urals and western Siberia that many of the basic munitions and supply centers for future wars have been and are being built.

Weaknesses of Communism

On the other side of the picture four main off-setting weaknesses in the Communist empire stand out sharply:

1. Communism is passionately hated by many of its subjects. Free movement of people is always away from Communist areas. Of course, there are no free elections or Gallup polls in the Soviet Union, in China, or in the East European "people's democracies." But there have been impressive formal plebiscites in many parts of the world, and all have gone overwhelmingly against Communism.

One such plebiscite was in the Finnish territory annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940. Some 400,000 inhabitants had the choice of leaving their homes and moving into Finland or of staying as Soviet citizens. All but a negligible handful decided to move to Finland.

There were about 800,000 uprooted homeless refugees, DPs, in UNRRA camps in 1946 and probably at least as many more who were hiding out with false identification papers. Every one of these refugees had fled from an "Iron Curtain" country. There has been a tidal wave of migration, often at considerable physical risk and always at the price of losing all immovable property, from Communist East Germany to West Germany. The movement in the other direction, although entirely free, has been a minute trickle.

The same holds true throughout the whole lost domain from Korea to Czechoslovakia. An illustration in reverse is the desperate resistance of almost all alien Communists in the United States to deportation. Instead of welcoming the prospect of a free trip to their Communist fatherlands, they usually employ every trick of "capitalist" legal procedure to stay in this country.

2. Totalitarian political dictatorship means complete personal insecurity even for, and perhaps especially for, members of the ruling caste. (There is no greater fiction than the idea that Communism,

whatever may be its faults, offers "security.") Short indeed is the step from eminence to execution, from "hero of the revolution" to "traitor and mad dog." After what happened to so many veteran Communists in the Soviet Union and in the countries of eastern Europe, the highest officials in the Communist hierarchy must feel uneasy premonitions that the end for them also may be a bullet in the brain after long nights of sleepless torture. This situation opens wide opportunities for adroit psychological warfare, designed to promote defection.

3. Communism demands the immunization of peoples under its control from contact with the outside world. The Iron Curtain is no empty phrase. It is an almost literal description of imposed isolation from all foreign influence. But such self-isolation imposes handicaps. The most progressive economies have always maintained the freest policy in their relations with other countries. This was recognized twenty-four hundred years ago, when Pericles, in his imperishable memorial address, boasted of Athens:

"We throw open our city to the world and never exclude foreigners from any opportunity of learning or observing, although the eyes of an enemy may occasionally profit by our liberality."

4. There is no means by which Communism can assure a peaceful transition of the enormous power now vested in the hands of Stalin. There is no means of conducting a free election, even within the ranks of the Communist Party. There is no principle of legitimacy. Stalin himself felt secure in power only after he had finally killed all those who had been members of the seven-man Politburo at the time of Lenin's death: Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov, Bukharin, and Tomsky. This lesson is not likely to be lost on the men who are in line for the next succession.

Situation in America

That is a rough balance sheet of the Communist world which has been organized and dominated from Moscow. What is the situation in the non-Communist world, of which America, without conscious will, desire, or design has become the leader by virtue of superior military power and economic wealth?

America's greatest strength is not in its atomic weapons, or its mighty industrial plants or busy laboratories, or the wealth of its farms and mines. It is in those qualities of individual freedom, opportunity, and self-reliance that are more characteristic of Americans than of any other people in the world.

Another priceless American asset is a deep underlying national unity that has nothing to do with forced uniformity. Americans are not split uncompromisingly along lines of class and ideology. For thirty-five years the Kremlin has been using every subversive means in its power to weaken and divide America. With one exception, the recruiting

of individuals for fifth column purposes, the effort has failed. This is an important exception and one that calls for legal and psychological defense. But there is happily no parallel in America to the situation in France and Italy, where large compact minorities of the people are openly on the side of the enemy.

However, the United States, like the Soviet Union, has its weaknesses.

1. The cost of freedom is high, especially in a period of high international tension. It permits apathy. It tolerates defeatist and distracting talk, ranging from open support of the enemy's position to fantastic schemes for escaping the realities of the cold war in a cloud-cuckoo land of world government and gigantic give-away projects by the United States for the benefit of "underprivileged" nations. An unduly pessimistic picture is sometimes created because every defeatist voice in America and Western Europe can shout itself hoarse without let or hindrance, while only victory moods find expression behind the Iron Curtain.

It would, of course, be entirely undesirable and a subtle form of defeat if the United States and other free nations should imitate the Communist method of intensive indoctrination and merciless repression of critical thought. Nothing of this kind would be possible without repealing the guarantees of the American Constitution.

But free peoples have moral responsibilities. The American citizen owes it to himself to become familiar with the Communist design of world conquest, with Communist methods of subversion, with the background and history of the cold war. When he is equipped with this knowledge, he may be relied on to reject the fallacies and quack remedies of the appeasers and defeatists. Until this responsibility is recognized and fulfilled, American national will and purpose will not be as firm and unyielding as the nature of the Communist threat requires.

2. A still more serious weakness on the non-Communist side is the existence, outside the Iron Curtain, of many rifts and fissions which make the building of an effective anti-Communist coalition, surest guarantee of peace or of victory if the Soviet rulers resort to war, a matter of great delicacy and difficulty. The Franco-German antagonism is grotesquely obsolete in view of the overshadowing threat to both countries of the Soviet empire. Yet this antagonism has seriously delayed the organization of an effective defense of Europe. A glance around the world reveals many other national feuds and schisms, which are cunningly inflamed and exploited by the right hand and the left hand of the Soviet empire, by Soviet diplomacy and by the Communist parties.

3. America's permanently favorable balance of trade and payments with the outside world is to her disadvantage at the moment. Ever since the First World War the outside world has wanted to buy more from America than America was able or willing to buy from the outside world. The situation became especially acute after the Second World

War, when European countries were impoverished by war destruction and by the loss of overseas investments and colonial sources of revenue.

4. American inexperience in foreign affairs, the consequence of the comfortably isolated position which the United States enjoyed before the First World War and even, to some extent, up to the eve of the Second World War, is a handicap in the conduct of the cold war. When we try, as we should try, to stimulate subversion behind the Iron Curtain in response to the continuous Communist effort to promote subversion in non-Communist countries, our effort often gives the impression of amateurs competing with professionals.

Responsibility for the Cold War

Here, then, are the competing balance sheets in this era of intensely polarized struggle, with mastery of the world as the ultimate stake. On both sides there are political assets and liabilities, points of strength and points of weakness. Probably a historian, writing from the observation point of the year 2000 can assess these balance sheets more accurately and see more clearly what determined the issue of the struggle that now hangs uncertainly in the balance.

One thing, however, may already be said with certainty. There was no course of action, consistent with elementary national security, by which America could have avoided the test of strength in which it is involved.

Those critics on both sides of the Atlantic who hold America equally responsible with the Soviet Union for the cold war should face squarely the following questions:

Did the Soviet Union or the United States carry out the most extensive demobilization after the end of the war?

Was it the Soviet Union that blockaded West Berlin or the western powers which blockaded East Berlin?

Was it North Korea, armed and politically controlled from Moscow, that invaded South Korea, or was it the other way around?

If these questions are candidly answered a consistent pattern appears. American actions which are sometimes represented as bellicose—the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, the building up of air bases in Great Britain and in the Mediterranean area, our rearmament program since 1950—have in every case been responses to Soviet challenges and would not have occurred without these challenges.

Our conflict with the Soviet empire—and it is deep and irreconcilable—does not exist because we are intolerant of the Soviet political and economic system. The conflict is implicit in the Communist dogma that there can never be peace until Communism has conquered the entire world, and in the practical consequences of this dogma.

Because of this dogma, which is closely intermeshed with old Russian imperial ambitions and

with the dream of a Russian messianic mission, and is reinforced by a kind of dynamics of fear, the Soviet Government and every regime it has organized on a satellite basis pursue policies which are completely incompatible with normal peaceful and friendly relations. They flood non-Communist countries with spies and subversive agents, treat non-Communist foreigners as enemies and intrigue throughout the world to turn discontent into riot and riot into revolution.

The Soviet regime is constantly impelled to new acts of hostile aggression by a dynamics of fear, not fear of military attack, of which there is no serious prospect with the present world balance of strength, but fear of the still small voice of freedom, of the example of free societies where the standard of living is so much higher than it is in the Soviet Union. In this connection I remember an impressive talk with Tomasz Arciszewski, veteran Polish Socialist and Prime Minister of the Polish government-in-exile which was betrayed and thrown over by Roosevelt and Churchill.

"Remember this above all," he said at the end of a long conversation in London in 1946. "So long as one free country exists anywhere in the world, the Communist rulers will never feel safe. No matter how peaceful that country may wish to be, Moscow propaganda will always represent it as imperialist and try first to divide it from within, finally to destroy it."

Everything that has occurred during these last years helps to confirm the truth of Arciszewski's words. For the men in the Kremlin can never feel safe until there are no more free countries to serve as beacons of hope and sanctuaries of refuge for their discontented subjects.

When one third of the human race has been harnessed to a project of world conquest through a combination of force and revolutionary propaganda, a permanently explosive international situation is created. The cold war may go on for decades. It may erupt into a last decisive struggle for military supremacy within a much shorter time. What is certain is that, in one form or another, it will continue, with aggravations and abatements, twists and zigzags, until the present regime in the Soviet Union is overthrown or transformed beyond recognition, or until the cause of freedom is lost forever.

What We Should Seek

Our political aim in the cold war should not be to convert the whole world, including the Russians and Chinese, to American-style democracy. The attempt to use military occupation as a school of democracy in Germany and Japan was naive and far from successful. What we should seek is to divide our enemies and to disintegrate the formidable Communist empire. Once this is done, the nature of the regimes that might emerge in former sections of this empire would be a matter of secondary concern. The important thing is to see that no power shall again acquire the appalling predomi-

nance, in manpower, territory, and natural resources, which makes the Communist empire such a nightmare from the standpoint of American and West European security.

The test of the cold war is supreme. The stakes could not be higher. The ultimate consequences of Communist victory are clearly foreshadowed in the experience of every country that has fallen under Communist rule. Such a victory would mean a blotting out of every value of our Greco-Roman and Judean-Christian civilization. There would be a dark night of the soul. The world would become spiritually a dead planet, functioning like a mechanical ant-heap. This is not a gentlemanly, old-fashioned war, in which the defeated side loses a bit of territory and pays a moderate indemnity. This is a total struggle between two completely irreconcilable conceptions of human life and destiny.

Even if Communism is decisively defeated, the immediate results of an all-out Third World War would be disappointing and disillusioning. No responsible statesman would deliberately unloose the terrible destructive forces of such a war. Every resource of American and western statecraft should be used to stay within the narrow channel between an open and unlimited shooting war and the still greater disaster of endless retreat and futile appeasement.

But it is unwarranted pessimism to assume that all-out war would mean the destruction of civilization. The experience of recovery after the devastation of the last war, especially in Germany, shows that there is more resilience in the human organism than is sometimes imagined. A world freed from the Communist nightmare of eternal, scientifically organized tyranny over the minds, souls, and bodies of men might rise, with the aid of modern invention and technology, to new heights of cultural and spiritual achievement and material well-being, on the sound basis of individual freedom.

Ever since the Soviet Union began to loom so large on the American foreign policy horizon the question has been put, in hope and in fear: How can we get along with Russia? Many answers have been offered, some sensible, some foolish, some based on intelligent knowledge, others inspired by disingenuous propaganda or dense ignorance. But there is only one realistic answer.

It is possible for us to live in the same world with a swollen power like the Soviet Union only on a basis of equal or superior strength—military, economic, diplomatic, moral. When this lesson has been learned by the governments of that greater part of the world which is still outside the Communist orbit, when the peoples who are still free realize that there is no safety in retreat, no security in cowardice, and no peace in appeasement, then victory will be assured, if only through the inner weaknesses of Communism and the strains and fissions which will be brought to the breaking point by a policy of firm, united opposition.

The winning of this victory may well be long and may also be tragically costly.

The Man Who Made Harding

By HERBERT COREY

Those who remember Harry M. Daugherty think of him as the sinister figure in the administration of President Warren Harding. He had had complete, unquestioned control of an honest, warm-hearted, naive President, at a critical moment in our national history. He had been successful beyond his wildest dreams. As the master of practical politics in the United States at a time when the world had gone mad he would have been able to meet on even terms with the political leaders of the other great countries. There might have been no Presidents Hoover, F. D. Roosevelt, Truman if it had not been for Daugherty. No one now can say. Perhaps no Eisenhower, if Daugherty had played his cards differently. Yet he failed, and he knew he would fail. No one would defend him, but the story should be told. A poet once said that to know all is to forgive all.

It isn't true.

I had been the correspondent at Columbus, Ohio, of the Cincinnati *Enquirer* during Daugherty's rise to power and knew and liked him well. He was my best source of political news. When Harding was elected, I was writing syndicated stories from Washington. The old New York *World* was bitterly opposing Daugherty's confirmation as Attorney General. The Harding-Daugherty combination had complete control of the Senate, but the *World's* campaign seemed to me to be so vicious and untruthful that I wrote Daugherty's story as I saw it and telephoned him:

"I want you to check it for facts."

"Send it over. I'll read it when I have time."

Some days later he telephoned me to come in and see him. He was then living in the Ned McLean house on H Street, across the way from the old Cosmos Club. We shook hands. I remember that we sat in the wide, green-painted window seat. One of McLean's servants brought highballs and cigars. Daugherty handed me the story I had written:

"You can't print that."

I was angry and puzzled. A newspaperman resents any attempt at censorship—even by his editor. I knew it was a friendly story, and, to be frank about it, I thought it was a very good one, and I began an excited protest. Daugherty interrupted me:

"You don't understand. We've been friends. It is conceivable that if the story were printed it might

Harry W. Daugherty, attorney general and friend of Warren G. Harding, foretold and explained in advance the notorious scandals that brought that President's Administration to such a tragic and shameful conclusion.

come back to do you a serious injury. I wouldn't want that to happen."

I just goggled at him. Washington was filled with triumphant Republicans. The world and its fatness was at their feet. No one could believe that dark days might come. Daugherty said:

"I see I'll have to tell you. You don't understand. I hope to leave this office as the greatest attorney general the country has ever had. I have the ability, I know the law, and I know what's going on and who is doing it. But I must face the facts. It is possible that I will leave office with every man's hand against me. I may be the most thoroughly discredited, shamed, damned, and tarred man ever to be thrown out of public office. If that were to be the case and you published this story about me—you might be irreparably injured."

"I can't understand you. I don't believe it."

"Listen," said Daugherty. I remember he ran his hand over his face and leaned back in Ned McLean's high-backed, overstuffed chair. He was a very tired man. The chairs were covered in a loose, figured green silk that harmonized with the color of the walls. There was a constant clatter of feet on the pavement outside the window. Some of them no doubt of men seeking office. Or just jobs. "I'll do the best I can."

He said he had had no money when he began to practice law in Ohio. Hardly more than board money, and that had been borrowed. The quick way for a young lawyer to establish himself was to get into politics. But the party bosses had nothing for him. It isn't good for an ambitious young man to be turned away from the boss's door. It low-rates him.

"So I started a minority faction. I could always make trouble and in that way gain recognition. I could always make friends. Many of them had grievances. Politics is a rough game. I have known men who were in it for unselfish motives, but I have never known anyone who refused to take a profit—money, power, influence, social advantage—when he could get it. I had nothing of this to offer. Nothing. My men stayed with me for friendship. Now and then we might pick up some small city or county office but not often. We had no money, for we were not strong enough to get the contracts. I tell you, Corey, that time after time I have had to take the silver change out of the pockets of my

friends so we could buy stamps to put on the campaign letters. We were always broke."

He promised freely, of course. "When and if." His friends knew he would keep his promises when and if he could. They stayed with him loyally through the lean years. When the tide turned and the Daugherty faction began to develop power, they were patient. Men who had earned offices or jobs or contracts let him give these good things to outsiders if the faction's strength could be increased. As his position in Ohio was bettered, he began to make political friends in other states. When the time came to call in these friends to nominate Harding for the Presidency:

"I promised, of course. Everything. Now I've got to make good."

He said he would try to hold them down, but he knew he could not. They were running wild. Harding knew little of what was going on and was enjoying himself. "It's a big thing to be President of the United States. He is still surprised." "Harding knows," said Daugherty, "that he would still be a country editor in Marion if I had not picked him up. He has said so often enough. He has never interfered with my management of politics, and he will not now. He is completely loyal. I do not know whether I can protect him. I'll try. But I'll need a miracle. I can't stop."

After the roof had fallen in on him and Harding had died broken-hearted, Daugherty sent for me to come to his quarters at the Wardman Park Hotel in Washington. He had received a generous offer for the story of his life, he said, and he wanted me to write it. He would pay me well. I was enthusiastic, as any reporter would be.

"It's a wonderful chance, Harry. You can tell the story of the last few years, and it should be one of the great books of the generation, and a textbook of politics for the coming years. You remember how you told me you built up your machine and nominated and elected Harding and then found you were compelled to make good on the promises you had given—and how you feared what might happen. No one knows the story as you do. There are chapters that have never even been hinted at. Your story should be an unforgettable part of world history."

"No," said Daugherty. "I'll not rat on my friends."

Years later he telephoned me in New York and invited me to dine with him in his hotel suite. He was in a midtown hotel—the Barclay, perhaps. I am not sure. He was a broken old man. His mind seemed not to be entirely clear at times and his hands shook. I remember that he said he owed his fine health to the fact that he had never taken a drink after dinner, and that was definitely a lapse of memory. I alluded to the time he made me tear up the friendly story I had written, and he asked me to tell it over again. When I had concluded he said:

"Funny. I had completely forgotten that incident. But I was right."

Worth Hearing Again

Price-Fixing, A.D. 362

The inclemency of the season [A.D. 362] had affected the harvests of Syria, and the price of bread in the markets of Antioch had naturally risen in proportion to the scarcity of corn. . . . [Therefore] the emperor [Julian, the Apostate] ventured on a very dangerous and doubtful step—of fixing, by legal authority, the value of corn. He enacted that, in a time of scarcity, it should be sold at a price which had seldom been known in the most plentiful years. . . . The consequences might have been foreseen, and were soon felt. . . . The proprietors of land or of corn withheld from the city the accustomed supply; and the small quantities that appeared in the market were secretly sold at an advanced and illegal price. Julian still continued to applaud his own policy.

EDWARD GIBBON, *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Vol. II, 1781

An Eighteenth Century Warning

In this scheme of energetic government, the people will find two sets of tax-gatherers—the state and the federal. . . . This, it seems to me, will produce such dreadful oppression, as the people can not possibly bear. The federal [sheriff] may commit what oppression, make what distresses he pleases, and ruin you with impunity. For how are you to tie his hands?

PATRICK HENRY, *Life, Correspondence and Speeches*, Vol. III, by William Wirt Henry

General Confession

The liberal age in which I was born and the liberal circles in which I was educated flowed contentedly towards intellectual dissolution and anarchy. No atmosphere could have been more unfavorable to that solidity and singleness of conviction to which by nature I was addressed. I suffered from a slack education, conflicting traditions, deadening social pressure, academic lumber, and partisan heat about false problems. The pure philosophy to which, in spirit, I was wedded from the beginning, the orthodox human philosophy in which I ought to have been brought up, has never had time to break through and show all its native force, pathos, and simplicity. I ought to have begun where I have ended.

GEORGE SANTAYANA

The *Freeman* welcomes contributions to this column, and will pay \$2 for each quotation published. The sender should give the source of the item, and whenever possible the exact date. These quotations can not be returned or acknowledged.



Arts and Entertainments



The Fog of Mediocrity

Two dismal theater seasons in a row are enough to make any playgoer view the future of the American stage with alarm. Theatrical managers are not only making a desperate attempt to protect their investments, but it seems that both the long-suffering public and a majority of our drama critics agree that a mediocre theater is better than no theater at all. All factions are eager to please and be pleased, and a general softening has set in down the line.

Evidence that some of New York's distinguished critics have been guilty of backsliding lately may be traced to their glowing endorsements of three attractions currently on the boards — Peter Ustinov's "The Love of Four Colonels" (Shubert Theater), Arthur Miller's "The Crucible" (Martin Beck Theater), and "Mid-Summer" by Viña Delmar (Vanderbilt Theater). All three are popular through default. I am certain that at least two of these productions would never survive a normally active season. Miller's drama rests heavily on its sensationalism, so I suppose curiosity would keep it going despite tougher competition.

When it comes to Peter Ustinov's frivolous bid at playwrighting, we have Rex Harrison and Lilli Palmer to blame for the entire proceedings. For if they had not been so sure that they could do no harm, Mr. Ustinov's inept piece would never have found lodgings in Shubert's Alley. All the Harrisons did was give it their smooth kiss of assurance, and fanfare did the rest. Actors less known or less adored would undoubtedly have been booed right off the stage for showing such poor judgment as to appear in this makeshift pretense of a play.

It is my guess that Peter Ustinov may have been a holy terror in the classroom. Precocity is his long suit. But it does not make a first-class playwright. He is elusive, capricious, even well read. He never lights in any one spot long enough to pin him down to a substantial thought. His undergraduate sense of humor is the main drawback to an imagination that gambols all over the place. He obviously derives more fun out of the whole business than the players or the audience.

Ustinov has taken the Sleeping Beauty fable, international politics and national vanities, with sex as the teaser, to concoct his opera bouffe. For his fairy tale is actually a framework inside of which four allied army colonels on duty in postwar Germany are given an opportunity to make fools of themselves by taking part in amateur theatricals. Needless to say, each colonel is given a chance to woo the Sleeping Beauty, and fails. Even the inter-

vention of a good and a bad angel, who also have a passion for theatricals, can not prevent our uninformed Lotharios from looking ridiculous as they play opposite the Beauty. For each has a skit to himself, during which Lilli Palmer (Beauty) changes wigs and accents to meet the requirements of Ustinov's broad lampoons on French period comedy, Elizabethan and Chekhovian drama, and Hollywood melodrama. Mr. Harrison manages to direct all these cavortings while cutting capers with an agile cast. Why? Had Harrison heard, too, that Ustinov was literally a whiz with plays? One of Ustinov's plays, a three-acter, which I saw in London during the war, was reported to have been written in twenty-four hours. If speed is commensurable with quality, then no doubt Ustinov whisked off "The Love of Four Colonels" between breakfast and high tea.

Arthur Miller might have called his play "The Blowtorch" instead of "The Crucible," for it is a noisy, untidy dramatic work that blasts the nerves. The setting is Salem, Massachusetts, 1692, during the famous witchcraft trials which tore that pious community apart. According to the records, a group of hysterical Salem lasses were the instigators of this notorious purge. And Miller has built his entire drama around the frenzied testimony of these silly, emotionally repressed Puritan maids.

The curtain rises on a shrill note which never lets up throughout the performance, so that the more quiet moments in this play between the central figures, John and Elizabeth Proctor, fall terribly flat. Also Mr. Miller's feeling for the dialect of the period does not help the mood in these tranquil scenes. He has some notion that husbands and wives in Puritan Salem never had very much to say to each other. When they do address each other in his play, it is mainly a monosyllabic exchange of "aye" or "How is our child?", to which Beatrice Straight, portraying the role of obedient wife to Arthur Kennedy's John Proctor, answers with a blank expression "He grows." It is this pseudo-biblical dialogue mixed with the stagey rhetoric of some of the more exciting scenes, which makes one question whether Miller is not a little out of his depth writing on seventeenth-century Salem.

It was a rainy Saturday afternoon. I could have gone to a Grade B Hollywood movie, but I especially wished to see Geraldine Page in her first role on Broadway. Her compelling performance in Tennessee Williams' "Summer and Smoke" had impressed me quite favorably when I saw it in Greenwich Village last year. Here was a young actress, I felt, who, if given a less neurotic role than

the frustrated heroine in Williams' play, might very possibly develop into a star in no time at all. But the curtain had not been up ten minutes on "Mid-Summer" when I began to wonder if a movie would not have been a wiser choice. Viña Delmar, of *Bad Girl* fame, could have sold this script to her Hollywood cronies without a hitch.

"Mid-Summer" is about as stereotyped and palatable as all those other sentimental sagas of Grandma and her tights and Grandpa's black-faced minstrel days. The year is 1907. The locale is a Fourteenth Street hotel in New York City. The hotel bedroom, in which the entire action takes place, with its unmade bed and curtainless windows, is several shades more squalid than it would be presented on the screen. And Mark Stevens, film actor, is a bit too genteel a hero for these surroundings. Nonetheless, Viña Delmar's palled little domestic comedy limps along, depending mainly on puns, stale gags, and on the hand-to-mouth struggle for existence in one room of Val and Lily Barton and their hungry but brainy little daughter, Carlo, for most of its laughs and tears. It is Lily, played by Geraldine Page as though she had St. Vitus' dance, who somehow does not fit into the scheme from the start. Lily is supposed to be a scatterbrain who has never got around to learning how to read or write. Naturally, as a result of this, she feels inferior both to her husband, who is a school-teacher, and to her ten-year-old daughter, who can recite Matthew Arnold's essays and Robert Ingersoll. Lily dreams about "a little white house in the country," but Val and Carlo don't give two hoots for any little white house. The father would rather test his luck in vaudeville, while the child has her heart set on catching the brass ring on the merry-go-round at the seashore. Here is conflict for drama. But trust Mrs. Delmar to put things right and make her audience squirm for the last ten minutes of her soap opera.

Miss Page's fans are apparently so numerous that her stardom is assured. I must say I can not go along with them. To do so would mean overlooking her tiresome mannerisms and the fact that she is most limited in her histrionic range. Alongside of a finished supporting player like Vicki Cummings, who plays a shady but generous friend of the family, Miss Page seems awkward, inexperienced. It would, indeed, be a shame for her to lose the opportunity of developing her fresh talent by being continually cast in these bedraggled female roles. For it takes an actress like Lillian Gish to invest drabness with any inner glow.

It looks as though the miasmic fog of mediocrity that has settled over Broadway's theatrical district is not going to lift for months to come. All the hot-air merchants and highly paid drum-beaters working day and night can not drown out the truth—these are the blackest days the legitimate stage has known since 1931. And as long as we encourage plays of the caliber of the trio discussed here, we shall have to content ourselves with another anemic season in the theater.

RICHARD MC LAUGHLIN

Profit on Canadian Dimes

The New York subway's account books show a recent profit of \$90.00. The subway made this money by selling Canadian dimes that people had dropped into its turnstiles. Because Canadian money is now worth more than United States money, the New York Board of Transportation gained in this international monetary transaction.

A year earlier, it had to sell its collection of Canadian coins at a loss. Although we do not begrudge the revenue-hungry City of New York its additional income, we frankly liked it better the old way. In the good old days of 1951, the U. S. dollar still had enough muscle to outwrestle its Canadian cousin.

Back in late 1950, the Canadian dollar could be bought for around ninety U. S. cents. That was the fixed rate of exchange; that's how Canada's currency had been officially "pegged." Then the Canadians let their dollar out of its gilded cage, to soar as high as it might—or dive as low as the storms of global finance might push it.

The *Christian Science Monitor*, in an ironical mood, commented on this event as follows: "Now anybody of nodding acquaintance with the theories of modern money managers knows that currencies must be controlled or else things will go to pot. Britain, for instance, has been operating in this theory for more than a decade; if you point out that the British pound has already gone to pot, the theorists will tell you that without controls it would have gone pottier."

Anyway, the Canadians cut their dollar loose—and it immediately went up five per cent in world value. Later, they opened their fiscal border in both directions: Canadians were free to bring in, or take out, dollars as they saw fit.

All this, to the "new" monetary theorists, was sheer heresy. According to their notions, you've got to fatten up a currency behind closed doors before you can send it unguarded into the world. But the Canadians did the opposite; they let their dollar fend for itself. And it did fine.

Meanwhile, the Canadians cut down on government control of imports and exports. They did another unorthodox thing: they balanced their budget. This weird thing happened because the government spent less than it earned in tax money. Also, instead of coming to Washington for some of that foreign aid, Canadians made investments by U. S. citizens as attractive as possible. They let Americans take back to the United States the profits their money earned in Canada.

The whole performance was enough to make graduates of the London School of Economics sick with embarrassment. Our own government financiers have in the past viewed the Canadian dollar as an oddity, not unlike the duck-billed platypus. Who in the world, they have asked, wants to be a duck-billed platypus?

MARTIN EBON

BOOKS IN REVIEW

Koestler's Twisted Arrow

By MAX EASTMAN

I've rarely opened a book with a livelier curiosity than I felt for Arthur Koestler's autobiography. It was not because I don't know him, but because I do. I met him first at a cocktail party given by *Partisan Review* the day before his "epoch-making" speech in Carnegie Hall in 1948. It was to be epoch-making because it was the first time we anti- and ex-Communists, lonely with the truth about Soviet Russia and of how Stalin was playing the western statesmen for suckers, had been able to fill a big hall. Koestler, with his great book, *Darkness at Noon*, had blazed forth our private knowledge into the public domain. He had aroused and educated the world as no novel had perhaps since Upton Sinclair published *The Jungle*. And now the famous author—our author—was coming to the United States. He was coming to Carnegie Hall. We filled the vast hall to the roof, and were prepared to lift the roof off cheering for Arthur Koestler—cheering for the truth about Soviet Russia.

At the cocktail party Koestler consulted me about speaking conditions in the hall. "It's an immense place," I said, "but with the microphone you won't have any difficulty. In the old days it took a Bull of Bashan to make himself heard."

"No microphones for me," he said with an emphatic gesture. "I have no use for them."

The tone was so self-assured that I gazed at him in wonder. Great heavens, is he an orator too? Has he addressed mobs in Albert Hall and the Cirque d'Hiver? Can he do it in French, German, Hungarian as well as English, do you suppose? I went up to Carnegie Hall the next day in the mood of an Athenian democrat going to hear Demosthenes denounce the Macedonian tyrant.

Well, I never saw or imagined such a flop. There was, for some reason, a flat table instead of a lectern on the platform. And Arthur, after being introduced by a real bull of Bashan (who used a microphone, nevertheless) and greeted with peals of thunder, moved the microphone out of his way, sat down on the left edge of that table, and began chatting with the audience in a casual manner and swinging his leg. It was a picture of a man who had got up from his chair at a restaurant table, and lingered a moment to make a few remarks to his table companions before leaving. Only the cigarette was lacking. But, alas, it was only a picture to the audience. Not a word was to be heard beyond

the third row. And what might have been heard was drowned by impatient shouts of "louder!" from all over the hall. In the hullabaloo Arthur became incapable of speaking louder, if indeed he knew how. The chairman finally pushed the microphone back in front of him and he pushed it away—not completely—and talked half in and half out of it against those continued shouts of "louder!" At last, in complete frustration, he went back to his chair, gathered up some sheets of paper, and read aloud, still half into the microphone and still swinging his legs, an astute and very charming essay (afterwards published in the *New Leader*) on the fallacies of the fellow travelers. By that time the audience was beaten down beyond the hope of resounding applause.

When it was over and I met Kaestler in the wings, he was dripping with sweat—not from effort, from mortification.

"Eastman, it was a disaster!" he groaned, and I'm afraid I lied myself blue in the face I was so sorry for him. I doubt if, even so, he realized what a disaster it was, a defeat in our struggle for public opinion that could only be compared to Gettysburg.

I've always wondered since, and never quite reached the point of asking him, why, being so wise a man, he could have behaved so foolishly. I find the answer—indeed I find many answers—in this book, *Arrow in the Blue* (Macmillan, \$5.00). Chiefly I find it in a little forty-line essay on Timidity which is a veritable gem of psychological literature. To all shy people—and isn't that about half of us?—I recommend it as a classic, a consolation, and—who knows?—perhaps a cure.

This very wise man—and so calmly wise!—is tangled up inside with more conflicts and obsessions than ever got crowded into one human bosom before. His shyness, which he describes as of the "intermittent" type—that is, phases of brash and over-confident behavior alternate with states in which the victim remains "encased, swathed, stifled, deaf and dumb"—is only one of his inward troubles. Except for the sane and sovereign composure with which he describes himself, you can't imagine what kept this precocious, torn, twisted, and crazily impulsive boy out of the booby-hatch. It was just sheer thinking brains that did it. His soul is a battlefield, but his mind is the clear sky above it.

With his father he had no intimate relation at all. His mother kept him as a baby in continual jitters with "abrupt changes of mood, from effusive tenderness to violent outbursts of temper." A tight-lipped female tyrant named Bertha instilled in him an overriding conviction of guilt-in-the-abstract. A series of unnecessary shocks from heartless surgeons filled him with fear-in-the-abstract. And owing to his Viennese mother's contempt for everybody in Budapest, he was totally alone. "All my earliest memories . . . group themselves about three dominant themes: guilt, fear and loneliness. I was an only child and a lonely child; precocious, neurotic, admired for my brains and detested for my character by teachers and schoolfellows alike . . . I emerged from childhood an exasperating and pathetic figure. Almost the whole of my adolescence is painful to remember. I was short, slim . . . had a rather handsome face with unformed, infantile features and a constant smirk which looked impudent and concealed my boundless timidity and insecurity."

What a start! And then he suffered from the "shorty complex" in an extreme form. He wouldn't go to a party until he found out whether any tall girl was to be there. "The examples of Napoleon, Beethoven, and other undersized great men comforted me, but not much. Nor did they serve as a warning against the short man's traditional vanity, aggressiveness and lust for power."

To make things worse, Arthur (a name he hated) looked like a child, and was taken for a child by strangers, no matter how old he grew or what he achieved. As Middle East correspondent of the Ullstein papers, the biggest newspaper chain in Europe, he secured an interview with King Feisal in Bagdad. The King's adjutant received him kindly, but whenever he mentioned the promised interview, sidetracked the conversation with some inquiry as to what young boys were taught in the English schools. Finally the adjutant rose and dismissed him with the question: "And when can we now expect your papa?" Koestler's ready answer, "Mon père, c'est moi,"

comforts him a little, but the memory is still apparently more painful than amusing.

Besides fear, guilt, loneliness, the young Koestler was troubled with such violently conflicting impulses as a passion for the active and an equal one for the contemplative life; an oriental infatuation with infinity (that is the arrow traveling through space forever, though space, my mind keeps objecting, is not blue) and a godless zeal for occidental science; a fervid Zionism and a stubborn objection to Judaism. "Most bewildering of all was the discovery that the saga of the 'Chosen Race' seemed to be taken quite literally by traditionalist Jews. They protested against racial discrimination, and affirmed in the same breath their racial superiority based on Jacob's covenant with God. . . . The more I found out about Judaism the more distressed I became—and the more fervently Zionist."

Even his love of science—and he had risen at twenty-five to be science editor of the Ullstein papers—digs up a relic of superstition to go to war with: he can't help believing in the occult significance of "events which come in series." And then, while precociously endowed with reason, he became so enamored of the ideal of "unreason" that, after seven semesters in an engineering school, with only one more to go, he touched a match to his credit card "in a moment of manic exaltation," and walked out without a diploma—his parents having at the time no property left and no hope but in his career. After which it is not a surprise to learn that, when almost dying of starvation, as he was for the following whole year in Palestine, he would refrain from taking a second helping when friends entertained him through reluctance to expose his "naked hunger."

Koestler is also harried, of course, by the supposed conflict between art and exhortation. "I have spoilt most of my novels," he says, "out of a sense of duty to some cause." He hasn't spoilt them for me—any more than Tolstoy spoilt *Resurrection*, or Milton *Paradise Lost*, or St. Luke the story of Jesus. I will de-

fend Art for Art's Sake to the last ditch, if that is the true motive of the artist, but I think the notion that art must not enshrine ideas, convictions, valuations, judgments, solutions of problems, or anything else that engages the passions of the artist, belongs with the degenerate aspects of our too sophisticated age.

Of course, Koestler can not write an autobiography without getting trapped between two incompatible forces: the extrovert and the introvert, the "chronicler's urge" and the "Ecce Homo motive." "Obviously a good autobiography," he says, "ought to be a synthesis of the two." That does seem obvious, and the weakness of *Arrow in the Blue* as far as it goes (up to his twenty-sixth year when he joined the Communist Party) seems to be that the synthesis does not occur. Both things are here, and both are fascinating. The chronicle carries him from such occupations as dueling in the old German face-carving style, through selling lemonade on the streets of Haifa and selling advertising space in Tel Aviv, up to nosing toward the North Pole in a Zeppelin—the only reporter to accompany the famous Eckener expedition in 1931. And the self-revelation carries him with merciless candor through many a battlefield such as I have described. But somehow the two are only thrown together. They are not fused. There is plenty of emotional experience for the reader—astonishment, horror, pity, satisfied curiosity, impatience, even disgust, and certainly admiration. But there is not enough participation. There is not enough suspense. The art of the novelist, Koestler's own art, is lacking. Perhaps it is because the book contains too many thoughts, astute and distracting thoughts, about a great variety of subjects. One of these thoughts that I would like to signalize is this:

We [who supported the Bolsheviks] were wrong for the right reasons; and I still feel that, with a few exceptions—I have already mentioned Bertrand Russell and H. G. Wells—those who derided the Russian Revolution from the beginning, did so mostly for reasons that were less honourable than our error. There is a world of difference between a disenchanting lover and those incapable of love.

No. 1 Fellow Traveler

Soviet Civilization, by Corliss Lamont. New York: Philosophical. \$5.00

Having concluded his speech on the great progress and marvelous achievements of the Soviet regime, the visiting agitator asked whether there were any questions. A simple-minded workman in the back rows timidly raised a hand and was recognized. "I have a question, comrade," he said. "If everything is so good, why is everything so bad?"

This now-classic anecdote, a favorite when I was living in Russia, kept recurring to my mind as I read this amazing, this grotesque, this incredible apologia for Soviet totalitarianism by Corliss Lamont.

If everything is so nearly perfect in your Soviet civilization, Dr. Lamont, why is there so much wretchedness, so many millions of political prisoners, such unrelieved and ever-expanding terror? Why does the Kremlin fear to let outsiders look at its new civilization? Why does it make the attempt of its happy citizens to leave the country punishable by death?

If, as you say repeatedly, the Soviet people in the last war bled and died "to preserve their new socialist order," why did hundreds of thousands of Red troops desert to the Germans; why were Communist slogans and symbols hastily swept aside in favor of old-style patriotic appeals to soil, blood, and history; why were Marx and Lenin discreetly kept in the background while Suvorov, Kutuzov, Ivan the Terrible and other tsarist heroes were rushed into the foreground of internal wartime propaganda; why, finally, did millions of Soviet citizens who found themselves beyond their native frontiers after the victory have to be repatriated by threat and force?

The temptation is to brush this book aside as a piece of imbecility—the kindest thing one could do for the author. But that would be carrying kindness too far. There is too much deliberate trickery to let Lamont off with a verdict of idiocy. The man is both sane and able. Whatever the psychological compulsions behind this hoax between covers, it is perpetrated with consider-

able skill and, within the limits of its fantastic premises, a measure of logic.

Dr. Lamont does not contend that black is white. It is white with some grey flecks. The Soviet Union is not yet perfect, but well on the road to perfection. There are still certain "regrettable" and "lamentable" flaws, due in every case to the heritage of tsarism and the hostility of the non-Soviet environment. How would any reasonable reader, after such startling concessions, dare dispute his claim that he is "dispassionate," "scientific," and "objective"?

Especially objective. Lamont is not one to conceal that the Soviets "hamper" reporting and scientific inquiry; that the USSR has not yet "caught up with the Anglo-Saxon countries" in the matter of political democracy and civil liberties; that the evolution of freedom under the hammer-and-sickle has been "retarded" by conditions beyond its control; that the system of civil rights provided by the Stalin Constitution "has obviously not yet been put fully into effect"; that there are still "lingering traces" of racial prejudice; that the rewriting of history to make the past conform to present Party views seems to him "a lamentable and ludicrous step"; that there is a "lag" in free speech under Stalin. Could anything be more fair, balanced, objective?

However, Dr. Lamont does not let his passion for dispassionate analysis run away with his sense of values. He sees no point in exaggerating what he calls the "limps and lags" in an otherwise great new civilization. He is careful to note, therefore, that America also shows "great shortcomings and backslidings" in the area of civil liberties. "The Soviet Government has from time to time used unnecessarily harsh measures to maintain itself. Yet we should not lose sight of the ultimate democratic aims of the Soviet Republic." Let us not forget that the very word Soviet means "council" and "therefore carries with it a democratic connotation."

In short, we must be fair. And calm. Though he does not altogether approve a one-party election, objectivity compels us to recognize that "no candidate was nominated to op-

pose George Washington" and that a one-party system "does not necessarily prevent true democracy." Besides, "the Marxist idea is that when classes have been eliminated, as in the Soviet Union, then the need for a multiplicity of parties also disappears." Meanwhile, "it is regrettable that during the past few years the Soviet dictatorship has manifestly become tighter instead of relaxing." But "this is not surprising," considering that two-thirds of mankind is not yet "socialist."

For students of semantics the volume offers a glorious feast. "Along its Western frontier the border states of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania became firm allies of the Soviet Union. . . Communist-led regimes have come into power throughout most of Eastern Europe and in China." Happening to be around, Soviet occupation forces and Moscow emissaries "of course actively encouraged the liquidation of old fascist elements and the establishment of People's Republics." He has "always regretted" that the Czechoslovak Communist Party "took such drastic action" as killing incumbent ministers and hijacking the elected government—but "even with Soviet encouragement" it was still a purely local affair. Though "it seems probable that the north Koreans were guilty of the initial aggression," it was after all "the aggression of North Korea and not of Soviet Russia." Indeed, "it is regrettable that the Soviet Union did not use its influence at the outset to dissuade the North Koreans from their mad venture."

The italics are all mine, by way of helping the less perceptive among those semantic students. Here is Dr. Lamont's summation of the collectivization period, when the Kremlin "liquidated" about five million peasants and killed off about as many more in a man-made famine: Russian peasants "took destiny into their own hands and rode roughshod over the enemies of the new order." As for large-scale executions, blood purges, slave labor and totalitarian methods generally, they are simply the "rough and tumble aspects of the Russian Revolution." In objectively noting the limitations on freedom, Dr. Lamont admits that persons

seeking to restore tsarism "would quickly get into hot water."

If he has been less than exhaustive on some phases of Soviet civilization, the "rough and tumble" phases, Dr. Lamont is at least frank about it. "I have concentrated on those features . . . which have particularly interested me," he forewarns in a foreword. Evidently forced labor doesn't particularly interest him, and it's his book, isn't it? So he disposes of the subject in less than two pages. He denies the "huge totals" of forced laborers claimed by detractors of the Soviet civilization, without bothering to give his own estimate. Then he offers his objective explanation:

The Soviet Government has from its earliest years prided itself on its method of retraining and rehabilitating prisoners of whatever variety for a normal life in the community by giving them useful work while imprisoned. One of the chief aims of this procedure is to ensure a good job for the prisoner when he is finally released. . . .

Poor Lamont forgets that millions of the prisoners *had* good jobs before being imprisoned—as professors, engineers, commissars, authors, peasants. But presumably digging canals, mining gold in Magadan, cutting trees in Siberia, would, if they survived, prepare them for better jobs.

What does particularly interest Dr. Lamont is the Soviet Constitution, even if it is not yet "fully" in effect. Accordingly he devotes nearly 50 pages to it. He fails to point out that most of the men who drew up that document have been liquidated—some of them being shot even before their handiwork was formally accepted. But that is clearly irrelevant. What is relevant is that the constitution "has many similarities with the democratic institutions in the United States and Great Britain." Better than those in the United States, come to think of it, since the parliamentary system provided is like England's, and "many constitutional experts believe that placing ultimate power in the legislature is, other things being equal, a more democratic arrangement than the system of checks and balances." One can not help admiring Dr. Lamont's concern for the finer points

of democracy. The minor circumstance that in Soviet Russia the ultimate power rests with Stalin and his satraps, that the parliamentary system is a fraud, is again outside the orbit of the author's highly selective interests.

The notion that the Soviet State is a riddle and enigma Dr. Lamont rejects as a lot of capitalist nonsense. We could all be as well informed as he is if we made better use of such objective sources of information—he lists them for our convenience—as the magazine *Soviet Russia Today*, the American Russian Institute, the National Council of American Soviet Friendship, and the Soviet Embassy *Information Bulletin*. In addition there are ever so many individual experts like those whom he quotes in his book, including George Seldes, Ernest J. Simmons, Maurice Hindus, Ralph Parker, all as objective as himself. With this sample of scientific research before me, I can not help congratulating Columbia University on the intellectual quality of this member of its faculty.

"I present this work," Dr. Lamont declares, "as the nearest approach I can make to the truth about Soviet Russia." Why he can't approach any nearer presents an interesting question that is not part of a reviewer's assignment. If it were answered for Lamont, the Number One fellow-traveler, we might come closer to an understanding of the whole phenomenon of fellow-traveling.

EUGENE LYONS

A Patient Judge

Judge Medina, by Hawthorne Daniel, New York: Wilfred Funk. \$4.00

Judge Harold R. Medina, who in 1949 presided over the historic trial of the eleven American Communist leaders, was afraid of heights.

So the Communist pickets outside the Foley Square courthouse carried placards containing the words "jump!" or "fall!" over and over again. Judge Medina had an old back ailment, stemming from his football days at Princeton. So for nine long months he wore a stiffly stayed brace which tormented him miserably

during the humid summer weeks. (Reporters covering the trial wondered whether his rocking to and fro in his chair was an idiosyncrasy; it was only an effort to ease his extreme discomfort.) Judge Medina, realizing that his case would be a landmark in constitutional law, determined to try the case on its merits. So for nine months he endured a stream of endless bickering, a series of exasperating delaying tactics, tirades of haranguing and other behavior by the defendants' attorneys which normally would have earned them contempt sentences after the first few weeks. Judge Medina was subjected to a torrent of poison-pen letters and telegrams sent by the party faithful—all designed to destroy his very sanity.

It proved to no avail. Although on the federal district bench barely a year when the trial began, Judge Medina possessed a list of qualifications for this job which enabled him to see the case through to a successful conclusion and to win the acclaim of a grateful American people.

It is of this background—of scholarship, judicial brilliance, mental discipline, and personal warmth—that his authorized biographer, Hawthorne Daniels, tells.

An authorized biography usually finds this reviewer putting two strikes down against it. In the first place, it tends toward indiscriminate glorification of its hero. In the second, it fails to strike a proper balance between the important and trivial occurrences in his life.

This biography suffers not only from these two disabilities, but also from a third: it is not well written. It is labored, cliché-ridden, and affected.

Almost incredibly the book surmounts these serious defects. The character of Judge Medina is one reason; a detailed recounting of the dramatic and precedent-making case of the eleven Communists is another.

Human memories are short, and so it is a good thing for Americans to have a record of this case, set down in narrative style—the record of a grandstand propaganda play that failed. It is good also to remember the nature of the man who made it fail. The book should be widely read.

MILTON EDELMAN

"Objectivity" vs. Facts

Stalin, by Nikolaus Basseches.
Translated from the German by
E. W. Dickes. New York: Dutton.
\$4.75

I Dreamt Revolution, by William
Reswick. Chicago: Regnery. \$4.50
One of the Fifteen Million, by
Nicholas Prychodko. Boston: Lit-
tle, Brown. \$3.00

If one may be permitted the para-
phrase, historical "objectivity" is
the last refuge of the Soviet pa-
triotheer. Of the three authors here
reviewed, it is Mr. Basseches who
makes the most elaborate protesta-
tions of objectivity, and it is he who
is most clearly guilty of slanted re-
porting, contrived obscurantism,
gargantuan omissions (he doesn't
mention either the slave labor camps
or the man-made famine), and all
the other tricks of the propagandist.

All this doesn't make Mr. Bas-
seches either a Communist or a pro-
Communist. He is a Moscow-born
Austrian, who served as Moscow
correspondent for the Vienna *Neue
Freis Press* for fifteen years prior
to his expulsion from the Soviet
Union in 1937. His book is not a
biography at all, but a collection of
extraordinarily didactic "think
pieces" designed to give us a rather
sympathetic portrait of Stalin as a
statesman and empire-builder of
genius, with a slight penchant for
intrigue, blackmail, murder, fraud.

One is at a loss to explain how
Mr. Basseches achieved either this
point of view or his style, which is
that of a pompous and belligerent
village schoolmaster. In fairness,
this reviewer hazards the guess that
many, although certainly not all, of
his baseless certitudes, his awkward
and self-conscious *obiter dicta*, his
owlish rationalizations derive not so
much from bias as from ignorance
and incompetence.

Here are some not unrepresenta-
tive specimens of what the jacket
writer calls Mr. Basseches's "re-
markably objective book."

Concerning the collectivization of
agriculture: "It is widely supposed
that the Russian peasant is against
the *kolkhozy*. This is not so."

Concerning the morale of the
Soviet peasant armies that surren-
dered by the hundreds of thousands

during the first weeks of the 1941
Nazi invasion: "Now a new life
was introduced [into the Russian
villages] and need it be said, it
seemed marvelous to the peasant.
Hence his eagerness to fight for his
country in the Second World War,
in contrast to the first."

Concerning "good old Joe": "All
foreign visitors to Stalin without
exception, describe him as an attrac-
tive personality An inquiry
into the facts supplies no evidence
that Stalin is more revengeful than
other people Stalin and Tuk-
hachevsky, for instance, were more
or less rivals in the Polish war, and
Stalin could not endure Tukhachev-
sky's aristocratic manner; but he
did nothing to interfere with the
Marshal's career." (He just had
him shot.)

Concerning the confession trials:
"From these former owners the
engineers received instructions in
regard to sabotage and especially
requests to flood certain mines to
preserve them for their former
owners. That these things had been
done was fully confirmed at the
trial." (The 1928 trial of the
Russian engineers of the Shakhta
mining area.) "The third trial was
that of Bukharin and Rykov and
also of Yagoda, the former head of
the secret police, and of Krestinsky,
Deputy Commissar for Foreign Af-
airs. Here again the truth of the
facts alleged was thoroughly
proved."

Enough has been quoted to indi-
cate that Mr. Basseches's book need
not be read by anybody except per-
haps the publisher. Conceivably the
latter may wish to ascertain why the
manuscript was not reviewed in ad-
vance of publication by competent
journalists and scholars. Among
those well qualified to appraise Mr.
Basseches's performance is William
Reswick, whose long awaited book is
published by Regnery under the title
I Dreamt Revolution.

In 1903 when the 1905 revolution
was already brewing, Reswick was
a boy of thirteen in the Ukrainian
city of Starikonstantinov. With
other teen-age revolutionaries he
was caught distributing handbills to
the soldiers of the Tsar; a few days
later his parents smuggled him
across the frontier.

Now, fifty years later, Reswick

tells what the present Master of the
Kremlin did to his dream. From
1923 to 1934 Reswick served with
distinction as the Moscow representa-
tive of the International News
Service, and later of the Associated
Press. These were the critical years
during which the crafty Vozhd
maneuvered his way to total power.

No other Moscow correspondent
was on such intimate terms with
Rykov, Yenukidse, Bukharin, Kras-
sin, and other right-wing Communist
leaders. Much of what Reswick now
tells could not have been put into
print sooner without endangering the
lives of his friends and informants.
Stalin's kept historiographers will
doubtless do their best to discredit
the veteran journalist, who writes
this searing appraisal of the dictator
and his foreign apologists:

I had seen these foreign intellec-
tuals in the midst of the famine. Now
in their own countries they were de-
fending Stalin in the midst of his
pogrom against all that was best
and noblest in Russia. They were
unwilling or unable to see that Stalin
had destroyed the Revolution, had
enslaved the peasants and workers
and had established a regime of
naked police rule, not as a means to
an end, but in order to perpetuate his
tyranny over a helpless people. His
annihilation of every vestige of
socialism, his inborn sadism, and his
hunger for absolute power, combined
to make him a menace to free man-
kind.

In this passage Reswick is writing
of the Moscow trials, the bloody con-
summation of Stalin's fifteen-year-
campaign of fraud, intrigue, and
violence. He had seen the beginning
of this campaign as far back as 1922
when he first returned to Russia
with the Hoover Relief Mission.
Already the word "Stalinist" was
being applied as an epithet to the
thugs and careerists whom the
party's scheming secretary was re-
cruiting to staff its *Apparat*. Many
of these had been members of the
military Cheka who had served under
Stalin during the Civil War. Lenin
had warned against criminals in the
Apparat and demanded that they be
removed, as later he demanded the
removal of their chief.

But now Lenin was ill. Step by
step, Stalin achieved control of both
the press and the GPU. During the
months that preceded Lenin's death
he used the press to further his feud

with Trotsky. He used the secret police to terrorize the unfortunate Nepmen and create an atmosphere of tension and fright in the capital, where nightly the Black Marias rolled down to the Lubyanka.

At Lenin's funeral, Stalin stood dry-eyed among the crowd of weeping Bolshevik leaders on the platform. Reswick believes that if the Right opposition and the Trotskyists could have reached agreement, Stalin could have been stopped then. Muralov, commander of the Moscow garrison, demanded Stalin's immediate arrest. But Rykov, Bukharin, Tomsky, and their friends feared a renewal of civil war, and Trotsky was away from the capital.

During the next four years Stalin played one faction against the other, meanwhile building up a powerful GPU army under his direct personal control. Reswick reveals for the first time that this army was largely recruited from the millions of "wild children" who had learned in their earliest youth to rob and murder.

By 1928, when this fully militarized, privileged police force was strong enough to challenge even the Red Army, Stalin was ready to move against his most hated rival. Reswick was the only correspondent to witness the extraordinary scene in the railroad station when Trotsky, disheveled and in hospital pajamas, was carried through, followed by his weeping wife and children. Vainly the younger son appealed to the indifferent onlookers: "Comrade workers, look, be witnesses! They are carrying away my father . . . who gave us victory!"

With Trotsky in exile, Stalin moved next against the Rights. Their doom was foreshadowed by the Shakhta "confession" trial, which saw the debut of Andrei Vishinsky as public prosecutor. Before the revolution, Vishinsky had been a hanger-on in the criminal courts, defending Moscow's pimps and prostitutes. Reswick describes the trial of the engineers accused of sabotaging the coal mines as a cruel farce designed to discredit the Rights. But when Rykov and his friends met to plan measures of defense, Ordzhonokidse, whom they later discovered to be Stalin's spy and provocateur in the Kremlin, would invariably betray them to the

Boss. This omnipresent espionage, more than anything else, made possible Stalin's triumph.

In 1935, when Reswick was preparing to leave Russia, Rykov predicted his own destruction in the Great Purge of 1936-37. Now, twenty years later, the veteran correspondent contemplates the wreckage of his dream of revolution and recalls that Stalin told Kamenev and Dzherzhinsky in a moment of terrifying frankness: "There can be no greater pleasure in life than to choose one's enemy, inflict a terrible revenge on him and go quietly to sleep."

Perhaps the most surprising and encouraging thing about *One of the Fifteen Million* is its imprint—that of Little, Brown & Company. This means a real awakening, for Professor Prychodko's account of his experiences in, and escape from, a Siberian slave labor camp is one of the best of these documentaries. It is well written, perceptive, and full of startling detail, such as the slaughter of prisoners by the NKVD during the retreat of the Red Army in 1941.

JAMES RORTY

Word-Juggling

The Taming of the Nations: A Study of the Cultural Bases of International Policy, by F. S. C. Northrop. New York: Macmillan. \$5.00

Reputations are strangely made these days. Since the publication of *The Meeting of East and West*, Professor F. S. C. Northrop has been widely and extravagantly hailed as a distinguished philosopher who brings deep spiritual and intellectual insights to bear upon the problems of our time. But a careful reading of his books, a little checking on his more obscure references, leaves the unhappy impression that to his self-appointed task of harmonizing the differences between nations and cultures he brings little more than enthusiasm and good will.

His mind appears to have been trained exclusively in the contemporary disciplines of scientific method and the "philosophy of science." He seems incapable of the most elementary understanding of the con-

tent and meaning of the philosophical and religious concepts of East and West which he so blithely tosses about; and of the historical development of the cultures he discusses he is appallingly ignorant.

In *The Taming of the Nations*, his latest book, his stated purpose is to discover a cultural basis for the framing of international policy and an international law. He insists that "international relations must become more than . . . an art. It must also be a science. . . ." But he modestly questions whether it is possible for it to be a science. "Are we not in the presence of imponderables?" Yes, he says, we are, but let us not despair. There is an answer, "imponderables can be specified"—and once they are specified, the problem is solved. "Specifying the imponderables" of civilizations will enable us to control international relations in the same way that analyzing the qualities of chemical elements has made it possible to predict the reactions of chemical materials.

A happy thought. But who can bell the cat? Civilizations are not objective physical entities which can be studied and known by the experimental scientific method. Professor Northrop, however, seems to think that when he has characterized a civilization with a string of words ("specified the imponderables"), he has exhaustively analyzed it in the same way that the natural scientists have exhaustively analyzed the chemical properties of an element. He reduces all the richness of man's histories to a series of fat phrases and then endows these corpulent entities with autonomous being.

Thus, India's culture is based on "attachment . . . to the intuitively felt, all-embracing immediacy in its timelessness and formlessness." "Spiritual, experimental, naturalistic universalism [is] the soul of the people of the United States." Western civilization generally is based upon "the abstract, logically formulated, theoretical way of thinking about naively observed, personally sensed and felt natural phenomena, which requires quantitatively exact experiments for its verification."

A Spengler or a Toynbee might momentarily stress an insight into one or another facet of a great cul-

ture, but a few pages later he would enrich it with another insight. But once Professor Northrop has achieved his little vision, he avariciously hoards it up in a formula. This formula becomes a counter in a game, or more exactly, an algebraic symbol which he manipulates and combines and re-combines with other similar symbols. Such simple reductions of the complex reality that makes up a culture of living men can lead to nothing more than what logicians call "agreement between propositions." The significance of such an agreement depends on the original validity of the insights which led to the propositions. Professor Northrop's insights may sometimes agree with themselves, but, being one-sided and often blind, they can say nothing about human civilizations.

The aridity which is the manifest weakness of such an approach has usually at least the merit of its defect—a stringent sense of logic. But Professor Northrop manages, even in the combination of his abstractions, to be maddeningly untrammelled by any logical scruples. He recognizes one of the basic principles of law and jurisprudence, that what he calls "living law"—the basic attitudes of a society, the social norms—underlies and gives substance to all legislative enactments, "positive law." Therefore, positive international law can only become possible when there exists an international "living law" on which it can be based. But there does not exist an international "living law." There is no international norm. There are only a series of different, often contradictory, social norms. The logical conclusion would seem inevitable: there can be no positive international law. The stage would seem to be set for an intelligent and biting critique of all the assumptions of one-worldism, for a defense either of the concept of the balance of powers, or, if that be impossible in this Soviet-infected world, of a Pax Americana.

But, no, Professor Northrop calls the many cultural norms of the many civilizations "living law pluralism," (which, of course, is simply another way of saying they are "many"). Then he takes the phrase "living law pluralism" and gives it

independent being. International law, he says, is entirely possible: the only thing is, it must be based on "living law pluralism."

What conceivable meaning is there to this word juggling? All it can possibly mean is that international law must be based on many different social norms, contrary and contradictory. But many different norms, contrary and contradictory, equal no norm; therefore there is no possibility of international law today. *Quod non erat demonstrandum.* Which is, indeed, the opposite to what he was trying to prove.

There is no room in this review to treat at length his errors of fact, insight, and interpretation—historical, philosophical, and theological. I have noted down some twenty-seven of them; a sampling will perhaps suffice. *Item:* The Logos, neither in the Neo-Platonic nor the Christian cosmos, is a "concept of scientifically known, theoretically conceived man and nature." It is the Immanent God in this world—the mystical principle of creative form. *Item:* The "Yin and Yang" concept is not Confucian but is immemorial in the Chinese outlook, while its philosophical development is primarily the work of Tsou Yen and the "Yin-Yang experts."

Item: Indian civilization is not

divided sharply into a Vedic Aryan segment and an aboriginal Dravidian segment. The two are as inextricably combined as the Greek and the Hebraic are in Western Christendom. *Item:* Hellenic society certainly does not move "from the immediately felt relations of the joint family and the village elders . . . direct to the Western state universal." Professor Northrop apparently has never heard of the Greek city-state, the political form of Hellenic society in its most glorious period.

Enough. Ideas and words to Professor Northrop are what he wants to make them. As Humpty Dumpty said, "There's glory for you!"

"I don't know what you mean by 'glory,'" Alice said.

Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. "Of course you don't—till I tell you. I meant 'there's a nice knock-down argument for you!'"

"But 'glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knockdown argument,'" Alice objected.

"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less."

"The question is," said Alice, "whether you *can* make words mean so many different things."

FRANK MEYER

Second Harvest

By EDWARD DAHLBERG

Florentine Codex, by Fray Bernardino de Sahagun. Translated from the Aztec by Arthur J. O. Anderson and Charles E. Dibble. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press. Two volumes. \$10.00

Father Bernardino de Sahagun, a Franciscan monk of Mexico, started this work on the Aztecs in Tepeapulco in the sixteenth century. The Franciscan was a mild nature whose family were probably Portuguese; he attended the famous university at Salamanca. Sahagun's Mexican history, in twelve books, consisted chiefly of hieroglyphics drawn by the Indians, and their interpretation in Aztec. The original Mexican codex was trilingual, Nahuatl (Mexican), Spanish, and Latin. The famous Fanning Bandelier translation is from the

Spanish of Bustamante, but the Florentine Codex is a literal translation from the Aztec, containing two of the twelve books, and is done by Arthur J. O. Anderson of the School of American Research and Charles E. Dibble of the University of Utah. Praise is due to the University of Utah—and also, incidentally, to the University of Texas, which is responsible for the English rendering of Garcilasso de la Vega's "History of Florida."

Sahagun, unlike Torquemada and the Bishop Diego de Landa, was a soft-going man, with abundant affection for the Indians whom he taught in New Spain. Sahagun had the strongest abhorrence of the Indian idols and human sacrifice. On one occasion he climbed to the almost inaccessible peaks of two vol-

canoes, Iztaccihuatl and Popocatepetl, to find the craters where the Indians sacrificed children, captives, and women to appease their fierce gods. At another time, learning that there was a stone idol hidden in a spring of sweet water, he went down into the spring and erected in the place of the Aztec image a cross. Diego de Landa, though he wrote some marvelous matter on the Mayans of Yucatan, so detested their man-eating practices that he burned their writings and glyphs: Father Sahagun simply observed them.

The two books of the Florentine Codex are on the gods, the ancient ceremonies and the calendar. The Aztec calendar was more accurate than the Julian or Gregorian. The Aztecs had eighteen months in their year, each month containing twenty days, in addition to five extra days known as the barren days.

The Aztecs' vows and penances were as important as their festivals. When there was drought, the priests of the Tlalocs fasted, abstained from women, and offered copal to the gods so that the rains would come. During the rain festival, which took place in the sixteenth month, they made images of their mountains, and set in the heads teeth of squash seeds and the eyes of beans. Though their gods were fashioned out of seeds and vegetables, the Aztecs took great pains not to become fat, drinking brine to be lean and smooth.

The old Aztec tongue is a strong mountain and crater language which is ruled by the cactus, the eagle, and the nettles and flowers of the Sierras. It would reinvigorate American English to include Mexican Indian words and symbols. The astonishing Indian peoples have been a lodestar of a number of American figures, the historian William Prescott, Hart Crane the poet, Ambrose Bierce the writer.

Sahagun's twelve books cost their author much pain, and it is a miracle that these precious histories ever came to public knowledge. Sahagun's superior, a monk of far less probity and learning, refused to let him have any copyists to rewrite the annals, saying such an expense violated the Franciscan vows of poverty. Sahagun had labored over the rites, gods, and songs of the Aztecs

until his hand was too old to hold a pen. Then the superior had the twelve books dispersed so that they could be scrutinized by other priests in different Mexican cloisters.

The religion of the Aztec will repel many subtle readers; it will not so much ravel out the conscience as the imagination, for people are more upset by blood than morally wounded by its presence. The Mexican gods are figures of war and gore and evil, and they are in part reptile, bird, ocelot, vulture: their raiment is paper, the feathers of parrots, and their sandals are made to represent rain and foam. The god Vitcilu-puchtli, a primitive Indian Hercules, was a killer of towns and people, and he had a dragon's head which emitted fire. Texacatlipoca strode the heavens and earth and hell and sowed hatred and wars between men and nations. Quetzalcoatl was a wind and cloud god who swept the roads for the gods of rain. Quetzalcoatl wore a mitre which was spotted to resemble a tiger's skin. One of the principal goddesses of the Mexicans was Civicoatl, who gave adverse things to men, such as poverty, melancholia and sorrows. Civicoatl means woman of the snake, and like Eve of the fable of Eden she was called Our Mother.

The Aztec religion is in many ways a gospel for lions, the osprey, the cormorant, rather than a faith for the gentler peoples who inhabit the four directions of the world; yet there are no men anywhere who have not blood that boils or ravens as the beast. It is true, the Aztecs were adepts in special vices, and that their greatest ecstasies were had from flaying, flailing, and eating people, and that all their festivals were generally consummated by anthropophagous rites. Still, they had laws covering drunkenness, adultery, stealing, infidelity, and lying. Except on the rarest occasions, only the old men and women, those who were heavy with desolation, were permitted to drink wine or pulque.

The Aztec had many vigils and fasts, which is important discipline for the head, the soul, and the belly. Nations which are laggard in such observances are also sluggish in vision, poetry, and justice. Penance,

too, was commonly observed. Sahagun tells us that only the old men and women confessed their vices, which shows unusual discernment. For the young, there were the rigors and the sins; for the aged there was pulque and confession and waiting for death.

The most pedestrian stealth was punished by slavery. Adultery was a great crime, and could be punished by death. The North American Indians, inferior to the Aztec in art and manual civilities, such as weaving, featherwork, the growing of maize, the singing of psalms to flowers and honey and hemp, also viewed adultery with gravity. Lying also was particularly offensive to the Aztec and the Inca.

The Aztecs had a pious regard for crafts, plants, maize, copal or incense, wine, pulque, reeds, papyrus; they wrote with the reed, and the Aztecan idols, astounding pieces of sculpture, were clothed in paper, in quetzal feathers intricately woven, and in cotton upon which were marvelously wrought stags, monkeys, deer, and signs for wind, rain, and misfortune. The ancient Mexican made rush-seats out of the same reed with which he wrote.

Work, and penance, and art, and festivals were mingled, and when the Aztec had sinned he pierced his tongue with the maguey spines out of which he also made food and religious symbols. His lord of the four directions was the tutelary deity of the Aztec matmakers guild. This god fashioned mats of large, fat reeds, and showed man how to make chair seats. This tells us that for the Aztecs the crafts were an awe and a prayer. Our modern crafts have lost their veneration, and this is why Sahagun carries a message for our time.

My Epitaph

Here Pushkin buried lies. With his young muse
In love and laziness he lives a happy span.
He did no good, but was in his own soul—
So help me God he was!—a good man.

ALEXANDER PUSHKIN
TRANSLATED BY M. E.

BACK DOOR TO *War*

"Indispensable

to the alert citizen and student of world affairs, Professor Tansill's book is equally unique and invaluable as a textbook for university and college classes. It is the only up-to-date and comprehensive textbook available for courses in general or world diplomatic history from 1918 to 1942, as well as for recent American diplomatic history . . . Professor Tansill's book is likely to remain . . . the classic work on the genesis of the second World War."

—HARRY ELMER BARNES

Roosevelt Foreign Policy 1933-1941
by Charles Callan Tansill, Georgetown University

- "The main narrative rests largely on official diplomatic correspondence, which is digested with clarity and skill; especially for the years 1935-39, Dr. Tansill has exploited much hitherto unused material." —*U. S. Quarterly Book Review*
- "It is the most up-to-date and one of the most scholarly pieces of revisionist writing on the causes of America's entry into the Second World War yet to appear." —THOMAS H. D. MAHONEY, *World Affairs*
- "To the work of the World War II 'revisionists' . . . Professor Tansill now adds a much more weightily documented volume . . . a work of great learning." —JULIUS W. PRATT, *American Historical Review*
- "Opinions and deductions apart, here is a highly documented narrative of events which will have to be taken into account by anyone who wants to form an intelligent judgment on the ticklish questions which are here raised." —*Christian Century*

Pp. xxi & 690. Index and Bibliography. \$6.50

HENRY REGNERY COMPANY

20 W. Jackson Blvd., Chicago 14, Ill.

Gentlemen: Please send me postpaid _____ copies of
BACK DOOR TO WAR, at \$6.50 per copy.

Check / money order enclosed.


Name _____

Address _____

City _____ Zone _____ State _____

At All Bookstores


HENRY REGNERY COMPANY




CHEVROLET



PONTIAC



OLDSMOBILE



BUICK



CADILLAC

GENERAL MOTORS
PRESENTS The Key Values
For 1953 – Handsome
examples of the engineering
progress that makes the key
to a General Motors car your
key to greater value!



NOW ON DISPLAY AT CHEVROLET, PONTIAC,
OLDSMOBILE, BUICK, CADILLAC DEALERS