Was Stalin Insane?
By Two Former Soviet Officials

Red Bridgehead in the Guianas

What Elects Republicans

Lids on the German Economy

How Many Other Harry Whites?
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Our Contributors

SERGEI PRAVDIN and MIKHAIL BOROV are the pseudonyms of two Russian refugees now living in the West who were previously intimately connected with persons close to the Politburo. They have been recommended to us on the most trusted authority as absolutely reliable. Further clues to their identity must be withheld in order to assure their personal safety.

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FLOYD DELL, former newspaperman and editor, is the author of a number of novels (including Moon-Calf), plays, biographies, and several volumes of verse and essays.

New Reprint Available

The enthusiastic response we have received to the article "Why Socialize Niagara?" by Robert S. Byfield, which appeared in our issue of November 16, has led us to make reprints of it available for those readers who would like to share it with their friends and business acquaintances. Copies are now available at the following rates: single copy, $1.00; 10 copies $10.00; 100 copies $60.00; 1,000 copies $45.00; 10,000 copies $400.00.
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A Slight Case of Treason

It was an appalling revelation that Attorney General Brownell made on November 6: "I can now announce officially, for the first time in public, that the records in my department show that White's spying activities for the Soviet government were reported in detail by the FBI to the White House by means of a report delivered to President Truman through his military aide, Brig. Gen. Harry H. Vaughan, in December of 1945. In the face of this information, and incredible though it may seem, President Truman subsequently, on January 23, 1946, nominated White, who was then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, for the even more important position of executive director for the United States in the International Monetary Fund."

Now this is a fact. With all the irrelevancies that have been dragged in and the counter-charges that have been hurled to obscure the main issue, nobody has denied this fact. Mr. Truman's memory of it, at first, turned out to be as nonexistent as Harry Vaughan's. "I know nothing about any such FBI report," he said. Yet he immediately added: "As soon as we found White was disloyal we fired him."

Here was at least an admission that White was disloyal and that Mr. Truman finally knew it. That Mr. Truman "fired" him, however, is disproved by the record. He failed to withdraw the White nomination to the Monetary Fund post even after a second FBI report on White delivered to General Vaughan on February 4, 1946. Governor James F. Byrnes of South Carolina, who was then Secretary of State, has, in addition, flatly declared that he drew the second FBI report to Mr. Truman's attention on February 6, 1946, and urged him to withdraw White's nomination. Yet not only did that nomination go through, but in a letter written April 30, 1946 Mr. Truman accepted White's resignation as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury with "regret," adding that he was "confident" that White in his new position would "add distinction to your already distinguished career with the Treasury." And even when White finally resigned from this new job in turn, Mr. Truman wrote a public letter on April 8, 1947, accepting the resignation "with sincere regret and considerable reluctance."

Taking up this strange case chronologically, we come next to President Eisenhower's extraordinary press conference of November 11. Some reporters seemed to forget that their sole function there was to elicit information, and not to air their own opinions. Anthony Leviero of the New York Times actually began his "question" by saying: "Mr. President, I think this case is at best a pretty squalid one." (And what he apparently thought "squalid" was not that the Truman government had harbored and promoted a spy after it had been officially informed he was a spy, but that Mr. Brownell had finally accused the Truman government of it.)

The press conference was also remarkable for the confusion and lack of knowledge that it revealed on President Eisenhower's part. Like Harry Vaughan, "he didn't know who was White." Yet in addition to what was known about White by every informed Washington reporter, Mr. Eisenhower had been in a position to have special information. A former Treasury Department official, for example, Fred Smith, reported in an article in the United Nations World of March 1947, that Eisenhower (then Supreme Allied Commander in Europe) had met with him, Secretary Morgenthau, and Harry Dexter White in a tent in England on August 7, 1944, to discuss the so-called Morgenthau Plan for the pastoralization of Germany.

Next at the press conference, Mr. Eisenhower answered that he would not have subpoenaed Mr. Truman or Chief Justice Clark. All he needed to have done was to stand on his first reply—that he was not a constitutional lawyer.

Finally, when Mr. Eisenhower was asked at the press conference whether he felt that President Truman had "knowingly appointed a Communist spy to high office," he replied that this was "inconceivable"—instead of pointing out, as he should have done, that the real damage was that a Communist spy was appointed to and retained in high office, knowingly or unknowingly; and that it was up to a congressional inquiry, and not to him, to determine the extent of Mr. Truman's knowledge or lack of it.

This brings us to the next step in the case.
Harold H. Velde, chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, acting ill-advisedly but certainly not illegally, served a subpoena on former President Truman to appear before the committee. At first Mr. Truman indicated that he would respond; but encouraged and assisted by Mr. Eisenhower’s public disparagement of the subpoena, changed his mind and declined to comply. He got Samuel Rosenman to draft a reply citing as alleged precedents the cases of sixteen Presidents who declined to respond to congressional subpoenas. Yet the New York Times, after diligent search, reported that “no authority could be found to support Mr. Truman, as a private citizen, in his refusal to appear before the committee.”

It is also significant that Mr. Truman’s list of sixteen Presidents studiously avoided the name of Andrew Johnson. This would have reminded the country that the alleged constitutional “independence of the Presidency” is considerably less than complete. One of the most important provisions in the Constitution is the power given to Congress to impeach the President for “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.” Mr. Truman stands accused of a dereliction of duty so gross that it imperiled the security of the nation. Such a dereliction, if it occurred, is at least an impeachable “misdemeanor” within the meaning of the Constitution. What a President in office could be impeached for, an ex-President, as a private citizen, can certainly be questioned about. Mr. Truman preferred to make a radio and television talk. But that is not a substitute for testimony under oath, and subject to cross-examination.

Mr. Truman’s response to the accusations of Attorney General Brownell, as we have seen, was to say first, “I know nothing about any such FBI report” and, second, “As soon as we found White was disloyal we fired him.” Both of these replies were promptly destroyed by the facts of record. So Mr. Truman’s friends and the high Democratic command had to bring forward a new one. This was first unfolded by Arthur Krock in the New York Times of November 14. This story was that, sure, Mr. Truman knew all about the FBI report on White, but after consulting with Attorney General Clark, Secretary of the Treasury Vinson, and J. Edgar Hoover, director of the FBI, decided not to keep but to promote White so they could get further evidence on him.

Even if this astonishing story could be made to stick, what are its implications? After Mr. Truman knew about the FBI report, White was promoted, kept in office for fourteen more months, and finally allowed to retire with effusive public expressions from Mr. Truman of “sincere regret and considerable reluctance.” When White, as a result of charges by Elizabeth Bentley, was called before the House Un-American Activities Committee on August 13, 1948, the committee got no public help whatever from the Administration. And even after White died, three days later, the Administration revealed nothing.

In short, even on this story, high officials of the Administration, including the President, conspired to conceal and suppress the whole case of Harry White. They were able to keep it suppressed for nearly eight years. And whenever any rude Congressman raised the question of Communists in government they denounced him for “McCarthyism.”

Where does this leave us? Mr. Krock admits that even if the version of the story that he presented is true, “Attorney General Brownell, Jr. would have been on solid ground . . . had he asserted, not that Mr. Truman had promoted a Russian spy and knew it, but that Mr. Truman had commissioned a man who he knew the FBI had decided was a Russian spy.” The defenders of Mr. Truman are entitled to whatever satisfaction they can derive from this technical amendment. But let us hope that they will not continue to raise irrelevancies and create diversions.

The White affair destroys the whole case of the Truman Administration on the issue of Communists in government. That case has been built on the argument that congressional investigations of suspected disloyalty in the government service are not only “un-American” but unnecessary, because this was the function of the FBI. But in the White case the FBI made an investigation, and put its evidence and its adverse verdict in the hands of the supposedly responsible officials; and its report was ignored or suppressed.

The defenders of Mr. Truman began by resting practically their whole case on the contention that it had not been proved that Mr. Truman knowingly appointed a Communist spy to office. The adverb is important so far as Mr. Truman is concerned. But it is a subordinate issue so far as the security of the nation is concerned. For with or without Mr. Truman’s knowledge, the country was betrayed by the Whites and the Hisses in high government positions.

If an automobile driver runs over a woman and kills her, it makes an important legal difference to him whether the court decides that he did it with premeditated intent, in which case it is murder in the first degree, or whether he was merely drunk or reckless or incompetent, in which case it is merely manslaughter. But in either case the victim is dead, and cannot be brought back to life. And we now know that if only through incompetence, blindness, or gullibility, the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations appointed Communist spies to high office. Keeping them there, after the FBI and others had brought in their evidence, can only be described, in view of the appalling risks that were run, as criminal negligence.
How Many Other Harry Whites?

Harry Vaughan certainly must have kept his head close to the icebox in those good old White House days. Not only had he never seen the now famous FBI reports. He had never even heard of Harry Dexter White, he said. True enough, General Vaughan was a busy man, and a lot was passing over, and under, his desk. A little item like an official notification that a top government official was a Soviet spy could easily get lost in—shall we say?—the shuffle.

And make no mistake about it: Harry Dexter White was in literal truth a top official. From 1941 until 1946, when President Truman appointed him U.S. Director of the International Monetary Fund, it was generally known that Harry White was running the supremely important foreign operations of the Treasury, and was taking quite a share in running the government as a whole.

In December 1941, an official Treasury Department order, signed by Mr. Morgenthau as Secretary, read: “On and after this date, Mr. Harry D. White, Assistant to the Secretary, will assume full responsibility for all matters with which the Treasury Department has to do having a bearing on foreign relations.” In February 1943, by which time White was a full-fledged Assistant Secretary, he was assigned “full responsibility” in connection with “the operations of the Army and Navy and the civilian affairs in the foreign areas in which our Armed Forces are operating or are likely to operate. This will, of course, include general liaison with the State Department, Army and Navy, and other departments or agencies and representatives of foreign governments on these matters.”

Harry White was official Treasury representative on nearly every important wartime agency and committee, from the Board of Economic Warfare to the OSS Advisory Committee.

Elizabeth Bentley was the first to mention that the “Morgenthau Plan” for the pastoralization of Germany was a Harry White product. In his 1948 appearance before the Un-American Activities Committee, White modestly acknowledged his authorship. This was the Plan designed to eliminate German heavy industry for all time and to turn Germany into a farming country with a population cut in half. Secretary Morgenthau took it to the Quebec Conference, where, under President Roosevelt’s urging, it was accepted “in principle.” By the best of luck, it was never applied 100 per cent in practice, but its spirit remained to bolster the Unconditional Surrender demand and the policy of vengeance that was pursued in Germany during the first three postwar years.

Messrs. Langer and Gleason, in their recently published official history, The Undeclared War, disclose that there had been a still earlier Morgenthau Plan, also produced by Harry White. On November 17, 1941, White submitted a memorandum to Secretary Morgenthau, who the next day, over his own name, sent it on to the President. The contents of this memorandum reappeared as the Ten Point ultimatum that was issued to Japan on November 26. Even Langer and Gleason agree that with this document the last chance of avoiding immediate, all-out war with Japan disappeared.

Harry White, we must grant, was quite a plum in Moscow’s Washington pie. Sitting in their corner, the Politburo members must have had quite a chuckle when Harry Truman pulled him out of the Treasury and stuffed him in as U.S. (and therefore controlling) Director of a Fund with nearly $8,000,000,000 at its disposal.

But one plum does not stand out in a pieful. Attorney General Brownell has focused public attention for the moment on Harry White. That is all to the good—and high time it is. It should not be allowed to obscure the terrible truth that there were scores of Harry Whites. The truth about many of them was known to the FBI, and was communicated to the proper officials of the executive branch.

There were several dozen names besides Harry White’s in the secret 1945 report to which Mr. Brownell referred. In almost all the cases the reports got the same brushoff that was applied to the Harry White information.

In the same Monetary Fund of which White was controlling director, the chief administrative officer, at $20,000 a year tax free, was Virginius Frank Coe. He was a protégé of White’s, his successor in the Treasury as Director of the Division of Monetary Research. He was named in the same 1945 secret report as a collaborator in espionage. In 1948, before the Un-American Activities Committee, he followed White in singing the same “What a good boy am I!” song. A year ago, still Secretary of the Fund, he refused on the ground of self-incrimination to answer questions put to him by the Internal Security Subcommittee. He could never have acquired or held that job except on the initiative and support of the Treasury and the White House.

Harold Glasser, also of the Treasury, a special adviser of General Marshall at Moscow, was also named; Edward Fitzgerald and Harry Magdoff, top officials of the Department of Commerce; and all three continued for nearly two years to advance into the top bureaucratic levels.

Consider the still more startling case of Nathan Gregory Silvermaster. The sworn testimony in 1945.
names him as chief of one of the principal espionage cells (one for which Harry White was a "source"). According to the testimony, the documents were "processed" and photographed in the basement of the Chevy Chase house where he resided with William Ludwig Ulman, who at the Pentagon had access to virtually all Air Force information.

Three years before that, in 1942, General George V. Strong, for Army G-2, had submitted a report on Silvermaster, when he was up for a Foreign Economic Administration job, which concluded: "G-2's opinion having been asked in relation to Mr. Silvermaster, we adhere to our opinion that he should not be employed where he has access to confidential or secret information." (June 17, 1942.)

This was mild enough in the light of the report itself, which, after an exhaustive history of Silvermaster's career, summarized as follows: "The overwhelming amount of testimony from the many and varied witnesses and sources, indicates beyond reasonable doubt that Nathan Gregory Silvermaster is now, and has for years, been a member and a leader of the Communist Party and very probably a secret agent of the O.G.P.U."

This in 1942. But Silvermaster continued his rise in government ranks, into a $10,000 (P-8, highest civil service category of those days) post in the War Assets Administration. He resigned "without prejudice" only in December 1946.

Part of the explanation is on record. Lauchlin Currie intervened for Silvermaster with Robert P. Patterson, then Undersecretary of War. Patterson thereupon cleared Silvermaster. Currie, it will be recalled, was one of President Roosevelt's confidential White House assistants. For some years he has been uninterruptedly located in Colombia, South America.

Alas, these facts about Alger Hiss, Harry White & Co. do rather alarm the public. They suggest that a substantial conspiracy has existed, and still exists, to subvert and destroy our government. How wise the New York Times, Washington Post, and Eleanor Roosevelt are in their oft-repeated advice to shut off the congressional investigating committees! Why, if it hadn't been for these nosey, applecart-upsetting committees, we wouldn't have known a thing about these dreadful goings-on. And, of course, what we don't know can't hurt us. Or can it?

An Uncertain Trumpet

"For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle?"

St. Paul, First Epistle to the Corinthians

A good example of the trumpet with an uncertain sound which the great Apostle deplored is the recent pronouncement on Communist issues by the General Council of the Presbyterian Church. For, behind a smokescreen of inconsistent and contradictory statements, this message lends the authority and prestige of an historic church to many of the fallacies, exaggerations, and half-truths of anti-Communism.

The introduction to the pronouncement is altogether sound and invalidates much of the succeeding contents. It is stated that Communism is a menace, that its leaders aim to subvert the thought and life of the United States, and that congressional committees have rendered some valuable services to the nation.

So far, so good. But most of the remainder of the message is an amazing non sequitur. The authors call on Protestant Christians to take a grave view of the situation which is being created "by the almost exclusive concentration of the American mind upon the problem of the threat of Communism."

Now if Communism is a menace committed to subverting the life and thought of the United States, some intense and serious thinking on the subject of how to combat this menace would not seem out of place. But where is the evidence of this alleged almost exclusive concentration of the American mind upon the problem of Communism? Certainly, as Peter Viereck showed brilliantly in his Shame and Glory of the Intellectuals, the American intelligentsia, quick to see the evil in Nazism and Fascism, were disgracefully slow in recognizing the evil and danger in Communism. And one wonders how many educated Americans even now would get a passing mark in an examination in the basic ideas of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, in Communist methods of government and infiltration and direct and indirect expansion.

The authors of the letter go quite off the deep end in describing some congressional inquiries as "inquisitions which find their historic pattern in medieval Spain and in the tribunals of modern totalitarian states." This is exaggeration fantastic to the point of irresponsibility. Has there ever been a case in the Soviet Union, Red China, or the satellite states where witnesses insulted and browbeat the members of the tribunal or got off scot-free by invoking a "fifth column amendment"?

The letter contains gratuitous slurs on the truthfulness of ex-Communists who have helped to bring the facts of Communist conspiracy to light. It further deplores "fanatical negativism" in
relation to Communism and makes the sensational suggestion, quite unwarranted by any observable fact in American life, that a fascist tyranny, in case of a national crisis, could occupy the "emptiness" of our national life. Again one is puzzled by the contradictory sounds of this very uncertain spiritual trumpet. To a logical mind, there would seem to be something amiss with the capacity for moral judgment of a person who had not a negative attitude toward Communism in view of its proved and unvarying record in every country where it has seized power. A negative attitude toward Communism is inherent in a positive attitude toward the spiritual, human, and cultural values of our civilization, all of which would be lost should Communism succeed in its grand design of world domination.

Finally, the authors of the letter, who seem strangely oblivious both to the teachings of recent history and to current news dispatches, call for us "always to be ready to meet around a conference table with the rulers of Communist countries," "to employ the conference method to the full in the settling of disputes with our country's enemies," "to take the initiative of seeking face-to-face encounter with our enemies." There is no intimation that this is just what the Western powers have been trying to do, only to meet one rebuff after another from the Kremlin.

In a climax of futility the letter asserts that the United Nations stands between us and war (although the U.N. was the formal sponsor of our only large venture in postwar hostilities), and recommends "talk, unhurried talk . . . talk which takes place in private" as "the only kind of approach which can lead to sanity and fruitful understanding."

What about all the private "talk" at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam? The results could hardly be called "fruitful understanding."

There was much that the leadership of the Presbyterian Church could have said that would have been heard around the world as a clear rallying call to the defense of the basic principles of moral order. It could have expressed horror at the denial of the right to worship God freely behind the Iron Curtain and sympathy for the victims of religious persecution in the Soviet Union, in Communist China, in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the other satellites.

It could have called attention to the scandal created by the Dean of Canterbury and his imitators on both sides of the Atlantic who abuse their position in the Christian ministry to act as propagandists for atheistic and barbarous dictatorships.

It could have expressed sympathy for the innumerable victims of Communist totalitarianism, and for the anti-Communist Chinese and North Koreans who have been undergoing a cruel and unnecessary ordeal at Panmunjom.

It could have affirmed faith in the ultimate triumph of righteousness, in the survival of our great heritage of Roman-Greco and Judaeo-Christian civilization.

To a clear message of this kind there would have been a clear and resounding echo. What a pity that the Presbyterian leadership chose to play a trumpet with an uncertain sound and many false quavering notes of appeasement and anti-anti-Communism.

**Whose "Voice" Is It Now?**

The new United States Information Agency has now put out its shingle. It has taken over most of the functions, including the Voice of America and the other propaganda activities, of the State Department's old Division of Public Affairs. It is now supposed to operate as an independent agency under the Operations Coordinating Board.

Theodore C. Streibert, the first chief of U.S. I.A., has begun business in the approved public relations manner, with a press release and an interview. As compared with his State Department predecessors, who were formidable competitors in the field, he has already set one new record—for the amount of nonsense per paragraph.

Under him, the agency is going to avoid "going violently anti-Soviet." Mr. Streibert seems to be the world's most unprejudiced man. "Where there are two sides to a question here we shall be sure to give both sides." We had been under the impression that as taxpayers we were supporting an organization that is supposed to popularize one particular side, the American side, of a question in dispute. That was no doubt a reactionary, right-wing prejudice on our part.

The reporters asked Mr. Streibert: "Can you define for us what the 'enemy' is? . . . Is it Russian expansionism or world-wide Communism?"

Mr. Streibert replied with a figurative shake of his rhetorical head: "It is Russian expansionism and imperialism. I wish we knew more about why it exists. It may be through fear on their part of another strong power . . . that they feel threatens their existence. It may be the old Russian imperialism . . . That is the target of our effort, not Communism as such."

So Communism is all right by us from now on. When the two were celebrating together the recently signed Pact, Molotov observed to Von Ribbentrop that "Nazism is a matter of taste." We now (officially speaking) add "Communism" to the list to which the tolerant rule applies: *De gustibus non est disputandum*.

What kind of political novice has the President appointed to this post, so important to the nation for future good or ill? This man seems to think he can talk to the Soviet peoples without "taking
a stand" on the one fact that determines their entire existence; namely, that they live within a Communist society. He knows so little about Communism that he apparently believes it to be in no basic conflict with a philosophy and society of freedom. Even about "Russian expansionism," he is willing, it seems, to accept or half accept Moscow's standard line: "fear on their part of another strong power." If so, then the way to straighten out Soviet-American relations is presumably for us to disarm at once and completely, to blow up our own atom plants, and to bury all A- and H-bombs at the bottom of the sea.

And if that is so, there is surely no need for us to spend our money saying it. Those ideas are already well enough handled by the Voice of Moscow and, still more exactly, by the Voice of Belgrade. In fact, if we really mean that our target is not "Communism as such," we could get the new agency off to a running professional start by farming it out to Tito.

**Private Atomic Energy**

When Congress meets next January, it will have to take a good look at the Atomic Energy Act. Meanwhile, congressional leaders have several reasons to study revisions of the government's atomic development program. One reason is the exhaustive hearings which the Joint Congressional Committee held during the last session; the other is the Administration's announcement that it will have its first full-scale atomic energy plant, entirely geared to peace use, complete within four years; a third is the Atomic Energy Commission's proposed amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.

The Administration's announcement was made by Thomas E. Murray, speaking for the A.E.C. Mr. Murray did not duck the controversial question of private or government control over peacetime atomic energy. He said that government must sponsor and finance full-scale power plant development "initially," but that "the cost-cutting drives, the know-how, skills and competition of many segments of America's business and industry" are essential for the future.

Mr. Murray also said: "As privately financed efforts gain momentum, the work should gradually be transferred from the federal government, so that eventually industry will be carrying the greater part of the burden of this industrial development."

While the government's peacetime atomic power plant gets under way, the basic controversy remains in the lap of Congress. A number of electric and chemical companies say they are even now ready to produce atomic energy for private use.

All this means a lot to every American, because the eventual impact of atomic energy on our daily lives promises to be enormous. According to Dr. Alvin M. Weinberg, who directs the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, "one large truck load of U-235 would power New York City for a year," and "one pound of ordinary uranium, at a cost of $10 per pound, has the same energy content as $10,000 worth of coal."

We might have atomic energy ready for private use ten years from now. But will the government continue to finance atom plants? Will industry be permitted to own, or at least be able to use, fissionable material, which is now exclusively in official hands? Will private companies be forced to hand over to the government all atomic patents, even those developed by their own research staffs?

These are some of the questions Congress will have to answer. Luckily, the data for such an answer is now available. The joint congressional hearings have produced a wealth of solid information. Conscientious legislators still have plenty of time to study the subject in its entirety.

No one, in or out of government, seriously doubts that private operations would spur peacetime atomic development. But the details of government-industry relations must now be worked out. What, then, are the next steps?

The Atomic Energy Commission is now considering a series of amendments to existing legislation, designed to change the framework of future government-industry relations in the field of peacetime atomic development. These amendments include provisions whereby private industry might either own or rent fissionable material, and own and operate power reactors under government control. The suggested legislation would give the Commission greater discretion in the exchange of atomic and thermonuclear information. It would liberalize the patent system, so that private industry may eventually benefit from its own patents. It would do away with the difficult "Q clearance" for general laborers before they are permitted to work on atomic energy projects. It would also extend coverage of the act from the atomic energy field to the thermonuclear program, which includes production of the hydrogen bomb.

If adopted, these changes will open the way for eventual integrated, and efficient, government-industry relations in the field. It is worth remembering that is was David Lilienthal, a staunch energy-by-government pioneer, who said that "industrial development of atomic energy simply won't happen until business management, the engineering and chemical professions—and some Edison-type inventors—have their chance for a crack at it, in a wide-open competition of ideas, based on wide-open access to knowledge."

Before the door to private atomic energy is opened wide, it has to be opened a crack. Congress now will have to decide just how wide a crack it shall be.
Was Stalin Insane?

By SERGEI PRAVDIN and MIKHAIL BOROV
(Translated and adapted by Robert Donlevin)

The following article presents for the first time a hypothesis which, if confirmed, could certainly be recorded as recent history's grisliest joke: the clinical insanity of Joseph Stalin. The report comes from two former Soviet officials now living in western Europe who, of course, must write under assumed names. These men claim that before the war they were acquainted with people close to the Politburo later shot because they knew that three eminent Kremlin physicians liquidated in the thirties had diagnosed Stalin as a paranoiac. It is impossible to check their story in detail. However, it comes to us from the highly reliable French fortnightly B.E.I.P.I. (Bulletin de l'Association d'Études et d'Informations Politiques Internationales), a publication of documents and analyses of world Communism prepared by a staff of experts unrivalled for their intimate knowledge of events behind the Iron Curtain. Other experts on world Communism in this country who have read the report and met Stalin, are convinced of its plausibility. The FREEMAN feels justified in running this as yet unverified report as a guidepost for further research.

The fantastic announcement last January of a widespread plot against the lives of the top Soviet leaders, involving the most eminent Russian physicians, flabbergasted many a Western observer already hardened to the weird ways of the Stalin regime. But confusion was compounded when, in the tumultuous months following Stalin's death, the indicted doctors were set free and their accusers publicly charged with extracting confessions by torture.

No satisfactory explanation has yet been found for the so-called "doctors' plot." Could it be that the doctors were in possession of some terrible secret dangerous to the Stalin regime? A secret which Stalin believed they were about to break—and which apparently lost much of its potency after the death of the unmourned dictator? Although this question cannot yet be answered categorically, there is strong evidence that the secret was the fact of Stalin's clinical insanity. There is testimony that his case had been diagnosed by the top medical minds in the Soviet Union as a dangerous paranoia (persistent, logically reasoned delusions, especially of persecution and grandeur).

People around Stalin first began to notice signs of his mental illness in 1932-33 when he started to use to the fullest horrible extent the tremendous power he had acquired. They reported that this power was apparently too much for his mind to absorb. Those were the days of forced collectivization, when literally millions of peasants who tried to buck the government program were ruthlessly starved to death. Paranoia would explain both Stalin's obsessive fear of "capitalist encirclement" and the wild excesses of his purge, which struck down friends, alleged foes, and groveling sycophants without distinction. It would also explain the fact that he compelled people to equate him with Socrates and Aristotle, with Karl Marx and Lenin, with Goethe and Pushkin. He declared himself the greatest of scientists, philosophers, writers, linguists, statesmen, and finally had himself proclaimed the supreme genius of the human race. The parallel with Caligula is obvious.

The case was of special interest to one of the most eminent physicians attached to the Kremlin in the thirties, Dr. Dmitri Dmitriovich Pletnev, who had ample occasion to observe Stalin. The doctor often accompanied the dictator to his retreat in the Caucasus. He knew that his Number One patient, who was able to control himself in public, was subject to attacks during which he became savage, capable of killing. Pletnev began to wonder about the death of Stalin's young wife, Nadejda Allilueva, who was rumored to have committed suicide after Stalin threatened her when she reproached him for killing off or deporting all their Old Bolshevik comrades. Along with others familiar with Stalin's fits, the physician was inclined to believe that her sudden and violent death had resulted from one of the dictator's outbursts of rage.

Dr. Pletnev also knew of Stalin's pathological interest in the tortures carried out by the N.K.V.D. When the secret police were trying to break some important prisoner, he would call them hourly for details. It was in the years 1936-38 that Stalin's persecution complex was most apparent. In 1936 he rarely showed himself in public. At a celebrated Central Committee meeting in March 1937 he delivered a thundering two-hour diatribe against "capitalist encirclement"—his old bête noire. He
accused the “bourgeois” countries of sending behind the lines of the Soviet Union three times as many spies as they sent into other countries, and also “saboteurs, troublemakers, and assassins.”

General Walter Krivitsky, one-time chief of Soviet intelligence in western Europe, who escaped to the United States, wrote of this meeting that Stalin’s henchmen listened in terror; nor were their fears idle. After this speech a mass extermination began, directed by Stalin himself. Tens of thousands were shot, hundreds of thousands deported to slave labor camps. Stalin liquidated members of the Foreign Office, Politburo and Five-Year Plan Administration; ambassadors, marshals, army commanders, scientists, writers, artists, engineers, directors of trusts; Comintern members and other foreign Communists who had come to the U.S.S.R. to help the “chief of the world proletariat” build the Communist regime. In the person of Yagoda and all his deputies he exterminated the top personnel of the Commissariat for the Security of the State, which Stalin himself had called “the vigilant guardian of the revolution.” In the army he annihilated seven deputies to the Defense Commissar, thirteen out of fifteen army commanders, 80 per cent of the corps and division commanders, 40 to 50 per cent of the regimental commanders, over ten thousand field and junior grade officers.

These purges went far beyond any stated purposes of maintaining security and discipline. They tore apart all Soviet society and struck at many of the staunchest Stalinists. Many purgers were themselves purged. To those around Stalin it became clear that there was no rational explanation. They, who had never blanched at the thought of the most ruthless suppression of any real threat to their power or regime, could find only one answer. Their chief was mad.

Fear Held Them Back

But how does one get rid of an apparently mad dictator who has built himself up to be the most powerful human being the world has ever known? Merely raising the question of Stalin’s mental health would be enough to insure arrest and liquidation. Petrified by fear, they kept quiet and went along with all the chief’s wild projects, hiding their thoughts from one another. Even if the leaders could have agreed on some action, it would have been extremely difficult to carry out. Stalin’s pathological distrust of everybody had led him to devise the most elaborate measures for his own protection both inside and outside the Kremlin. When he went to his resort home at Sochi on the Black Sea, two trains left Moscow. No one knew in which one Stalin traveled. When he motored to and from his villa in the environs of Moscow, only his personal secretary knew which of a whole line of cars he was in. Absolutely no one, not Molotov, Malenkov, Voroshilov, or even Beria, was permitted to carry a weapon when in the presence of Stalin.

Another thing that held the despot’s lieutenants from acting was the possible effect of the revelation on the Soviet people and on the Communist parties abroad. Nevertheless, several hardy men did try to do something. Molotov’s associate, Ian Rudzutak, Vice President of the Council of Commissars, suggested that a secret meeting of the Central Committee be convoked without Stalin’s knowledge. The Committee should then draw up a petition signed by all members, humbly begging Stalin to give up his office until he had “regained his health, damaged by the strenuous work he had accomplished for the good of socialist society.” It is not known to whom Rudzutak dared confide his suggestion, but Stalin soon got wind of it and the unhappy Vice President was liquidated as a spy and an enemy of the people. The same fate befell the second Vice President, V. Shubar, who apparently favored a solution similar to that of Rudzutak. The third Vice President, Valerian Mezhiauk, also perished for having transmitted abroad intelligence concerning Stalin’s mental illness. He was rumored to have been killed by N.K.V.D. chief Yezhov himself.

News of Stalin’s condition did get abroad, first in 1937 and then in 1938. Not more than three or four people knew of it, only one with all the details. But they did not see fit to divulge it, allegedly because they were afraid it might compromise the coming fight against Hitler—although it seems strange that they held this attitude during the two years of the Stalin-Hitler Pact. In any case, the original recipient of the details died during the war, probably in one of Hitler’s crematories. However, close relatives of this person knew important fragments of the story, from which this article has been reconstructed. Some of the information which follows has passed through several hands, thus the quotations may not have word-for-word accuracy, although the substance is vouched for.

Stalin often reproached Pletnev and other Kreml physicians for not being able to do anything for his insomnia or for the horrible nightmares he would have when he finally did get off to sleep. But the most disturbing thing about the dictator was his constantly repeated accusation that Pletnev, Yagoda, and Dr. Levin, dean of the Kremlin physicians, were preparing to kill him.

Dr. Pletnev had always rigorously obeyed the N.K.V.D. ruling never to discuss anything that happened in the Kremlin and especially never to talk about what Stalin did, what he said, or how he felt. But now, terrified by Stalin’s threats, he decided he had to talk to someone he could trust. He chose Dr. Levin, whom he had known for years. Levin enjoyed the confidence of Yagoda and was also the N.K.V.D. chief’s personal physician. In a heart-to-heart talk Levin admitted he had suspected Stalin of being mentally ill for over a year,
but he was horrified to hear that his own name had been dragged into the chief’s persecution complex. Deciding that their situation was so desperate that they had little to lose, they went to Yagoda. Levin saw him first alone, then with Pletnev. It is not known how many meetings they held (one included Dr. Khrodovski, then head of the Kremlin Health and Sanitation Department, and later shot) but they told Yagoda everything they knew. The ruthless police chief, then at the apogee of his power, was badly shaken by the news that Stalin had mentioned his name as a possible conspirator. The two doctors told Yagoda the disease might finally drive Stalin entirely mad, killing him. The only way out would be a complete rest. But to make sure their diagnosis was accurate, they suggested a consultation with some of their colleagues. Yagoda consented, and in the meantime decided to try to fortify his position by seeking support in the Politburo. He had to wait for the right opportunity.

Soon he had it. Orders came down from Stalin’s secretariat to purge Ordjonikidze’s right-hand man, Piatakov. Ordjonikidze, a Georgian like Stalin, was probably the only man in the Kremlin who dared talk back to the dictator. When he heard that a purge was planned for Piatakov, he was furious and stormed in to see Stalin. Upon Stalin’s refusal to save his man, Ordjonikidze raged: “You’re crazy. I know it now. You are mentally ill...”

This interview probably took place a few days before Ordjonikidze’s sudden and suspicious death. Pletnev himself was called when the bold Georgian suffered a heart attack. When the doctor arrived with his assistant, Mrs. N. Magus, who is now a refugee living in the West, he found Ordjonikidze lying on the floor, breathing with great difficulty. They put him on a couch, but before they could do anything for him they were ordered out of the room by a person unknown to them. They learned from Ordjonikidze’s wife that just before the attack he had had a stormy telephone conversation with Stalin, who told him that Yezhov was coming to arrest him.

Stalin learned through his own private spy network of the Pletnev-Levin-Yagoda meeting. Yagoda was sensationaly removed from office and given a minor position. Dr. Pletnev was next. He was framed on charges of having attacked a sick woman who came to be treated by him. Later he, Levin and another Kremlin physician, Dr. Kazakov, head of the Institute for Medical Research, were brought up on charges of having murdered half a dozen eminent patients.

There is no need to deal with the many contradictions in the charges and the parrotlike fashion in which prosecution witnesses repeated their stories. It is, however, interesting to note a striking similarity between the doctors’ plots of 1938 and 1953. In both cases the men arrested were top physicians charged with having murdered Soviet leaders. The doctors who, in 1938, had been terrorized into testifying falsely against their indicted colleagues were themselves among those accused in 1953. In neither case was any really convincing evidence introduced to support the charges. What reason could there be for purging doctors who had no active part in the country’s political life? What could the doctors have hoped to reap from their “plot” that could possibly offset the tremendous risks they were running? The complete lack of logic—even Soviet logic—in these two cases seems to indicate they had no rational cause. Both purges could well have been the products of a diseased mind which for a quarter of a century held the reins of the most powerful dictatorship the world has ever known.

After Stalin’s death the new directorate scattered a few crumbs of reform in an attempt to improve relations with the Soviet population and countries abroad. The problem was how to preserve the heritage created by an abnormal mind, and still keep the vast reserve of power Stalin had accumulated. The idea of personal dictatorship has been consistently attacked in the Soviet press by the new regime. But those on both sides of the Iron Curtain who hoped for any real abandonment of Stalinism have been sadly disillusioned. The Communist explanation that the German riots were instigated by Western "imperialists," and the sudden overthrow of Beria showed that Stalin’s methods, if not all his madness, remain in vogue. Stalin is dead, but Stalinism lives on.

The Big Three Meet

By M. K. ARGUS

London, April 1954

The conference between President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Malenkov continued in Moscow yesterday. Premier Laniel, faced with threats of a new ministerial crisis and a general strike, was forced to remain in Paris. Mr. Eisenhower had reluctantly agreed to participate in the informal discussions after the Soviet Union had acceded to his demand that, prior to the meeting, the Russians show their good intentions. Vishinsky, thereupon, delivered a speech in the United Nations General Assembly without once referring to the Americans as cannibals or barbarians but calling them only imperialists and warmongers. The speech made a profound stir in certain American and British political circles, and twenty-eight Laborite members of the House of Commons even discerned in it portents of a new era of international good will and collaboration.

Malenkov also met a condition by Sir Winston, who declared his readiness to travel East but insisted that Malenkov meet him halfway. The Soviet
Premier then agreed to hold the meeting in Moscow which is exactly halfway between Siberia and London.

The first of the informal meetings was attended only by the three principals and their translators—one American, one British, and ninety-five Russian. Premier Malenkov opened the meeting.

Malenkov. We are assembled here to find ways and means of easing international tension. Churchill (to Eisenhower). If I had his ways and your means I wouldn’t be here.

Malenkov. The Soviet Union stands in the forefront of all peace-loving nations. We are always willing to discuss proposals that are acceptable to us. But first we must have an agenda.

Eisenhower. Why an agenda? Aren’t our discussions supposed to be informal?

Malenkov. Formal agendas for formal discussions. Informal agendas for informal discussions. But there must be an agenda. No agenda, no discussions.

Churchill. Very well. Let’s have informal discussions about an informal agenda.

Malenkov. The unanimity of the peace-loving Soviet Union, capitalist America, and imperialist Great Britain is essential for the preservation of peace. We have already prepared the agenda. As its first item we propose another banquet tonight.

Eisenhower. Oh no, not another banquet!

Churchill. We’ve barely survived last night’s reception in the Kremlin.

Malenkov. I see that you wish to sabotage our friendly endeavors. In the Soviet Union we work for peace, not for war. We do not spend money on guns and atom bombs but on caviar. Tonight’s banquet will be given in your honor by our late beloved First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.

Eisenhower and Churchill. Did you say “late”?

Malenkov. Yes. The First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. will be late for the banquet. He departed suddenly on an urgent mission in behalf of peace.

Churchill. May he rest in peace.

Eisenhower. I still have a hangover from last night’s affair. My head is very tense. A peculiar way of easing international tension! (to Churchill)

After Yalta and Potsdam you and I still have a hangover from last night’s affair. My head is very tense. A peculiar way of easing international tension! (to Churchill)

Malenkov. The committee should consist of one representative of the United States, one representative of the British Commonwealth, and one representative of the People’s Democracies.

Eisenhower. Agreed.

Malenkov. We therefore nominate to the committee the following persons: Mao Tse-tung of the People’s Democracies, Paul Robeson of the U.S.A., and Jawaharlal Nehru of the British Commonwealth.

Churchill. If I hear that Nehru mentioned again, I’ll scream.

Churchill. You, at least, can scream. How do you think I feel?

Eisenhower. What about the Far East?

Malenkov. What about it?

Churchill. I know that the Soviet Union would rather build its own prosperity than go to war.

Malenkov. I’m glad you think so, Comrade Winston. Thank you.

Churchill. You’re welcome, Sir Georgi. Your illustrious predecessor ...

Malenkov. My who?

Churchill. Your illustrious predecessor Joseph Stalin ...


Churchill. Mr. Stalin always said he believed in the possibility of friendly coexistence of adverse regimes.

Malenkov. I also believe in the friendly coexistence of the Soviet regime with all other regimes that are willing to accept our friendly advice and guidance. The Soviet Union, as is well known to the entire world, never interferes in the internal affairs of other nations.

Eisenhower. But what about the Far East?

Malenkov. We do not have any Far Eastern questions on our agenda. Besides, there is no tension in the Far East. There is peace in Korea. Discussions are being held there now, and if the imperialists do not resort to obstructions, the talks will go on and on in the most peaceful manner. As for Indo-China, it is a recognized Russian province known from time immemorial as Viet-Minsk.

(Several of the Soviet translators suddenly begin to scratch themselves with utmost violence. Malenkov looks at them, jumps up, and points an accusing finger at Eisenhower and Churchill.)

Malenkov. Now you stand unmasked before the progressive world. You have come here with concealed bacteriological weapons. I see some of my beloved fellow-countrymen suffering in agony.

(He leaves the room, followed by the ninety-five translators, some of whom continue to scratch themselves. Eisenhower and Churchill are left alone.)

Eisenhower. You came here because you thought you ought to meet Malenkov face to face. Now you’ve seen his face. Well?

(Iron Curtain)
Red Bridgehead in the Guianas

The strategy by which the Communists seized power in the British colony must be known if we are to combat its duplication elsewhere in the hemisphere.

By NATHANIEL WEYL

For 190 days the people of British Guiana have been subjected to an interesting, and in some respects unique, attempt to transform their slumbering equatorial colony into a Soviet-controlled "people's republic." The revolutionary era began on April 27 when Guiana held its first general elections under a new constitution which gives the suffrage to all adults except Bush Negroes, Caribs, Arawaks, and other savage inhabitants of the jungle hinterland. The election resulted in overwhelming victory for the People's Progressive Party (Communist) over a weak, confused, divided, and directionless opposition. Eighteen out of twenty-four seats in the House of Assembly and all elected Cabinet posts went to P.P.P. leaders.

The first legislative act of the new regime was to resolve that Her Majesty's Government should intercede with President Eisenhower to save the Rosenbergs. From that revealing moment until October 9—when the Guiana constitution was suspended and British warships steamed into Georgetown to suppress a perhaps imaginary armed uprising—the young and gifted Communist leaders of the colony worked to seize power by political encroachment and calculated economic wrecking.

The Guiana strategy differed from that employed in eastern Europe because the geographical situation of the colony precluded Soviet military aid of any sort. The revolutionaries had to rely on their own resources. They had to consolidate power quietly. They needed massive, well-organized popular support to forestall British intervention. In the economic field they worked to eject foreign capital, wipe out the middle class, and bankrupt the economy. This policy not only weakened the class enemies of the Communist program, but brought havoc and hunger to an already impoverished people. Economic disintegration and successive political crises fanned the anger of the masses, strengthened their desire for rebellious action, and thus served to strengthen the power of the P.P.P.

The stage on which this revolutionary program was attempted differs from the banana and mañana republics in one important resource. In 1952 British Guiana produced one-fifth of world supplies of bauxite. The ore is mined, dried, and calcined at Mackenzie sixty-five miles up river from the capital city of Georgetown, and it comprises 30 per cent of the colony's exports and 15 per cent of its government revenues. Moreover, the neighboring colony of Surinam (Dutch Guiana) is the world's leading bauxite producer. The two Guianas account for about 45 per cent of global output. Since Surinam can be politically dominated from British Guiana, the Communist regime was a clear and present danger to the free world.

Under quiet conditions the bauxite industry in both colonies could have been harassed out of existence. Given a major war crisis, the P.P.P. government could have swiftly disabled bauxite production by blowing up the crushing plants, loading machinery, and wharves, and by closing the river arteries along which this vital material must flow.

Political control by the Soviets of more than half the free world's bauxite supplies represented a very real threat to the American and British aircraft programs. Our domestic ore production is low grade and runs a poor third to British Guiana. While rich ore reserves await exploitation in Africa and Jamaica, the time lost in developing ports, roads, docks, and mine camps would have meant a major setback to aluminum output.

Land and People

If bauxite is the key to the struggle for the Guianas, it is at the same time background to a drama that was played on the coastal plains. This equatorial colony is a place of paradoxes. Although as large as the British Isles, it is today scarcely able to support its 450,000 inhabitants. Eighty-three percent of the colony consists of tropical forest—a dense green wall of vegetation pierced by narrow, deep, tea-colored rivers.

The population is concentrated on the coastal plains. Some 283,000 acres are tilled by more than 100,000 Guiana sugar workers and small peasants growing wet rice. Land hunger has recently been accentuated because the Guiana population is today growing at the prodigious rate of 2.8 per cent per annum as against a prewar 1.5 per cent. The hero (or villain) of this rapid multiplication of human numbers is Dr. George Giglioli, chief health officer of the sugar estates, who in 1945 inaugurated the first mass civilian campaign in history to eradicate malaria with insecticides. Infant mortality was slashed; the birth rate went up dramatically.

Potentially available to the increased population are 800,000 uncultivated acres of excellent alluvial and coastal land. However, the Guiana coastal
belt is either below sea level or subject to tidal inundation. Before these acres can be tilled, massive sea walls (or polders) must be built to hold off the water.

Nevertheless, the economic and political prospects of the colony were generally favorable. The bauxite interests (a subsidiary of the Aluminum Company of Canada) were committed to expansion as were the high-cost sugar producers whose product flowed to the sheltered British market. Gold, oil, and columbite-tantalite concessions were being actively explored. Between 1942 and 1951, the gross national product of the colony advanced from $56,600,000 to $150,600,000. During that time living costs on the sugar estates doubled, but wages more than trebled. The budget was balanced and revenues were increasing. In early 1953 the International Bank proposed a five-year $66,000,000 development program to open up land resources for family farms and modernize transportation. Private savings were to provide most of the capital; enterprises were to be transferred from public to private hands; the emphasis was on building a strong middle class.

Although the trend has been upward, the working class lives in squalor and congestion. Families of ten and more live in ramshackle one-room huts perched on stilts for protection against ground water and insects. A measurement of the poverty of the people is that 1951 per capita income was $302 per year.

Rise of the Communist Movement

In 1943 Janet Rosenberg, an unusually attractive twenty-three-year-old member of the American Young Communist League and student nurse in a Chicago hospital, met Dr. Cheddi Jagan, the son of a Guiana sugar foreman of British Indian extraction, and turned down four other suitors to marry him. Jagan had worked his way through Northwestern and made a brilliant academic record. The couple settled in Guiana, where Jagan practiced dentistry, earning enough to send a brother and sister through college.

After a few years Janet Jagan founded and edited a Communist paper called Thunder. Very soon a Red organization mushroomed around her. The key spirits were men such as Dr. J. P. Lachmansingh, who formed a Guiana Industrial Workers Union to challenge the power of the anti-Communist Man Power Citizen's Association, which had brought trade unionism to the colony and controlled labor in sugar, bauxite, and other key industries; Ashton Chase, who had been sent to London to study trade unionism at Ruskin College and had studied Communism instead; Lindon F. S. Burnham, another Negro leader, a barrister and a scholarship winner.

The nuclear organization, in short, comprised radical intellectuals. Perhaps the expectation was that this colonial intelligentsia would follow the British Labor Party. If so, it was a naive one, for it ignored the unreasonably bitter hatred of the English which seems to pervade the population.

Early this year British Guiana was granted a new constitution. It provided for a lower chamber of twenty-seven members, all but three of whom were elected. The upper house, controlled by the Governor, had no power to initiate legislation, but had a suspensory veto of a year. The Governor retained his prerogatives of assent, disent, and declaration, but could normally exercise them only on the advice of the Executive Council, which was dominated by the lower chamber. To add to the general administrative complexity and confusion, the elected Ministers were to function through a permanent civil service free of politics.

Meanwhile, the Jagans and Burnham had launched the People's Progressive Party. Beginning in November 1950, Soviet liaison was established by sending P.P.P. leaders to the world congresses of Red-front organizations. In the last two years ten leaders of the P.P.P. made trips behind the Iron Curtain. These pilgrimages provided opportunity for private conferences with responsible leaders of the Cominform, for working out directives and for close Soviet scrutiny of the Guiana leadership.

In the election campaign last April, P.P.P. leaders attacked the new constitution and the intentions of the British. The Party swept to victory. Jagan, the first Communist Prime Minister in the Americas, polled 82 per cent of the vote in his district. Contrary to normal Communist electoral experience, the P.P.P. was carried to power in Guiana largely by women's votes—a result of Janet Jagan's organizational ability and popularity.

Of decisive help to the P.P.P. was its success in uniting the Negroes and Hindus. About 47 per cent of the population is of African blood, 45 per cent of Indian extraction. The Hindus were imported as indentured labor to cover the labor shortage caused by emancipation of the slaves. The Negroes consequently tend to regard the Hindus as immigrants and fear their growing competition for professional and business jobs in Georgetown. A further source of fear is that the Indian population is growing more rapidly than the Negro and will soon become the majority. The sugar hands are largely Negro; the rice garden plots belong to Hindus. The P.P.P. unified these two groups. To do so required skillful compromise and adjustment, including relinquishment of a ministerial portfolio by Janet Jagan to one of the Negro leaders.

A former Fabian, Governor Sir Alfred Savage entertained the illusion that ministerial responsibility would sober the "radicals" of the P.P.P. On May 1, H. Vance Nichols, Managing Director of Demerara Bauxite Company, told the press: "Indeed there are good sound people in the P.P.P. who are interested in seeing this country prosper." He added that labor was entitled to a fair wage and that the key to prosperity was production. That
same day the P.P.P. led a great May Day demon­stration with enormous placards hailing Stalin and Malenkov.

It would be quite superfluous to repeat the massive evidence that the P.P.P. is a Communist Party. Jagan prophesied that socialism, having replaced capitalism, would "itself evolve into the higher communist society." The young leaders of the state repeated all the clichés of agit-prop; they followed every pretzel twist of the line; they spoke of "the camp of socialism"; they organized Guiana branches of the major international Red front groups. Speaking of Mau Mau terrorism in an election speech, Jagan said: "In Kenya the Africans are not only killing white men who took away their land, but are killing their own people who turn stooges (here)... who are fighting the cause of the government and not the people."

The Road to Power

As distinct from Socialists, Communists are trained that the core of every political issue is power and the business of the Party is to conquer and consolidate that power. The electoral program of the P.P.P. blueprinted the road that was to be followed. Translated into the language of power, the decisive goals were these: to force landowners to develop their acreage and provide for their tenants and to couple this with "agrarian reform." In short, the spine of the sugar companies was to be snapped by compelling them, on pain of expropriation, to develop huge irrigation systems on idle acreage and to invest their capital in clearing land for thousands of squatters, many of whom did not even work on the sugar estates. This process was to be expedited by a land redistribution program.

The chief weapon of action was the trade unions. The anti-Communist Man Power Citizens' Association (M.P.C.A.) represented the large majority of the sugar workers. The government threw its support to the rival Guiana Industrial Workers Union (G.I.W.U.), led by Dr. Lachmansingh, who also doubled as Minister for Health. In the first four months of 1953, there were three minor stoppages in the sugar industry. From May to September—the period of P.P.P. control—there were sixty-four.

The first great blow for power was a demand that the sugar industry give exclusive recognition to the minority G.I.W.U. The latter countered with a proposal for dual recognition—G.I.W.U. for field hands, M.P.C.A. for mill workers. Without replying, the P.P.P. called the workers out on strike, closed the industry for over three weeks, and cost the colony the loss of about 5,000 tons of sugar. This was followed by a demand for general strike—in which the Communist ministers again abandoned their desks to serve as union organizers.

Meanwhile, as the Party pushed events toward crisis, it consolidated its organization and began to penetrate the key areas of state power. There had been a hiatus—a sort of stagnation in the drive toward power—during the month of May because Janet Jagan was visiting Denmark and Rumania for political instructions. She returned with a directive that the P.P.P. be reorganized on the basis of small, tightly knit cells and fractions. The Party consisted of perhaps 6,000 members and 400 cadres. A vigorous effort was now made to transform the general membership into revolutionary material, to educate them in Marxism-Leninism, to ensure security and secrecy for the Party's operations, and to set up flexible, swift methods of liaison and chain of command.

At the same time, the P.P.P. introduced measures to strip the Governor of his power to refuse entry to subversive aliens—the purpose being to set up apparatuses under the direction of experienced foreign Communists in Georgetown. The P.P.P. sought to break down the civil service system and the various independent commissions of government and subordinate them to Party control. Party cells were set up among the police—the strongest potential combat force in the Colony.

The Crisis and its Aftermath

The decisive crisis occurred when the sugar strike failed. The Ministers introduced a bill to force employers to recognize any union which obtained 52 per cent support of the workers by ballot. The calculation was that the power and prestige of the Ministers would be exerted to swing the majority of the workers into the Red unions. The Ministers, as trade union leaders, would then urge labor to make unreasonable demands. When collective bargaining broke down, the trade union leaders, as Ministers, would arbitrate in favor of labor. This operation would be used to gain control over the industries and bend them to the will of the Party.

The P.P.P. introduced this bill in the House of Assembly on September 24 and demanded that the rules be suspended and it be acted on that day. When the speaker refused, the Party organized a demonstration of 5,000 supporters, who invaded the legislative chamber.

This was the turning point. Meanwhile, the process of economic wrecking had reached significant proportions. The columbite and gold concessions were abandoned and two North American oil companies bowed out of the picture. Even more important was a decision by the Canadian parent concern of Alcoa to shift bauxite expansion plans from British Guiana to Africa. The building trades stagnated because of political fear, and lumber mills reported output declines of 12 to 40 per cent. Sir Winston Churchill's dramatic intervention in British Guiana and the subsequent suspension
of the new constitution and dismissal of the Ministers were too thoroughly reported in the press to require any résumé here. The Party had expected intervention on a limited scale and had, in a sense, prepared for it. The Jagans had met with other leaders to perfect plans for wholesale arson in the event that the Governor arrested any of the Ministers. Following this meeting, large sales of gasoline were reported to Guiana citizens who happened to lack automobiles. What the Party was not prepared for was a swift, overwhelming display of force. In the crisis, the leaders vacillated between cries of defiance, appeals for mass action, and the role of innocent liberals who merely wished to present their case before Commons or the United Nations.

The British Labor Party moved and rather narrowly lost a vote of censure against the Conservative government on its handling of the Guiana matter. It is worth noting that Clement Attlee, after a long interview with Dr. Jagan, expressed himself as thoroughly satisfied as to the latter’s intellectual dishonesty and that the Labor Party conceded that the P.P.P. had “used methods tending to the establishment of a totalitarian regime.” It based its proposed censure on its belief that the evidence of a Communist plot to seize power by insurrection was inadequate and that no sudden emergency had arisen which justified suspension of a colonial constitution.

On the charge of insurrection, P.P.P. Minister Burnham retorted: “For a coup you must have arms and I do not know that we have any arms.” This seems to be the plain truth. Neither the geographical nor the political situation of the Guiana Communists made armed uprising possible as a road to power.

The justification for suspension of the constitution is a different one. The suppression of even the most “democratically established” Communist government is justified, since its ultimate purpose is to suppress future freedom of political choice. Democracy, in short, has a dimension in time as well as in space.

The pieces are now being slowly picked up. The flight of funds from the banks stopped in early November. Mr. Stassen is giving serious consideration to a $300,000 technical aid appropriation for Guiana workers’ housing. The International Bank development plans will probably go through. Every effort will be made to coax back alarmed concession holders and check the spiral of economic decay. As for the political situation, it is not improbable that a few truant P.P.P. leaders will be invited into a caretaker cabinet while the constitutional issue is being studied.

The striking power of the P.P.P. is still formidable and will become more so as the initiative drops from the grasp of London. We can expect strikes, political agitation, demonstrations, possibly sabotage. The economic setbacks to the colony are serious. The great advantage that may be obtained from this somewhat bungled situation is establishment of the principle that any Communist government set up by any means whatsoever within the free-world area will be suppressed and ousted, its capacity for, and commitment to, evil having no relationship to the techniques by which it gained and fortified its power.

What Elects Republicans

By C. DICKERMAN WILLIAMS

“[Mr. Padrutt, the Republican candidate] ran on the basis of complete support for the Eisenhower Administration.”

U. S. News and World Report, reporting on the special congressional election in Wisconsin, 1953

“[Mr. Hetfield, the Republican candidate] asked the voters to elect him as a sign of confidence in the Eisenhower Administration.”

The New York Times, reporting on the special congressional election in New Jersey, 1953

The Republican setbacks in recent congressional elections are susceptible of various interpretations. One negative conclusion, however, cannot be denied. Republican candidates, running in heavily Republican districts, cannot be elected on a pledge to cast their votes as members of Congress in support of the program of the President, whatever it may be.

This irresistible conclusion should dispose of the demand of many commentators of New Deal persuasion that Congressmen should accept White House proposals irrespective of their own judgment. Such commentators are greater champions of Presidential power than the President, who, according to a semi-official statement by the Vice President, “does not want a rubber-stamp Congress.”

A favorite argument of such commentators in support of their demand has been that the election returns of 1952 show that the people voted for Eisenhower and not for a Republican Congress. This theory does not stand analysis; a careful examination of the 1952 returns supports the contrary view, strongly confirmed by the special elections of the last few weeks, that the way for a Republican candidate to get elected is to have definite convictions of his own, and to run on those convictions.

The conten tion of the proponents of the thesis that it is the duty of a Republican Congressman to be a rubber stamp has been that the Republican candidates in 1952, if taken as a group, barely won the election, whereas the President was swept into office by a large majority. It is even suggested that the Republican members would not have got in at all had it not been for the enthusiasm caused by the Eisenhower candidacy. Proponents of this argument cite figures showing 33,324,351 votes for
Eisenhower to 27,314,987 for Stevenson, a majority of 6,509,364—as against 28,543,334 for the Republican candidates for Congress to 28,178,682 for the Democrats, a majority of only 364,662. (The term “Congress” is here used to mean the House of Representatives; as there were elections for the Senate in only thirty-three states, nation-wide comparisons are impossible.)

At first glance these figures seem persuasive, but there is a catch: in the eleven states of the former Southern Confederacy the conservatives vote Democratic, and the Republicans run few candidates.

In the thirty-seven Northern and Western states Eisenhower received 29,710,808 votes to Stevenson’s 22,891,764, a majority of 6,819,044; the Republican congressional candidates got 27,518,484 votes to the Democrats’ 22,319,730, a majority of 5,192,754. These majorities are roughly comparable, especially since about 5 per cent of the voters in the Presidential race in these states failed to vote for any congressional candidate. In thirty-four of these states Eisenhower’s majorities were greater; in three, those of the Republican candidates considered as a group.

The “Republocrats”

Now it is well known that, from a New Deal point of view, Southern Democrats are as bad as Republicans—with perhaps a few exceptions such as Lister Hill of Alabama. It was the New Deal commentators who coined for them the word “Republocrats.” If we add the vote for Southern Democratic Congressmen to that for the Northern Republicans, the total is 33,371,427. This figure compares very respectably with Eisenhower’s 33,824,351, when we consider the slightly smaller aggregate vote cast for congressional candidates than for Presidential candidates.

A New Dealer who challenges this reasoning might be asked to interpret Texas. There Eisenhower got 1,102,878 votes, and Martin Dies, running for Representative-at-Large on the Democratic ticket, 1,979,889. Does this show that Dies is almost twice as popular as Eisenhower and should be allowed to control the Texas delegation? New Deal commentators, who regard Dies as highly objectionable, don’t seem to have made that claim. A principal explanation of his much greater vote is that Dies had no opposition. Correspondingly, in comparing the total Presidential and congressional votes, should not weight be given to the fact that in most Southern districts the Republicans ran no candidates at all?

To analyze what is more important, the position of individual Republican Congressmen, let us illustrate with Michigan. In that state the Republican candidates for Congress in the aggregate had a margin of 142,603; Eisenhower had a majority of 320,572. This comparison might seem to suggest that the congressional candidates were carried into office on Eisenhower’s popularity. Yet consideration of individual Congressmen shows that most Republicans had personal convictions necessarily known to the voters because they had repeatedly elected them, beginning long before Eisenhower had become a political figure, and that they won by very large majorities. That veteran die-hard, Clare E. Hoffman, elected continuously since 1914, won by 87,703 to 43,350; Jesse P. Wolcott, long known as a foe of controls, in Congress since 1931, won by 101,936 to 66,699. Other forceful Republican personalities from Michigan, old in congressional service and easy winners, are Dondero and Shafer. Their constituents can hardly have elected these men to office term after term without knowing and approving their convictions. The reason that the total congressional vote in Michigan was fairly close is that the Democrats who were elected also got large majorities. Thaddeus M. Machrowitz, for instance, won by 118,695 to 21,442.

Another illustration is the victory of Representative Daniel A. Reed of New York, perhaps the most unyielding of Republican Congressmen at the session of 1953. He won in 1952 by 91,534 to 44,276. Reed, who has served in Congress continuously since 1919, when the President was a young lieutenant, would perhaps be astonished to be told that he “rode into Congress on the coattails of Eisenhower.” One can only think that he is in Congress because his district knows him and his ideas, and wants him there.

Of the 221 Republicans elected to the House of Representatives in 1952, more than three-quarters (174) had been members of that body before President Eisenhower entered politics. Necessarily they had election winning programs of their own. If candidates Padrutt and Hetfield had given more consideration to such a program, they, too, might have been elected. It is significant that in each instance the successful Democratic candidate ran on a platform adapted to his district—in Wisconsin, isolationism; in New Jersey, internationalism. Certainly neither pledged himself to vote according to the views of Adlai Stevenson as such.

The basic fallacies of the New Deal commentators are two: they disregard the situation in the states of the Southern Confederacy, and they make their comparisons on a group and nation-wide basis. But Congressmen are not elected as a group, nation-wide; they are elected as individuals in particular districts. To get elected they must, as individuals and not as Presidential robots, offer programs that appeal to the voters of their districts, not programs adapted to nation-wide elections. This, of course, is not to say that their own programs may not be based on considerations of national welfare.

The Constitution does not provide, and President Eisenhower does not desire, that members of Congress imitate the deputies to Hitler’s Reichstag or Stalin’s Supreme Soviet. The voters agree.
Can We Trade with Malenkov?

Inspired by what they believe is a more conciliatory policy in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death, economic prophets in England and France—and some in this country—are holding out the hope that business between the free and the Communist-dominated countries can now be accelerated. We present here two views on the question by European authorities.

The Editors

The East-West Trade Illusion

By JACQUES GERSZUNI

One of the most moth-eaten panaceas being peddled in Western European Communist, crypto-Communist, and neutralist circles this year is the illusion of East-West trade. It is significant that those who believe that increased trade with the Soviet bloc is possible in view of changed policies under Malenkov are often the same people who advocated more trade with Russia in the Stalin era. Last year they said the economic and political needs of the West called for the development of commercial relations with the Iron Curtain countries. This year it is Malenkov's emphasis on more consumer goods for Soviet citizens which the London Economist, in its issue of August 15, sees as making him "at least temporarily dependent on two factors not wholly under his control—a continued international détente, and more trade with the West."

The free world, the British review believes, should "do some intensive rethinking" on the subject. Arguments run something like this: Western Europe must bridge the dollar gap by seeking to replace present imports from the dollar zone with imports from other areas. Because little has been done to implement the "trade, not aid" slogan, the only other areas likely to be able to fill this need are in the Soviet bloc. The products bought from the East are mainly certain raw materials and foodstuffs: timber, grain, and coal. England is the Soviet Union's best customer for timber. France also buys very small quantities of furs from Russia, coal from Poland, and glassware from Czechoslovakia. But even if there were no bars to trade with the Soviet bloc, such commerce would not, under present conditions, balance Western Europe's dollar deficit. Rubber, petroleum products, copper, and some machinery must always be bought from the dollar zone.

Wishful Thinking

The illusion that a satisfactory substitute for missing dollars can be found in the East was furthered, as might have been expected, by Gunnar Myrdal of the Economic Commission for Europe (E.C.E.) at Geneva. A recently published E.C.E. report concluded that an increase in the export of timber, grain, and other food products from the Soviet Union would be a useful contribution toward the solution of Western Europe's dollar deficit. It was a rather unrealistic conclusion in view of the fact that the only development of East-West trade indicated by contacts between representatives of the two blocs would be an accentuation of the export to the Communist empire of capital goods and machine tools. The Soviet bloc is continuing its industrialization program at full speed, and all the premature conclusions now being drawn in Paris and London about the alleged desire of the Malenkov regime to raise the standard of living at home certainly will not make the Red overlord decide to effect any radical changes in the structure of Soviet foreign trade by switching to the importation of raw materials and food products.

In connection with the recent view expressed by both the Economist and Dr. Myrdal, it is interesting to note that in December 1952 the Economist doubted the ability of the Soviets to balance any purchases from the West with deliveries from their side of the Iron Curtain, and cited such inability as an obstacle to the development of East-West trade. The E.C.E. made a similar estimate of the situation in 1952. There is no possibility of the Soviet Union's exporting capital goods or machinery. Of the exports it might make—timber, coal, and grain—the only one that offers any prospect for development is timber. There has been no change in the volume of coal exports since before the war. The only country that continues its coal deliveries—principally to Scandinavia—is Poland.

Soviet grain exports are now made up principally of secondary cereals, not breadstuffs. In the satellite countries, where economic unrest is a factor to be reckoned with constantly, the use of any grain reserves is determined not merely by the maintenance and extension of Communist power. The U.S.S.R. prefers to direct its "planned" grain surplus to the countries of the East.

There is also the question of the willingness of...
the Soviet bloc to deliver. The Iron Curtain regimes look at all trade from a political rather than an economic standpoint, and thus prefer to do their exporting to and importing from the backward areas of the world where they may reap political profit from such activity.

An analysis of the existing pattern of trade with the Soviet bloc gives a good idea of just how little the economic health of the West depends upon such commerce. The following figures on East-West trade were given by the E.C.E. The East is composed of the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria.

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<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Western Europe's imports</th>
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<td>925</td>
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<td>1952</td>
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Taking 1938 as a base year, western Europe's imports from the East have diminished 70 per cent (from $3,170,000,000) and western Europe's exports to the East have diminished 45 per cent (from $1,137,000,000). Before the war the West sold 6 per cent of its exports to the East and bought 9 per cent of its imports from the East. Today these figures are about 3 per cent in both directions. The fact is that the Communist economies simply are not at present capable of handling any significant increase in the volume of trade with the West. The commercial agreements such as those signed with France are mere drops in the bucket.

Unfounded Hopes

We often hear of how a developed East-West trade would benefit the economies of the West. In France, for example, there is a lot of talk about easing the pressure of German competition in foreign markets, or that the restrictions imposed on French exports to the sterling area would disappear after an increase in trade between England and the U.S.S.R. However, the only too justifiable doubts about the potential size and conditions of any such operations make these suppositions seem quite unfounded.

In reality, the economic factor plays a secondary role in this whole business. Political and military motives underlie every Soviet attempt to increase East-West trade. Last year's economic conference in Moscow proved that Soviet interest was only in strategic materials. The campaign carried on in Paris and London for the revision of the Battle Act list "B" of goods not to be exported to the Soviet bloc is certainly more political than economic.

The orders brought back from Communist China by French and British businessmen do not justify the illusion of a significantly expanded East-West trade, and French authorities are not yet favorably disposed to give the green light to these private transactions. In England there seems to be a stronger sentiment in favor of granting licenses for transactions with Communist China, but "British realism," so often referred to in the Communist and crypto-Communist press, certainly isn't going so far as to favor trade with the Communist world. No government could take the risks of backing up the business operations of its own nationals who are trying to find cracks in the economic Iron Curtain.

Finally, even if the West imposed no restrictions at all to East-West trade, the profound gulf between the economic and political systems of the two blocs would make the establishment of any large-scale economic relations between them practically impossible. Furthermore, it is high time that economic considerations should not be simplified too much, or separated too far from considerations of another kind, which determine the life or death of the peoples and nations that still remain free.

Economic Strategy*

By RAYMOND ARON

What is to be our attitude toward East-West trade, trade between the West and the Soviet sphere? One fact should be noted at once. Many in the free world believe that the United States opposes, and the Soviet Union favors, East-West trade. This has by no means been the case, at least at the outset. We need only study the statistics to see that countries which enter the Soviet system are compelled to reorient their foreign trade.

In 1938, Czechoslovakia had hardly any commercial relations with the Soviet Union (1 per cent of its total foreign trade). Before the coup d'état (1948), almost all of its trade was with the West. Today, it has been more or less integrated into the Soviet bloc, with 60 per cent of its foreign trade going to Iron Curtain countries in 1951, as against 11 per cent in 1937.

The reduction of East-West trade fits in with a number of Moscow's plans. The policy of forced industrialization eliminates the surplus of food products and some of the surplus of raw materials which the East European countries used to export. At the same time it forbids the importation of manufactured products from the West. The Soviet bloc must be as nearly as possible self-sufficient, and the Soviet Union proposes to organize trade inside the "socialist world" according to its own interests. Moreover, in Stalin's words, the breakdown of the unity of the world market aggravates the crisis of capitalist economy. More simply, the tensions within the world economy are aggravated

* Copyright, 1953, by James Burovask

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to the extent that the region open to free (or freer) trade is restricted. The Moscow theoreticians have never made a secret of what they call “socialist encirclement.” Capitalism will be condemned to death on the day when it is confined to a sufficiently narrow area of the world economy.

Does this mean that the Soviet planners want to eliminate all East-West trade? Obviously not. They want to get from the West the means of production and the raw materials which they lack, while selling the smallest possible amount of those raw materials which the West really needs. East and West manage to agree about some exchanges that serve the interests of both parties, but there is a permanent lack of harmony between the trading aims of the two camps. The Soviet wants to buy the least possible quantity of manufactured goods, whereas the West wants to sell the most possible.

**Goods or Armies?**

The United States did not initiate the restrictions on East-West trade. It was led to impose its own set after 1949 and especially after 1950 because it justifiably wished to block the sale of certain products that were considered strategic, capable of directly and immediately increasing the military and economic potential of the Soviet Union. Moscow naturally tried to get around these restrictions. The United States is especially concerned about the risk of helping Soviet economic construction by furnishing such products as machine tools and ball bearings, both of which the Soviet Union lacks.

Without denying the importance of such strategic products, Europeans wonder whether the complete separation between the two worlds does not in reality serve Soviet interests as these are summed up in the doctrine of socialist encirclement. (How can Japan, for example, have a viable economy if cut off from China?)

The choice between the two conceptions depends on one’s hypothesis concerning the development of the cold war, on the relative weight assigned to economics and to armies in the struggle between Communism and the free world, and on the basic strategy that is adopted.

If, as the West has been doing up to now, we try to lessen the great schism gradually through the effects of time, and hope for the weakening of the virulence of a religion come to power, then controlled and limited trade between East and West will be to the advantage of both sides.

In any case, even if the American leaders judge it desirable to stop East-West trade almost entirely, they should still feel some responsibility toward the difficulties thereby imposed on Japan or Great Britain. Economic strategy toward the Soviet bloc must be made part of that world economic policy which the United States alone is in a position not merely to conceive but to carry out.

**THIS IS WHAT THEY SAID**

**Due Process for Harry White**

The death of Harry White, the former Treasury Department official who was accused before the Un-American Activities Committee of engaging in treasonable activities against his Government, has made it impossible for these charges ever to be fully answered. He alone could have done that. Mr. White was granted his brief “day in court” by the Committee, where he labeled as “unqualifiedly false” the unsubstantiated testimony that had been given against him. But he had not been granted an opportunity to confront his accusers in a court and he was charged, by inference, outside of recognized legal procedure, with commission of an infamous crime. First the Committee and now death denied him that due process of law which is one of the most precious rights of an American citizen.

Mr. White’s death was due to a heart condition brought about by years of arduous government service and aggravated by the ordeal through which he had to pass during the committee hearings. The Committee cannot be charged with responsibility for an illness so caused and of such long standing. But it can be charged with having denied him the due protection of the law, with having permitted witnesses to make unsubstantiated statements of which the accused learned only through public sources, and by so doing ignoring the Bill of Rights and outraging our American sense of justice.

Whether Mr. White and other former government officials named before the Thomas Committee were guilty of anything except working too hard for less pay than they could have earned in civilian employment we do not know. Mr. White cannot now make his plea. We seriously doubt that we will ever find out much more through the processes of the Committee on Un-American Activities, which only at this late hour, apparently, is seeking substantiation of the charges made before it, by some of its witnesses, against Mr. White and the others. This procedure is not the American way of doing things. It is the un-American way. We believe that unless it is corrected it places in jeopardy a fundamental concept of American life.

**THE NEW YORK TIMES, Editorial, August 18, 1948**

Chicago, Nov. 6—Attorney General Herbert Brownell Jr. said today that former President Truman had promoted an official to a high Government post in 1946 despite a report by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that the man was spying for Russia. Mr. Brownell identified the spy as the late Harry Dexter White. . . .

**THE NEW YORK TIMES, November 7, 1953**
Lids on the German Economy

By VOLKMAR MUTHESIUS

West Germany's recovery so far has been the result of its removal of economic controls, but for full recovery a full return to free enterprise is needed.

The economic revival of western Germany has been so remarkable that many consider it a "miracle"; yet it is merely the result of a relatively consistent application of the principles of free enterprise. It is thus nothing but the fruit of the liberation of human energies. This economic success, however, would be even more remarkable if free enterprise in the commodity markets were now followed by free enterprise in the money markets.

In Seelisberg, Switzerland, in September, one of the participants in the conference of the Mont Pèlerin Society (an international group of economists adhering to the philosophy of free enterprise and representing a dozen different countries) pointed out that a country with foreign exchange control, and with its money market and housing also under government control, can hardly be called a country of free enterprise. And, in fact, a country where the three most important groups of prices are controlled can certainly not be called "liberal" in the full sense of the neo-liberal terminology.

If what still remains of wartime government controls were now removed, the economy of western Germany would be provided with an additional impulse which might increase prosperity even faster than it is increasing now. And this is precisely the aim of the economic policy of Ludwig Erhard, federal Minister of Economics. The strengthened position of the government, as a result of the September elections, should offer him the political opportunity to achieve it.

The absurdities which still distort the West German economy are illustrated most clearly in the money markets, and particularly in the stock market. True, the formation of capital has made considerable progress, especially through savings deposits and insurance. But savings reflected through the stock market are far behind. There are only about a third as many new issues as those recorded after World War One and the currency stabilization at that time. Then an annual average of about 3,000,000,000 DM (Deutsche Marks) in securities were sold on the open market, not much less than half of which were mortgage certificates. Such certificates in the past have always played a dominant part in the financing of home construction. Since the currency reform in 1948 an annual average of only a little more than 1,000,000,000 DM in open market certificates have been sold. Less than half were mortgage bonds.

The absolute figures do not adequately show the extent of the market drought. The mortgage bonds were mainly sold not to private holders but to public banks—the authorities which supply money for public housing "social home construction" through institutions issuing loans on real estate. This is not a genuine formation of capital, but a sort of window-dressing for an already completed compulsory formation of capital by taxation. Professor Müller-Armack, one of the most important economic policy advisers to Ludwig Erhard, has practically conceded this.

Why Securities Sold Poorly

The Germans are no longer afraid of a currency reform. Such a fear cannot be the explanation of the very poor sale of securities prior to the winter of 1952-53. The real explanation is much more the irrational and unjust progressive income tax, which collects 35 per cent even of an annual income of 25,000 marks (approximately $6,000). Another most important explanation is the preposterous interest policy, which is influenced by rent control and public housing policies. Thus we have an interesting example of the contagious effect of any government interference within an economy. Any government interference leads to unintended secondary effects; these in turn force further interferences in neighboring fields, and so on. In this case, housing control has encroached upon the money market. The legal freezing of rents is the reason why the interest rate on capital has not been allowed to develop freely.

The rent freeze was thus followed by an interest-rate freeze. For the better understanding of this, one should take a close look at the housing development in western Germany. More than one quarter of the homes available at the beginning of the war had been destroyed by air raids, and, after the war there was a severe housing shortage. This was intensified by the influx of refugees from eastern countries. For political reasons it was decided not to correct this shortage by creating private incentives for home construction through the free movement of rents and prices. On the contrary, even after the currency stabilization, rents remained frozen. The natural result was that private capital for home building either became entirely unavailable, or was used only in connection
with great public subsidies. From the commercial aspect, in view of the costs of building on the one hand and rent control on the other, an apartment house at the moment of its completion is worth only half of what it has cost to build. The normal relation between income-value and production costs has been destroyed by rent controls. This happens, of course, in any type of price control that fails to consider the formation of market prices and costs of production.

The theory of rent control says: The rent can amount only to so much; therefore new housing can tolerate a load of only such-and-such an interest rate. This rate was fixed at 5 per cent. The result was that, on a considerable part of the capital expenditure for home construction, no interest can be paid at all. The difference must be granted by the government as a subsidy. Every year the government invests 2,000,000,000 to 2,500,000,000 DM in building homes. This still has partly the outward appearance of private enterprise, but is ultimately government-financed.

Of course there are people in West Germany who try to justify such types of capital formation by declaring that private individuals are incapable of forming or unwilling to form capital. This reminds one of the old joke about the young man who had murdered both his parents and then claimed mercy in court on the ground that he was an orphan.

Attitudes of Nazi Regime Persist

In judging the effect that the 5 per cent compulsory interest rate has on the market, one must remember that Hitler's collectivism completely destroyed understanding within Germany of the stock market's functions. Years after the Nazi regime had been destroyed, most Germans still believed a holder of securities to be a kind of drone, if not a criminal. Even the credit and money market experts did not seem to understand the most elementary principles of the market. For instance, it was almost completely forgotten that a security price depends in large part on the relation between the interest rate it carries and the general interest rate in the country. During the period of cheap (or rather, worthless) money, people had become used to believing that "interest is of no importance." The function and influence of the interest rate had to be rediscovered. In a national economy regulated on the basis of competition this is known to every banking apprentice. In Germany, after the intellectual as well as physical destruction brought on by the Hitler regime, even the bankers had to learn it.

The experiment of putting the stock market back into operation with unrealistic interest rates had to fail. Public banks purchased certain amounts of the 5 per cent bonds, but it was difficult to sell them to private capital investors. Now and then a banker succeeded, but he had to be as smart as the salesman who talked a farmer with a single cow into buying an electric milking-machine for which he took the cow in payment.

In the course of the years the false interest-rate policy more and more proved to be the main obstacle to revival of West Germany's stock market. Therefore the legislature decided, after much debate, to issue late in the fall of 1952 a "First Law for the Promotion of the Money Market." It is the basic idea of this law to enable the Treasury and public housing to keep the standard interest rate of 5 per cent with the help of a coupon tax (by which the income tax is settled) graduated from zero to 60 per cent. All the other capital borrowers must offer about 8 per cent interest if they want to compete with the tax-exempt interest return of a public security.

Thus two interest levels were created, as seen from the debtor's viewpoint, but only one net-interest return as seen by the creditor after deduction of his tax. In this manner the structure of income-tax progression has been disrupted. The conception of worthiness of promotion has been invented. Those whom the authorities declare to be worthy of promotion are allowed to issue tax-exempt securities; the others are not.

This topped money-market interventionism. The practical outcome proved that those were right who, on the publication of this law, had predicted an issuance boom but discrimination against private borrowers. From December 1952 until the fall of 1953, about 1,750,000,000 DM worth of securities were issued. Approximately nine-tenths of these were by public corporations for "social home construction"; only about one-tenth by private issuers.

The grotesque thing in this pattern is, however, that this "cheap" interest is only a fiction, an illusion. The tax deficit, which results from the exemption of interest proceeds from income tax, amounts to several times the interest expense. The purchaser of a federal loan who belongs in the 50 per cent income-tax bracket can count on the equivalent of a 16 or 17 per cent interest rate on his capital investment from a 5 per cent security if he considers his savings of taxes as interest. In other words, the government indirectly pays a concealed interest rate.

All of these absurdities on the market for fixed-interest-bearing securities are confronted by a situation just as bad on the share market. Shares were outlawed by Hitler and Gobbiels. The stock law was subjugated to the so-called Führerprinzip (the authoritarian principle). The shareholders were deprived of power. (According to Hitler's still effective law, the stockholders are not even entitled to prepare the balance sheet.) The management and the directors were made omnipotent. The shareholder, however, is not only a man who has next to nothing to say about his property; he is also considered a speculator, a man with an "out-of-
work income,” because the moral stigma put on him by the Nazis is still felt.

Only slowly is this atmosphere of suspicion, prejudice, and misunderstanding beginning to lift. But here also the tax problem is perhaps even more important. The double taxation of a corporation’s earnings is no German specialty, but in view of the German tax rates it is especially hard. For the corporation itself the profit is taxed at practically 80 per cent (because of some peculiarities of the very complicated revenue law). The amount distributed as dividends is taxed 30 per cent (this likewise for the enterprise itself). And when it gets into the hands of the receivers of dividends and the shareholders, the distributed amount is subject to the individual income tax, with its rate as high as 75 per cent in the top brackets. This is illustrated by the following example: A shareholder at the 50 per cent income-tax level receives from 6 per cent gross dividends 3 per cent net. But in order to distribute these dividends, the corporation must earn 20 per cent on its capital, 17 per cent of which goes to the Treasury. In other words, investment capital from new shares becomes so costly for the enterprise that this method of financing becomes virtually prohibitive. On the other hand, this forces the contracting of debts, and leads to forced “self-financing” by high prices. Thus taxes are losing their character of profit taxation, and become additions to costs of production.

The Task Facing Erhard

Thus, now that the September elections have endorsed his economic policy, Ludwig Erhard has a wide and important sphere of action still before him. It will not be easy for him to carry through a more realistic economic policy, because the opposition is still strong. Nevertheless, it is important at the present time to see the situation as it is. Germany still retains a tax system hostile to private property and enterprise. The efforts to avoid paying genuine interest rates for capital obstruct the stock market’s ability to function as far as demand and supply are concerned. It is doubtful whether normalization is possible unless housing control is removed either previously or simultaneously.

Anyway, at the present time the position of the stock market represents more than a mere aesthetic defect in West Germany’s conception of economic policy. A spread of this disease might in the long run even endanger the functioning of competition on the commodity market. Certainly no one can hope for an influx of capital from abroad—as many German entrepreneurs and politicians do—if the domestic market has not previously been brought once more into a free economic order.

Many people in West Germany today are inclined to believe in a phrase which may become increasingly dangerous—the so-called “distant objective.” This phrase is now very fashionable. The reasonable and simple object—the freely functioning market—is theoretically and platonically confirmed, but only as a “distant objective” which must be reached step by step because the presumed social and political obstacles are too great.

This frequently emphasized “distant objective” reminds one of the well-known prayer of St. Antonius, who, as a young man, and when he was no saint at all, used to ask the Lord every night: “Heavenly Father, give me chastity, but please not at once.” German economic policy has been acting in accordance with this formula in those fields where the 1948 and 1949 leap into liberty was not ventured—especially on the money market.

Will Ludwig Erhard be able to insist that here, too, Germany must now seek the restoration of freedom?

To Each His King

When Richard Lovelace lay in gaol, 
He still could laugh and sing: 
They let him drink in wine and ale

The health of Charles the King. 
So careless-kind the Roundheads were, 
And kinder still, the Fates: 
Althea came—none lovelier!—

To kiss him through the gates. 

And what had Richard Lovelace done 
To win his prison laurels? 
Was he by inadvertence one 
Embroided in civic quarrels? 
Was his, perchance, a poet’s crime— 
Did he, in frolic jest, 
Inflame the Puritans in rhyme 
With Venus half-undressed? 

He, faithful to the sword he wore, 
And answering to his summons, 
A Royalist petition bore

From Kent unto the Commons: 
And hence a prisoner, his name 
Is written on the scroll

Of those who kept, whatever came, 
The freedom of the soul. 

The roll is long: to each, his King: 
To some, the prison gates: 
And ever may Althea bring 
Love’s counsel to the grates! 

And courage still from you we take, 
High-hearted prison-sage: 

“Stone walls do not a prison make, 
Nor iron bars a cage.”

FLOYD DELL

NOVEMBER 30, 1953 169
Seven years ago the Book-of-the-Month Club distributed Thunder Out Of China, of which Theodore H. White was co-author. In that earlier book, the attitude, estimates, and proposals that from the American side eased the Communist conquest of China were expressed with journalistic skill and color. Not without reason was it hailed in the general press by reviewers L. K. Rosinger, John K. Fairbank, and Edgar Snow. The Daily Worker, referring to a small group of “excellent books about China,” found it appropriate to list it next to the books of Guenther Stein and Agnes Smedley, two journalists much praised in that day, who later emerged as members of the Sorge espionage ring.

This month the Book-of-the-Month Club is once again distributing to hundreds of thousands of homes a book by Teddy White. (Fire in the Ashes, by Theodore H. White, 405 pp., William Sloane Associates, $5.00.) Because the earlier book was so accurate in its prognosis of the future, because it may even have played its modest part in making the future, we will do well to read Fire in the Ashes with some care. To get at the foundation ideas, we must dig through a good many layers of journalistic plaster, which is put on with a smooth and expert trowel.

I shall confine myself to a small list of items that somehow struck me.

“Were it not for the Germans, Western Europe would already be united.”

“The rules of American politics . . . made it impossible to approach the subject as the two other grand partners, Britain and Russia, would have preferred.” (My italics. The subject is postwar policy.)

Commenting on American objections to an alleged Anglo-Russian deal on Rumania and Greece: “This obscure incident must, almost certainly, have been one of the initial shocks to Russian diplomacy.”

“A morbid, almost hysterical suspicion of Western intent ran from top to bottom of the Soviet world.”

“These were the measures that provoked the famous Berlin blockade.”

At this point I am beginning to feel so sorry for the Russians that I will skip to the short practical program of action with which Mr. White concludes:

Carry through the “final negotiation” of the Korean war.

“It is to our interest . . . to negotiate directly with the Communists in Indo-China.”

“We must turn quickly and shrewdly, our wounds still aching, with sorrow in ten thousand homes, to offer Mao Tse-tung an exit out of the Russian world into a larger and freer one where he can make his own decisions and act in his own interest.”

“By postponing the arming of Germans, or yielding on it altogether, we can exact an enormous price.”

We must drop all ideas of “a crusade” for “liberation” or anything foolish of that sort, and take the path of “negotiation.” There will be enough negotiating to keep everyone busy, because our “deal” with Moscow is going to consist of “myriad little deals . . . separate, individual adjustments at points of greatest mutual irritation.”

We can expect positive results because “the new Communist leadership that emerges is quite different from that of the rough, hard-bitten, earthy men who brought the revolution to power under the cruel and brilliant leadership of a handful of intellectuals.” Now we have middle-aged, Victorian-type conservatives whose basic aim is just to stabilize the internal regime that upholds their privileges. “If one substitutes the term ‘businessman’ for the Russian word ‘engineer’ or ‘economist,’ what emerges is a governing class dominated by the Russian counterpart of the Western businessman-producer.” So naturally American businessmen can get along with their Russian similars.

The negotiations and deals will in time clear up that little problem of the Communist “theory” about running the world. “Their philosophy cannot be penetrated by our ideas and faith except by prolonged contact and the education of negotiation.” The myriad deals will expose them “to the seepage of questions . . . which ultimately, we hope, will erode their system of politics, at home and abroad, into impotence.”

Meanwhile, in order to carry out the program, American “leadership” must be free to act “without impossible daily Congressional interference.”

Please don’t get the idea that Mr. White has written a pro-Communist book. Why, you never read a book that is fuller of anti-Communism—enlightened anti-Communism, of course. What it’s mostly about is the nature of the Communist threat and how to meet it.

Somehow, though, if I were Malenkov, and wondering just what sort of book would best serve to influence American public opinion along the
line that I was currently pursuing, I would consider the publication of *Fire in the Ashes* a most happy coincidence.

It is much better written than the *Daily Worker*, and with the help of the Book-of-the-Month Club I should imagine that it will be more widely read.

In recent years, “art books” have multiplied like the leaves in autumn. Everyone knows that their manufacture has become something of a racket. With recent technical advances they are too easy. All that is necessary is to assemble forty color reproductions of some painter or “school,” hire a professor to write a five thousand-word essay, and float the volume at fifteen dollars on the Christmas market.

Of André Malraux’ new work, let me first insist that it is not an “art book” (*The Voices of Silence*, by André Malraux, 661 pp., Doubleday and Company, $25.00), though it contains no less than 465 reproductions, fifteen of them in full color. Nor is it a history of art, though not a little art history is incorporated within it. *The Voices of Silence* is, in truth, not about art, but is rather itself a work of art, and of the highest order. Like all great works of art, it is unique, a new forming of reality.

In the conventional art book the reproductions and the verbal text are separate, with only the “subject” (Renoir, the School of Fontainebleau, the Metropolitan Museum) as a formal connection. This link is, one might say, external: the reproductions “illustrate” what is said explicitly and adequately by the words. The meaning of the words is a complete whole to which the pictures are a useful but nonintegral addition. With no more than a few minor changes, the verbal text could be (and often is) published without the “illustrations.”

Malraux’ text could not conceivably exist without the reproductions. The words and reproductions do not “illustrate” each other, or say “the same thing” in different mediums. Each is part of the essential structure of his meaning.

And these reproductions, incidentally, are of a subtlety and splendor that is not quickly realized. Our eyes are jaded by the large-size many-colored reproductions that are principally in fashion. The page dimension of this volume, which was made in France under Malraux’ direct supervision, is an ordinary book size, and 97 per cent is black and white. It all seems rather modest and minor at first glance, until you suddenly grasp that you are seeing things, and groupings of things, unlike anything that you have known before: shadings and textures that you would not have thought possible in black and white photography; astounding objects that, when you investigate, are the details of miniatures or coins blown up; a rock crystal skull of the Aztecs facing an Athenian frieze; big things made small, and statues seen from perspectives unavailable to human eyes.

For his “museum without walls” Malraux has ravaged history and the earth. The devil art of dark primitives is here, and the serene reconciliation with the universe of Chinese scroll painting. Siva, the cave paintings, the art of Khmer and of Nara are brought into a whole with the carvings of New Ireland, the porch statues of Chartres, the wonderful metal art of the Steppes.

This lavishness in the quantity and kind of reproductions is not merely display. In the Dialogue which Malraux and I composed several years ago (*The Case for De Gaulle*, Random House, 1948), he stated his conviction that the development of the techniques for reproducing works of art (music, painting, sculpture, etc.) was of critical human importance. As it applies to plastic art, the “theory of reproduction” is a recurrent theme in *The Voices of Silence*, as it was in *The Psychology of Art*, the earlier and shorter form of this present book.

Through museums, which are the product solely of Western, post-Renaissance culture, through easier world-wide travel, and now through reproductions, modern man, unlike any of his predecessors, claims all art, of all times and peoples, as his own. Of course, past or exotic works of art, when they come to modern man as exhibits in a museum or as reproductions, are not the same things that once existed in a particular place and were understood in terms of a particular, no longer felt scheme of life. The head has left the torso; the fresco the wall; the pillar no longer supports the temple; the brightly painted classical world is without color.

All the objects undergo what Malraux calls a metamorphosis. For us, the creative metamorphosis which we impose on all the objects turns them from whatever they once were—acts of piety, symbols of the dream, tools, shelters, pastimes—into, precisely, works of art. Only for us have they all existed as works of art, part of “this new realm of art . . . as though our excavations were revealing to us not so much the world’s past as our own future.”

As the modern range expanded,

. . . a fundamental concept, that of style, was involved . . . For us, a style no longer means a set of characteristics common to the works of a given school or period, an outcome or adornment of the artist’s vision of the world; rather, we see it as the supreme object of the artist’s activity, of which living forms are but the raw material. And so, to the question, “What is art?” we answer: “That whereby forms are transmuted into style.”

That quotation is far too abstract to suggest this book. Almost always Malraux directs his sentences toward concrete objects or artists. Or through a concrete image he illumines:

Stained glass . . . replaced the mosaic set in a gold ground as the free light of day replaced the furtive glimmer of the crypts . . .

The art of Byzantium, which owed its being to
the insistent pressure of an oriental God wearing down indefatigably the multitude of his creatures, after becoming petrified in the mosaic, branched out in two directions: towards Chartres and towards Samarkand. In the West, the window; in the East, the carpet.

I remember very well the evening in Paris when Malraux had just returned from Rome and his first sight of the great apse of the Church of SS. Cosmas and Damian. He had found all the wonder of art and of man in the marvel of that mosaic, which, he here writes, explored the realm of color through...

... an orchestration based on contrasts that maintained and amplified it, as flying buttresses were to shore up, ever higher, the naves of the cathedrals. Surely El Greco felt a thrill of joy when he set eyes on the red of those clouds billowing around Christ against a starry background whose azure darkens and deepens little by little into the profound blue of the Roman night.

Malraux ends with an assertion of the defiant Humanism that he has maintained before the terrors of our century, among which he, like T. E. Lawrence, has so intimately figured as actor as well as artist.

I have often seen the Malayen seas at night starred with the phosphorescent medusas as far as eye could reach, and then I have watched the shimmering cloud of the fireflies, dancing along the hillsides up to the jungle’s edge fade gradually out as dawn spread up the sky, and I have told myself that even though the life of man were futile as that short-lived radiance, the implacable indifference of the sunlight was after all no stronger than that phosphorescent medusa which carved the tomb of the Medici in vanquished Florence or that which etched The Three Crosses in solitude and neglect...

... Though humanity may mean so little in the scheme of things, it is weak, human hands... that draw forth images whose aloofness or communion alike bear witness to the dignity of Man: no manifestation of grandeur is separable from that which upholds it, and such is Man’s prerogative. All other forms of life are subject, uncreative, flies without light...

And that hand whose wavering in the gloom are watched by ages immemorial is vibrant with one of the loftiest of the secret yet compelling testimonies to the power and the glory of being Man.

Moscow’s Hands Abroad


Imperial Communism, by Anthony T. Bouscaren. 256 pp. Washington, D. C: Public Affairs Press. $3.75

The third and concluding volume of Mr. Carr’s historical trilogy is devoted to the foreign relations of the Soviet government during the period of revolution and civil war and the first years of the New Economic Policy.

The author is realistic in drawing no distinction between the activities of the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and those of the Communist International; these were merely the right hand and the left hand, subject to direction by the same brain in the Communist Party leadership. Trotsky declared in an interview shortly after the Bolshevik seizure of power that diplomatic intercourse is necessary “not only with governments, but also with revolutionary socialist parties bent on the overthrow of the existing governments.”

The commitment of the Soviet regime to the ideal of overthrowing all non-Communist governments and its disposition to break or evade any agreement to the contrary are amply documented; the author cites Lenin’s decisive statement on this point:

“It is inconceivable that the Soviet republic should continue to exist for a long period side by side with imperialist states. Ultimately one or the other must conquer.”

Mr. Carr’s scholarship is painstaking, and there is far more available material about these early years of the Soviet regime than one could find about the period of Stalin’s dictatorship. Especially interesting is the light cast upon the evolution of the Communist movement in Germany and the attitude of the Turkish nationalist leader, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, toward the Soviet regime. He accepted Soviet aid, but tossed the leading Turkish Communists into the Black Sea and informed Moscow they had met with an accident.

The present volume is perhaps the best of Mr. Carr’s trilogy. It is not marred by any exhibition of the soft spot which Mr. Carr cherishes in his heart for totalitarian politics and economics and which is reflected in some of his other works. The story is told with deadpan objectivity and with occasional bits of humor at the expense of the Communists. However, the general impression of the three-volume work is somewhat dry and abstract because of the absence of human characterization and because the author divides his work into watertight compartments. What Mr. Carr has constructed, with admirable and diligent research, is rather a history of Communist ideas and Soviet institutions than a narrative of living events.

While Mr. Carr shows the theoretical basis of Communist subversive activity outside the Soviet frontiers, Mr. Bouscaren’s book gives a brief survey of what Communism has achieved, on a country-by-country rundown. The author compresses much useful information about the essentials of Communist revolutionary doctrine into limited space and his account of Communism in various countries supplements and brings up to date the somewhat similar guidebook on international
A Primer in Ecology


Already a century ago Darwin used the word "ecology" and he even pointed out man's critical position in the fragile web that binds together all the life processes of our planet. Yet ecology and its applications—for the lack of which man-made deserts march and civilizations die—is still relatively new. Hence Mr. Storer's book is not only an excellent primer but also in some measure a "first" book in that it is one of the first to essay the difficult task of bringing together all the vast dimensions of ecology, from the behavior of the hydrologic cycle to that of human beings, whose wise or unwise actions "lie at the very center of the earth's great web of life."

Naturally, so slender a volume can do little more than expound by illustration. But the illustrations are well chosen and well interpreted. Even more gratifying is Mr. Storer's simple, unliterary style which never strains for a phrase and never pontificates. For this and other reasons educators will welcome the book for supplementary college and high school reading.

Since most contemporary landscapes have felt to some degree the impact of technological man, most ecology is human ecology: a huge discipline that inevitably must span the natural and social sciences. And because ecology constantly confronts human values and choices, it is bound to be less, or perhaps more, than a science.

The balances and successions of subhuman ecology are regulated by natural law, and as Mr. Storer points out, in his early days man was controlled by the same natural law. Famine, disease, and war kept population close to the carrying capacity of the environment, and the chain reaction of ecological disaster was limited; when ancient civilization destroyed their environments the sands of man-made deserts buried them quietly—the Mayans of Yucatan never heard what happened to Carthage and to Babylon.

Not until the twentieth century did our human ecology become planetary in scale. Not until then did technological man precipitate the global ecological crisis that underlies the chronic political crisis of our time. Today, as Mr. Storer points out, the industrial civilization has achieved "almost unlimited power to destroy its environment and almost unlimited power to multiply. These two together add up to almost unlimited compulsion toward destruction of environment which eventually means self-destruction. While pursuing this course the mass of mankind has become so far removed from the soil that supports it that it little realizes the problem involved. Orderly natural law has given way to unregulated chance."

The book is greatly helped by a twenty-four page insert of excellent photographs. It is marred by an incomprehensibly meager and haphazard bibliography which fails to list even the work of Paul Sears, Edward H. Graham, Charles E. Kellogg, and other outstanding scientists.

JAMES KORTY

Middle Eastern Dilemma

The Arab World, by Nejla Izzeddin, 412 pp. Chicago: Henry Reger Company. $6.50

World Without End, by Emil Lengyel. 374 pp. New York: John Day Company. $5.00

William Ernest Hocking, in his foreword to The Arab World, blithely derides the American who is "tied to his watch" and extols the Arab who whiles away time near a sleepy water-wheel. Unfortunately, however, the world today has no time to watch the water-wheel. "The Arab lands," according to the blurb on Dr. Izzeddin's book, "occupy one of the most vitally strategic regions on the face of the earth. . . . Courted by East and West alike, the Arab nations today announce their claims with a new note of confidence."

These claims, we gather from Dr. Izzeddin, are simple, but not modest. The Arabs simply want everything their own way. They want to do oil business with the United States, but they don't want the United States to protect these oil deposits against Soviet aggression. The Arabs don't want to join in the defense of the Western world, but they want the West to come to them "with cleaner heart and hands." But this reviewer—submerged in an avalanche of books by foreign authors urging the West, and particularly America, to confess its sins, repent its crimes, and cleanse its heart—would like to pit the cleanliness of American hearts and hands against that of any in the Middle East or elsewhere. More than any other country, America has contributed to the development of the modern Arab world. Yet America is the pet whipping boy of Arab politicians and intellectuals. Dr. Izzeddin, a woman who studied at Vassar and Chicago University, should know better than to fall into the easy demagoguery of the Cairo agitators who recently stenciled on the walls of our diplomatic mission there: "This is the Embassy of the Jew-S-A."

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN
For the past few years our local crop of books on the Middle East has featured criticism of the Arabs and exaggerated sympathy for Israel. Now we find a number of books taking the side of the Arabs against both Israel and the rest of the world. But none of these books, including The Arab World, features much criticism of the Soviet Union.

For my part, I would still like to see a frank study of the Middle East written with an eye on the protection of the interests of the free world, and particularly America, in that region. Foregoing neither our friendship for the Arabs nor our sympathy for Israel, we should know what to expect in that territory. Professor Emil Lengyel, a Hungarian who has written extensively about the Mediterranean area, approaches the problem in World Without End. But aside from a useful exposé of the importance of Communism in the Middle East, he, too, advises the United States to go East bearing nothing but gifts. Thus, we are still waiting for a book about the Arabs and the Middle East written neither from a British, Arabian, or Hungarian, but from an American point of view, having at heart the interests of America as well as those of the free world.

**Briefer Mention**

**Father Divine: Holy Husband**, by Sara Harris, with the assistance of Harriet Crittenden. 320 pp. New York: Doubleday and Company. $3.55

"I was combusted one day in 1900 on the corner of Seventh Avenue and 134th Street in Harlem." Thus George Baker, the jovial little Negro preacher who calls himself Father Divine, explains his mysterious "coming" to the million of exuberant followers who have given up sex and sin and found an emotional—and often economic—haven in his million-dollar cooperative enterprise. In her sympathetic yet detached biography, Mrs. Harris, a practical sociologist, probes a bit deeper into the obscured background of the now some seventy-odd year old sharecropper's son from Georgia. She not only traces the phenomenal rise of this curious religious movement in America, and often amusing detail, but she also sets out to explore the economic and spiritual climate of America's Negro communities which made this phenomenon possible. Based on extensive and sometimes rather repetitious individual testimony, Mrs. Harris points out how this rambling "deity"—often denounced as a charlatan and racketeer, and wanted since 1942 in New York State for not obeying a court order—came to fill a real need, in his own curious way. For, Mrs. Harris maintains, Father Divine not only operated one of the most effective relief missions in Harlem during the depression years, but he also gave his followers of "darker complexion," as he calls them, a feeling of racial equality and the promise of relief from economic misery. This also serves as an explanation for his on-and-off flirtation with the Communists. That he embroidered his positive work with a spurious cult of his own divinity, his immortality, and his "purity" (he claims, for instance, not to have any income when questioned by the Internal Revenue Department), Mrs. Harris seems to imply, is only the other side of a basically valid coin. And she adds, somewhat dramatically, "if Father Divine were to die, mass suicides among the Negroes in his movement could certainly result. They would be rooted deep, not alone in Father's relationship with his followers but also in America's relationship to its Negro citizens."

**The Passionate Heart**, by Beatrix Beck. Translated from the French by Constantine Fitz Gibbon. 210 pp. New York: Julian Messner, Inc. $3.50

There could be no more devastating reflection on the current state of French literature than the awarding of the esteemed Prix Goncourt to this opus by Beatrix Beck. In a conglomerate of vaguely surrealistic scenes, Mlle. Beck relays a rather confusing tale of sadism, mysticism, lesbianism, religious conversion, murder, and war, which, perhaps, is supposed to depict a slice of "Life." Her heroine, widowed by war and trying to survive in occupied France, is in love with another woman. But eventually she transfers her affection to religion and her desires to a priest, whom she fancies "spiritually sublime," "just," and "charitable." She demonstrates these qualities, and presumably the author's outlook on life, by saying that one must not take one's moral convictions too seriously. And she adds with a certain amount of candor that "there are people for whom the most charitable thing that one can do is to blow out their brains."


Sholem Asch's new novel begins as a gripping and perceptive psychological study of a man's struggle with guilt. Isaac Grossman, the hero, has risen from the grinding poverty of his youth to a position of great wealth and national respect through his integrity and brilliant business acumen; but at the pinnacle of his success he is tortured by the knowledge that his career began with a theft—twenty-seven dollars. All his achievements are meaningless to him, because he is convinced that he could not have attained them by his ability alone, that they were made possible only by his crime—a crime which he thinks ruined his victim's life. His intensely religious upbringing and his belief in a vengeful
God convince him that unless he finds his victim and expiates his sin, he is damned to eternal hell-fire. But as Isaac begins his search, the story leaves his inner conflict, and becomes a chronicle of the effects of his obsession on his family and friends, and of their efforts to halt the quest for a man they believe to be only the fiction of Isaac's sick and tormented mind. The delineation of a man's inability to live with guilt—which is the original focus of the novel—is lost, and other, more superficial characters take Isaac's place on the center of the stage. This unfortunate shift of focus makes faintly anticlimactic the final resolution of the spiritual struggle, and mars the value of this otherwise forceful and original story.


In 1912-13 E. M. Forster paid his first visit to the Indian state with the odd name of Dewas Senior. Eight years later, in 1921, he returned for some months as temporary private secretary to its ruler. He has now put together letters written during the two visits and connected them with explanatory passages. This has been done with such skill that, combined with the narrative quality of the letters and their grace of style, the whole becomes a continuous story. A story, indeed, with a hero—the ruler himself, the Maharajah of Dewas State Senior, whom Forster found "lovable and brilliant and witty and charming and... complex." He provides plenty of evidence to support his judgment of the man, and adds a plot besides, involving two marriages, considerable intrigue, strange and fascinating festivals, and finally catastrophe. Though certainly not a major work of the author's, nor intended as such, The Hill of Devi is altogether pleasant and rewarding reading.

The Inward Journey, by Doris Peel. 241 pp. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. $3.00

The outward journey forming the framework of this book involves a rather complicated trip to Berlin from West Germany, and the Soviet World Youth Festival for Peace in 1950, which the author attended as a member of the press. The so-called "inward" journey is taken up with the attitudes and thoughts of the youth in both zones and an attempt to reach some common ground of understanding. The whole episode as reported by Miss Peel consisted mostly of endless, gushing conversations on a nineteen-year-old level with a miscellany of young things possessing strictly Germanic first names such as Pauli or Ernst or Liesl and little else by way of individuality or identification. There is a great deal of chatter as well as emotion about how we must all be friends. A less eventful or purposeful journey would be hard to imagine.

Of Continuing Interest

European Communism, by Franz Borkenau, $6.00. A fresh, brilliant, and enlightening history of Communist activities in non-Soviet Europe.

The Renaissance, by Will Durant, $7.50. A rich and readable account of the famous pageant of Renaissance Italy.

Cowhand, by Fred Gipson, $2.75. A true and lively story of Fats Alford, a working cowhand in the range country west of the Pecos.

Paradise Prairie, by Cecil B. Williams, $4.50. Recollections of an Oklahoma farm in the first decades of the century, written with realism and love.

Portrait of André Gide, by Justin O'Brien, $6.00. The translator of Gide's Journals has combined a revealing biography with a critical survey of all Gide's writings.

The Communist Conspiracy, by Stephen King-Hall, $3.00. An excellent summary of the theory, methods, and history of this important subject.

Memoirs, by Franz von Papen, $6.50. This apologia of Nazism's most famous fellow-traveler is in its own way a document of extraordinary interest for the history of our times.

An Autumn in Italy, by Sean O'Faolain, $3.50. Proof that a useful guide for tourists can be first-rate literature.

Containment or Liberation?, by James Burnham, $3.50. A clear statement of the basic choice that confronts American foreign policy.

The Spirit of St. Louis, by Charles A. Lindbergh, $5.00. The complete story of the great flight, written with accuracy and dignity.

The Return of Germany, by Norbert Muhlen, $4.50. The most informative and most enlightened book that has been written on postwar Germany, East and West.

Brain-Washing in Red China, by Edward Hunter, $3.75. A terrifying account of the calculated destruction of men's minds in the Communist orbit.

The Captive Mind, by Czeslaw Milosz, $3.50. An account of writers and artists in the captive countries, beautifully written by a poet who escaped to freedom.


A Century of Conflict, by Stefan Possony, $7.50. A thoroughly realistic study of Communism as a system of power and violence.
An American Architect

By SERGE FLEIGERS

After reading Frank Lloyd Wright's latest book (The Future of Architecture, 326 pp., New York: Horizon Press, $7.50), visiting his current exhibition entitled "Sixty Years of Living Architecture," and, talking with the great man himself, one invariably comes to the conclusion that the world of architecture is divided—so to speak—into Wright and wrong.

As Mr. Wright himself admits in his own forthright way: "I defy anyone to name a single aspect of the best contemporary architecture that wasn't done first by me. Or a single aspect of the worst contemporary architecture that isn't a betrayal of what I've done." The amazing fact about this statement is not its arrogance—a trait for which the Leonine 84-year-old Mr. Wright is widely noted—but its accuracy. According to Herbert Leary Smith everything good and bad in American architecture stems from Wright—the good is a good copy, and the bad is a bad imitation. In the view of others, Wright is to architecture what Pasteur was to microbiology, and Einstein is to physics.

Upon looking at the photographs in his book, or the drawings maquettes, and the full-scale house shown at the Guggenheim Museum in New York, one is not, at first glance, struck by the pioneering quality of Mr. Wright's work. True, there is a house (the second Jacobs House in Middleton, Wisconsin) that looks suspiciously as if it had been inspired by flying saucers, but the exhibition's pièce de résistance, the life-scale reproduction of the Usonian House of Chicago, looks anything but advanced. It is a pleasant, four-room, one-story family dwelling that might cost about $25,000, if it were now erected in Westchester. Just like some of the better designed houses of today, this one has clean, restrained lines, a panoramic glass wall for the living room, and is built around the pivotal center of a light and airy kitchen. Nothing really exciting, one is prone to say, till one realizes that this house was not designed this year, or last. It appeared on Mr. Wright's drawing board in 1900, at a time when his contemporaries still dressed by gaslight, and spent their lives in dismal brownstone houses, carrying food from a basement kitchen to the plush-and-velvet dining room. The prophetic quality in the work of Frank Lloyd Wright is demonstrated again and again with the Larkin Building (1905), entirely fireproof and air-conditioned, the Cooley House (1908), and the Robie House (1909)—all edifices that with slight modifications, would be the pride of any architect in 1958. If Wright had stopped drawing in 1920, he would still be classed as one of the great designers of this century. But it is his continuing drive to establish a native American architecture and the evolution of an American philosophy of ethics in this process that have reserved for him a place in history.

When Wright, three months short of getting his college degree, joined the Chicago firm of Adler and Sullivan, American architecture was a pitiful echo of European traditionalism of the Beaux Arts School, best expressed in the Chicago exhibition of 1893. Then Wright's boss and teacher, Louis H. Sullivan, originated the skyscraper, although Wright acidly remarks in his book: "Michelangelo built the first skyscraper, I suppose, when he hurled the Pantheon on top of the Parthenon. The Pope named it St. Peter's and the world called it a day." The skyscraper became a symbol of America's immense vigor. But it grew up with a borrowed face, with facades that imitated European styles which in turn had imitated the styles of earlier periods, classic and gothic. After World War One, these European styles came under heavy attack from a group of architects led by Mies van der Rohe, Walter Gropius, and Le Corbusier, who had formed the famous Bauhaus group in Weimar Germany. They directed their fire at the rosettes, coquillages, and curlicues so dear to the heart of traditionalists. Their cry was for functionalism and they carried off many victories in Europe, specially in the Scandinavian countries. But when Groppius and Van der Rohe moved to this country, their basically revolutionary concepts did not accord with the evolutionary character of American life. Young American architects with a feeling for their country's silhouette turned in increasing numbers to Frank Lloyd Wright. With him they found a lyrical appreciation for America, for "the long, low lines of color, wind-swept terrain, the ineffable dotted line, the richly textured plain, great striated, stratified masses lying noble and quiet or rising with majesty. . . ." American architecture, they hold, must not fight with its surroundings; it must harmonize with them; it must form a living link between man and the soil he lives on.

Wright is contemptuous of the urge that drove man to break with nature, to build a tower of Babel to defy God, and pyramids along the Nile to defy man. He is also derisive about some of our present-day builders. The glass-and-steel United Nations structure and the Lever House in New York he calls "architectural aberrations," while Corbusier's sub-city outside Marseilles is termed "massacre along the waterfront." As an example of a truly American skyscraper, Wright designed the H. C. Price Company tower for Bartlesville, Oklahoma. It has no gothic griffons or glass-and-steel nudity, but a texture and silhouette resembling the tall desert cactus of the landscape in which it will arise.

Wright is against town planning such as advocated by Le Corbusier, since "it raises additional carbuncles on the epidermis of our civilization." He urgently advocates decentralization, and his advice is apparently heeded by the thousands of people who leave the cities every year to live in pleasant, pretty houses designed by the pupils, followers, and imitators of Frank Lloyd Wright. Thus Wright's arrogance seems eminently justified. But that is only as he expected, for he remarks: "Early in life I had to choose between honest arrogance and hypocritical humility. I chose honest arrogance and have seen no occasion to change."
How You can back up the Revolt on the Campus

We received a sharp jolt the other day. Visiting an old friend we were present when his daughter, who attends a leading Eastern university, received her current copy of the Nation. She opened it with the remark: "Now I can find out what really to think about what's been happening." In subsequent conversation we learned that the Nation is the only journal of opinion she reads—"We all do," she said—and that her ideas on the basic problems of our time are taken from its pages.

The left has always recognized that the students of today are the leaders of tomorrow. For years collectivist and statist propaganda has dominated the thinking on college campuses. So-called "progressive" on the faculty back student political action clubs and surround membership with an aura of intellectual respectability. The liberal conservative professor is often derided as a reactionary, even a "fascist." That is why during the past twenty-five years the Nation and the New Republic, with their average circulation of only 20,000 to 40,000, have been the major influences in forming political thought and attitudes in America.

College reading tables everywhere feature these publications. In contrast the Freeman is rarely found on any of them. Now we offer you the opportunity to remedy this lack, to back up the revolt against the collectivist trend on our campuses. We have worked out several plans whereby you can give students and professors a chance to get the facts and arguments that expose the fallacies of collectivist and statist thinking.

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Spotlight on the P.T.A.

In the November 2 issue of the FREEMAN Jo Hindman (“Gag Rule in P.T.A.”) stated: “Shocked by the instructions [from the National Congress of Parents and Teachers] to sing the praises of UNESCO, many P.T.A. members rejected the literature.”

In this case Mrs. Hindman shows unfamiliarity with the United Nations Organization, and complete unfamiliarity with both the name and activities of UNESCO . . . which deals only in education, science, and cultural affairs.

The dominant assumption of Mrs. Hindman’s remarks on the United Nations is that it is a subversive and therefore dangerous organization. I find such remarks based on ignorance of even basic information about the United Nations Organization extremely objectionable, especially in a magazine that usually holds to high critical standards. I rather think it is just this sort of criticism that is dangerous. The United Nations needs a lot of changes, but no change either in the P.T.A. or in a specialized agency of the U.N. will help us if it is made in an attitude of fear and suspicion.

Winnetka, Ill.
Bruce Cutler

I was glad to read the article by Mrs. Hindman concerning the regimentation of the P.T.A.s. It is difficult to find an institution where subversion could accomplish greater harm to freedom than in the public school system. I do not necessarily confine the term subversion solely to destruction and overthrow of the Constitution by violence.

There is not the slightest suspicion in my mind that the inner core of reformers who have dominated the policy of the National Education Association for many years, is following religiously and hopefully, and so far successfully the methods of infiltration and propaganda perfected by subverters who accept as their creed socialism, either of the Fabian or the Marxist persuasion . . .

It would indeed be most salutary if those who feel Mrs. Hindman’s report overemphasizes the conditions, would set up in their own localities an entirely unbossed group of intelligent and unbiased parents to look into the charges and prove or disprove them . . . Bridgeport, Conn.

James Westbook

Dewey vs. Dewey

Robert S. Byfield’s devastating analysis of Governor Dewey’s turncoat position on Niagara’s power development [“Why Socialize Niagara?,” November 18] is characteristic of the FREEMAN’s straightforward thinking. I hope you will have sufficient reprints to send to senators and members of Congress for whom this article is “must” reading.

Kenneth D. Robertson, Jr.
Concord, Mass.

Farm Price Supports

Your statement, on page 77 of the November 2 issue, that “it is precisely the price support principle that is the cause of half the economic mischief in the world,” is typical of the point of view of most urban people, but places a lot of blame where it is not justified.

In the first place, the farmer is the “Johnny come lately” in this price support business. Has not all the favorable legislation for labor and labor unions been a support price for labor? Have not all the protective tariffs we have had for years, to protect our “infant industries,” been a support price to manufactured goods of all kinds? Have not freight and utility rates been raised time after time as a result of rulings by their state and federal governing bodies? All these policies have been in force almost from the beginning of our country’s history. Agricultural price supports are a very recent thing, and are only an evening-up measure for some of the supports afforded other segments of our economy for years.

You also say that farm price supports mean higher food prices for city workers. It is not difficult to prove that it is largely the labor and services added to agricultural products after they leave the farmers’ hands that causes such high food prices.

In any major price decline or depression, agricultural prices are the first to decline. The manufactured goods the farmer buys are slow to come down due to protective tariffs, labor

union monopolies, subsidized railroads and truck lines with their protected rates. Only under some plan of price support has the farmer any protection against these inequalities.

McNabb, Ill.
Walter G. Griffith

Socialized Ballet?

Seldom have I read a more childish piece of criticism than Serge Fliegier’s review of the Sadler’s Wells Company [“Socialized Ballet,” October 19], which, to me, epitomizes much of the critical writing in your magazine.

Without a doubt the accuracy and timing of the Sadler’s Wells Company is reprehensible and a reflection of regimented socialism—just as, I suppose, any inaccuracy or mistiming on the part of an American ballet troupe would be a glorious illustration of rugged American individualism and laissez-faire philosophy.

Carolyn W. Mallison
Syracuse, N.Y.

“Negotiation” and the FTC

In your editorial, “The FTC Talks Sense” [November 2], you refer to the new FTC policy of clearing “misunderstandings” between government and business by negotiation, rather than court action.

For a good many years government bureaus have proceeded largely upon two policies. Their favorite attitude toward any point in question boiled down to: “We are right, you are wrong.” The other has been even worse. It has been to take a position of strength and light—“Now let’s get together. We are only too glad to show you why we are right.”

If the Federal Trade Commission and a host of other federal agencies can and will change, and proceed on the realization that “negotiation” means to determine, in good faith, which of two or more viewpoints is right, a new day will dawn.

Santa Fe, Cal.
W. Russell Fawcett

A New Liberalism Needed

Max Eastman, in his article “The Delinquent Liberals” [November 2], exemplifies once more the urgent need for a reevaluation of the liberal position not of yesterday, or the 1930’s, but of today and tomorrow. For, it seems to me, there are quite a few people in this country who, while opposed to any form of totalitarianism and government encroachment in the economic as well as private sphere, do not believe that a return to the old forms of nineteenth-century liberalism can resolve all our present problems.

To give these non-leftist liberals a direction should be one of the tasks of the FREEMAN.

New York City
Charles Willfort
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