FELIX MORLEY: AN OLD FASHIONED REPUBLICAN CRITIC OF STATISM AND INTERVENTIONISM*

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"It is a reality attested by all history that if a republic assumes imperial functions it will not remain a republic".11

Dr. Felix Morley, educator, scholar and author, has been a staunch defender of federalism, limited government and Jeffersonian Republicanism throughout his long and distinguished career. As editor of the Washington Post, he received a Pulitzer Prize for his writing. He became President of Haverford College in 1940, and during World War II he served on a number of government committees. A member of a family noted for literary accomplishment, Dr. Morley has been a news correspondent and a radio commentator, and is the author of many books and many more articles.

In The Power in the People (1949) and Freedom and Federalism (1959), Dr. Morley championed constitutionalism, decentralization and individual liberty. Freedom and Federalism was an almost neo-Calhounian defense of states rights and an attack on democratic nationalism and an activist foreign policy. As expounded by Morley, Jeffersonian Republicanism is "extreme", socially cautious and conservative, and anti-egalitarian; more the Jeffersonianism of Macon, Randolph and Taylor than that of Jefferson.12 With Frank C. Hanighen, once a liberal muckraker, Dr. Morley was editor of the Old Right weekly newsletter Human Events (for which Garet Garrett and Frank Chodorov also wrote). More recently, he has contributed to the conservative quarterly Modern Age, and the financial paper, Barron's Weekly, and has written an opinion column in the Nation's Business. From the later 1940s to the 1970s, Felix Morley has regularly expressed the libertarian and "isolationist" outlook characteristic of the Old Right. It is with Morley's dissent from the Cold War interventionist consensus that we will be concerned here.

MORLEY AS A CRITIC OF THE EMERGING EMPIRE

Already in 1944, Dr. Morley, as contributing editor of Human Events, began a vigorous and penetrating critique of the United States' imperial foreign policies. In "Pointing Towards Imperialism", in the fourth issue of Human Events, he assailed an Administration scheme to build an Arabian oil pipeline at public expense, a venture he viewed as reflecting a "strongly imperialistic" policy.13 Interior Secretary Ickes was selling the project to Congress as necessary — even then! — because of the alleged dread danger of America's running out of known oil reserves by 1958. Morley dismissed this argument, as well as the threat of "drastic gas rationing", asking instead what Secretary Ickes was doing promoting a project "as remote from the interior" of the U.S. as possible? Such involvement in the Middle East would embroil America in the Russo-British conflict over Iran (and elsewhere) as well as in the developing struggle between Arab nationalism and Zionism in Palestine. It was hardly coincidental that permanent conscription was also being urged upon the Congress. Before the Administration got the country "permanently involved in the perils of this Middle East entanglement", Congress should determine American petroleum policies, Morley concluded, a warning which seems timely enough today.

At the same time, Dr. Morley voiced

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criticism of America's new-found moral posture of "might makes right" and the violent excesses which inevitably accompanied it. In "Civilians and Civilization", also in Human Events, he wrote that the vehement public opposition to attempts by Vera Brittain and the Fellowship of Reconciliation to raise the issue of mass slaughter of German civilians from the air reflected "public uneasiness, both as to the methods utilized to win the war and as to the manner in which our tremendous national power may be employed when the war is over". Noting that mass terror bombing was militarily ineffective and, more importantly, morally degrading to those who employed it, Morley concluded that "the concept of Nationalism has first submerged and is now destroying the inheritance of a common Western Civilization", a civilization which had been based in large measure on the freely expressed opinions of civilians.

In a speech before the American Society of International Law in Washington, D.C., in April, 1944, Dr. Morley broadened his critique of official American attitudes toward power. Discussing the history of neutral rights during wartime and alluding to recent statements of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, he cautioned that the U.S. policy of pressuring neutrals for allowing their nationals to carry on activities which might indirectly aid our enemies could usher in undue interference with their affairs. Secretary Hull's policy seemed to bespeak "the growth of an American attitude which could be antagonistic to the orderly development of international law". "America First," he warned, "might, by 1945, come to possess a connotation very different from that which it had in 1940". While "an assertive American imperialism" could result from a power-oriented posture, Morley still believed in 1944 that it was not entirely likely. Our institutions, he wrote, were not suited to it. For Morley, America's merit lay not in her strength, but in the liberty which had made such material achievement possible. Indeed, our very strength might be our undoing: "The glory that was Greece can easily pass over into the far more ephemeral grandeur that was Rome". Morley recounted how the Melians had sought to remain neutral during the Peloponnesian War, and had said to the Athenians, "We see you are come to be judges in your own cause", when the Athenians massed their forces against Melos. Since we were, in 1944, engaged in a struggle against the equation of power and justice, for Morley it was all "the more imperative that history shall never record us among those who insist on being judges in their own cause".

A year later, Morley questioned another manifestation of the U.S. posture of "might makes right" — the Unconditional Surrender policy. Stressing the rarity of such a demand in international affairs, he observed that "Good sense... is often shouted down in wartime". In addition to the burden of administering Germany after an unconditional capitulation, there were the effects on the victor society. "Before a people can exact unconditional surrender from the enemy they must themselves be prepared to surrender unconditionally to the wartime practices of their own government". Even if this were preferable to foreign dictation, "complete subordination of the individual to the State is a heavy price to pay for victory in a society based on the principle that government is made for man, not man for government". Moving from the moral to the practical realm, Morley warned that only the Soviet Union would stand to gain from forcing capitulation upon Germany. The policy was both a moral and a practical disaster.

In a very bitter piece, "The Return to Nothingness", Morley commented on the outstanding U.S. atrocity of World War II, the use of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In reply to the implicit equation of Pearl Harbor and the bombing of Japan, he wrote that at Pearl Harbor casualties were "for the most part confined to men who had voluntarily enlisted", whereas the victims at Hiroshima were civilians — "like ourselves, merely the helpless instruments of the ruthless Moloch of Totalitarian Government". Hence, Hiroshima was "an equally infamous act of revenge", perhaps "ethically the more shameful". We had paid a terrible price for victory in "loss of ideals" and "spiritual desolation", seen "in the miserable farce put...
on by those who try to reconcile mass murder of 'enemy children' with lip service to the doctrine that God created all men in his image'. Some kind of atonement was called for, inasmuch as the atomic bomb was "a weapon different in kind" and degree — an encroachment "of the innermost mystery of the universe". The Bomb set us "hopelessly adrift", without ethical restraints. In Thomist terms such a pass invited a return to nothingness. A society in which the State could control such a force naturally "shifts to insect values — 'full employment' or 'security' within the meticulously organized anthill of the expanding State". Morley ended on a question: "We have won the war. Now what is our purpose for the Power we control?"

**MORLEY AS COLD WAR CRITIC**

As the Cold War took shape out of the ashes of the Second Global Bloodbath (to borrow a term from a "broad revisionist"), Morley became less confident that America would avoid imperialism. As early as December, 1944, he commented pessimistically on the crisis in Greece. Accepting the premise that the Soviet Union took an active interest in the spread of communism as such, a contention later revisionist historians would dispute, Morley, though himself a firm philosophical opponent of communism, pointed out some inconsistencies in the British suppression of the Greek revolution. The British had to somehow prove "to a large number of individual Greeks that while they were 'patriots' to resist a German puppet government they become 'gangsters' if they oppose a British puppet government". As a consequence, many Greeks would naturally ask why not a puppet government "of the Russian pattern"? The disintegration of civilized society caused by war itself, created fertile soil for communism, and desperate people everywhere could be expected to embrace it. Morley offered no easy solution to this dilemma.

A little over a year later, in a piece contrasting "Imperialism and Americanism", Dr. Morley surveyed some straws in the wind. For one thing, the U.S. Government was revealing its imperial pretensions by its refusal to genuinely demobilize now that the World War was ended. Instead, discontented citizens were still stationed abroad in large numbers, causing a major drain on real economic productivity. "From shirts to shelter", Morley observed, "we are failing to meet domestic needs, let alone those of the Tagalogs, Hotten-tots and Yugoslavs". In addition to our vague and far-flung commitments, came another attack on neutrality, this time by Spruille Braden, a recent U.S. Ambassador to Argentina, who was denouncing an unnamed "typically fascist" regime in the hemisphere. Unfortunately, Braden's outburst was typical of U.S. official attitudes. At a time when yet another U.S. Administration busies itself worrying over the internal affairs of other nations, Morley's comments of 1946 take on added meaning. "With pronounced self-righteousness, at best not a lovable characteristic, we are rapidly establishing ourselves as the world's greatest moralizer on the subject of the conduct of other governments". This posture might "succeed" in some sense, but only if uniformly applied, consistently adhered to, and backed by the people. Behind "a blustering foreign policy" must be "a general will to back official pretension with military force". To Morley, the GI demonstrations abroad and strikes at home showed that the people cared neither for the peacetime conscription nor the economic hardships which imperialism, to be successful in its own terms, would require. America was moving, he concluded, perhaps too optimistically, "toward a showdown between these advocates of Imperialism and those who intend to keep America a country in which men are raised as citizens instead of as subjects".

With much of the public cowed by official propaganda and convinced that the "lessons" of Munich and Pearl Harbor proved the necessity of U.S. intervention throughout the world, a real debate over foreign policy scarcely took place. Only a handful of Old Right stalwarts, including Garet Garrett, Congressman Howard Buffett, Frank Chodorov, Lawrence Dennis and Dr. Morley, took the risk of presenting an "isolationist" or noninterventionist viewpoint. In March, 1947, a week
before the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, Morley wrote in *Human Events* that the American people were "confronting a political decision more momentous than any presented to them since 1776". We had to choose whether to remain a Republic or "become an empire by assuming responsibility for dependencies which Great Britain can no longer control". Our institutions would change fundamentally if we took the latter course. "It is a reality attested by all history", Morley stated, "that if a republic assumes imperial functions it will not remain a republic". The British Empire was dissolving, and its dissolution would be hastened by the development of domestic collectivism in Britain. Our response was not clear. To pay for British operations in Greece would create tension and increase the risk of war with Russia. Further, inflation, high taxation and permanent conscription lay ahead if we stepped in. Above all other dangers, we would transform "our Federal Republic into a strongly-centralized empire". The Constitution would be in abeyance. Yet the alternative — a Mediterranean Sea and southern Europe under Soviet domination — was highly disturbing. Whether our leaders, on their past record which included a bankrupt and "vindictive policy of 'unconditional surrender'", could be relied on to resolve the problem effectively was a real question. Once again, Morley did not present an answer, emphasizing merely that the issue was one of empire.

As U.S. policy under the Truman Doctrine escalated far beyond the localized conflict in Greece, Morley, as a critic of interventionism, became a good deal less restrained. In March, 1948, he launched a blistering and bitter attack on the whole of America's Cold War foreign policies. American policy supposedly based on "world responsibility" had in fact achieved nothing at all, Morley asserted, other than to "throw our weight "Actually", he wrote, "the Administration is now concentrating on preparation for another war, in which there is much to indicate that we would be the aggressor". Such a preventive war would be a confession of moral bankruptcy and could lead to ruin. Attacking intervention and the conscription it required, Morley wrote that "[t]he lives of our youth are not the property of the State, to throw on a rubbish heap in Korea or Yugoslavia as some brass hat may ordain". We were a decent people, and before we were "conscripted for the war that nobody wants, an accurate accounting of governmental performance is in order".

Essaying such an accounting, Morley charged President Truman with giving Manchuria and northern Korea to Russia, with politically motivated concessions to Zionists with regard to Palestine, with leading America into the futile United Nations organization. Finally, he wrote:

> it was Truman who personally indorsed the two cold-blooded atrocities by which America destroyed all of its moral supremacy in the last war — the atomic bombing of Nagasaki, after Japan was licked; and the Nuremburg trials, a travesty of justice accomplished in concert with a government which the President himself now indicts as a menace to American institutions.

No one could uncritically accept Administration claims to be working for peace in the light of this record.

The United Nations was defunct as a real force for peace, Morley stated, aborted by those "who, defying everything in the American tradition, attempted to base world peace on a concept of power politics. As *Human Events* has often pointed out, the United Nations was in theory nothing more than an alliance of Great Powers, set up to dominate the world". When the two superpowers failed to get along, the U.N. proved useless.

Recent experience showed, Morley believed, that "the so-called isolationists were essentially right".

> They knew that America can run its own affairs reasonably well. They knew that in pontifically declaiming on the world stage we would be likely to prove ourselves blundering fools.

Our political system, our Federal Republic, was "based on foregoing the path of empire, on developing those private ventures in which American genius is brilliant. . . ." Attacking Harry Truman directly, Morley exploded:

> It is not unnatural for a ward politician to be President of the United States. But it becomes grotesque when a man of parochial outlook, inferior training and deficient ability attempts to push a reluctant people down the dangerous road of imperial rule."
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It was a bitter realization to see that America "during the past few years, has led the world in smashing the fabric of civilization"; we had not merely dismantled German factories, but "the whole structure of American ideals". As for the struggle against communism, Morley, like his fellow Old Right publicist Frank Chodorov, believed that it should take place first and foremost "in the realm of mind and spirit, saving conscripted bodies as a last and forlorn hope". A year before the ratification of the NATO treaty, Morley argued that while European unity was a good thing, it should not be turned into "a military alliance" with America and against the communist bloc. The Marshall Plan, he observed gloomily, had become "a program for subsidizing and even arming Western Europe as a fringe of imperial outposts"; it was no longer aimed at the economic recovery of Europe. Our leaders' proclivity for solutions based on power was leading us to war. Without a revival of American ideals we could plunge to our doom.

A JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICAN CRITIQUE

Despite the efforts of a divided and fragmented opposition, which included figures to the Left and the Right of official policymakers, postwar U.S. foreign policy continued along the interventionist path — if anything, at greater speed than before. Dr. Morley elaborated his fundamentally Jeffersonian critique in a speech delivered before the Conservative Society of Yale Law School in November, 1954. Discussing "Conservatism and Foreign Policy", he sketched out the need for a critical conservatism which rested on a genuine belief in free competition in society. After spelling out the content of his essentially libertarian brand of conservatism, Morley set forth a conservative libertarian position on foreign policy. He started from the premise that the American Constitution does not locate final sovereignty in any branch of government, and observed that this lack of an arbitrary element in the State made U.S. foreign policy more uncertain than that of a State whose functionaries are less subject to control by opinion and institutional checks. But this was all to the good. The Constitution was for Morley an essentially "isolationist" document, and the relative "isolationism" we had practised in the 18th and 19th centuries was demanded by the character of our government. The Founding Fathers had "feared that an active foreign policy would concentrate too much power in the hands of the President".

The Monroe Doctrine, which prohibited European intervention in the Americas and pledged the United States not to interfere in the affairs of Europe, was an expression, Morley thought, of our moderate and somewhat "isolationist" foreign policy. But, he wrote, our government had long since "discarded the self-denying feature" of the doctrine, as exemplified by FDR's proclamation that Iceland was a part of the Western hemisphere subject to our protection against German raiders — a declaration made while we were still at peace with Germany. On the other hand, we still cleaved to the "self-asserting" part of the doctrine as "camouflage for our own self-interest". Morley asserted that our foreign policy was thus no longer based on principle, but on "military and financial strength", saying "I can find no principle broad enough to explain why we should take both Fascist Franco and Communist Tito... to our breast as allies".

When our policy was based on principle, it had been "isolationist", for the principle at the base of the Constitution had been stated at the Constitutional Convention by Charles Pinckney of South Carolina who said: "Conquest or superiority among Powers is not, or ought not ever to be, the object of republican systems". Such superiority was a goal of present policy, Morley declared. He doubted we could prove Pinckney wrong by running "an Empire under Republican forms" — something Rome had been unable to do. "Our foreign policy", he continued, "is now by every impartial test imperial". Imperial centralization, forbidden by the Constitution, especially the Tenth Amendment, must follow such a policy.

The great revenue necessary for the conduct of an imperial policy would drain funds from the states and localities, some of which they
might get back — strings attached — as federal aid. In addition, the system of imperial alliances made governmental secrecy inevitable. Agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency and the Atomic Energy Commission “operate in the deepest secrecy”, and Congress “tends to become more and more of a rubber stamp for undisclosed executive policy”. People and Congress waned in the face of a growing executive bureaucracy.

America’s organic law went against this sort of centralization, yet our imperial role in the world demanded it. Something must give way. “To my way of thinking”, Morley pessimistically predicted, “it is our republican institutions, rather than our imperial policy, which will be modified”. The odd theory of bipartisanship had been advanced to eliminate real criticism of executive conduct of foreign affairs. To take it seriously was to say that the people should have no concern over how they are governed; in which case, we were “ripe for dictatorship”. As an anticommunist, Morley expressed concern over what he viewed as a genuine Soviet threat, but expressed even greater concern over the tendency of our imperial policies to undermine our classical liberal, republican institutions.

Almost three years later, well after the greater part of the Right Wing had gone over to anticommunist interventionism with a vengeance, Morley returned to his Old Right theme of Republic versus Empire. Writing in the first issue of Modern Age, the conservative quarterly, in the summer of 1957, he focused on the danger of a permanent war economy. We had reached a point, he wrote, where “we have a vested interest in preparation for war”. We needed an external threat, for as long as the people and Congress believed in such a threat, Congress would continue voting unlimited appropriations for “defense”. This dovetailed nicely with a major tenet of Welfare State orthodoxy: Full Employment, and the duty of the State to provide it. Defense spending directly caused a massive expansion of the “hard goods”, or capital goods, industries. “If business is good in those industries”, Morley observed, “it will be good throughout the nation as a whole”. (An Austrian economic analysis, of course, would sort things out a bit more.) The result was that:

our whole economy now is geared to preparation for war, and if we stopped preparing for war the effect on the economy would be disastrous.

Eventually, the situation would right itself after a stoppage of defense spending, but much hardship would exist in the interim. The people had been encouraged “to expect continuous prosperity” by their leaders and surely would throw out those who were responsible for their difficulties. Other spending could take up the slack and postpone a reckoning, but no other form of spending was so easy to get through Congress as defense — a point the astute “isolationist” writer John T. Flynn had also made many times.

Our addiction to defense spending was evidenced by our reluctance to talk seriously with the Soviets on disarmament. Our representatives “ignore the force and logic of the Soviet position”, dismissing them as liars. “Such an attitude is barren of any promise for improvement in this international situation”.

Again Morley raised the issue of our federal system versus our imperial conduct. A government seeking the “superiority among Powers” that Charles Pinckney had condemned had to have sufficient rein to formulate a moment-to-moment, flexible foreign policy. To do this in a system such as ours, it had to deceive public opinion continually.

The centralization flowing from imperialism meant that more and more problems were being handled at the national level. But such centralization, growing up in a formally federal and representative system, meant that “we are losing the substance of self-government”, Morley wrote:

The larger the numbers involved, the more certain it is that the will of the majority becomes unascertainable, and is therefore interpreted in specific terms by a very small number of leaders who count on the apathy of the mass to accept their definition.

Under the rubric of democracy, “a self-perpetuating managerial elite” could arise, giving all the verbal professions of faith in democracy necessary. Such were the results of an imperial policy that denied its own name. Morley reiterated his thesis that the federal,
republican structure must give way to the necessities of an imperial policy. The alternative was, of course, to abandon the path of empire. Either course would bring foreign and domestic policy into greater consistency with one another, and either might be preferable to the present uneasy reality of public dishonesty. "[O]ur political scientists", he wrote, "should face the issue squarely".

FREEDOM AND FEDERALISM

Dr. Morley's most complete exposition of his political ideas came with the publication of Freedom and Federalism in 1959. Here he set forth the connections between democracy, centralization and empire; here he once again defended a Jeffersonian alternative consisting of republicanism, federalism, decentralization and nonintervention. Constitutional government, and its ongoing subversion by democracy and empire, were the book's twin themes.

There is not time to summarize Dr. Morley's fascinating survey of American constitutional and institutional history, except to call attention to the remarkable similarity of his interpretations to those of historian Arthur A. Ekirch in The Decline of American Liberalism. For our purposes, Chapter 8 of Freedom and Federalism, "Democracy and Empire", is most important. Morley distinguished two major causes for the decline of classical liberal constitutionalism in the United States. First, the reformers, while initially seeking only to "prevent the abuse of power where already centralized", end up crying that "there 'oughta be a law'". Believing in the volonté générale of Jean Jacques Rousseau — Morley's bête noire — the reformers equate their own will with this "common good", turning to a strengthened bureaucracy to carry it out.

While a major problem in its own right, this "Ralph Nader syndrome", as we might call it today, has not been the chief cause of centralized statism in American history. No, for Morley, the primary destroyer has been just what a classical liberal would suspect: war. Here, Morley, however conservative he may be in temperament, parts company with today's establishment conservatives, whose obsession with communism blinds them to the evils of war and intervention. (Indeed, war and intervention have to a great extent become their sacred cows.) A Morley puts it, "power is most easily centralized by war, or by the expectation of war".

Remarking a paradox to which other writers have recently called attention, Morley writes that "every war in which the United States has been engaged was both immediately preceded by a political flowering of democratic theory and immediately productive of centralization". By "democracy" Morley clearly means the Rousseauian tradition of "virtuous unitary statism" which is so antithetical to the republican federalism of the Constitution. The close connection between "democracy" with an active interfering state at home and interference abroad has been noted by many classical liberal observers, including Herbert Spencer.

As Morley unkindly observes, it was, after all, the Jeffersonian party itself, which, once safely in power, gave us 'Mr. Madison's War' complete with "a national debt, a national bank, a high protective tariff and certainly a great impetus for the strongly centralizing Supreme Court decisions of Chief Justice Marshall". While the so-called Jacksonian movement was many-sided, one side of course emphasizing a laissez faire liberal economic program, its strongly democratic side also ran in the direction of unitary Nationalism — as seen in the conflicts leading to the Nullification crisis. And, Morley adds, the imperialist War with Mexico can be viewed as symptomatic of both slavery expansionism and democracy. (Strict constructionists in the South, like Alexander Stephens, opposed the war with logical consistency.)

Democratic theory led to the question: if the people rule, what harm can come from powerful government? By 1860, a Northern majority was prepared to fight for the principle of centralized democratic statism, destroying the evil institution of slavery in the process, but probably for the wrong reasons, and destroying much else besides. The war shook federalism tremendously, but more quakes were to come. They came from the efforts of great centralizers and democrats like Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson.
The theory of democracy had no logical limits, writes Morley, and required extending throughout the world in the minds of its advocates. Cuba must be freed from Spain and Spain's possessions made U.S. colonial wards. Soon we could "justify the suppression of the Filipinos"; "[T]he private enslavement of Negroes was ended. The public control of alien populations had begun". Soon we were in limits, writes Morley, and required extending these were "years in which the country moved simultaneously towards democracy and towards imperialism". The income tax was but one measure which was "democratic" and imperial. Great ventures could be sustained, great demagogy indulged in.

The very "general will" to escape the Depression helped push America into World War II, and Korea showed the degree of centralization previous wars had caused; one man had, on his own motion, precipitated Congress and people into another bloody conflict far away. Assessing the situation as of 1959, Morley, ever cautious, did not describe the U.S. as an empire, but as a Republic with increasingly imperial burdens, attitudes and policies. The chief features of American imperialism were alliances abroad, subsidization of allies militarily and economically, "hostility to the theory of neutrality" (which Morley had noted in the 1940s), the idea that "there should be no political debate over foreign policy", and, finally, a tendency "to dilate in grandiose terms about [the empire's] blessings for mankind".[201]

For Morley, all these things threatened true liberal values of self-government and federalism and freedom, and enhanced only the State, which he had once termed "a cold-blooded instrumentality of power".[201] We stand in his debt for his sustained and consistent critique of state interference at home and abroad. Our only criticism today, if any, might be merely that Dr. Morley has perhaps erred on the side of moderation too many times. His concluding remarks on "Democracy and Empire" are so timely that they deserve quotation in full and require little amplification:

There is widespread recognition that the national talent is not imperial and that an extremely large number of people all over the globe are more disposed to dislike than to admire our much-vaunted "American Way". As problems of every sort increase at home we realize that what happens to Israel or Ethiopia is not our first concern. And this is not to be called a rebirth of "isolationism", but rather a recognition that federalism, even if we misname it democracy, is not adapted or adaptable to the path of empire.[221]

NOTES

1. Felix Morley, "The Twilight of An Empire", Human Events, IV, 10 (March 5, 1947), p. 3.
5. Felix Morley, "Judges In Our Own Cause", Vital Speeches, X, 16 (June 1, 1944), pp. 499–502. The speech was delivered April 29, 1944 (p. 501).
8. Felix Morley, "Portent in Greece", Human Events, I, 46 (December 13, 1944), pp. 1–4. In the 1940s it was widely assumed that Stalin actively supported the Greek Left, first the target of British and, later, U.S. intervention. Recent accounts call this into question. See, for example, Constantine Tsoucalas, The Greek Tragedy (Baltimore, 1969), p. 94, and Richard J. Barnet, Intervention and Revolution (New York, 1972), pp. 111–112.
15. See, for example, J. Bernard Burnham, "What Liberals Don't Understand About Vietnam", National Review, XXIII, 3 (January 26, 1971), pp. 77–80, a defense of interventionism scarcely rivaled anywhere since.
17. Ibid., pp. 101–102. For two recent essays which stress the surprising connections between democracy, empire and war from somewhat different perspectives, see William F. Marina, *Egalitarianism and Empire* (Menlo Park, Ca., 1975) and Robert J. Brosler, *The Ideology of the Executive State* (Menlo Park, Ca., 1974).