Religion, Politics, and the American Polity: A Dynamic View of Relationships*

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During the Renaissance, among the fellow citizens of Machiavelli, there arose a new adage calling attention to the common observation of the time — namely that the thought of the palace is one thing, and that of the public square is another.

Karl Mannheim

For generations, political historians used "the thought of the palace" to describe politics and party battles. They consciously borrowed the words of articulate political leaders and (perhaps) unconsciously adopted their mind sets to depict election contests as struggles over the specific contours of national policy. They pictured millions of citizens trooping to the polls to record their views on such subjects as the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Civil Service Reform, currency inflation, and the latest change in some arcane tariff schedule. The citizens who marched through the pages of these traditional historical accounts were deeply interested in politics, attentive to current events, informed of party and candidate differences on the issues of the day, and motivated to cast their ballots accordingly.

While these accounts accorded well both with rational models of voter behavior and with what high school civics texts argued the electoral process ought to be like, the reality of "the public square" was another matter. The survey research findings of the early 1950's captured that thought rather well. They depicted a collective electorate whose level of political involvement was generally low, whose knowledge of political affairs was sorely deficient, whose interest in politics was sporadic at best, and whose election-day behavior very rarely satisfied the minimal requirements of issue-oriented voting. The atomized, informed,

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issue-conscious citizen of the historians' accounts was indeed rare, and the modal citizen of the survey findings voted for a particular party-candidate alternative in a particular election because he had customarily voted that way. Furthermore, in so doing he was quite likely to be acting on the basis of an attachment to that party acquired from his parents during his early childhood years.3

Needless to say, in the expansive climate the late 1950's and early 1960's, findings such as these turned voting behavior analysis into a growth industry. Not the least among the progeny of that growth was what has since come to be known as the "new political history." Some political historians began to question dominant interpretive frameworks and, more importantly as it turned out, to adopt new research methodologies to probe the contours of past politics. In the context of an intellectually conservative discipline, one that venerates its own traditions even more ardently than it does the nation's past, these historians embarked upon a radical course. They ceased depending primarily on the post-election statements of political elites to discern how masses of citizens had cast their ballots. Instead, they examined the voting and census returns to determine whether there were consistent differences in partisanship among socially distinct types of voting units.4

To speak now of these early efforts evokes a sense of nostalgia. In more ways than one, those were less complicated and more hopeful days. Then the studies undertaken were quite limited in geographic scope, and necessarily so since the requisite data usually had to be collected, processed, and analyzed without benefit of a team of research assistants, high speed computers, or even the programmable calculators that are now in common use. For the most part, the political historians doing the work were equipped with only rudimentary statistical tools and sets of concepts and expectations derived from the quite unambiguous survey findings of the 1940's and 1950's.5 Since then, times have changed: machine-readable voting and census data are routinely available, as are the major surveys since the 1930's; teams of scholars now unite diverse capabilities into single research thrusts; and easy-to-use software packages enable even novices to employ sophisticated statistical routines.6

While partial regression coefficients and probit estimates have replaced the simple percentages and correlations used in the early studies, they have not seriously undermined their central analytic findings.7 To be sure, these more recent efforts have not been fruitless exercises. By using better estimation procedures and covering a larger geographic area, they have expanded our knowledge of past political behavior. Some scholars have entered caveats and reservations; others, invoking Marx, but often forgetting what they might have known of his writings, have disingenuously reinterpreted ethnicreligious conflict as class conflict. But for the most part the expansion of knowledge that has occurred has followed the predictable lines demarcated by the earlier studies.

We need not tarry to summarize the state of knowledge, for that has been cogently done by Professor Silbey and, I think, imaginatively expanded by Professor Jensen. Instead we can begin by reflecting on the magnitude of the
change that has occurred in our understanding of past politics. The papers by Professors Silbey and Jensen symbolically capture the essence of the transformation. An intellectual generation ago, two papers arguing that religious values were somehow important, let alone fundamental, to mass politics — if presented at all — would have been received with a skepticism probably verging on genteel derision. Yet notice that these papers do not argue that point; they take it for granted. They do not ask whether ethnoreligious values were important to past political battles, but rather how they operated to that effect.

Taken collectively, the voting behavior studies have created a new interpretive framework within which to view mass political behavior and party battles. The radical departure of the early 1960’s has become the standing orthodoxy of the early 1980’s. In effect, we again run the danger of demonstrating the applicability of the Renaissance adage: we have built a new palace. And the thought of this new palace threatens to become as removed from that of the public square as it was in Machiavelli’s day.

The source of this emerging danger lies in the tendency to view the full course of American politics as the late-nineteenth century writ large. Political historians have been strongly tempted to interpret both earlier and later politics within the frameworks generated by the intensive studies of post–Civil War party combat. The temptation is to construct for American political history an ethnoreligious synthesis whose encompassing character rivals Turner’s frontier thesis.8 We should strongly resist that temptation; for, in yielding to it, we would push American political history into a static and artificial mold. We would ignore the ways in which group subcultures have changed over time, and the necessary adjustments that these changes have produced in their political outlooks.9 We would not deal adequately with the ways in which parties themselves have been transformed, or with the alteration of their roles within the larger political process. In short, such an interpretation, by emphasizing continuity across time in the relationship between religion and politics, would preclude understanding the dynamic nature of interpenetration and, therefore, the adaptive — perhaps even developmental — character of American politics.

Certainly Professors Jensen and Silbey are sensitive to the danger and alert us to it. Professor Jensen, for example, observes that “in the twentieth century the connections between religion and politics weakened greatly.” And Professor Silbey explicitly points out that “contemporary [tribal] polarization is not as clear as it was.”10 Both statements are accurate, but neither goes far enough. Indeed, these statements quietly sidestep the essential difference between the late-nineteenth century and other historical periods.

We can most conveniently bring that difference into focus by noticing the characteristics of late-nineteenth-century politics and how they were interrelated. Then the two major parties mobilized the support of distinctive — but mutually antagonistic — coalitions of ethnoreligious groups. Party differences were expressions of these irreconcilable ethnoreligious conflicts; elections became the secular analogs of religious wars; and most citizens came to see party-candidate
alternatives as all-or-nothing options. Under these conditions, partisanship was an intensely felt and behaviorally stable attachment. Most men, in other words, were party voters, who neither split their ballots, nor defected to the major opposition, nor gave their votes to minor parties. Moreover, because they could readily perceive how election outcomes would affect their daily lives, most men voted in most elections.\textsuperscript{11}

It is important to notice that the separate components of this picture fit together. The strong and stable partisanship of the period was a product of the linkages between ethnoreligious values and party oppositions. In turn, the widespread diffusion of strong party norms among the mass electorate made the late-nineteenth century preeminently a partisan era. Parties not only commanded the psychological and behavioral loyalty of the overwhelming majority of voters, they also controlled the conduct of elections and virtually monopolized the flow of political information. Parties dominated the processes of recruiting candidates and mobilizing voters, and thus they were able to exert discipline over their office-holders and thereby forge tangible links between their elected government and their electorate. As a result, the citizenry's strong and positive orientations toward parties were reinforced by the accurate perception of them as effective instruments of collective social action.

It also needs to be noticed that the dominant social-structural characteristics of the period operated to reinforce and perpetuate these linkages between group subcultures and political parties.\textsuperscript{12} It was a society marked by relatively low levels of functional interdependence and flow of information. While it was a polyglot society, it was one composed of small and relatively homogeneous groupings deployed into well bounded and psychologically isolated communities. It was a world of close ties to family, church, and community. The dominant social conditions were conducive to the maintenance of group cohesion and as well to the maintenance and transmission of party identifications that were inextricable components of group political cultures. Under these political and social-structural conditions, the processes of political socialization operated effectively, and among contemporaries “it was expected as a matter of course that partisan politics would descend from sires to sons with unbroken regularity.”\textsuperscript{13}

When we look at the late-nineteenth century, we see a set of political characteristics that operated in tandem and that were reinforced by the predominantly localistic character of the society. Parties and politics, as a result, played quite different roles in the lives of nineteenth-century citizens than they do in our own day. Partisan attachments now are to secularized, individualist cadre parties, to limited liability associations that do not greatly intrude upon the lives of their adherents. Party identifications, like party activities, have become “seasonal” affairs, often detached and remote from daily life experiences. In that earlier and less complex society, party identifications were commitments to “political churches,” to secular formations that functioned very much as western European parties of religious integration do, with a capacity to absorb the total life of their adherents in a comprehensive political subculture. Quasi-confessional identifica-
tions of this sort stimulated the participation of party members and immunized them against electoral appeals both from their traditional partisan opponents and from new political movements. Moreover, politics occupied a great share of the individual's life, because political matters were not complex, intangible, and remote — as they now are — but simple, concrete, and directly related to the concerns of daily life. Ethnoreligious and political communications reinforced each other and created a party system whose cleavage line reflected this absorbing, extensive, and energizing social conflict.

That is the critical and essential feature of late-nineteenth-century politics: ethnoreligious conflict structured the prevailing party system. It was not simply a period in which there existed some partisan differences in the voting behavior of religious groups; it was one in which ethnoreligious conflict shaped the basic cleavage line of the political system. The contending religious and ethical values in which that conflict was rooted were the central features of that era's party and political systems. When we look at the grassroots manifestations of that conflict, they appear trivial and anachronistic; for they involved struggles over such matters as prohibition, Sunday-closing statutes, parochial schools, and language laws. But we need to see the forest as well as these individual trees. Viewed from a system perspective, these battles were of profound significance, for they involved nothing less than establishing the terms and conditions under which national integration would be achieved. One set of groups insisted on what amounted to an unconditional surrender, a cultural homogeneity to be attained by using public power, if necessary, to coerce compliance with their conceptions of the good society and right behavior. Other groups valued cultural pluralism and resisted these imperialistic encroachments. The crucial point is not that these differences existed, or even that they prompted some members of the opposing groups to behave in particular partisan ways. The crucial point is that this conflict structured the Democrat-vs.-Republican party system of that era. Therefore, party battles were central features of the major policy issue confronting the polity at that stage of its development: how to integrate a polyglot population into a viable nation-state.

The manner of resolution of that conflict was uniquely American. Only the late-nineteenth-century American political context, dominated by essentially constituent parties, could allow the cultural pluralists to have lost the battle though they won the war. The details of this ideational transformation of the Republican party have been laid out elsewhere. Here it is only necessary to notice that the Republican party that attained political hegemony in the mid-1890's was no longer committed to a cultural homogenization of the society. Its acceptance of cultural pluralism, however tenuous and tacit in some instances, marked the end of the struggle over the terms of national integration. Certainly, not all groups accepted that resolution with equal equanimity. The anti-German furor of the late 1910's, the Klan's anti-Catholic crusade in the 1910's and 1920's, and the advent of national prohibition attest to the fact that the cultural imperialists did not fold their tents and steal quietly into the night. Ethnoreligious conflict persisted, as did
its political salience, and its grassroots forms had not changed all that much from those of the late-nineteenth century. What was different was that it no longer structured party oppositions; Democrats and Republicans no longer so unambiguously represented the opposing sides of the conflict. It is well to remember, for example, that the anti-German furor was ignited by the policies of a Democratic administration; that the Klan was a divisive question with the Democratic party; and that national prohibition went into effect under a Democratic administration and, more importantly, as the result of considerable bipartisan legislative support.17

These changed leadership behaviors had their counterparts at the mass level. In the late-nineteenth century attitudes expressed on prohibition referenda neatly dovetailed with party selections. In 1882 in Iowa, for example, virtually none of the Democratic voters, but 75.2% of those who cast Republican ballots, voted for prohibition. In 1916 only 48.6% of Iowa's Republican voters supported that year's prohibition measure, but so did 40.4% of those who cast Democratic ballots. The change was even more dramatic in Michigan and Nebraska, where majorities of the 1916 Democratic voters, but less than half of the Republicans, voted in favor of prohibition.18

Needless to say, there were exceptions. Ethnoreligious conflict seems to have remained alive and well in New York and Massachusetts. And in the 1910's and 1920's it seems to have continued to shape the party oppositions in those states, aided no doubt by the statewide candidacies of Democrats who were Irish and Roman Catholic. The 1928 election produced its much chronicled "Al Smith Revolution" in the nation's major cities, a mobilization of immigrant and immigrant-stock voters in support of the Democratic presidential candidate. Larger and less noticed was a "Hoover Revolution," a pro-Republican mobilization of native-stock and Protestant voters in small and medium-sized cities.19 But these cases stand out precisely because they are distinctive when compared with the normal voting patterns of the period. In the late-nineteenth century such cases and the voting patterns they elicited might have gone unnoticed because they were the norm.

After about 1900, in other words, we can still detect lingering traces of the older patterns of religious-group partisanship. And when the election-specific stimuli were unusually strong and unambiguous, those patterns sharpened and stood out even more clearly. But they were residual traces of earlier party systems, behavioral artifacts testifying that human beings neither readily forget their histories nor facilely alter their habitual behaviors. No longer does their appearance inform us significantly about the character of the party system or about the nature of the conflict that structured it. The resolution of the integration debate shifted the policy agenda at the system level and rendered the political expression of grassroots ethnoreligious conflict essentially irrelevant to a new debate over the distribution of resources and values within a capitalist economy.20

Of course, when it was to their advantage, politicians continued to tap and mobilize such conflict and channel it into election-day support. And ethnoreli-
igious group leaders continued to use their roles within the subcultural community as avenues to political careers and upward social mobility. But these and other vestiges of earlier practices and behaviors were peripheral to the policy agenda; they were ritualized sideshows, irrelevant to the policy-making process. As citizens came to perceive that reality, they came as well to devalue parties that no longer operated as instruments of collective social action, and the rates of abstention from active participation in the electoral process increased correspondingly.

Finally, there was one further consequence of the party-system transformation of the 1890's and the aftershocks that it produced on mass political culture. No longer was there any national political party defensive of *laissez faire* values.

In the late-nineteenth century, "personal liberty" was more than a voter mobilization ideology for the Democrats. It was more than a slogan to remind that party's varied support groups of their reasons for being Democrats, and more than an empty rhetorical device used to criticize the behavior of the opposition party. It was as well a guide to the policy behavior of the Democratic party in government. An assertive, positive government was as repugnant to Democrats in office as it was congenial to Republican elites. Grover Cleveland's response to the depression of the 1890's — his insistence that the government's sole responsibility was to maintain its own fiscal solvency — was not simply a personal reaction. It was a party reaction, consistent with the rhetorical traditions and past behaviors of the Democratic party in government.

However, the depression of the 1890's was a turning point for the Democrats. It created the set of conditions that led to the displacement of the party's traditional leadership by a new generation of national leaders, composed mainly of southern and western agrarians. This change in personnel was accompanied by a change in the party's ideational orientation. The Democratic version of *laissez faire* yielded to an agrarian and small-producer version of positive government. Thereafter, Democrats and Republicans did not debate, as they had in the nineteenth century, *whether or not* government should be powerful, assertive, and intrusive. Instead, their policy disagreement was constrained by a broad consensus supportive of strong and durable public institutions that penetrated the society and intruded upon the lives of its citizens. Within the context of that consensus, of course, they disagreed fundamentally over the specific applications of government power, over which groups should have access to it and benefit from its use.

The concrete referents of partisan dialogue have changed considerably since the turn of the century. Economic and social transformations have reduced the size and importance of older groups, while prompting the crystallization of newly defined interests and the consequent formation of new groupings. While the names of the group actors have changed, the character of party struggle remains essentially the same. Parties battle for control over powerful and penetrative governmental institutions, and their shared commitment to the maintenance and aggrandizement of those institutions forecloses representation to groups whose values prescribe a maximization of individual options. To such citizens, the major party alternatives of our own day simply represent choices between different
means to the same end — the infringement of human liberty. It does not matter materially whether that infringement results from affirmative-action quotas and a multitude of other wide-ranging bureaucratic regulations, or from the construction of a military leviathan and an unprecedented concentration of private economic power. Given such party-defined alternatives, partisanship becomes irrelevant; for, no matter which party wins elections and controls the government, the outcome remains the same — the continued decay of individual freedom.

NOTES


6. Country-level voting and census data from 1824 through 1980 are available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of Michigan, as are the SRC/CPS national elections surveys. The AIP0 surveys (Gallup Polls) are available from the Roper Center, University of Connecticut. The most usable of the software packages is SPSS, whose initial release was in 1970; see Norman H. Nie et al., *SPSS: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975).

7. I will make no effort here to enumerate the later studies. Much of the argument concerning the substantive findings has dealt with their statistical underpinnings; for an overview of the debate over techniques, see William G. Shade, “‘New Political History’: Some Statistical Questions Raised,” *Social Science History* 5 (Spring 1981): 171–96.

8. Notice the time period covered by the works cited in note 5. For a bold and imaginative effort to construct such a synthesis, see Robert Kelley, “‘Ideology and Political Culture from Jefferson to Nixon,’” *American Historical Review* 82 (June 1977): 531–62; and also see the “Comments” on Kelley’s essay by Ronald P. Formisano, *ibid.*, pp. 568–77.


18. In Michigan 60.5% of the Democratic voters and 49.3% of the Republicans supported prohibition, and in Nebraska the figures were 52.0% of the Democrats and 46.1% of the Republicans. In Michigan in 1887 and Nebraska in 1890 a majority of the Republican voters (67.0% and 75.4%, respectively) cast ballots for prohibition, while virtually none of the Democrats did. For additional evidence and discussion of the behavioral indicators of this type of transformation at the mass level, see Kleppner, *Who Voted?* pp. 66–82.

20. On the character and policy agenda of the fourth electoral system, see Burnham, “The System of 1896,” pp. 147–201.