

Human Choice and Historical Inevitability*

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I shall begin with some sharp and drastic criticism of *The Poverty of Historicism*.¹ Since the International University of the Open Society owes its very name to Sir Karl Popper, you may well see this undertaking as a sort of attempted intellectual parricide. But those who have learnt most from that great man will comfort themselves with two thoughts: first, that Popper is preeminently the thinker who himself forever asks for criticism; and, second, that dissent from that book will involve the development of a no-less fundamental and, in fact, even more decisive demonstration of the falsity of every form of historicism. The first thing is to refresh our memories of the doctrine against which *The Poverty of Historicism* polemicizes.

I. An Engagement with K. R. Popper

It is unfortunate and, I fear, characteristic that the definition offered in the Introduction of Popper's book does not correspond with the author's own actual usage. He says:

It will be enough if I say here that I mean by "historicism" an approach to the social sciences which assumes that *historical prediction* is their principal aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the "rhythms" or the "patterns", the "laws" or the "trends" that underlie the evolution of history.² (Emphasis in original)

This is in fact, at one and the same time, both not enough and too much. It is not enough, in that it fails to specify that for Popper the essence of historicism is the belief in natural laws of historical development. Such natural laws assert, first, that the occurrence of whatever they determine is as a matter of fact or, contingently, necessary; and, secondly, that the occurrence of anything inconsistent with themselves is correspondingly as a matter of fact, or contingently, impossible. That this is indeed the intended crux comes out most clearly in Popper's splendid Dedication: "In memory

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of the countless men and women of all creeds or nations or races who fell victims to the fascist and communist belief in Inexorable Laws of Historical Destiny."³

Further, once we recognize this insufficiency of the definition offered, we must also recognize that there is no call to reject—along with all talk of "Inexorable Laws of Historical Destiny"—more modest suggestions that there are perhaps some rhythms, patterns or trends to be discerned in "the evolution of history." To reject all these too would surely be to repudiate the entire project of pointed, intelligible and illuminating historical writing. It would, by the same token, give hostages to the historicist enemy, for it provides the enemy with good reason for contending that to jettison historicism is to abandon history as a serious form of inquiry. (See, for example, the semi-historicist E. H. Carr in his George Macaulay Trevelyan lectures on the nature and implications of the historian's trade, a series originally delivered in Cambridge and since published under the title *What is History?*⁴)

Here it may seem that the assault on historicism must threaten the very possibility both of history and of all the other human sciences. Perhaps it is in part with the hope of forestalling such a charge that Popper proceeds to present "a really fundamental similarity between the natural and the social. . . ." This putative "fundamental similarity" arises thanks to "the existence of sociological laws or hypotheses which are analogous to the laws or hypotheses of the natural sciences."⁵ My own prime contrary contentions are: first, that there neither are nor could be any laws of human action as such; and, second, that precisely this is the basis of the fundamental *dissimilarities* between the natural and the human sciences. Furthermore, as I shall later argue, the most elegant, direct, and decisive refutation of all historicist theory follows from this; for, if it is true that no sociological or historical laws exist, then it must be impossible to have any historicist laws of historical development.

Popper's method of refuting the suggestion that there are no "such sociological laws and hypotheses" is characteristically forthright in stating "I will now give a number of examples." Yet the several propositions he offers either are not true or else—what is perhaps in the present context more significant—do not carry the appropriate implications of contingent necessity and contingent impossibility. Unlike some other disputants, Popper does begin by recognizing that any proposition capable of expressing a true law of nature has to carry such implications. Putting the same point in an alternative terminology, we can say that Popper does recognize that any nomological proposition has to be what Kant delighted to describe as apodictic.

Any proposition, that is, asserting either a law of nature or a causal connection, has to involve or imply the use of terms which indicate the demonstrativeness of demonstrative arguments—notably "must" and "can-

not," "necessity" and "impossibility"; although, as Kant himself seems never to have realized, these apodictic terms have to be construed here in their contingent rather than their logical senses. (To indicate those logical senses it will here be sufficient to explain that to say that a proposition is necessary is to say that anything incompatible is impossible; that is, to assert that some proposed description is self-contradictory.) Popper takes the point that any proposition capable of expressing a true law of nature must carry implications (not of logical but) of contingent necessity and impossibility. He writes: "As I have shown elsewhere, every natural law can be expressed by asserting that *such and such a thing cannot happen*; that is to say, by a sentence in the form of the proverb: 'You can't carry water in a sieve.'"⁶

The most persuasive of the several examples deployed by Popper is: "You cannot have full employment without inflation."⁷ No doubt it is true that whenever one finds full employment one also finds some measure of wage-push inflation; and that there are no measures (or no tolerable measures) which government can take which will completely neutralize this inflationary pressure. There is, however, no call to argue about this in the immediate present context, for if Popper had really laid his hands upon a true law of nature, then the contingent necessities and contingent impossibilities entailed by that law would have to constrain all the agents concerned. It is not enough that such necessities should apply only to those in and around governments, and then only to governments inhibited by some scruples against or restraints upon the totalitarian full employment of state power. They would have to apply equally to all, including all those outside government whose several individual determinations to do the best they can for themselves sum up to the pressure for wage-push inflation. And, however strong and well-grounded our confidence that they—that we—will never in fact suppress our unrelenting drive to better the condition of ourselves and our families, we do nevertheless all know equally well that, in a sense soon to be further explained, we could.

Popper goes wrong here because, misled by his own chosen paradigm, he views the entire economy exclusively from the standpoint of the actual or would-be social engineer; from the standpoint, one might add, naughtily yet affectionately, of an actual or would-be member of the new class! Now we can well afford to allow that it is impossible for the fine-tuning social engineers to produce full employment without inflation. This concession constitutes no reason at all for suggesting that none of the other agents concerned really are agents: that it is contingently impossible for any of them (not to act but) to behave other than they do behave and it is contingently necessary for them all to behave just as, in fact, they do behave. But agents they most certainly are. So it must be, and is, possible for them to act in ways other than those in which they do act: their behavior cannot, and does not, unroll with inevitable necessity.

"You cannot have full employment without inflation" is Popper's most

promising candidate for the position of a true sociological law. It is, as we have just seen, not nearly good enough. Some of the others are so terrible that I am at a loss to understand how Popper ever brought himself to enter them. Take, for instance, "You cannot introduce agricultural tariffs and at the same time reduce the cost of living."⁸ Of course you can; always supposing that you—the social engineers again!—are so fortunate as to possess the means for affecting some more than corresponding reductions in the prices of some other items in the cost-of-living index. If we are now told that this candidate has to be assessed as if it had contained an all other-things-being-equal clause, then we come back hard with the reply that this makes the claim true but at the cost of making it tautological. Certainly it is true—all too true—that any increase in the price of any item in a cost-of-living index will result, all other prices remaining the same, in an overall increase in that index. But if a candidate is to be accepted as a law of nature it has to be not tautological but substantial.

Or again, take: "You cannot introduce a political reform without strengthening the opposing forces, to a degree roughly in a ratio to the scope of the reform."⁹ This one is simply not true, and here no parallel possibility of withdrawal beckons into the sanctuary of tautology. For there are plenty of reforms which, once implemented, win the more or less grudging acceptance of those previously opposed. There are also reforms which create interests or institutions which make reversal politically impossible. The most exhilarating example to cite is the reform package of Ludwig Erhard, which unleashed the quite unmiraculous German economic miracle. It was perhaps Erhard's greatest triumph to succeed, within eleven years of that liberating action, in persuading the sometime doyen of Marxist parties that socialism and Clause IV had to go if it was to enjoy any prospect of getting voted into office. And so at Bad Godesberg go they did in 1959; and the very same year, I cannot but note with wry regret, Hugh Gaitskell's far milder move at the Conference of the British Labour Party was defeated.

"You cannot introduce a political reform without strengthening the opposing forces, to a degree roughly in ratio to the scope of the reform" may strike a reminiscent chord. Was not this the doctrine introduced by Stalin to explain why the total victory of the proletariat within the empire of the Great Russians, and the annihilation of its class enemies, had nevertheless to be accompanied by the progressive reinforcement of its party's machinery of repression?

Be that as it may. Enough has now been said to show that Popper is unable to field any genuine specimens and is hence unable to achieve the promised knockdown refutation of the thesis that there are no "sociological laws or hypotheses which are analogous to the laws or hypotheses of the natural sciences." (His own suspicions ought to have been aroused when he found that he was having to construct candidates out of his own head, and

that there were no ready named specimens pushing themselves forward. Indeed, why is it that those works of sociology which burden our shelves index no references to Comte's Law or to Spencer's Law, paralleling those to Boyle's Law, to Ohm's Law and all the others which we can find in any textbook of physics?) The moral for us to draw is that proposed already: Popper can neither find any established and accepted sociological laws in the textbooks nor excogitate presentable substitutes on his own simply because there neither are nor could be any laws of nature applying to human action as such. This fundamental truth, together with the inexpugnable reality of such action, constitutes the surest basis for the decisive disposal of historicism.

II. An Engagement with E. H. Carr

To many my proposed moral will appear scandalous. It is perhaps all very well when Popper merely disowns "an approach to the social sciences which assumes that *historical prediction* is their principal aim." But now for me to insist, as I do, that there is a conceptual incompatibility between human action and laws of nature, and then in that understanding to appeal to the inexpugnable reality of such action—this, surely, must be to become committed to an obscurantist campaign against the discipline of history and against the very possibility of any other social science? I will turn next to this objection as presented in E. H. Carr's *What is History?*¹⁰

Carr takes issue first with Sir Isaiah Berlin. Berlin's long essay *Historical Inevitability*¹¹ is denounced and derided on the grounds that "he added to the indictment the argument, not found in Popper, that the 'historicism' of Hegel and Marx is objectionable because, by explaining human actions in causal terms, it implies a denial of human free will. . . ." ¹² Carr continues: "First then let me take determinism, which I will define—I hope, uncontroversially—as the belief that everything that happens has a cause or causes, and could not have happened differently unless the cause or causes had also been different. . . . The axiom that everything has a cause is a condition of our capacity to understand what is going on around us."¹³

Between the two sentences just quoted, Carr also involves Popper in his condemnation, citing the statement in *The Open Society* that "everything is possible in human affairs,"¹⁴ a statement which does indeed appear to be flatly incompatible with the position taken in *The Poverty of Historicism*. About the implications of the determinism thus expounded Carr is ambivalent. Most of the time he interprets it to mean that the historian, and everyone else aspiring to explain human behavior, must first presuppose that it all has to be inevitable; and then actually discover in detail that in fact it was. In following this dominant interpretation Carr takes it that the inevitability is absolute and universal. Yet, as is both usual and understandable, he never in these contexts brings himself to say outright that it must be, *even*

for the agents themselves, impossible to escape from predetermined historical destiny.

Occasionally, however, he goes far beyond such reticent discretion. Then, without attempting to reconcile a new and different position with the supposed occupational requirements of his determinism, he dismisses all talk of historical inevitability as empty rhetoric. Carr writes on one of these rather rare occasions: "Historians, like other people, sometimes fall into rhetorical language and speak of an occurrence as 'inevitable' when they mean that the conjunction of factors leading one to expect it was overwhelmingly strong."¹⁵ This irenic statement gives no hint whatever of either necessity or impossibility.

Although Carr himself would be one of the last to admit it, such ambivalence is a symptom of unresolved philosophical perplexity. In order to untie the knots the prime need is to make and to maintain distinctions between two radically different senses of the word "cause" and its semantic associates, as well as between two corresponding senses of the word "determinism". The nub of the matter can be briefly put. When we are talking about the causes of some purely physical event—e.g., an eclipse of the Sun—we employ the word "cause" in a sense implying both contingent necessity and contingent impossibility. If this is the sort of thing we are discussing, and if we are employing the word "cause" in this sense, then Carr's hopefully uncontroversial definition of "determinism" is entirely correct: "everything that happens," which does indeed have "a cause or causes" *in this sense*, "could not have happened differently unless the cause or causes had also been different."

Yet the same is precisely not true with the other sense of "cause", the sense in which we speak of the causes of human actions. If, for instance, I give you good cause to celebrate I do not thereby make it inevitable that you will celebrate. To adapt a famous phrase from Leibniz, causes of this second sort may incline but do not necessitate. So it remains entirely up to you whether or not you choose to celebrate. Certainly knowledge of such causes, especially when combined with some familiarity with the persons to whom they are presented, may provide both historians and laypersons with overwhelmingly strong reasons to expect some one particular behavioral response. But that, as we so recently saw Carr remarking, is a very different thing from knowing that the outcome is inevitable—even by the agents themselves.

Given these two fundamentally different senses of the word "cause", it becomes clear that we now need, if only within the human sphere, to distinguish two correspondingly different senses of "determinism". To be committed to the doctrine that absolutely everything that happens, including all human behavior, is completely determined by causes of the physical kind must be, surely, to be committed to a strong doctrine of the ultimate inevitability of everything.

Determination by causes of the second sort, however, has to be another matter altogether. It was in fact just such a non-necessitating determinism which Freud labeled "psychic", although he then at once went wrong by assuming that this psychic determinism was nothing but the psychological particular case of what I should call a universal determinism of physical causes.¹⁶ No one would suggest that psychic determinism applies to anything except those elements in human (and possibly some other animal) behavior which are or could be actions. Anyone recognizing and adopting this fundamental distinction between kinds of cause would presumably conclude that psychic determinism is incompatible with, rather than a particular case of, the universal determinism of physical causes.

Carr never makes these crucial distinctions. He therefore manages within the space of a mere couple of pages to slip from first rejecting the "charge of inevitability... and the vehemence with which it has been pursued in recent years" to a final conclusion more ruinous than the historicism of Marx himself. Marx, it will be remembered, wrote: "when a society has discovered the natural law that determines its own movement, even then it can neither overleap the natural phases of its evolution, nor shuffle them out of the world by a stroke of the pen. But this much it can do: it can shorten and lessen the birth-pangs."¹⁷

For Carr the universal inevitability, unqualified by any partly saving sentence about birth-pangs, is not a consequence of a law of development but a presupposition of critical history. He begins in what he apparently believes is a reassuring way: "Nothing in history is inevitable except in the formal sense that, for it to have happened otherwise, the antecedent causes would have to be different."¹⁸ This contention is not formal at all, but very substantial indeed. So Carr is at least consistent in proceeding to develop the theme of a universal inevitability in history. Admittedly the passage which I am about to quote speaks of the historian writing *as if* what happened was bound to happen, a phrasing which would normally indicate at least some doubt. I cannot, however, believe that Carr wanted thus to suggest that historians do, and to recommend that they should, spread a doctrine which they believe to be false. And certainly he gives no indication of any reason why they have to write as if something were true, notwithstanding that it is not. The standpoint of the authentic and ideal historian, surely, is the standpoint of Leopold von Ranke as the Recording Angel, putting down (of course not all of but at any rate only) what actually happened.

The passage from Carr runs:

Last term here in Cambridge I saw a talk to some society advertised under the title "Was the Russian Revolution inevitable?" I am sure it was intended as a perfectly serious talk. But if you had seen a talk advertised on "Were the Wars of the Roses inevitable?" you would at once have suspected some joke. The historian writes of the Norman Conquest or

the American War of Independence as if what happened was bound to happen, and as if it was his business simply to explain what happened and why; and no one accuses him of being a determinist. . . . When, however, I write about the Russian revolution of 1917 in precisely this way—the only proper way to the historian—I find myself under attack from my critic for having by implication depicted what happened as something that was bound to happen.¹⁹

Carr ought to congratulate himself, rather than complain, when he is attacked precisely and only for holding what he has just so very clearly explained that he does hold, and what he, mistakenly but most emphatically, believes that every historian is by his cloth required to hold. But of course Carr also believes things which are true, and incompatible with these false and demoralizing doctrines. It is, no doubt, his awareness of being elsewhere inconsistently subject to the compulsions of truth—*quasi veritate coactus*—that gives him this unfounded feeling of being unfairly done by.

Carr is also, I dare to suggest, constantly edged towards a doctrine of universal historical inevitability by his own contemptuous devotion to power and success. Carr's historian, like history for the historicist, is always on the winning side: "Good historians," he maintains, "whether they think about it or not, have the future in their bones";²⁰ and—revealing his own principles even in a frivolous illustration—"the history of cricket . . . [is] presumably studded with the names of those who made centuries rather than those who made ducks and were left out of the side."²¹

However, the next task is for us to examine a second batch of key words and expressions. These are chronically so misinterpreted as to make what is in reality evidence for determinism in the second, non-necessitarian sense appear to be evidence for the other, threatening kind. Consider, for a start, an everyday antithesis between, on the one hand, someone in the ordinary and philosophically untechnical sense acting of their own freewill, and, on the other hand, someone in the correspondingly ordinary and psychologically untechnical sense (not performing a compulsive action but) acting under compulsion. Both the persons who act of their own free will and the persons who act under compulsion act; i.e., their behavior is not to be categorized with the spasmodic and involuntary tics, jerks, quivers, tremblings, flutters and twitches which are conventionally but misleadingly labeled "reflex actions" or "compulsive actions."

So when we say of individuals who have, in this most ordinary sense, acted under compulsion that, as things were, they had no choice, or that, considering all the circumstances, they could not have acted otherwise than they did, these common and easily charitable expressions need to be construed with caution. If they really did act, albeit under compulsion, then it cannot be true: either that they literally had no choice at all; or that, in the most fundamental sense, they could not have done otherwise. The point, rather, is: not that they had no alternatives at all, but that they had no

tolerable alternatives; and not that, in that most fundamental sense still to be explained and justified, they could not have done otherwise, but that, although of course they could, it was in every way unreasonable to expect that they either would or should. The case, for instance, of the recalcitrant businessman who received from *The Godfather* "an offer which he cannot refuse" is vitally different from that of the errant mafioso who is without warning gunned down from behind. The former is an agent, however reluctant, but the latter, in that very moment of sudden death, ceases to be.

This whole batch of idioms really is quite extraordinarily misleading. We have no business to be surprised that so many, even of the wise and good, have been and are misled; for the clear implication of the previous two paragraphs is that, when we say in the ordinary everyday sense that particular individuals had no choice at all, or that they could not have done other than they did, we are not saying that in the most fundamental sense they did not have any choice, or that they could not have done other than they did. On the contrary: we are presupposing that they did and that they could. Before the Diet of Worms Luther said: "Here I stand. I can do no other. So help me God." With apologies both Freud himself and to his official biographer,²² to interpret this magnificent manifesto of the Protestant conscience as evidence for a necessitarian determinism is to require that we interpret Luther as at the same time both explaining and excusing what appeared to be, yet was not, an act of defiance upon the memorably implausible grounds that he had been suddenly afflicted with a paralysis rendering him literally incapable of retreat!

All this is directly relevant to the disputed question of historical inevitability, and, in particular, to the suggestion which we have seen Carr developing, that the ultimate inevitability of all human behavior must be a presupposition of the possibility of historical explanation. In formulating explanations of the relevant actions of those whom the historian is studying (and not only explanations of what was done reluctantly, pleading compulsion), the historian is bound to claim that he has shown that these agents could not reasonably have been expected to do other than they did. All too likely this will be mistaken to imply necessitarian determination.

Of course it does not. Your private predictions, for instance, of my electoral behavior—well-grounded though they be upon your long knowledge of my firmly unfashionable political convictions—do not to any degree constrain my choices. Nor does the fact that we can readily explain the mendacity of that other lot in this particular affair, in terms of their usual clearheaded but unscrupulous appreciation of their own party interests, have any tendency to show that, in the most fundamental sense, they could not have behaved in any other way.

The truth is, indeed, quite the reverse. To offer any explanation of behavior as conduct is to presuppose the contrary. Certainly we may be able, in the light of the evidence available to us, to conclude that those

people could not have done otherwise; meaning that it would not have been reasonable to have expected—in the purely descriptive sense of “expect”—that they would in fact do otherwise. Again, we may be able, in the light of that same evidence, to conclude that they could not have done otherwise; meaning that it would have been neither right nor proper to have expected—in the prescriptive sense of “expect”—that they should do otherwise. (It is worth remarking, by the way, that Carr’s dismissal of those who would “pronounce moral condemnation on the Charlemagnes, Napoleons and Stalins of history” seems to be based in the main upon a failure to separate these two senses of “expect”, a failure reinforcing the pervasive necessitarian belief that fully to explain is completely to exculpate.)

The truth to cleave to is that before we can even raise these questions of whether, in such inferential or prescriptive interpretations, people could not have done otherwise, we have to take it as given that, in the most fundamental sense, the sense which is essential to the whole idea of conduct, they could have. And, of course, it is not inconsistent with this modal claim to maintain that in fact they did not.

III. The Essential Reality of Human Action

It is now time to briefly attempt to explicate the fundamental sense of “can do otherwise,” which I contend to be essential to the very idea of action; and to indicate why it is out of the question to deny that we are all of us, in our waking hours, in some or many respects, agents who can do other than we do. I start from one of the great chapters of John Locke’s *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, entitled “Of Power.”²³

Locke writes:

This at least I think evident, that we find in ourselves a *Power* to begin or forbear, continue or end several actions of our minds, and motions of our Bodies. . . . This *Power*. . . *thus to order the consideration of any Idea*, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and *vice versa* in any particular instance, is that which we call the *Will*.”²⁴ (Emphasis and punctuation original)

The explanation continues, marred only by the fact that he sees himself as spelling out what is meant by “a free agent” rather than, more simply and more fundamentally, by “an agent.” The three Latin words in this next quotation refer to St. Vitus’s dance:

everyone, I think, finds. . . a power to begin or forbear, continue or put an end to several actions in himself. . . . We have instances enough, and often more than enough, in our own bodies. A Man’s Heart beats, and the Blood circulates, which ‘tis not in his Power. . . to stop; and therefore in respect of these motions, where rest depends not on his choice. . . he is not a *free Agent*. Convulsive Motions agitate his legs, so that though he wills it never so much, he cannot. . . stop their motion (as in

that odd disease called *chorea Sancti Viti*), but he is perpetually dancing: he is . . . under as much Necessity of moving, as a Stone that falls or a Tennis-ball struck with a Racket.²⁵

Now, let us call all those bodily movements which can be either initiated or quashed at will "movings," and those which cannot "motions." Obviously there are plenty of marginal cases. But so long as there also are, as there are, plenty—indeed far, far more—which fall unequivocally on one side or the other, we may well stubbornly refuse to be prevented from making a distinction of enormous practical importance by any such diversionary reference to marginal cases. If, having seized the high ground, we remain thus resolute to hold it, we are positioned to see off any and every necessitarian counter-attack. For once "action" has been ostensibly defined in terms of movings, there remains no possibility whatsoever of denying that all of us often are agents and, when we are, must be able to do other than we do. The most infatuated necessitarian theoreticians can scarcely hope to bring themselves to deny that some of everyone's bodily movements are movings rather than motions; and, given this, there is no room for doubt that with respect to these movings, and in the most fundamental sense ostensibly defined precisely and only by reference to such movings, they can do other than they do do.

So the upshot of the whole preceding paper is: not that there are not—in addition to natural ones—humanly imposed and maintained necessities and impossibilities in history; but that, as indeed Popper has always maintained, there neither are nor could be any natural laws of historical development binding upon all concerned. It is certain that there are all manner of necessities constricting the possibilities open to particular individuals and groups. There is, for instance, formidably good reason to believe that a Leninist regime, once established, cannot be overthrown by any effort of those who might be persuaded that they stand to gain from pluralism and liberty. Yet even this irreversible could be reversed if the beneficiary power elite so chose.

Throughout my central thesis has been the assumption that our rejection of historicism should be founded upon an argument of the same sort as misleads many historians to believe that they are by their cloth required to accept it. Whereas these misguided folk see inevitability as both presupposed and discovered by every adequate historical explanation, I maintain that this is the diametric opposite of the truth. As so far everyone agrees, history is the story of things done: *Latine, historia rerum gestarum*. However,—and here I distance myself both from the Popper of *The Poverty of Historicism* and from so many others—it is of the essence of human action that (not only free but all) agents must, in the fundamental sense just now ostensibly defined, be able to do other than they do. And it seems manifest to me now, although I willingly confess that I have taken a long time and much effort to attain this glimpse of the obvious, that not

only the particular conception of an overall law of historical development, but also the general idea of any law of nature, are both entirely incompatible with human action so understood. There can, therefore, be no law of either kind determining human action as such. I end with an inspirational motto from Hayek. He concludes a chapter—significantly, a chapter on “Labour Unions and Employment”—complaining:

This path is still blocked, however, by the most fatuous of all fashionable arguments, namely, “that we cannot turn the clock back.” One cannot help wondering whether those who habitually use this cliché are aware that it expresses the fatalistic belief that we cannot learn from our mistakes, the most abject admission that we are incapable of using our intelligence.²⁶

NOTES

1. Karl R. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957).
2. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
3. *Ibid.*, p. v.
4. E. H. Carr, *What is History?* (London: Macmillan, 1961).
5. Popper, *Poverty of Historicism*, p. 62.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*, p. 62.
9. *Ibid.*
10. Carr, *What is History?* This is a work which I criticize more extensively and on somewhat different lines in *A Rational Animal* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978), chap. 3, sec. 4.
11. Isaiah Berlin, *Historical Inevitability* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954).
12. Carr, *What is History?* p. 86.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 87–88.
14. Popper, *The Open Society* (1945; 2nd ed. rev., London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952), 2:197. The statement quoted here is not to be found on that page in the fifth revised edition of 1966.
15. Carr, *What is History?* p. 90.
16. Flew, *A Rational Animal*, chaps. 8, 9.
17. Quoted from the Preface to Marx, *Capital*, in Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism*, p. 51.
18. Carr, *What is History?* p. 90.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 90–91.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 102.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 120.
22. See Flew, *A Rational Animal*, chaps. 8 and 9, where the relevant references to the works of Freud and Ernest Jones are given on p. 188.
23. John Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), bk. 2, chap. 21.
24. *Ibid.*, sec. 5, p. 236.
25. *Ibid.*, sec. 7, p. 237.
26. F. A. Hayek, *The Constitution of Liberty* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960), p. 284.