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An Editorial

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A WORD ABOUT OUR CONTRIBUTORS

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Forthcoming

The Freeman's special issue on education, our next number, will include articles on various aspects of the subject. Not only parents and teachers but the average citizen and taxpayer will find in it new and useful material on current trends in American schools and universities.

Index to Volume 1

A comprehensive index to Volume I of the Freeman (October 2, 1950 — September 24, 1951) may be had for one dollar. As a public service, the index will be supplied without charge to public and school libraries on request.
THE FORTNIGHT

Suppose that tomorrow, or even before these words appear in print, it were triumphantly announced that a cease-fire had been agreed upon in Korea. Just how much would we have gained by it? There would be, of course, a temporary silence on the battlefront and a temporary halt in casualties. But how much nearer would we be to a real and permanent settlement? President Truman is himself authority for the statement that an agreement with the Communists is not worth the paper it is written on, yet at his orders our negotiators have been trying desperately to get such an agreement.

Mr. Truman's judgment regarding the worthlessness of such agreements is amply supported by our experience with previous agreements with Russia, from Lend-Lease to Potsdam, as well as by Lenin's advice "to make compromises, to 'tack', to make agreements, zigzags." Certainly our troops would have to remain in Korea, in a constant state of alert, for months and perhaps years. The Chinese and North Korean Communists would continue their build-up for a new attack, with increased Russian equipment. Meanwhile they would be able to divert more forces to cleaning up anti-Communist guerillas on the Chinese mainland, to aiding the Communists in Indo-China, or perhaps to an attack on Formosa. The cease-fire would doubtless be followed by political negotiation; and most of us would wait uneasily again to see whether the State Department was going to recognize the Chinese Communists or give away Formosa. Meanwhile, Korea would still be divided into two countries, north and south. The only real difference, as compared with the situation prior to June 25, 1950, is that South Korea would have been laid waste, and that UN forces, consisting overwhelmingly of Americans, would have suffered 100,000 casualties.

But suppose there is no truce? Suppose it turns out that the Communists have merely used the previous time gained by the truce negotiations to build up their forces for a new gigantic assault?

How will the Administration be able to justify then the four months that have been spent in wrangling, the more than thirty fruitless meetings, each of which has been used by the Communists, not to arrive at a quick cease-fire (which could have been arranged, if they were sincere, in a single day at a single meeting), but for a propaganda barrage, and ever-new trumped-up charges against us? How did we get into this, anyway? All that was necessary for our commanders to do was to broadcast an announcement that the Chinese Communists could have a cease-fire at any time they wanted on the following terms: 1. The Korean dividing line would in no case be south of defensible lines of battle at the time of the truce. 2. Guarantees for observance would have to be given... and so on. With such a statement, we would have been at least as far ahead as we are at the moment this is written, without the danger of let-down in the morale of our troops, the alternate raising and dashing of hopes, and the opportunities we have created for Communist propaganda. Why didn't we make such a simple public declaration of our minimum truce terms at the very beginning? Did the State Department fear to let the American public know what our minimum terms were? Or didn't it even know itself?

The Conservative victory in Britain, which was achieved by a narrow margin and a minority vote, should neither be overestimated nor underestimated. Following in the wake of anti-Socialist victories in Australia and New Zealand, it proves that the British Empire will not go over to total collectivism without a fierce struggle. Unfortunately the new Churchill government comes in with no particular mandate to cut back the amount of Statism which Britain already has. Steel will be denationalized, yes. But the doctrine of centralized planning will hardly be dented unless the whole mania for "control" is abated.

The really sobering thing about the election is that it underscores a point frequently made, that Britain is split almost exactly down the middle on questions of ultimate social philosophy. The Brit-
ish have a technique of forebearance, an ingrained habit of practicing good will. Nevertheless, a long-continuing fifty-fifty division on strict class lines is bound to produce some fairly ugly politics. If Churchill can win some glittering victories in the realm of foreign affairs, it might serve to mitigate domestic bitterness. But the ghost of socialism in Britain has certainly not been laid.

How has a Republican newspaper to conduct itself before the Party's Presidential candidate is officially nominated? This problem of political and journalistic etiquette, by no means new but always fascinating, has just been made acute by the New York Herald Tribune which—as was its perfect right and, in fact, its duty—has declared its preference for General Eisenhower. But suppose (and this wouldn't happen for the first time) the Republican Party resisted the editorial charm of Mrs. Ogden Reid and nominated such a tangential Republican as Bob Taft? In that case, this wanton and frighteningly irresponsible editorial indictment recently advanced by the allegedly Republican Herald Tribune, will be thrown into Mr. Taft's teeth throughout his entire campaign: "The spirit that creates in men the love of freedom, and imparts to institutions a vital being, eludes him [Taft] completely." Consequently, if Mr. Taft is the Republican candidate, the Herald Tribune will of course have to campaign for Truman. Granted that this would give Mr. Taft a considerable tactical advantage. On the other hand, some old-fashioned folks, when they discover that her lifelong Republicanism was not enough to teach Mrs. Reid elementary political manners, might in despair vote for Father Divine.

We learn from Variety of September 19 that "In a bit of surprise casting, the National Association of Manufacturers employed comic Henry Morgan on Sunday, [September] 16" to be master of ceremonies at a Constitution Day Americanism rally in Elmira, New York. Morgan's listing in "Red Channels," according to Variety, "has kept him off the air in recent months, with sponsors and networks fearing to touch anyone tinged by the book." But the choice of Henry Morgan was not the only surprise:

Evidence of the new thinking [in the NAM] was a nix on the idea of having Ginger Rogers attend the Elmira celebration. [Leonard] Smith was seeking glamour for the show and knew Miss Rogers was in the cast for a play, but turned down the idea of inviting her because of her association with ultra-right-wing groups on the Coast. NAM's aim is to play it down the middle.

So, we gather, if anyone has been so unfortunate as to fight Communist infiltration in Hollywood she is too right-wing for the NAM, which wants to keep itself respectable by hiring people who have been associated with left-wing groups. Does Variety have the facts right? Let's hear a little more about this.

Joseph Alsop and William Henry Chamberlin have been carrying on a running debate about Yalta in the pages of the socialist New Leader. Over and over again Mr. Alsop has chanted his refrain: "Yalta would have been a pretty good deal if it had only been kept." Over and over again William Henry Chamberlin has answered: "Why should anyone have expected a revolutionary murderer and bank robber to keep a deal?" Just where does this sort of debate leave us? Well, it used to be said in Mr. Alsop's Yankee home state of Connecticut that the proof of the pudding is in the eating. The revolutionary murderer and bank robber didn't keep the deal. That is the answer of history, and we have to go on from there.

But why must we go on with the same cast of characters that guessed wrong about the bank robber's word? In ordinary life the man who gives you a bum steer is distrusted until he has admitted his mistake and gone back to school to learn something. Mr. Alsop naturally has a vested interest in his pipelines, for they provide him with good newsy columns. But why should Mr. Alsop care about losing a pipeline or two? He's an aggressive reporter and could always get another. Dean Acheson isn't the only answer to a journalist's prayer.

We regret that William Brownrigg, of Penrith, Scotland, was defeated in the recent British parliamentary election. His platform was the lowering of the school departure age from fifteen to twelve. Had Britain given Mr. Brownrigg's idea a fair try, there would have been, not necessarily more lamb chops, but certainly fewer Oxford graduates to think up those regimenting orders.

Our contributor Forrest Davis concludes his two-part article on General Marshall (p. 112) with a suggestion which we heartily endorse. He proposes that the McCarran subcommittee on internal security invite the General "to relate his part in the events of May 29 [1945] et seq. bearing on the peace with Japan." We think that the postponement of peace, with its disastrous consequences, is a legitimate subject for the subcommittee's attention. We also think, after reading Marshall's testimony at the hearings on MacArthur's recall, that unless the members of the subcommittee could forget the prevailing senatorial estimate of the General as "someone close to God," little would come of the inquiry beyond a mountainous record of evasive verbiage. Unless the subcommittee really got tough, trying to elicit a clear account of his part in those fateful negotiations would be like setting forth in wet rubber gloves to catch an eel.

Missing on October 24 at the celebration in New York of United Nations Day, was the architect of the UN and Secretary General of its San Francisco Conference on Organization, Alger Hiss.
But Is It Churchill?

If Britain's new Prime Minister is the real Churchill, and not merely a faded facsimile used for a cover, the President of the United States would have a superb chance to evolve an effective American policy if the United States had a President. The area between these two awkward ifs is sown with booby traps.

Offhand, it would be rather difficult to think of a man less likely to serve as a front than Winston Churchill. And yet the flabby campaign he fought, even more than his advanced age, makes it quite conceivable that the Young Turks of his party could have succeeded in domesticate their magnificently lion for a silly act of "Me-Tooism." The old master's strangely inept response to Labor's rascally "peace offensive"—his promise of an immediate conference with Stalin—is an ominous case in point.

To meet one's ruthless antagonist in conference, without having first arrived at a plan for decisive action, plus superior tools for executing it, is of course suicidal; and no one knows this better than the successor to Neville Chamberlain and author of "The Second World War." Nor is this un-Churchillian catering to popular stupidity the only symptom of flabbiness. Mr. Churchill, like many a landed aristocrat, harbors an impatient contempt for economics. And some of the Young Turks who have formed dizzy notions of a housebroken "conservative socialism," seem to be cleverly playing on his constitutional indifference to economic policies. The result is what could be called the "economic neutralism" of certain non-Socialists—a disturbing tendency to consider socialization an inexorable law of history.

Winston Churchill, however, is quite a law unto himself, and the clever young men in his entourage may yet feel the inexorable momentum of that law. At any rate, it is at least possible that Churchill has returned to power not only figuratively, and that his extraordinary instinct for right judgments is unimpaired. What a break this could be for the entire free world can be measured by the prospect which a truly Churchillian government in Britain would open for the implementation of a truly American foreign policy.

What is it, indeed, that has partly aborted and partly maimed America's potentially immense contribution to the emergence of a free and prosperous world? Fundamentally, it is national socialism—sometimes defiantly capitalized as "National Socialism," sometimes cleverly mishabled as "humanitarian reform," sometimes virulent abroad, sometimes creeping throughout our own government; but always eating away the world's substance of health and wealth. The modern heresy of national socialism has disrupted not only the indispensable economic unity of the world, but also the flow of American political stimuli. And no national socialism has been more pernicious than the respectable British brand.

Given the suffocating mortgages of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam (given, in other words, the unnecessary emergence of a gigantic Soviet Empire), the one relevant objective for an American foreign policy was to instigate strength, economic and military, in all anti-Soviet nations, and to rally them in a firm coalition. True, this objective has been partly ignored and partly betrayed by a partly ignorant and partly infiltrated Truman Administration. Yet even if nothing but patriotic wisdom had ruled in Washington since 1945, Britain's national socialism would have stymied America.

Specifically, the American stimulus, to be effective at all, required a genuine unification of western Europe. Unless it grows into a free area of complementary trade, western Europe can grow neither economically strong nor militarily defensible. But it remains one of the profound paradoxes of life that nothing prevents economic unification so surely as to plan it from the top: Rather than facilitate a subsequent cooperation of "organized" national communities, every "planned" national economy erects one more barrier. And of the blocks on the road to the coalescence of Europe, none was more forbidding than the national socialism of the British Labor government.

One merely had to see the arrogant Mr. Hugh Dalton swing his weight at a Strasbourg meeting of the European Assembly to be cured, once and for all, of the hope that the internationalist jargon of traditional socialism might somewhat mitigate its national egotism. Year after year the British delegation to the European Assembly grew more cynical, more recklessly determined to obstruct a Continental integration which, quite inescapably, would by its own success negate the viability of an isolated British national socialism. No government in recent European history has been a more obstreperous saboteur of Continental economic cooperation than Mr. Attlee's.

True, what is euphemistically called Mr. Marshall's Plan was from the beginning a mixture of fatuous "generosity" and an amateur's characteristic blindness to facts. Had it been confined to governments which genuinely favored free economic cooperation (i.e., to non-socialist governments), ECA could have advanced the organic integration of Europe in spite of Labor's obstructionism. But only tendentially. Continental integration just can not be decisively achieved without both eastern Europe and Britain.

And British national socialism sabotaged the alliance of free peoples not only in Europe. Wholly
dedicated to squaring its socialist circle, Mr. Attlee's government approached every world problem with the peculiar provincialism and crude egotism of national socialists. Anything that, for the moment, seemed to cover a hole in the cracking “plan” was considered permissible—trade with the Soviet bloc, recognition of Mao’s gang rule over China, exploitation of the growing American need for Malayan rubber—anything at all to postpone the admission of bankruptcy. In fact, one can sympathize with Mr. Acheson who, it will be recalled, refuses to turn his back on friends: British national socialism would be the only presentableabley in his monolithic record of failure—and he can not present it!

In short, Britain—America's most important partner in the great anti-Soviet alliance—was for six crucial years ruled by a group of men who, in their heart of hearts, thought of communism not as the implacable enemy but as the prodigal son of the free world, and suffered from a paralyzing nostalgia for the golden years of “Popular Front” follies.

Winston Churchill's return to power—if it is indeed Churchill's return, and not the ascendency of Young Turks to whom the language of freedom is Greek—could be a chance to get that mixed policy cart of ours out of the rut. His commitment to European integration and an honest alliance with America is more than political; it is the man himself. Though he might sometimes have to play his hand cagily, to neutralize the still tremendous power of British labor, he might be counted upon to keep his word—if it were not for the two remaining nests of clandestine but nonetheless potent obstructionists.

One is the confused cabal in Churchill's own party—a group vaguely corresponding to our “liberal Republicans” (here as there, a hidden life insurance for hidden socialism). The other nest, of course, is right in the American Department of State. Disconsolate as Mr. Acheson et al. may be over the recession of their Wave of the Future, British crest, they will recover in no time. Our State Department is the one Fabian constituency no conspiracies have thought about whether it is the man himself. Though he might sometimes have to play his hand cagily, to neutralize the still tremendous power of British labor, he might be counted upon to keep his word—if it were not for the two remaining nests of clandestine but nonetheless potent obstructionists.

To expect Mr. Truman to act like a President of the United States, rather than the single-track dispenser of brazen patronage he is, would be unpardonably naive. And so, we are afraid, the Fabian ghosts Churchill has just laid in Downing Street will continue to haunt the State Department; and the perilous lag between American and British policies will continue, though now in reverse. The momentous potentials of the fact that Britain may have acquired an authentic Prime Minister will be nullified by the even more momentous fact that the United States, at least until 1953, is without a President.

The Tense Middle East

The nineteenth century had its no doubt somewhat high-handed way of solving the problems that came up in “colonial” areas. The *de haut en bas* method was called “imperialism.” “Imperialism” meant that when the citizens of a big sovereign power had investments within the borders of a weaker power, the big power undertook to protect the contractual rights of its own nationals. This resulted in proceedings that frequently violated the *amour propre* of local politicians, who may or may not have spoken for their peoples. But the system, for all its crudeness, had one great benefit: production was seldom halted. And because of the prospect of continuous and profitable production, more and more people were willing to risk their hard-earned money overseas. The world, even including the “backward” areas, benefited and prospered.

Today only the most intransigent Colonel Blimp is willing to do “imperialism” any public honor. “Imperialism” is considered totally unethical. That is why the British have not dared to protect their contractual rights in Iran by sending a cruiser or two and a couple of divisions to guard the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company properties and to keep them producing. But the world still needs systematic production, and this includes the most violently nationalist Iranians as well as British investors in oil. If the old system of guaranteeing contractual rights is no longer viable, then a new system must be devised.

Many people thought such a system had been created when such things as the UN and a World Court were brought into being. But if the crises now rending the Middle East from Iran to Egypt prove anything, it is that the UN system of holding the world together is impotent. Nobody dares to put the UN to any significant test, and nobody seems to honor any system of law transcending the various separate national systems.

Meanwhile the world waits to see whether it is going to be cut in two at Suez. Egypt claims sovereign rights in this area, and insists that these rights have been violated. The British claim contractual rights under a treaty. Both Egypt and Britain have a case. But who is to balance the cases against each other?

British troops, as both the British Information Services and our State Department have made clear, are in the Suez by right of treaty. The Egyptians argue that the 1936 treaty agreeing to the stationing of troops in the Canal Zone was made under duress. Egypt claims further that Britain, in return for occupying the Canal Zone, was to have trained and equipped an Egyptian Army. This agreement, so the Egyptians say, has been only partially fulfilled. Britain’s forces in the Suez were to be limited to 10,400 men. The Egyptians insist that the total British garrisons in the Suez and in the Sudan are closer to 100,000 than to 10,400.
If there were no passions involved, it would be an easy matter for Englishmen and Egyptians to balance claim against counter-claim and settle the business. But with nationalist spirit running high in the Middle East, the Egyptians, goaded by the apparent success of the Iranians, are determined that Britain’s troops must go. The whole Moslem world of 300,000,000 people is tensely watching developments.

Since there is little chance of a compromise being worked out between Britishers and Egyptians, the situation calls for an honest broker. In default of action by the UN, the United States of America could offer its services here. Unfortunately our State Department has endorsed Britain’s stand, which causes us to inherit all the antipathies which nationalistic Moslems hold against Britain.

Is it too late for the United States to serve as a mediating influence in the Middle East? Since Egypt is eager for Western arms, which would have to come from American production lines, we have some latent power to affect the situation in the Suez. With a new party in office in Britain, there is a chance to begin all over again in an attempt to settle the Middle Eastern crisis. Egypt has asserted its eagerness to join the West in a defensive alliance against Communist expansion, provided that it gets status as an equal. Since the concept of equal status does not necessarily mean that treaty rights and obligations as between Britain and Egypt should be unilaterally denounced, there is real opportunity at the moment for statecraft. The prerequisite is that Washington should know what it wants and take the lead.

The Escalator Idea

The Escalator method, which is nothing more than an automatic plan for making everything in an inflation go up with everything else, is much older than the now famous General Motors formula. That formula, it will be remembered, ties wages to the cost of living so that when living costs rise, wages also rise in some specified proportion. The only novelty in the GM formula is the so-called improvement factor by which employees automatically receive an annual raise of four cents an hour to enable them to share in the gains from technological progress, if there are any or if there are not.

There is nothing new in this way of adjusting wages to prices. Far back in both American and English economic history wages in a number of industries moved up and down, not with the cost of living, but with the prices of the commodities those industries produced; and the procedure was aptly described as the “sliding scale.” In time and for a variety of reasons this means of wage-fixing was discarded, to be revived in periods of rapidly rising and, to a lesser degree, rapidly falling prices. This is what happened during World War I and again in the short period of deflation which followed that war.

The contemporary use of such devices is much different. For one thing escalation has been elevated to the position of a principle. It has become the means of making inflation viable. In these terms the escalator method is to be applied not alone to wages but to all prices and incomes, and performs, accordingly, the function of making it possible for everyone to live happily and forever under a full-fledged and progressive inflation. This is what Professor Sumner Slichter has in mind when he proposes that the face value of a government savings bond should rise with the increase in prices. The anonymous author of the fantastic series of three articles published recently by the Economist of London goes Mr. Slichter one better, dives off the deep end and advises the escalation of everything expressed in terms of money, thus launching an experiment in money-printing certain to appeal to the departed spirit of John Law.

Another difference is that some of the beneficiaries of the escalator begin after a while to be dissatisfied with it. They think they ought to do better by invoking some other principle, or a number of them. This is today the state of mind of Mr. Philip Murray, president of the CIO United Steel Workers, a union with more than a million members and a creation of the late Wagner Act. Mr. Murray has for several months been paving the way for wage demands on the steel industry. He has let it be known that, cost of living or no cost of living, his members need, want and expect to get a substantial wage increase. In response to a statement by Mr. Eugene G. Grace, chairman of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, that there was no justification for a steel wage increase, Mr. Murray said that he would be “remiss in the performance of [his] duties” if he failed to refer to the fact that “the steel industry is not a progressive-minded industry. It is an industry that believes more in the big ingot than it does in the big pay envelope.”

Whatever these words mean, they forecast a determined effort by a powerful labor organization to establish, for the time being at least, a new principle of wage determination calculated to do more for the steel workers than the cost of living principle. That is certainly what the figures suggest. According to the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, steel workers earned $66.63 a week in June 1950 and $80.14 in June 1951. By the hour they earned $1.67 in the first and $1.93 in the last of these two months. Obviously it will require a good deal of ingenuity to argue with and around these figures.

The issue is further complicated by the existence of Federal wage regulation and wage ceilings, above which wages are not supposed to go. These controls and ceilings would not matter much were it not for the fact that labor unions are such inveterate advocates of regulation. They are always demanding more and stiffer control. At the same time they are constantly engaged in devising the
means of evading the regulations and piercing the ceilings.

To support their position the unions have invented a battery of reasons and rationalizations. They set out to prove that wage increases can be paid out of excessive margins of profits. They claim that they are not sharing in the increasing productivity of industry. They complain that the official measure of living costs understates the real rise in prices. For some time they have contended that tax rates should be included in the cost-of-living index on the theory, or in the hope, that their inclusion will push the index up faster and further.

These are the politics of the escalator principle. A strongly organized group, like the labor movement, intends to profit from inflation but knows it can not do so if everybody else attempts to profit at the same time and in the same degree. Hence it demands freedom of action in the setting of wages, or the price of labor, and severe control over all other prices. It knows that when a vast program of munitions production creates a shortage of civilian goods and a plethora of income, the only way to deal with the situation is to keep incomes from rising too fast and to keep a tight rein on the use of existing income. It also knows that the root of the trouble is a fabulous government budget. But it is unwilling to use its political influence to restrain the extravagances of Washington. As long as this is so, no principle of wage determination will work for any great length of time and wages and prices will chase each other as they always do when a central government deliberately violates all of the tested principles of correct fiscal policy.

In Defense of Virtue

There comes a moment in every journalist’s life when an irresistible inner voice calls him to the rescue of innocence beleaguered. We heard the call in the case of Frank McKinney—but alas! events outran us.

With the labor market getting tighter every day, the Democrats seemed unable to hire a chairman for their National Committee. The job pays all right, but security, social and otherwise, is inadequate. So the retiring paragon, Mr. Boyle, got panicky. The excellent name he had made for himself in the job naturally qualified him to select his successor, but for weeks he found no takers. In his disgust, it seems, he simply grabbed the Telephone Directory of Indianapolis and just happened to pin-prick one Frank McKinney who, until proved guilty, must be considered innocent.

McKinney was just minding his own business—which was to secure a government priority for more than 100,000 tons of scarce steel for his United States Pipeline Company—when Mr. Boyle’s call came through. You could have blown McKinney over with a subpoena. What would people think? What, in particular, would Frank McHale think?

Frank McHale, longtime Democratic National Committeeman from Indiana and McKinney’s political foster-father, is tremendously touchy when it comes to even the faintest suspicion of mixing political influence with private profits. Well does he know that no creature under the sun is more easily misunderstood than a Democratic National Committeeman trying to be kind to a private business firm, for a small consideration. Some years ago he had fixed a few sensitive matters for the Empire Ordnance Company (for 5 per cent of the company’s common stock)—and how should an innocent Hoosier have known that there was a war on and that Empire Ordnance was clipping the Army? But everybody’s nerves then were on edge, even F.D.R.’s, and the boy from the sticks was advised to leave turbulent Washington for the quiet of Indiana.

And now McKinney—his pal, his pride, his protégé! Could fate be really so mean as to strike one little clan twice in seven years? Should McKinney’s United States Pipeline Company now be rudely suspected of laying one straight into the United States Government? No, McKinney must not be shanghaied into Washington bondage! This was the time for all good men to come to the aid of Hoosier virtue.

Although, in spite of Mr. McHale’s delicate scruples Mr. McKinney was shanghaied, we have some modest suggestions to offer in case—well, just in case.

A way must be found, we submit, to abolish the cruel system of destroying innocent country boys by drafting them for the Democratic National Committee. The nation can no longer afford the constant debasement of virtue. And so we would like to propose three possible remedies.

One, the Democratic Party might pick its next chairman from among certified wards of bankruptcy courts who are legally incapable, and therefore beyond the suspicion, of handling checks, cash, or steel priorities.

Two, the Democratic Party might pick Senator Wayne Morse to head its National Committee. He considers his Republican Party affiliation irrelevant and immaterial anyway, and votes pretty much the straight Truman ticket in the Senate. Surely Democrats could no longer be blamed for their National Committee’s peddling political favors if a Republican were at its helm.

Three, the chairmanship of the Democratic National Committee could be auctioned off to the highest bidder, or even better, made the second prize in a national lottery—the first prize, of course, being the St. Louis receivership of internal revenue.

So far as we and all other upright defenders of virtue are concerned, it does not really matter which suggestion the Democrats may follow when the time comes. What alone matters is that an end be put to the debasement of bucolic innocence.
Spain, the Indispensable Ally

By HOFFMAN NICKERSON

Many people who welcomed alliance with Communist Russia on purely military grounds now oppose an alliance with Fascist Spain on political or religious grounds. Major Nickerson maintains that a Spanish alliance is as vital to the free nations today as was alliance with Soviet Russia in 1941.

IN ALLYING itself with Spain the United States would exchange a militarily hopeless position on the continent of Europe for a very strong one. At the bottom that is all there is to it. With the help of comparatively few American troops the chances of a successful Soviet invasion of the Peninsula would be extremely small. Moreover, the country is large enough to serve as a base from which counter-attacks could be launched when circumstances permitted. Finally, a strong Spain would give us a secure entrance into the Mediterranean, the great inland sea which bounds all southern Europe and nearly all northern Africa, and is an ideal theater for sea and air power.

If our present policy of stationing American troops in Continental Europe can make sense at all — and that is a big “if” — it can do so only if centered on Spain. As it stands it is only a sham, an invitation to military disaster and an attempt to justify government spending in order to keep Truman and Acheson in power.

It is a sham because we and our Allies under the North Atlantic Treaty do not now have and are not even planning to raise armies and air forces powerful enough to hold any appreciable parts of western Europe north of the Pyrenees against a determined Soviet attack. Only a delaying action could be fought behind the Rhine which is the only serious military obstacle now available to us. As soon as the Rhine was forced we could hold only peninsulas like Denmark and Brittany and perhaps a redoubt in the French Alps. Since these areas are too small to be militarily important, the real problem would then be to hold the Pyrenees and behind them to organize Spain and Portugal as our Continental European base. Obviously this could be done more easily before than after the shooting has started.

These elementary facts of military life have been somewhat blurred in the public mind by the organized lying known as propaganda. The trick has been to talk about how nice it would be if we could hold the Rhine and even the Ruhr — although for a considerable time we shall not have a dog’s chance of doing so.

Nevertheless, anyone who habitually reads the headlines in a first-class newspaper knows that our High Command — “the Pentagon,” if you prefer — has long been pressing for a military understanding with Spain. If the present heads of our Defense Department thought that we had even a moderate chance of success in western Europe without Spain, then they certainly would not oppose the strong anti-Spanish feeling of the present British and French governments and of our own State Department. After all, the Chiefs of our Armed Services have not recently been conspicuous for resisting political pressure. That they have stood up in the Spanish case is good evidence that the strategic weakness of our European position without a Spanish alliance is too alarming to be overlooked. Probably it would be hard to find a group of educated, professional fighting men anywhere who, if speaking frankly and in private, would not agree.

Indeed it is an open secret that some of our most intelligent high-ranking officers privately agree with ex-President Hoover that we should plan only for hemispheric defense and wait for the Red Empire to blow up from internal strains which would increase if that Empire attempted further territorial expansion. This, however, is by the way.

Our Weakness in Europe

Space permits only very brief analysis of the military weakness in our present European position. An obvious point is that of numbers. Britain’s former Defense Minister Shinwell said at Ottawa recently that the USSR has 215 divisions of which at least 70 are “deployed against the West, and the Russian forces are growing in power and numbers.” The Red Army is particularly strong in armored divisions. There are also about 60 satellite divisions. By contrast the much publicized Eisenhower Army exists chiefly on paper. Hanson Baldwin, the distinguished military editor of the New York Times, recently wrote that if all the present North Atlantic Treaty powers except Greece and Turkey fulfil their entire military programs by the end of 1951, there may be six American and the equivalent of seventeen West European divisions available for the vital sector between the Alps and the North Sea. Since that sector is about 400 miles wide, if we assume a full divisional strength of 15,000 each and if we calculate defensive density in an old-fashioned way, there would be less than one man for every two yards of front, including reserves. Including non-divisional combat troops, there would certainly be not much more than one man for every two yards. In 1914 such a front would have been as thin as tissue paper, and everyone knows that the multiplication of planes, tanks
and other present-day military instruments have greatly strengthened offense as compared with defense. Moreover, some Western units might well be cut off and militarily destroyed before they could cross the Rhine.

The French hope to have five more divisions by the end of '52. In 1940 they had more than a hundred. In the matter of tactical aviation, all military authorities seem to agree that in tactical planes we would be heavily outnumbered.

That so-called "strategic," i.e. long-range, bombing could prevent a westward advance by the Red Army has rarely been maintained since Korea. Moreover the German generals who fought on the Eastern Front during World War II all say that attacks against the communications of Russian forces were not as effective as they would have been against Western armies because Russian soldiers are accustomed to hard conditions and habitually lived off the country.

By destroying the bridges over the Rhine and destroying or seizing as many of the local river craft as we could, we might gain a breathing spell. It is worth remembering, however, that throughout military history river lines have almost never been long and successfully held against determined opponents who approached on a broad front. This was true on and over again in World War II. The Volga at Stalingrad is no exception, for the Germans reached it only at the tip of a deep and narrow salient.

The critical stage is seldom the original crossing; advanced elements almost always get across. Then follows a "race of reinforcement," with the defender trying to wipe out the attacker's footholds and the attacker trying first to hold them and then to break out into the open. Air power and large airborne forces like those of the Soviets increase the chances of the offensive. During World War II even without airborne operations the Red Army scored a series of striking successes in crossing rivers. Lieut.-General Sir G. Le Q. Martel, who was the chief of the British military mission to the USSR in 1943, says in his book "Our Armored Forces" that the Soviet military engineers were extremely skilful in organizing river crossings, building a number of bridges across the Donleiper at points where that river is 1500 feet wide in an average of only four days per bridge. Some of their bridges carried tanks.

Spain Is Defensible

All told, therefore, Eisenhower's staff can hardly be planning for more than a brief stand behind the Rhine. There is no other continuous natural obstacle between the Rhine and the Pyrenees.

On the other hand, the Pyrenees are exceptionally formidable. Considerable mountain ranges are serious military obstacles because the wheeled vehicles essential to large-scale military transport can cross them only on prepared roads, caterpillar-tracked vehicles are often almost as much restricted, and even small parties of athletic and lightly burdened men on foot can cross only at comparatively few additional points. Also the few roads across a big range run for miles through thinly inhabited country where shelter and appreciable reserves of food do not exist, whereas in civilized countries great river valleys have dense populations, developed road systems and abundant food and shelter.

The Pyrenees are almost ideally suitable for a modern defense in that the coastal strips at either end of the range are extremely narrow, and four out of the five roads which cross the mountains themselves do so close enough either to the Bay of Biscay or the Mediterranean to permit not only land planes but also carrier planes easily to join in defending them. Flying eastward from the Bay, the pass of Roncavalles is only 35 air miles from tidewater, the Somport 74 and the Portalet seventy-nine. For 54 air miles westward from the Mediterranean coastal shelf there is no road until you are over the Cerdagne, the one pass over the chain with any breadth to it. Over the 133 miles between the Portalet and the Cerdagne, the only road follows the difficult Bonaigua pass.

Even if the Red invaders could force the Pyrenees, more than a thousand air miles from the Russian border, they would find their geographical difficulties only beginning, for the peninsula is crossed from sea to sea by a succession of transverse ranges.

Also, we saw at the beginning of this article that Spain commands the western entrance to the Mediterranean which with its islands is an ideal theater for sea and air power. Along that inland sea we have access to Greece, Turkey and the oil deposits of the Near East. From its eastern end our planes can threaten the Soviets' vulnerable southern flank, i.e. the Caucasus and the Caspian oil region up the Volga. The Mediterranean is also a barrier against land invasion of North Africa.

Without a strong Spain astride the Straits of Gibraltar our organized bases in the western and southeastern Mediterranean area must be confined to Africa where we would suffer various disadvantages. East and west ground communications there are difficult north of the Sahara and non-existent elsewhere. The North African Moslems, like their co-religionists in other regions, have been deeply offended by our policy toward Israel. Also, as General Fellers recently noted in the Freeman, we would be politically whipsawed by the necessity for taking sides between their nationalist movement and the imperialism of France and Britain.

Turning now to the human factors of Spain, the average Spaniard is conspicuously tough and brave. Although the Spanish armed forces lack much of the expensive military equipment which only the richest nations can afford on any scale, their senior officers are veterans of the long and ferocious Civil War which ended only a few months before World War II began. As a result of that Civil War the Spanish government is probably more anti-Communist than any other in the world. The local Commu-
nist Party is outlawed and exists only underground in hunted fragments. We may contrast France and Italy where Communists are a large and powerful minority, so that extensive sabotage is to be feared.

Even if geography and lack of military numbers did not make a ground defense of European France against a serious attack impossible, it would still be absurd to base our European policy on a country where both expert and general public opinion does not believe in the urgency of preparedness. Even those who, like the present writer, have always believed in the future resurrection of France must face the fact that not only the average Frenchman but also the French Military Intelligence Service firmly believes that the Soviets will not attack westward. If the French are correct, then our whole policy needs revision.

In Spain the political atmosphere is wholly different. General Franco and his government, having seen communism in action on their own soil, fully appreciate its menace. During World War II Count Jordana, then Spanish Foreign Minister, repeatedly warned the Western governments of what they might expect from Moscow, and time has proved him all too true a prophet.

The Arguments of Prejudice

To refute the usual arguments against a Spanish-American alliance it is hardly necessary to do more than state them. When it is said that Franco's officials are corrupt, we should remember that our State Department Pinks said the same thing about our friend Chiang Kai-shek—for the benefit of the Chinese Reds now killing our men in Korea. If the charge against Spanish officialdom be true—and on this sinful earth a certain amount of corruption exists everywhere—then that is only an argument for adequate American supervision of what is done with whatever dollars and materials we may send.

Since most of those who complain that Franco is a dictator approve of our supporting Tito, who is not only a dictator but a Communist dictator, it is enough to quote, as W. H. Chamberlin recently did in Human Events, Our Lord's own words: “Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites who strain at a gnat and swallow a camel.”

The real reasons why from 1945 until recently the Spanish government was practically boycotted throughout the West have one thing in common: none of them has anything to do with either military or anti-Communist considerations. At bottom all are due to political or religious prejudices. Spain has been and is politically Roman Catholic, and in accordance with the inflexible Spanish pride and with the absolute character of Spanish thought her governments have been Roman Catholic in a rigid and uncompromising way. To many English-speaking Protestants the legal disabilities still imposed upon the negligible handful of Spanish Protestants are provocative. These disabilities strengthen the inherited Anglo-American habit of thinking about Spain in terms of the Inquisition and the Armada of 1588—neither of which is a really live political issue. During the Spanish War English Socialists of the Labor Party strongly sympathized with the anti-Nationalist side, and an appreciable number fought on that side. Attlee himself went to Spain and is said to have been photographed giving the clenched-fist Communist salute which was customary throughout the anti-Nationalist army.

For centuries France and Spain were unsympathetic rivals, and throughout the unhappy Third French Republic their traditional antagonism was exasperated because most French politicians were so anti-clerical that they made it their chief business to abuse the traditional religion of both countries. Since the same French politicians naturally sympathized with Spanish Reds and Pinks, during the Civil War while nationalism was winning in Spain and while the Popular Front was busily preparing the catastrophe of 1940, feeling on both sides of the Pyrenees ran higher than ever.

Readers may judge for themselves whether religious memories or sectarian political prejudices are more important than military necessities.

To say that our leaders should try hard to make a firm alliance with Spain does not mean that they ought to throw themselves into Franco's arms and do whatever he might suggest. Not being a fool, he might well prove a shrewd bargainer. In this article we need not consider what concessions our negotiators might reasonably ask in return for substantial American assistance.

Meanwhile Truman and Acheson have already delayed so long before beginning to make friends with the Spanish government that we may wonder whether their $65 billion military budget is intended to support any real defense of western Europe. If that defense is not based upon Spain it will be worthless.

Worth Hearing Again

John Adams to His Wife, Abigail

Baltimore, 7 February, 1777

... The prices of things here are much more intolerable than at Boston. The attempt of New England to regulate prices is extremely popular in Congress, who will recommend an imitation of it to the other States. For my own part I expect only a partial and a temporary relief from it, and I fear that after a time the evils will break out with greater violence. The water will flow with greater rapidity for having been dammed up for a time. The only radical cure will be to stop the emission of more paper, and to draw in some that is already out and devise means effectually to support the credit of the rest. To this end we must begin to tax the people as largely as the distressed circumstances of the country will bear. We must raise the interest from four to six per cent. We must, if possible, borrow silver and gold from abroad.

THE DEBATE over price controls may be characterized as a sham battle from the point of view of economics. It has little relevance to the inflation problem. It is essentially political. Inflation is an excess of monetary demand in relation to the volume of goods available for purchase. It is too many dollars trying to buy too small a supply of goods. The only way to stop inflation is to restore the balance between monetary demand and the goods available for purchase. Stopping inflation requires either an increase in the supply of goods without a corresponding increase in purchasing power until the balance is restored or a curtailment in monetary demand until it corresponds to the amount of goods available.

Price controls do not restrain inflation but, on the contrary, actually promote inflation. When prices are held down artificially, the result is to increase the demand. With monetary incomes the same, there will be a greater demand for sirloin steaks at 75 cents a pound than if they cost $1.50 a pound.

Changes in prices in the free market affect not only the demand for goods but also the supply. High prices encourage increased production because they make it more profitable for producers to supply the demand. When prices are held down artificially by price controls, they tend to squeeze the profit margin of producers—often make production unprofitable—and therefore tend to decrease the supply. If price controls are not to disrupt the proper functioning of our economy, it is essential that prices be permitted to reflect increases in costs. As the London Economist points out:

If price controls have any useful purpose at all there is certainly no justification for prohibiting an automatic increase in prices with an increase in costs. . . . No price control would be better than inflexible price control.

The “Terrible Capehart Amendment”

What Mr. Truman calls “the terrible Capehart Amendment” provides that price ceilings shall reflect increases in costs. If prices do not cover costs, they will result either in curtailment of production and shortages of goods, or in diverting goods to black markets. The announcement that only two out of 212 meat packing companies invited to bid on government orders for beef for the Army submitted bids and could supply only 190,000 pounds of beef instead of the 13,000,000 pounds the government wants, is a dramatic illustration of how unrealistic price ceilings disrupt the economy and create artificial shortages. The packers didn’t bid because they can not get the beef under the existing price ceilings.

When price controls cut production in particular industries, they frequently create supply bottlenecks in other industries. Often the indirect loss of production is far greater than directly affected by ill-designed price limitations. A flagrant example is found in the machine tool industry. Our whole defense effort depends upon machine tools. The London Economist points out in its “American Survey”:

Some of them [machine tools] are so complex they take from three months to a year to build and without them a defense program is nothing more than an oratorical blueprint. The machine tool industry is delivering goods at only one-quarter the rate attained in the last war and some manufacturers will promise no deliveries before late 1953.

Our entire defense effort has been effectively sabotaged by ill-conceived price controls on machine tools. This the government admits. I quote a UP dispatch from Washington of August 21, 1951:

The Government said today that price increases granted the machine tool industry apparently had broken a bottleneck that had been hamstringing the defense program for more than a year.

As Barron’s weekly points out:

Five million dollars worth of small tungsten carbide cutting tools supports an output of $10 billion worth of automobiles. And their relation to military items is probably about the same. Why should there be any price regulation at all on items such as these? Obviously they have not the slightest bearing on the cost of living or anything in which the Office of Price Stabilization is supposed to be interested. Just as obviously regulation can and does impede production.

Just why did it take the OPS “more than a year” to discover that price controls in the machine tool industry were sabotaging the entire defense program? Was it just bureaucratic incompetence and stupidity? Whoever is responsible (however well-meaning and patriotic he may be) has given “aid and comfort” to the Soviet Union.

Price controls also contribute to inflation by requiring for their enforcement a small army of job holders and snoopers who otherwise might be engaged in the production of useful goods and services. Barron’s weekly reports that there were “6700 employees now working for OPS” and that “their number is slated to quintuple.”

Price controls increase demand and decrease supply. This increases inflation—it does not restrain it. Dr. Emerson P. Schmidt, Economic Research Director of the United States Chamber of Commerce, says:
A free price performs an enormously important function. When it rises, that helps to conserve scarce supplies; it stimulates greater effort at production. It encourages the use of, or the production of, substitutes. Price control, if effective, stops this automatic adjustment. Price control is an attempt to make the price tag say something which is not true. Price expresses the equilibrium between supplies and demands. Sitting on the price with the aid of law, directives, and the policeman, does nothing to improve the supply, and indeed discourages increased supply. And equally bad, price control enormously increases people's efforts to get the "bargains," which control appears to promise.

Price controls are useless in checking inflation, except in the case of monopoly prices. Monopoly prices are controlled prices which are higher than the prices which would be set by a free market and, therefore, can be reduced without destroying the incentive to produce. But the best way to attack monopoly prices is by means of anti-trust legislation—not price controls. Our anti-trust laws are a protection against monopoly prices by business. But there is no similar protection against monopoly prices in the field of agriculture, where the government support programs often peg prices above the market. There is no such protection against monopoly prices for labor. If wages were the result of the free play of market forces, there would be no excuse for wage controls. But because wages are set by the coercive force of powerful labor monopolies, there is ample economic justification for rigid wage controls. There is a similar economic justification for doing away with farm price supports.

With these exceptions, holding prices down by price controls promotes inflation by widening the gap between too many dollars and too few goods. This truth has been demonstrated time and time again throughout history. There is nothing new about price controls. They were used by Hammurabi in Mesopotamia 2000 years before the birth of Christ. In 301 A.D. in ancient Rome, the Emperor Diocletian issued his famous Edictum de Pretiis imposing maximum legal prices and wages. According to Will Durant:

The Edict was until our time the most famous example of an attempt to replace economic laws by governmental decrees. Its failure was rapid and complete.

Price Controls Enforced by Guillotine

Price controls were tried in France 150 years ago during the French Revolution and, as they invariably do, failed to work. I quote from "Fiat Money Inflation in France" by the late Andrew Dickson White:

The first result of the Maximum [price control laws enacted September 29, 1793] was that every means was taken to evade the fixed price imposed, and the farmers brought in as little produce as they possibly could. This increased the scarcity, and the people of the large cities were put on allowance. Tickets were issued authorizing the bear-

er to obtain at the official prices a certain amount of bread or sugar or soap or wood or coal to cover immediate necessities. . . . Shopkeepers therefore could not sell such goods without ruin. The result was that very many went out of business and the remainder forced buyers to pay enormous charges under the very natural excuse that the seller risked his life in trading at all. That this excuse was valid is easily seen by the daily lists of those condemned to the guillotine, in which not infrequently figure the names of men charged with violating the Maximum laws. Manufactures were very generally crippled and frequently destroyed, and agriculture was fearfully depressed.

In the light of history, which shows that price controls promote inflation rather than restrain it, that they disrupt the normal workings of the economy and bring misery rather than relief, then why is it that politicians always attempt to meet inflation with price controls? There are two basic reasons. First, most people, including many politicians, not only want inflation to continue because it increases their money incomes but also want to avoid the higher prices which are a consequence of inflation. They have the naive belief that if incomes increase and the supply of goods does not, price controls will enable them to buy all they want at no increase in price. That is why, as the London Economist puts it, "belief in this panacea [price controls] prevents governments from getting at the cause behind the symptoms."

The second reason that politicians always attempt to meet inflation with price controls is that inflation always is the result of governmental policies and the politicians want desperately to avoid blame for the higher prices which are the consequence of their inflationary policies. To point out that inflation is a result of government policies is not to condemn every governmental action which promotes inflation. For example, our present defense program to rebuild our military power and that of our Allies is highly inflationary, but it certainly is necessary to our survival. But whether the governmental policies which promote inflation are necessary, or merely represent political demagoguery or incredibly stupid blunders, as they frequently do, the causes of inflation are always found in governmental policies.

Throughout history whenever governmental policies result in unpleasant consequences, the chief aim of politicians is to find a scapegoat for their own blunders. Emperors, kings, dictators and presidents tilt at windmills in an effort to divert the attention of the people from the evils of government. Hitler's slaughter of the Jews and Roosevelt's slanders of businessmen were slick, professional, twentieth-century applications of the political tactics which the Roman emperors used to persecute the Christians. I am not, of course, making a moral comparison between Hitler's slaughter of the Jews and Roosevelt's use of the businessman as a scapegoat. Yet from the standpoint of political strategy there was no difference at all between the techniques of Hitler and Roosevelt.

Not only is the demand for rigid price controls
motivated by political rather than economic considerations, but the methods used to promote price controls are largely patterned after Communist techniques. "Liberal" advocates of rigid price controls use a smoke screen of emotion to conceal the dishonesty of their arguments. This is the technique that was used when the Communist press falsely branded the Taft-Hartley Act as a "slave-labor" act despite the fact that it protects the rank and file of labor against coercion and exploitation by union officials. Thereafter, "liberals," labor leaders, and their press propagandists adopted this false Communist "slave-labor" slogan as their own. The same technique is now being used to smear those opposed to price controls. For example, Drew Pearson uses the emotional falsehood that they are "against the housewife":

No housewives were present when the Senators debated price controls, but this column is able to report who was for and who was against the housewife.

Pearson reiterated this false theme in several of his columns. This is not economic discussion—it is unashamed demagoguery.

Democracy can not long endure if government by slogan is substituted for a rational discussion of issues, and public opinion is manipulated by the propaganda techniques originated by Lenin and perfected by Michelson, Stalin, Goebbels and Hitler. There is no question as to the Communist origin of this technique. Joseph Stalin, in his book "Leninism," devotes several chapters to the discussion of the tactical use of emotional slogans. He even credits the success of the Bolshevik Revolution to the selection of effective slogans. He even credits the success of the Bolshevik Revolution to the selection of effective slogans.

Smear Propaganda for Price Controls

This type of smear propaganda to discredit the opponents of price controls is put out by the propagandists for price controls, notwithstanding the fact that the overwhelming majority of economists is in substantial agreement that the only effective way to fight inflation is through indirect controls—that is, budgetary, fiscal, credit and tax controls—which can exert a decisive influence upon monetary demand. Even Defense Mobilizer Wilson and the President's Council of Economic Advisers admit that the direct controls which they advocate are of minor importance as compared with indirect controls. Mr. Wilson says:

It has been correctly said that direct price and wage controls treat only the symptoms of inflation rather than its basic cause.

The President's Council of Economic Advisers says:

There is no more important single measure for combating inflation under present circumstances than the maintenance of a balanced budget. . . . Price and wage controls would be doomed unless taxation, credit controls, and savings programs hold the inflationary pressure down to manageable proportions.

The Joint Committee of Congress on the Economic Report said:

Efforts to control prices and wages, no matter how zealously and efficiently enforced, will be futile precisely to the extent that this nation fails to remove the inflationary steam under the boiler now.

On January 12, 1951, 405 economists representing 43 colleges and universities submitted a statement about inflation to the Joint Congressional Committee on the Economic Report in which they said:

The basic cause of inflation, an excess of money demand relative to available goods, must be attacked. Only adequate fiscal and monetary measures can remove this basic cause.

The London Economist points out that "holding all prices down merely guarantees that it [inflation] and its harmful distortions shall go on forever."

Whether inflation will be controlled, or whether we shall have further inflation, will depend primarily upon the aggregate money demand and its relation to the supply of goods. The government policies that will have the greatest effect upon the volume of monetary demand and the supply of goods will be those concerned with the government budget, taxes, interest rates on government bonds, subsidized credit for housing, and the Controlled Materials Plan. If the government wants to prevent further inflation, then a cut of eight to ten billion dollars in non-defense expenditures is urgently necessary. A tax program to be anti-inflationary should bear with great weight upon the lower and middle income groups which in the aggregate do the bulk of the spending. Taxing millionaires out of existence will have little or no effect upon the demand for goods. Taxing the person of small or moderate income who does the bulk of the spending will have a great effect upon the demand for goods. The excess-profits tax is an invitation to corporate extravagance, is highly inflationary, and should be repealed. The actions of Congress in easing installment credit restrictions and passing the Defense Housing Act to ease housing credit and add $1,500,000,000 to the lending power of the FHA are distinctly inflationary. The government should permit the interest rate to rise in order to restrain credit and to give some inducement to the public to save. Every dollar that is saved that otherwise might be spent is a dollar that doesn't go to market as monetary demand to bid prices up.

The Controlled Materials Plan announced in the latter part of July is more likely to promote inflation than to restrain it. Under this plan our government, instead of merely setting aside a certain portion of steel, aluminum and copper production for military purposes, as it should do,
is undertaking to allocate materials for non-military production as well. The assumption that the men in Washington can perform this vast plan of allocation better than the free market is belied by experience. The CMP is an invitation to bureaucratic blunders like that which imposed unrealistic price controls on machine tools and sabotaged our defense program. As Barron's weekly points out:

The basic danger of the Controlled Materials Plan is that it puts into the hands of government life and death powers over what every firm in the country and every industry may or may not produce.

Congress fortunately rejected President Truman's demand that he be given authority to build and operate new plants, expand existing plants, and install new processes in private plants. It likewise rejected authority to license corporations in order to enforce price regulations. If to the powers given the government under the Controlled Materials Plan were added Presidential authority to build government steel plants and other plants to compete with private industry and authority to control business by licensing, the businessman would be completely at the mercy of government. It would give the bureaucrats life and death power over the American economy and the economic activities of every farmer and businessman in the country.

The present malodorous RFC scandals show what happens when bureaucrats are given control of a small section of our economy—the section composed of businessmen who can't compete in the open market but depend upon government favors for undeserved profits. If such bureaucratic control were extended to cover all business, it takes very little imagination to see what might happen.

Power-Hungry Bureaucrats

The power-hungry bureaucrats in Washington are so well entrenched that they have become largely self-perpetuating. Administrations come and go, but bureaus go on forever. The President and Congress can create new bureaus and agencies, expand existing ones and add to their powers. But neither the President nor Congress can do much to cut down the permanent bureaucracy. Government agencies and bureaus are relatively independent of the Administration and able to exert political pressure on Congress to get what they want. The principal objective of the permanent Washington bureaucracy is the aggrandizement of their own power. They are skilled in lobbying and propaganda and are using the defense emergency to promote further socialism, to get a stranglehold on the American economy, and to increase and perpetuate their own power. They constitute a totalitarian threat more dangerous than communism.

This Is What They Said

Soviet Central Asia... will certainly trade with countries where Americans and American goods have become more widely known... than ever before. This trade, and an extension of the cultural intercourse that has already begun, can not but cause deep thought among the peoples of the Near East as to the methods whereby the kindred nations of Central Asia have risen to a position not only of political and social, but of economic equality with the Russians for whom they were formerly a colony.

WILLIAM MANDEL, "The Soviet Far East and Central Asia," published 1944 under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

[The Chinese Eastern Railway] has brought only trouble to its Soviet owners. They have long wished there were some one in eastern Asia to whom they could give it with good grace. Failing this, they wish that they, and the world, could forget about it.

JOSEPH BARNES, Asia, November 1934

The Fourth of July, when we celebrate our freedom, made me want to urge my readers to become familiar with Howard Fast's "The American." Mr. Fast's book is... the story of the organization of the little man, the man who works with his hands for small returns... Many of us forget the long fights and the leadership that individuals have given in order to advance every forward step; and it is good when a book of this kind is written... .

ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, "My Day," July 5, 1946

One may accept or reject the ideology of Hitlerism as well as any other ideological system. But everybody should understand that ideology can not be destroyed by force, that it can not be eliminated by war. It is therefore not only senseless but criminal to wage such a war as a war for "the destruction of Hitlerism" camouflaged as a fight for democracy.

MOLOTOV, speaking from Moscow, reported in People's Daily World, November 1, 1939

Operation Treadmill

Now if anything is important, if anything is true about the situation in Korea, it is the overwhelming importance of not forcing a showdown on our side in Korea and not permitting our opponents to force a showdown.

DEAN ACHESON, Department of State Bulletin, July 23, 1951
This is the second of two articles on General Marshall's role in postponing the Japanese surrender. The ultimatum referred to in the beginning was a peace proposal approved by President Truman in May subject to endorsement by the military. Marshall rejected it.

WHY WAS the ultimatum of July 27 "premature" on May 29? Upon what did Marshall base his decision?

The most telling clue may well be found in the cabled report by Harry L. Hopkins of a Kremlin conference with Josef Stalin at 6 P.M., Moscow time, on the day before the Pentagon conference. Hopkins's biographer, Robert E. Sherwood, explicitly reports that Hopkins, varying his usual custom, sent off a detailed message immediately after this interview because of what he deemed the importance of Stalin's assurances regarding the war in Asia. Hopkins had been sent to Moscow by Mr. Truman to iron out difficulties that had arisen at San Francisco, where Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Alger Hiss and others were endeavoring to form a United Nations organization. What did Hopkins so urgently cable the night of May 28?

By August 8 the Soviet army will be properly deployed on the Manchurian positions. The Marshal repeated his statement made at Yalta that the Russian people must have a good reason for going to war and that depended on China's willingness to agree to the proposals made at Yalta... For the first time he stated that he was willing to take these proposals up directly with Soong (T.V.)... Stalin left no doubt in our mind that he intends to attack during August.1

In view of its urgency, this message in all likelihood was in the hands of the President on the twenty-ninth. Did Marshall have a copy? Could this first-hand report that the Red Army would not be ready to march until August 8, that the Yalta pledges could not be extorted from China for some weeks yet, have influenced Marshall's decisive pronouncement? Which of the Pentagon conferees had seen the Hopkins cable? We gather from Forrestal's diary that he had not. He speaks of McCloy advising him of its contents at a later time. Did the conferees know of the Yalta Agreement on the Far East, the text of which was still reposing in a White House safe? Marshall did, as we know. Whether the others were aware of that deal, such knowledge did not deter them from their manifested desire for peace.

At all events, none had Marshall's stake in seeing it to it that the Red Army fought in Manchuria and that the Yalta Agreement was fully implemented. This had been peculiarly Marshall's baby since the Marshall memorandum at Quebec in August 1943 (an astonishing document complacently foreseeing postwar Soviet ascendency over Europe) made it American doctrine that we must seek Russia's aid in subduing Japan.2 The memoirs of the late Secretary Stettinius and Maj. Gen. John R. Deane make it explicit that Marshall alone and operating through Roosevelt sent Averell Harriman and Deane to Moscow in the fall of 1943 to bribe Stalin into the Asiatic war; a venture to which he already stood committed on the undeniable ground of Russian national interest. A study of the sources leaves little doubt that Marshall, even more than Roosevelt, fathered the shabby, reactionary Yalta Agreement; a sell-out wholly unnecessary as we see it now and, as should have been apparent at the time, restoring to the Kremlin the pre-1905 imperialistic position of the Tsars in eastern Asia.

General Marshall had pursued this objective so zealously, so steadfastly, could he now stand by and see it frustrated by a "premature" peace? We can not know that the time scale operating after July 26 would have prevailed after May 29. The lost opportunities of history do not admit of categorical assumptions. Had the Japanese responded as promptly in June as in August, we should have had peace by mid-June. We do know that a June peace would vastly have altered the shape of the future.

The Americans and Chinese in that event, not the Red Army, would have taken the surrender of the Kwantung army. That army's huge stores, the Mukden arsenal, the industrial and communications complex of Manchuria, would not then have been put at the disposal of the Yenan Reds. Without those munitions, or their equivalent from

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An eight-page reprint, including Forrest Davis's two articles on General Marshall, is available at ten cents per copy or twelve copies for one dollar. Orders may be placed with the Freeman, Dept. R3, 240 Madison Avenue, New York 16, N. Y.
Russian sources, the Reds could scarcely have
conquered China. True, the Yalta promises of
Roosevelt still stood, but with the Republic of
China firmly planted in Manchuria it is possible
that Soong would not have felt obligated in July
to put China's head under the chopper at Mos-
cow. Stalin might have been required to send
negotiators to China. Nor, with peace in June,
would there have been excuse for the War De-
partment to partition Korea along the 38th
parallel, the historic frontier between Russian
and Japanese imperialist ambitions.

A June peace, to summarize, might well have
obviated the Communist rape of China. It would
certainly have spared us many lives in the
summer of 1945; in all human probability it
would likewise have spared us the war in Korea,
the loss of which either by diplomacy or mili-
tary defeat will go far toward assuring the
hammer and sickle hegemony over all Asia. With
China still in friendly hands, with Russia con-
fining to her pre-Yalta holdings in eastern Asia,
with our vital Pacific flank therefore secure, who
can seriously believe that western Europe would
today stand in military danger?

No Peace Without Stalin

Hopkins sent a supplemental cable immediately
after his first on May 28. Dealing with the prob-
lems of peace with Japan, it read in part:

Japan is doomed and the Japanese know it. Peace
feelers are being put out by certain elements in
Japan and we should therefore consider together
our joint attitude and act in concert about the
surrender of Japan. Stalin expressed the fear that
the Japanese will try to split the Allies.4

At Potsdam, Stalin was to inform Mr. Truman
that Japan repeatedly had asked Moscow's good
offices as mediator in settling the war, an indica-
tion that the Japanese Government was not
aware that the ways had been greased for the
Soviet Union to be in at the kill. The Japanese,
said Stalin, had gone so far as to suggest send-
ing Prince Konoye to Moscow to propose terms.
Stalin noted that he had rebuffed these overtures
and "President Truman expressed his approval
of Stalin's action."5

Does this quotation mean that by Potsdam the
President had accepted the thesis that peace
should await Stalin's political and military neces-
sities? In the absence of completer evidence we
can not answer that question with assurance.
We do know that when Mr. Byrnes came to write
his recollections he set forth that at Potsdam he
had had the gravest misgivings about Russia's
participation. He wrote:

As for myself, I must frankly admit that in view
of what we knew of Soviet actions in eastern
Germany and the violations of the Yalta agree-
ments in Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria, I would

4 "Roosevelt and Hopkins," p. 903.

have been satisfied had the Russians determined
not to enter the war . . . I feared what would
happen when the Red Army entered Manchuria.
Before it left Manchuria, my fears were realized.6

How shall we read Hopkins's second message of
May 28? Beneath the sympathetic phrases of
Stalin's American friend can there not be dis-
cerned a warning that the United States must
not move for peace without the Kremlin's assent?
The autocrat of all the Russians was appealing
to an as yet non-existent alliance (although one
that had been surreptitiously agreed upon at
Yalta) for solidarity. Is not this the key to the
whole question of the delay of peace in the
Pacific? And was not Stalin reminding Hopkins
that, in the light of Yalta, the active tendency
toward immediate peace in the Administration at
Washington (concerning which he must have
been amply informed) was premature? Stalin
further suggested to Hopkins that the Allies out-
bit the Japanese, saying, in Hopkins's phrase-
ology, that "perhaps we can get a surrender with-
out using the words 'unconditional surrender'
but give them 'the works' once we get to Japan."
The Forrestal editors report that "Mr. Forrestal
clearly was not satisfied that this was the right
answer."

In any case, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Stimson and
Mr. Grew did not abandon their efforts to bring
about an early peace. As June wore away, a note
of urgency entered their deliberations. General
Marshall, carrying all before him, seemed bent
upon launching a frontal attack upon the Jap-
anean homeland without first trying to secure
peace. The Forrestal diaries suggest that none
of the Cabinet members looked with equanimity
upon the loss of life entailed in what they
believed to be an unnecessary operation. On June
19 Forrestal noted Stimson's "vigorously" agree-
ment with Grew's contention at a State, War
and Navy conference that terms safeguarding
the Emperor's status should be worked out as a
means of averting the invasion. Forrestal wrote:

Both Stimson and Grew most emphatically assert-
ed that this move ought to be made, and that if
it were effective at all it must be done before any
attack was made upon the homeland of Japan . . .

Marshall Insists on Invasion

The issue of invasion vs. peace came to a head
at a conference of the President with his military
leaders at the White House on the eve of his de-
parture for Potsdam. The military, paced by
Marshall, unanimously assured the President that
the invasion was necessary to obtain Japan's sub-
mission. Two years afterward Forrestal obtained
from McCloy his version of the session, which
the Secretary of the Navy had not attended. Con-
cerning this the Forrestal editors wrote:

Mr. McCloy, though his views had not been asked,
spoke up for a political offensive first, including
a hint of the atomic bomb and a promise to pr-
serve the Emperor; "the military leaders," Mr. McCloy remembered, "were somewhat annoyed at his interference," but the President "welcomed the idea."

For military leaders read Marshall, it being evident to any student that during World War II it was Marshall’s will that ruled the Joint Chiefs of Staff. McCloy’s experience with military assertiveness is reminiscent of that of Stettinius, present at a White House conference just before San Francisco where the President himself and the military discussed the failure of the Soviet Union to abide by the Yalta agreement on the Balkans . . . the United States military representatives pleaded for patience with the Soviet Union because they feared that a crackdown would endanger Russian entry into the Far Eastern war. This was at the end of April. Stettinius further observed that "even as late as the Potsdam conference, after the first atomic bomb had exploded at Los Alamos on July 16, the military insisted that the Soviet Union had to be brought into the Far Eastern war."

The declared desire of the Joint Chiefs to invade Japan was repugnant to others among the high brass as well as to the civilian chiefs of the armed services. As early as July 1944 President Roosevelt had been assured by General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz that Japan could be defeated short of an invasion. This assurance was given at the President’s conference with the Pacific High Command at Honolulu, being duly reported by Admiral William D. Leahy.8 Leahy, who remained as Chief of Staff to Truman, exhibits in his recollections a steady aversion to Marshall’s project of recruiting the Red Army for the war in Asia and for the invasion as well. Perhaps because of Leahy’s stand and the opposition of the civilian chiefs of the armed services, bespoken by McCloy, Mr. Truman assented only grudgingly to the invasion proposal, insisting that the plans be confined for the present upon southernmost Kyushu.

At the State, War and Navy meeting of June 26, as noted by Forrestal, Secretary Stimson read the paper he was to hand the President on July 2, a reworking of the Dooman draft. The sense of urgency expressed the week before still held and, as Forrestal reported, "it was agreed by all present that such a statement should be made before the actual invasion of the homeland of Japan was begun."

The Potsdam Ultimatum fortunately forestalled the invasion, a project which Marshall once estimated would engage two million men and cost a half million casualties. Yet if Marshall’s desires failed to carry in the military field he prevailed in an arena where he has operated with the utmost skill since 1941: the political. Because of the delayed “peace offensive” the Red Army was able to sweep virtually unopposed through Manchuria with all the hazard to which that event has put our security, our lives and treasure in Asia.

**“Someone Close to God”**

Is it not clear from the Dooman testimony, the Forrestal notations and the other sources cited that in the closing weeks of the late war there did exist within the Administration two camps with widely contrasted objectives? The first, enlisting the President and his principal Cabinet advisers, sought the earliest possible peace, with or without reference to Soviet Russia’s interest, and seriously questioned the necessity of invasion. The second and victorious faction, indefatigably led by the Army Chief of Staff, with collateral and as yet little disclosed assistance from Dean Acheson and leftist-liberal subordinates, favored prolonging the hostilities at whatever cost, including that of the invasion so persistently pressed by Marshall.

The question naturally arises, how could a simple Chief of Staff override the President and his able and experienced Cabinet chiefs in state affairs of such portent? What manner of man is Marshall? Because of his proclaimed unwillingness, almost alone among his eminent contemporaries, to submit a published accounting of his career, we have little or no internal evidence concerning his impulses and motives. The prevailing public view, typified by the laudation heaped upon him in the United States Senate when he recently retired as Secretary of Defense, is flat, superficial, without light or shadow.

As it happened, Mr. Dooman testified just two days after these senatorial discourses and, while the encomia heaped upon the retiring Secretary were perhaps exorbitant and certainly mortuary in tone, they did supply one answer to our question. As one perused the pious reflection of Senator Olin D. Johnston (D., S. C.) that ”every time he [Marshall] opened his mouth to speak he gave me the impression that I was listening to someone who was close to God”; as one observed the worshipful utterances of Senators McFarland, Lehman, Ives and Morse, among others, one realized that the prestige of General Marshall in partisan and “liberal” circles is scarcely mortal. In the light of that towering senatorial estimate, it was easier to understand why the Dooman testimony, raising questions which may well be engaging the interest of historians a century hence, received such scanty notice where noticed at all in the great “liberal” and Democratic press of the Atlantic seaboard, a press ever solicitous of Marshall’s repute. It is to this all but idolatrous prestige, the overwhelming moral authority which has increasingly subdued Mr. Truman’s judgment, that we must look in part for the reasons why General Marshall was able

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Nehru's Three Voices

By HUBERT MARTIN

Mr. Martin’s view of the much admired Nehru as just another dictator who is destroying his country’s new-awn freedom, has recently been confirmed by Nehru himself in his proposal to subject the Indian people to forced labor.

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU, Prime Minister of India, has cast himself for the role of spokesman of Asia in the Korean tragedy. Many people who know no better are accepting him in that role, partly because he is so vocal and partly because those who do know better are silent.

Of course, it is nonsense for anyone to claim that he speaks for a whole continent and for a billion people. But just because such a claim is so outrageously extravagant, few people are ready to question it in public. Moreover, we have come to regard Sri Nehru as the spiritual successor to the Mahatma Gandhi who managed to get himself accepted by the Western World as the spokesman of India—a claim only slightly less fantastic than that of Nehru. That Gandhi was opposed by most of India’s Moslems and by many other Indians, that the policy which he initiated led to the worst massacre of Indians by Indians which the continent had seen in centuries, and that he himself was at last assassinated by some of the Hindus for whom he professed to speak, does not seem to have caused many of us to revise our opinions.

Yet Gandhi was at least consistent. He spoke with a single unvarying voice. Not so Nehru. His name flits through the news frequently, usually in connection with one of three topics: the demands of the Chinese Communists; the impending famine in India; and the dispute over Kashmir. On each of these subjects he speaks, and on each with a different voice. Which is that of the real Nehru? Or does none of them belong to the real Nehru? Are they only disguises which hide the real man from the curious ears of the Western World?

The voice of the Nehru who lectures the world on Korea is the voice of the anglicized Nehru who went to Harrow and Cambridge, and who, like many another timid civil servant, was trained to carry out loyally, regardless of personal beliefs, instructions received from those in authority. This habit has made him capable of advocating with genuine enthusiasm and in the teeth of all experience the appeasement of all those who show determination—as Chamberlain appeased Franco, Mussolini and Hitler.

To the more forthright American he is a bewildering figure. What makes him tick? Can he genuinely believe that pigs have wings and that the lion will be content with less than the lion’s share? Doesn’t he know that the lion—or in this instance the Russian bear—does not share, and that it is only a matter of time until he devours the whole prey? Or can it be that Nehru’s sympathies are with the predatory beast? Or does he delude himself into thinking that in the end he may be able to outwit the Russian bear?

More important still, how would he behave if he had to choose between two groups that spoke and acted with equal determination? If he stood not between Acheson and Vishinsky but between Vishinsky and a resolute American? The experiment might be worth making. It might reveal a vastly different Nehru, though the contrast could hardly be as great as that with Nehru in his second role of spokesman of Indian imperialism.
For India under Nehru is pursuing a course of imperialistic aggression even more shameless than that of the Soviet Union. Indian troops occupied the State of Jammu and Kashmir over three years ago and continue to occupy it against the will of the majority of inhabitants, and the Indian Government is continuing to defy the United Nations in practice while paying lip service to the lofty principles on which the United Nations structure is supposed to rest. For over three years Nehru has frustrated every attempt of the UN to find a peaceful and just solution of a conflict which he could easily have prevented. By now he looks like just another of the dictatorial type of statesman who under different names—as William II, as Mussolini, as Hitler, as Stalin—has plunged the world into a succession of wars.

Such a comparison can shock only people unfamiliar with the events in Kashmir. Kashmir is a good-sized country—82,258 square miles, about as large as the New England states and New York together—but with a small population of just over four million, mainly Moslems. It has the best climate and the best scenery of all India, and in this respect has been to India what Switzerland has been to Europe. From its mountains flow two of the five rivers on which the life of eastern Pakistan depends, the Jhelum and the Chenab. Apart from these material facts, Kashmir has two human claims to distinction. Its present Maharajah, under the pseudonym of "Mr. A.,” has figured prominently in one of the juiciest scandals that ever came before an English court of law, a scandal that recalls the famous "Necklace Affair," the prelude to the French Revolution. The tactful intervention of the British Government in the 1920s saved Kashmir from a similar fate and secured the succession to the Maharajah.

More important still, Kashmir is the home of the Nehru family. Just as Adolf Hitler was not content to rule over big Germany but had to have little Austria as well, so Nehru must have little Kashmir as well as big India. Like Hitler he is willing to have this matter confirmed by a plebiscite, provided that the plebiscite is held in the presence of his troops. With one Indian soldier to forty Kashmiris, children included, he feels certain of a favorable outcome. Without them, he seems equally certain that the vote will go against him, and for more than three years he has resisted the efforts of all who have taken a hand in it—our own Admiral Nimitz, the Canadian General MacNaughten, the Australian Judge Sir Owen Dixon—to make it possible for the inhabitants of Kashmir to express their opinions without intimidation.

To safeguard himself against a possible adverse vote, Nehru has been insisting throughout the dispute that India has a valid legal claim to Kashmir because the Maharajah declared its accession to India on October 26, 1947. The Maharajah made this declaration to save his throne, when his troops had been defeated and he was being driven from the country. For weeks before that event the Maharajah’s Hindu soldiers had been killing off his Moslem subjects—237,000 according to the London Times—until the Moslems revolted and called upon their fellow Moslems over the border for help. On October 23, 1947, Moslem tribesmen marched into Kashmir. That would have been the end of the Maharajah had not Nehru’s Indian troops arrived by air on the morning of October 27.

Whether a ruler about to be deposed for the worst kind of misgovernment is entitled to dispose of his country against the will of its inhabitants is, to say the least, debatable. It may, of course, be part of the divine right of kings. Americans don’t happen to believe in the divine right of kings. Nor does Nehru—at least not if it is invoked against the territorial claims which he puts forward on behalf of India. This he showed in a parallel case six weeks earlier. The Maharajah of Junagadh, a state much smaller than Kashmir with a population of only about 670,000, declared the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan. But because 80 per cent of the people of Junagadh are Hindus, Nehru on September 12, 1947, protested by telegram to the Maharajah and soon after sent his soldiers to occupy the country. They are still there. The Maharajah’s complaint is before the Security Council, which is paying no attention to it.

The case of Hyderabad, a state about as large as Kashmir but with a population more than four times as large, is in some respects similar to that of Junagadh. The Maharajah of Hyderabad is a Moslem; most of his subjects are Hindus. The Maharajah knew better than to invite Indian intervention by trying to join Pakistan. He declared that he wanted to preserve the independence of his country and, in order to buy India’s good will, he agreed to hand over to India the conduct of Hyderabad’s external relations. It availed him nothing. India declared that the Hyderabad Hindus were being oppressed by the Hyderabad Moslems, sent in troops, and took over the government. When the Maharajah’s complaint was considered by the Security Council, he had already been forced to make his submission to India. The Indian representative at Lake Success declared that the representative of Hyderabad had been disavowed by his ruler and therefore had no right to plead. In this India followed the example set by Soviet Russia two years earlier when the Soviet representative denied the right of the Iranian Ambassador to speak for his country. But at that time Communists carried less weight in the UN and Iran won its case, whereas that of Hyderabad is still pending and unlikely ever to be discussed by the Council.

Is it surprising that Nehru, who has already managed to get away with two flagrant violations of the international order and is expecting to get away with a third one, should feel a certain sympathy with Mao Tse-tung and his supporters who have embarked on a similar course? It would be contrary to human nature if it were otherwise, and we may excuse him personally on that account. But
we can hardly accept him as an authority on what befits the UN, or deny that by his actions he has seriously weakened its spirit and damaged its prestige.

He has done more than that. He has harmed the UN materially as well. Pakistan was and still is eager to send soldiers to fight on our side in Korea—as they have gallantly fought in two world wars—but Pakistan has no soldiers to spare; they are needed to stand guard on its own borders.

**The Harm** which Nehru has done to others is perhaps more than outweighed by the damage which he is inflicting upon his own country. The needless military expenditure imposes a heavy financial burden on India and has dissipated her capital. India’s capital resources are small as it is; to waste them is to perpetuate the poverty of the Indian masses. Not only that; in the best of times India has difficulty in growing enough food for her rapidly increasing population. Yet land has been diverted from food crops in order to grow jute, which up till now Pakistan has grown for India. But Nehru’s government has set out to harm and weaken Pakistan by cutting off her export markets.

And Pakistan today finds herself forced to take sweeping measures against the Communist plots which have been hatching in this atmosphere of disorder.

India herself has been hit even harder. This year, the country has been brought to the verge of famine. During the last famine, seven years ago, it was possible to place the blame on Great Britain. Today that can no longer be done, and the government is trying to stifle criticism by imposing curbs on the press.

Not that Nehru’s government has shown much tolerance to dissenters in the past. It has deposed recalcitrant rajahs like the ruler of Baroda and has imprisoned disappointed opposition leaders like Master Tara Singh, the spokesman for some six million Sikhs, with much less hesitation than its British predecessors. Nevertheless, opposition has been growing until a split occurred even in Nehru’s own party. In June Mr. Kripalani succeeded in organizing an opposition party with a program which calls for a return to the principles of Gandhi and specifically condemns the trend toward nationalization of industry as a move toward state capitalism and injurious to democracy.

By way of precaution Nehru forced several constitutional amendments through the Indian Parliament a few months before it was to be dissolved and replaced by a popularly elected one. The limitation on free speech is only one of these, though it is the most striking. It has aroused violent opposition among the public, and the editors of the daily press resolved to suspend publication for one day by way of protest. In the long run, however, two other amendments may produce even graver consequences. One removes legislation relating to landed property and land tenure from review by the courts. The other abolishes the principle of equality by permitting legislative discrimination in favor of socially and educationally backward classes of citizens. The attack on freedom has begun.

Taken in conjunction with certain features of the recently released Five Year Plan, such as the advocacy of “cooperative cultivation,” these three amendments should give pause not only to Indians but to all friends of India as well. The countless Americans who have warmly supported the cause of Indian freedom can not view without concern this attack on India’s new-won liberties. Is there nothing we can do to help the cause of Indian freedom now? We are once more collecting donations of food and money for India. We are supplying aid under the Point Four program. Should we not also remind Nehru’s government that neither men nor nations can live and thrive by bread alone?

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**New Masks for Old**

By GEORGE S. SCHUYLER

The anti-communist bandwagon has become so overcrowded of late that there is already need for trailers. By comparison the rush-hour subway seems deserted. If the stampede from Moscow continues, the only Reds left among us will be our aborigines.

There have been no such wholesale somersaults since the Stalin-Hitler “non-aggression” pact nor such mass renunciation of idols since the Christians captured Rome. This sudden conversion rivals anything in Holy Writ.

What a motley crew of former Stalin-lovers now packs the bus! How loudly these ideological hitch-hikers now trumpet their undying affection for the American way of life! Only yesterday, it seems, they were tossing about their most withering smear, “100 per cent American”!

Once these now penitent fellow-travelers returned from Intourist trips gurgling their praises of the Workers’ Paradise where all was just and fair. Once this swarm of poets, publicists and professors wrote ecstatically about the Miracle of Planning which they wanted adopted here instantly, if not sooner. How odd to find them currently packing committees to rescue the enslaved moujiks whom they tardily discover to have nothing to lose but their chains.

Huddled under the pink banner of the ADA are all of the erstwhile architects of the Roosevelt Disaster who joyfully engineered our “recognition” of the Soviet abattoir. Sardined behind them are the Democrats (Social and Pendergast), the mob of repentant Wallace Progressives, the platoons of Fair Dealers from the Deep Freeze Circuit, the One Worlders, the Anglophiles, the Swimming Pool Proletarians from the Hollywood gold mines, the “artists” who once chanted songs of social significance, the left-wing Methodists and Baptists, and
the pixilated disciples of Father Divine and other self-appointed Messiahs.

This overcrowded Juggernaut offers convincing proof that anti-communism has become more popular than canasta or "the numbers." Woe betide the hapless yokel who now praises, even faintly, the "statesmanship" of Comrade Stalin or calls him "good old Joe." Shame on any false Etruscan of the "Greeks, Indo-Chinese and Koreans have discovered.

They pant for Federal control and direction of public education with curricula directed by omniscient pundits from Missouri. Most of them would socialize medicine and morticians, along with music, drama and recreation. They still adhere religiously to the notion that the state should decide which work is "socially necessary," meaning slavery through regulation. They would consolidate small "wasteful" farms into agricultural factories suspiciously like the old-time plantations. They are sold on relieving women from the "drudgery" of the home for joyful labor as equals in mines and mills.

Honest men would call this communism, but they camouflage it as democracy. They once called it Soviet democracy until that designation became unhealthy, or at least embarrassing. Many are even fearful of dubbing it socialism, "Welfare State" being much more respectable; but totalitarianism by any other name is just as oppressive and repugnant. They froth at mention of Hitler and National Socialism, and yet they are brothers under the skin.

Aye, times have changed, and yet the New Emancipation is but an infant from Yalta via Frisco and Seoul. Anti-communism, at long last, has acquired glamour. Ten years ago its adherents were reviled as psychiatric cases. Six years ago they were loathed by all liberals, progressives and do-gooders. Three years ago, even, they were considered logs across the broad highway to the New World a'Comin, their piping protests drowned by White House roars of "red herring." Trampled by the herd of Johnny-come-latelies, the veteran anti-Communist rises painfully from the dust to ask, "How anti-Communist are these anti-Communists?"

The query is not without justification, for clearly most of these Safety Firsters are questionable converts. Too often they are fellow-travelers who have made the long journey from Moscow without changing boots or baggage. Like Peter they have denied their "Christ," but are too loud about it to be convincing. Wrapping the old totalitarianism in the Stars and Stripes and appropriately rebranding it deceives only the incurably gullible. Like reformed alcoholics, these new anti-Communists have to be watched. Most of them are ready to jump off the wagon as soon as the first bottle of new hooch is opened.

Undoubtedly they would all hotly deny that they are Communists masquerading in libertarian clothing, glibly piping platitudes about democracy and freedom. Test them, however, and the preponderance of Red corpuscles is immediately apparent. Indeed, the only thing white about many of them are their livers. They are riding the bandwagon now through opportunism rather than conviction. While vocally outdoing everybody in praising the American way of life, most of them still want Washington to run everything and save everybody, here and abroad, and damn the taxpayers.

They still favor taxing "the Interests" into extinction. They still decry political opposition as "disunity" while secretly wooing the monolithic state run according to plan. They still favor regulating the national finances by the printing press instead of the market. Most of them would eliminate all landlords except the government. They would surrender national sovereignty to the United Nations, thus ending war—as the Greeks, Indo-Chinese and Koreans have discovered.
Young Man in Revolt

By THADDEUS ASHBY

THE OTHER afternoon Radio Station WNYC, the voice of New York, brought us a discussion program involving an assortment of university seniors. It was called "Puberty Prattles," or possibly "Youth Speaks." I've forgotten, but you understand the kind of program I mean. What I heard caused me to turn at once to another station. Now I understand why the older generation, businessmen particularly, regard my generation with hostility and terror.

I am a youth, aged 26. I wish to protest that I have been smeared. Most youths my age complain that the businessmen to whom they apply for employment convict them without a hearing. I wish to say that it isn't businessmen who convict youth. The number of programs on which youth can sound off, ranging from the puerile little parrots on "Juvenile Jury" to the platitudinous seniors on "Youth Speaks," is rising. The businessmen are outslanted and outnumbered. Who smears whom? I say it's the self-styled leaders who have included me among the led, who have claimed to speak for me.

The leaders of the veterans' organizations, the conscience-stricken fraternity presidents, the chairman of Assemblies of Youth for This, for That, the artistic chain-gangs which champion each esthetic lunacy, these sages in their nonage who preside each interview with "Youth needs..." or "Youth demands..." have smeared the rest of the young. There are a few of us who do not seek pleasure in herds, who can't sound off on WNYC, who wish mainly to be let alone, but who have been smeared beyond recognition by those claiming to represent us. I don't know how many belong to my small minority group by virtue of the fact they don't belong to any minority group, but I hope to strike a few echoes, if only to help me go on believing in that slogan: "The free spirit of youth will father our nation's future." If those seniors on "Youth Speaks" are fathering our future, as far as I'm concerned it will be illegitimate.

"Youth is united in its determination to build a more friendly world, a world of brotherhood through education, peace through World Government, and security through freedom from fear and want," thus over the ether spoke one of the candidates for the degree of B.S. What youth is he talking about? What made him think youth is united? I'm not. Maybe I want an unfriendly world. How does he know? Maybe I am of the unfriendly opinion that ever since the friendship of Neville to Adolf, Franklin to Joe, Dean to Mao, there has been too much friendship in the world. Since World War II our politicians have been swimming in a crook of friendship; they are open-armed with our affections and open-handed with our money; their creed has certainly been Love Thine Enemy. Never has so much brotherly love been proclaimed; one can not doubt the politicians' sincerity, for they put it into practice. They practiced Brotherhood, Turn The Other Cheek, and Footie-Footie. For Russia, Roosevelt's favorite phrase was "our gallant ally." Truman's pet name for Stalin? "Good old Joe."

Not content with preaching Love Thine Enemy, our youth leaders have championed ruinous friendships with our bosom buddies. The first loan to England was figured out by some very sincere young people at Harvard during my stay there; they assured me that England would not need any more than one little billion. England needed five more. She repaid our friendship by refusing to rearm and begging us to appease her friend, Red China. On the theory that friends can be bought we've offered gifts to Tito and Franco, and a handsome subsidy to Nehru, who has nothing but blame for us and usually votes against us. Whatever the reason we find ourselves in military and diplomatic disasters, it's not lack of friendship on our part. Will you scream if I suggest it's too much?

I have three friends; nobody I know has more than five. Maybe a world in which we choose our friends with discrimination instead of having them chosen for us would never be terribly charming. The glad-handers who know hundreds of people by their first names usually have no friends at all. The same is true of nations. On a long trip through South America I learned that the people there regard us alternately as suckers for shelling out Good Neighbor dollars, and Shylocks for not shelling out more. They are happy to take our money, but it doesn't decrease their suspicions. I was brought up to believe that friendship can't be bought. Has our State Department any evidence that it can?

PUGILISM in the young used to be regarded as a healthy sign. It taught them to stand up for their proper rights; when they matured they had the independence to see that old age is not infallible; they had the guts to express seditious sentiments against the government and to criticize their wives' relatives. They chose their friends and enemies with equal gusto. But no more. Now they transfer to the government their desire to hide behind their mothers' skirts. I could not today stand up and give my unfriendly but free opinion of Judith Coplon or Paul Robeson, without some friendship-happy youth group denouncing me as a fascist race-hater.

A world of freedom is a world of fight. Competition and the law of survival mean conflict. Some prosper—to claim that none should fail would mean government subsidy of every incompetent parasite—as proved by the recent activities of the RFC. Above all, a world of freedom is disunited. Disunity is the essence of freedom. If unity were the essence, what would we need two parties for? If more than one party is a good thing within nations, then more than one government is a good thing for the world. Show me a country of absolute unanimity of opinion, and I'll show you knouts and truncheons.

Where did that beardless boy get the gall to think
I wanted to be united with him? These friendship boys are desperately afraid of trying to survive alone—they say it’s impossible. Demanding sheltered environments, advocating indiscriminate alliances, quailing before quarreling, they degenerate into pleading for peace at any price. Those who make friendship, unity and peace the first virtues, make honor the last. It’s time somebody said it; and before the men whom I respect, the members of the last generation who helped build this nation, decide that modern youth consists unanimously of soft-center custard, I will say it and be damned: Any kind of war is better than any kind of peace, when that peace consists of appeasement.

From Our Readers
A Fundamental Issue
I would like to take this opportunity of thanking you for publishing Mr. Stanley High’s article, “Government by Lawlessness,” in your magazine [August 27]. The public has not been aware of the important issue involved in our litigation. It is not just an individual seeking the return of his property which has been wrongfully withheld, it is a question of whether the Executive Branch of our Government can defy the orders of our courts. The more people who can be made to realize this, the quicker we will return to a government of laws and not of men. Your publication of this article, together with its appearance in the Reader’s Digest, will certainly help a great deal in informing the American public.

San Francisco
R. STANLEY DOLLAR, President
The Robert Dollar Company

Against Rearming Germany
Your editorial “Neither Guns Nor Butter” (September 24) advocates forcing a reluctant (?) Germany to rearm even though an unreasoning France and Britain are opposed. This one-sided presentation misses the whole point of their opposition: it is not because rearmament means German wealth but because a defeated—and still unreconciled—enemy will be resurrected. Even on the grounds of expediency this is not something to be done lightly so soon after a second devastation.

It is quite easy to visualize a situation where a resurgent Germany occupying the strategic center of Europe plays Russia against us for unification. And, while we might be the highest bidder for her favors, this would definitely throw eastern Europe to wholehearted cooperation with the Reds. France would turn Communist.

You have noted that Germany does not seem too enthusiastic. May I refer you to Taft’s speech of last January when he disapproved the arming of hesitant peoples for our use? Some thought might be given to the whole question whether Europe is actually defensible north of Spain.

While I generally concur with your policies, I am in total disagreement on this matter. Taft’s air-seapower defense of the continent seems the right answer.

Newark, New Jersey
THOMAS L. JARMICK

Letters From the Front
... The picture of the little Korean boy from the cover of Newsweek is all too familiar. That little lad is lucky, however; he is wearing socks, a coat and long pants. I saw too many last winter running on the ice and snow barefooted and wearing only shorts and a t shirt, ragged shirt. And there will be many more this winter.

The article on replacing those of us who were here last winter makes me laugh. I could kick the newspaper publishers from there to here for printing that kind of “bull.” Rotation is merely for publicity—for the gullible citizens of the United States of America. Few but the dead are going home. I’ll bet that not 10 per cent of us who were here last winter will have a chance to go home before at least next spring. We are not getting any replacements; there are none in sight. I wish the public was not so easily fooled.

Inje, Korea
G. I.

All of us here feel a hellish frustration over the paradox of Washington acting the umpire to a war—a particularly vicious war—in which it is a very interested participant. It was all very well to make clear to Mao and Kim at the initial stages of Kaesong that the war would continue. Instead of implementing that very practical stand we sat back, allowed the enemy to build up his potential and watched him dig in.

Just what that two-and-one-half month lull meant is showing in our Autumn Phase of operations. It’s costing us more in blood than any action that’s taken place since I came almost a year ago. That’s particularly true in relation to our achievements.

MacArthur has long since been vindicated in the minds of most of us. And we can’t but feel that some of his proposals will be put into practice in the relatively near future. They’ve got to be, else this incessant ruthless version of the bear goes over the mountain to see yet another mountain will continue, and with it a terrible toll in lives.

Somewhere in Korea
S. C.

The Dangers We Face
May I thank the Freeman for its unique courage in telling the truth about current controversies? My son is now in the service of his country, ready to give part or, maybe, all his young life for the safety of the rest of us. I am glad there is one publication awake to the dangers within and outside of this country. Keep arousing the people to what is happening to liberty. I will spread the knowledge of the Freeman as widely as I can.

Brooklyn, New York
MARY KIMM
A REVIEWER’S NOTEBOOK

By JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

The destiny of man in our barren epoch seems to be almost inextricably bound up with politics. Yet politics is the least satisfying, the least rewarding, of human preoccupations. The more we intensify our political activities, the less time we have to spend on personal development, or the arts, or creativity in general. It is some such realization, I think, that is at the bottom of all the recent refurbishing and revaluation of the decade of the nineteen twenties. Few of our “intellectuals” loved the American twenties when they were living through them; that was the decade when the superior children of the arts were saying “Good-bye, Wisconsin” (or Kansas, or wherever), when Main Street was considered a hopelessly benighted place, when our “business civilization” was being damned from hell to breakfast by renegade businessmen turned writers. But in the twenties no one had to enlist for self-protection, or for the protection of a way of life, in murdrously serious political wars. Life had (or at least it seemed to have) a margin, an area of velvet; the human being had time to love, to create, to play.

He also had time to make a damned fool of himself, which is what lots of people did. During the nineteen thirties all that could be seen in retrospect was the foolishness and the wantonness of the period. In their rush to hail the new bottoms idee to dismiss all the salient figures of the twenties. But in the twenties no one had to enlist for self-protection, or for the protection of a way of life, in murdrously serious political wars. Life had (or at least it seemed to have) a margin, an area of velvet; the human being had time to love, to create, to play.

It’s all very touching and a little foolish, of course. But it is lucky for his readers that Vincent Sheean can go overboard. For his preoccupation with Miss Millay’s adventures with the birds has led him to pursue the mystery to its bottom with a down-to-earth statement, “They come here because I feed them.” This Maine Yankee earthiness should have satisfied Mr. Sheean, who should be humble enough to realize that all things, whether “material” or not, are part of the great encompassing mystery of creation. Even the very cobbles in the street are touched with a wonder that no scientist, even the most dedicated, can fathom; origins always dissolve into origins further back. But Mr. Sheean can not be content with the common-sensical order that exists within the grain of the universe; he persists in his feeling that Edna Millay was a witch (a very nice witch) who had somehow chosen the indigo bunting in preference to a black cat and a self-propelling broom.

Now the penitents are coming back. Vincent Sheean, for example, has discovered that Edna Millay had the same rapport with the world of glowing nature that one finds in Shakespeare. His memoir of Miss Millay, “The Indigo Bunting” (Harper, $2.50), is an odd little book, for it betrays a naivete that seems strange in a person as well-traveled as Mr. Sheean. Edna Millay loved birds; she fed them, and observed them as they were feeding, at her bosky home at Steepletop, near Austerlitz, New York; she even had gulls flying around her head at her summer refuge on Ragged Island in Maine’s Penobscot Bay. Now there is nothing occult about such human relationships with the animal world; beasts and birds respond to friendliness even as human beings.

Edna Millay hooted at this particular display of Sheean mysticism; she met his persistent attempts to pursue the mystery to its bottom with a down-to-earth statement, “They come here because I feed them.” This Maine Yankee earthiness should have satisfied Mr. Sheean, who should be humble enough to realize that all things, whether “material” or not, are part of the great encompassing mystery of creation. Even the very cobbles in the street are touched with a wonder that no scientist, even the most dedicated, can fathom; origins always dissolve into origins further back. But Mr. Sheean can not be content with the common-sensical order that exists within the grain of the universe; he persists in his feeling that Edna Millay was a witch (a very nice witch) who had somehow chosen the indigo bunting in preference to a black cat and a self-propelling broom.

It’s all very touching and a little foolish, of course. But it is lucky for his readers that Vincent Sheean can go overboard. For his preoccupation with Miss Millay’s adventures with the birds has led him back to the lyrics of “Second April,” to the pantheistic feeling of “Renascence,” to the poems in which the sea and the sky and the equinoxes and the solstices are the pervading influences. Miss Millay was born a woman and distressed by all the needs and notions of her kind, but she was also born with the faculty of feeling the earth-forces that moved the Elizabethans three centuries before her time. Her lyrics and sonnets are, as Vincent Sheean indicates, quite Shakespearean in their feeling. But they are not derivative, they are not the old clipped coin of
the Romantic tradition in English poetry. Edna Millay’s vocabulary, her turn of phrase, and her informing spirit, all derive from the Maine Penobscot country, where New England takes on amplitude as it faces toward the tides of Fundy and the open Atlantic.

Vincent Sheean saw Edna Millay only a few times. He is such a sensitive observer of human moods, however, that his spasmodic contact with his subject has resulted in a subtly revealing book. “The Indigo Bunting” makes it clear that Mr. Sheean’s true love is not politics (a subject on which he has wasted half his life) but the whole human range of creativity from which the State should be banished utterly. Now that Mr. Sheean has found his vein I hope that he goes on exploiting it.

I hope, too, that Malcolm Cowley and Alfred Kazin, two critics who spent a good deal of their time in the nineteen thirties cultivating the illusion that the way to free man was to put his energies under the control of Socialist politicians, have turned for good to other themes. Malcolm Cowley has just finished rearranging F. Scott Fitzgerald’s “Tender is the Night” (Scribner’s, $3.50) in accordance with an outline left by Fitzgerald himself in his notebook. The reshuffling of the components of “Tender is the Night” into more strictly chronological order does improve the novel. Edward Dahlberg, who thinks Fitzgerald an overrated man, sent me to reading the new Cowley-Fitzgerald version of “Tender is the Night” with trepidation; I was afraid that I would discover Fitzgerald had become a diminished figure. But I found that the writing in “Tender is the Night” is just as good as I thought it was in 1934, when I first read it. There is a shoddy strain in some of Fitzgerald’s work, and Mr. Dahlberg is quite right to feel angry at the general American habit of periodically overpraising what has been neglected and underpraised before. But Fitzgerald had purified both his style and his attitude for the writing of “Tender is the Night.”

Mr. Kazin’s “F. Scott Fitzgerald: The Man and His Work” (World, $3) is a collection of criticisms and appreciations of Fitzgerald that span a full thirty years of time. The collection makes for some interesting reading. One of the things which it proves, inadvertently, is that our off-the-cuff reviewing has been considerably better than our more pretentious criticism. When a single critic feels he has to drop in the names of Racine, André Gide, Goethe, John Milton, Proust, Yeats, Shakespeare, Dickens, Voltaire, Balzac, Henry James, George Moore, AE, Stendhal, St. John of the Cross, Wordsworth, Keats, Shelley, Dostoevski, Byron, Shaw and Samuel Butler to explain Fitzgerald, the traffic becomes a trifle overburdened, to say the least.

The nineteen twenties made much of the cult of sport: the period’s great names inevitably include Babe Ruth, Bobby Jones, Red Grange, Bill Tilden and Jack Dempsey, to name only a few of the athletes. Today, what with the basketball scandals, the West Point cheating and the lurid tie-ups between bookies and police departments, sport is getting a bad name. Soon, in another wild swing of the pendulum, our colleges may be discontinuing football, basketball, or whatever. But this would be to heave out the baby with the bath. When the Greeks insisted that athletics and music belong in any good school curriculum, they had something: one can not throw a discus, or make a double play, or turn an accomplished figure on a skate, without a very real knowledge of technique, of the relation of cause to effect. For our money, if it came to a choice between football and the average modern economics department in a college, we would throw out the economics department. A freshman can hardly play football without learning that a missed signal can lead to disaster. But freshmen can and do take Economics 10 without ever being told the truth about energy relationships in the field of production and distribution.

Since sport is getting a bad name because of the activities of a few bad sportsmen, someone ought to step in and save it from the wretches who are clouding its future. The fact that baseball, for example, can build character in a good man as well as destroy it in a weak one is apparent in two good books of recent vintage, Arthur Mann’s “Baseball Confidential: Secret History of the War Among Chandler, Durocher, MacPhail and Rickey” (David McKay, $2.50), and Duane Decker’s “Fast Man on a Pivot” (Morrow, $2.50). I thoroughly enjoyed both these books, the one an informed chronicle of how the major leagues survived the somewhat inane High Commissionership of ex-Senator Happy Chandler, the other a novel about a second baseman who has some (but not all) of the characteristics of the New York Giants’ brainy Eddie Stanky.

AND ORCHARD FRUITS

Lucretius mentions the marjoram Young suitors smeared on the doors Of the damsels.
Solomon sang of the myrrh and aloes On the locks Of the bridal door. Jesus ached for the alabaster The Pharisee denied.

“Would to God That all the Lord’s People Were Prophets,” Moses said,
And sighed for men Whose souls smelled of frankincense And orchard fruits. EDWARD DAHLBERG
SELF-DESTROYED SAINT

Waiting For God, by Simone Weil. Translated by Emma Craufurd. New York: Putnam's. $3.50.

Certainly our age has not outgrown the need for saints and martyrs; whether it can make redemptive use of them is another matter. During the war the Free French government in London—to its great credit—tried to use the genius of Simone Weil. Out of this attempt grew her "L'enracinement"—a memorandum on the rights and duties of the state and the individual to be published next year in this country as "The Need for Roots."

A student of comparative religions, Simone Weil did not find her own roots in any organized faith, although for years she "waited for God" on the threshold of the Catholic Church which her friend Father Perrin vainly begged her to enter. The present volume consists of selected letters and essays that give us the record of this waiting, which was rewarded toward the end of her life by mystical experiences the authenticity of which it is impossible to doubt. The book is, in fact, a major contribution to the literature of mysticism, of especial interest to the intellectuals of the between-wars generation some of whom (Budenz, Douglas Hyde) shared Simone Weil's pilgrimage from Communist picket lines to the sources of religious revelation.

Simone Weil was born in 1909, the precocious daughter of an agnostic Jewish physician. At the age of five she refused to eat sugar as long as the soldiers at the front of World War I were not able to get it. Seventeen years later she was threatened with the loss of her teaching license for marching in the picket lines of unemployed workers, with whom she insisted on sharing her food. Still treading the pathway of sainthood, she endangered her frail health by hard labor in the Renault auto plant, and again by service in the Spanish Civil War, where she suffered severe accidental burns. This experience ended her political activity. She had learned, as Leslie Fiedler remarks in his excellent introduction, that "Not even defeat could purify the revolution!"

Thereafter, Simone Weil turned from her "social" preoccupations to the practice of the religious disciplines she had studied at the École Normale where she was the protégée of Alain. Steps on the ladder that led to her ultimate encounter with God included her discovery of the Gregorian chants and of English seventeenth-century metaphysical poetry; her reading of the Bhagava-Gita in Sanskrit and of Plato, the Pythagoreans and the Stoics in Greek.

Her life continued to be filled with absurd and completely sincere gestures. At one time she wished to be parachuted into wartime France so that she could bring spiritual solace to the underground fighters; at another, although she had been denounced earlier as a Trotskyist, she wished to go to the Soviet Union!

The letters to Father Perrin reveal a lonely mind and spirit, intense, original, exquisitely feminine despite her deliberate effacement of all the attributes of personal charm, and not in the least "neurotic." She was in fact contemptuous of the spurious mysticism that derives from frustrated sexual desire, and her own experiences were clearly not of that character. Here is her description of one of her own experiences, achieved by the recitation, at a supernormal level of concentrated attention, of the Lord's Prayer:

At times the very first words tear my thoughts from my body and transport it to a place outside space where there is neither perspective nor point of view. The infinity of the ordinary expanses of perception is replaced by an infinity to the second or sometimes the third degree. At the same time, filling every part of this infinity of infinity, there is silence, a silence which is not the absence of sound, but which is the object of a positive sensation, more positive than that of sound. Noises, if there are any, only reach me after crossing this silence. Sometimes, also, during this recitation or at other moments, Christ is present with me in person . . .

More comprehensible, and not less impressive than this testimony, is the extraordinary essay entitled "Forms of the Implicit Love of God." This implicit, or indirect love, she writes, may be directed at religious ceremonies, at the beauty of the world, at our neighbor and at friendship—all as preparation for the "personal visit of the Master." She regards love of our neighbor as a means by which we participate in the divinity, transcending the mechanical necessity that grinds out blind injustice much as the force of gravity makes water flow downhill.

Concerning the order and beauty of the world, Simone Weil writes:

It is because beauty has no end in view that it constitutes the only finality here below. For here below there are no ends. All things that we take for ends are means. Money is the means of buying, power is the means of commanding. . . . The soul's natural inclination to love beauty is the trap God most frequently uses in order to win it and open it to the breath from on high.

Concerning the "inspiration" of the poet-artist-thinker, we have this:

Every time that a man rises to a degree of excellence, which by participation makes of him a divine being, we are aware of something impersonal and anonymous about him. His voice is enveloped in silence. This is evident in all the great works of art or thoughts, in the great deeds of saints and in their words.

Prayer, as Simone Weil practiced it, consisted of attention. She devotes an entire essay to discussing the usefulness of school studies, considered as a discipline requiring a lower kind of attention, but effectively increasing the power of attention that will be available at the time of prayer.

The last essay in the volume consists of a phrase-by-phrase exegesis of the Lord's prayer. In ten pages she provides enough spiritual insight to equip
an average generation of theological students for their entire careers.

Simone Weil died in England in 1943. Her death was probably hastened by her unwillingness to eat more than the hunger rations then prevailing in occupied France. Her parents are still living and their reticence still withholds many of the facts of her life. Much of her work still awaits publication in French, and this book, except for the pamphlet entitled "The Iliad: or, the Poem of Force," translated by Mary McCarthy, is the only volume now available in English. Enough is in print, however, to leave no doubt as to the quality and importance of Simone Weil's genius.

Thus far this century, which has witnessed the reductio ad horrendum of Marxist materialism at the hands of Lenin and his totalitarian successors and emulators, has produced no nobler or more tragic figure. Against the monstrous dogma that would banish God from heaven and earth, make men into things, and enthrone a common murderer, Simone Weil opposes her terrible earnestness, her untempered assumption of the world's affliction, her unintended and self-destroying sainthood.

JAMES ROTTY

THE JOYOUS STEVENSON

Voyage to Windward: The Life of Robert Louis Stevenson, by J. C. Furnas. New York: Sloane. $5.00

Of many hues, virtues and robust attitudes despite the air of the sickroom, this study of Robert Louis Stevenson does the right thing at all times. It is a devoted book by a worshipful man, full of infinite details; a portrait more engraved with telling dots than with huge splashes of conventional color. Yet it is a full portrait—down to the minutest personal dissection and cross-graining, an expert rendering by a man who has traveled the track and distances Stevenson journeyed.

But it is the Samoan chapter that is of special interest to me, for it completes the portrait of Stevenson as a great writer and extraordinary human being. Here Mr. Furnas is very much at home, having recently written "Anatomy of Paradise," a study of life in the Pacific Islands. Samoa in the 1890s, before the West cooked up exotic tours for jaded writers, was already down at the heels. Stevenson, who had traveled to many places for his health eventually settled there with his clan. And it was a clan, in family and friends, on the last pastoral frontier in the blue sea. When Stevenson arrived, it was very much an unsettled place, with German, British and American colonials just about ready for the twentieth century and its ways.

This is a full, fleshy, witty book. Stevenson was not merely a romancer in a velvet jacket, but a man who knew women, had a sense of joy, a lively air—and Edinburgh had provided this in his youth despite the all-pervading Calvinistic gloom.

By the time Louis was admitted to the bar (for his father insisted on law as a profession), the thousand pounds his father gave him taught him all the niceties of Bohemia, literature, the publishing business and love. As for law, he never practiced. His "love" was mostly through correspondence with the virtuous Mrs. Sitwell (Clair) and stormy reactions via the mails. With only sixteen years of life left (and sickness robbed him of much of that brief period of creation), Stevenson embarked on his literary career, earning about four hundred pounds during the first four years. When he set out for America he left, like many an immigrant, with just passage money and emotional excitement for currency. He was going to marry Mrs. Fanny Vandegrift, eleven years his senior, who resembled the beautiful Mrs. Sitwell.

He was the perpetual wanderer. It is too easy to compare him to D. H. Lawrence—both looking after their lungs but finding that it was more than health and good air that made them travel to distant lands. Stevenson never had roots that dug in too deeply, only his literary friendships with men like Gosse, William Ernest Henley (who became embittered later), George Saintsbury, Henry James—the elite of the "new literature," and with them he carried on a huge correspondence. In far-off Samoa the stiff-necked and pretentious Henry Adams pays him a courtesy call. Stevenson could very well have arranged to have been out and not missed a thing. He was a gracious host, a generous and warm man. But Adams, a specious recorder, is mostly snide, puffed up, vain and stupid when he recounts the incident.

It was at Davos that Stevenson became the full-fledged writer, doing hackwork for what cash it would bring. There he began "Treasure Island," which sold for thirty-four pounds under a pseudonym. Admired by all, including Mr. Gladstone, Stevenson was eventually reconciled to the book when William Butler Yeats put the final stamp of approval on it. He was now acclaimed, for on his second visit to New York eight years later he arrived as a celebrity, much in demand by publishers and magazine editors for anything he cared to write. In 1886 he chartered the beautiful yacht Casco, having recalled his boyish delight when he heard stories about the South Seas, and he set out, clan and all, for the distant "Isles of Voices."

He had, literally, selected his burial ground—and what a place to live and die. His death came eight years later, after many pauses en route, visits to Tahiti, Hawaii, Australia, and the adjacent islands. Though Samoa provided the only real ease for him, Stevenson was soon engulfed, as was his habit, in politics. It was a politics woven of the brittle colonial strands of German, British and American interests in the Pacific. The spadework that Stevenson did eventually dug the German out and dug the others in.

Having arranged to write Travel Letters for McClure's magazine, Stevenson found his material
lying fallow in the islands, and his voyages paid off financially and spiritually as he roved the Pacific before settling down at Vallima under the shadow of scraggy Mt. Vaea, where he lies buried beneath a huge block of marble. I have been there and climbed the steep, harsh mountain, stood in awe beside the tomb, on which is inscribed “Home is the sailor, home from the sea.” The little Samoan boy and the American wrestler, Cliff Theide, my companions, were likewise affected by the memory of something—that man Stevenson, dead at 44, the consumptive consumed with an art containing so many endless delights and memories. And there we stood and cried for Stevenson, enshrined in so many memories in our once boyish hearts.

Mr. Furnas’s biography is a proud piece of writing, research and discovery. Many a ghost is laid in this book, replete with informal criticism. The errors of past biographers, too dainty for the real life of Stevenson, are corrected. Henley and others emerge the worse for their picayune natures. The scholar in Furnas merged with the man who loved his materials and this book is a fine piece of coordinated research and writing, to keep Stevenson within his natural environment and stature.

HARRY ROSKOLENKO

IMPERIAL SOVIETS

The New Soviet Empire, by David J. Dallin. New Haven: Yale. $3.75

A scholarly social-democratic exile from the Soviet Union, David Dallin during the last decade has published a most valuable series of books on Soviet politics and economics, foreign policy and social conditions. His work, “Forced Labor in Soviet Russia” (written in collaboration with Boris Nikolaevsky), is the standard classic on the subject.

Mr. Dallin’s latest work is broader in theme than the title would suggest. It starts with a most interesting close-knit analysis of how the Soviet Union exploits economically the areas which have fallen under its political domination in eastern Europe. The author then discusses certain aspects of Soviet political philosophy. In later chapters he presents a good deal of material obtained from conversations with “non-returning” Russian refugees.

Very illuminating is the chapter on “blat,” a slang word for the corruption that lubricates the wheels of the unwieldy state bureaucratic economy of the Soviet Union. Workers in a soap factory eke out their meager wages by stealing some of the soap and splitting the proceeds with the guard who is supposed to watch them. A great many transactions in state industry and trade are on a basis of evading fixed prices and selling part of the product (which is never enough to satisfy the demand) outside the legal channels. If extensive research in this field were possible, it would probably be found that many of the laws of “human action,” as defined by von Mises, continue to operate in the straitjacket of what is, in theory, a rigidly collectivist economy.

Tsarism was once described as despotism tempered by assassination. The Soviet economy might, according to Dallin’s account, be defined as socialism tempered by humanizing and moderating corruption.

Communist propaganda represents the Soviet Union as the champion of the oppressed and exploited of the world against “imperialist” powers, like the United States. This propaganda has given a guilt complex to some good-hearted Americans who have not thought the subject through.

Dallin’s work should be an effective cure for this guilt complex. He estimates the total value of “political” imports (a polite term for what has been extorted and stolen in one way or another) into the Soviet Union from conquered and satellite areas since the end of the war at between twenty and thirty billion dollars. Meanwhile, “imperialist” America has given away, through the Marshall Plan, through UNRRA, through grants of various kinds and loans that will most probably never be repaid, at least an equivalent amount to foreign countries.

The author lists, with many concrete illustrations, eight methods by which the wealth of the vast new Soviet empire is siphoned off into Russia. These include reparation payments, wholesale looting of everything from consumption goods to heavy industrial equipment, commercial treaties in which Soviet goods are priced high and satellite goods are priced low, “mixed companies” to which the Soviet Union contributes management and the satellites contribute real assets, and various forms of trade manipulation. For instance, the Soviet Union buys Polish coal at an artificially low price and resells this coal to Sweden at a high price.

The Soviet-controlled portion of East German industry, according to Dallin, embraces 34 per cent of the coal output, 40 per cent of the electric power, 82 per cent of the oil, 64 per cent of the metallurgy and machine-building, 52 per cent of the chemical production, 25 per cent of the optical industry, etc. Stalin has been given many undeserved titles, but “greatest imperialist exploiter of all time” would seem to be one which he might claim without reasonable fear of contradiction.

The author stresses the point that Stalin has reversed the emphasis of Marx by giving politics priority over economics. While the United States has been acting on the theory that social and economic conditions must be improved in order to forestall Communist victories, Stalin has proceeded on the assumption that anything can be done with a sufficiently powerful machine of propaganda and terrorism.

The book contains some vivid material on the tremendous inequalities in Soviet living conditions, much of it derived from Soviet fugitives who had formerly been able, as architects and engineers, to observe the habits of the Soviet ruling class. As Mr. Dallin points out, the war has brought no important change in the Soviet political and economic
system, which has been restored without modification. Workers are still chained to their jobs; the collective farm system is more rigid than ever; the main burden of the high military expenditures falls on the consumer through a sales tax far heavier than any dreamed of by the most conservative economist in this country.

The author is extremely pessimistic about the attitude of the Soviet rulers toward peace, but no more pessimistic than their philosophy and the Soviet political record during and since the war would warrant. As he writes:

It is perfectly safe to say that not a single high-ranking Communist in the Soviet Union believes in the possibility of a lasting peaceful settlement of the present worldwide contest for power. The only question in the minds of the Soviet leaders is when and where the conflict will break out.... The chain of Stalin's wars remains unbroken—conventions, treaties, armistices and the United Nations notwithstanding.

Mr. Dallin believes that the Russian people are a key force in the struggle of the Western world against the Soviet rulers and their designs of world conquest. He believes that these people are "too intelligent to be deceived, but too weary to rebel" and that it is a grave error to assume that they are in sympathy with the Soviet system. He thinks the Western world needs Russia, within her prewar boundaries, as a potential ally, a deterrent, a balance in the great-power scale, and suggests that it would be shortsighted to Balkanize Russia by breaking it up into a number of smaller independent states.

On this point the author is perhaps inclined to prejudge a situation which can be clarified, in all probability, only under the stress of war. Do the more advanced non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union, notably the Ukrainians, feel nationalist grievances which would impel them to demand separation? Perhaps it would be wiser to leave this question to the decision of future events. Every war brings political, as well as military surprises. This is all the more true of a conflict which in many countries would probably assume the character of a civil war.

There are one or two other flaws in this generally excellent book, besides the author's somewhat dogmatic approach to the question whether it would necessarily be desirable to preserve Russian unity within the frontier antedating the Stalin-Hitler Pact. It is questionable whether the author is correct in his assumption that the British policy has been more realistic than the American. In the case of China the reverse would seem to be the case. And the organization of the rich material in the book might have been improved. On balance, however, like all Dallin's works, it achieves a fine synthesis of factual reporting and intellectual analysis. It is indispensable for anyone who wishes to follow the pattern and methods of Soviet imperial rule, abroad and at home.

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

THE BOYS LEARNED


From the earlier volumes of Captain Morison's history of the Navy in the war, few things emerged with greater clarity than the singular failure of the Japanese to follow up an advantage once gained. They continued to operate along predetermined lines. In this, the sixth volume, and the fourth to deal with the war in the Pacific, the repeating pattern is that of an equally remarkable Japanese persistence in sticking to a plan that obviously had a hole in it, in throwing good money after bad.

The confused and desperate fighting in the Central Solomons was marked by many American failures. Our torpedoes were nowhere near as good as the Japanese, the PTs were too light for the task given them, the cruisers were handled as though no one had ever heard of Japanese methods, the landings were fumbled. "The strategy and tactics of the New Georgia campaign were among the least successful of any Allied campaign in the Pacific," says Captain Morison. Yet at the close of the book the great fortress of Rabaul is neutralized, the Japanese army on Bougainville is employing most of its men to raise food, and MacArthur's drive to the Philippines can go serenely ahead with its flanks secure.

What happened? Well, for one thing the American industrial plant was dismayingly more efficient than the Japanese. When one of our destroyers went down, there would be another one along in a minute, while the Japanese could not afford losses except in return for something sensational. For another thing, the boys learned. In the later chapters of this book, the Navy is fighting the battles of Empress Augusta Bay and St. George's Channel, and beating the enemy all around the town at their own specialty of high-speed night action fought out mainly with the torpedo.

But the ruling factor seems to have been the immense flexibility of American planning, and the skill with which all units and services were dovetailed together. In the November strike on Rabaul the carriers stripped their docks for the attack; land planes from the Solomons came out to cover them against any counter-stroke. In Bismarck Strait unsupported air turned back a naval movement. American destroyers were constantly shooting up Jap artillery and troop concentrations when they attacked our perimeters. Hardly anything was tried twice. Beside this use of every weapon in the arsenal, Japanese planning looks hackneyed and unimaginative. The enemy learned so little as to tempt the conclusion the Japanese man is not an adaptive mechanism. And they paid high for the lessons they failed to learn. The campaigns of this book kept the Japanese naval air service from recovering from the losses it had taken in the Guadalcanal campaign, reduced their destroyer arm to impotence and isolated more troops than the Ameri-
can High Command was able to put in the field.

Nearly all the story is here, told with Captain Morison's usual care for detail, his usual shrewd judgments and usual brio. It is rather a pity that he did not bring in the submarine operations of the period, for they had reached the point where they strongly influenced the thinking of the Japanese High Command.

FLETCHER PRATT

LEVI STOPPED AT ROME

The Watch, by Carlo Levi. New York: Farrar, Straus and Young. $3.75

Carlo Levi's first book, "Christ Stopped at Eboli," was something unique in the field of modern Italian prose. It had sensitiveness, humanity, and fine writing. Further, its subject matter was definitely unusual, presenting to the average reader, whether American or European, a fairly full if somewhat impressionistic study of a way of life, arresting and exotic even though a part of our contemporary world. And precisely because it was the study of a particular group in a particular set of surroundings it had universal implications and the character of the culture studied had in it something of the eternal. I do not think that one can claim as much for "The Watch."

To be sure, there are plenty of good things in the book. Levi is a painter and has the discerning eye of his profession. Some of the portraits of the individuals who crossed his path in the stirring summer of 1945 are very well drawn. And since he is also a man of warm emotions, some of the scenes depicted will move the reader too, just as his philosophical-political commentary is interesting because the author is an intellectual whose opinion on recent historical events must command our attention. But the book as a whole fails to come off. I think it is because of the nature of the subject. The time was an exciting one to live through, for the aspirations of the Italian resistance were just making their first disillusioning contact with the elements of inertia and compromise traditional in the country's political mores. But the fact is, for the foreign reader at least, Rome of 1945 is too near to us to have any of the glamorous encrustation of time and too far away—so fast do things move nowadays—to appeal to us as a study in contemporary politics. The place, too, lacks the unique charm of Lucania—as a subject for original literary treatment, that is.

This is not to say that Rome and its strange assortment of types of humanity are not interesting—that would be heresy indeed. But there have been many books written about Rome and this, somehow, seems only another one. Perhaps it is unfair to point out that no character of the whole gallery, however well drawn, seems to have an importance in the story, if "The Watch" can be called a story. But the point may be made that these characters lack the appeal of the peasants of Lucania because they are, after all, metropolitan types we have met before. So, viewed as a story, the book has no direction; considered as another sociological study (for lack of a more adequate classification), it suffers by contrast with "Christ Stopped at Eboli" because the material is by no means so original. And considered as history, it is lacking in background, for the writer takes a good deal for granted that the foreign reader at least would not be aware of. Atmosphere it has, and added thereto warmth and sharp observation with a touch of gentle melancholy. All this is good but not nearly as good as "Christ Stopped at Eboli."

The translation is adequate, though a word or phrase occasionally suggests a foreign hand—a journey by land, for example, in English is not called a "voyage." Still, I can not understand why the translator is not named; I have read many worse translations.

THOMAS G. BERGIN

TWAIN IN HARTFORD

Nook Farm: Mark Twain's Hartford Circle, by Kenneth R. Andrews. Cambridge: Harvard. $4.75

Professor Andrews has familiarized himself with enormous amounts of new Mark Twain material, including new data about the members of Hartford's Nook Farm Literary Colony, to which Twain brought his bride. Those now largely forgotten notables—Harriet Beecher Stowe, Charles Dudley Warner, Rev. Joe Twichell, John and Isabella Beecher Hooker—are not blacked out by the fame of Twain. They appear here as fractions of his life. This collective biography is packed with forgotten incidents and old controversies, including the Henry Ward Beecher scandal (Isabella Beecher Hooker believed her brother to be guilty). It is all neatly selected and arranged, a convincing picture of Twain in domesticity, professionally writing, mingling in civic affairs, struggling with a publishing house and with the promotion of an invention.

Twain needed money. He had married a rich man's daughter and chose to lecture four months of the year to support her. Lecturing cut deeply into his time, but it paid for the wife he wanted and permitted him to entertain foreign celebrities. Twain's later pessimism is traced to the loss of the children he adored, his two big business failures (if he had only bought Aetna stock at low after the Chicago Fire, he would have had an increasingly profitable backlog), and the implacable impact of the industrial revolution, which vanquished the world he knew and loved. Twain was more of a great chronicler of a nostalgic past than he was an artist. He was good with frontier characters, but he never successfully projected the character of even one adult woman.

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