Secretary Dulles' Somersault
Henry Hazlitt

It Costs to Be Thrifty
Lewis H. Haney

The Conservative Revolution
Martin Ebon

The Democrats: Back at the Old Stand
An Editorial
TEEMING INGOTS AT J&L. Molten steel is “teemed” into ingots after it has been “tapped” from J&L’s new open hearths at Pittsburgh.

A glowing forecast of your future... is “teemed” in molten metal!

From gigantic ladles, steel is poured or “teemed” into molds to make ingots. This is the first solid form steel takes on its way from the furnaces to the finishing operations.

Here is the beginning of all those steel products that are so important to you—your automobile... railroad freight and passenger cars... oil and gas pipelines... ships, airplanes... the stove, washing machine and refrigerator for your home... bicycles for your children... television masts... business machines for your office... the military weapons that defend all you have.

Today, we need more ingots than ever before. It’s a need that keeps growing. It has created a bigger job for steel-making.

At J&L there’s a program of progressive expansion and modernization to meet this challenge. J&L’s new open hearth shop where these ingots are being “teemed” is another example of progressive steel-making... a tradition at J&L for 100 years.

JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION
PITTSBURGH
The Fortnightly
For
Individualists

Editor
HENRY HAZLITT
Managing Editor
FLORENCE NORTON

Contents
VOL. 4, No. 1 OCTOBER 5, 1953

Editorials
The Fortnight.................................... 7
Back at the Old Stand.......................... 9
Mr. Durkin's Resignation...................... 10
Looking Toward the Sun........................ 11
Freedom Wins in Germany........................ 11
Trieste Tremens................................ 12

Articles
Secretarial Somersault............................................................... 13
The Conservative Revolution............................ MARTIN EBON 15
Our Near Eastern Outposts.............................. WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN 17
It Costs to Be Thrifty...................... LEWIS H. HANEY 19
When the Red Flag Came Down............. NORBERT MUHLEN 21
Victory Through Word Power?.............. MAX SHEROVER 23
The Kremlin's Forgotten Aggression........ ROBERT DONLEVIN 25

Books and the Arts
On the Rewriting of History.......................... JAMES BURNHAM 27
The Desert Fox at Bay................................................................. 29
One-Sided........................................................... LAWRENCE R. BROWN 30
Woman of the New Japan............................... IRENE CORBALLY KUHN 31
Briefer Mention............................................................. 32
Eternal Hollywood.............................. SERGE FLIEGERS 33

Poem
In Saecula Saeculorum.......................... BEN RAY REDMAN 24

Worth Hearing Again............................. 14

From Our Readers................................................................. 4

Our Contributors
MARTIN EBON, a frequent contributor to the FREE­MEN, is currently at work on a book about world­wide population pressures. He is the author also of World Communism Today and Malenkov: Stalin's Successor, published last May.

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN has just returned from an extended journey abroad, which included a visit to the Middle East.

LEWIS H. HANEY, a well-known financial column­ist, is also professor of economics at New York University. His most recent book is reviewed in this issue (p. 32).

NORBERT MUHLEN, newspaperman and political scientist, came to America from his native Germany in the thirties as a refugee from Nazism. He has since then become known in this country for his anti-Nazi and anti-Communist articles in a number of national publications, and his book, The Return of Germany, published last spring by the Henry Regnery Company. He is now spending some time in Germany, where he arrived last June in time to witness at first hand the East German riots.

MAX SHEROVER, a former trustee of the Institute of General Semantics, is an accomplished linguist, president of the Linguaphone Institute, and inventor of Memory Trainer and of Dormiphone, a device for teaching during relaxation and sleep.

HENRY C. WOLFE saw service in both world wars, in the first on the field of combat, in the second as a war correspondent. He has traveled extensively in Europe, the Americas, and the Far East. In between he has written a number of articles for leading periodicals, also several books, including The Imperial Soviets and The German Octopus.

LAWRENCE R. BROWN, an engineer in Philadelphia, is engaged in preparing a comprehensive history of Western thought and action.

IRENE CORBALLY KUHN, who has won distinction as a foreign correspondent and anti-Communist writer, is co-author (with Father Raymond de Jaegher) of The Enemy Within.

CORRECTION. In our preceding issue C. Dickerman Williams was erroneously described as "a Solicitor in the Department of Commerce." He was General Counsel, that is, the chief law officer, of that department.

Among Ourselves
This issue of the FREEMAN is the first in Volume Four—which is another way of saying it marks our third birthday. Like any birthday child we must admit to a kind of joy and also pride in what has been—but especially in what is to be.
FROM OUR READERS

Our “Leading Thinkers” Line

Your editorial, “Did We Win the Wrong War?” [September 7] prompts these remarks. I agree with you, for the prospects are dismal for us and for our friends the South Koreans.

If I understand some of our Leading Thinkers such as Walter Lippmann, what the United States must do goes something like this: Since we as a nation are committed to the unification and rehabilitation of Korea, and further since President Rhee is such a troublesome old man we are stuck with (though he does not truly represent his nation any more than Chiang Kai-shek ever did his), we are on a spot. Since no peace is possible that is not satisfactory to the North Koreans and other Reds, the spot is really tight. But there is a simple way out. All that is required is a large enough “Peace Conference.” Let’s have just about everybody in on it that wants in. Then we can nobly proclaim the purity and steadfastness of our intentions—and gracefully yield to overwhelming world sentiment, all in the name of comity and friendship with all others of like highmindedness . . .

We wash our hands then of all further responsibility in the name of the United Nations. We surrender South Korea, with proper plaudits of regret and good wishes, to the Red wolves. Of course the whole deal will be so fancifully dressed up in verbiage it will be hard to see the raw sell-out . . .

LORING W. BATTEN, JR.
Monrovia, Cal.

The Perversion of “Liberal”

I was struck with the manner in which Max Eastman (“What to Call Yourself,” August 21) links the perversion of words with revolution. Of course, I have noticed how the Reds of our age have expropriated such words as democracy and liberty, and proceeded to use them as tools to delude the gullible. It is interesting to learn that Thucydides noted this deception as a trait of revolutionists in ancient times . . .

Mr. Eastman’s eloquent plea for a word to replace Liberalism, now tainted by the company it keeps . . . is indeed most touching . . . I propose as a word to replace this empty spot in our political vocabulary, Personalism. An adherent of this political and social school of thought would be a Personalist, just as a Humanist is a believer in Humanism. I realize that Personalism does not have the simplicity and the easy manner which we attribute to Liberalism, but neither did Liberalism when it was first used. However, I believe that the word has more possibilities than neo-liberalism, or paleo-liberalism, or liberal-conservatism. After all, our Declaration of Independence speaks of the inviolability of the personal rights of human beings, and the Bill of Rights . . . secures to persons both personal and property rights . . .

CHARLES A. WALSH
Concordia, Kans.

“Needed More than Ever”

I am trying hard to get your wonderful magazine before more people, for it is needed now more than ever. Our leaders still seem to be woefully weak on the fundamental principles of economics and taxation. They also have not awakened to the fact that Communism has wrapped its deadly coils around our American institutions . . . Congratulations on this magnificent work that you are doing to preserve freedom in America.

BLACKBURN HUGHES
Memphis, Tenn.

Fluoridation Article Appreciated

It will no doubt be gratifying to you to hear that “The Truth About Fluoridation” by James Borty [June 29] has scored again.

Our community was scheduled to be educated along the line of the good points to be obtained from water fluoridation. Local dentists and doctors were apparently behind the movement. I sent a copy of your article to every dentist and doctor in the community. Just received a report that the “professional” supporters had withdrawn their support from the campaign.

Bowling Green, Ky.
R. M. PARRISH

Mrs. Roosevelt’s Book

I have just finished reading Mr. James Burnham’s review of Eleanor Roosevelt’s book [August 24] and I’m mad! I am not an avid admirer of Mrs. Roosevelt, but it certainly irked me . . . to read such an ungentlemanly, unkind, and scathing review which was not nearly as much a criticism of the book itself as a very nastily contrived indictment of the woman who wrote it . . .

Detroit, Mich.
DORIS BRUSHABER

Fallacies Exposed

Of the magazines I read the FREE- man is far and away the best. It holds to the faith that is mine. In each issue its writers put their fingers on the fallacies that weaken us and on the truth that would save us.

Denver, Colo.
WILLIAM N. RAINK
THE

Vance Sanders Method

of creating and administering

PROFIT SHARING RETIREMENT PLANS

by simplified procedures specifically designed for companies of moderate size

1953 EDITION INCLUDES:

1. A standard profit sharing plan which can be adopted unchanged or varied as desired.

2. A related trust agreement which can be conformed to the adopted plan.

3. Printed forms for requesting a ruling as to tax exemption.

4. Procedures for simplified investment and custodianship.

Available, without obligation, from Investment Dealers or

VANCE, SANDERS & COMPANY

111 Devonshire Street, Boston, Mass.
You'll have good neighbors in the PORT HURON MODEL INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT

There are many advantages in becoming part of a carefully planned development such as the Model Industrial District now being organized at Port Huron, Michigan. Port Huron is a good location, too. Excellent transportation by rail, water, or highway. Close to Detroit, Pontiac, Flint and Saginaw.

Labor is no problem because it is an ideal place to live; a friendly city with all kinds of recreation at hand.

The Model Industrial District includes 185 acres which will be divided into sites 600 feet deep and as wide as desired. Several other properties are also available in the Port Huron area. All are on the railway and range from 6 to 152 acres.

For a Pin-Point Survey giving full information on Port Huron or other industrial sites, write to either the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway, Industrial Development Department, Cleveland 1, Ohio, Detroit, Michigan, or Huntington, West Virginia or address your inquiry to the Industrial Development Corporation of the Port Huron-Marysville area, 1109 Military St., Port Huron, Michigan.
The Fortnight

At the opening of the United Nations General Assembly, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles delivered a speech that was generally accepted as an expression of the administration's latest foreign policy program. Mr. Dulles began in fine form with a positive demand that Soviet Russia and Communist China should renounce their ambitions in Korea and allow that country to be united. But after this statement—presumably prompted by the energetic Dr. Rhee—the Secretary began to lose himself in a morass of stale generalities and pusillanimitiies. He made the usual polite protestations against Communist activities in Indo-China and the Communist refusal to carry out promises in regard to the unification of Germany and the settling of the Austrian peace treaty.

There was nothing new or startling in these points. It was when he moved over to the subject of the "once independent people of Europe" now under Soviet domination that Mr. Dulles injected a new, off-key note. Under a sugar coating of the usual phrases about faith and liberty, he in effect condoned the policy that holds 600,000,000 people on the periphery of the Soviet Union in virtual slavery. He said: "We can understand the particular desire of the Russian people to have close neighbors who are friendly. We sympathize also with that desire. The United States does not want Russia encircled by hostile peoples." As an example of an inexcusable euphemism, this statement takes the prize. What does Mr. Dulles think Russia is surrounded by now—a network of Malenkov fan clubs? The very fact that the Soviet Union has deprived the Poles, Czechs, Bulgarians, Rumanians, Hungarians, and other peoples of their freedom keeps them in a constant and understandable state of hostility. Is Mr. Dulles now granting official sanction to the Kremlin's oft-repeated cry of "capitalist encirclement"?

Madame Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit of India, sister of Nehru, bitter anti-American, consistently pro-Communist and pro-Soviet, was elected President of the current session of the Assembly of the United Nations. Prince Wan Waithayakon of Thailand, warm friend of the United States and the West, proved anti-Communist and anti-Soviet, was defeated, 37 votes to 22. And who led the fight for Madame Pandit and against Prince Wan? Why, we did, of course. Our diplomacy goes farther than the time-honored injunction of the New Testament. We punish our friends, and reward our enemies.

The decision of the four jurists constituting the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations that four Americans who dodged answering questions about Communist affiliations or espionage should be reinstated in the employ of the U. N. and that large indemnities, running as high as $40,000, should be paid to seven others should be a "Stop, Look, and Listen" signal. Secretary-General Hammarskjold has taken a little of the edge off the situation by refusing to reinstate the four. But few Americans like to see the flouting of the almost unanimous sentiment in this country against employing Americans of dubious loyalty in the U. N. or relish the prospect of paying money compensation to such persons. This incident should inspire some thoughtful questions. Do we wish to leave decisions of still greater importance to our security and national interest to a U. N. majority? If the American majority is No, what logic or common sense is there in continuing to talk of "strengthening" the U. N.? Why not just wait for that organization to pass into what Grover Cleveland called "innocuous desuetude"?

For years the United States has been paying the largest single slice of contributions to the pie that makes up the United Nations budget. Now we are at last beginning to wonder how and why we ever put ourselves into the very exposed position of Uncle Croesus, sitting there surrounded by a bevy of nieces and nephews who are contributing mere slivers to the huge budget pie. It isn't as if we had been bullied into taking over the major financial burden of the U.N. Rather, we forced our largesse upon the other members, flaunting, as it were, our wealth before the goggle-eyed natives. Just how we are ever going to get out of this self-built trap, we don't pretend
to know. But it is good to know that one man at last has decided to take a good look at this whole matter. He is Congressman Daniel Reed, who is best known as the fearless knight who fought a losing battle on the issue of getting income taxes reduced this year. Reed is looking over the U.S. contributions to the United Nations, and he does not like what he finds. We hope he sticks to his guns and decides to let us all know just how much we have spent so far to keep the U.N. afloat, how much of it went where, and how we can extricate ourselves from this fiscal bear-trap.

Recent press dispatches indicate that the United States is supposed to increase its aid to France for purposes of the Indo-China war by 100 per cent. We are not sure just how this is to be done; but we hope it does not involve the moving of equipment from Korea, nor the stripping of our bases in Japan and Germany. Just what the end of the Indo-China affair is going to be, no one can tell for sure. But we do know that France would not come crying for more aid if its taxpayers coughed up the proper revenue and its workers did not go on extended strike binges. Until France has found a way to keep herself from a recurring state of internal economic confusion, the United States will probably be forced to hand over new millions from time to time. But that is no reason for taking it for granted that our own taxpayers can forever be counted on to supply France's hard-pressed treasury with enough dollars to make up for slovenly tax-collecting methods or the antics of an irresponsible labor force.

The decision of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States to limit the framework of the ANZUS pact to the countries that are now its participants came as no surprise. It did, however, point up the very limited scope of the pact itself, and of the self-imposed limitations on its possible practical use. As long as the really crucial areas of Asia remain outside any such pact, it can have only limited and rather secondary importance. We are not in favor of throwing the pact open to anyone who craves to be protected by the strength of American arms and American funds; but we do think it is necessary to remember that the pact, as it stands now, provides little protection to anyone who may be regarded as close to the Communist menace that throws its shadow southward from the Chinese mainland.

Let no one suppose that the trials and tribulations of the President over his labor policy and the future of the Taft-Hartley Act have been dissipated by the resignation of the Secretary of Labor. On the contrary, the risk is great that those who advise Mr. Eisenhower will persist in their efforts to appease the political leaders of the A. F. L. and the C. I. O., either by making a second dubious appointment to the Department of Labor or by sponsoring amendments to Taft-Hartley which are bound to compromise the genuine interests of workingmen and the public. The fight, therefore, to preserve and strengthen the Taft-Hartley Act is just beginning, and those who wish to participate in it would do well to read and circulate Joseph H. Ball's "How to Save Taft-Hartley" (The FREEMAN, September 21, 1953; reprints available).

Now that the New York Mayoralty primaries are over and Mr. Wagner has been chosen by the Democrats as their standard-bearer, the citizens of this vast and difficult city have little to look forward to in the election next November. The choice of Wagner over Impellitteri is a decision the voters can afford to view with indifference, for there is no evidence on their record that one is superior to the other. Mr. Hailey, the candidate of the Liberal Party, showed his caliber as a public servant when he followed the instructions of his political boss, Adolf Berle, to vote for the Transit Authority if his vote was needed to put the project through but to vote against it if his support was not needed. Besides, the management of New York hardly stands to gain by replacing Tammany with Mr. Dubinsky and his private labor-political machine. In this galaxy of eager aspirants, only Mr. Riegelman deserves support. But in the months preceding this campaign both the forces of good government and the Republican Party scandalously muffed their opportunity to agree on a man and platform which could have commanded the respect and approval of the long-suffering New Yorkers.

As our readers know, the FREEMAN takes pride in its conservative principles. Because it is the business of conservatism to uphold tradition, we feel duty-bound to note with alarm certain tendencies that cropped up in this year's Miss America contest. For decades the Miss America rules have been classic in their purity. Bust and hip measurements must be identical, and the waist exactly ten inches less. Miss Evelyn Margaret Ay, a green-eyed ash blonde from Ephrata, Pennsylvania, was crowned this year in spite of a bust one inch in excess of hips, and waist a good (very good) twelve inches less. This is the sort of looseness with standards that can lead, well, almost anywhere. As if such tampering were not bad enough, Miss Ay clinched her title by announcing her ambition to go to India to help fight malnutrition. We have nothing against food for India, and (from the pictures we have seen) we are certainly all for Miss Ay. But to be really orthodox, our Misses America should stick to their traditional job of filling those Atlantic City bathing suits, and leave India to Mrs. Roosevelt.
Back at the Old Stand

After staying on the floor for a ten months' count, following the knockdown last November, the Democratic Party is now trying to push back into the center of the ring. The first sign of life, significantly enough, came as the voice of Harry Truman speaking to the Labor Day rally of the Detroit trade union organizations. Next, with rather stagey timing, followed the resignation of Martin Durkin. Then, as climax to this short first act of the comeback drama, the scene shifted to Chicago, where Truman and Adlai Stevenson shared—or contested—top billing before an applauding chorus.

Ours is a two-party system of government, and we can only rejoice that either of the great parties, when down, is not out. That both of them should be healthy, alive, and kicking is a fine thing for the nation. We are therefore watching the Democratic Party's emergence from post-election paralysis with sympathy, and even with hope. Did not Sophocles assure us that man learns through suffering?

It may be that the Democrats haven't yet suffered enough. At any rate, they give no indication that they have as yet learned anything.

Ex-President Truman's performance, both at Detroit and later at Chicago, was strictly repeat. It could have been handled by a dummy equipped with recorded excerpts from the speeches of 1948-52. He began, of course, with the Depression in 1932—apparently the high point in the political memories of all New Dealers. He concluded with "the wrecking crew" now at the levers of government, and violently accused the Republicans of doing a dozen of the things the people last November voted to have them do: cast off government controls; stabilize money; withdraw the dead hand of government from various branches of the national life; tighten the budget; fire Democrats (called "loyal career employees" by the ex-President).

We do not suggest that no legitimate criticism can be made of the conduct of the new administration. With all allowance for the difficulties of taking office after twenty years as the opposition, there are many acts, and omissions, that deserve, and should receive, criticism. For the most part, the administration may be reasonably criticized for failing to carry through far and fast enough the mandate of the citizens to have done with Roosevelt-Trumanism. From both a party and a national standpoint, the administration has not once gone wrong when it has acted to strengthen the foundations of free enterprise, to combat statism, or to oppose Communism, at home or abroad, boldly and clearly. Its mistakes have been made when it has pulled back, shilly-shallied, compromised with left-over Fair Deal ideas and individuals. Let the cases of Bohlen and Durkin be eloquent witness.

World traveler Adlai Stevenson did not have much to say on domestic issues. He returned to Illinois full of global quips that taste a bit sour when you chew on them: "We Democrats lost the election in the United States but carried every other country from Japan to Britain." (Does he feel that the U.N., which already seems to determine our military plans, should also appoint our Chief Executive?) His principal speech at Chicago, like most of his press interviews, was mostly about the big international problems.

"It is no time," Mr. Stevenson insisted, "for arrogance, petulance, or inflexibility." God forbid that we should insist "dagnostically" on a plain straightforward American point of view! "Red China is a reality that cannot be wished away"; meeting her "at the conference table...we must not be prisoners of domestic political propaganda."

"Is our object," he asks, "to discover through negotiation ways to relax tensions, or is it intensification of the cold war; is it co-existence or extermination of Communist power?" And, though it is most painful for Adlai Stevenson ever to say anything simply and directly, he leaves no doubt that he is all for the maximum of conferences, negotiation, and co-existence: "to disclose Russian intentions if we can; to confer, negotiate, and accommodate when we can; to reduce tensions and restore hope where we can. We may have to eat a lot of Intemperate, witless words and modify some rigid attitudes." Such rigid attitudes, it would seem, as rigid anti-Communism, a rigid determination not to permit the Soviet Empire to conquer ourselves and the world, a rigid refusal to be fooled once again about the "Russian intentions" which Mr. Stevenson thinks are still waiting to be "disclosed."

If we strip the Truman-Stevenson speeches of "give 'em Hell" slogans, effete wisecracks, and demagoguery, we can summarize the platform which they are laying down in two short planks: (1) bureaucratic statism at home; (2) appeasement abroad. This is the objective political meaning of their critique and their proposals. We believe it of great importance that this should be understood by every citizen, including every member of the Democratic Party.

What this means is that the combined Truman-Stevenson program is in a precise sense bankrupt as well as reactionary. Not a single new idea was expressed at the entire Chicago meeting, or in the speeches and interviews that prepared for it. On the domestic side, there was the mere reiteration of a past which, for good or ill, is over and done
with. The country does not propose to have another 1932 style Depression just to let the Democrats start with NRA again. For foreign policy, there is nothing but a politely dressed-up version of the same appeasement line that led to World War Two and the postwar triumphs of the Soviet Empire.

This is not good enough for the nation, and not good enough for the membership of the Democratic Party. Responsible Democrats, concerned for their party and country, were not well represented at Chicago. It is time for them to reassert themselves.

**Mr. Durkin’s Resignation**

Whatever the immediate political repercussions of Secretary Durkin’s resignation may appear to be, there can be little question that its long-run effects will be helpful to President Eisenhower and his administration and beneficial to the country. For, if Mr. Durkin had stayed in office and elected to fight for the now-famous nineteen amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act, the country faced the risk of being saddled with a mistaken and reactionary labor law and the Republican Party with deep and abiding internal dissension.

The truth is, the leading among the proposed amendments were not designed to improve the existing law or to protect legitimate interests, public and private, but were, instead, a brazen attempt to add to the already excessive power of the series of political machines which today run the American labor movement. The sooner the administration in Washington learns these simple facts of life, the better able it will be to draft legislation which deals effectively with prevailing abuses in labor relations.

It is indeed hard to see how the nature of some of these amendments eluded the critical faculties of those representatives of the administration who were in on their drafting. There are, first, provisions aimed to weaken the prohibitions against the secondary boycott. At this late date, nothing new can, or need, be said about this ancient and improper weapon of organized labor. It is, as is well known, the use of force to require men and women, whom the unions have been able to persuade by legal peaceful means, to join unions against their own free will. Union leaders know that the secondary boycott is not only improper but unnecessary, for they have been parties to thousands of government-supervised, secret elections, in which, under the law of the land, employees are afforded the opportunity to signify whether they desire to join a union or not. Hence, if any amendments in this respect to Taft-Hartley are needed, they should strengthen, not weaken, that statute.

An equally indefensible example of Mr. Durkin’s bundle of amendments is one which deals with welfare funds. These funds, on the scale on which they now exist, are the result of public policy, in particular, decisions by the National Labor Relations Board which made such funds bargainable issues. In the absence of this policy, welfare funds would most likely have been a relatively unimportant source of insurance, or welfare, benefits. Government intervention built them up so that they are today large and growing reserves. It is obviously a government responsibility to see to it that they are honestly and carefully managed and are not used for anyone’s personal profit or for ulterior purposes.

To safeguard these funds, Taft-Hartley contained the mildest of provisions which simply said that employers should participate in their administration. Now Mr. Durkin and his fellow authors of the nineteen amendments argue that this provision discourages the setting up of welfare funds by small employers and they propose amending the law by allowing small employers voluntarily “to waive participation” in such administration. But, in the language of labor relations, these common words carry a double meaning. “Voluntarily” means “forcibly,” and “to waive” means “to surrender” at someone’s request, suggestion, or order. In any case, it is a matter of extensive experience that small employers are peculiarly exposed to union pressure and it is hard to imagine a more callous surrender of the rights of their employees.

If any further examples were needed of what the labor leaders want by way of labor amendments, the climax is reached in a proposal related to several others, which taken together make it easier for unions to compel people to join and to stay in unions once they are in. This particular proposal empowers a union to expel a member, and, therefore, to have him discharged from his job, not only for nonpayment of dues but also for disclosing “confidential information of the union.” This assumes that a union is a species of private, secret organization, pursuing some obscure objectives and free to harass and intimidate members who happen to disagree with its policies and methods. How this item got by the watchdogs of the White House is one of the unsolved mysteries of Washington.

Behind the problems raised by Mr. Durkin’s resignation and the views he holds of his office lies the deeper issue of the policies of the great departments of government and of the persons who administer them. To say that the Department of Labor represents the interests of labor is not to say that the Department and its Secretary are the agents of the A. F. L. or the C. I. O. or any other private interest. The Department of Labor, like the Treasury, Commerce, Welfare, State, are concerned with applying policies which, in the best judgment of the administration in power, promote the public welfare. When other policies, whether devised by unions or employers’ associations, come into conflict with public policies, it ought not to be
Freedom Wins in Germany

The recent German national election was a tremendous personal victory for Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who emerges as the most constructive German leader since Bismarck and the outstanding statesman of postwar Europe. The election was more than the triumph of a man. It was the triumph of an idea, the idea of freedom.

The German people, by a majority that is impressive in a free ballot, voted for capitalism, for a free market economy, for military, economic, and political integration of West Europe, for association with the responsibilities and risks of defending Europe against the totalitarian threat. They repudiated overwhelmingly Communism, neo-Nazism, and neutralism and gave a severe set-back to the historic party of a considerable part of the German working class, the Social Democrats. For the first time since World War One and in striking and happy contrast to the situation in France and Italy, there is not one Communist in the Bundestag.

The significance of this is emphasized by two facts.

The Communists in West Germany are a legal party. They ran an active campaign, with organized aid from thugs and rowdies in East Germany.

Before the rise of Hitler the Communists in Germany were capable of polling five or six million votes. The big port of Hamburg and the coal-steel area of the Ruhr were Red strongholds. In this latest election the Communists could not muster enough strength to elect a candidate in even one West German constituency.

Another element in the situation should not be overlooked. It has long been an accepted dogma with leftist and New Deal politicians and commentators that it is necessary to support Socialism in order to beat Communism. But the regime that gave the Communists in Germany their knockout blow at the polls was committed to the philosophy of traditional liberal capitalism.

The individual most responsible for the great German economic recovery of the last few years is the Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard, an outspoken champion of the free economy. Erhard has been fighting equally hard against statist on one side and against such symptoms of capitalist fatty degeneration as monopolistic cartels and high tariffs on the other. In the election campaign Erhard himself was in the thick of the fight, calling on the voters to compare the first years of occupation with the enormously improved conditions after four years of a free economy.

With the prospect of a long period of stable government, Germany now seems the most dependable cornerstone of European defense and of plans for a closer union of free European countries to form a permanent barrier to the threat of Communist aggression.

Incidentally, the result of the election clearly
exposed the superficial, biased, and downright incompetent nature of much American reporting of postwar Germany. Commentators who specialize in seeing a Nazi under every German bed are confounded by the fact that the neo-Nazi German Reich Party got even fewer votes than the Communists, 1.1 percent of the total. And what becomes of the fashionable theory that most Germans have a "plague on both your houses" attitude toward East and West, when the All-German Party, which campaigned on this kind of program, did not elect a single candidate?

A more sophisticated type of fallacious criticism is the suggestion that Adenauer is not a truly reliable ally of the United States because he doesn't represent a folksy type of "democracy" and is pursuing German rather than American interests. But Adenauer's usefulness to America lies precisely in the fact that the majority of his countrymen regard him as a German patriot, not as an American or Western puppet. Germany, like Turkey, is one of our strongest allies because both these countries are going our way of their own volition and in their own interest.

**Trieste Tremens**

European political waters have recently been troubled by an old-fashioned nationalist political brawl over the disputed Adriatic port of Trieste. The stopgap Italian government of Prime Minister Giuseppe Pella indulged in the empty gesture of mobilizing troops in the neighborhood because of an apparently unsubstantiated rumor that Yugoslavia intended to annex Zone B, a part of the Trieste area which is under de facto Yugoslav administration. The gesture was empty because everyone, including Tito, knows that Italy would not and could not resort to war on this issue.

There has also been fault on the Yugoslav side. Tito was not helping to bring about an attitude of conciliation when he delivered a truculent speech to a gathering of former Yugoslav partisans near the Italian border. And his proposal, that the city of Trieste should be internationalized while the surrounding territory should be handed over to Yugoslavia, was neither reasonable nor realistic.

Both Rome and Belgrade might profitably heed the slang American injunction: "Act your age." It is suicidal folly for two countries which are both committed to the struggle against Soviet imperialism, Italy by membership in NATO, Yugoslavia by its act of secession from the Soviet bloc in 1948, to be exchanging verbal brickbats. They would be much more profitably employed in concerting measures to provide for the defense of the Ljubljana Gap, through which Soviet armor might penetrate across Yugoslavia into Italy.

The quarrel over Trieste is all the more complicated in view of recent history on the subject. The peace treaty with Italy, finally agreed on after prolonged Soviet obstruction in the winter of 1946-47, provided for the setting up of a Free State of Trieste, with an area of 320 square miles, to be detached from Italy without being annexed by Yugoslavia.

The population of the city of Trieste itself is overwhelmingly Italian; the coastal area of the Free Territory is also mainly Italian, except where Italians have been pushed out by Yugoslav administrative pressure; there are Slav enclaves in some of the hilly sections away from the coast.

Italian hopes were unduly raised when America, Great Britain, and France, on the eve of the Italian election in the spring of 1948, issued a joint statement to the effect that the territory of the Free State, Italian before the war, should revert to Italy. The issue of this statement probably had a good effect on that election; failure to implement the return of the area to Italy had a bad effect on the election of 1953.

The three powers were offering Italy something that was not theirs to give. From the beginning Yugoslav troops were in occupation of the southern, Zone B, part of the projected Free State. Even if Tito had not deserted the Moscow camp, it is improbable that military force would have been used to dislodge him from this area.

At the same time it is unrealistic for Tito to expect that he will get any share in the control of the city or of Zone A, the northern part of the Free State. The plebiscite proposed by Italy's Premier would seem, offhand, to offer a fair solution. However, plebiscites, like elections, can be gerrymandered. In this long-disputed Adriatic borderland it would be easy to arrange a plebiscite that would show either an Italian or a Slav majority, depending on what areas were canvassed.

At last report Washington favored settling the dispute, temporarily at least, through "diplomatic channels." This, too, has its drawbacks. Certainly no solution is possible if the United States continues to make the issue a mere matter of political expediency. We did this after the war when, in line with our friendship-for-Stalin policy, we conceded a zone of occupation in Trieste to Tito, who was then in the Soviet orbit. By 1948 we had changed our minds about Stalin, ergo Tito, and become mightily concerned with wooing Italy into the Western camp. Now we have swung back to our flirtation with Tito.

It seems probable that the problem of Trieste could be worked out by a properly organized plebiscite or negotiated agreement. But only if the major powers of the West are prepared to use their authority and to make clear to both Yugoslavia and Italy that they must subordinate rigid nationalistic claims in the interest of Western security. One hopes that some such solution may be reached before a new fit of "Trieste tremens" comes on.
Mr. John Foster Dulles, less than a year before he became Secretary of State, made as persuasive a statement as anyone so far for the need of a constitutional amendment to curb the treaty-making power:

"The treaty-making power is an extraordinary power liable to abuse. Treaties make international law and also they make domestic law. Under our Constitution treaties become the supreme law of the land. They are indeed more supreme than ordinary laws, for congressional laws are invalid if they do not conform to the Constitution, whereas treaty laws can override the Constitution. Treaties, for example, can take powers away from the Congress and give them to the President; they can take powers from the states and give them to the federal government or to some international body and they can cut across the rights given the people by the constitutional Bill of Rights."

Now that Mr. Dulles is Secretary of State, he has completely reversed this position. It is not necessary to inquire into his motives. One need merely point out that this reversal called for some very expert somersaults, and that the Secretary's awkward flip-flops are not only unconvincing but have probably caused him permanent injury.

For Mr. Dulles' new argument seems to rest on three tacit major premises: (1) that any restriction on Presidential power is not only unnecessary but intolerable; (2) that congressional participation in American foreign policy is not merely an annoyance but a calamity; and (3) that our existing constitutional checks are mainly a nuisance anyway.

Let us look at some of his arguments in order:

Mr. Dulles argues that there may have been some danger that some of the United Nations committees would impose socialistic regulations on this country under the Acheson-Truman regime, but that "the danger, never great, has passed" under the Dulles-Eisenhower regime. Whether this contention is factually true or not we need not stop to inquire. It is enough to point out that it is irrelevant. The Constitution is not amended merely to meet a short-run danger, but to keep such a danger from arising at any time in the future.

Section 1 of the Bricker Amendment reads: "A provision of a treaty which conflicts with this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect." Secretary Dulles seems willing to accept this, but declares: "I believe that this states the law as it now is." This not only completely reverses his own opinion as just quoted, but is opposed to the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Missouri v. Holland.

Section 2 of the Bricker Amendment declares: "A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation which would be valid in the absence of treaty."

Now listen to Mr. Dulles: "Section 2 would cut down the nation's treaty power so that no treaty could bind the nation in respect of matters which, under our federal system, fall within the jurisdiction of the states. This would set the clock back to an approximation of the conditions which existed under the Articles of Confederation. Then, that condition was so intolerable..."

Putting aside the rhetorical hyperbole, Dulles is here arguing that the Secretary of State and the President ought to have the power to amend or set aside the Constitution through the treaty-making mechanism. Mr. Dulles' argument against Section 2, therefore, contradicts his ostensible acceptance of Section 1. It is precisely the purpose of the Bricker Amendment to prevent executive or federal usurpation of power through abuse of the treaty-making device.

Mr. Dulles goes on to argue that since it convened in January 1953 the Senate has approved twenty-three treaties, twelve of which override the constitutional perogatives of the states. If this is so, it would be hard to think of a stronger argument for the need of the Bricker Amendment.

A Distortion of Meaning

Mr. Dulles next opens up on Section 3 of the proposed Bricker Amendment. Section 3 reads: "Congress shall have power to regulate all executive and other agreements with any foreign power or international organization. All such agreements shall be subject to the limitations imposed on treaties by this article."

Mr. Dulles proceeds to argue, somewhat hysterically, that under this provision "Congress, and not the President, would be responsible for the day-to-day conduct of our foreign relations"; that the provision "would make it impracticable for the President to conduct foreign affairs and would throw upon the Congress in this respect a daily and incessant responsibility which such a numerous and already overburdened legislative body is, in practice, incapable of discharging."
This argument rests upon a complete distortion of the meaning of Section 3. For that section does not say that Congress shall negotiate executive agreements or even that Congress shall regulate all executive agreements. It says that “Congress shall have power to regulate all executive and other agreements.” It could have added after the word “regulate,” (though this would have been quite unnecessary), “to the extent that it deems advisable.” To contend that the legislative power to regulate must involve assumption of “daily and incessant responsibility” is like contending that the power of a state or city legislature to draft traffic legislation means that the legislators must also be the traffic cops.

Mr. Dulles knows perfectly well why section 3 was inserted in the Bricker Amendment. He knows that, in recent years particularly, Presidents have resorted to the device of making “executive agreements” rather than “treaties” in order to bypass the constitutional requirement that all treaties must be ratified by two-thirds of the Senate. Section 3 was included in the Bricker Amendment to curb this abuse. Obviously a mere executive agreement should bind merely the executive. It is intolerable that an executive agreement shall bind Congress and the country when it has never been submitted to Congress and the country—who may, in fact, be ignorant of its very existence.

Powers of the President

Mr. Dulles quotes President Eisenhower as contending that the Bricker Amendment would “hamper the President in his constitutional authority to conduct foreign affairs.” On this kind of argument, all limitations on Presidential powers “hamper” the President. The Bricker Amendment is merely designed, and it is precisely designed, to confine the treaty-making power within existing constitutional limitations.

And the implication that the Constitution gives and is designed to give the President sole “authority to conduct foreign affairs” is simply not true. The Constitution explicitly provides that the President is to share that authority with Congress. He must submit any treaty to the Senate before it can become valid. And Congress alone is granted the power to declare war. If Mr. Dulles and Mr. Eisenhower now insist that the President is to have sole, “unhampered,” and unrestrained power to conduct foreign affairs, then they are the ones who are trying to alter the Constitution.

“There is no actual experience,” says Mr. Dulles, “to demonstrate the need of the far-reaching changes [in the Constitution] that have been proposed.” But the Bricker Amendment, in fact, is not designed to alter the constitutional balance of powers; it is designed to prevent that balance from being upset through the device of using the treaty-making power to bypass or amend the Constitution.

Emboldened by the onrush of his own rhetoric, Mr. Dulles finally works himself up to this incredible statement: “We have a system which has survived for over 160 years without there being a single instance of treaty abuses such as are feared.” (Our italics.) This is said at a time when scores of United Nations commissions, dominated by a statist, controlist, and socialist ideology, are trying (sometimes successfully) to force the adoption by this country of measures which embody that ideology. It is said in the face of Yalta and Potsdam, which even Mr. Dulles is forced to mention in the course of his speech, though the strongest criticism he can now think of making against them is that they are “unpopular and perhaps ill-advised.” (Our italics.) Yalta and Potsdam are exactly the kind of “executive agreements” that the Bricker Amendment is designed to prevent in future. Yet Mr. Dulles, with his suddenly acquired new set of values, now thinks it would have “a calamitous effect upon the international position and prospects of the United States” for Congress to have the power to curb or examine future “perhaps ill-advised” Yaltas and Potsdams.

In a final effort to block the Bricker Amendment, Mr. Dulles falls back upon an argument which, if it were valid, would apply against any amendment of the Constitution whatever: “It is impossible to rewrite the Constitution of the United States so that it is foolproof. It is impossible to make freedom so automatic that its retention does not need constant vigilance.” Perhaps. But it is not impossible, we submit, to amend the Constitution so that it will provide even greater safeguards of freedom, and stronger safeguards than it now does against certain forms of folly.

That is all that the Bricker Amendment, in fact, proposes to do. And why the Secretary of State and the President are now attempting to prevent these safeguards is difficult to understand.

WORTH HEARING AGAIN

The Treaty Power

Treaties are binding, notwithstanding our laws and constitutions. ... I say again, that if you consent to this power, you depend on the justice and equity of those in power. We may be told that we shall find ample refuge in the law of nations. When you yourselves have your necks so low that the President may dispose of your rights as he pleases, the law of nations cannot be applied to relieve you. Sure I am, if treaties are made infringing our liberties, it will be too late to say that our constitutional rights are violated. . . .

PATRICK HENRY, speech in the Virginia Convention, June 18, 1788
Regimentation is no longer popular. All over the world voters have shown open rebellion against excessive government controls. This is a trend that has grown in strength over the past few years. At home, last November's elections were a demonstration of this trend. But abroad, too, a conservative revolution is under way. The most recent example is in the results of Germany's September 6 elections, which gave only 150 seats in the Bundestag to the Socialists, none to the Communists or to the neo-Nazi German Reich Party, but 244 seats to Chancellor Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union, which has followed free economic policies.

In Great Britain, of course, in Australia and New Zealand, in Turkey and Greece, as well as in many other spots throughout the globe, a rebellion by ballot has taken place. As a result, the pendulum has swung away from excessive government controls and toward a freer economy. The transition has been gradual; it has occurred in widely separate areas; and it has certainly been an unviolent revolution. These reasons have tended to obscure the trend, have kept it from being recognized as a long-range shift in public feeling and thinking.

Generally speaking, the forces against which this rebellion is directed developed their key positions and policies during the 1930's. But emergency measures which, under the shock impact of the depression, may have had wide public support, had since become overextended and calcified. And the voters who still had the free ballot finally decided to call a halt.

This world-wide trend against super-government is not an ideological revolt directed against forces often described as "left," or as "socialist." Super-government is a machinery used by ambitious men of varying colorations—from the deep red of the Soviets to the black-shirted Italian Fascists or the brown-shirted Nazis. At present, the right-wing dictatorship of President Juan Perón of Argentina represents the ranking super-government in the Western Hemisphere.

One of the most accurate, but also most vague descriptions of current societies is the phrase "mixed economy." Few people oppose a "mixed economy" as such; they recognize that some controls, some policing, are necessary—and even the Soviets, as Premier Malenkov demonstrated when he promised the peasants assistance for their privately operated plots, allow a measure of "free enterprise."

A "mixed economy," like a mixed drink, may be soothing, or stimulating, or a Mickey Finn. It depends on the mixture. And no barman knows more mixtures than are familiar to an inquiring economist. The voters of many countries have, in effect, balloted to mix their own—rather than have a stiff, centrally-administered concoction forced down their irritated throats.

Thus, the current revolt against regimentation takes many forms and achieves differing results. On occasion, its manifestations look contradictory. Take, for example, the Canadian national elections of August 10—the meaning of which has, unfortunately, been largely ignored in the United States.

Canada Voted for Less Bureaucracy

Viewed superficially, the Canadian elections seemed to show that our northern neighbors didn't think it was time for a change. They kept the Liberal Party administration of Premier Louis St. Laurent in power, and granted it 171 seats in the 265-man Parliament. The Progressive Conservative Party, headed by George Drew, managed to get only fifty seats.

It would be simple to draw the parallel that the Liberals are the equivalent of the Democratic Party, and the Conservatives are the northern twins of our Republicans. But it would be quite wrong. A number of political factors make mincemeat of this too-easy parallel. One is the fact that Premier St. Laurent is a Quebec man, and that Quebec gave him sixty-six parliamentary seats, with only four for the Conservatives. Another factor is Mr. Drew; he is widely respected, but he lacks the political glamour of Eisenhower.

But the underlying factors of the Canadian elections are economic rather than political. The Liberals managed to fit their sails to the anti-regimentation winds. As long ago as September 1952, Prime Minister St. Laurent publicly recognized the strength of the prevailing trend. This prompted him to say, in a Quebec speech: "If too much is left to government, there is real danger of building up a mechanical and bureaucratic machinery which will disregard the natural family relationship and responsibility, and whose existence may dry up the voluntary enthusiasm so vital to..."
a well-rounded welfare plan and, moreover, will not justify the benefits it offers.” Mr. St. Laurent also noted that “the burden of payment falls upon all Canadians—the wage earner, the businessman, the civil servant, and even the politician who enacts the social legislation.”

Sensing the shift in public mood, the St. Laurent Administration quietly shelved an ambitious national health insurance plan that it had championed earlier. Other welfare programs also were discreetly put away, as their burden to the taxpayer became increasingly clear.

Although being welfare-minded, the Liberal Party Administration never permitted its postwar economy to become unbalanced. Canada used the boom years well. It put money aside, year after year. It not only kept its budget in balance, but reduced its national debt by $2,000,000,000 after World War Two.

All this made it possible to offer substantial tax reductions that took effect last July 1. They included a cut in personal income taxes, and reductions in other sources of revenue. This made it possible for the St. Laurent Administration to take in its stride a Conservative proposal of cutting taxes by half a billion; the Liberals rode with the tide, but managed to steer their boats skillfully through the rapids.

Canadians voted for the Liberals, I believe, because they felt that the party was responsive to their changing wishes—that it recognized and adjusted itself to the trend against excessive regimentation. The Canadian Socialist Party received twenty-three parliamentary seats in the elections; their strength remained generally stable. But the most telling expression of the anti-regimentation trend comes with the fate of the Social Credit Party, which received thirteen parliamentary seats. Known as the “Socreds” for short, they are, according to prevalent nomenclature, a party of the right. But the label supplied by their critics, who call them the “funny money” party, is more accurate.

The party made its big sweep in the western province of Alberta in 1935, and has run that provincial government ever since. Of late, Alberta has been rolling in oil, metals, and revenue, and the “Socreds” have been sitting at the top of a boom. Last year they won startling successes in the Far West province of British Columbia. But their performance in the national elections fell far short of expectations.

The leaders of the Social Credit Party bring a fundamentalist, pseudo-religious flavor to its economics, flaunting such phrases as that they “would make money do what it should do and distribute the goods we have available.” The party’s administration of Alberta has, on the whole, been sober and level-headed. But its ideology goes back to Clifford H. Douglas, an Englishman of unique fiscal ideas, who maintained that a “balance” be-

between goods and purchasing power can be achieved by social services, “national dividends,” and outright grants. Stripped of its roundabout verbiage, this seems to many Canadians equivalent to a policy symbolized by the high-speed currency printing press, of inflation and deficit-financing.

Commonwealth Countries Reject Socialism

The evidence in Canada of the world-wide trend against excessive government controls followed a notable swing of the pendulum in the mother country, when the British elections of 1951 replaced the Labor Party regime of Clement Attlee with the Conservative cabinet of Winston Churchill. The Conservatives found it difficult to unscramble the Labor Party omelets, particularly in the case of steel and transportation; both had been nationalized by Attlee, and Churchill has moved to have them returned to private ownership. Generally, of course, personal initiative and a free price system have given the British economy a lift; labor-management relations are improved, and per capita output is on the increase. Credit has been placed on a sounder footing, with the Bank of England rediscout rate advanced from 2.5 per cent to 4 per cent. And the world has come to know and respect the mind and ability of a new Conservative statesman, Mr. R. A. Butler, Britain’s Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Two Commonwealth members, Australia and New Zealand, demonstrated the trend against regimentation a few years ago. After twenty years of Labor Party rule, Australia voted the Liberal Party leader Robert G. Menzies into office. Menzies has been having a pack of trouble since then. The demoralizing influence of long-time inflation could not be eliminated overnight. Living within one’s means is, at first, a trying experience: taxes had to go up, credits had to be tightened. Menzies has found it difficult to cut loose from the habits of two decades.

Next door, in New Zealand, the Labor government was, on December 1, 1949, replaced by Sidney G. Holland’s National Party. It received a second ballot endorsement two years ago, securing forty-five out of eighty parliamentary seats. Previously, the Laborites had been in control since 1935. The National government has cut down rent and price controls, import controls, and subsidies on many goods and services. Of late, the government has looked closely at the heavy load of social security benefits, which amount to £120 for a typical four-person family.

In the eastern Mediterranean, two countries that have contributed most effectively to the armed strength of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have also proved themselves aware of excesses in state control. They are Greece and Turkey. The Greeks had their national elections last fall. They voted for the Greek Rally of General Alexander
Papagos, a respected soldier who relies heavily on the economic know-how of Coordination Minister Spyros Markezinis.

The Greeks voted Papagos a clear parliamentary majority, which gives his government a chance to govern without undue respect for lobbyists and political pressures. Now the biggest task is a balanced budget. [See William Henry Chamberlin's article directly following this one.]

In neighboring Turkey, the change has been even more drastic. Premier Adnan Menderes and his Democratic Party took over the country's reins in 1950. Those were remarkable elections, made possible by enlightened sentiments of the Republican Peoples Party, which had enjoyed authoritarian one-party rule since the advent of Kemal Ataturk's regime at the end of World War One. The Republicans, who had favored étatism—which is simply French for “statism”—sincerely desired a free expression of public sentiment. They, and their heavily planning-minded government were voted out of office; but they did win the moral victory which their very defeat symbolized.

Since then, Menderes has governed well; his policies were well summarized before the Grand National Assembly earlier this year. The Premier said on February 14: “The Democratic Party administration is against the principle of controlling the country's economy from above, by planning. The great economic structures of the world have emerged as a result of the workings of private enterprise, and the intelligence of the citizenry, and not by the Five Year Plans of the totalitarian states.”

Premier Menderes also said: “The duty of the state is to create an atmosphere conducive to improvement. The government's duty is to construct roads and dams, to establish production security, to follow a reasonable price policy, and, by putting the national intelligence in motion, to prepare the ground for the recovery of the country.”

These are plain words. They represent mature thinking. They illustrate the world-wide trend against excessive government controls. But the pendulum which in recent years has swung away from super-government may easily swing in the opposite direction—in the United States and elsewhere on the globe.

Our Near Eastern Outposts

By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

Fifteen years ago Greece and Turkey were known to only a limited number of Americans—educators, diplomats, businessmen, archaeologists, journalists, and students. An American warship in the Mediterranean was a curiosity. That either country would become a direct charge on the budget of the United States would have seemed fantastic.

But today Greece and Turkey represent the right flank of the NATO defense system. Backbone of Mediterranean defense is the U. S. Sixth Fleet, spearheaded by two mighty aircraft carriers, each capable of releasing 120 bombing airplanes. American sailors can be seen doing the sights in the colorful mosques of Istanbul and on the Acropolis.

Greece and Turkey together represent a combined American political, economic, military, and relief investment of about $3,500,000,000—about $1,200,000,000 for Turkey, almost double that sum for Greece, for the relief aspect of this expenditure has been confined to that country.

Shortly after my visit here disaster struck Greece again in the shape of devastating earthquakes in the Ionian Islands off the west coast, including Ithaca, legendary homeland of Ulysses. This may make further economic and financial readjustments necessary, unless there is a generous response to appeals for aid for the victims.

What was necessary in Greece was a holding and salvage operation. On the average every Greek had received about $300 in American aid. One of the more thoughtful of our diplomats in Athens summed up the benefits of this program as follows:

1. Greece did not go Communist, as it almost certainly would have if it had not been for American help.

2. Instead of the military chaos of the immediate postwar period, there is now an anti-Communist army of high caliber, able to cooperate with the armed forces of Turkey and Yugoslavia in discouraging Soviet military adventures in this part of the world.

3. A huge amount of World War and civil war damage has been repaired, and with improvements. Greece now has better roads, a better transportation system, a better system of water supply.

4. Thanks to United States technical aid, malaria has been eliminated, and farming methods have
been so improved that Greece is much more nearly able to supply its own needs in wheat and other staple products. Greek politics have been traditionally volatile and unstable, suggesting France on a smaller scale, with coalitions forming and dissolving with kaleidoscopic rapidity. Last November, however, an election was held on the basis of the party with the highest plurality winning the seat, without the proportional representation which, more than any other idea, has helped to make responsible, effective government difficult and sometimes impossible on the European continent.

**Man with a Plan**

The result was that the Greek Rally, an amalgam of parties and political groups, headed by the veteran general who finally led the country to victory in the civil war, Alexander Papagos, was swept into office with an overwhelming parliamentary majority. Papagos entrusted the management of the economy to his Minister of Coordination, Spyros Markezinis, a slight, slender, almost wizened lawyer, a prodigious worker who gives the impression of being almost consumed with his own energy. Markezinis is Greece's Man with a Plan.

One soon finds that it is not possible to conduct an orderly question-and-answer interview with Markezinis; he almost falls over himself anticipating questions and opening up new lines of thought. The main features of his plan, designed to make Greece entirely independent of American economic aid (which has been steadily tapering off and is only $20,000,000 for the current fiscal year, although an unused amount, variously estimated at from $35,000,000 to $90,000,000, is still in the "pipeline") are:

- A drastic devaluation of the national currency, the drachma, from 15,000 to 30,000 to the dollar. This operation was carried out in April and was designed to stimulate exports and tourist industry and to make possible the elimination of a complicated system of subsidies and special import levies.
- Free imports without quota restrictions.
- Attraction of foreign capital through a new law which will contain reasonable assurance about transfer of profits.
- Return to the Greek flag of much shipping which now operates under foreign registry because of difficult labor regulations.
- Elimination of redundant government employees. Markezinis is also eager to put into effect a capital investment program of about $230,000,000, half in foreign currency, half in drachmas, in order to stimulate electric power development (in which Greece is still backward), agricultural reclamation, industry, and mining. For some of his projects he is looking hopefully to the International Bank for financial assistance.
- Such a program, in the long run, should be beneficial. In the short run it treads on a good many toes. The devaluation caused an appreciable rise in the cost of living, which the opposition parties and newspapers exploit to the utmost. The employees threatened with dismissal and their friends and relatives are naturally not pleased. Markezinis himself is under no illusion about the discontent which his program in its initial phase has excited.

"In the first year," he said to me, "we must expect to be very unpopular. We are trying to get over the most difficult measures at once. In the second year the people will feel that things are not so bad, after all. In the third year we shall be really popular."

One of the most interesting personalities in the present Greek government is a distinguished intellectual and specialist in the philosophy of Kant who is also Minister of Defense. He is Panayiotis Kanellopoulos, who talked to me with the frankness that is the inquiring journalist's delight. The Greek armed forces now consist of about 170,000 men, with the main ground forces distributed in three corps located in the three northern provinces, Macedonia, Thrace, and Epirus.

Mr. Kanellopoulos declared that, while the Communist Party in Greece still exists on an underground basis, its influence has been reduced to a negligible point. He spoke appreciatively of the seven new squadrons of jet planes which have strengthened the army's striking power.

Like all the officials with whom I talked, Mr. Kanellopoulos believes that Yugoslavia is a reliable ally in the new three-power pact with Greece and Turkey. "We are convinced," he said, "that there is no question of Tito's going back to his former role as a Kremlin satellite. The Yugoslavs, we feel, are thoroughly with us in our defense alliance. Formally we cannot go as far as we might like to go, because Greece and Turkey are members of NATO and Yugoslavia is not. We cannot make binding commitments for our NATO partners. But we already have certain contingent understandings as to what each country would do in the event of a Soviet attack, in which Bulgaria would most probably be the spearhead. For here in Europe there will be no localized war, no second Korea. Any Soviet act of aggression against Yugoslavia, against Germany, will unloose a general conflict.

Mr. Kanellopoulos spoke enthusiastically of the military aid which has been supplied to Greece by America and of the work of the American military mission in Greece, headed by General Charles Hart. But he struck a sober note when he declared that Bulgaria, armed to the teeth by Moscow, possesses about four times as much artillery and about three times as many tanks as Greece.

[Contributions for earthquake victims may be sent to the American Red Cross, New York City 16, or the Ionian Islands Relief Fund, Greek Orthodox Archdiocese, 10 East 79th Street, New York City.]
It Costs to Be Thrifty

By LEWIS H. HANEY

Our greatest battle for freedom may be fought at home. In this battle our first line of defense is to inform ourselves of the inroads on our American economic system made by a generation of devotees of the welfare state. One of the most strategic and vulnerable points on which our enemies within have concentrated is our system of capital formation—our system of encouraging by reasonable rewards individual saving and investment in productive enterprise. These enemies have thrown up serious roadblocks to such capital formation. Their tactics need objective understanding so that a counter-offensive may be launched.

The principal factors which have been causing an ever-diminishing incentive to investment are, first, the depreciation in the purchasing power of the dollar caused by inflation, and secondly, the vast accumulation of debt that underlies the inflation. The one means that dollar incomes, savings, and investments are not “real”; the other that they are not net. Particularly notable is the burden of debt, public and private. The government’s debt is so great that it can’t reduce taxes. The citizen consumer owes so much on installment purchases and mortgages that he can’t buy or invest as much as formerly. The corporation which employs him finds its fixed charges mounting as it is forced to resort to financing by bonds and notes, while its “working capital” deteriorates by decreased cash and increased receivables and inventories.

The debt and inflation, in their turn, find expression in a maze of inhibitive taxes, monetary policies, and government controls and activities, all of which center on restricting individual freedom of choice and building up national collectivism. These are the immediate impediments to capital formation. The result is that the system of regulated free private enterprise, which in the first half of the century seemed about to replace the old individualistic “capitalism,” is now seriously threatened. One of the threats appears in the inability of private enterprise to get sufficient capital from individual savers and investors.

What, then, are the specific obstacles which, by impeding private capital formation, threaten to choke free private enterprise? Capital is that part of our savings which we invest in capital goods, such as tools and machinery, barns and factories, and stocks of materials and goods for sale—all made and used for production. Since all capital formation depends upon individual saving and, in a free economy, on individual investment, the obstacles to be analyzed are those that affect (1) the desires, will, and ability of people to save and to invest; and (2) the real costs in the shape of dissatisfactions and sacrifices we must bear that tend to restrict our saving and investment.

We save when we don’t spend our incomes for present consumption, but set part aside for future consumption or for investment in production. Upon this depends the supply of loanable funds available for capital formation. How much we tend to save depends upon our individual characters and acquired habits (affecting our propensities to save for gain, prestige, and future security), our incomes and surpluses, and such conditions as the length of the time period involved, and the risk.

What has happened to affect these during the last generation? First, the outlook has been made more uncertain and risky by inflation, tax policies, and the trend to government interference looking toward equalization of incomes. Probably the establishment of a sound monetary system based on a gold standard, and elimination of the threat of “planned inflation,” would help most.

Second, the “easy money policy” of artificial low interest rates, closely related to inflation, has been part of an attempt to reduce interest rates almost to zero. Low interest restricts the desire of many people to save.

Third, many of us have suffered changes in ideals and standards concerning individual thrift. Our desire and will to save have been reduced.

Among the chief means of this demoralization have been “social security” programs, government subsidies, low-cost housing programs, etc. The propaganda and sales effort to push “savings bonds” into the hands of the public are probably an adverse factor reducing the tendency to save for real productive investment. Perhaps part of this demoralization is to be seen in the spread of the insistence on high material standards of living, which emphasize current spending rather than providing for the future.

Fourth, the middle and upper incomes have been curtailed and surplus funds reduced by taxation. Here the steeply progressive income-tax rates are especially to blame. The result, as one business leader points out, is that those who know how to invest haven’t the money, while the wage earners who have the money don’t know how to invest.

The real cost of saving felt by the saver has in
general been increased by increasing the intensity of the individual's "time preference" on account of uncertainty about the future of prices, labor costs, taxes, and property rights.

Capital is the direct result of investing savings in instruments of production. This may be done by speculative venturers (who supply equity capital, or "risk capital") or by investors proper. According to his character and ability, the investor seeks to put his savings to work effectively as productive capital in his own business or by purchasing securities in others. Whatever dims the outlook for income from investment (interest or dividends) acts as a depressive on his desire or will to invest. These "depressives" may be classified as follows:

Eight Impediments

First, the taxes that reduce the return on invested capital, probably the most important being:
1. The double taxation of corporation net income, once as earned by the company and again as dividends or interest received by the investor.
2. The excess profits tax which hurts most businesses and generally encourages waste.
3. Cases in which tax laws permit inadequate depreciation allowances on capital.
4. Provisions that penalize small businessmen who seek to build up their working capital by retaining net earnings in the business.
5. The tax on capital gains that penalizes all investors who secure gains by realizing on their investments even when they switch from one investment to another.
6. Tax discrimination in favor of "cooperatives."

Second, the government has come to compete with private industry to such an extent that it discourages investment and therefore capital formation. This may go as far as government monopoly in some areas, as in hydro-electric development. There have been threats of nationalization of so-called basic industries (e.g., steel).

Third, the demands of the leaders of organized labor monopolies have been a strong deterrent, and high labor cost per unit of product has reduced the proportion of gross business income available for interest and dividends.

Fourth, although with some people over fifty the remembrance of sad experience in the 1929 financial crash still serves as a deterrent to investment, one agency set up to guard against such crashes has been abused. The Securities and Exchange Commission, by restricting information to investors, interfering unwisely with the handling of new security issues by investment banking syndicates, and needlessly expensive registration requirements, has retarded capital formation.

Fifth, those policies and regulations of the SEC, the Treasury, or the Federal Reserve authorities which have reduced either interest rates or the commissions or profits of dealers enough to restrict desirable sales or sales effort, have narrowed the market for securities and thus hindered capital formation.

Sixth, there remains the need of government regulation to maintain a fair competitive market for the securities and funds which concern investment and speculation. This is important to prevent fraud and manipulation, and to build up reasonable confidence among potential investors. To this end, it may be desirable to replace the SEC with a better conceived administrative body.

Seventh, the enterpriser who employs the investor's savings often runs into the monopoly power of organized labor; also into controls by, or competition with "big government." These limit his demand for capital, thus hindering its formation.

Eighth, the excessive diversion of credit into installment sales, low down-payment housing developments, and the like has doubtless reduced the supply and increased the expense-cost of funds for investment purposes. In the money market, the competition of the government in its attempts to make credit easy to some has hampered others in securing funds for productive purposes.

Most of these immediate impediments to voluntary individual saving or investment can and should be removed promptly by legislative changes in taxes and by eliminating government competition or interference with business. Others require changes in administrative policy. Both changes require active discussion and wide public understanding right now.

To be very effective, however, laws and policies must generally express the ideas and beliefs of the people. Therefore, changes in laws and policies often must be accompanied by ideological changes. The foregoing impediments are closely related to the unsound and radical theories of Keynes, Veblen, Pareto, and Marx as developed by their diverse followers. (The "monopolistic competition" theory has also played a part.) Such theorists supply many of our government "economists," write most of our economic texts, and monopolize the economic reviews. They and their "national income approach" have come to dominate the teaching of economics and the employment of economics teachers. To them, individual desire is relatively unimportant, and there is no standard of value. To them, private saving is bad, and investment includes any government spending. Capital is treated either as money used to acquire any sort of income (money being mere government credit), or as business "assets" that are mere voidable property rights. In either case, interest payment is seen as unnecessary, and profits as temporary and tending to disappear under competition.

This theory, pointing toward political control of economic life, furnishes indeed a barren soil for the growth of capital and its productive use by private enterprise.
When the Red Flag Came Down

By NORBERT MUHLEN

A young Berlin truck-driver—reared under the Nazis, then living under Communism—showed in one dramatic gesture that the love of liberty cannot be crushed.

He did not look, or talk, or, it seemed to me, feel like a hero. He was an average German boy who, with his tweed jacket, his crepe-soled shoes, his bright plaid shirt open at the collar, and his intense interest in the make and mechanics of every passing automobile, might almost have been an average American boy. His name is Horst Ballentin. For one brief moment, a moment that reduced the struggle of our time to a simple gesture and yet expressed all its drama and its irony, he stood, quite literally, high above his people and his rulers and succeeded—for an equally brief moment—in showing to all the world that his people were at war with, and winning a victory over, their rulers. What happened to him, and what he made happen, was history which he neither foresaw nor understood.

History started for Horst Ballentin on June 16, 1953. He was twenty-three years old, a truck-driver in East Berlin, hard-working and happily married. As on every other weekday, Horst checked in at his garage at 6:30 A.M., where he was given his first assignment for the day—to deliver a carload of bricks to a Berlin hospital being constructed by the government. At the hospital, he helped the workers unload the bricks from his truck, although this was not part of his job. But he liked to help them out, for he knew that if they did not fulfill the impossible “norms” set by the Socialist Planning Commission, their wages would be cut. After an hour, the job was completed. As he drove back and his papers were being checked by the eternally suspicious guards at the construction lot entrance, he wondered how he could buy the new shirt he badly needed. He made 250 (East German) marks a month, and a shirt cost thirty marks. But Horst wasn’t a worrier. He was whistling when he pulled up at his garage.

The worker who was to load the truck with more bricks met him with a grin. “Today,” he said to Horst, “you won’t have to drive any more. There’s a strike on in Stalin-Allee.” Horst grinned back. Berliners are joking all the time, poking fun at their worst troubles. “O.K., so it’s a strike,” Horst said. “And perhaps two bottles of champagne to every worker, by courtesy of Comrade Ulbricht.”

“It’s true,” his fellow-worker insisted.

Horst, still not convinced, walked into the dispatcher’s booth. “No more work for us today,” he greeted Horst. “All East Berlin is on the streets!” And he told Horst what had happened, as he had heard it from eye-witnesses. “This morning some workers on Stalin-Allee were told by their union officer that their norms had been increased by 10 per cent. For weeks they had been pressured to vote for the increase themselves, but they wouldn’t; it would have cut their wages by almost 30 per cent. The boys got so mad they stopped working and went to speak up to the government. As they passed through Stalin-Allee, 2,500 others stopped work and marched with them. By the time they reached the city, there were more than 10,000 of them—all the workers along the way had joined them! Just as in 1920 when we had our last general strike in Berlin,” the elderly dispatcher added.

Horst, who in his short lifetime had seen his people only obey, said: “They’ll all be shot.”

“No, my boy,” the dispatcher said, “you haven’t heard the rest yet. An hour ago, they arrived at the Government House. The Vopos [People’s Police] who are generally all over the place seemed to have disappeared except for some who joined the workers and marched with them. They shouted for the Goatee [Walter Ulbricht, leading Communist] and Grotewohl [former Socialist, now Communist Prime Minister] to come and listen to their demands. Instead, only a few fat government big shots appeared. When they began dishing out the same old rubbish about socialism in progress, and workers’ sacrifices, and errors of the party and the government to be corrected now, the boys just refused to listen. Instead, one of them pushed forward and asked for better wages; then another urged that nothing be done to the strikers and their spokesmen; then a lady—a real good-looking girl she was, I hear—stepped up and said it isn’t only the workers from Stalin-Allee who’re here, it’s the whole people from all of East Germany. After her, a Stalin-Allee guy declared that was enough of the Communist government, we want free, secret, democratic elections and a new government. Finally, a boy proclaimed a general strike for tomorrow, and then they marched home again.”

All of a sudden, the old dispatcher got excited. “We’ve been slaves long enough!” he shouted.

To convince himself that all this was possible, Horst drove his truck out into the streets again, from one construction lot to the other. Nobody
was at work. Then he went home and tuned in to the West Berlin radio and heard the news. "At last," he said to his wife, "those pigs are being treated the way they deserve. If the men will only hold out against them tomorrow!"

When Horst went to work the next morning, June 17, his colleagues were waiting until their whole crew had gathered to join the other marching strikers. They did not even listen to the Communist union officer who had come to talk them out of their plan. Horst marched in the first rank of his colleagues. Soon their little group became part of large columns formed by the workers of two other factories marching in the same direction.

After half an hour, they were passed by five armored cars of the Soviet occupation army. One of the marchers called to the Russian soldiers to get out and join the Berliners, but they did not seem to hear him. A little farther along, they were stopped by a barricade of Vopos. Their officers ordered the marchers to halt and turn around.

By ten o'clock the marching mass approached the Brandenburg Gate, once the triumphal arch of the Kaiser's and the Nazis' armies, now on the borderline between East and West Berlin. High above it a red flag was waving, visible from far away on both sides. It had been raised in 1945 by the "liberating" Soviet Army.

The marchers began singing an old German song—"Brethren, toward the sun, toward freedom." As the first ranks drew near the gate, Horst heard a fellow-marcher say: "That flag should come down." He knew at once he must be the one to do it. "Let's get it down," he said to the boy walking by him, a boy he had never seen before. Police with tommy-guns and Soviet armored cars stood nearby in hostile preparedness. "I wonder how long it would take for them to fire," Horst thought. Then he called to his fellow-marchers to stand by at the foot of the gate.

Horst and his new friend climbed quickly up a narrow staircase and a ladder. When they reached the top—two small figures, as widely visible as the flag toward which they were moving—the crowd below became silent. Carefully balancing himself on the narrow platform, Horst advanced toward the flagpole. He found a crank with which to lower the ropes on which the flag was suspended, and turned it. Slowly, the flag came down. The crowd broke out in triumphant shouts. As Horst tried to rip the flag, heavy from the previous night's rain, from the strong ropes, voices called up to him: "Come down, the police are coming." There was no time to cut off the red flag, lying on the platform.

When Horst and his comrade returned to the street, protected from the police by a strong wall of workers, he was kissed by Berlin girls, carried on the shoulders of Berlin boys, cheered and applauded, and asked for his autograph by a number of Americans. But Horst felt that his job was not yet done. He borrowed a strong knife and climbed back to the top of the gate, at which the guns of Soviet armored cars were now pointing. For the second time his fellow-citizens stood staring up at him in silent suspense. Horst hacked away at the sodden flag with his knife. After a few minutes the flag fell to the street, where the crowd shouted even louder than before.

"Suddenly I was very happy. I felt as if I were floating over the crowd," Horst remembered afterward. He had won a victory over the Red troops, and torn down the symbol of Soviet slavery. "I felt very strong, as if I had lifted a mountain from the earth and thrown it away."

While the people on the street tore little pieces from the flag to keep as souvenirs, Horst said to himself: "And now we have to raise our flag, the flag of free Berlin." But where could he get a flag in a hurry?

Near the Brandenburg Gate there stands a monument on West Berlin ground, which on national holidays is decorated with the Berlin flag. Today was no national holiday. Horst and a friend hurried to the monument and asked the guardian to lend them a flag they could raise on the Brandenburg Gate. He refused. A bystander said that he knew of a West Berlin municipal office where flags were stored for solemn occasions, and offered to drive the boys to the office. The manager said he would be pleased to give them a flag, for he was an anti-Communist, but he could not take it upon his conscience to provoke the Russians into possibly shooting the boys. A long discussion followed: the manager grew more and more sympathetic to their idea, and finally disappeared for some time with flags in hand.

"No time," the boys said, and the manager gave them a Free Berlin flag. He handed them the money—25 West Berlin marks—made them sign a receipt, and wished them good luck.

Happily, the boys rushed to a West Berlin shop where flags were for sale. The salesman inquired curiously what the flag was for, and started to wrap it in a neat bundle. "No time," the boys said, and grabbed it and ran. Hours had been lost; it was now two o'clock. From nearby in East Berlin, they could hear the fire of tommy-guns, machine-guns, carbines. An hour ago, the Soviet commander of East Berlin had decreed martial law. Anybody who resisted his orders—the first being to empty the streets—was to be shot.

When Horst arrived at the gate he found two armored Soviet cars, their guns pointing at the high platform on top of it, surrounded by excited crowds. For a third time he climbed the steep..."
Victory Through Word Power?

By MAX SHEROVER

In the past few months the term “truce talks” was mentioned so frequently in news broadcasts and the columns of our daily papers that it almost became a new word, with the emphasis on the last syllable. And now “treaty talks” is about to take its place in our vocabulary. Not conference or discussion of negotiations, note, but talks—mountains of words that cover up the absence of deeds. Take the Austrian treaty, for instance. So far it has been the subject of 264 meetings and some millions of documented words. But there has been no withdrawal of troops on the part of Soviet Russia, no single act that would enable Austria to get on her feet economically and become a sovereign nation.

But the Kremlin’s representatives do more than turn every situation—every conference table or truce tent—into a talkathon. Words have never been so cleverly chosen, so diabolically used as they have been by these masters of effective address. With them words have become weapons—weapons that have already aided them substantially in winning a large part of the earth.

We are caught in a social maelstrom, swirling between two shores. On the one side there is the private-initiative profit system, able to provide the mass of the world’s population with ample sustenance but as yet unaware that only along this road lies the way to survival. On the other side, we see an ideological, word-drunk tyranny, the offspring of a misalliance between medieval feudalism and pseudo-Marxism, paradoxically adopting the vestigial social ills which enlightened capitalism threw out with the horse and buggy, kerosene lamps, and wooden ice-boxes. The “Workers’ State” has taken over and now uses such relics of barbarism as prison-labor, child-labor, inquisition, torture, forced confessions, execution without trial, solitary confinement, racial persecution, professional informers, religious discrimination.

How did all this come about? During the first quarter of this century private enterprise, as a part of its normal development, had enormously multiplied wealth-production. Had the events of 1917 in Russia not produced a social change, a virile capitalism would have become preoccupied with the industrial development of backward countries: Russia, China, India, Central and South America, the Near East, and Africa. Such a program would have given the countries capable of supplying equipment and engineering skill greater opportunities for the material advancement of their own people, while at the same time raising the standards of living for hundreds of millions who had never known more than bare subsistence.
Then in the throes of the First World War history gave the world an abnormally-born creature. It came to life in the one country that was least able to cope with it. The amateur social doctors, believing their own revolutionary mumbo-jumbo, misread the signs of the times, looked at the wrong calendar, and did not even know what time it was. The “dictatorship of the proletariat” was born and permitted to grow. To protect this monster of reaction, it became necessary to dope people with perversely used slogans and phrases: “Bread and Freedom” became a verbal ersatz for actual bread and actual freedom. There followed a barrage of words, phrases, clichés, and songs, but no bread, no freedom—and no clothes. “Parks of rest and culture,” but neither rest nor culture. “Peace Resolutions” while starving workmen produced the instruments of war. “Dictatorship of the Proletariat” with the proletariat enslaved as never before.

The Hazard of Thinking

The disciples of Verbal Revolution wanted no truck with the practitioners of deeds. To protect this reaction against progress, they had to exclude “dangerous thoughts.” To keep their victims reiterating slogans of lip-service to a lie was the way to do it. Give them neither time nor privacy for thinking. Thinking became a hazardous occupation. Word production became the honored trade. And word consumption was enormous. Some men are strange animals. They would just as soon swallow a phrase as eat a meal, just as Pavlov’s dogs salivated at a signal—only these men go right on believing the signal is food.

The returning revolutionists who had spent their exile bandying Marxian terminology, splitting hairs over phrases, had no practical administrative experience. They could operate only in terms of the profession they had practiced for a lifetime—speechmaking, writing, verbalizing, pamphleteering. Now they were in a veritable paradise of soap-boxes, platforms, tribunes, halls. They could pour out words to their hearts’ content. The audiences—made up of soldiers, sailors, workers, peasants worn out by struggles, hunger, and want, had literally “nothing to lose but their chains.” It didn’t cost them anything to listen: oratory replaced religion as “the opium of the people.” Bread production could wait the coining of new slogans like “Stakhanovism” and the “First Five Year Plan.” Eventually slogans, it was hoped, would somehow be turned into bread.

Consider the history of these pathetic thirty-five years! The topmost leaders stand out for the part they played in the battle of words. Their fame is enshrined in volumes of words. What do pictures and statues of Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Molotov, Vishinsky and the lesser lights show them doing? Working at a bench, a drafting board, or even a desk? No. They portray them in the act of talking. Talking became the highest art. The speaker at a party rally became the high-priest; his speech a ritual. Talking oneself into a commissariatship became the universal ambition. Talking led to advancement. It also led to prison, exile, death.

This discovery, that in approved speech lay the road to power, soon spread and spilled over the borders. Mussolini, who had spent his time scribbling words for Avanti, awoke to the fact that talk gets a quicker response. He stopped writing and started talking. With a little slogan-slinging, he was soon marching to Rome, and to power—to war, and to oblivion...

An obscure ex-corporal in Germany took the hint as it was borne in to him on the winds from the East and South. He started talking, and he outdid them all. He implemented his words with shrieks, and, sure enough, they led to power—to more power—to war, and to oblivion...

On the other side of the earth the Yamomotos and the Tojos found that there, too, words are all powerful. Slogans: “Co-prosperity sphere,” “Asia for the Asiatiques,” led to power, to more power, to war, to defeat, to the gallows, and to oblivion...

In the country where the idea of victory through word power first appeared (because its practitioners had been longer and were better at it), they are still going strong. Malenkov, Molotov, Vishinsky, having spent a lifetime in the school of words, are outdoing their teachers and their gone-with-the-wind imitators. Hate, amplified by hysteria, utters ever new slogans—“warmongers,” “imperialists,” “germ-warfare”—names, insults, abuse. Is it conceivable that this reckless reliance upon word power, which brought their imitators to an ignominious end, can do better for the U.S.S.R.’s practitioners of word power?

Can it be that words will win out in the long run over deeds? In America we have always believed that actions speak louder than words. We have left the harangues, the tirades, the name-calling to the other fellow. Only when he starts swinging his fists, have we shown ourselves ready with our power-packed arm, and from there on it becomes a battle of deeds. If our statesmen could see that to the Communist throwing words at us is the equivalent to swinging fists, we might start countering with deeds before it is too late. Only then will we make victory through word power another name for defeat.

In Saecula Saeculorum

How many empty years
Fill up
The tight-packed instant
Of eternity!

BEN Ray Redman
The Kremlin’s Forgotten Aggression

By ROBERT DONLEVIN

As our diplomats undertake the dubious task of securing through negotiation the honorable peace they denied our soldiers in combat, Americans may rightly ask whether our expenditure in lives and billions in Korea was only a first installment on the price we shall eventually have to pay to stop Communist aggression.

The first clear-cut case of that aggression took place a third of a century ago. Many who are well informed in history would be hard put to remember it. Like Korea, the victim was a little democracy that had regained its independence in the aftermath of a great war. Like Korea, the threat of invasion was known to exist months before Communist troops poured across the frontier. Like Korea, the chief executors of the plot were native sons of the invaded country. And like Korea, the actual invasion was preceded by unsuccessful attempts at fomenting a coup d'état. But there the similarity ends. For the Soviet Union's own forces conducted the entire invasion of a little nation which the Kremlin, only ten months before, had recognized as independent.

The country was Georgia, now a 25,000-square mile "republic" in the Soviet Union proper, buried in the rugged folds of the Caucasus mountains. The year was 1921. The renegade son who engineered the aggression was Joseph Stalin, then Soviet Minister of Nationalities.

In its short-lived three years of freedom from 1918 to 1921, the little democracy, under a Social Democratic government, instituted a land reform based on small holders, undertook an industrial program favoring private initiative and the investment of foreign capital, held free elections, and gained the de jure recognition of many of the great powers of the world, including the U.S.S.R.

In the first years after the Bolshevists took over in Russia, when there was still some discussion of policy, a controversy raged in the Kremlin over the Georgian question. Georgia was slated for sovietization. Nobody argued that. But there were two schools of thought as to the methods to be used. The Minister of War, Leon Trotsky, later murdered in exile by the G. P. U., belonged to the "moderate" group that wanted to weaken Georgia by subversion before bringing Red Army troops to the aid of a "spontaneous" uprising. But Stalin and his ruthless lieutenant, S. Ordzhonididze, wanted to crush their native land with outright invasion. Stalin had a personal score to settle with the Georgian Social Democrats who had expelled him fifteen years previously for his intrigues.

At first the counsel of the "moderates" seemed to prevail. But then they suffered a series of staggering setbacks. Georgia's voters elected 103 Social Democrats to their national legislature. The other 27 seats were divided among five splinter parties. The Communists didn't get a single seat. The high point of the "moderate" line was the signature of a solemn treaty between the two countries in which the U.S.S.R. recognized its small neighbor as completely sovereign and independent, and promised not to interfere in its internal affairs.

Communist agents operating from an outpost Soviet legation in Tiflis, the Georgian capital, spent millions in paper money trying to foment insurrections that would lead to the declaration of a Communist state. But the disorders they brought about in the eastern part of the country were quickly put down by local people. An attempt to start a revolt at the military academy in Tiflis also failed.

Would the West Intervene?

The icy resistance to Soviet agitation of a free people determined to stay free served to incite the "hothead" school that had been arguing all along for outright invasion. They now told the "moderates" that the latters' wishy-washy policy had been wrong. This nation that didn't want to accept the blessings of Communism must be vigorously crushed, they fumed.

And the Western nations? What would they do about it? Georgia's foreign minister, Eugene Gueguetchkori, didn't have too many illusions about that. Even getting them to recognize his country had been no easy task. The United States had not yet done so. Would they insist upon the safeguard of the high-sounding principle of self-determination expounded so eloquently by President Wilson? Or would they turn their heads discreetly away for fear of "provoking" the U.S.S.R.?

Things began to move to a head. In December 1920, the Kremlin requested General Hekker, commander of the Eleventh Red Army deployed near the Georgian frontier, to send a report to Moscow on what forces would be required to effect a successful invasion. The General's prompt reply pointed to complications. Much would depend upon the attitude taken by Turkey, Georgia's southern neighbor. Unless Turkey viewed the project favorably, it would not succeed. This delayed the invasion timetable, but Red Army troops began to move up to the frontier anyway.

Georgia's foreign minister sent protest after protest to Moscow in vain. The Bolshevik press hammered away at Georgia more furiously than ever. "The time has come," one editorial thundered, "to put an end to Georgia." Meanwhile, diplomatic advices reaching Washington indicated that Lenin might not be able to keep the Soviet Eleventh Army from invading Georgia on its own. Stalin was getting impatient. He had been violently opposed to the treaty with his native land recognizing

OCTOBER 5, 1953 25
its independence. Burning with a desire for revenge, he and Ordzhonikidze, who actually led the invasion forces, regarded every manifestation of Georgia’s resistance as a personal affront. They decided to take matters into their own hands.

Crashing across the frontier in armored trains, the Red Army hurled itself toward Tiflis on February 11, 1921. When queried by the Georgian government, the Soviet envoy in Tiflis replied coolly that he knew nothing of any invasion. There must be some mistake. Perhaps it came from (Soviet) Armenia, where Red Army troops were stationed. But the Armenian representative insisted that his government was in no way connected with the offensive. Both envoys were probably telling the truth. The invasion was not brought to the attention of the Politburo until three days later when it was presented as a fait accompli.

On February 15 the Soviet envoy in Tiflis received a coded message from the headquarters directing the invasion indicating the Politburo’s assent. “It has been decided to cross the Rubicon. Act accordingly.” At the same time other detachments of the Eleventh Army crossed the frontier from another direction. On February 16 Georgian Prime Minister Jordania’s attempts to contact the U.S.S.R.’s acting foreign minister or the Georgian envoy in Moscow failed. On February 17 the Soviet foreign minister cynically informed the Georgian government that he knew nothing of the facts of the attack but he would serve as mediator between Georgia and Armenia. The Georgians weren’t fooled, but answered accepting on condition that the Soviet armies withdraw from their territory. They received no reply.

**Georgia’s Heroic Defense**

Tiflis was now hard pressed by Soviet troops converging on it from two sides. Factories, schools, and workshops closed down. Students, workers, and shopkeepers were given rifles, hastily trained by the pitifully small and woefully underequipped Georgian army, and sent to the front. The maximum number of men they were able to get into the field was about 50,000, against a Red Army force of 100,000.

On February 21 Georgia’s harried President radioed the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs: “What are your demands? Formulate the objects of the war you are conducting against us. Perhaps we can come to an understanding without bloodshed.” No reply. He then appealed to the minister of war and even to Lenin himself. Still no reply. Instead, the Red Army opened three new offensives. The half-makeshift Georgian army was forced to give up Tiflis on February 17. Then they hurled back two enemy offensives, retook the city, capturing 1,000 prisoners and twelve cannon, but were forced out again on February 27.

The Soviet news agency proudly announced to the world that the “Revolutionary Committee of Georgia officially proclaims the occupation of the capital by local revolutionary peasants and workers.” But the account of a participating Red Army soldier appearing in an army newspaper described the capture of Tiflis as a conventional military operation.

At the same time Turkey attacked from the South, annexing several cities in southern Georgia. This was too much for the Georgians. In a last flare-up of anger their beleagured armies threw the Turks out of Batum. But the odds were too great. On March 17 they decided to cease fighting and on the next day the cabinet evacuated to Constantinople and then to Paris to set up a government-in-exile.

**“Gifts” to Moscow**

In the first months of the occupation the Soviets collected all the best railway cars and engines, machines, automobiles, and various manufactured items. They called it all a “present” from the newly-conquered nation. This caused inflation. Russian technicians and administrators came to take over the country. Red Army troops were quartered with local families who had to feed them although the country was in the throes of a famine. In a year the price of bread had gone up 1200 per cent. Wages had only slightly increased.

Russians filled all administrative posts. Higher officials were appointed in Moscow. The best men in the Georgian parliament were thrown into prison. All democratic freedoms guaranteed under the previous regime were abridged. Open courts were abolished. Soviet secret police methods were substituted. Secret arrest, trial, and sentence were the rule. Local workers were deported to remote regions of the U.S.S.R. and their places were taken by Russians.

But the little democracy proved more resilient than the Reds expected. Ten thousand students and workers held a demonstration for the withdrawal of the Red Army. Peasants objected to grain collections. Dispersed soldiers took to the rugged mountains, as their ancestors had done before them, and held off the authority of the invaders indefinitely, while peasants brought them food.

Had the sovietization been premature? Trotsky thought so. He wrote later that it “strengthened the Social Democrats for a certain period and led to the broad mass uprising three years after the invasion when, according to Stalin’s own admission, Georgia had to be ‘replowed anew.’”

The Soviet Union’s indefensible invasion of Georgia thirty-two years ago was one of the earliest proofs that we could not do business with the Bolsheviks. Strong diplomatic representations accompanied by economic sanctions and the sale of arms to the Georgians might have sufficed to make the U.S.S.R.’s first flagrant aggression its last.
In a totalitarian country, history is written to the prescription of the political authorities. Facts, like the human spirit, are formless matter, to be shaped and used, reversed or discarded, according to the needs of prevailing policy. As policy changes, so must history. The interpretation and facts that supported the Popular Front won't do for the Nazi-Soviet agreement. And woe to the historian who can't smell soon enough an approaching shift in the political wind! Even if he does guess right, he may have to be sacrificed along with the condemned facts of yesterday.

Under a totalitarian regime, history is official. History is part of the method of ruling, and the historian belongs (though usually in a subordinate capacity) to the apparatus that rules. No history except official history is permitted to exist.

Our present social order is not totalitarian. It is therefore possible that among us there should be more than one interpretation of history. If X omits or distorts historical facts, or is thought to do so, Y is still free to recall or correct the data. Z will not be exiled or shot because his views on history conflict with what the currently dominant political group takes to be its interests.

Though we rightly rejoice at these liberties, we should not be so careless as to suppose that the tendencies which reach fruition in totalitarian regimes are altogether absent. In our land also there is an official history, or what amounts almost to that. Historians who deviate too far from its norm are not exiled or shot, but they seldom taste the grants of the great Foundations nor do they sit in the endowed Chairs of the major universities. To them the State Department does not easily open its doors or files. Their road to a publisher is rocky, and in the leading book sections, though physically still immune, they will be spiritually drawn and quartered.

How pleasingly contrasted is the path of the historian who is ready to be official. Consider William L. Langer, the second volume of whose huge history of "The World Crisis and American Foreign Policy" has just appeared. (The Undeclared War, by William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, Harper & Bros., $9.60 pp., $10.00.) A distinguished publishing firm has brought it out in a handsome, expensive format. It is sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, that formidable aggregate of important persons, blood brother of the Foreign Policy Association, and cousin — shall we say? — of the Institute of Pacific Relations. William Langer has his Professorship of History at Harvard, was Chief of Research and Analysis in OSS, then Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, and more recently Assistant Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Gleason was also in OSS, and is now Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.

The second important book of official history has also just been published. (The China Tangle, by Herbert Feis, Princeton University Press, 445 pp., $6.00.) This volume too, brought out by a leading university, is physically splendid. The author worked in the State and War Departments. He has recently been a member of the heavily endowed and exceedingly influential Institute for Advanced Study, now headed by J. Robert Oppenheimer. The Ford Foundation provided the "grant which enabled me to write this book." It "was made possible only by the wish of the State Department."

Mr. Feis continues in his Foreword with a very long list of individual acknowledgments. Then-President Truman himself was of aid, Averell Harriman and Clarence Gauss, Ballantine and Bohlen and Kennan, Dean Rusk and John P. Davies, Herbert Elliston (editor of the Washington Post), Paul Hoffman and Joseph Alsop. With so many willing helpers for this book on "the American effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission," Mr. Feis quite naturally had no time to consult Patrick Hurley or Paul Linebarger, David Rowe or Karl Wittfogel, Freda Utley, David Dallin, William McGovern, Kenneth Colegrove, Eugene Dooman or George Taylor, Walter Judd, General Claire Chennault or Admiral Charles Cooke, or other Chinese (for a book about China policy) than T. V. Soong. In short, Mr. Feis did not consult with the unofficials. And why should he have done so? The purpose of official history is to defend the course of the regime, not to clutter up the record with useless facts.

But what regime? The problem is not quite so simple as in the Soviet Union, where everyone knows that the regime to be defended by the official writer means the Presidium (formerly Politburo) as it was, is, and always will be. We are looser, and our regime — the powers that rule us — is less monolithic.
The first great practical step toward an official history in the United States was taken when the New Deal began drawing intellectuals into the apparatus of government, and extending government into the fields of writing, publishing, general research, and the universities.

However, the roots of the official tradition extend before the New Deal, as it continues to live on thereafter. It grew out of the big Foundations; the civic organizations like the Foreign Policy Association, Council on Foreign Relations, and Institute of Pacific Relations; the associated faculties of universities; certain groups of lawyers, bankers, and foreign-oriented businessmen; and, during the past two decades, many in the upper levels of the State Department, its Foreign Service, and the various intelligence agencies. Politically, these elements made an odd alley of what the Chicago Tribune calls "Eastern internationalism" with academic "liberalism" and Marxism.

This official stream is nonpartisan (as between Democratic and Republican parties). Although it had to trim its course somewhat for the coming of Eisenhower, it continues ascendant in the Foundations, the big universities and civic associations, as well as in the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council.

This is why no fundamental shift in foreign policy has yet taken place under the new Republican Administration, in spite of the wish of the electorate and of Congress.

The Undeclared War and The China Tangle are, then, embodiments of this continuing official tradition. The objective of The Undeclared War is to defend the general policy of the State Department and the Roosevelt Administration for the period from September 1940 (the signing of the Tripartite Pact) to Pearl Harbor. Mr. Feis' objective in The China Tangle is a defense of the policy toward China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall mission (1941 through 1946).

I do not wish to suggest that these books are trivial, or are nothing but biased ex parte defense. The authors are able, they and their associates have done much work, and both books are impressive. The two volumes contain an immense amount of material that is necessary to an adequate library on contemporary history. But at critical points the account of what happened becomes distorted by the controlling official interest.

It is no longer really possible for a 100 per cent official defense to be made. Too much has become known for anyone to claim any longer that everything done by the Administration through the late '30's and the '40's was wisely and well done. The official spokesmen are forced back on deeper positions from which they seek to protect not every knob and hillock, but the "general line."

Messrs. Langer and Gleason's problem is: how did we get into the war, and why? Although they give occasional signs that they would prefer to throw him to the revisionist wolves, their protagonist is, as it must be, Franklin Roosevelt. He is the key to their position, and if he is lost then all goes. But they are confronted by an inevitable dilemma. Roosevelt must be judged either blind and stupid, or a deliberate, cold-blooded deceiver of the American people. Either he did not know where his 1939-41 steps were going (Lend-Lease, destroyer deal, ultimata to the Japanese, etc.), or he did know and set himself to prevent the people from knowing.

The authors do not wish to accept either horn of this dilemma, because either conflicts fatally with the official ideology. They shuttle between the two, and sometimes try to find in Roosevelt's mind a cloudy view of "neither peace nor war," with plans for fighting Hitler to total defeat while yet not going to war against him.

Actually, the only way out of this dilemma is the conclusion that Franklin Roosevelt was a brilliant but irresponsible opportunist, whose method was always to try to ride with events. Without ever facing the issue clearly, he "courted the war," which he on the whole favored, and hoped that the tide of events would take the decision out of his hands—as, at Pearl Harbor, it finally did.

Messrs. Langer and Gleason cannot in the end avoid the explicit question whether "Mr Roosevelt deceived the American people, bypassed Congress, violated his election pledge of 1940, and purposely maneuvered an unwilling and unsuspecting country into war." Their conclusion is so remarkable, and such a perfect summary expression of the official conception of history, that I quote it in italics:

"The historian can hardly evade the responsibility of pronouncing on this crucial and controversial matter. Basically his opinion will depend on whether he agrees with Mr. Roosevelt's conclusion that Hitlerism constituted a menace to the United States and to the principles on which the nation is founded, and that therefore it was in the national interest to support the opponents of Nazism and contribute to Hitler's defeat."

No practitioner of mere Aristotelian or mathematical logic could ever construct a syllogism where the premise that so-and-so is "in the national interest" could prove whether or not it is true that Roosevelt deceived the people, bypassed Congress, and what not. For such a proof only the dialectical logic of a totalitarian philosophy will suffice. Langer and Gleason's mode of reasoning here is an application of the doctrine that what serves the group interest (as officially interpreted) is true.

Let me shift to a small verbal point that equally shows how far this book is from objective history. All citizens who in any way opposed the policy of the Administration are lumped under the label of
“isolationist,” sometimes supplemented by “appeaser.” At best this is casual journalism rather than serious history. It is something worse than journalism when the label is applied without distinction to individuals and organizations of the most diverse kinds, motives, and connections: pacifists; Lindbergh; the Catholic Church; Joseph Kennedy; the Communists (before June 22, 1941, that is—the Communists drop out of the Longer picture after that date); Charles Beard; the Bund; the Hearst Press; Robert Taft; America First; Norman Thomas; Gerald L. K. Smith. Among the names on this long black list there is only the same real connection as among those whom the Kremlin designates “Trotskyists, wreckers, and imperialist agents”: real or fancied opposition to the official line.

That something went wrong with United States policy immediately before, during, and just after World War Two is no longer in dispute, even by the most official of defenders. It is further agreed that, insofar as what happened is not to be attributed to impersonal destiny, the primary human cause was an incorrect estimate of the Soviet Union and of world Communism on the part of those who were running the nation.

This incorrect estimate must be explained by ignorance, miscalculation, or subversion, or by some combination of these three. Messrs. Langer, Gleason, and Feis let it go with some ignorance and a certain amount of miscalculation. “Neither those in Chungking who wrote the dispatches,” writes Mr. Feis, “nor those in Washington who read them kept on their desks the articles and speeches of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. They did not study closely the past resolutions of the congresses of the Soviets and the Comintern.” Why not? Wasn’t it part of their business, for which they drew their salaries from the public payroll?

Mr. Feis’ reply here, his defense of the Foreign Service, is in effect that they cannot be blamed because the whole country was equally ignorant and naïve. He is rather neat, and a little sly, in showing by selected quotations that a number of present extreme critics of the China policy (Hurley, for example, and Wedemeyer) were not always so clear about the Communists as they now consider themselves to be. But this argument, even if true, is not really relevant. We do not excuse a doctor for a false diagnosis by pointing out that the average man on the street would have done no better.

Subversion is not merely ruled out by these three official writers: they do not even mention it as a possibility. This total omission, after the thousands of pages of sworn and interlocking testimony, demonstrates that their official zeal has carried them beyond the boundaries of the historian’s license.

Does Professor Langer really believe it enough to mention (just mention) that Owen Lattimore was appointed Roosevelt’s personal envoy to Chiang in June 1941, without a single reference to the millions of words of testimony bearing on Lattimore’s service to Soviet interests? When Mr. Feis describes the very important role that Lauchlin Currie played from his inner White House office, does he think it wholly irrelevant that converging sworn testimonies have linked both Currie and one of his principal assistants to Communism and to Soviet espionage? Is there no significance in the established fact, absent from both these books, that Americans were part of the Sorge spy ring? Langer and Gleason record that Harry Dexter White was the author of the basic memorandum that developed into the fateful proposals made to Japan in November 1941. The independent lines of testimony that prove White’s active role in Soviet espionage do not seem open to much further doubt. And Langer and Gleason do not publicly doubt this evidence; they do not acknowledge its existence.

If we dismiss the whole question of individual subversion as of secondary importance, there remains the basic problem of the Soviet strategy toward Japan, China, and the United States. Of these three writers show only a little more comprehension, with all the benefit of “hindsight,” than did Roosevelt, Wallace, Marshall, or the others whose past ignorance they are so concerned to defend and excuse. The problem of Soviet strategy belongs to our future even more crucially than to our past. This official distortion of past history is simultaneously a blueprint for future disaster.

The Desert Fox at Bay


In London, back in July 1944, I was asked to make a series of broadcasts to Germany over an Allied radio station. The program directors chose me, I was told, because I had written an anti-Hitler book. In discussing the broadcasts, however, I was dismayed to learn that I could only threaten the Germans with utter destruction. There could be no suggestion that an early surrender would lessen their punishment, no hint that if they threw Hitler over it would be taken into consideration by the Allies. I protested that this kind of broadcast followed the very line of Hitler and Goebbels and played right into Goebbels’ hands; it would prolong the war, and aid post-war totalitarianism. But I was unable to discuss the matter with anyone because I could not find out who was responsible for the radio program. After one broadcast, I declined to make any more.

This situation came to my mind as I read The Rommel Papers. In the summer of 1944 Field
Marshal Rommel (and also apparently Field Marshal von Kluge and others) believed Germany had lost the war and that further resistance meant senseless slaughter. According to his son Manfred, Rommel said: “What we should do now is to see it that our Western enemies occupy the whole of central Europe and keep the Russians outside our borders.” The Marshal bitterly blamed Hitler and his clique who, in order to “prolong their miserable lives a few months,” blindly continued to resist the Western Allies. This period was a half year before Yalta, apparently months before the British and Americans had agreed to halt their armies when they reached the heart of Germany.

The book is mainly composed of Rommel’s letters and reports; there are comments by the editor, by Manfred Rommel, and by General Bayerlein, as well as photographs, maps, and a good index. The letters and reports are the very meat of history, prime source material and invaluable for students of World War Two. Published first in Britain, the book stirred up acrimonious discussion there. Some British reviewers sharply attacked it; others vigorously defended it. Even at the height of the war, the “Desert Fox” held the admiration of certain leading British fighting men: Prime Minister Churchill told Parliament that he was “a great general.” Unquestionably Rommel was the most colorful military personality on the Axis side. A ruthless, hard-bitten, professional soldier, he nevertheless did not figure in the mass murders, pogroms, and atrocities that disgraced so many of his fellow officers, especially the SS men. Opponents on the battlefield considered him a clean fighter. One British critic concedes that he was “possibly the greatest armored commander of the last war.”

Much of the volume is taken up with the North African campaigns. Here Rommel complains of fuel and munitions shortages, of lack of naval and air support. He pillories the Italian soldiery but has only contempt for their higher officers. When it was no longer practicable to keep up the battle in Africa, Rommel wanted to withdraw his men and save them to fight another day. Hitler would not hear to it. In consequence, the surviving troops of the once mighty Afrika Korps became prisoners of war.

Rommel’s criticism of Hitler, Göring, and the bigwigs at the Führer’s Headquarters is unsparing. Time and again Hitler ignorantly interfered with strategy in the field, compelled his officers to stand in undefendable positions, wasted his soldiers through stupid and impossible orders. The same was true when Rommel was attempting to stem the Allied invasion of France. The wonder is that a group of army officers waited until July 20, 1944, to carry out their abortive bomb plot against the Führer.

Rommel’s death was in keeping with his dramatic career and the Götterdämmerung end of the Third Reich. Hitler gave him the choice of taking poison or facing the ignominy of a treason trial. He chose poison. In death there was “a look of contempt on his face.”

HENRY C. WOLFE

One-Sided


Since Dean Padover limits himself to Madison as a political thinker and expressly declines to consider Madison the politician and President, it would not be fair to object to the omissions of Madison’s state papers. True, these could hardly be intelligible without a running historical comment and this in turn would make it difficult to come out with a very high estimate of Madison’s abilities, even as a political thinker. But the result of this chosen omission is to make The Complete Madison, for more than half its pages, a mere reprint of Madison’s contributions to the Federalist. The balance is chiefly extracts from Madison’s personal letters, which rarely express more than the conventional political and social platitudes appropriate to a man of his time and position.

There seems little profit in attempting, as Dean Padover does, a re-evaluation of Madison without considering his character as well as his ideas, and it is in his life, not in his letters, that his character is displayed. He had a sharp and able mind. He was widely read. But he was weak. During the framing of the Constitution, while Jefferson—who opposed the idea—was in France, Madison was under the strong influence of Jay and Hamilton. Hence the centralist Madison of the Convention and the Federalist. When Jefferson returned, Madison gradually shifted the other way and, as Jefferson’s Secretary of State, amably stumbled along with him on the policy of “all aid short of war” to France, the policy that so effectively laid the groundwork for the folly of 1812. (If anything is in need of historical re-evaluation, it is that incredible war.) Finally, when he was President, it was Clay and Calhoun with their rabble-rousing slogans and their easy notion of a cheap victory in alliance with the irresistible Napoleon who did the real political thinking—the thought that led to action—for this pitiful little President. (It is curious to note how then, as now, the early friends of the social reforms of the Jacobins were able to retain their friendship for the military imperialism that so naturally grew out of them.) And so from the righteous enemy of the Alien and Sedition Laws we have the suppression of public debate in Congress on the declaration of war; from the believer in the pacific nature of democratic states, the proposition for the military conquest of
Canada; from the logician and rationalist, the proposal to challenge England on the seas with a handful of frigates—and John Adams’ frigates at that.

The chicane and folly of this first “dynasty of democracy” is indeed worth historical re-evaluation, and the Paddock who has given us a penetrating picture of Louis XVI could have done it. I hope he tries, for The Complete Madison is not even of much aid toward it. In the meantime the fire scars on the walls of the Capitol and the White House—which 140 years of paint have hidden but not erased—will seem a sufficient monument to Madison and to the whole school of political incompetence masquerading as political virtue.

LAWRENCE R. BROWN

Woman of the New Japan

The Broader Way, by Sumie Seo Mishima. 247 pp. New York: John Day Company. $3.50

The books of personal experiences by men and women who lived through the horror and holocaust of World War Two have one thing in common. Whatever the teller’s nationality, whether he was on “our side” or was the enemy, he has a human hatred of suffering, an understanding of the average man’s helplessness before the mysterious forces which create wars, and a compassion for his fellow-sufferers on the other side.

All this and more is clearly evident in this newest of the ever-growing number of such war books, an account by an American-educated Japanese woman, with a good reporter’s eye and ear for detail, and a sensitive awareness of all that was happening to her and her country. She had a personal resentment against the Japanese who led her country into war with the United States, for she knew and loved Americans from her days among them as a young girl; and she nursed no grudges against the Americans for the terrible sufferings and hardships she and her family and neighbors endured as the war progressed.

She has gone further than merely recording the horrors of war, which she has done with considerable skill and a woman’s natural revulsion from the degradation of humans living like animals in a slowly-starving, bomb-wrecked city. What makes this simply but sincerely written and always interesting book so different and valuable is that Mrs. Mishima was able to watch and record the gradual breakdown of the old stratified Japanese society, and the consequent liberation of the women from feudal bondage.

Indeed, the main theme of her book may be said to be just that; and told in such an intensely personal way, without the inhibitions and reticences which were universal in Japanese women before the war, it is a social document of exceptional value to the historian as well as to the reader just looking for interesting information and knowledge.

Mrs. Mishima was graduated from Wellesley and returned to Japan in 1928 full of high hopes for her future. Those hopes were quickly imprisoned in medieval tradition, and she struggled valiantly but almost in vain against her lot.

Frustrated in her desire to use her talents and expensive Western education to help modernize her fellow countrywomen, she hoped for much from her marriage to a professor of Chinese history. Here, too, she was disappointed, for she learned all too quickly that she had married into a matriarchy, solidly entrenched in the ancient social traditions of the Japanese people. Her divorced husband had four children and an august mother, an old-fashioned Japanese aristocrat who expected her new daughter-in-law to conform to all the old shibboleths of a way of life against which even then Japanese women were timidly rebelling, a way of life the daughter-in-law had herself set out to change. The young woman would not concede defeat either in her marriage or in her ideas, and the measure of her hard-won and dearly-bought success is in the awakening of the older woman eventually to the worth of those ideas, and her almost complete acceptance of them.

One of the most interesting sections of the book is the author’s account of her postwar job as translator with the War Crimes Tribunal. She explains the frightening complexities of the Japanese language and the heavy responsibilities of the translators in clearing the barriers between thought and language. She does more: she explains the almost unexplainable, the practical, realistic raison d’être of the trials, “these shows,” as some of her American friends in Japan and abroad called them.

“They disclosed to the otherwise ignorant Japanese people all the defects of our nationalistic militarism,” she says. “The voluminous verdicts of the Major War Crimes Tribunal especially have given us an authentic, judicious, detailed history of Japanese imperialism from the Manchurian Affair to its downfall, which no contemporary historian could have written.”

She has never lost her affection for the United States, and in optimistically assaying the future of her own country as a democratic nation, Mrs. Mishima raises the interesting point that Japan may belong less to Asia than to the Pacific, “that final meeting place of East and West.”

This is a book written with rare grace by a woman whose own mind and spirit are a meeting place for East and West. It should be of immeasurable help to all men and women of whatever nationality who are building a bridge to that meeting place.

IRENE CORBALLY KUHN

OCTOBER 5, 1953 31
Briefer Mention

How You Really Earn Your Living, by Lewis H. Haney. 282 pp. New York: Prentice-Hall. $3.00

This book is the result of a suggestion made by a keen-minded businessman to Dr. Lewis H. Haney, Professor of Economics at New York University and the author of a widely syndicated financial column. The businessman was concerned about the lack of economic understanding among employers, employees, and neighbors. Younger people especially have yet to learn that war is not a usual condition of American life and that we cannot borrow ourselves out of debt. Everybody believes he knows a lot about economics and money when the truth is that he knows very little. Doctor Haney's book is devoted to the subject: What is worthwhile—from the economist's viewpoint? How can it be achieved? The author employs the question-and-answer method. To illustrate the absurdity of the farm subsidy program, he gives us this gem—one of many in his book:

The government buys potatoes at $2 a hundred pounds.
It sells them at one cent per hundred pounds to feed hogs.
The corn-hog grower then feeds less corn and has more corn to sell.
The government buys the corn.
It then sells the corn cheap to another hog grower.
The government buys the surplus pork.
You figure the next one!
You and I would not do these things. Why should the government? Just suppose, if you will, that we were all farmers: where would our subsidies come from?

The paper-bound edition ($1.50) is ideal for group distribution. This is the easy-reading book which many firms have been looking for as a means of educating their employees in fundamental economics.

Ukraine Under the Soviets, by Clarence A. Manning. New York: Bookman Associates. 223 pp. $3.50

Most Americans know little about Ukraine, after Russia itself the largest constituent nation of the Soviet Union. The 35,000,000 Ukrainians, the rich Ukrainian fields covered by twelve feet of black earth, the mines, factories, and great Ukrainian rivers were the prize which Hitler believed would secure his thousand-year Reich. What the Ukrainians do will prove a major and perhaps critical factor in determining the outcome of the struggle for the world.

For many years, with scholarly integrity but also with a lively sympathy for the Ukrainian people and their aspirations, Professor Manning has studied Ukraine and written about its history.

This present book is based on work done by exiled Ukrainians in Europe. It has particular importance as a concrete illustration of the methods by which the Soviet system is built up. "It is not only a study of the past. It is the story of a process... It is no exaggeration to say that the Russian Communists have used the Ukrainian land and the Ukrainian population as the laboratory for their future conquests."

Maugham's Choice of Kipling's Best, selected and with an introductory essay by W. Somerset Maugham. New York: Doubleday & Company. 324 pp. $3.95

Of the sixteen stories which Somerset Maugham has chosen for this volume, all but one (The Village that Voted the Earth was Flat) are from Kipling's early writings, and most are about India. Maugham believes that these early Indian stories are Kipling's best, and that at his best, "he is our greatest story writer. I can't believe he will ever be equalled. I am sure he can never be excelled."

This is extreme praise, and it may be that in rating these stories so highly Maugham has also himself in mind. Maugham and Kipling both found in Asia their most congenial subject-matter, they both mastered the short story as a genre, a technique, both wrote much ("Copiousness is not a defect in a writer; it is a merit," Maugham insists), and both gained enormous commercial success. In both, one must add, there is a certain defect of sensibility that keeps them out of the highest rank.

Most of these Kipling stories stand up well, though. It is amusing to note that it is just the ones that got Kipling outlawed a generation ago that now seem to come off best. It is when he is writing about Empire and Queen and Native and Honor that he tells us and moves us most.

The Earthquake, by Heinz Risse. Translated by Rita Eldon. 254 pp. New York: Farrar, Straus and Young. $3.00.

This slim volume comprises the "notes" of a man who has been convicted of murdering his wife. The "Professor" in charge of his case has labeled him schizophrenic and asked him to record his thoughts. A depressing situation, and one that could easily have led many a novelist into a maze of unintelligible sequences of pseudo-symbolic drivel. Not so Herr Risse, who has skillfully sidestepped the tempting pitfalls and written a story of pathological escapism with sanity and subtlety. Indeed, his presentation of a mind sick from childhood is so sensitively drawn and so expertly convincing in the smallest detail that it is a surprise to learn he is not a trained psychiatrist with a flair for poetic prose, but an accountant, and that this is his first full-length novel. On the basis of it, we should hope it will not be his last.
Eternal Hollywood

When Columbia Pictures first offered *From Here to Eternity*, the Navy's film distribution organization banned it from its list of approved pictures "because it might create disrespect for a sister service." The idea of Navy officers going out of their way to safeguard respect for the Army might be amusing to veteran spectators of the Army-Navy games. To others, the Navy's action seems pointless not only because the Army approved the picture and helped with its filming, but because *From Here to Eternity* actually creates respect for the Army and the courage and devotion of its men. It also creates respect for Hollywood, which has finally discovered that a book does not have to be turned into an eviscerated potboiler in order to become a successful moving picture.

Respect also is due to Harry Cohen, president of Columbia Pictures, who disregarded the advice of his experts who claimed that filming "Eternity" would be as absurd as turning a Thomas Wolfe book into a comic strip. Further respect should go to writer Daniel Taradash and director Fred Zinneman, of *High Noon* fame, who took a book about life in the pre-Pearl Harbor Army and gave it the stark, human tenseness of a Greek drama.

But mostly *From Here to Eternity* serves to build up respect and admiration for a man who had almost disappeared from the American Scene—crooner Frank Sinatra, alias Frankie, alias "the Voice." When a British sociologist returned from a World War Two visit to the United States, he reported that our country "was obsessed by sex, swing, and Sinatra." The three were not necessarily synonymous for, in 1942, Sinatra seemed much more important than sex and swing. During his appearance in New York's Paramount Theater that year, the crooner's female fans caused riots in Times Square. When he sang they swooned by the dozens, and were carried off in ambulances provided by the thoughtful Paramount management. His fame then was so great that even Moscow's *Pravda* sent over a sour-faced correspondent, who later reported that Sinatra had no voice and that Russia had invented bobby-soxers years before America developed them.

But the rage for Frankie diminished. Soon he found himself in the unenviable position of an idle idol. His engagements became few and his record sales dropped. He tried song-and-dance roles in the movies, but Hollywood remained indifferent. He started a radio show on CBS but landed at the same time as Milton Berle's NBC spot, and had to quit. Meanwhile he divorced his wife and married film star Ava Gardner. His misunderstandings with that lady finally landed him in that most dismal graveyard of celebrities—the gossip columns.
But Frankie did not give up. When he read *From Here to Eternity* he became fascinated by the character of Maggio, the spunky sidekick of the hero, whose Italian ancestry brought him insults and finally death at the hands of a sadistic sergeant. Sinatra meekly asked Columbia to try him out for the role. But Columbia gave him the “see me later” treatment, and Frankie took off dispiritedly for Nairobi, where Ava was working on location. It was there that a grinning Swahili houseboy brought him the cabled promise of a screen test. Sinatra flew half-way around the world to take that test, but it was worth it, for he got the role.

As Maggio, Sinatra proved himself to be one of the great dramatic cinema actors of this generation. His acting overshadows such box-office potentates as Burt Lancaster who, by comparison, seems a mountain of muscles with a throaty growl. Deborah Kerr appears wooden beside him. Only the restrained and sensitive playing of Montgomery Clift is on a par with Sinatra’s acting, as Clift portrays the role of Prewitt, the soldier who endures untold humiliation in order to maintain his right of American individualism. But Sinatra’s performance is the memorable highlight of a memorable film, and the rewards have started rolling in. Two weeks after “Eternity” was released, Frankie’s night club price doubled. And Capitol records are hailing “the record-resurgence of Sinatra.”

In the opinion of this reviewer, it is Sinatra the actor rather than Frankie the crooner who will leave his mark in the entertainment world.

By chance or design, Sinatra sings neither of the two musical numbers in “Eternity.” In one scene he does hum a little tune while waiting in line for his week-end pass. The soldier in front of him turns around and advises caustically: “Can that singing stuff, boy, can it.” For the sake of Sinatra’s dramatic career, we second the motion.

When Hollywood turns out such a sensitive production as “Eternity,” it is almost heartbreaking to contrast it with what is probably more representative of the film-makers’ art—a movie called *I, the Jury,* based on one of the tough thrillers of Mickey Spillane. Spillane started what might be described loosely as a literary movement some three years ago when he published his first book, *I, the Jury.* In the words of Spillane’s own publicity men, the book was a mixture of “murder, mayhem, sex, and sadism.”

Apart from any moral considerations, the book was atrocious. Yet this was apparently just the mixture needed by some sixty million readers, who have seemingly found a perfect avenue for escape and an ideal outlet for their aggressions in Mr. Spillane’s works.

Never lagging far behind the public taste, Hollywood snapped up the option to *I, the Jury* and has now released it through United Artists as a three-dimensional opus starring a newcomer to the screen, Biff Elliot, in the role of Mike Hammer, the tough detective.

If an award of an Oscar denotes excellence in performance, we should like to award a “Racso” (Oscar spelled backwards) to Mr. Elliot and to Harry Essex, the writer and director of *I, the Jury.* Considering the low quality of Spillane’s book, it is difficult to believe that the film could be any worse. It is, however. The action is disjointed and catalcptic, made only more morbid by Mr. Elliot, whose performance is strangely evocative of the antics of an adenoidal rooster afflicted with St. Vitus’ dance. Even hardened Spillane fans will be disappointed in this film, which belongs on the three-dimensional dungheap.

Serge Flegers
Good motor truck transport contributes to the well-being and security of each and every one of us. In fact, more than 9 million trucks make up the miracle of present-day motorized transportation.

All America has grown through the years these millions of vehicles have come into use. And starting with the "Auto-Wagon," the International truck of 1907, International Harvester has produced a steady stream of trucks. Today our highway systems are expanding, trucks are becoming ever more efficient. These two factors mean even greater mobility and lead toward greater prosperity for the entire nation through service to every community in the land.
Why Don’t You Defeat Communism with Sound Money by returning to the GOLD COIN STANDARD?

The surest way to overturn an existing social order is to debauch the currency." These portentous words, credited to Lenin, point the way to defeat Communism, at home and abroad. Make monetary strength the weapon—and sound money the ammunition.

The only sound money system that has ever been successful is the Gold Coin Standard. It stabilizes the value of money—prevents issuance of flat currency... gives the individual close control over government policy since he can redeem his currency for gold coin whenever such policy is inimical to preservation of individual rights and liberty.

This sovereignty of the citizen over government is the great difference between dictator-ship and democracy. We must be proud of it... display it fearlessly to the world... make it the principle that will persist for free men... and keep them free!

For twenty years the recently deposed federal administration pooh-poohed this principle. Our citizens suffered—became more and more the economic slaves of government. The value of their earnings and savings shrank—up to 60%.

Fortunately, technological advancements, such as Kennametal, increased industrial productivity during this period—and helped partially to offset the evil effects of irredeemable currency. The President, important Cabinet members, Senators, and Congressmen are aware of the inherent relationship between the Gold Coin Standard and individual freedom. Why, then, should legislative action on it be delayed?

The tremendous impact on all other nations of sound money in the United States will lead the way to international economic stability... impel a new high level in human relationships, and provide a healthful domestic atmosphere in which American industry, of which Kennametal Inc. is a key enterprise, will provide ever-increasing benefits for all our people.

We must resume without devaluation or delay.

Excerpt from Republican ‘Monetary Policy’ Plank

Let Freedom RING

KENNAMETAL Inc.
Latrobe, Pa.

One of a series of advertisements published in the public interest by WORLD'S LARGEST Independent Manufacturer Whose Facilities are Devoted Exclusively to Processing and Application of CEMENTED CARBIDES

The right to redeem currency for gold will help keep America free... ask your Senators and Congressman to work and vote to restore the Gold Coin Standard. Write to The Gold Standard League, Latrobe, Pa., for further information. The League is an association of patriotic citizens joined in the common cause of restoring a sound monetary system.