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The Philosophy of Freedom

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> Our hope that freedom is not going to be ultimately destroyed by the joint pressure of totalitarianism and the general bureaucratization of the world, and indeed our very readiness to defend it, depends crucially on our belief that the desire for freedom . . . is not an accidental fancy of history, nor a result of peculiar social conditions or a temporary by-product of specific economic life forms . . . but that it is rooted in the very quality of being human.
>
> Leszek Kolakowski (Sometime Professor of Philosophy in the University of Warsaw)

Taking the words "freedom" and "liberty" for present purposes to be sufficiently synonymous, I propose to argue that Kolakowski was right. I shall start by distinguishing between two fundamentally different yet intimately connected senses of these key words. Kolakowski's concern was with what—so long as we do not forget that liberties may be sometimes sustained and sometimes restricted by institutions other than the state—we can conveniently call political freedom. The other sense refers to what is usually dubbed the freedom of the will. My contention is that it must indeed be very difficult, if not practically impossible, to become and to remain committed to the extension of political liberties and the defence of political freedom so long as you refuse to recognize that the freedom of the will "is rooted in the very quality of being human." I shall try to show that it is in fact so rooted and furthermore that no one could contrive to understand the very words in which any denial of this fact has to be expressed without at the same time being in a position to know that that denial must itself be false. In an earlier article I argued that, in order to provide a plausible rationale for the rights claims of the American Declaration of Independence, we have to ground them all upon this same fundamental fact of our human nature.[1]

1. Political Freedom

In this political understanding, people are correctly described as being free or enjoying liberties inasmuch as and insofar as they are neither confined as prisoners nor constrained by formidable threats. Before proceeding to the freedom of the will, it is worth spending a little time on a few of the commonest confusions, since these are often effectively exploited by the enemies of political freedom.

1. Certainly it would be the diametric opposite of the truth to say of anyone who is "a prisoner and in chains" that he or she is free and at liberty. But it would also be false to say of people who are not in any way prisoners, much less in chains, that they are free or at liberty to do particular things when the doing of those particular things would incur serious penalties, irrespective of whether those penalties would be imposed by law, or nonlegally or even illegally. It is because those who are not prisoners or in chains may still be in many respects unfree, and also because almost everyone is free in at least some respects although in at least some others not free, that it becomes best usually to speak of liberties or of freedoms in the plural, and to begin pedantically to particularize whenever clouds of confusion loom.

Paradoxes arise here because a person or a people may be free from one thing but not another, may here enjoy these liberties but not those. Thus, notoriously, the citizens of countries that have achieved freedom from colonial rule may now enjoy fewer legal liberties than they had under the old regimes; while, equally notoriously, inhabitants of what, because it has yet to be conscripted into "the Socialist Camp," can properly be called the still free world, may nevertheless be subject to other and sometimes comparably burdensome domestic oppressions. Notwithstanding that nowadays such questions seem to be favoured mainly by spokespersons striving to restrict or to devalue existing or expected liberties, it is almost always clarificatory to ask "What freedoms, freedom from what, and freedom for whom?"

2. The eighteenth-century French *philosophe* Helvétius wrote, "The free man is the man who is not in irons nor imprisoned in a jail. . . ." But he added both a third disjunction, "nor terrorized like a slave by the fear of punishment," and a caveat, "it is not lack of freedom not to fly like an eagle or swim like a whale."[2] A century earlier the most formidable of all English political thinkers, Thomas Hobbes, had produced an even terser epitome: "A free man is he that . . . is not hindered to do what he hath the will to do."[3] It is a pity that he apparently failed to notice both that, always supposing that people would in fact intervene to constrain or coerce someone were some particular action to be performed, then that person must remain in that particular respect unfree; and that this is the case regardless of whether or not "he hath the will to do" whatever it may be. A prisoner in jail does not become at liberty to leave just because it so happens that he has no wish to do so. Both the contented and the discontented are, therefore, equally unfree.

The caveat that Helvétius offers is also important. For I may be free to do many things that it is, for various reasons, not in my power to do. The fact that I am incapable of flying like an eagle or even a butterfly may make my freedom to do these things worthless to me. But, since it does not constitute a ban on my doing them if only I could, this limitation is a limitation on my powers, not on my freedom.

Again we may sympathize with Anatole France scoffing at "the majestic equality of the law that forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets and to steal bread".[4] Nevertheless, a liberty that some of us either cannot or do not wish to use is still a liberty. And people reasonably may and in fact often do resent the imposition of restrictions upon actions that they themselves either are unable or do not wish to take. For instance, resentment against the Group Areas Act in South Africa extends far beyond the comparatively small numbers of those who might be able to afford to buy property in areas in which they now are legally forbidden so to do.

Nor should we overlook the possibility that one set of people, the members of which do not themselves propose to take advantage of certain liberties, many nevertheless stand in less direct ways to gain inasmuch as these liberties are also available to other people who will choose to make use of them. For instance, I for one shall never establish any commercial enterprise. Yet I am constantly benefitting from the fact that other people can and do use their freedoms to enter the market as new competitors with those who are at present supplying goods and services I buy.

3. Another rich source of confusion lies in the fact that there are those who want to restrict the word "liberty" to only those freedoms that they think we ought to have; and which, if available, they think we are morally required or at least entitled to exercise. Thus, in his essay on the *Tenure of Kings and Magistrates,* John Milton, the poet and champion of the liberty of unlicensed printing, wrote, "None can love freedom but good men; the rest love not freedom but license." At the end of the following century, men of quite another stamp, proto-Leninists of the French Jacobin clubs, used to say, "No man is free in doing evil. To prevent him is to set him free."

Any such recommendation for a change in our verbal usage should be rejected without hesitation. For it conceals the essential truth. Even liberties that it was agreed we ought not to have at all, or which no one, though having, ought to exercise, remain still, like any other liberties, absences of external coercion or constraint.

In the present context it is essential to insist upon that qualification "external." It is correct English, and often true, to say such things as "I was forced to do it, I had promised"; or "I could not help myself, I felt so ashamed." But these are constraints of a very different kind from the obstacles put in our way by other people. It is those last, and only those last, with which we are concerned here.

It may sometimes and for some people be the course of prudence to recognize that some kinds of external coercion or constraint may be irremovable, at least by them; and hence that, at least for them, it may be realistic to react by somehow abandoning or disengaging all those desires to the satisfaction of which the irremovable kinds of coercion or constraint constitute an obstacle. But what you become, by thus "emancipating yourself from enslavement" to those unsatisfiable desires is most emphatically not, in the relevant respects and the relevant understanding, free or at liberty.

Certainly there was something magnificent in the deathbed response of the Stoic sage Posidonius. Suffering agonies, he insisted, as his philosophy required, that these, like everything else, were expressions of the Cosmic Reason and therefore welcome: "Do your worst, pain; no matter what you do, you cannot make me hate you." Yet, whether or not this response is to be accounted a manifestation of the spiritual freedom of Posidonius, freedom in the political understanding neither is nor can be any kind of recognition of necessity. It is, rather, the opening of alternatives, whether these be good or bad, desired or undesired.

4. Liberties, though they can be secured only by powerful positive measures, are in themselves—like peace and health—essentially negative. There is a temptation to argue that nothing so important and so good as freedom, or peace, or health, can in truth be merely negative. These misobservations are then gleefully seized on as offering opportunities for the observers to commend their personal agenda as constituting the elements of *true, positive* whichever it may be. It then emerges, in the present case, that a man is endowed with *positive* freedom not insofar as he "is not hindered to do what he hath the will to do" but inasmuch as he is in fact—perhaps more nilly than willy—behaving in some approved way.[5]

Programs for the promotion of particular sorts of behaviour—often programs proposing the employment of every means of compulsion—can thus be commended as promising the realization of an alternative conception of *freedom;* an alternative superior and hence referring to what alone is, supposedly, properly describable as freedom. Gullible or sometimes perhaps themselves intentionally gulling interpreters are then all too ready to respond by misrepresenting thinkers who were in fact pursuing altogether different or actually incompatible ends as if these thinkers had been close political associates of the author of *On Liberty.*[6]

The truth is that "positive" in the expression "positive freedom" is what the Scholastics called an alienans adjective. Positive freedom is thus no more a kind of freedom than imaginary horses or Soviet democracy are kinds of horses or kinds of democracy. Certainly it appears to be almost irresistibly tempting to assume that it is the positive-sounding terms "liberty," "peace," or "health" rather than "unfreedom," "war" or "disease" that are, so to speak, logically dominant. But again the truth is that it is the seemingly negative notion rather than the apparently positive that—in J. L. Austin's memorably inelegant phrase—"wears the trousers." For, as the same sage continued, "commonly enough the

'negative' (looking) word marks the (positive) abnormality, while the 'positive' word . . . merely serves to rule out the suggestion of that abnormality.''[7]

2. Freedom of the Will

Turning now to the second sort of understanding of our two key terms, we may truly be said to be endowed with free will when and insofar as—in a strong sense soon to be elucidated—we could do or could have done other than we do do or did do. The intended reference is to the familiar fact that, always throughout our waking lives, we are all of us agents, although the scope of that agency varies not only from one individual to another but also, from time to time, in one and the same individual—whether in sickness or in health, whether in maturity or in senility. Necessarily, as agents, we can and cannot but make choices. Equally necessarily, as agents, in a sense shortly to be elucidated, we always could do or could have done other than we do do or did do.

(i) What makes the use of the words ''free'' and ''free will'' misleading here is the logical fact that all agency is not, as such and necessarily, free agency. For the man who receives from the Godfather ''an offer he cannot refuse'' is in a crucially different case from the errant mafioso who is without warning gunned down from behind. As the latter collapses into a pool of his own blood, he simultaneously ceases both to live and to act. In that very collapse he is no longer an agent at all, but purely a patient. Contrast with him the unfortunate who is told that within thirty seconds either his signature or his brains will be on the document surrendering his property: ''Now choose!'' Although in this transaction far from a free agent, he nevertheless remains an agent still.

He remains an agent because, although the signing is most certainly not done of his own free will, he did—in the more fundamental senses still to be elucidated—have a choice, and he could have done other than he did. Certainly, in the less fundamental but more common senses of these expressions, we do correctly say that people really had no choice or that they could not have done other than they did; when, although it is our belief that in those more fundamental senses they did or they could, nevertheless there were in fact no alternative courses of action open to them that—in either the descriptive or the prescriptive interpretations of ''expect''—they could reasonably have been expected to adopt.[8] These correct and idiomatic usages, like the philosophical abuses of the terms ''free'' and ''free will,'' are seriously misleading. For they draw our attention away from the essentials of agency.

(ii) The better to appreciate what these essentials are, we need now to consult the great chapter ''Of Power'' in *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*[9]. It is as certain as without direct testimonial evidence this sort of thing can be that Hume had this chapter most in mind, perhaps even open before him, when, in both the *Treatise* and the first *Enquiry*, he composed his enormously yet not always happily influential sections ''Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion'' and

"Of Liberty and Necessity." A critical examination of this seminal chapter in Locke's *Essay,* together with an equally critical examination of the results of Hume's consequent meditations, can yield two very valuable trophies.

(a) First, our study of these classical sources should in the end be sufficient to show us that we all have the most direct and the most inexpugnably certain experience: not only both of physical (as opposed to logical) necessity and of physical (as opposed to logical) impossibility, but also both of being, on some occasions, able to do other than we do do and of being, on other occasions, unable to behave in any other way than that in which we are behaving. Logical necessity and logical impossibility—with which physical necessity and physical impossibility are always implicitly or explicitly contrasted—are, of course, definable without direct reference to the nonlinguistic world: one proposition follows from another with logical necessity if and only if to deny the one while asserting the other would be to contradict yourself; whereas a proposed project, or a supposed situation, is to be dismissed as logically impossible if and only if that very proposal, or that very supposition, is self-contraditory.

(b) Second, once we are seized of these insights, we should be ready to recognize that there is no way in which creatures neither enjoying nor suffering experiences of both these two contrasting kinds could either acquire for themselves, or explicate to others, any of the corresponding notions. If this contention is indeed correct, then if must constitute an objection of overwhelming and decisive force against any doctrine of universal, physically necessitating, determinism. If it really is right, then no one could ever be in a position to assert that the entire Universe is subject to universal and inexorable physical necessitation, without at the same time being in a position to know that any such assertion cannot but be false. For if the very ideas both of physical necessity and of the ability to do other than we do do, both are, and can only be, acquired by references to our abundant experience of the two contrasting kinds of reality to which these ideas refer; then who but the most bigoted of Behavioristic psychologists could continue to insist that, *really,* even paradigm instances of the latter are covert cases of the former?

(iii) Anyone inclined to doubt either the first or especially the second of these two findings should be challenged to excogitate his own explications of all the various notions in the kinds distinguished—including the intellectually indispensable concept, not so far explicitly mentioned, of the contrary-to-fact conditional.

A contrary-to-fact conditional is a proposition of the form, "If this were to have happened (which, as a matter of fact, it did not), then that would have occurred." Such propositions are relevant and of great importance because nomologicals (propositions stating what are thought to constitute laws of nature) can be distinguished from merely material implications (propositions stating—without any implications about what might have been but in fact was not—only not-as-a-matter-of-fact-this-and-not-that) by the logical fact that they entail contrary-to-fact conditionals. Also implicit in the notion of the nomological is

the idea of physical necessity: it is precisely and only because to assert a nomological is to assert that certain relationships between sorts of logically possible events hold with physical necessity that we become licensed to infer contrary-to-fact conditionals from nomologicals.

Perhaps the challenge put at the beginning of the previous paragraph can, after all, be met. But until and unless it is met, and met convincingly, the prudent philosopher is bound to adopt the archetypical attitude of the man from Missouri who, notoriously, has to be shown. Our own assurance that these things just cannot be shown should be strengthened by considering why Hume failed to locate any suitable sort of parent experiences ("impressions") by reference to which the concepts ("ideas") of physical necessity and physical impossibility could have been legitimated.

This failure, like so much else that is most characteristic of Hume, is to be attributed to his misguided Cartesian insistence upon starting all his philosophical thinking from the position Descartes reached at the end of the second paragraph of Part IV of the *Discourse on Method.* Hume insisted, that is to say, upon thinking of himself as an essentially incorporeal and impotent subject of (always private) experience—as solely a bodiless observer, rather than as the flesh and blood observer-cum-agent he was and all of us are. It is no wonder that such a pure observer was unable to detect in causation anything more than a relationship definable entirely in terms of exclusively material implications; a relationship involving no physical necessities, and carrying no consequences about the contrary-to-fact.[10]

(c) Locke, in the chapter "Of Power," was concerned solely with the sort of power that can be predicated only of people—or of such other putative, quasi-personal beings as the theist God, the Olympian gods, archangels, angels, devils, and other assorted disembodied or ever-bodiless spirits. Let us, therefore, attach to this first sort of power the label "power (personal)." In another sense, which is the only sense in which the word can be applied to inanimate objects and to most of animate nature, a power is simply a disposition to behave in such and such a way, given that such and such preconditions are satisfied. Thus we might say that the "nuclear device" dropped at Nagasaki possessed an explosive power equivalent to that of so many tons of TNT, or that full-weight nylon climbing rope has a breaking strain of (a power to hold up to) 4,500 pounds. Let us label this second sort of power "power (physical)."

A power (personal) is an ability at will either to do or to abstain from doing whatever it may be. Thus we might say that in his heyday J. V. Stalin had the power of life and death over every subject of the Soviet Empire, or that a fertile pair of people of opposite sexes have the power to start a baby. In three characteristically vivid passages, Locke not only explicates both this idea and the contrasting concepts of physical necessity and physical impossibility, but also demonstrates that there can be no question but that all these ideas have abundant

application. It is regrettable that Locke, in the third of the passages following, mistakes it that he is explaining what is meant not by "an agent" but by "a free agent":

> This at least I think evident, that we find in ourselves a Power to begin or forbear, continue or end several actions of our minds, and motions of our Bodies. . . . This Power . . . thus to order the consideration of any idea, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and *vice versa* in any particular instance, is that which we call the Will. (*Essay*, II (xxi) 5, p. 236)

> Everyone, I think, finds in himself a Power to begin or forbear, continue or put an end to several Actions in himself. From the consideration of the extent of this power over the actions of the Man, which everyone finds in himself, arise the Ideas of Liberty and Necessity. (Ibid., II (xxi) 7, p. 237)

> We have instances enough, and often more than enough in our own bodies. A Man's Heart beats, and the Blood circulates, which 'is not in his Power . . . to stop; and therefore in respect of these Motions, where rest depends not on his choice . . . he is not a free agent. Convulsive Motions agitate his legs, so that though he wills it never so much, he cannot . . . stop their motion (as in that odd disease called *chorea Sancti Viti*), but he is perpetually dancing: He is . . . under as much Necessity of moving, as a Stone that falls or a Tennis-ball struck with a Racket. (Ibid., II (xxi) 11, p. 239; the Latin means 'St. Vitus's dance').

3. Deny Free Will and Disdain Political Liberty

If, once we have recognized that we are indeed agents who as such can and cannot but make choices between alternative physically possible courses of action or inaction and who, also as such, possess various kinds and amounts of power (personal), then it becomes obvious both that this complex fact is of enormous and quite fundamental importance for our understanding of the nature of man and that it must have substantial bearing upon consequent questions about which of our choices ought properly to be subject to some external coercion or constraint, and how much and of what kinds. Some years ago now, under the sinister yet altogether fitting title *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, the doyen of Behavioristic psychology, B. F. Skinner, made what his publishers described as his "definitive statement about man and society".[11] This "definitive statement" provides abundant illustrative material under both heads.

(i) Skinner's catastrophic, misguiding principle is that, to be genuinely scientific, any study of man must eschew all anthropomorphic notions. The explicit and authoritative statement of this grotesque general assumption is possibly more important than anything else in the entire book. For Skinner is saying outright what others more cautious leave implicit. He begins: "We have used the instruments of science; we have counted and measured and compared; but something

essential to scientific practice is missing in almost all current discussions of human behavior."[12]

It appears that what is missing is, awkwardly, the absence of certain notions that Skinner insists can have no place in any truly scientific discourse. For, he continues, "Although physics soon stopped personifying things . . . it continued for a long time to speak as if they had wills, impulses, feelings, purposes and other fragmentary attributes of an undwelling agent. . . . All this was eventually abandoned, and to good effect. . . ." Nevertheless, deplorably, what should be "the behavioral sciences still appeal to comparable internal states. . . ."[13]

We are, therefore, supposed to regret that "almost everyone who is concerned with human affairs—as political scientist, philosopher, man of letters, economist, psychologist, linguist, sociologist, theologian, educator, or psychotherapist—continues to talk about human behaviour in this prescientific way."[14] We all of us, that is to say, continue to ask for and to offer explanations of the conduct of agents in terms of the plans and the purposes, the desires and decisions, of those agents themselves. But "a scientific analysis," we are told, "shifts both the responsibility and the achievement to the environment."[15]

So it is, it seems, unscientific to claim that anyone, acting as an agent, ever effected anything. Hence certain unnamed Freudians are rebuked for recklessly "assuring their patients that they are free to choose among different courses of action and are in the long run the architects of their own destinies."[16] For Skinner as a psychological scientist the true causes of all human behavior are, and can only be, both environmental and necessitating.

The first reason why Skinner believes that he has to embrace this absurdity is that he misconstrues the expulsion of such notions from physics as the repudiation of essentially superstitious ideas, rather than as the rejection of misapplications of ideas in themselves entirely proper, indeed indispensable. The second reason is more particular. He sees all these ideas as involving and involved in what is for him an utterly unacceptable concept, "autonomous man." He writes, "I deny that freedom exists at all. I must deny it or my program would be absurd. You can't have a science about a subject matter which hops capriciously about."

On the contrary: it is Skinner's actual program that truly is absurd, a programme for erecting a science of human behavior upon the false and perversely factitious assumption that all behaviour is physically necessitated, and none of it the conduct of agents who always as such could do other than they in fact do do. Skinner is wrong too in insisting that to admit the reality of agency must be to foreclose on the possibility of discovering causes and developing a science.

The first essential here is to distinguish two crucially different senses of the word "cause." For there is an absolutely fundamental difference between, on the one hand, ensuring that some person will act in one particular way by providing them with some overwhelmingly strong reason so to do; and, on the other hand, making some purely physical phenomenon happen by bringing about the causally

sufficient conditions of its occurrence. That absolutely fundamental difference is that, whereas such sufficient physical causes necessarily necessitate the occurrence of their effects, correspondingly sufficient moral causes do not. If, for instance, I convey to you some splendid news—news that, if you decided to celebrate, you and everyone else would point to as the cause of that celebration—then I do not by so doing ensure that you must, willy-nilly, make whoopee. Actions that are thus caused by moral causes are neither uncaused nor necessarily capricious and inexplicable; although, inasmuch as they are indeed actions, it is impossible for them to be physically necessitated. It is equally mistaken to assume—as most professing social scientists apparently do assume—that all environmental causes are, in the sense explained, physical, and therefore physically necessitating.

(ii) Since he denies outright the reality of agency and choice, Skinner is bound to make a shambles of all the crucial distinctions. And so he does.

(a) First, he refuses to recognize any real difference between a setup in which abortion is illegal and one in which it is not. In the latter case, "The individual is 'permitted' to decide the issue for himself [*sic*], simply in the sense that he [*sic*] will act because of consequences to which legal punishment is no longer to be added."[17] Well yes, I suppose, precisely in that sense; and exactly that is what it is all about.

(b) Second, he considers "the practice of inviting prisoners to volunteer for possibly dangerous experiments—for example, on new drugs—in return for better living conditions or shorter sentences." He asks, rhetorically, "but are they really free when positively reinforced. . . .?"[18] Since positive reinforcement is Skinner's technical way of talking about the promised rewards, the correct answer is clearly "yes." The contrast is, for instance, with those prisoners in Belsen and Dachau who were forced to become subjects for medical experimentation.

(c) Third, "A person never becomes truly self-reliant. Even though he deals effectively with things, he is necessarily dependent upon those who have taught him to do so."[19] But what self-reliance excludes is present dependence, not having been so educated in the past that you have now become self-reliant.

(d) Fourth, and finally, Skinner refuses to allow any important difference between persuasion by the giving of reasons and "persuasion" by forcible methods of mind-bending: "'Brain-washing' is proscribed by those who otherwise condone the changing of minds, simply because the control is obvious."[20] But the issue is not between what is overt as opposed to what is covert. It is rather a matter of giving or not giving what are, or are thought to be, good reasons, as well as of employing or not employing force and the threat of force.

Politically libertarian hopes perhaps rise a little when we read: "Permissive practices have many advantages." Any such hopes are soon dashed: "Permissiveness is not, however, a policy; it is the abandonment of policy, and its apparent

advantages are illusory. To refuse to control is to leave control not to the person himself, but to other parts of the social and non-social environment."[21]

This statement is on two counts obnoxious. First, even if I have got to be controlled either by a person or by impersonal forces, still the difference between these alternatives matters enormously. If, for instance, I suffer something painful I am much less upset if I believe my suffering to be the result of blind forces than if I believe it to be someone's malign intention. (This is one reason why a moment's thought makes the ideal of a totally planned society so repellent to all but those who see themselves as the total planners; and, correspondingly, so endlessly enchanting to actual or aspiring members of such power elites.)

Second, Skinner's contention that leaving control to the person himself is an illusion is supported only by his insistence that the true and always necessitating causes of human behavior are, and can only be, environmental. This popular misconception has been demolished already. Furthermore, it is a misconception peculiarly incongruous with the program proclaimed in Skinner's earlier utopian novel *Walden Two;*[21] a program, that is, under which the unenlightened psychologically lay masses are to be controlled—for our own good, of course—by a psychologically initiated elite. But how, upon Skinner's principles as proclaimed in *Beyond Freedom and Dignity,* can it become right to say that in Skinner's utopia it would be Skinner's Controllers who would be controlling the lesser breeds, rather than the environment of the Controllers that would be ultimately controlling everybody? To be an action for which an agent can be ultimately responsible, that action must be—as all true actions necessarily are—a first cause not itself brought about by any physically necessitating causes.

NOTES

1. Antony Flew, "Could there be Universal Natural Rights," *Journal of Libertarian Studies* 6, nos. 3–4 (Summer/Fall 1982), pp. 277–88.
2. Quoted by Isaiah Berlin in *Four Essays on Liberty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 122 n.
3. *Leviathan,* Chapter XXI, second paragraph.
4. *Le Lys Rouge* (Paris, 1894), p. 117.
5. Thus Steven Lukes in the chapter entitled "Freedom and Emancipation" in his *Marxism and Morality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) pretends to see and to meet a need to explain why (classical) "liberals are often drawn to an opportunity rather than an exercise conception of freedom, according to which my freedom is solely a matter of how many doors are open to me" (p. 76). But what is there to explain in the fact that people who are ingenuously and sincerely devoted to freedom are "drawn to" the genuine article rather than to tawdry substitutes meretriciously and deceitfully packaged as *positive* freedom?
6. Compare, for instance, Lukes, *Marxism.* No friend of unilateral disarmament in face of Leninist imperialism could be a friend of John Stuart Mill!
7. J. L. Austin, *Philosophical Papers,* J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock, eds., rev. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 192.
8. See, for an explanation of this distinction, my *Thinking Straight* (Buffalo: Prometheus, 1977), Sections 5.9 and 6.11.

9. John Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, P. H. Nidditch, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), Book II Chapter 21.
10. For a full development of this theme compare my *David Hume: Philosopher of Moral Science* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
11. B. F. Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971).
12. Ibid., p. 7.
13. Ibid., p. 8.
14. Ibid., p. 9.
15. Ibid., p. 25.
16. Ibid., pp. 20–21.
17. Ibid., p. 97.
18. Ibid., p. 39.
19. Ibid., p. 91.
20. Ibid., p. 69.
21. Ibid., p. 84.
22. B. F. Skinner, *Walden Two* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948).