Harold J. Laski: The Liberal Manqué or Lost Libertarian?

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A generation after his death in 1950, Harold Laski, the eminent political scientist, socialist, and British Labour Party leader, is almost forgotten apart from an occasional monograph analyzing his political theories. Yet he remains significant and, rather paradoxically perhaps, his ideas are important for American libertarian thought. Laski, of course, from the time of his World War I teaching at Harvard, while still a very young man in his mid-twenties, retained a lifelong interest in the United States, which he continued to visit and write about. And, all his life, he never really resolved the major tensions between his early radical individualism and pluralist theories of sovereignty and the state, and his later socialism and Marxism. In his many published works and extensive private correspondence with such American friends as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Felix Frankfurter, he developed themes which continue to inform and enlighten our contemporary intellectual confusion.

In 1950 Max Beloff, the distinguished Oxford don, in his obituary assessment of his fellow political scientist, called the modern period "The Age of Laski." In intellectual history, Beloff believed, Laski has played a catalytic role much like that of John Stuart Mill in the mid-nineteenth century. Carroll Hawkins, an American scholar, though critical of both his later conviction that classical liberalism was the creature of capitalism as well as of the unfortunate effect of his effort to marry modern liberalism to Marxism, also noted that Laski, in his early devotion to liberty, "was essentially a philosophical anarchist." "Man who does not voluntarily take out membership in that steadily increasingly powerful organization, the sovereign state, could be grateful for such a champion as pluralist Laski."2

In the flurry of tributes to Laski following his death, there was general agreement that the well-recognized shifts in his thought had paralleled the declining hopes of liberal democracy and the accompanying worldwide rise of collectivism and statism. Laski, however, was no mere camp follower. Though a practical politician, he was also an intellectual, an idealist and, perhaps most importantly, a superb teacher. Thus Thomas I. Cook, an
American political scientist, predicted that Laski's most lasting influence would be through his students. His lectures, Cook observed, "were fraught with a dynamic sense of social ardor. He conveyed, as few teachers convey, the conviction that the subjects with which he dealt were the vital issues of life itself. . . ." He encouraged differences of opinion that were honest and informed and made his students feel the worth of what they were doing. His ultimate concern with the problems of liberty versus equality and of individualism versus authority transcended in importance even his prolific political commentary on the issues of capitalism, communism, war, and fascism. He is furthermore not the less interesting to Americans because of his involvement with the New Deal and friendship with Franklin D. Roosevelt.

As a political theorist, Laski made his most original contribution in his first books—all published by 1925 when he was still not past his early thirties. In *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty* (1917); *Authority in the Modern State* (1919); *Political Thought in England from Locke to Bentham* (1920); *The Foundations of Sovereignty* (1921); and *A Grammar of Politics* (1925), together with occasional essays and magazine pieces and his letters to Justice Holmes in this period, he made his case for pluralism and individual liberty. Though already beginning to be troubled by some doubts about the efficacy of classical liberalism in the postwar world, Laski provided intellectual support for what was essentially a radical libertarian point of view. This point of view, although it was only characteristic of a relatively short span in his life, belonged to his most scholarly years, and it was also a point of view which he never entirely abandoned.

The young Laski's first personal confrontation with the state came in wartime Great Britain. Physical disability, rather than conscientious objection, kept him from the military service which his older brother experienced. Although he wrote Justice Holmes in the summer of 1916 that "Our British offensive thrills me. . . ." he now also began to publish in American magazines articles which decried the growing worship of the state, an attitude, he believed, that was especially endemic to Germany. Individual rebellion was fundamental to his own philosophy, and he worried over the future of representative government and the treatment being meted out to conscientious objectors. "My problem," he wrote to Holmes, "is to take away from the state the superior morality with which we have invested its activities and give them back to the individual conscience. . . . That is why I like Bills of Rights." From his American experience he doubted the universal validity of majority rule as against the "wealth of wisdom to be gleaned from Mill on Liberty." "I remember the thrill it gave me five years ago," he informed Holmes, "to realise that what he said about individuality lay at the root of the sanest political philosophy I know." 4

In the *Problem of Sovereignty*, Laski set his pluralistic theory of the state against an authoritarian or monistic theory that asked citizens for sacrifices contrary to their own conscience. "How ever," he asked, "are we to get any
worth out of historical experience if such absolutism is to be held valid? Every state then becomes exalted above the moral law." For, "when men begin at the cost of suffering, to surrender their convictions with a monotonic regularity they will end by surrendering them without a pang." The state, he contended, should have to "prove itself by what it achieves," and submit to the test of competing groups within society. Laski admitted that his view was in fact "an individualistic theory of the State—no pluralistic attitude can avoid that." The American founding fathers won his praise for their establishment of a decentralized, federal type of government. Although he agreed to the need of some final responsibility in any country, he concluded: "In a democracy, the surest guaranty of civic responsibility seems to lie in the gift of genuine functions of government no less to the parts than to the whole." He concurred accordingly with Felix Frankfurter that the control of child labor might well be left to the states, and he wrote to Holmes: "There are far too many American reformers eager to legislate the U.S. into their own peculiar nostrums."  

The attack on the state which Laski launched in the Problem of Sovereignty he continued in Authority in the Modern State. More important to him than the historical theories on the origins of the state was its purpose to promote the good life. Neither a simple individualism nor a rigid collectivism seemed to be the solution, however. Nor did liberty, which he defined as the absence of restraint, answer the growing demand for equality. Yet the only permanent safeguard of democratic government, he believed, was the individual conscience and recognition that the state was a means, not the end. "Freedom of thought, then, the modern state must regard as absolute... A state which opposes those who are antagonised by the way in which government interprets its purposes is bound to drift slowly into despotism."  

Laski saw little chance of any lasting reconciliation of the interests of capital and labor, but he also viewed with alarm the wartime supervision of industry by the state. "This has meant," he wrote, "an immense increase of centralisation... The most striking change in the political organisation of the last half-century is the rapidity with which, by the sheer pressure of events, the state has been driven to assume a positive character. We talk less and less in the restrained terms of Benthamite individualism. The absence of governmental interference has ceased to seem an ultimate ideal. There is everywhere almost anxiety for the extension of governmental functions." The familiar maxims of Lord Acton on the corruption of power in high places, he believed, were illustrated in the degradation into bureaucracy of the socialized democracy initiated in England by the Lloyd George budget of 1909. "It was an epoch which began with immense promise; and, at its close, it seemed likely to end in something but little short of disaster."  

Democracy after the war, in Laski's opinion, stood at the crossroads. In his interpretation of history, he was still sympathetic to the classical liberal
tenets expounded by Locke, Adam Smith, and Mill. Locke's natural rights were closely related to the question of freedom, and the separation of the powers of government he accepted as "one of the great needs of the modern State..." In his treatment of Adam Smith and the foundations of economic liberalism, Laski wrote: "No poison is more subtly destructive of the democratic State than paternalism; and the release of the creative impulses of men must always be the coping-stone of public policy." But he added that liberty was impossible without certain minimal standards of security achieved through collective effort. Smith's Wealth of Nations, therefore, was the creature of its age, while the problems of freedom changed with the times. 8

By the mid-twenties, Laski's liberal hostility to the state and his skepticism regarding the bases of its authority were beginning to waver. The libertarian socialist, however, was not dogmatic about the forms community ownership might take. "All that he insists is that until they are effectively the possession of the community, they cannot be fully administered in the interest of the community... Implied in all this, of course, is the insistence that the true Socialism is a libertarian, and not an authoritarian, socialism." Although he placed Mill's individualism within the framework of nineteenth-century liberalism and noted his later vague modification of private enterprise by socialism, Laski nonetheless concluded that "the ideal of Mill is still as noble an ideal as a man may desire: the perception that the eminent worth of human personality is too precious to be degraded by institutions." 9

A Grammar of Politics, the last of his major early scholarly books, made clearer Laski's growing ambivalence in regard to a libertarian philosophy. The state remained the enemy, but now he was becoming more concerned with the problem of achieving and enforcing equality. Sovereignty was limited, and men must be true to the "realisation of what is best in themselves." Yet rights too were limited and included duties that were not independent of society. "We have them because we are members of the State." Because the state was, however, only a means and not itself an end, one's duty was "to the ideal the actual State must seek to serve." While the state "should always be called into account when it invades rights," Laski recognized that in the complex modern world "State invasions of private liberty may be more subtle." There must accordingly be a free press, greater access to formal education, and economic liberty in the sense of security and opportunity. Though equality did not "mean identity of treatment," it did entail "first of all the absence of special privilege." 10

Laski concluded that the modern citizen was being driven to look at the nation-state in new ways even though he optimistically predicted that state sovereignty was in the process of disappearing in international affairs. 11 This concern over foreign policy, as well as his developing Marxist interpretation of history, increasingly dominated the new introductory chapters with which he prefaced subsequent editions of the Grammar of Politics. Yet
his about-face with respect to classical liberalism was still not complete. It is necessary therefore to look carefully at the views which he expounded in his books, *The Dangers of Obedience* and *Liberty in the Modern State*, both of which were published in 1930.

*Liberty in the Modern State* reiterated in more popular form much of the argument Laski had already advanced in the *Grammar of Politics*. He continued to be bothered by the problem of reconciling freedom and security. Thus the book, which reads as a kind of running debate, reflected its author's intellectual confusion—although its first sentence begins straightforwardly with the statement: “I mean by liberty the absence of restraint upon the existence of those social conditions which, in modern civilization, are the necessary guarantees of individual happiness.” He pointed out, moreover, that “though it is a condition without which liberty is never effective,” economic security was not liberty. Unwilling now to go all the way with Acton’s famous dictum, Laski nevertheless agreed with Acton and Mill on the dangers of tyranny. “Power as such, when uncontrolled, is always the natural enemy of freedom.” Liberty and equality, in Laski’s opinion “are not so much antithetic as complementary,” but the “absence of equality means special privilege for some and not for others.”

Laski believed the true theory of liberty denied the assumptions of Hegel’s idealist theory of the state. “For as I encounter the state, it is for me a body of men issuing orders.” The citizen can obey most of the state’s commands but, as in the case of military service, not those which violate his individual conscience or religious beliefs. As a realist, Laski, in his discussion of the Bill of Rights, the value of which he continued to affirm, nevertheless pointed out that its efficacy depended more on the determination of the people than on constitutional guarantees. In the same way, together with checks on bureaucracy, he emphasized opposition to excessive centralization and the granting of as much power as possible to local government. Vital still for him in his definition of liberty, along with the need for social power, was individual intellectual freedom and respect for reason. “Liberty means being faithful to oneself, and it is maintained by the courage to resist. This, and this only, gives life to the safeguards of liberty; and this only is the clue to the preservation of genuine integrity in the individual life.”

*The Dangers of Obedience* was composed mainly of pieces on education, interspersed with comments showing Laski’s continued concern for the individual. No state, he argued, citing the examples of objection to war and American prohibition, “can act in the face of considerable opposition from its citizens, if the latter are deeply and conscientiously moved by the issue in dispute.” But, as in the United States, where he believed Babbitt was king, the average man, ever fearful of originality, moved quickly to suppress it. “We are the slaves of custom, and we have begun to hug our chains.” Medieval superstition was being replaced by the witch-hunting of the
modern Leviathan state, an institution now worshipped uncritically by millions of its subjects. Yet, Laski was not an elitist. Thus he stressed the danger of letting experts, indifferent to the need of convincing people, decide public matters. Not generals or admirals or bureaucrats, but amateur politicians, must govern if there was to be a “recovery of citizenship.”

The important changes in Laski's thinking which became so evident after 1930 seem to have been a result primarily of the worldwide economic depression and the Labour Party's collapse in Great Britain. More than the rise of Hitler and the deteriorating international situation, domestic economic and political problems transformed his youthful individualist liberalism and Fabian socialism into an increasingly doctrinaire Marxian philosophy. But this new dogma was, in turn, temporarily modified by his British patriotism in World War II and his growing intellectual and personal ties with the United States and President Roosevelt. Apart from his continuing extensive correspondence with Justice Holmes, the 1920's had found Laski absorbed in his scholarship and teaching at the London School of Economics. By the 1930's, in contrast, journalistic opportunities, together with lecture tours and visits to America, drew him more actively into the ferment of politics and current affairs. As Kingsley Martin, his biographer, has written, the difference between Laski, the Fabian of 1925, and the Marxist of 1938, "was that between the two dates he had seen the great slump of 1929, the constitutional device of Nationalist government in 1931, the rise of fascism in Spain, the triumph of Hitler in Germany, and the widespread decline of democratic institutions." Although he was at first inclined to minimize Hitler's significance, Ramsay MacDonald's Labour Party defection and decision to head the English coalition government appalled Laski.

As the British Labour Party had grown stronger in the 1920's, labor's interest was no longer antistatist. At the same time, Laski's own allegiances to libertarian views and then to guild socialism also disappeared. In the words of Herbert Deane, "By 1931 Laski shifts the ground of obedience away from the moral adequacy of the state's commands as judged by the individual and makes obligation to obey a function of the degree to which the state secures to the individual at least a minimum of material well-being." Thus, as he moved to Marxist socialism, Laski forgot his old diatribes against statism, bureaucracy, nationalism, Fabianism, and paternalism. He also became disillusioned in his original hope that the Labour Party might engineer "revolution by consent." "I am more than ever doubtful," he wrote to Felix Frankfurter in 1932, "whether a Socialist society can be established in this country within the framework of existing conditions. The dice are too loaded. One doesn't realise the evil MacD. [onald] has done until one gets to the Continent and hears him used as the proof that all radical action is in the end futile and that it is folly to believe that Socialist leaders can be trusted."

Laski's new anxieties formed the theme for the lectures which he delivered...
in 1931 at the University of North Carolina. Published in expanded form two years later under the title, *Democracy in Crisis*, the book outlined a pessimistic view of the future. The Labour Party, even if elected in Great Britain, could not, he predicted, take over the government, and revolution might be the result. In nineteenth-century Europe, political democracy had secured the liberation of the commercial middle class from domination by a landholding aristocracy. But now capitalist democracy, in Laski's opinion, "could not, from its very nature, bring liberty into a just relation with equality." Nor could capitalism abandon private property as a central principle or motive. Meanwhile socialists had to face the fact that "A democracy must be led, and in a capitalist democracy the main weapons of leadership are in the hands of capitalists."17

The general intellectual dilemma, which was also Laski's, he put into broader context in *The Rise of European Liberalism* (1936). Unlike most Americans, who uncritically and unhistorically identified liberalism with positive government, Laski of course recognized liberalism's original skeptical, negative attitude toward social action and the way that it had favored individual innovation against social or political uniformity. Liberalism thus, in his interpretation, had had the flavor of romanticism and had tended to be subjective and anarchistic. Now, however, he stressed the old antithesis of liberty and equality. Though valuing certain gains it had achieved in the past, he argued that liberalism's progress had not been shared equally.18

During the thirties, in much the same way, Laski also revised his old pacifism. The pacifists, he believed, had to confront "the necessity of mastering imperialism or being mastered by it." They rightly insisted on the need for disarmament and international security to prevent war, but the answer lay in countering imperialism by social reform and in the development of the home market. Although socialism was no guarantee of peace, it offered the hope of "an equal world-community" and "economic world planning."19

These new developments in his thought found interesting application in Laski's attitude toward the American New Deal. His earlier experience in the United States had been disillusioning despite the extraordinary intellectual achievements: teaching at Harvard, his first books published, articles and reviews in prestigious periodicals. Laski, however, had returned to England in 1920 embittered by what he felt were unfair attacks on him personally for his defense of the Boston police strike. "I came back from America," he later wrote, "convinced that liberty has no meaning save in the context of equality." To his friend Frankfurter, he deplored American materialism and the weaknesses, La Follette excepted, of the presidential candidates in 1924 and '28. Rather surprisingly Laski, like Herbert Hoover, opposed government spending and pump priming as a cure for the economic depression. At the same time, he quickly came to share Frankfurter's admiration for Franklin D. Roosevelt.20
Although he affirmed his disbelief in heroes, it is clear that Laski liked FDR much better than the New Deal. To the socialist Laski, the latter was simply not radical enough in its economic program. Still, Russia apart, he contended that nothing quite equaled the adventure on which Roosevelt had embarked in his deliberate use of state powers. Even though he did not regard such measures as the National Recovery Act as really new, he suggested that Roosevelt was attempting to accomplish what the English Labourites had failed to achieve: a revolution by consent. Meanwhile FDR’s failure, he feared, would mean the end of political democracy in the United States. Although, in the long view, capitalism could not make the concessions necessary for the attainment of real democracy, Laski saw the emergence of the positive state in America as evidence of the maturity of capitalism. The positive state accordingly represented a new stage in historical development. And Laski, who had made his scholarly reputation with his attack on the sovereign state, now argued that a forthcoming socialism, close to the people, would be more libertarian than the state capitalism of Roosevelt’s New Deal. Although socialists, like all collectivists, could not logically oppose a strong state, Laski, despite the essential abandonment of his own classical-liberal, pluralist position, could in a curious way achieve a kind of intellectual halfway house by thinking of a future libertarian socialism as the successor of a capitalist statism.

Laski continued to be critical of some of Roosevelt’s political tactics, especially the plan to revamp the Supreme Court. And he admitted that the New Deal’s conservative opponents, to whom Laski was an anathema, had intellectual support from what he now regarded as the outmoded liberalism of the nineteenth century. As Herbert Deane noted, the radical thus found himself in agreement with extreme conservatives in insisting that the title “liberalism” belonged to the nineteenth-century political and economic views of such New Deal critics as the Liberty League. But any disposition on the part of Laski to waver in his backing of FDR was countered by his high regard for the American President as an essential bulwark to the rise of fascism in Europe. “In this grim and terrible world,” he told Roosevelt early in 1939, “you cannot easily imagine what a comfort your presence in the White House means to me. Let the dogs bark; you know that the caravan passes on.”

Laski’s book, _The American Presidency_, published a year later as he rejoiced in Roosevelt’s reelection to an unprecedented third term, was unsurprisingly a historical brief for stronger, more positive executive powers.

As late as the mid-thirties, Laski’s initial disposition in respect to foreign affairs, a relic of his earlier pacifism, was still to urge disarmament and American neutrality. In a letter to Frankfurter in October 1935, he passed on the bedside admonition of the dying Arthur Henderson, former Labour Foreign Minister. “Will you tell F.D.R.,” he wrote Frankfurter, “that nearly the last thing he said to me was that, the certainty that the United States would not help any belligerent next time, was one of the few hopes of peace.
He repeated that three times." But the news from Germany, Laski observed, "gets worse all the time—new streams of refugees." Although thoroughly alarmed now by Hitler's consolidation of power and the triumph of fascism in Spain, Laski, unlike such American friends as Frankfurter and Archibald MacLeish, was not ready to lay the blame on the isolationism and pacifism of the intellectuals and college youth—MacLeish's "irresponsible." The future for democratic government was grim, but no nation wanted war and no class wanted revolution. Both, however, sought ends that were difficult to achieve peacefully. Intellectuals could no longer afford the luxury of impartiality in the coming world struggle, but MacLeish, Laski believed, was wrong to pillory the younger generation for its finding that there was a discrepancy between official pronouncements and the reality of facts.23

In the spring of 1939, on the eve of the war, Laski was in America lecturing and traveling across the country. Much frightened at the prospect of another imperialistic world conflict, he urged Roosevelt to use his influence to "press the British government to hasten the completion of an Anglo-Soviet arrangement." Back home by the end of the summer, he wrote FDR that England was determined about the war, but, he added: "I do hope you will be able to keep America out." The United States should be in a position to offer a mediation consistent with international decency. "And it is more than ever vital to go on full steam ahead with the New Deal."24

In his wartime correspondence with the American President, Laski assumed that his own radical interest in democratic reforms was also Roosevelt's major concern. While the latter found Laski a convenient unofficial bridge to the British Labour leaders, he, in turn, wanted Roosevelt to push the Tory Prime Minister Winston Churchill toward the left. Roosevelt, he told Frankfurter, "is that rare thing, an aristocrat who understands democratic aspirations. Such a lot of the future turns on his power to communicate that understanding to Winston." Although each found the other useful, it is unlikely that either was deceived in their correspondence. Laski deeply admired both Churchill and FDR as war leaders, but after 1943, foreseeing victory, he returned to his prewar Marxist attacks on capitalism and the so-called negative freedoms of democracy.25

In the remaining few years of his life, following World War II, Laski was indeed the liberal manqué with scarcely a trace of the old libertarian individualism. State control of a planned economy was inevitable, while American capitalism would lead to a massive postwar depression. "Plan or Perish," he told an American audience. "There is no middle way. Free enterprise and the market economy mean war; socialism and planned economy mean peace. We must plan our civilization or we must perish." Laski's criticism of the United States, which culminated in his attack on American business and politics in his massive book, The American Democracy, published in 1948, was coupled with a defense of the Soviet Union. Thus he apologized for Stalin's dictatorship, the lack of civil liberties in the
Soviet Union, and Russian conduct in the Cold War. While Russia admittedly did not enjoy political democracy, Laski wrote that a Russian citizen would say: "Western exponents of 'classical' democracy ought sometimes to bear in mind that its institutions have application only in 'classical conditions.'"26

Although an increasingly doctrinaire socialist in the latter half of his life, Laski was not shrill or strident in his Marxism, and he continued to reject violent revolution. Ever the urbane, civilized English scholar in his manner, he remained an intellectual as well as a politician. Concern over equality and dislike of privilege were at the bottom of his abandonment of pluralism and classical liberalism. But he always retained a certain nostalgic libertarianism in his moral defense of the individual conscience against the dictates of the state. In his American Democracy, for example, he observed that Americans still accepted the old Puritan idea that a person could be made good by legislation. "And once there is a law which touches a theme from which men desire to escape, it is obvious that they will pay for their liberation."27

It was clear, however, that Laski no longer adhered to his original definition of liberty as the absence of restraint. In thus yielding the antistatist views on which he had built his scholarly reputation, he was unwilling to admit that collectivism would forge new constraints by its planned regulation of the economic system, constraints that would be impossible to reconcile with his old hope of eliminating the absolute sovereignty of the state.28 In the best classical sense therefore, Laski's lost liberalism was indeed a tragedy for libertarian thought.

NOTES


11. Ibid., p. 666.


13. Ibid., pp. 15, 17-18, 51, 55, 64, 77, 81.


24. Laski to Roosevelt, April 17, September 4, 1939, PPF 3014, Roosevelt Papers. See also Martin, Harold Laski, pp. 131-32.
25. Laski to Frankfurter, November 4, 1940; July 2, 1941; March 31, August 16, 1942, General Correspondence, Boxes 74, 75, Frankfurter Papers; Laski to Roosevelt, August 26, November 6, 1940; February 18, 1941; December 27, 1942; December 5, 1944, PPF 3014, Roosevelt Papers; Deane, *Political Ideas of Laski*, pp. 227-28. See also Laski, *Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time* (New York: Viking, 1943), passim; M.M. Kampelman, "Harold J. Laski: A Current Analysis," *Journal of Politics* 10 (February 1948): 131-54.

