HOW TO WIN GERMANY
William Henry Chamberlin

GOVERNMENT BY LAWLESSNESS
Stanley High

ACHESON’S GIFT TO STALIN
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KILLING WITH KINDNESS
Sir Ernest Benn

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A WORD ABOUT OUR CONTRIBUTORS

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN, who recently returned from Europe, interviewed leading personalities in Germany for his Freeman article. His latest book is “America’s Second Crusade.”

GARET GARRETT’s latest pamphlet “Ex America,” part of which appeared in the Freeman of June 18 under the title, “These Hated Americans,” will be published on October 31 by Caxton Printers, Ltd. of Caldwell, Idaho.

STANLEY HIGH, a minister’s son and a graduate of Boston University School of Theology, turned to the pen instead of the pulpit. He became a correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor, editor of the Christian Herald, Director of Talks for NBC, and since 1940 has been a roving editor of Readers Digest.

SIR ERNEST BENN founded the Society for Individual Freedom in England, which publishes a monthly magazine, Individualism.

EUGENE LYONS, magazine writer and author of “Assignment in Utopia” and “The Red Decade,” is chairman of the newly formed American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia.

HARRY SERWER, a guest author of “A Reviewer’s Notebook” while John Chamberlain is on vacation, wrote “Old-Fashioned Radicals” for our issue of July 30.

THEODORE KOMISARJEVSKY was a director of the Imperial and State Theaters in Moscow until he left Russia in 1919. Since then, he has directed and designed dramatic and operatic productions in England, France and the United States.

Forthcoming

In our next issue we expect to publish an article on the “French Revolution of 1944-45,” by Bertrand de Jouvenel; also an article by Hubert Martin giving factual evidence on the disastrous record of UNNRA.
THE FORTNIGHT

When he signed the new Defense Production Act—and signed it only for the reason that in some ways it did extend the economic powers of government—the President said: “But the inflation control provisions of the act are gravely deficient . . . It is a law that will push prices up . . . force price ceilings up on thousands of commodities clear across the board. It is like a bulldozer crashing aimlessly through existing pricing formulas, leaving havoc in its wake.” Then he added: “To the extent that this act permits prices and the cost of living to rise, it will be necessary to allow reasonable adjustments in wages. We cannot ask the working people of this country to reduce their standard of living just to pay for the higher profits this act provides for business.”

Can anything be imagined more calculated to cause reckless buying than a positive prediction by the President that prices are going to rise? If enough people believed him, that alone would suffice to start a panicky exchange of irredeemable paper money for things. If prices rise, he will be right, and Congress will be wrong. Is that what he wants?

Two things we may be sure of about the new Defense Production Act—two only. It will increase the economic confusion and it will have political reverberations. How else it will work nobody knows. Too many factors are variable and unpredictable, even the intentions of government. The Washington correspondent of the Wall Street Journal says the official mind is divided. Some say, “Let us be as tough as possible with the law such as it is,” and some are saying, “Let the ceilings blow up, and then when prices rise we can blame Congress for not giving us the kind of law we wanted.” You do not have to be as cynical as that to understand that no law will work as Congress expects it to work if the Administration wishes either to discredit it or to circumvent it. If people believe Mr. Truman, prices will go up. If people are disbelieving, they may go down. They may go down and then up. Or, if anything should happen to the cold war, the whole economy might go into a tailspin. But if the law Mr. Truman wanted had been passed exactly as his economic advisers wrote it, still it would not have done what he said it would do. There was the fundamental dishonesty. Price control is no more a cure for inflation than balsam of Peru is a cure for cancer.

It is news when Senator Connally, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, blows up at the Marshall Plan Administrator and says:

You fellows who spend all your time spending the government’s money never think where the revenues come from. You were put in to take care of Europe. Now you go over to Asia. Where are the instructions from Congress that you have got to take care of the whole world?

It is news the next day when the President says he is sorry the Senator said that. It is news when Senator Byrd says we are plunging toward a financial debacle out of which may emerge a totalitarian state. It is news when a member of Congress rises to say the government could cut ten billions out of its budget and nobody would ever miss it—and that is how billion-mad the government is. But all of this is headline stuff. Ask yourself what it means. The real news is not in the headlines; it is in the meaning.

Is it not news that Congress no longer controls the public purse—that its only function is to fill it? These moments of panic and alarm in Congress are absurd, except as evidence of the appalling thing that has happened to the first principle of popular government, namely, the principle that Congress shall hold the purse strings. Why should Congress plead with the Administration to reduce its non-defense expenditures? Congress could reduce them if it would. Why should Representatives and Senators call on the Administration to balance the Federal budget and denounce it for deficit spending? Congress could balance the Federal budget if it would, simply by refusing to make appropriations in excess of the revenues.
The Marshall Plan Administration is trying to weaken the European money pool, which it has been nursing with dollars—$350,000,000 last year. However, it will not cut off "structurally debtor countries," like Greece, Austria and Turkey. To these it will issue a special currency with which they can pay their debts to the pool, and that special currency of course will be redeemed in dollars. The only difference to the American taxpayer is that the hair comes before the hide. But how the language has been enriched by the term structurally debtor countries! They are countries that can not live without dollars. Does it follow that this is a structurally creditor country? Not so. A creditor is one to whom something is owed. These structurally debtor countries do not owe us anything. They get the dollars for nothing. The formal term for what that makes us has not been invented.

We make a little present to Austria, namely, a rolling mill. As he breaks the strings and unwraps this Marshall Plan gift, the American High Commissioner says: "The Russians make you only empty promises, but see what we give you?" What would the structurally debtor countries of the world do without the Russian menace?

The U. S. High Commissioner in Germany, Mr. John J. McCloy, would have even under perfect conditions a distressingly difficult job on hand—a job whose inherent confusions are measured in William Henry Chamberlin's revealing article on page 745 of this issue. But as though our Departments of State and Defense were bent on insuring him against success, Mr. McCloy seems to be getting and accepting a kind of advice which exudes incompetence that borders on mental disorder. That borderline has been decidedly transgressed in the latest scandal—the altogether incredible case of one Hans Kemritz.

A Berlin court found Kemritz, a German shyster lawyer of exceptional ill repute, guilty of kidnapping some of his trusting German clients and delivering them, for cash, to the Russian secret police. Because he had performed the same kind of service for Hitler's Gestapo, the rogue tried to save his skin by giving, in 1945, some information to U. S. Counter-Intelligence. When, six years later, an independent Berlin court wanted him to account for a recent dirty job, the U. S. High Commissioner's office issued an order to quash the case. Kemritz, says the order, earned in 1945 exemption from any prosecution by a German court by having "made an important contribution to the security of the Western world."

Berlin's excellent mayor, Ernest Reuter, refused to execute that order, and we congratulate him. Nevertheless, under pressure from McCloy the German court suspended the execution of its judgment; and it is reported that a joint U.S.-German Commision will review the case. We think Mr. McCloy would have done better to cut his losses and rescind the infamous order, and also to make quick use of the dramatic opportunity offered by this case to get rid of the worst among his advisers—for it is later than he thinks. The State Department is just about ready to unload Mr. J. P. Davies on him—the same Mr. Davies who consistently recommended the appeasement of Stalin that has passed for a U. S. China policy in the perverted forties. Davies is slated for assignment in Germany as the State Department's top political adviser to Mr. McCloy—a provocation to Congress and the country so wanton that we doubt whether even the State Department will try to put it through. But if Mr. Davies were indeed to arrive in Frankfort, Mr. McCloy should take the very same plane for a return trip to Washington and put his resignation on the President's desk.

In September we shall be rolling out the mat for the Foreign Secretary of the Socialist government of Great Britain. He will confer, says Reuter's, with Secretary Acheson and other United States officials. What do you suppose he could be bringing us? Not the news that the British Treasury is unable to begin paying interest on its $3.75 billion loan of 1947. A cabinet officer would not cross the ocean to tell us that. Besides, we knew it. What then? News that Socialist Great Britain, for all the Marshall Plan aid it has received, is still unable to feed and clothe itself? That also we knew. The only thing we don't know is how much it is going to cost to save England again for the free world. It may be that in view of the decline in the purchasing power of the dollar the British will suggest increasing their charge of $95 a month to the taxpayers of this country for each American wearing a uniform in Great Britain.

As a guest star for the Voice of America in Asia, Governor Thomas Dewey took the usual line. Please, would the Asians try to understand that the Americans were not so bad when you came to know them in perspective. Wicked propaganda misrepresented them. For example, the newspapers of Singapore and elsewhere had greatly distorted the race riot in a Chicago suburb, giving it front-page position and pictures and all, whereas really we were not that kind of people, not as a whole. And so on and on. Why must Americans be on the defensive when they go forth in the world? In India, where only a few months ago the fanatical slaughter of sect by sect filled the world with horror, or in China, where the mass liquidation of anti-Communists has been a popular public spectacle, or in Singapore, where murder is a political pastime, an American has only to be asked why in his country there is discrimination against people with black skins and he becomes immediately apologetic. We wish somebody would say to them: "We have our pimples. Have you no running sores?"
Law, it is wonderful. Some very earnest people now are believing that you can limit the government's spending by passing a law. But we have thought of a law to solve the whole problem.

In the financial news we noticed that the United States Treasury, although it has five or six billions in its till, is already borrowing money against a deficit it sees coming up. It is borrowing this money on its ninety-day notes, for two reasons: first, the notes are easy to sell on what Wall Street calls the bill market, where all the fluid and fickle money lives, and secondly, it is not going to be so easy for the Treasury to sell long-term bonds, which it would much rather do.

There is the rub. How shall the Treasury, in a time of inflation, make its bonds more attractive to private and institutional investors who want to put their money to bed? Owing to the fall in the value of the dollar, the holders of government bonds have been wickedly hurt. Not only has the buying power of their interest declined, but when the bonds come due the dollars they get back may be, in the extreme case, worth only half as much as the dollars they loaned to the government when they bought the bonds a few years ago. Since inflation is expected to continue, there is a lively fear that this experience will be repeated. That is why it is more and more difficult for the Treasury to sell bonds. The rate of interest of course might be raised, but raising it enough to entice investors back would be very damaging to the government's cheap money policy.

So now a very novel thing is proposed, namely, that the government shall offer investors a bond payable not in a certain number of dollars but payable in a fixed amount of buying power. It means this: You buy a $100 bond. If during the life of the bond the current buying power of the dollar should fall one-half, you would get back two hundred dollars. With that, you would be able to buy as much as you might have bought with $100 if you had bought something you wanted instead of a government bond in the first place. The holders of that kind of bond would be immune from the consequences of inflation.

The symptoms of our idea are beginning to appear. We are coming to the law we thought of.

In the name of stabilization the government now allows the escalator clause in wage contracts, by which organized labor gains immunity from the worst evils of inflation. If prices go up, wages go up, automatically. The farmers have their parity prices, supported by the government, so that as the things a farmer buys go up in price, farm prices rise, again automatically.

So why not be democratic about it? Why not confer immunity on everybody? Why not pass a law saying that everybody's income, from whatever source derived, shall rise as prices go up—interest, dividends, wages, salaries, pensions, social security payments, everything in the way of income?

It could be done scientifically with index numbers and a slide rule. The cost of living, says the Bureau of Labor Statistics or the Federal Reserve Board, rose one point decimal six last month. Everybody's income goes up accordingly. To find out how much, you push the slide rule to 1.6 and log it, and the rest you can do by arithmetic with a pencil on the back of an envelope. Everybody would have to have a slide rule. You would be able to see the signs beforehand. If the grocer marked up the price of butter you could say, "Ha! Look at that. My income is rising." Then, pooh to inflation! Everybody's income would have constant buying power.

You may say there is an immense body of old bonds—government, state, municipal and private bonds—bearing fixed rates of interest, in the legal status of contract. Shall the slide rule apply to all of these? Shall the rate of interest go up with the cost of living, and shall the principal be paid in more dollars than the contract calls for, only because the buying power of the dollar has fallen?

Certainly. We see no difficulty there at all. When a few years ago the government repudiated the gold clause in its own bonds it declared at the same time that the customary clause calling for payment in gold or gold equivalent was null, void and illegal in all bonds whatsoever. They were payable thereafter not in gold, as the contract said, but in irredeemable paper currency. If the government could do that it can do this. It can change again all existing private contracts. It has only to pass a law.

There remains only the matter of taxes. What shall be done for the taxpayer? Well, that is simple too. Prices would rise so fast (and remember that as prices rise all incomes rise accordingly) in the interval of time that must elapse between the enactment of a tax law and the actual collection of the tax by the Internal Revenue Bureau, that everybody would be able to pay his tax out of the increase of his income. Eureka!

P. S. On reflection, having read this piece over to ourselves from the beginning, it occurs to us that this law would perform another miracle. It would absolutely stop inflation. How? In this way. There is no point to inflation if nobody gets hurt. One man's hurt is another's profit. If you take the hurt out of it, as our law would, you take also the profit out of it; and when there is no longer any profit in it for anybody the ecstasy of inflation will die.

GARET GARRETT

AUGUST 27, 1951

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The Case of Joseph Barnes

THE FORMER Soviet General Alexander Bar-
mine has told the McCarran Committee that
the Soviet General Berzin in 1933 spoke to
him of Owen Lattimore and Joseph Barnes as “our
men.” Hede Massing, former Soviet spy, has testi-
fied to seeing Joseph Barnes at an NKVD tennis
court in Moscow, and being told not to worry about
his having seen her there. Before the Tydings Com-
mittee on April 25, 1950, Mr. Louis F. Budenz, for-
mer member of the Communist Party and Man-
aging Editor of the Daily Worker, spoke of Barnes
as “known to me personally to be a Communist”
(Hearings, Part I, p. 590). Elsewhere in his testi-
mony (p. 491) he said that in 1937 at a meeting
called by Earl Browder, then Secretary General of
the Communist Party

... it was brought forward that we were now
under instructions to name the Chinese Commu-
nists or represent them no longer as Red Commu-
nists ... and it was agreed that Mr. Lattimore
should be given general direction of organizing
the writers and influencing the writers in repre-
senting the Chinese Communists as agrarian re-
formers, or as North Dakota nonpartisan leaguers.

Later (p. 513) Mr. Budenz said:

... I think I have indicated quite well there that
Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Barnes were involved in
this campaign.

Mr. Barnes’s name was on a list presented to the
Committee by Mr. Budenz, of writers for Pacific
Affairs (published by the IPR) while Owen Latti-
more was editor (ibid., pp. 589-590). Secretary of
the American Council of the IPR at that time was
Frederick Vanderbilt Field, of whom Mr. Budenz
testified:

I accuse him here as a Soviet espionage agent who
used money to influence the Institute of Pacific
Relations. [Ibid., p. 495]

It is not within the competence of a private citi-
zen to weigh these grave charges. But one aspect
of the activity of both these men is open to analysis
and criticism by anyone. Both are writers; both
have sought to influence public opinion. The influ-
cencing of public opinion has been one of the most
important objectives of Soviet psychological war-
fare against the American people A partial
analysis of Mr. Lattimore’s writings was included
in Senator Joe McCarthy’s speech of March 30,
1950. It casts great doubt upon Mr. Lattimore’s re-
cent statement that he was known to the Russians
only through his writings, which “they did not
like.” The published writings of Mr. Barnes cast
equal doubt on his present contention that he has
never even been a sympathizer with communism.

Mr. Barnes has held strategic positions in the
opinion-making field. He has been consecutively
secretary of the American Council of the Institute
of Pacific Relations, foreign correspondent of the
New York Herald Tribune, Deputy Director for At-
lantic Operations of the OWI, foreign editor of the
New York Herald Tribune, and editor of the New
York Star. He is at present an editor of Simon and
Schuster, one of America’s most successful and in-
fluential publishing concerns.

In his writings Mr. Barnes has long been one of
the smoothest and most plausible apologists for the
Soviet Union. During the early thirties he was
chiefly preoccupied with the wonderful strides be-
ing made under the Five Year Plan, and with per-
suading American readers that the Comintern no
longer constituted the slightest menace to the rest
of the world. On this second theme he contributed
an article to the Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science for July 1933, en-
titled “The Tactics of the Third International.”
Speaking in this article of Stalin and his policy, he
said:

He is the leader of a party which draws its moral
enthusiasm no longer from oppression and ex-
plotation, but rather from the pioneer spirit of
opening a new country. These men are confident
that they can defend their policy of socialism in
one country, not by words but by deeds. The moral
fervor which is engendered by this conviction is
directed more toward industrial problems at home
than toward the strategy of engineering revolts
abroad.

This thesis was also stated in a pamphlet “Be-
hind the Far Eastern Conflict” by Mr. Barnes and
Frederick Vanderbilt Field, published during that
same year by the IPR. “The Soviet Union,” they
said,

is ... engaged in an industrial struggle at home
which demands above everything else the avoid-
ance of war.

Mr. Barnes’s method of reconciling slave labor
with the supposed absence of “oppression and ex-
plotation” from the Soviet scheme of things was—
not to recognize it by that name. In 1934 he edited
a symposium, “Empire in the East,” among whose
contributors were Owen Lattimore and F. V. Field.
In his own chapter, “Soviet Siberia,” he speaks of
the great building projects in Siberia, manned by
“transplanted people,” and says:

Transplanting people in bulk to the new areas has
been a knotty problem. Anyone who has seen the
long trains of box cars in Siberia filled with mis-
erable peasants ... being shunted from siding to
siding ... has reason to doubt whether these
careful plans are executed with any degree of
precision.

Not the forcible uprooting of these peasants dis-
turbs Mr. Barnes; merely the way in which it is
carried out. Indeed, he is of the opinion that “even
this crude procedure” is an “advance” upon some-
thing or other. Then he proceeds:
A special problem which Siberia has yet to face is the assimilation back into normal life of large groups of semi-outlawed individuals. Most of them are kulaks, peasants who have openly resisted the collectivization campaign.

Those who know the objective facts of Soviet history will recall the ghastly famine which resulted from this campaign. In October 1936 Mr. Barnes wrote an article entitled "Soviet Agriculture" for the monthly Bulletin of the American Russian Institute for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union (editor Harriet L. Moore, of whom Louis F. Budenz testified, "I know her personally to be a member [of the Communist Party]" : op. cit., p. 590). In such a discussion he could hardly ignore the famine entirely. This is how he treated it:

... In the winter of 1932-33 there occurred in many parts of the Soviet Union ... an undoubted food shortage.

The nation-wide terror of the late thirties offered no greater problem to Mr. Barnes. For example, in reporting the Rykov-Bukharin trial in March 1938 for the New York Herald Tribune he swallowed the official Soviet version, hook, line and sinker. When the accused Krestinsky repudiated his signed confession on the opening day and acknowledged it on the second, other correspondents speculated on the pressures (including possible torture) which might have brought about this reversal. Not Mr. Barnes. On March 3 (Herald Tribune, March 4) he reported:

Chief Prosecutor Andrei Y. Vyshinsky needed only a single day to draw a net of confessions of other prisoners tight around Krestinsky [italics mine].

The confused and contradictory "confessions" apparently aroused no doubt of the trial's authenticity in Mr. Barnes. Instead, he reported in the issue of March 5 a suspicion among foreign observers that Rykov, Bukharin and Krestinsky might be "sabotaging the trial" through demonstrably false admissions. And he commented:

Attempts to discredit Soviet justice by making grotesque statements or reversing confessions are not beyond men who have confessed such bitter enmity over a period of years.

Mr. Barnes took his leave of this subject in an article called "The Great Bolshevik Cleansing" (sic) in Foreign Affairs for April, 1939. With a plausible show of objectivity he reduced Stalin's one-sided civil war against the Russian people to the dimensions of a party reform with some unfortunate shooting. "The purge is nothing new in Communist history," he writes. "The Bolshevik faction originated in the expulsion of the Mensheviks from the Social Democratic Party." And after discussing the "party cleansings" of the twenties, he says, "Then came the most recent purge."

It is an effective way of playing down the horror. Barnes does not defend the purge trials, of course. He "explains" them:

The simple assumption that failure was a symptom of political unreliability was based, in the first instance, on the undoubted existence of a large amount of real sabotage, and secondly, on the difficulty, under a Socialist economy, of removing vulnerable but inefficient heroes of the barricades from inaccessible positions [italics mine].

So it was necessary to frame and murder these heroes! The Kremlin, says Mr. Barnes, "was faced with issues which would hardly wait for mild methods." Of the generals who were purged, he says:

... the Red Army group led by Marshal Tukhachevsky ... undoubtedly were at first unwilling to admit their errors and began to take counsel with each other. How far the discussions fell short of being conspiracies and how far they were motivated by a sincere desire to save the revolution are interesting psychological questions on which there is little evidence. ...

To Mr. Barnes the question was not one of guilt but of psychology. Interesting indeed. After that one is not surprised to find him declaring that "most Russians believe that the ideas of 1917 are nearer realization now than when the purge began." His writings, it should be remarked, give the impression that Mr. Barnes's knowledge about the opinions of "most Russians" borders on the miraculous.

In Far Eastern Survey (organ of the IPR) for August 11, 1941 Joseph Barnes appeared as co-author with Harriet L. Moore of an article entitled "America and the Soviet Union." Miss Moore had not slackened her output of pro-Soviet articles even during the Stalin-Hitler Pact. In Amerasia (the Soviet photo-stating plant disguised as an American magazine) for January 1940, she concluded an article by saying that the United States "should exert its influence to stop the European conflict as soon as possible by means of a negotiated, balance-of-power peace."

That was before Hitler invaded Russia. Six weeks after the invasion Mr. Barnes and Miss Moore developed the thesis that the national interests of the United States and the Soviet Union had always been "parallel," yet cooperation between them had been infrequent, due chiefly to American misunderstanding, although "The excessive zeal of the American Communists and the Soviets' almost deliberate policy of putting their worst foot forward in explaining the Nazi pact to America" also helped to explain it. Two instances were the "popular front" line and the Spanish Civil War in which "both the Soviet Union and the international Communist movement supported ... the elected, democratic middle class government in Madrid"—which, as the authors do not mention, paid for this help by being ousted to make way for the pro-Communist Negrin government. "Neither of these events," say the authors, "was welcomed or ... understood in Washington."

In December 1941 Pearl Harbor put America in the war and the war put Joseph Barnes in charge of the Atlantic operations of OWI. And there he remained until February 8, 1944, when Elmer Da-
vis finally put him out, along with James Warburg and Edd Johnson.

The Herald Tribune at once took him back, this time in the position—especially strategic in war-time—of foreign editor. In the autumn of 1945 he went to Europe for the Herald Tribune. Some of his observations from Moscow make strange reading in the light of subsequent developments. He reverted to his favorite theme of the early thirties: that Russia was no threat to the outside world.

The "twin goals of peace and socialism," he reported, are "what the Soviet Union wants more than anything else," and "the Communist Party's instructions to the Soviet people are clear—to cultivate their own garden." The next day (November 6) Molotov's speech at the celebration of the October Revolution bristled with threats to the West. On November 8 Mr. Barnes insisted that in spite of Molotov's belligerence "a simple list of Russia's war losses makes clear the reason for the Kremlin's giving reconstruction top priority." On November 9 he said:

In the opinion of experienced observers here, the Communist Party is too well informed about public opinion to disregard this widespread desire [of the Russian people] to taste some of the fruits of peace and socialism.

In the summer of 1947, Mr. Barnes reviewed nine books for the American Scholar, among them E. H. Carr's "The Soviet Impact on the Western World," of which he wrote:

... he demonstrates that the Soviet system is no monstrous apparition out of deepest Asia, but a society stemming directly out of Western experience and fumbling with problems common to all of us [sic].

The book, he says,

... will irritate many American readers. The process of social change may seem more clear and inescapable to men in Great Britain today than it does in the United States.

One might draw the conclusion that Great Britain is farther along the road to the concentration camp and slave labor than backward America. But that isn't in the least what Mr. Barnes was trying to convey. He deprecates the "recent spate of sensational books about the iron curtain," and gives his highest praise to "The Year of Stalingrad" by the pro-Communist Alexander Werth and "Through Russia's Back Door" by the pro-Communist Richard Lauterbach.

In Foreign Affairs for April, 1948, Barnes published an article on "The Foreign Policy of the American Communist Party," in which with characteristic understatement in such matters, he spoke of its "apparent commitment...to the interests of the Soviet Union." He also managed to plug the international Communist "line," so successfully (and disastrously) put over on Mr. Acheson and General Marshall, that Mao and his gang were an independent party. Here is the kind of talk that has cost us over 80,000 military casualties:

The Chinese Communists...are convinced that the political value of their status as a national Chinese party inside an international Communist movement is more valuable to them than the dubious gain of complete doctrinal orthodoxy and a few Russian machine guns.

In December of 1948 Barnes left the Tribune, and with Bartley Crum took over the expiring PM, which they renamed the Star. The paper, which ran until January 28, 1949, was pro-Communist from front to back. Its particular whipping boy was the House Un-American Activities Committee, with Chiang Kai-shek running it a close second. It attacked the indictment of the twelve Communist leaders; the deportation of alien Communists; Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley; the American Bar Association (for a resolution barring Communists); William Bullitt; "the iniquitous Mundt-Nixon Bill"; "witch hunts" and "spy scares." It defended Henry Wallace and the Progressive Party; Harry Bridges; the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee (in contempt of Congress); Gerhart Eisler; the "Red Dean" of Canterbury; and Alger Hiss.

Among the "guest columnists" who turned up on the Star's editorial page were Louis Adamic, Andrew Roth (of Amerasia case fame) Mark Gayn (ditto), Robert St. John, and Lillian Hellman. Ella Winter (identified as a Communist by Louis F. Budenz; op. cit., p. 590) contributed an article on agriculture in Poland. A symposium on "why the Communists are winning" in China (November 21, 1948) included such contributors as Edgar Snow, Owen Lattimore, Annalene Jacoby, and Agnes Smedley (identified by both Mr. Budenz—op. cit., p. 498—and Hede Massing as a Soviet spy). With few exceptions the authors maintained that the Communists were winning because they were "progressive" while Chiang was "corrupt" and "reactionary." The Star was vociferously for "hands off Communist China"—"Even a Communist victory would not necessarily drive China into the Soviet orbit." It was also for hands off Soviet spies and against stirring up "hostility against Russia." It quoted with approval an article by Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart in Foreign Affairs, as follows:

It is still more than an even money bet that Russia's policy of consolidation in East Europe is dictated more by fear of being attacked than by desire to attack others.

Such, in partial outline, is the record of Joseph Barnes's contributions to the molding of American opinion on Soviet Russia and communism. You will find occasional mild adverse comments on the Soviet Union, but you will find many more that are favorable. You will find a great show of objectivity, but the end result is always pro-Soviet. You will also find that Mr. Barnes's literary associates have been pretty consistently on the Communist side. If Mr. Barnes has never been a Communist or a sympathizer with communism, how does he explain his public record?

Suzanne La Follette
Winning Germany for the West

By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

Can the balance of power in Europe be shifted in favor of the West in partial compensation for the surrenders of Teheran, Potsdam and Yalta? There is only one way, in the opinion of such an experienced observer as Mr. Chamberlin, and that is to win western Germany to the Allied cause.

To win Germany as an equal partner in a West European alliance is, or should be, the supreme American diplomatic objective in Europe today. This is the strongest impression I brought back from a recent trip which took me to Bonn, Paris and Rome.

Thanks to the abysmal follies of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam, the European balance of power has tilted formidably in favor of Moscow. The Soviet Union remained armed to the teeth and set about arming its satellites with characteristic disregard for treaty obligations and realistic indifference to which side these satellite states had fought on during the late war.

America and Great Britain cut back their armaments heavily, carried out a hundred per cent demilitarization of West Germany and a thorough crippling of Italian military power. Only recently has there been any serious attempt at rearmament in France and in the smaller nations of western Europe. French rearmament proceeds under two heavy handicaps: a war in Indo-China that keeps many of the best French professional troops on the other side of the world, and a Communist fifth column that polled about a quarter of the votes cast in the June election.

There is one place in Europe, and only one, where a substantial shift of the over-all balance of power in our favor is possible. That place is West Germany, with its population (including the western sectors of Berlin) of about fifty million.

General Eisenhower can consider himself lucky if there are fifteen American, British and French divisions in Germany by the end of this year. It is now estimated that there are about 33 (somewhat smaller) Soviet divisions in the Soviet zone of Germany. There are also the satellite armies of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria, amounting in all to some fifty or sixty divisions. Provision of these forces with modern weapons has been stepped up, although the political reliability of the soldiers is probably open to some question. As a counterweight to the satellite armies are the troops of Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, although these potential forces on our side are not now as well coordinated as those of the Soviet vassal states.

Every American military officer with whom I talked during my trip (on a “don’t-quote-me” basis) recognized that the defense picture for Europe would be immensely brightened if there were a German division to match every Western division in Germany. And it is not merely a question of more men with weapons in their hands.

The day when Germany ceases to be a passive occupied country and becomes an active ally will mark the end of the neutralist, “plague on both their houses” illusion which still bemuses some sections of German public opinion. To win Germany for the West politically is just as important as to win it militarily. It may well be the turning point in the cold war.

Conditions for Alliance

The transformation of Germany from ex-enemy into ally implies new attitudes on both sides, and acceptance on both sides of certain obligations, risks and sacrifices. There are two main prerequisites of this transformation, and they should go into effect simultaneously.

The German government should declare itself unequivocally on the side of the West, should undertake to raise a specified contingent for a European or an Atlantic Pact army and should consent to apply the same measures as the other members of the Western bloc in stopping exports of strategic material to the iron curtain countries.

At the same time there should be a clean sweep of all restrictions on German sovereignty, political and economic, apart from such restrictions as are part of voluntary agreements concluded in the interest of European defense and European economic well-being. During my visit to Germany, my third since the end of the war, I could see very substantial progress toward the restoration of independent self-government.

The right to veto German legislation has been allowed substantially to fall into disuse. The crippling restrictions on German industrial output which were part of the vindictive legacy of the Morgen­than Plan have, for the most part, been scrapped or greatly relaxed. German newspapers are free to express critical sentiments.

Dismantling of German factories, a most wasteful and uneconomic means of collecting reparations, which excited much bitterness in 1949, had been wound up. German foreign trade in 1949 was under the control of an interallied alphabetical agency known as JEIA, which the Germans privately nicknamed: Jeder Export und Import Augeschlosslen. (All exports and imports excluded.) The head of
this agency assured me very seriously in 1949 that the Germans could not run their foreign trade as well as the JEIA could do it for them. JEIA is now an unalloyed memory; and Germany’s foreign trade trebled during the short period, 1949-1951.

The American High Commissioner, Mr. John J. McCloy, expressed very liberal and constructive sentiments during a talk which I had with him in his Frankfurt office. Both he and his wife, who speaks excellent German, have been indefatigable in trying to promote cultural contacts between Americans and Germans. And McCloy’s initiative has speeded up British and French consent to the elimination of some of the economic restrictions on German industry.

However, although considerable progress must be recognized, there are a number of features of the regime of the High Commissioners which must change if Germany is to be an equal partner in a European or in a broader Western federation. Germany’s basic industries, coal and steel, are under the control of an international body, the Ruhr Authority, on which Germany possesses only minority representation.

There are also two inter-allied organizations, a Coal Control and a Steel Control, which give the impression of being bureaucratic fifth wheels. The director of a large German Ruhr firm mentioned, as an example of the petty supervision exercised by the Steel Control, that his firm was required to obtain a special permit before it could paint a hotel which it owned.

The Bureaucratic Die-Hards

There is a good deal of interference in German economic life in connection with a trustbusting or “deconcentration” program which has been prolonged beyond some other forms of outside control. The ideal of doing away with cartels and monopolies is desirable. But the methods employed in breaking up the big Ruhr iron and steel companies and the large chemical company known as IG Farben have excited much criticism among the Germans because of the confusion and scrambling of property rights involved. Even if these methods had been above reproach (and one derives from talks with some of the American officials engaged in deconcentration the impression that they are more interested in weakening Germany economically than in writing a fair trade program) it must be doubted whether changes of this kind should be imposed and dictated from without.

Employees of the three High Commissioners number some 10,000; about 5000 British, about 3000 French and some 2000 Americans. To justify their existence some of these officials are tempted to exploit the broad reserved rights which the High Commissioners retain under the Occupation Statute and to resort to acts of petty and unnecessary interference in matters of German local concern.

The truth is, and the more farsighted occupation officials recognize this fact, that the regime of the High Commissioners, a transitory stage which replaced direct military government, is obsolete and ripe for liquidation. Simultaneously with the German commitment to take an active part in the defense of Europe, the High Commissioners should be transformed into Ambassadors. Their staffs should be cut down to normal Embassy proportions. All forms of one-sided control over German economic life should cease; the Ruhr Authority, the Steel Control, the Coal Control, should be abolished.

The Germans have a genuine grievance against the Ruhr Authority, because that body, with its majority of foreign representatives, has been forcing Germany to export coal, at prices below the world market figure, in excess of what the economic interests of the country would prescribe. Minister of Economics Ludwig Erhard, Vice-Premier Franz Bluecher and other economic experts with whom I talked in Bonn argued that Germany was threatened with industrial cutbacks and unemployment and with shortage of coal for consumer needs because of this one-sided foreign direction of German coal exports.

The Schuman Plan, with its provision for a European market of 160 million customers, its abolition of tariffs and subsidies on the products of the coal and steel industries and its common administration of these industries in France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg, may provide the saving formula for dispensing with the present one-sided controls. The Plan is an object of hot debate among European economists and businessmen, and finds supporters and critics on both sides of the Rhine.

I found a good deal of agreement on the proposition that everything would depend on how the Schuman Plan is executed. If narrow nationalism prevails in France, in Germany, or in both countries, the Plan will most probably break down in an atmosphere of mutual recriminations. If the hope of French Foreign Minister Schuman and Chancellor Adenauer—that problems of coal and steel production can be resolved in a spirit of European good neighborliness—is realized, the Plan may be the beginning of a new era in European economic integration.

In any event, Chancellor Adenauer is throwing all the weight of his authority behind the ratification of the Plan. And the curiously nationalistic opposition of the German Social Democrats is offset by the fact that the trade unions take a more favorable attitude toward the Schuman project.

Why Germany Is Unarmed

It is a sobering thought, and one that reflects little credit on the perspicacity of our statesmanship, that today, five years after the beginning of the cold war, German rearmament is still in the blueprint stage. There is not a regiment of German troops at the present time, although there have been some belated attempts to strengthen the bor-
der police. This is in striking contrast to the Soviet policy of putting arms in the hands of every people under Soviet control, from North Korea to East Germany.

There are several reasons for this delay. American public opinion was deplorably slow in accepting the logical necessity of an alliance with Germany as the counterstroke to the Soviet organization against us of the vast area of eastern Europe and, later, of East Asia, which had been handed over to Soviet domination at Yalta.

When the State Department, apparently under strong pressure from our military leaders, suddenly came out for German rearmament last autumn the transition was a little too abrupt and encountered resistance, both in France and in Germany. The Germans had only recently been allowed hunting rifles. Then reasons were found for delay. There was first the futile conference of Foreign Ministers, and all important political decisions had to be postponed pending the French election last June.

It is my impression that opposition to rearming is not as stubborn or uncompromising as is sometimes represented. There is some reluctance, compounded of several causes. War weariness, universal in Europe, is especially strong in a country that suffered the most devastation from air bombing. One finds among some Germans a Schadenfreude psychology, which might be summed up as follows: "You Americans and the British combined with Communist Russia to crush us and make us militarily impotent. Now you want our help against your former ally. Well, you can get out of your troubles without us."

Among some radicals and liberals there is fear of the re-emergence of a professional officer class and its possible influence on the government. The most reasonable argument, and one that was put to me with much force, by Carlo Schmid, prominent Social Democratic deputy in the Bundestag, or Parliament, runs as follows: We need a screen of Western troops strong enough to deter a sudden Soviet swoop before we take the risk of creating a regular army.

But the mixed mood of frustrated nationalism, pacifism and fatalistic neutralism which was apparently rather strong in Germany last winter seems to be yielding to a more realistic appraisal of Germany's present position and future prospects. A recent congress of German trade unions voted down overwhelmingly a Communist proposal to repudiate rearmament.

In contrast to the anti-Communist Socialists of France and Italy, the German Social Democrats have retained their hold on the majority of the German working class. And, however much the Social Democrats, under their bitter, passionate, invalid leader, Kurt Schumacher, may attack Adenauer on issues of foreign and domestic policy, they are under no illusions as to their fate in the event that the Red Army marches into Germany. It is safe to say that Schumacher would have a high priority on the "wanted" list of the Soviet political police.

Moreover, intelligent Germans give the impression of realizing more and more that, even if they wished, they could not escape war by accepting slavery. If the Germans should fold their hands in the event of a Soviet invasion they would be caught between Soviet terror and American bombs. If the first so-called American Great Debate did not settle anything else conclusively, it made it quite clear that the United States would regard any Soviet attack on western Europe as a casus belli. Both Senator Taft and ex-President Hoover were very explicit on this point.

The Principle of Equality

France has been regarded, not without some reason, as a stumbling block in the way of German rearmament. The Minister of Defense, Jules Moch, is outspokenly negative in his attitude. A Socialist, but a very resolute anti-Communist, who broke the general strike of 1947 and the miners' strike of 1948, Moch lost his son in the Resistance and his distrust and dislike for Germans is emotionally understandable. With considerable reluctance, as I gathered in an interview with him in May, he is willing to concede that Germany should make a contribution to a European army. But, then at least, he was not willing to accept the principle of equality in arms and organization without which effective German rearmament is scarcely feasible.

The French attitude toward German rearmament shows signs of becoming modified. "It is a struggle between the head, which is for it, and the heart, which is against," said an American diplomat in Paris. "I think the head will win." General de Gaulle has been rather strikingly hospitable to the idea. And it is difficult to understand how anyone who takes the Communist threat seriously can stand rigidly for keeping Germany a military vacuum. The French statesman and former Prime Minister René Pleven has perhaps opened a door for German rearmament with a plan which bears his name, for a European army with a German contingent.

What every German, in or out of official position, emphasizes is the principle of Gleichberechtigung, or equal treatment. This would mean first the restoration of full German self-government, the scrapping of the obsolete remnants of the occupation regime. It is suggested in Bonn that the Western occupation forces should be given the status of "Defense Forces," like the American air units in Britain. It means, second, equal treatment as regards weapons, military organization units, etc.

Moch, for instance, wanted to exclude German divisions, to limit the German contingent to "combat teams" of 5000 or 6000 men each. The Germans, I believe, will insist on the same type of organization as the other states which participate in the European Army; and they want their troops to be under the command of their own officers, although

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they are willing to accept the over-all command of General Eisenhower's headquarters. Germany is willing, I believe, to provide soldiers for the common defense of Europe, but would balk at any suggestion that its troops be limited to infantry or at any proposal that they serve as a rear guard to cover a Western retreat to the Rhine or the Pyrenees.

Germany As Ally

In considering Germany's reliability as an ally it is significant that aversion to communism is much stronger in Germany than in France and Italy. The Communist vote in West Germany is at an all-time low since the German Communist Party was organized in the break-up after the end of the first World War. It is barely five per cent of the electorate, as compared with 25 per cent in France and Italy, and the trend is downward.

The reason is obvious. Very few French or Italians have any first-hand experience of communism. Almost every German family has some member who was a war prisoner in Russia, or knows of the plight of friends and relatives in the Soviet zone. Almost every German community, however small, has its quota of pitiful refugees, driven from their homes in the eastern provinces of Germany, in the Sudetenland, in other regions of southeastern Europe. One can hardly imagine a more effective inoculation against Communist propaganda.

So there is reason to believe that Adenauer can deliver his part of the bargain by raising an army of 250,000 men in twelve divisions, as suggested in his speech at Essen on July 9. From a private talk with the Chancellor during my visit to Bonn I carried away the impressions that he is deeply concerned over the threat of war and Soviet aggression, that he is genuinely European-minded, and that he was, at least until recently, discouraged by the slow progress of the talks which have been going on between German and Allied representatives on the conditions of rearmament.

Conversations with Chancellor Adenauer, President Heuss, Generals Hans Speidel and Adolf Heusinger, who have been carrying on military talks with Allied representatives, and other spokesmen for the German government gave me a fair idea of what Germany will and will not accept as conditions for rearmament. The Bonn Cabinet does not expect or desire a completely independent national army. Nor is there any desire to build up a big munitions industry in perilous proximity to the prospective front line, in the event of armed conflict.

Three common objections to the idea of German rearmament may be briefly considered.

1. The Germans are untrustworthy and are likely to pass over to the Russian side. If there were any such intention on the part of the German leaders, the virtually unanimous call in Germany for more Western troops would make extremely little sense. An entente between Germany and the Western powers should not be based on sentimentality on either side, but on a sense of real and urgent national interest.

The overwhelming majority of the people in West Germany would certainly lose, spiritually and materially, if a replica of East German conditions were created there. It is very unlikely that any large part of continental Europe can be held without active association of Germany with its defense. With a German army there is at least a fighting chance of successful defense. It is these considerations that should outweigh, in the face of the overriding Soviet threat, the recriminations which Americans, British and French, on one side, and Germans on the other, may be tempted to exchange about the last war.

2. The rearming of Germany will precipitate a Soviet invasion of Europe. There can be no absolute certainty on this point, although Soviet violence is much more likely to follow a show of weakness than of strength. But swift disaster is certain, once our foreign policy is based on cowardice and appeasement.

3. Germany may drag the rest of the Western world into war to regain the lost territory east of the Oder-Neisse line. The Germans are realists in military matters. They would not be likely to hurl their prospective twelve or fifteen divisions against the vastly superior Soviet forces. On the other hand, if, as is overwhelmingly probable, aggression comes from the Soviet side, it would be reasonable for the Western powers to assure the Germans of fair consideration of their claims to a return of lands historically and ethically German after the end of the war. After all, the Oder-Neisse frontier is in shocking violation of the Atlantic Charter and has never been endorsed by the United States, Great Britain or France.

No More Bataans

The inclusion of Germany as a full partner in the Western military, political and economic coalition would be the first real victory, as distinguished from indecisive holding actions, in the cold war. To achieve this victory America will be well advised to use all its means of persuasion and pressure in London and Paris. The American people are entitled to a change from the dreary diet of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. And the American soldiers in Europe are entitled to something better than the prospect of a bigger Bataan.

A revived friendly Germany in the West, a revived friendly Japan in the Orient, would be symbols of a restored balance of power in both the European and the Asiatic continents. And the fundamental blunder of Roosevelt and of the men of Yalta, too many of whom are still associated with the direction of our foreign relations, was that they forgot the supreme importance of preserving a balance of power in the face of the vast totalitarian empire which they let loose on the world like a devouring Frankenstein's monster.
Revelations of corruption in high places have become a commonplace of the Fair Deal dispensation. In this article Mr. High exposes a persistent attempt by the Federal Administration to expropriate a private company in defiance of the courts, in order to sell it to political friends.

For "disobedience of and resistance to" an order of the Court, the U. S. Secretary of Commerce, Charles Sawyer, was charged last April 10 with civil and criminal contempt of court by unanimous decision of the three judges of the U. S. Court of Appeals in Washington, D. C.—the second highest court in the land. On May 18, by unanimous decision, the Court gave the Secretary five days in which to comply with its order or go to jail: "No man is so high that he is above the law."

Mr. Sawyer and eight U. S. officials charged with him have not complied. They have not gone to jail. In a letter to Mr. Sawyer, the President of the United States told him and his colleagues to refuse to do what the Court had ordered. Here is a brazen attempt on the part of the executive branch of the government to override the judicial branch in order to serve the political and economic purposes of the party in power. This, said the heading of an editorial in the Washington Post, is the "Wedge of Despotism."

What the Court had ordered Mr. Sawyer to do was to return to private citizens possession and operation of a business enterprise which, in two unanimous decisions, "confirmed in effect" by the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals had found were legally and rightfully theirs. When Mr. Sawyer refused to do this, the Court said:

Here we have the spectacle of a government which proclaims adherence to law as the governing force among men, not only refusing for six years to submit to its own courts its claims to private property derived from a purely commercial transaction, but endeavoring by every device to thwart and defeat the judgment of those courts after it has been rendered.

We have seen such actions, said the San Francisco Chronicle, "by Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin and we have seen the results. The results have been the end of the rule of law and the beginning of systematic, cynical proscription of individual rights."

The property at stake is the $68,000,000 Dollar Steamship Company, pioneer and foremost carrier of the U. S. maritime flag in the Pacific. Due to the depression, a sharp decline in China trade, West Coast shipping strikes, the government's cancellation of the line's mail contracts and its refusal to grant operating subsidies or pay subsidies already due, the Dollar Company, in 1938, had been driven to the verge of bankruptcy. At that time the U. S. Maritime Commission, to which the company owed $7,500,000, moved in. It rejected proposals for settling that debt which would have left the line in private operation. To save their property and prevent the loss to American shipping of its most important commercial and defense asset in the Pacific, the owners had to turn over their stock—and control and operation of the company—to the Maritime Commission as security for their debt.

On July 17, 1950, the Court of Appeals found that "the transaction of 1938 was merely a pledge of the shares, and not a sale; that when the indebtedness secured by such collateral had been paid in full with interest, the pledgers were entitled to have the shares returned to them."

But in 1938, when the government undertook operation of the company, it forthwith changed the name of the Dollar Line to the American President Line. And into the lush, $25,000-a-year job as company president it put a succession of men, notable alike for their influence in the Democratic Administration and their inexperience in shipping.

The first President was William Gibbs McAdoo. Mr. McAdoo had been a Democratic Secretary of the Treasury and a U. S. Senator from California. His previous business experience had not included shipping. While heading the American President Line, he remained California's Democratic National Committeeman. Later, the Presidency went to Henry F. Grady, an influential West Coast Democrat who has served the present Administration as Ambassador to India, Greece and, most recently, Iran. He had never been in the shipping business. In 1947, the plum was passed to the present president, George L. Killion. Mr. Killion's longest previous business experience was four years as tax and legislative consultant to a chain of grocery stores. He had had no contact with shipping, but he was treasurer of the Democratic National Committee.

"The A.P.L.," says Harry Lundeberg, President of the Seafarers' International Union of 60,000 AFL seamen, "is run by the government and is like a government agency. You get a job there, not because you are a good seaman or a good maritime executive, but because you are a good politician."

With the war-boom in shipping, and restored subsidies from the government, even political management could not prevent the line from making
money. By the war's end, the company's debt to the government had been paid off, with interest. Thereupon, R. Stanley Dollar and his associates asked the Maritime Commission—since merged with the Department of Commerce—for the return of their property.

The Commission refused. Instead, asserting that the government now owned the stock, it offered the line for sale.

Highest bidder was a syndicate headed by Charles U. Bay, wealthy New York friend of the Administration and its present Ambassador to Norway. Another interested party is Ralph K. Davies, former protégé of Harold Ickes in the Department of the Interior, influential in Administration circles in Washington and among California Democrats. In an almost unprecedented business procedure, the government has held this politically friendly bid for six years. This fact may help to explain why Davies is prominent among those who have been "endeavoring by every device to thwart and defeat the judgment of the courts" to return the line to the Dollars and thus prevent its sale. In this effort, Harold Ickes, in numerous articles, has sought to lend a propaganda hand. (Ickes's son is employed in Davies's San Francisco office and has been an active participant in Davies's effort to put the line where it can be bought.)

Faced with the line's sale, the Dollars, in the fall of 1945, entered suit to recover their property. To defeat this effort, the government has waged continuous legal war for six years: "A longer filibuster on the part of the government," said Bennett Champ Clark, former U. S. Democratic Senator and now judge of the Court of Appeals, "than ever took place in the Senate."

Then, last spring, in the U. S. Court of Appeals, the case was "adjudicated to a final conclusion." "We say 'a final conclusion,'" said the Court, "because surely an issue which has been presented three times to an appellate court and three times to the Supreme Court ought to be considered finally adjudicated." "This conclusion," said Associate Justice Robert H. Jackson of the Supreme Court, "we, by refusal to review, in effect have confirmed." The "final" adjudication, so confirmed, upheld the claims of the Dollars.

The government contended that its actions were in accord with powers granted by Congress. The Court said: "There is not the slightest hint in any Congressional pronouncement that Congress intended to nationalize the outstanding trans-Pacific ship company."

The government had argued that "it had power to acquire this stock because it has power to subsidize the company." The Court said: "The subsidy and loan powers there provided were for the rehabilitation of private industry. They were not blinda for government acquisition of operating industrial concerns. Subsidy is not a synonym for socialization."

The government contended that return of the stock would "unduly" enrich its owners. The Court stated the following opinion:

Of course receivers like receiverships. Courts often have great difficulty in requiring a receiver to bring his labors to an end and release the property. But we do not find a reported case in which a receiver asserts a right to retain the property because to release it would unjustly enrich the owner.

The government made much of the assertion that what it was trying to save, in keeping this property from its owners, was "the people's money." The Court found that "the only such money which, so far as the record shows, went into this operation was the money loaned to the company by the Commission and which was repaid in full with interest."

The Court said:

The initial premise of the American form of government is that the rights of life, liberty and property are inherent in the people. The Courts determine that the property belongs to the citizen, that the official [i.e. Mr. Sawyer] does not hold it on behalf of the United States, that the official is in wrongful possession of the citizen's property and they order the official to return the property to the citizen. [To assert that the official] is immune from compulsion by the courts asserts the impotency of the judiciary as an organ of government.

The Court repeated its earlier order to Mr. Sawyer to return to the Dollars "effective possession" of their stock. But Mr. Sawyer had a letter from the President, written after the Court of Appeals had first determined that the stock belonged to the Dollars, after its first order to Mr. Sawyer to return the property to its rightful owners, and after that decision had been confirmed, in effect, by the Supreme Court.

Mr. Truman wrote:

Impairment of the government's title to this stock would seriously affect the public's interest. Accordingly you are directed to continue to hold this stock on behalf of the United States.

This, said the Memphis Commercial Appeal, is "frightening arrogance." "The fact that the Commerce and Justice Departments are acting in this matter under direct orders from the President," said the Washington Post, "only makes their defiance of the courts more outrageous."

Last spring the government, to enable it to continue to keep the stock from the line's rightful owners, brought action in a lower court—the U. S. District Court in San Francisco. This move, said the Court of Appeals, was for "the object and purpose of defeating and setting at naught this Court's jurisdiction." Attorneys for the government replied that their move was made at the direction of the President. To this Judge Clark replied: "If you have any idea that a letter from the President of the United States has any weight in the Court you are very badly mistaken. The President has no right to influence litigation by a letter to somebody."
But, armed with that letter, the government refused to withdraw its action in San Francisco. That action was being heard by Judge George B. Harris. Judge Harris, a staunch Democrat, had been recently elevated by President Truman from a municipal judgeship, and he speedily found for the government. Judge Harris’s decision, said Judge Clark of the Court of Appeals, “was more of a stump speech than an opinion.”

Thus, endeavoring by every device, the government has continued “to thwart and defeat the judgment of the courts.” It has kept Mr. Sawyer out of jail. It has kept the Dollars from possession of their property. It has now persuaded the U. S. Supreme Court, after six years of litigation and 93 court decisions and opinions—to hear the case all over again at its 1951 fall term.

From what that Court then decides, the American people may learn how far they can rely on their government, as the San Francisco Chronicle states it, “in preserving the rights of the individual against a capricious and arrogant Administration.”

Killing With Kindness

By SIR ERNEST BENN

The ROAD to Hell was never so well paved as with the good intentions of Uncle Sam toward John Bull. Loans, gifts and Marshall Aid have all, unwittingly, robbed the English nation of the need to pull itself together and justify the victory so arduously and gloriously won. The very idea of self-help, the basis of John Bull’s philosophy, has gone for the time being, and in its proud place we have “full employment,” “social security,” “fair shares” and other political deceptions. These fictions have, for five full years, successfully masqueraded as facts, until the recollection of such disagreeable things as individual duty and responsibility have almost ceased to trouble us.

In broad outline the story of the economics of the last ten years can be put into a few sentences. When the fall of Norway made desperate measures needful, the Trade Union Congress blackmailed its way into the government, in return for a promise to allow the workers to work. Mr. Churchill handed over the key offices, other than War, to the Socialists. Men who a few months previously had opposed every effort at armament, assumed effective control of the country’s domestic affairs. Then, while the Tories were busy with the war, there began a stream of reports drafted by the Socialists, but issued in the name of national government.

The Beveridge Plan was only one of many proposals to destroy personal responsibility and private enterprise. Our daily war news was interlarded with the most tempting and detailed particulars of what each member of every family would receive when the war against Nazism and fascism was won; and Cabinet Ministers did not scruple to make clear their view that capitalism and Nazism were one and the same thing.

When in May 1945 the American armies got to Leipzig, and Montgomery was on the Baltic, a weary, bombed and undernourished people were caught in the mood to sit back and let Beveridge and all the other planners implement their fantastic promises.

Since then we have lived in a veritable fool’s paradise. No penalty for failure and no adequate reward for success; wages for everybody measured not by the value of the work but by the need of the worker; no competition, no market, no choice. As a safeguard against the machinations of those who do not believe in these Utopian absurdities, the system of wartime control has been perpetuated and private enterprise, in so far as it is possible at all, must work in chains made of red tape.

In this respect Britain suffers a handicap from which the rest of Europe is happily free. Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and France were all “controlled” by the occupying Germans, who were never able to put a foot on British soil. In consequence, resistance to the very idea of control is ingrained in the hearts and minds of all these people as a positive patriotic duty, while the British are still afflicted with the degrading notion that control is for their good. American visitors to Europe who compare the drab shabbiness of English cities with the smarter appearance of continental places must notice the striking difference in the workings of the two points of view.

Americans should spare no pains to inform themselves of the results of nationalization, the outstanding achievement of the believers in socialist dogma; for a goodly proportion of all American aid is balanced by the losses on British government trading. The Bank of England has become a mere repository of credit and confidence.

Mines, railways, aviation and other industries, all of which made substantial contributions to the national tax revenues, now have heavy losses and are thus a double debit upon the taxpayer. In every one of these industries the charge to the consumer has been substantially increased, and there is no pretense of giving to the public such good service as private enterprise was expected to provide. The last justification for all this madness is now disappearing, for the comfort and content which the
workers thought to obtain has so disappointed them as to justify demands for still higher wages, without regard to the source from which the money is to come.

The framework of this dismal picture is made of sixty years of Fabian theory and fifty years of an organized Labor Party, preaching damnation to private enterprise and capitalism. All the ills to which flesh is heir were laid to the charge of private property and the profit motive, and the cure was the ownership and control of the instruments and means of production and exchange. That ownership and control has at long last been achieved, but the dupes of this false doctrine have yet to learn that Utopia is not a sort of improved convalescent home. Meanwhile they go merrily along, many of them doing less and less work for more and more money, the deficit coming from the charity of the United States and the Empire. To stifle doubt and suppress criticism, there is an army of boosters styled public relations officers, costing £15,000,000 a year, who fill the air and the newspapers with the joyful news of the next plan to undo the trouble caused by the last.

One must go back to Uncle Sam and John Bull to get the measure of the tragedy of a lapse in mind and morals which must end quickly, or end us. The vast expenditure of the United States to keep this sort of thing going may prove a good investment if it saves America from a similar experience.

It is not fair to put the whole of the blame on the Socialists; they have built a great edifice of error upon a foundation of falsehood laid by Lloyd George and “Ninepence for Fourpence.” Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, unless England’s warning is heeded, may well serve the same sordid purpose.

Some twenty years ago I paid a visit to a small Communist settlement run by Russian Jews a few miles from Jerusalem. There were up-to-date farm buildings half finished, land ploughed but not sown, and everything begun and halted. The Russian Commissar was in despair, because the financial crisis had cut off the flow of American capital! Something of the same kind, on a much bigger scale, is about to happen to the British Utopia unless John Bull awakens and, having lost six good miles from Jerusalem. There were up-to-date farm buildings half finished, land ploughed but not sown, and everything begun and halted. The Russian Commissar was in despair, because the financial crisis had cut off the flow of American capital! Something of the same kind, on a much bigger scale, is about to happen to the British Utopia unless John Bull awakens and, having lost six good years, starts again on the hard but worthy road of work and duty.

Washington Papers, Please Copy

I am for government rigorously frugal and simple, applying all the possible savings of the public revenue to the discharge of the public debt; and not for a multiplication of officers and salaries merely to make partisans, and for increasing by every device, the public debt on the principle of its being a public blessing.

THOMAS JEFFERSON, in a letter to Elbridge Gerry, January 23, 1799

This Is What They Said

It has appeared to me that there is a definite liberal group among the [Chinese] Communists, especially of young men who have turned to the Communists in disgust at the corruption evident in the local governments—men who put the interest of the Chinese people above ruthless measures to establish a Communist ideology in the immediate future.


Of course there are many who deny the possibility of such a thing as a form of democracy molded by Marxist thought. Whatever our own opinion of the Soviet form of society, however, we must accommodate ourselves to the fact that there are others who consider it democratic, because they are allowed to integrate themselves with it, instead of being subordinated to it as colonial subjects.

OWEN LATTIMORE, “Solution in Asia,” 1945

The selection of Mr. [John Foster] Dulles as chairman of the board and of Mr. [Alger] Hiss as president of the Endowment serves to emphasize the decision of the trustees to concentrate the Endowment’s efforts as much as possible upon the success of the United Nations as the instrument best adapted at the present time to promote the purposes for which the Endowment was founded.

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, Annual Report, 1947

These days every Communist cell is comprised of 50 per cent Communists, 25 per cent members of the FBI and 25 per cent members of the Un-American Activities Committee.

THURMAN ARNOLD, quoted by AP, May 5, 1950

It may be objected that vivisection of living animals is a sad and dreadful thing, and it is true that the lot of kulaks and others who have opposed the Soviet experiment is not a happy one, but again, in both cases, the suffering inflicted is done with a noble purpose.

WALTER DURANTY, “I Write As I Please,” 1935

Communist ideologies have never been combined with a military force which could threaten this hemisphere. It seems inconceivable that the present Russian forces could directly menace this country.

JAMES BRYANT CONANT, speech before the National Education Association, June 20, 1941
Acheson’s Gift to Stalin

By EUGENE LYONS

THE KREMLIN has been laboring in the post-war years to forge a patriotic united front with its wretched subjects against the West and in particular against the United States. The official thesis, implicit in all attacks on the free world, is that Western hatred of the Soviet regime is really a cloak for old-style imperialism, aiming to conquer and divide up historic Russia.

Accordingly, Soviet propaganda has seized avidly upon any American acts or words implying derogation of Russia and the Russians. Each time we attack “Russia” or “the Russians” when we mean the Bolshevik hierarchy, or speak contemptuously of “Asiatic hordes,” or identify world communism as a “Slav menace,” we are providing grist for the Kremlin mills. Our press and pronouncements are fine-combed in Moscow for quotations suggesting that the Soviet dictatorship is the same old Russian bear under its gaudy ideological clothing, since that bolsters the idea of Stalin as a good Russian patriot, successor to Peter and Ivan, boldly defending the genuine interests of his nation.

Our answer to the fantasy about American imperialism, in so far as any has been given at all, is that this country has no quarrel with Russia as such or with its citizenry, but only and entirely with the Soviet regime as spearhead of world communism. It is a true answer—there are indeed no sharp conflicts of economic or territorial interest between the two nations. And it is a politically effective answer, in that it draws a clear line between the Kremlin and its prime victims, the Russian peoples; between the genuine national interests of the country and the special world-revolutionary interests of its Red masters; between the conventional pre-1917 expansionist urges of Russia and the Communist drive for world hegemony.

All this is elementary. It is the basis, the sole basis available, for American psychological appeals to the Russian masses over the heads of their despots. It is the common ground on which Americans and democratic elements in the Russian emigration can meet for joint action against the Soviet regime. Somehow we must make as many Soviet citizens as possible aware that their interests in the final analysis coincide with our own, since they are equally eager to liberate Russia from the Communist yoke.

SECRETARY of State Acheson either has not grasped this argument or he does not consider it valid. On June 26, testifying before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, he offered the Kremlin a propaganda gift of incalculable value. Had he made an outright appeal to the Russian people to rally around Stalin as the inheritor and guardian of their traditions and destiny, he could scarcely have been more helpful to the Politburo.

The fact that his largesse was scarcely noted by the press and that its implications for Russo-American relations are not yet understood by the country does not make it any less mischievous. Among New York newspapers, only the Times bothered to report or comment on Mr. Acheson’s remarks, and it succeeded only in compounding the mischief. In a follow-up editorial it tied some pretty ribbons on the Secretary’s gift to Stalin. American policies after World War I opposing dismemberment of Russia, the Times declared, had been marked by a “peculiar unreality,” but now “Mr. Acheson’s statements show that these policies have been replaced by a new realism.”

In substance our Secretary of State repudiated the idea that America has no fundamental quarrel with Russia as a nation but only with its Communist overlords. He explained that the makers of Russian policy—“whether Tsarist or Communist”—have always been aggressors and imperialists of the same ilk. “It is clear,” he said, “that this process of encroachment and consolidation by which Russia has grown in the last 500 years from the Duchy of Muscovy to a vast empire must be stopped.”

The enemy of the free world, that is to say, is not international communism as most of us supposed and as American leaders from Truman down assert almost daily, but the traditional Russia. In Mr. Acheson’s book Communist methods and ideology—conspiracy, subversion, fifth columns, worldwide propaganda, the techniques of fomenting civil war, the Leninist bid for world dominion—are merely “new weapons and tactics” in a game of imperialist aggression as old as Russia itself. As if we did not have our hands full enough with the last thirty years of Russian history, he insists on taking on five centuries of it!

STATESMANKSHIP aside, considered just as history the Acheson attack on Russia leaves much to be desired. Certainly he would be hard put to it to find an example of a great power which did not, precisely like Russia, expand through the centuries at the expense of its neighbors through “encroachment and consolidation” by war, aggression and colonization. The accusation he lodges against Russia applies no less to Great Britain or France, Austro-Hungary or Germany. It applies, he might have paused to recognize, to our own country which grew from a coastal strip on the Atlantic to continental dimensions, not in 500 but in 150 years.
Imperialism is not exactly a Russian invention nor has the urge to expansion in the last five centuries been a specifically Russian obsession. Professor Michael Karpovich of Harvard wrote recently in a New Leader article:

Pre-revolutionary Russian imperialism was essentially no different from the imperialism of the other great powers. The Russian empire was a conventional one; its policies were traditional imperialist policies. Neither its emergence nor its expansion needs to be explained by allusions to "Russian messianism" or to peculiar traits of the "Russian character." If there is an illusory identity between pre-revolutionary and Soviet foreign policy, it stems from the fact that the same territories often constitute the objects of expansion. . . .

After all, when one comes down to it, the Soviet Union still occupies the same space as the Russian Empire did before it. . . . One can hardly conclude from this that the aims, methods and general character of both imperialisms are the same.

Singling out Russia for special blame in a historic process common to all imperialistic powers in modern times is parasitic nonsense. To make this nonsense the excuse for a threat of "dismemberment" of the country, as spelled out by the Times, is well-nigh suicidal in the context of the present struggle against world communism. "Unless we can mobilize our millions of allies behind the iron curtain, the game is up," the Saturday Evening Post (July 14) declared editorially—and that means above all the millions of potential allies in the Soviet Union itself.

In effect Mr. Acheson disowns those who talk of liberating Russia in partnership with its oppressed population and pulls the props from under the recent attempts to develop psychological-political strategy against the Soviets—including, Ironically, such enterprise under the aegis of his own Department. As one of the American organizations for friendship with the Russian people declared in a formal statement on the Secretary's testimony, his views "are open to misinterpretation as a virtual declaration of hostility to Russia as a nation and to the Russian peoples." He saddles the helpless subjects of the Kremlin with responsibility for its post-war policies and territorial grabs. He seeks to demolish the most potent argument of Stalin's Russian enemies, namely that the dictorship has been sacrificing Russia's genuine interests for its own Communist goals.

There is good reason to surmise that Mr. Acheson's remarks were inspired, directly or indirectly, by the most extreme Ukrainian "separatists," who have some energetic lobbyists in the capital. The fanatic sincerity of these gentry is beyond question, and no one denies their right to propagate their views. But the fact remains that they hate Russia and Russians more than they hate Bolshevism; that red-hot zeal for statehood blinds them to the special nature of the Soviet menace.

Apparently they have convinced some influential American officials that they speak for the majority of Ukrainians. But this is pure assumption. I have met hundreds of anti-Communist Ukrainians, within and outside Russia, through the years. With negligible exceptions they would settle for a federation of free and equal peoples in an undivided Russia. Inside the Soviet Union, Stalin's subjects, Russians and non-Russians, are too tragically concerned with the primary and common job of ridding the land of his despotism to think of secondary questions.

In any case, Americans are hardly in a position to make arbitrary decisions on such problems. Our primary interest is to overthrow the Soviet regime, in concert with all the peoples in Russia, after which a free and democratic nation can settle its own internal affairs. We should not, either as a matter of logic or policy, take sides on the nationalities issues, but must counsel self-determination by all Russian people after the elimination of the Kremlin dictatorship. To accept the "separatist" approach is to court the enmity of 100 million Russians, inflame interracial hatreds precisely when unified anti-Communist sentiment and action are called for, and provide Stalin with "proof" that America aims to "dismember" the country.

Unless unequivocal clarification on this matter comes quickly from the highest quarters, I believe Mr. Acheson's "Duchy of Muscovy" statement may rank with President Roosevelt's formula of "unconditional surrender" in the inventory of American foreign policy blunders. The effect of Mr. Roosevelt's offhand psychological mistake was to rally the German people, including most anti-Nazis, around the tottering Hitler regime. The effect of Mr. Acheson's error, if allowed to stand unchallenged, will be to wreck the effort so well begun—by private American groups and by some agencies of our government itself—to build an alliance of freedom-loving people, Russians included, against the Bolshevik abominations.

Mr. Acheson should be reminded that in the early stages of the Nazi invasion the Russian people, eager to believe that the foreigners were coming as liberators, welcomed the Germans with open arms. All this changed when it became manifest that the anti-Communist slogans were merely a cover for old-fashioned imperialist plans to smash and dismember Russia. Thus the Secretary's blunder is not even original. Fortunately it is not too late for an aroused American public opinion to undo it by making clear that we regard the Russian peoples as potentially our most valuable allies.
Letter From Washington

By EDNA LONIGAN

CONGRESS wished to recess in August, and come back in the fall, partly because it is essential that Members talk with the people they represent, and partly because the clash of wills in Congress today is so fierce that even the strongest minds can hardly bear it for months on end.

President Truman told the majority leaders Congress must stay in session until they passed his bills for foreign aid, new taxes and economic controls. The bitter fight over the Defense Production Bill was a result of the pressure, and a foretaste of what is to come before Congress votes on the rest of the “must” legislation.

The Administration left no doubt whatever when they submitted the defense production draft for the coming year that they wanted to use the war to complete government rule over the national economy. Congress had voted price, production and credit controls a year ago but even that would have been difficult to obtain without the Korean War. This year the Administration added the power to seize any property, to erect and construct defense plants, to pay subsidies, and to set up government corporations by fiat.

A New Bid for Power

Here was the Spence Bill again, the infamous bill through which the Fair Deal had tried to perpetuate its war powers over economic life in peacetime. In fact, as Walter Trohan reported in the Washington Times-Herald, the new draft closely resembled the bill introduced by Senator Connally in June 1940, which would have given the Administration a whole set of national socialist controls over “private” enterprise, through licensing of firms, marketing of products, price controls and the rest, many of which were later included in the Lend-Lease Act ingeniously hidden in the clauses about foreign aid.

What made the new bid for power so galling to Congress was the fact that it was so neatly hidden from the eyes of the public. Section 303, which gave the President power to purchase “other raw materials,” was amended to leave out the “raw”—that is, to bring in all materials. Credit control over new construction was extended to all real property and construction “whether existing or proposed.”

The question was whether Congress could come to grips with a problem so intricate, when our political parties are no longer functioning, and Congress had no press support with which to oppose the Administration’s propaganda machine. The results, though incomplete, are heartening.

It was a hot June night in Washington when the Senate stayed in session until 4:00 A.M. to complete the bill before the deadline. Party lines broke on DiSalle’s plan to roll back the price of beef cattle, and to set quotas for slaughtering. This left the Administration without any Democratic leaders to press its case, and put the fight in the hands of the Fair Dealers, where it belonged.

Benton of Connecticut and Lehman of New York led the critical battle over the provision giving the President power to seize existing plants or erect new ones when “in his judgment” the step could be called defense. The powers were sweeping. The bill authorized the President to acquire by purchase . . . or other means of transfer any real property . . . and to erect and construct plants, factories and other industrial facilities for the purpose of manufacturing, producing and processing . . . and . . . marketing . . . of such materials. [Italics mine.]

The way to test the wording is to see how neatly it covers newspapers. Not that the Administration would have moved openly against the press, or radio or magazines. It likes its powers latent. Then, with the control of raw materials (like newsprint), of machinery, of taxes and depreciation, it could proceed quietly, without unpleasant fuss.

Benton defended the bill in cultivated accents but with Lenin’s classic argument. Big business was getting bigger. Little business was dying out. Only the government could protect small business—by monopolizing all plants.

Senator George rose and paced up and down until he obtained the floor. Then he said:

The Secretary of the Treasury of the United States testified before the Finance Committee this morning. He stated that we have a surplus in the Treasury as of this date of $4,312,000,000 . . . and he accounted for it primarily by the fact that . . . private industry was now building the plants where private industry wanted to put them, and not where the politicians wished to put them, and that the government had not been called upon to pay for those plants . . .

Today the Secretary of the Treasury stated that the only reason why we have a surplus, when it was estimated that we would practically have a deficit, was that private industry had done the job. If we adopt this amendment we shall have taken a long step toward socialism, toward the socialized state, because that is the motivating influence behind all amendments of this kind—to put the government in business, to build plants, to spend the taxpayers’ money, and impoverish the taxpayers to the point where they can do nothing else but travel the road down which the British have gone.

His voice grew deeper and angrier. “As for my-
self, Mr. President, I will not follow that road."

When the vote was taken, 25 men were willing to give the President the right to set up plants at will. They included Benton, Humphrey and Lehman, the Three Musketeers of the Fair Deal, and Connally, Douglas, Kilgore, Moody, and Wayne Morse (R). This is the irreducible minimum of Fair Deal-collectivist votes in the Senate. Republicans and Southern Democrats joined to make 57 votes against the attempt to bring about socialization through war powers.

The issue then lay between those who wanted a moderate bill because they believed the government could spend $70 billion on goods for destruction, and still "protect" consumers against harsh reality, and those who wanted no part of the myth of war controls. Ten men stood out to the end against the hoax of the war economy—Dirksen, Jenner, Wherry, Malone, Welker, Williams, Young, Knowland, Bennett, and Butler of Nebraska. These are the men in the Senate through whom any fundamental reconstruction of the free economy must come.

Virtually the same contest was repeated in the House, with the same results. On Friday the 13th Rep. Javits, who is the Fair Deal spokesman among Republicans in the House, introduced (after one defeat) the amendment for government seizure or building of defense plants. As a test, he cleverly omitted the power to sell the products of such plants, although it was probably conveyed under other sections. In the last vote on this, the crucial point, two Republicans joined with the Fair Dealers to give 184 votes for socialization, but 190 Republicans and 42 Democrats, a total of 232, voted No. This Congress is not going collectivist, or even Fair Dealish, if it knows it.

In the final vote on the limited bill, 76 Republicans and 16 Democrats voted to the end against controls—not quite a third of the votes cast. Their names, on page 8811 of the Congressional Record, are a check list of those who understand collectivism even when it wears a uniform.

Congress is splitting into three groups, out-and-out collectivists, out-and-out supporters of freedom, and a confused "third force" which still believes that the Marshall Plan and price controls are bold new programs to serve the public good. This three-cornered fight, with a shifting center, will reappear in the debate over foreign aid, new taxes, and the State Department appropriation bill.

The large center group which opposed collectivism but voted for controls illustrates the weakness of the intellectual opposition. Many spokesmen for free enterprise succumbed and accepted the doctrine that King Canute can make the ocean stand still. Its modern equivalent is the Baruch formula, that prices can be kept stable by governments when the two components of price—the supply of goods and the supply of money—are moving rapidly in opposite directions. The classic case of the Baruch formula is the German "war economy" of Hindenburg. After 1918, Walter von Rathenau carried price and production controls to their logical economic end in Planwirtschaft or the planned economy, and then Hitler carried them to their logical political end, the survival of those most fit for the raw battle for power.

Exhibits A and B in the Administration's case were Charles Wilson and Eric Johnston, both naively assumed to be representatives of private industry. Johnston has long been hospitable to collectivist ideas, as in his book about Russia, and also to collectivist associates. Wilson was a true believer in freedom when he left Schenectady, but the palace guard are now expert in breaking down the defenses of any individual. They make him an expert in that which is alien to his world. Wilson knows the clear, hard world of material production. He does not know the subtle world of economics or the shadowy, deceptive world of politics. His mentor, Keyserling, knows both. A businessman who joins the Fair Deal is no part of the intellectual defenses of the free society. Either he becomes a politician like Paul Hoffman, or like Knudsen he is relegated to the rear.

Diversionary Tactics

The Administration has won all it really expected from the Defense Production Bill. Its main purpose is to make a case for blaming Congress when the inevitable scarcities cause high prices or black markets at the spending peak.

The party leaders put pressure on Congress to complete the "must" legislation because President Truman plans to take to the road and repeat his performance of 1948 by lambasting the "Do-Nothing 82nd Congress." Public attention will be kept on domestic issues. The build-up has already started to make this the "horse-meat Congress." That is the way to take people's minds off the MacArthur Hearings and the bad taste of the Korean peace. There is little danger that the Republicans will defend the Congress any more than they did in 1948.

While we forget about the unhappy business in Korea, the Soviet leaders will not be sleeping. In the thirties, Communists and Nazis held a "dress rehearsal" in Spain to try out weapons and tactics for the coming world conflict. They did not use their new weapons fully, only enough to see whether they were as good as the enemy's, or whether they needed improvement for the coming holocaust. It was hard on the Spanish people.

Korea is likewise a dress rehearsal. The Communists have found that—in spite of all our handicaps due to the Acheson-Marshall policies—American fire power is strong enough to overcome the advantage of hordes of manpower. All the other governments know it, and wonder why we do not use our victory. They do not understand why we should give the Soviet leaders the time they need to build up their strength in the place where they have found they are weak, and go on confidently to prepare for the greater war to come.
Man of the Half Century

By JULIEN STEINBERG

With this article Mr. Steinberg concludes his analysis of Lenin as the mentor and exemplar of Stalin. The first part appeared in our last issue.

WHERE does one even begin to unravel the myths about Lenin and his dictatorial regime? Let us consider purges in the Communist Party. That, surely, is an invention of Stalin's.

The facts are these. Lenin's distaste for the Communist workers' opposition groups (terror having taken care of non-Communist groups) came to a head during the Tenth Party Congress in 1921 which banned all factions. "The Congress ordered the immediate dissolution of all factional groups," states the official "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." The decision was contained in a resolution on "Party Unity" composed by Lenin. From the same source:

The Central Committee in 1921 organized a party purge. . . Altogether, nearly 170,000 persons, or about 25 per cent of the total membership, were expelled from the Party as a result of the purge. The purge greatly strengthened the Party. . .

Soviet historian Popov, in his "Outline History of the CPSU," put the figure at 200,000. "Certain excesses," he said, "were committed during the purging in the provinces." Many years after the event, Victor Serge, still convinced of Lenin's "probity," admitted: "Within the party, this meant a dictatorship of the old Bolsheviks plus disciplinary measures aimed not at the opportunists but at the critics." A decade and a half after Lenin "disciplined" his Communist opposition, Stalin, in a barbaric expansion, but following logically in the path of the master, would kill his.

It was also in Lenin's day that the Communist International, which is proving so useful to Stalin today, was organized for the openly avowed purpose of creating a Communist world by force, infiltration and guile.

Some disaffected Communists, whose puerile nostalgia does their intelligence no credit, have told us that Stalin's international fifth column is alien to its initial inspiration. The facts, of course, are otherwise. The Comintern, from the start, was housed, fed and dominated by Moscow. Its initial delegates, its "founders," were handpicked Moscow stooges representing only themselves. (Outside of the delegates from the left wing of the Scandinavian socialist parties, the only genuine representative of a foreign revolutionary group, Eberlein of the German Spartacusbund, came with Rosa Luxemburg's instructions to vote against the creation of a new International.)

The master blueprint for world communism, the "Theses and Statutes of the Communist International," published in 1920, was a quasi-military plan for world sedition, infiltration and treason. The biggest myth that the document blasts is the notion that Russian communism was dictatorial because of peculiar Russian conditions. The "Theses" not only make it unequivocally clear that dictatorship is the form of government in Russia because of ideology and not "necessity," but also specify that parliamentary bodies are to be destroyed in all countries in which the Communists come to power. In short, not only was communism a product for forcible export from the beginning, but so also was totalitarianism, because that is what communism is, not what it "became."

A year before Lenin died he worked up a personal distaste for Joseph Stalin, whom he had well tutored, whose strong-arm services he had valued highly, whom he had sponsored, brought along and called a "wonderful Georgian." About the significance of this much misrepresented and misunderstood hostility (which the Stalinists pretend didn't exist), two points should be grasped. First, the notion that one who develops enmity for an aspiring despot automatically becomes a democrat is nonsense. Lenin did come to fear the "peppery dishes" Stalin would prepare; but the Russian people in the half dozen years of Lenin's terroristic reign had come to know intimately the "peppery dishes" Lenin had already prepared. Nazi Ernst Roehm does not become a democrat because Hitler kills him, nor Trotsky because Stalin murders him, and surely Lenin does not because he becomes uneasy about a protégé. Two, there is not the remotest suggestion in Lenin's "Testament" that the Communists should abandon dictatorial control of the country.

The "Testament" has an important use: we should obviously use it to embarrass Stalin in any way we can, as we are attempting to take advantage of the Tito-Stalin cleavage; but we ought not—as we ought not in the international Communist dispute of today—to permit ourselves to be sold the nonsense that either of the Communist disputants is anything but a despot.1

Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin all burned for a Communist world. Each of them hated parliamentary democracy implacably. Not to understand this is not to understand communism, but only to be

1 For a fuller discussion of this subject, see "Lenin's Testament" and a Note of Background," which includes the full text of Lenin's suppressed document, in "Verdict of Three Decades."
volved in an intra-Communist feud. (It remains, apparently, a secret to some that Trotsky in exile supported the Stalinist rape of Poland and attack on Finland. Until the day the Stalinist state he helped create alpenstocked him to death, he favored the “unconditional support” of Stalin’s totalitarian state, a fact extraordinarily suggestive of the veracity of Trotsky’s charges that Stalin had “betrayed” Lenin’s wonderful state.)

Stalin succeeded because he was the best Leninist. He was able to build his Stalinist state because the Leninist state had prepared all the ingredients. The arguments between Trotsky and Stalin, their similarity hidden by the vicious heat of rivalry, were mostly fabricated arguments. As one writer, Paul Mattick, has so well put it:

... If only in a roundabout way, Trotsky’s Bolshevism, despite its saturation with hatred for Stalin, leads in the end merely to a defense of Stalinism, so the only possible self-defense for Trotsky. This explains the superficiality of the ideological differences between Stalinism and Trotskyism. The impossibility of attacking Stalin without attacking Lenin helps to explain, furthermore, Trotsky’s great difficulties as an oppositionist.

Stalin never believed in “socialism in one country,” as one can demonstrate easily from his writings, and from his empire building. The inner power feud is a matter of concern for Communists, although the tragic murder of the defeated Communist leaders is important for what it shows about the culture of the state. The purposes held in common by the rival Communists reveal the unity and continuity of the Communist New Order and the Communist doctrine. Stalin has proved himself worthy of Lenin. The oath to spread world communism which he took at Lenin’s bier he has not betrayed. Which ought, at long last, to provide the non-Communist world with a true, if revolting, appreciation of Lenin.

IN THE swamp of a troubled time myths flourish. The stature of a man little known to Russians, let alone to the world, before his historic seizure of power, increases steadily after his death. The scornful writings of his contemporary opponents (see Mark Aldanov’s 1922 “Lenin,” for example) are not read; nor were they ever. If they had been, the Western world might have been less fearful of indicating clear-cut, active hostility toward the new redemptionist state in the East.

Had the voices of Lenin’s humanistic opponents been heeded, the world could not have glibly told that only in the late thirties, under Stalin, did the monster state begin devouring its own children. It began not long after it had beaten down its opponents. The dead, unheeded voices in the dusty archives recall to us, among other things, the Kronstadt massacre of 1921 in which, under Lenin’s and Trotsky’s direction, the Communist regime turned the heavy guns of the state against the simple sailors who had played such a selfless, if blind, role in bringing Lenin to power. Three and a half years after Lenin takes power, the Kronstadt sailors (“the pride and glory of the Russian Revolution,” Trotsky had called them) can remain silent no longer. They ask for elementary liberties for “all who labor”; they ask this of the Workers’ State; they ask for the freeing of political prisoners. Lenin and Trotsky answer with gunfire. The Kronstadt sailors die, but superbly.

Before the Bolshevik Lidice is a success, the victims write in a manifesto: “Standing up to his knees in the blood of the workers, Marshal Trotsky was the first to open fire against revolutionary Kronstadt which has risen against the autocracy of the Communists.” (Years later, Trotsky innocently tells us all about the big, bad Stalinist regime that “betrayed” communism.) They write: “Here is raised the banner of rebellion against the three-year-old tyranny and oppression of Communist autocracy, which has put in the shade the three-hundred-year-old despotism of monarchy.” (Thirty years later, enlightened opponents of communism are just beginning to dare to suggest that communism is “worse” than Tsarism.) They write: “Let the whole world know.” And then they die.

Three decades later, those who find they have been “cheated” by Stalin who delivered to them exactly what communism innately promised (“He stole my program,” Trotsky kept yelling, in effect) can not yet turn away emotionally and fully from communism. In varied ways, a new generation, three decades away from the cries of Kronstadt, is still being told of the Glorious Beginning. Perhaps we will give Bolshevism a tryout somewhere else, in a place where the climate will be more congenial. The Communists pick China, and, with a characteristic contempt for communism’s victims, we give them a tryout there. Eighty thousand American casualties later, those who could not tell in advance about the nature of Chinese communism are not quite so certain any longer of the desirability of the Experiment, but it is not as easy to stop as it is to start. Some have not yet given up on Tito’s “humanism.” Perhaps he can pull off the trick, and create the Bolshevik Utopia. (Mention aid to Franco’s detestable dictatorship as a military necessity and you elicit moral revulsion; mention aid to Tito’s detestable dictatorship as a military necessity and you get a quick, “Of course, it’s only being practical.”)

THE MAN who invented the “dictatorship with a difference” grows in stature, in retrospect. Even his fair-minded opponents, who have often not understood a page he wrote, attest to his great talents as a writer, as a thinker, as a humanist. They stand ready to discover in him, because of “fairness,” all the trappings of genius his admirers create in their fanaticism. They still do not know that “He was obviously not the original thinker, still less the profound philosopher, which ignoramuses misled by cynics would like to see in him,” as Boris Souvarine so aptly puts it. Lenin’s success came not from the genius of his ideas, but from
the tenacity with which he held them, the ruthlessness with which he applied them, the weakness and divided condition of his opponents in Russia, and the gullibility, and other failings, of the Western world.

If Lenin was a democrat until he took power, as many tell us in a last-ditch stand, then why was Leon Trotsky, back in 1904, and then Lenin's opponent, already saying: "In Lenin's scheme, the party takes the place of the working class. The party organization displaces the party. The Central Committee displaces the party organization, and finally the Dictator displaces the Central Committee."

We examine the Prophet's works. We find, as numerous commentators have found, that they are of little inherent interest; were Lenin not the "Victor of October" many of them would probably never have been printed, or, surely, reprinted. We find them as tedious as those of Stalin. We find an almost intolerable cultural banality, a characteristic redundancy, a consistent and frenzied intolerance cloaked as loyalty to a cause, which has a name, but does not exist in heaven or on earth. We find a sustained proletarian Huey Longism, without a suspicion of humor, without a suggestion of charity except as a noble verbal cover for base acts. We find the brutality of the word, and later, once he was in power, the brutality of the deed. The purpose of the writing, especially against opponents, is not to debate, but to rant; not to determine what the position of his opponent really is, but to tell him what Lenin says it is. (Kautsky, to Lenin, is a "white guard," this about the man he once revered; Martov, to Lenin, is a "white guard," this about the man who was his closest friend.) Lenin's aim is the same as that of any rabble rouser, to incite and to inflame. His real appeal is to the basest emotions. It was Lenin who took the murky formulations of Marx and Engels about "expropriating the expropriators," and turned them into the lynch-cry, "Loot the looters!

He himself once told why he called the Mensheviks, or parliamentary Socialists, "traitors" in 1907. His explanation provides a useful key to his utterances as a whole. "That tone," he said of his own remarks, "is not designed to convince, but to break the ranks, not to correct a mistake of the opponent but to annihilate him, to wipe him off the face of the earth." This is the true Lenin, the man who, after listening to the "Apassionata" with Gorky, commented on its greatness, and then said that he couldn't listen to music too often. It affected his nerves, "makes you want to say stupid, nice things," and stroke the heads of people who could create such beauty in such a vile world:

And you mustn't stroke anyone's head—you might get your hand bitten off. You have to hit them over the head, without any mercy, although our ideal is not to use force against anyone. Hm, hm, our duty is infernally hard.

In 1917 he came to power and his real, nihilist credo soon exerted itself. By 1921 he is summing up what his methods of imposing communism by assault had achieved: "In our attempt to pass over to communism, we had suffered by the spring of 1921 a more serious defeat than any previously inflicted on us by Kolchak, Denikin or Pilsudski." Nevertheless what he had preached and done before had been, of course, necessary—the chief Communist cant-word at each point of crisis or fiasco. And having brought the country to the verge of ruin he made a "strategic retreat." It is still listed in the history books as one of his great acts of genius. He partly reestablished capitalism. That was all, and he said so himself. He also said, "We have made many mistakes, and it would be most criminal not to recognize that we went too far."

But the retreat was caused by necessity, not humanism, for he also said: "If we had not transformed our economic policy, we should not have lasted many months longer." He retained the dictatorship, and intensified it; he did not restore the "bourgeois" freedoms. We hear our humanist screeching at this time: "We will keep the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, whether open or disguised as non-party, in prison." A year later: "It's a case of machine guns for the people called Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries."

This is the Prophet, the man we are supposed to believe that Joseph Stalin "betrayed."

There are still many among us—knowledgeable enough about latter-day Soviet communism—who are determined, even with the advantage of retrospect, not to understand that what happened in November 1917 in Russia was one of the most horrible acts ever to occur in human history. It was not a continuation of the legacy of the American and French Revolutions, but a new movement pronouncing to us that all totalitarian systems in our time will come in the dress of idealism. Those who are still convinced, partially or completely, of Lenin's "probity"—or of communism, original or otherwise—are so obsessed partly because they can not understand the fraud of the slogans, the essential means for the establishment of the tyranny. (Some, of course, are entranced with tyranny precisely because of their knowledge that it is tyranny.) The extent to which Lenin himself was, or was not, self-deluded about what he was creating—and he was not in doubt for a minute about his means—is, in the historical scales, irrelevant.

We are told, for example, that Lenin was sincere, as if anyone ever accused him of ruining Russia in a frivolous moment. It would be more proper if we, his opponents, did everything we could to convince everyone that he was sincere—grimly, relentlessly sincere. We are told that he was without "vanity," and we, accustomed to thinking of vanity solely in terms of middle-class pleasures and frailties, do not yet understand that the most arrogant vanity of our time is possessed by an ascetic race of men, and their dupes, who dream and live power, whose vanity has reached godlike proportions in their insatiable desire to create a robot kind which con-
forms to shapes long seen by them in the private world which exists in their skulls.

The three-decades-old experience of Sovietism is suggestive of many far-reaching conclusions; in its own way, it has revealed the true core of a disguised nihilist development, often hidden to its proponents, that has been blended with the broad movement of enlightenment which seemed to augur so well for our day. But here let us content ourselves with a prosaic conclusion, and an arithmetic estimate of Lenin. Professor Vernadsky, in his "Lenin" (Yale University Press, 1951), writes:

If the number of people killed at the direct instigation of Lenin be taken into account—disregarding those killed in the "regular" civil war—and also the number of people who died from famine in consequence of his economic policy, the result is a staggering figure. It is enough to say that the number of Russians who died from famine in 1921-22 was twice the number of Russian soldiers killed and disabled in the World War. If judgment is to be based on the number of human lives destroyed by the government of Lenin, then it is impossible not to list Lenin among the most fearful tyrants history has known.

From Our Readers

Why No Voice For China?

In September, a generous and tolerant peace treaty will be signed with Japan in San Francisco. It is an act which all free men will applaud. But China has not been invited to participate in the Peace Conference—China that was the first to resist the Japanese-militarist aggression, China that bore the weight of war longer than any other ally, China that suffered the largest sacrifices in persons and property. China finds this exclusion from the Peace Conference inequitable and unjust, and all free Chinese protest and appeal to the friendship and fairness of the American people.

There is still time to reconsider the question.

The Chinese Legislative Yuan (Parliament) and the Yuan of Control (an elected supreme organ of control) both have sent a unanimous protest and appeal to Congress. Other official or private organizations have similarly protested and appealed to the American people. Among the most important are: the Provincial Council of Formosa, the Chinese Unified Union of Labor, the Association of Chinese Veterans, the Professors of the University of Formosa and the Bar Association of China. Especially to be pointed out is the moving appeal in the form of a petition signed in blood by an entire regiment of Chinese Veterans.

Except for the protest of the University of Formosa, which was sent through by Dr. Hu Shih, no other protest or appeal has been publicized in the American press! The American people should have all the facts and should know about these protests and appeals from the free Chinese.

Elmhurst, New York C. K. Stef
Former Chinese Minister to Vatican

The Closed Shop

I have read with great interest your supplement, "Free Men Vs. the Union Closed Shop," by Donald Richberg. Mr. Richberg has recognized and pointed out the fact that unions should always be tools through which free men have the opportunity to better their economic conditions, and how some are rapidly becoming ends in themselves, or rather means to provide monopoly power to the few who control them.

Farm organizations generally and farmer cooperatives in particular are likewise means and not ends. Their capacity to serve rests on their continuing to justify membership through works, demonstrating through the services which they provide to members and prospects that they deserve member support.

In Eastern States the right to join and the right to withdraw are the most potent means farmers have to control activities in their Association. That control has been an important factor in the steady growth of Eastern States cooperative purchasing service to farmers and of Eastern States opportunities to employees. Union members should never surrender this right so fundamental to the building of sounder and more valuable unions—as Mr. Richberg so forcefully points out.

QUENTIN REYNOLDS, General Manager
Eastern States Farmers' Exchange
West Springfield, Massachusetts

Scarcity and Value

In the issue of July 16, p. 645, under "C for Counterfeit" appears the following statement:

Prices rise for only one reason—ever: because there is more money than goods. There may be either a scarcity of goods or a plethora of money.

In this case there is no scarcity of goods. . . .

Such a statement does not do justice to the Freeman. How does one determine that there is more money than goods? Does one count an automobile against a dollar, a ten-cent whistle against a dollar? Then, if one could decide how to count the volume of money against the volume of goods, one could not accept that for the reason that there are the factor of the velocity of money and all the other forces that determine prices.

As to the statement that "there is no scarcity of goods," it should be recognized that scarcity is a requisite of value, and that every good or service that commands a price is scarce. Only free goods, commanding no price, are not scarce.

New York City

WALTER E. SPAHR
Executive Vice President, Economists' National Committee on Monetary Policy

[Professor Spahr is correct from the standpoint of strict scientific precision in the objections he makes about "more money than goods" and about "scarcity of goods." Our editorial phrases were the kind of shorthand that is commonly necessary in discussing technical matters in a general magazine. They were meant to be read with the qualifications that Professor Spahr makes.]

THE EDITORS]
The smog still hovering over the Truman-MacArthur controversy is a witches’ aura. It is the Hindu rope trick seen through the self-hypnosis of the ignoranim duped by sordid bureaucrats. The truth is as patent as Acheson under the goad of Senator Brewster. MacArthur did what heroic and patriotic generals have done since the beginning of time. It boils down to Shakespeare’s cliche: “Not that I loved Caesar less, but that I loved Rome more.” Indeed, the Bard seemed to have been obsessed with the subject. It runs through his historical plays. It is the theme of Coriolanus; and Henry IV admonishes Prince Hal on the matter.

Schiller wrote his magnificent Trilogy around the theme. Octavio Piccolomini, a very great general, joins the conspiracy against Wallenstein, his commander in chief, because he disapproves of the latter’s motives in the Thirty Years War. Wallenstein is murdered as a consequence, and history sustains Octavio’s judgment; for his war strategy enabled him to win some startling victories against the French, for which he was elevated to princey title and given great wealth. The fact that Piccolomini was a plunderer in his early war career is beside the point.

Dion Cassius—writing his Roman History during the successive reigns of Septimus Severus, Geta and Caracalla, Macrinus, Elagabalus and Alexander Severus—brought the theme up periodically. In fact it runs through his history like a Leitmotif. Many consuls in the field defied the orders concocted in the Roman brass vacuum. The great Scipios were persistent offenders; and it was damned lucky for Rome, because the Scipios took the Empire off the hook a number of times. Dion even plays up Hannibal’s constant defiance of the Carthaginian Pentagon; and he tells of the disgrace and final death of this great general who had almost destroyed Rome and gobbled up the East to the Euphrates. Hannibal refused to take crackpot orders because he was in the field and saw things differently from the desk brass. Both Herodotus and Thucydides give instances of similar defiance, and they are handled with sympathetic understanding. The “Iliad” is cluttered with such examples.

The Jews had a great hero, Bar Kokba, who led the revolt against Hadrian. Dion Cassius mentions it and blames Hadrian’s intention to build a pagan colony on the ruins of Jerusalem—a great sacrilege. The Jews blamed the governor general who habitually debauched Jewish virgins; the insult offered by the Romans to a Jewish bridal couple; and the report that circumcision would be forbidden. Bar Kokba was a Palestinian Paul Bunyan. Historically he made a mess of trouble for the Romans. Dion states the war was neither small nor short. Bar Kokba was resourceful and ruthless. Jerome and Eusebius referred to him as a murderer and a robber: he was supposed to have tortured the Christians for not having joined him against Hadrian. However, in very short order he took fifty strongholds and nearly a thousand towns and villages (Dion Cassius) all within the Palestine border. That was some trick against the famous Legions; and the Romans were really frightened. Hadrian ordered his most famous general, Julius Severus, out of Britain and to the East to mow Bar Kokba down. Though Severus marshaled the greatest army the Jews had ever seen in Palestine, it feared to engage Bar Kokba in open battle. It resorted instead to treacherous forays and grabbed one stronghold at a time; and finally Bar Kokba and nearly 600,000 Jews were slaughtered. Yet this great hero, during his amazing successes, was constantly harassed by his bureaucracy who piled him with crackpot orders. It is possible that if he had been allowed to follow his own plans unimpeded, he would have been able to force important concessions from Hadrian, in addition to securing an honorable peace.

General Speidel, in his dispassionate book about Rommel, handles the theme very well. It is too bad that “Invasion 1944” (Regnery, $2.75) isn’t being read by more Americans: and it is too bad that it was faintly praised by “impartial” reviewers and manhandled by the literary pimps. Speidel’s prestige is now at peak: the American war staff hopefully depends on him to bring the Germans into the Atlantic war camp. His book oozes authority and integrity. He was Rommel’s chief of staff during the Normandy crisis. Col. Truman Smith in his introduction says, “General Speidel is probably the only man alive who can tell the story of the Hitler-Rommel duel . . . night and day, for weeks on end, he shared the innermost thoughts of his chief. He conducted Rommel’s correspondence. He was present at the stormy conference at Margival where Rommel and Hitler relations reached a breaking point.”
Rommel guessed the Normandy invasion almost to a day and within a few miles of the exact spot. Rommel was already convinced that the Nazis had lost the war. His only hope was to stage a brilliant campaign of maneuvers and sue for honorable peace terms; for he knew he was highly respected by the Allies. He evaluated the situation coldly. As yet Germany was practically unscathed. There had been almost no bombing of Germany proper. Any reasonable peace terms, considering the dissolution of France, the mass destruction of Russian cities, and the horrible blitzes of England, would have been tantamount to a victory. He saw no other way out. The German Navy had deteriorated to an auxiliary service. In the West the Luftwaffe had been whittled down to less than 500 planes of which only 90 bombers and 70 fighters were in "operational condition." But these were futile: they could not be put into action because of the Allies' great air superiority.

Rommel pleaded with Hitler to transfer to the invasion area the flower of the German army stationed in idleness around the Mediterranean; and he asked for the right of mobility and maneuver. But Hitler hog-tied him:

The entire Atlantic front of 2500 miles was manned by some sixty semi-mobile infantry divisions. . . . Battle-tried men were scarce. Both the officers and the non-commissioned officers were, for the most part, over age. . . . They were poorly equipped. The number of horses [sic] available for transport were so inadequate as to leave them practically immobile and hardly able to obtain provisions. Rommel repeatedly brought these deficiencies to the notice of the High Command.

When he told Hitler that such an army was useless for modern warfare, the latter said "it was a soldier's duty to stand and be killed in defense, but not to be mobile."

It was then that Rommel decided to join the plot against Hitler: once the Fuehrer was out of the way the Nazi element could be disarmed, and peace arbitrated. But his mistake was insisting that Hitler be apprehended and tried before the People's Court. The other plotters were for assassination. Meanwhile, "There was no strategical maneuvering on the Western front. . . . Free processes of thought were thus banned. The Germans had learned . . . in Russia and Africa [as MacArthur had learned in the Philippines and other Pacific islands] that freedom to operate strategically could be abandoned only at heavy cost to themselves." Rommel rebelled because he could no longer bear having his soldiers rooted to the ground and destroyed (as MacArthur rebelled and blew his top about Formosa and, later, Manchuria, where the Chinese built up their offensive under the protection of our State Department).

Hitler feared Rommel and resented his unique prestige among the Allies. Rommel was a man of great conscience. He and most of the General Staff "were secretly against the political penetration of the army which they thought would weaken the reliance of the troops on their officers [wouldn't you call Acheson's domination political penetration?]." Rommel spent much of his time with the common soldiers—eating their food to make sure that standards were kept up, talking with them, and demanding the same service from his officers. He was deeply philosophical and a poet at heart. But Hitler couldn't stand this intrusion on his Napoleonic complex. He couldn't stand Rommel's obstinacy. It rankled him when "Churchill in Parliament explained severe British reverses in North Africa with the words: 'There was a great general fighting against us.'" And so Hitler had the great Field Marshal murdered. Truman merely dismissed MacArthur; but who can tell what any man might do with a power as absolute as Hitler's?

Speidel pulls out an oft-quoted paragraph from "The Prince" by Machiavelli:

The general whose skill had brought victory and success to the Prince, must stand in such high esteem with the soldiers, the people, and the enemy, that the Prince must not merely be grateful for victories. The Prince must secure himself against his general, do away with him, or strip him of his renown.

That was MacArthur's trouble: the esteem of the soldiers, the people, and the enemy was too much for Truman's vanity.

**Ballet in Our Time**

**The Art of Ballet, by Audrey Williamson. New York: Macmillan. $2.50.**

The book "is planned to be an analysis of ballet and its component parts," says the preface. As far as I can see, the author's main subject is not ballet in general, but the ballet at the Sadler's Wells and Covent Garden theaters in London.

There is no need to say that the efforts and merits of Ninette de Valois, Frederick Ashton, Constant Lambert and their British colleagues in the building up of a permanent ballet company in London deserve respect and admiration. Nevertheless, one can not help thinking that some British as well as foreign artists of various qualifications (the latter in spite of being restricted in their activities on the British Isles as aliens—"before you are admitted to British citizenship you are not even considered a natural human being," says "How To Be an Alien," a humorous British booklet) deserve more credit than the author of our book is willing to give their unselfish work in preparing the ground for a permanent London ballet.

"It is too early as yet to talk of an English school of dancing," writes Audrey Williamson. I should say that it is impossible to talk of an Eng-
lish or British ballet as yet. The performances of the Sadler's Wells Company in New York, led by the charming ballerinas Margot Fonteyn and Moira Shearer, were as a rule directed and danced with care and often talent, but the shadows of the late Marius Petipa, Lev Ivanov, Sergei Diaghilev, Vaslav Nijinsky, Michael Fokine, Enrico Cecchetti and of the still living Leonide Massine, Sergei Lifar and Georges Balanchine were perhaps too much in evidence on the stage of the Metropolitan Opera House at every performance.

"The basic style" of the London ballet, the author states, "is the Russian." Nevertheless, at times, the ghosts of such thoroughly un-Russian central European and American "modern" choreographers as Laban, Mary Wigman, Joos, and Martha Graham—looking rather gloomy because the London dancers seemed not too happy dancing barefoot—were on the Metropolitan stage, too.

To me, the characteristic traits of the Sadler's Wells Ballet are by no means those of the true Russian ballet, i.e., the ballet of the Russian Imperial (State) dancing schools and of the Russian Imperial Theaters before the Revolution of 1917. It goes without saying that the Sadler's Wells Company does not make me think of the USSR State Ballet, either.

Audrey Williamson is often at a loss when writing of things Russian, as for instance: Meyerhold did not invent "constructive" scenery; it was already on the Moscow stages before he returned from his unsuccessful escape to Crimea in 1920; the Moscow Art Theater could not "evolve" from amateur country theatricals; Gordon Craig had no influence whatever on the Imperial or on Diaghilev's ballet; P. Tchelichev's décor and his puppets for N. Nabokov's ballet "Ode" had nothing to do with Craig's ideas; and then, where has Audrey Williamson seen Russian Cossacks dancing on their toes?

I do not think that the Russian ballet is basically French, as the book asserts. It seems to be of international origin, having been created and developed by masters of different nationalities—Landé, van Hesse, Hilferding, Didelot, Perrot, Saint Leon, Cecchetti, Marius Petipa, Hansen, Vasilly, Geltzer, Lev Ivanov, Johannsen and others. The most important component part of the Russian ballet, as well as the classic ballet in general, is the danse d'école, a form of graceful, poetic acrobatism, originated in ancient Greece and Rome and having gone through many European transformations since the Renaissance. André Levinson—the outstanding ballet and dance critic of the first half of our century—says that the danse d'école is "a continuous movement of the body, displacing itself according to a precise rhythm and conscious mechanics in a space calculated in advance." The mechanics of this dance have been devised by choreographers and dancers of many lands.

In the days of Giovanni Battista Lully (1632-1687) and of Molière, there was created, under the influence of the Italian Commedia dell'Arte, and consequently developed—again with international efforts—the so-called danse d'action, or pantomimic dance, a combination of dancing and expressive gesticulation. The danse d'école and the danse d'action both became fundamental components of the classic ballet.

Though the French ballet master Noverre ascribed the invention of the danse d'action to himself, and Audrey Williamson confirms it, Noverre did not invent that dance. The first ballet d'action, or pantomime-ballet, was devised by the Viennese ballet master, Franz von Hilferding (1710-1768). Noverre could not even understand that an expressive gesture was the unified movement of the whole human body. "By gesture I mean," he wrote, "nothing but the significant movements of the arm, supported by the striking and varied expressions of the face."

Noverre's pantomimic principles, put into practice by himself and students of his writings, degenerated into that kind of deaf-and-dumb language which was ridiculed even in the pre-Fokine days in Russia by the advanced ballet masters and teachers—Platon Karsavin, Johannsen, Cecchetti and others. According to the deaf-and-dumb language, to indicate, for example, a pretty girl, the dancer had to gyrate his right hand around his face and blow a kiss into the air; to simulate fear, trembling knees were recommended; to show rage, it was necessary to gnash one's teeth; to declare love, one had to roll up one's eyes and press both hands to the heart; to seem to be sobbing, the dancer had to cover his face with both hands, violently moving his shoulders up and down. Oddly enough, this absurd pantomime can still be seen even in some of the Sadler's Wells productions.

"The renaissance of wonder," as Samuel Coleridge called Romanticism, brought supernatural forces, mystic fairy-taleism, spiritual longings and melancholy—all nourished upon a dislike for the banalities of modern life and upon yearning regrets for the poetic past and the beauties of unspoiled, therefore divine and mysterious nature—into the ballet stories. Passionate, chivalrous love, manifesting itself even beyond the grave, was an essential theme of the Romantic ballet too:

The love where Death has set his seal,
Nor age can chill, nor rival steal,
Nor falsehood disavow.

Together with imaginative themes, more acrobatism was introduced into the ballet, including toe dancing (about 1820) supposed to symbolize the airiness of the ballerina, and to assist and stress her balloon and elevation. It did all that, but at the same time contributed to the stiffness of the dancer's back and shoulders and often to overdeveloped, by no means fairylke, calf muscles.

Toe and "ballet" dancing, as taught to children by unimaginative instructors, often produce mental and bodily stiffness and sometimes even malformation. Mothers should also remember that one
semestem is far from being sufficient for the study of ballet. After years of dancing school, Pavlova, already a ballerina, studied with Cecchetti for three more years, and then practiced for hours every day all her life.

Though Carlo Blasis wrote in his "Code of Terpsichore" (1830): "Attend to the carriage of your body and arms...let their motions be easy and graceful...avoid stiffness," the average Romantic dancers could not help getting stiff and stilted, thanks to the impairing acrobatic exercises and absurd pantomimic training according to Novarro.

Eradication of routine is well-nigh impossible in the theater. In consequence, the unimaginative ballerinas began to rely almost exclusively on their toes, the number of fouettées (the record of 32 fouettées was set by Pierrina Legnani, prima ballerina of the Russian Imperial theaters, though an Italian), briés volés, cabrioles and other funambuleseque tricks for their success with tight-robe walking and football-cultured connoisseurs; while the male partners of the ballerinas, reduced in routine productions to mere accessories of female virtuosity, were earning applause by means of tours en l'air, batteries and other acrobatic contrivances, quite unsuitable as a rule to the character and the situation represented.

The Romantic stock ballet masters did not help the vitality of the ballets, either. I have seen one or two (including the innovator, Gorsky) putting stereotyped steps and movements together mechanically instead of inventing "new turns and graces." As to their treatment of music, I heard lately a prosperous ballet teacher saying to his companion: "Play anything—it doesn't matter," and then to his class: "The music is here, folks, so that I don't have to count."

It is true that the state of affairs in average ballet productions at the beginning of our century was only a little brighter than it still is in regular opera. However, no historian of the theater could subscribe to Audrey Williamson's statement that the ballet in Russia before Fokine, i.e. the Imperial Ballet, "had become conventionalized...trivial...artistically sterile...lacking in life and emotional vigour."

The Russian ballet before the revolution could not have been lacking in "emotional vigour" either. Verve and "soul" have always been the essential factors of Russian dancers. As to "artistic sterility," the fact that the following outstanding dancers appeared on the Imperial stages of St. Petersburg and Moscow before Fokine's time, as well as with him, makes this statement rather temerarious: Mathilde Kcheisinska, Anna Pavlova, Tamara Karasavina, Vera Trefilova, Olga Preobrajenska, Lubov Egorova, Helene Smirnova, Lydia Lopokova, Sedova, Anderson, Gerdt, Peter Vladimirrov, Boris Romanov, Adolf Bolm, Vaslav Nijinsky, Vera Korally, Obohov, Semyonov, Laurent Novikov, Riabzev, Joukov, Mordkin, etc.

The leading Imperial dancers of the period, trained by the great ballet master Marius Petipa and his colleagues, "repudiated the materialism of a purely muscular technique to illume the orderly efforts with the rays of the spirit" (Levinson). Their imagination was giving new life to the stereotyped steps, figures and movements; in their dances, the grammar of the Classic and Romantic ballet was becoming a modern living language. Anna Pavlova, as Levinson says, "la plus grande danseuse de tous les temps," was dancing the traditional dances as they had never been danced before; she was giving each stock-step an unexpected deep meaning. Tamara Karsavina was combining the art of a beautiful dancer with that of a sensitive actress, whether in "Le Spectre de la Rose," "Giselle," "Parade," "Bayadère" or "Scheherazade."

The seventeen years before the revolution were the efflorescence of ballet and of theater art generally in Russia.

We read in "The Art of Ballet" that many dancers of the Sadler's Wells, having studied with Russian teachers, are using "the Russian technique." If the London ballet reminds us of anything Russian, it is of the Diaghilev "Russian Ballet"—with one exception, however: while the Sadler's Wells has women as stars, Diaghilev's ballet had men. Dislike of the "weaker sex" was Diaghilev's peculiarity. When a woman chanced into his office, he would get up and remain standing, so he would not have to ask her to sit down. There were only a few women he could tolerate.

Like many other Russian noblemen and some members of the Imperial family, Diaghilev was a man of Western culture and fine taste; in art his leanings were toward international music and painting. Dancing he considered to be their appendage, and that was the main reason why his ballet, from its Paris opening on May 19, 1909, was not truly Russian. He called it "Les Ballets Russes" because the exhibitions of Russian paintings and the Russian concerts he had previously organized in Paris, Berlin and Venice (1906) had aroused great interest; besides, during the first seasons, his company was composed of Imperial dancers and was backed, though unofficially, by the Tsar's uncle, Grand Duke Vladimir. But very soon not one of the glorious figures of the Imperial Ballet was left in his company—Pavlova, Karsavina, Kheisinska, Trefilova, Smirnova, Nijinsky, Bolm, Mordkin and others were gone.

In Diaghilev's productions, as in those of the Sadler's Wells Company, the dancers were often subservient to the scenic designers—all artists of high rank—whose job was not only to design the sets and costumes, but to help devise the choreography as well. Eastern, primitive, jazz, "modernistic" and all kinds of anti-classical and anti-romantic dance techniques originally began to be used in the "Ballets Russes."

The talents of Fokine, chief choreographer of Diaghilev's first seasons, and of Nijinsky, Diag-
hilev's second ballet master, were under the influence of painters. Consequently a host of modern foreign artists, mostly French, took the place of the Russians and had an even deeper influence on Diaghilev's productions until his death in 1929 and the end of his ballet.

The author of our book calls Fokine a rebel. The renowned ballet master was a reformer in a way, but he worked in an era when modern currents of art were flooding the intellectual Russian life (1904-1916) and he, too, swam along with them. Fokine was interested in stylized realism, historicity and corresponding dance techniques. Nevertheless, in his "Dying Swan," "Les Papillons," "Les Sylphides," he followed the school of Lev Ivanov and Petipa, while his "Caraval" was patterned after Petipa's "Harlequinade." I don't think that Isadora Duncan had any direct influence on Fokine—their aims were different.

By the way, the first lady of the "modern" American dance is honored by Audrey Williamson with only a few lines, while such eminent figures of the American dance as Martha Graham, Doris Humphrey and Charles Weidman are either not mentioned or dismissed with a few lines. Argentina, the supreme Spanish dancer, has less than a line.

In Diaghilev's productions, as in many of the Sadler's Wells's, concert pieces were used, in disregard of the composer's musical intent. What is known as "pure dance" was often substituted for or mixed with dramatically "motivated" evolutions: the principles of cubism and other "isms"; of Dalcroze, of Freud; of the music hall, variety, circus; of machine movement, etc., were used as basis for dance composition. After Diaghilev's death, symphonic music became something not so much for hearing as for seeing, and articulation of musical themes, counterpoints and measures with the hands, arms and legs encroached upon ballet dancing. Almost all European and American dancing companies which call their work "ballet," including the Sadler's Wells Company, have now gone even farther than Diaghilev in their mechanical, sexual and biological exhibitions, and in the use of incongruous mixtures of dance styles. The French "Can-Can" is danced on the toes; representations of childbirth and of sexual relations—which would have horrified Diaghilev—are done with the help of arabesques, développés, ronds de jambe en l'air, combined with "modern dance" movements, as well as with Negro, Hindu, Spanish and other exotic steps.

In spite of what Audrey Williamson says, Romantic ballet and modern dance can not "exist alongside" in the same choreographic enterprise. Their ideologies and techniques have nothing in common. Ballet, since Duncan, has been considered by the "moderns" as "a false and preposterous art," while to the balletomane modern dancing is synonymous with grotesque exhibitionism.

THEODORE KOMISARJEVSKY

**CAN WAR BE LIMITED?**

War and Human Progress, by John U. Nef. Cambridge: Harvard. $6.00

This book can be read with much profit by all those interested in the central political problem of our time. The author joins the goodly fellowship of Irving Babbitt, Belloc, Ferrero, General Fuller and Maurras, who have contributed to the analysis of the imperfectly limited wars which have bedeviled our time and promise to do so still further.

Obviously the theme grew on the author's hands. Starting with the mere intention to refute the ponderous follies of Werner Sombart's "Krieg und Capitalismus," the fantastic idea that wartime improvements in industrial technique and organization more than compensate for the harm done to society by our mass massacres, he has ended by giving us a lucid historical summary of the relations between war and the social order throughout the whole modern period.

Among the striking merits of the work is that on the whole the limitation of war is recognized as a human problem which has little or nothing to do with the destructiveness of weapons. On page 268 Professor Nef well says: "Fighters, when they are sullen and hard and perverse enough can do each other in with the weapons nature gave them." To listen to the materialistic twaddle talked by too many worshippers of physical science, one would think that the mere possession of the atom bomb compels us to perpetrate massacres like those of Timur and Genghis Khan—exactly as if the possession of an axe compelled its possessor to cut down trees. Once in a while the text backslides into materialistic error, but it is much to have the clear and true statement just quoted.

Another point worthy of high praise is the recognition of the unity of history and the preeminence of religion in forming societies. On pages 16 to 19 there is an admirable summary of the interrelation between the inventions, sciences and arts of a period and its military, constitutional and religious developments. At the end we read:

The remedy is not . . . by rational means alone. . . . With weapons that would be safe only in the hands of God . . . the only hope . . . lies in redemption through Him.

Still another outstanding excellence is the concluding recognition that men of good will should not waste their time in chasing the will-o'-the-wisp of eliminating organized force from human affairs but should pursue the rational objective of limiting war as has been repeatedly done in the past. Amusingly enough, Crane Brinton in an otherwise intelligent review in the *New York Herald Tribune*, missed this point and wrote that the book asks: "How can warfare be controlled, limited, possibly even, before too long, eliminated?" What Professor Nef actually and wisely writes is: "Let us not hoodwink ourselves with notions of
perpetual peace and... the millennium. These only increase the danger of war, for they rest upon a misunderstanding of human nature... The result of such confusion will not be the gain of either earth or heaven. It will be the loss of both.” The reviewer, like the ranks of Tuscany in Macaulay’s “Horatius,” “can scarce forbear to cheer.”

A few points of detail need correction. The author accepts the strange belief of Delbrueck and Lot that Medieval statements of military numbers are all worthless—as if the men of the time which created the complexities of Gothic architecture and framed the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas could not count!

Further, the appreciative and just account of the strong points of eighteenth-century civilization contrasts with errors as to the battles of the time. Not only after the year 1740 but also before it one finds a number of general actions—for instance in Marlborough’s campaigns—in which percentages of loss as high if not higher than any recorded in military history were deliberately risked and endured. Malplaquet and the attack on the Schellenberg in the Blenheim campaign are examples.

Similarly, Lord Hay’s invitation to the French Guards at Fontenoy to fire first was by no means intended as courtesy. The capital principle of eighteenth-century infantry tactics was that of “reserving fire.” If your opponent delivered his volley at too great a range you won because you marched in on him while he was reloading his muzzle-loading muskets, and delivered your own volley at murderously close range. Lord Hay was deliberately taunting the French in the hope that they would “throw away” their fire.

Another statement which is at least questionable is that in the naval battle of Leyte much of the damage inflicted upon the Japanese was by torpedoes directed from “distant” submarines. Now the effective range of torpedoes has indeed been greatly increased since the first World War and is now about 4400 yards, say two-and-a-half miles. But inasmuch as the effective range of naval guns is so much greater—for even the five-inch guns of destroyers about eight miles, and for the larger pieces much more than that—it seems a little misleading to call the torpedo a “distant,” i. e. a long-range weapon.

These matters, however, hardly affect the value of this excellent book. Did space permit, one would gladly dwell on its treatment of a number of other matters. For example, the author is undoubtedly right in attributing many of the stupidities of our own revolutionary-democratic period to the disastrous denial of the element of evil in human nature. The “divine discontents” of those who will not endure peaceably the portion of unhappiness which must always afflict imperfect, i. e. sinful, man have indeed succeeded in making our planet unnecessarily resemble Hell. The shallow nineteenth-century optimism which believed that moral improvement must necessarily accompany material progress is admirably mirrored in a series of apt quotations. So is the exaggerated “mysticism of war,” the idea that inflicting and enduring violent death can redeem mankind even though the cause of the war may be unworthy or absurd.

The author vigorously drives home many neglected and necessary truths. And he does so with the help of a well-ordered mass of detailed information from which the reviewer—although no stranger to the general subject—has learned much.

WHEN GLAMOUR FAILS

The Loved and Envied, by Enid Bagnold. New York: Doubleday, $3.00

This novel—Enid Bagnold’s first in ten years—is not another “Serena Blandish.” It’s not even another “National Velvet.” It is a book purporting to give the low-down on glamour when one is threatened by the encroachments of old age.

The author has assembled a group of people (English, Scotch, French and American) in Paris and in certain large country houses near it. Most of these people have passed the half-century mark and several have lived a decade or two beyond it. They are a shallow lot; it is obvious they have had no equipment to meet life and its problems except money and the will to amuse themselves.

In that sybaritic, heartless era between the end of the first World War and the beginning of the second, their behavior was credible even if it didn’t make sense. Their cynical philosophy, their callous and frenetic pursuit of pleasure, might be interpreted as a gesture against a social upheaval which threatened their way of life. But that they could have weathered the second World War in sybaritic style is incredible. Granted they could so weather it—are they worth a book? Are they worth the shafts of satire, even?

Not that Miss Bagnold takes aim. One has the uncomfortable feeling that she takes these people seriously in spite of an occasional jab at their foibles. She even hints that their will to amuse themselves or die in the attempt has a certain gallantry.

They have one worry and only one: that approaching old age will diminish their power to charm and be charmed. There are four deaths in the book and they leave us unmoved because the people have never, in any real sense, been alive.

The principal character in the book is Ruby MacLean, a woman of 53, who still manages to be the only woman looked at when she is in the room. She has become accustomed at an early age to “the quick admirations which break out like brush fires in her wake” and it had been enough. We see her before her mirror still hard at work on the illusion. Ruby’s husband, Gynt, on the other hand, gets a bit worked up about himself as old age begins to take over. His one inner resource, if you can call it that, is the study of bird life. This, he decides,
The Morning Watch, by James Agee. *Boston: Houghton Mifflin. $2.25*

In 1941 James Agee published a book (Lionel Trilling's word for it—a "text"—is still the only one I can think of which is not wholly misrepresented) which was as recklessly, as compulsively, and yet as deliberately personal, as any in existence. It was called "Let Us Now Praise Famous Men." Its avowed subject was three Alabama tenant families. Its inadvertent subject—its subject in spite of itself, and in wilful spite at that—was the author's vertiginously self-conscious "I" in the pilgrim act of approaching these families (or insisting on the impossibility and outrage of approaching them).

The result was like a double exposure. In the background, the Ricketts, the Woods, the Gudgers, exhaustively, compassionately documented down to the last shoelace. In the foreground, Mr. Agee, in a reverent fury of refusal to "treat" them, to simplify, select, arrange, or otherwise submit their dignity to anything so falsifying, so betraying, so predatory, as a work of art. The very text, in a horror of presuming to the merest formality of layout, came at the reader in a melange of autobiography, exhortation, documentary, vignette, countermanding footnotes, intermission commentary, appendices, outlines, verse, etc., until the effect was like that of a film whose director, midway through the editing, has suddenly decided that a colossal injustice to his subject can be avoided only by gathering up everything on the cutting-room floor and running it all—hopelessly inadequate, yes, but at least thereby acknowledging its inadequacy—through the projector.

A risky and not original strategy; too much like that of the poem which wants to represent chaos by being itself chaotic. But sheer intensity of integrity brought it off. That, and some of the most resourceful and exacting use of language ever begotten upon the possibilities of English. The book also revealed—though in the midst of everything else, this may have been overlooked—that along with all his other gifts, Mr. Agee possessed that crucial one which makes for what we call a novelist: a sense not just of people, but of the in-calcullable texture of relationship which exists when they come together. I can't imagine, in all, a second book for which anyone interested in American literature ought to have waited more impatiently than Mr. Agee's.

Impatiently is the word, for it has taken ten years to appear. And even now, although there is nothing on the copyright page or blurb to indicate it, and although I am privy to no inside information, I wonder if these thirty thousand words may not be part, a wholly self-sufficient part, of course, of the author's portrait of—not necessarily the artist, but the abrasively self-conscious sensibility usually identified with the artist as a young man. This time, however, there is no lyrical, usurping "I" in the foreground. Mr. Agee has constrained himself to do merely an artist's job, and his subject, instead of being declaimed, is dramatized.

The action of "The Morning Watch" is modest. Richard, a twelve-year-old boy resident in a Catholic school in Tennessee, gets up before dawn on Good Friday, goes down to chapel for prayers, and there, in the long central section of the story, wrestles with the most harrowing of human acts: the unself-conscious address of a very self-conscious will. Readers who may think that such a subject could only be dramatized by a Dostoievski will find that Mr. Agee's insight and art are altogether its equals. At the climax of his agony, Richard prays for unawareness:

> O God, he prayed, be merciful unto me, a sinner. Let me not feel good when I am good. If I am good. Let me just try to be good, don't let me feel good. Don't let me even know if I'm good.

But such oblivion can not be his. A moment or two of at-oneness may prevail, but then, in the next,

> aware that he had whispered aloud, [he] opened his eyes in the fear that he had been noticed.

Only "the blessed will not care what angle they are regarded from"; and Richard, like most of us, for better or worse, is not that.

But I am already suggesting a restrictive "meaning." Nothing could be unwarier. It is the preeminent beauty of "The Morning Watch" that it evokes the same sense of inexplicitness that our own experience does. When, after leaving the chapel, Richard sneaks down to the quarry for an illicit swim, finds an empty locust shell, and later kills a snake freshly emerged from its old skin, there is no sense of things obediently happening to develop a particular meaning. Mr. Agee's art is of the quality Louis MacNeice had in mind when he said of Malory that "it is a virtue in a novelist that his point be able to be missed." If "The Morning Watch" must be said to be about anything, then one can only say it is about happening, opening, becoming, wondering. Does this make it sound amorphous, like something by Thomas Wolfe? It isn't, believe me. It is like a sequence from a film of Chaplin. It has been in the crucible. It is a work of art.

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